TAMING THE HYDRA: HOW TO RESIST KREMLIN’S INFORMATION AGGRESSION
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR INFORMATION POLICY Kyiv – 2018 TAMING THE HYDRA: HOW TO RESIST KREMLIN’S INFORMATION AGGRESSION RECOMMENDATIONS FOR INFORMATION POLICY
This analytical publication was compiled by NGO Internews Ukraine with the support of the European Union and the International Renaissance Foundation within the framework of the Civic Synergy Project and under the auspices of the Ukrainian National Platform of the Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum. Its content is the exclusive responsibility of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union and the International Renaissance Foundation.
This project is funded by the European Union.
Kyiv – 2018 002
Initiative group (Internews Ukraine) Latvia (Baltic Centre for Media Excellence). Andriy Kulakov — Ukrainian media Author of number of reports on psychological expert, PR consultant, programme director operations, Kremlin propaganda, and media of Internews Ukraine NGO. Editor and in EaP region, Central Europe and Balkans. co-author of “The Reforms Guide” and “Words and Wars: Ukraine Facing Kremlin Igor Solovey — Ukrainian journalist Propaganda” publications. covering international issues, the head of international department at LB.ua. Volodymyr Yermolenko — Ukrainian Media expert, consultant of “How Russian philosopher and journalist, director of Propaganda Works” publication. European projects at Internews Ukraine NGO, editor in chief at UkraineWorld.org, Vitalii Moroz — Head of New Media at journalist at Hromadske.ua. Editor in chief of Internews Ukraine NGO. Responsible for “Words and Wars: Ukraine Facing Kremlin strategy planning and implementation of new Propaganda.” technology and media projects. Oversees programs aimed to promote digital security, Vitalii Rybak — coordinator of EU-related fact-checking, Internet freedom and digital projects at Internews Ukraine, analyst at rights for journalists and civil society. UkraineWorld.org, co-author of “Words and Wars: Ukraine Facing Kremlin Propaganda” Pavlo Belousov — expert of Internews book, contributor to Ukraine Alert (Atlantic Ukraine NGO, consultant of Digital Security Council) and Ukraine Verstehen (Zentrum School 380. Liberale Moderne). Peer reviewer Expert group Ihor Rozkladay — lawyer of the Centre Tetiana Popova — Ukrainian media expert, for Democracy and Rule of Law (CEDEM), blogger, Advisor to the Minister of Defense leading expert of the “Media Reform” group of Ukraine (2014-2015); Deputy Minister of of the Reanimation Package of Reforms, Information policy of Ukraine (2015-2016); member of the Independent Media Council. strategic communication expert at Information Security NGO, managing partner at Arena Media Expert (Havas group). Editor Kateryna Kruk — Ukrainian Volodymyr Yermolenko communications specialist and political scientist focusing on Ukrainian post-Maidan Translators transition, international affairs and analyzing Valeria Mendez, Lesia Dubenko Russian disinformation campaigns in Ukraine. She is an external fellow at European Values Literary editor Kremlin Watch program and an analyst at Jacob Fawcett Stop Fake. Design Roman Shutov — Ukrainian political Nadiya Machkarina-Mykhailichenko scientist and media expert, Advisor of the EED Content Fund. In 2014-18, worked in Illustrations think tanks in Ukraine (Detector Media) and Artem Mykhailichenko 003 TABLE OF CONTENTS 004 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY • More Personnel and Resources • Monitoring Efficiency of Public Policy 006 HOW WE MADE THIS DOCUMENT • Public and Cultural Diplomacy • Work in the East and South of Ukraine 008 PROBLEM DESCRIPTION: • Work with Technical Giants WEAPONIZING INFORMATION • Cooperation with Civil Society • Support for International Journalists 014 RESPONSE: DE-WEAPONIZING INFORMATION 032 WHAT SHOULD UKRAINE’S PARLIAMENT DO? 015 RECOMMENDATIONS • Legislation on Countering Information Threats 015 WHAT SHOULD THE INTERNATIONAL • Support for Public Broadcasting COMMUNITY DO? • Equal Access to Media • Understanding the Threat and Addressing It 034 WHAT SHOULD EU INSTITUTIONS