Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy: Priorities for the 2015 NSS
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JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY The next National Security Strategy Written evidence Contents Dr David Blagden, University of Cambridge – written evidence ............................................................ 2 David L Bowen – written evidence ....................................................................................................... 26 Cabinet Office – written evidence ........................................................................................................ 27 Campaign Against Arms Trade – written evidence ............................................................................... 29 Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament – written evidence ..................................................................... 32 Conciliation Resources – written evidence ........................................................................................... 36 Dr Rory Cormac – written evidence ...................................................................................................... 41 A Defence & Strategy Research Group – written evidence .................................................................. 43 Professor Andrew M Dorman, Centre for British Defence and Security Studies, King’s College London – written evidence ................................................................................................................................ 52 James Flint – written evidence ............................................................................................................. 56 The Foundation for Information Policy Research ................................................................................. 61 Dr Jamie Gaskarth – written evidence .................................................................................................. 65 Global Sustainability Institute – written evidence ................................................................................ 70 Institute for Conflict, Co-operation and Security, University of Birmingham – written evidence ....... 72 Dr Victor Madeira, Senior Fellow, The Institute for Statecraft – written evidence .............................. 80 Dr Tim Oliver – written evidence .......................................................................................................... 87 Oxford Research Group – written evidence ......................................................................................... 92 Population Matters ............................................................................................................................... 99 Saferworld – written evidence ............................................................................................................ 102 Scientists for Global Responsibility (SGR) – written evidence ............................................................ 108 Dr Daniel Stevens (University of Exeter) & Dr Nick Vaughan-Williams (University of Warwick) – written evidence ................................................................................................................................. 112 Transparency International UK, International Defence & Security Programme – written evidence . 117 Dr David Blagden, University of Cambridge – written evidence Dr David Blagden, University of Cambridge – written evidence Written Evidence to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy: Priorities for the 2015 NSS Executive Summary Multipolarity – a situation of multiple great powers – is returning to the international system, as new great powers rise through the convergence growth produced by post-Cold War economic globalization. Such dynamics of relative rise and decline tend to produce major power competition and conflict incentives, with the potential to cause war unless other factors intervene. In light of the destructive potential of major power conflict, which dwarfs that of other contemporary security concerns such as terrorism, guarding against it should be the prime focus of UK national security strategy (and at least receive more attention than found in the 2010 NSS): it need not be imminent – or even particularly likely – to still qualify as the greatest danger, now that it is no longer wholly inconceivable, given its severity. While Western major powers in general are in decline vis-à-vis the rising ‘BRICs’, Britain’s economic outlook is actually relatively positive by European standards: so within Western Europe, the UK may actually qualify as a rising power, which will impact both the security benefits and burdens that we encounter in the years ahead. Within Western Europe, interstate peace is reinforced by an array of strategic, normative, cultural, and institutional factors – however, the negative consequences of the return of great power competition in the wider world will still impact the European and UK security environments, in five key ways. 1. The resurgence of Russia: globalization-driven growth has given Russia the military wherewithal – which may expand further, if global oil prices recover – to go with its political incentives to weaken NATO, particularly around its borders. As such, there is once again a hostile major power threat in Europe that poses a territorial threat to our allies, will likely seek to coerce us militarily, and is already confronting NATO forces in a way that creates a danger of potentially- unintended escalation. 2. The US ‘pivot’ to Asia: the resurgence of Russia would not otherwise be a serious security concern for the UK, except for the fact that the defence of Europe is no longer the United States’ principal strategic concern, focused as it is on balancing China. As such, European states – the UK foremost amongst them – will increasingly have to carry the burden of supplying European security and balancing Russia. 3. International military crises: under US unipolarity, the United States could pacify all other major power relationships by threatening to defeat one or – if necessary – both parties to a conflict, thus rendering aggression futile. Under multipolarity, by contrast, this is no longer the case – and both rising and declining powers may have reason to instigate crises to advance their interests. 2 Dr David Blagden, University of Cambridge – written evidence 4. Vulnerable sea lines of communication (SLOCs): a key manifestation of the return of great power competition is likely to be additional maritime contestation in areas essential to our economic viability as an import-dependent island power reliant on seaborne energy and raw materials, including the Northeast Atlantic, Persian Gulf, and Suez region. Such threats to SLOCs could compel UK involvement in a crisis. 5. Nuclear proliferation risks: a world of multiple competing major powers is likely to be one in which many states are attracted by the deterrent and coercive leverage provided by nuclear weapons. At the very least, this will create an unconducive environment for nuclear disarmament efforts – and possibly worse. These security threats in turn point towards the incorporation of five core principles by the 2015 NSS. 1. We must prioritise threats based on their relative danger, rather than just likelihood – which in practice means devoting more effort to hedging against powerful hostile states than has been the norm since 1989. 2. We must not conflate threats to global human security with threats to UK national security. 3. We must not mistake international activism for national security: status is not the same thing as safety. 4. We must emphasise deterrence, containment, and the preservation of national strength by eschewing low-priority commitments that lack a strong national security rationale. 5. We must preserve a balanced military capability set – even if that looks inefficient in the short term. These core principles can, in turn, be used to derive implications for the following specific policy areas (discussed in order): resourcing national security, nuclear deterrence, choice of grand-strategic posture, cyber deterrence, SLOC protection, prioritisation of regional commitments, nuclear proliferation policy, responses to terrorism, humanitarian intervention, responding to climate-/resource-induced conflict, and alliance policy. Certain key caveats are also in order: the BRICs’ current economic slowdown could turn into a more permanent stall or reversal of their rise, and the UK could choose self-defeating policies that weaken our strategic position. Introduction 1. The purpose of this evidence submission is to address the question of the UK’s national security priorities out to 2035, so as to inform the 2015 UK National Security Strategy (NSS) and the subsequent Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR). It does this by discussing the security implications of – and appropriate UK strategic responses to – the return of great power competition to the international system: a consequence of the ongoing relative economic rise of the so-called ‘BRICs’ (Brazil, Russia, India, and China). It recognises that this is not the only national security concern that the UK faces in the next two decades – but it will make the case that it is by far and away the most important. Post- 3 Dr David Blagden, University of Cambridge – written evidence Cold War international politics has been shaped profoundly by the absence of great power competition: a product of the United States’ unmatched and unprecedented economic and military preponderance between 1989 and today. The freedom that Britain has enjoyed