DO? 017 WHAT SHOULD NATIONAL • Act, Not Just Study PARLIAMENTS DO? • Development of the East Stratcom • Media Transparency, especially Online TaskForce • Transparency of Political and Information • Focus on Information Issues in the EU – Campaigns Ukraine Dialogue • Legislation on Hate Speech and • Common Digital Space Disinformation • Eastern Partnership • EU Programs 020 WHAT SHOULD THE NATIONAL • European Convention on Transfrontier GOVERNMENTS DO? Television • National Information Security Strategies • Sanctions against Information 037 WHAT SHOULD CIVIL SOCIETY Influence Agents AND MEDIA DO? • Branding Russia’s State “Media” • Identify Agents of Information Influence • Follow the Money • Strengthening Democratic Narratives • Media Literacy • Self-regulation and Co-regulation • Fact-checking 026 WHAT SHOULD UKRAINE DO? • Primary Approach: Explain, Do Not Lie 040 CONCLUSIONS
026 WHAT SHOULD PRESIDENTIAL ADMINISTRATION AND GOVERNMENT DO? • Information Security Doctrine • Coordination Among Key Institutions 004
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This publication is a follow-up to the book “Words and Wars: Ukraine Facing Kremlin Propaganda”1 which Internews Ukraine published in 2017 with the support of the EU/IRF Civic Synergy Project. While in “Words and Wars” we aimed at describing the challenge of Russian information warfare with regard to Ukraine, in this publication we discuss what to do about it. Since this question has become increasingly urgent worldwide, it is important for us to give a perspective based upon Ukrainian experience.
In this publication we argue that: • Russia is using information as a tool of domination and warfare; this conclusion can be made from both analyzing Russia’s official documents and monitoring its information practices; • In a situation when information is increasingly weaponized, national governments and parliaments, as well as international community should search for ways to de-weaponize it when it is used with malevolent purposes; • As security and disarmament were the key principles of Helsinki process in 1970s, which became a milestone for European security, it is important to pursue an approach of disarmament in the information field, i.e. of fighting against aggressive disinformation practices in the information area; • This “info-disarmament” should take into account that the tools used by the Russian information warfare are extremely flexible.
In this regard we address our policy recommendations to the international community as such, to national governments and parliaments, to Ukrainian government and parliament, to civil society (both national and international) and to EU institutions.
We advise national governments and parliaments to: • Increase the transparency of media, in particular online media, which can ensure that the traceability of malign influences, and that information resources are held accountable; • Increase the transparency of political and information campaigns, especially during the election period; ensure that internet platforms make the technologies providing for this transparency accessible worldwide; • Increase legislative action against the conscious spread of disinformation and information manipulation; • Increase legislative action against hate speech, in particular systematic hate speech on Russian information resources; • Adopt information security strategies and implement them at the national level; • Impose sanctions (travel ban and asset freeze) on actors of information warfare; • Impose sanctions on Russian “media” companies that violate previous sanction regimes (i.e. the Russian “media” companies that took over Ukrainian media frequencies in Crimea or Donbas);
1 https://ukraineworld.org/articles/infowars 005
• Impose special branding requirements on Russian state-owned “media” (requiring them to disclose that they are “funded by Russian government”); • Better do the “follow the money” research, i.e. checking sources suspected in spreading disinformation, hate speech, with regard to their funding; • Proceed more systematically with media literacy, not only in formal but also in informal and non-formal education.
We advise the Ukrainian government and parliament to: • Always follow the approach of telling the truth and explaining. Avoid any temptations to bend the truth; • Fully implement the Ukrainian “information security doctrine”; • Ensure stable coordination of key public institutions with regard to information security issues; create a government office that would monitor, analyze and respond to information attacks; • Provide more personnel and resources to these institutions; • Monitor the efficacy of public policy with regard to measures already taken in order to improve their efficacy in the future; • Work with technical giants (such as Facebook, Twitter, and Google) to establish partnerships which will take into account Ukrainian concerns; • Cooperate with civil society on fact checking, monitoring and naming the agents of malign information influencers; • Facilitate the work of international journalists covering the Ukrainian issues; • Adopt legislation taking into account security concerns, but also ensuring fundamental rights and freedoms; • Increase support of public broadcasting; • Ensure equal access to media, including the oligarchic media.
We also advise the EU to: • Inject more resources into the EU East StratCom TaskForce; • Cooperate with national teams (both government and non-government) working to debunk disinformation and analyze malignant Russian information influence; • Cooperate with non-EU teams (including from Eastern Partnership states) working in this area; • Make the fight against information warfare a priority within the Eastern Partnership, in particular the EuroNEST Parliamentary Assembly; • Ensure more EU-Ukraine cooperation under the aegis of Ukraine’s integration into the EU digital market; • Use EU programs (mostly education and research) to ensure better media literacy education and better research into information threats; • Use other European instruments (like the European Convention on Transfrontier Television) as a tool to pressure Russia.
We advise civil society and the media to: • Implement projects identifying agents of information influence “Naming( and shaming”); • Contribute to strengthening democratic narratives; • Proceed with more self-regulation and co-regulation, so that the government can adopt initiatives coming from the sector itself; • Enlarge fact checking practices throughout media and society in general. 006
HOW WE MADE THIS DOCUMENT
This paper is based upon Ukraine’s experience of facing Russian information warfare, placed into a global context. For the international audience, this document may be useful because it explains how Ukrainian experts have come up with solutions to problems which Ukraine began to face earlier than many other countries in the world — but which have since become global. For the Ukrainian audience, this document may be useful since during our research we talked with many foreign experts and studied foreign practices.
That is why the document is addressed to both Ukrainian and international decision makers and other stakeholders. We also believe that in today’s world it is important to engage as much expertise from as many different parties as possible. This document is not a product of one or just a few people — it is a product of collective intelligence and “crowdsourced knowledge”.
In order to identify key points, a team from Internews Ukraine NGO — Andriy Kulakov, Volodymyr Yermolenko and Vitalii Rybak — brought together a working group of six experts working on the topics of propaganda, disinformation and social networks. The working group includes Roman Shutov (EED Content Fund), Tetyana Popova (Information Security NGO), Ihor Solovey (LB.ua), Kateryna Kruk (StopFake, Kremlin Watch), Vitaliy Moroz (DSS 380, Internews Ukraine) and Pavlo Belousov (DSS 380, Internews Ukraine).
The working group held four meetings to outline current issues in the field of information warfare and identify recommendations for the Ukrainian, European and international policymakers. Simultaneously, we interviewed key experts in the field of information warfare, both in Ukraine and abroad. When selecting foreign experts, we tried to involve representatives of as many countries and organizations as possible so as to get a broad context of the problem. As a result, we learned about current issues of disinformation that exist in the United States, UK, Germany, France, Baltic States, Central and Eastern Europe, Italy, and Spain.
We interviewed 19 foreign experts. We talked to Andreas Umland (National University of Kyiv- Mohyla Academy, Institute for Euro-Atlantic Cooperation), Aric Toler and Eliot Higgins (Bellingcat), Dmitri Teperik (International Center for Defense and Security), Dovile Sukyte (Eastern European Studies Center), Gustav Gressel (German Council of Foreign Relations), Jacopo Iacoboni (La Stampa), Jakub Kalensky (Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center, formerly EU Stratcom East), Julian Roepcke (Bild), Kristi Raik (Finnish Institute of International Affairs), Monika Richter (European Values, Kremlin Watch), Nicolas De Pedro (The Institute for Statecraft), Nika Alekseyeva (StratCom NATO), Nina Jankowicz (Kennan Institute, Wilson Center), Ondrej Kundra (Respekt), Dmytro Borysov (Center for Propaganda and Disinformation Analysis), Simas Čelutka (Vilnius Institute for Policy Analysis), Veronika Vichova (European Values, Kremlin Watch) and Vytis Jurkonis (Freedom House in Lithuania). 007
We also interviewed 8 Ukrainian experts: Halyna Petrenko (Detector Media), Diana Dutsyk (independent expert), Liubov Tsybulska (Ukrainian Crisis Media Center), Oksana Romanyuk (Institute of Mass Information), Roman Kobets (Institute of Philosophy, National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy), Roman Kulchynsky (texty.org.ua), and Roman Rak (Polish-Ukrainian portal PolUkr). Additionally, we consulted with Ukrainian officials Dmytro Zolotukhin and Artem Bidenko (Ministry of Information Policy of Ukraine), as well as with Valentyn Petrov (Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council).
Ihor Rozkladay (Centre for Democracy and Rule of Law) carried out an external peer review of our document.
After processing the information we received, we held a round table in Kyiv at which a draft document was presented. The event was attended by 15 key Ukrainian experts in the field of disinformation. In addition to the experts already listed, Victoria Marchenko (USAID), Natacha Ephimoff and David Stulik (EU Delegation to Ukraine), Oksana Maydan and Serhiy Hrytsenko (Internews Network), Yevhen Fedchenko (StopFake), Kostiantyn Kvurt and Kostiantyn Romashko (Internews Ukraine) participated in the round table. We also took into account all those opinions and ideas which had been expressed during this event.
Communication with all these people enabled us to approach the problem as broadly as possible. At the same time, it is important to note that the responsibility for the ideas of this publication lies solely with the initiative group and expert group of the project. Other experts and officials whom we interviewed are not responsible for the content of this document, and may agree or disagree with its ideas.
We hope that our document will be useful for decision-makers at a time when in Ukraine and in other countries around the world, the first attempts at real counteraction of information warfare and information dominance are finally being carried out. 008
PROBLEM DESCRIPTION: WEAPONIZING INFORMATION 009
The modern world contains multiple discourses, communication mediums, and tools of power and influence. The terms power, influence and war are less definite than before — now, they entail an interplay of economy, diplomacy, cultural influence, and information.
Since the beginning of the millennium the Russian Federation2 has played a major role in the hybridization of power, influence and war. Russia under Putin is building two narratives: one recites how the country overcame the 1990’s “humiliation”, while the second emphasizes “western aggression” during the collapse of the USSR and the end of the Cold War. These narratives explain its main objective today: a hybrid counter-attack against the western civilization and a re-conquest of Russia’s lost spheres of influence.
Simultaneously, the Russian Federation uses and abuses democratic society’s achievements like pluralism, diversity, freedom and democracy, also relying on information and technology tools of western origin. However, it uses them to achieve opposite goals compared to their initial design: not for enhancing and multiplying freedoms and opportunities, but for achieving influence, power and dominance.
Russia’s information policy is just one of many examples illustrating its destructive behavior toward other countries. It does not operate organically — it is guided by: • The President of the Russian Federation, who sets out strategic objectives; • The subordinate ministries, agencies, special forces and state “media,” which fulfill these objectives; and • Other entities, which might not be directly dependent on the Kremlin, but that rely on Russian funding.
Russia’s official documents, such as its Military Doctrine, Doctrine of Information Security of the Russian Federation, and its Foreign Policy Concept elucidate the official stance and worldview of its government toward information policy. These documents show that Russia views the world from a perspective of confrontation, not cooperation. This confrontation, according to these doctrines, takes place at all levels; its methods have far exceeded traditional politics, diplomacy, and defense and now include information policy. Russia claims that these strategies, detrimental to its interests, are being used against it. Hence, it should succumb to a symmetric response.
For example, Russia’s Military Doctrine (2010) emphasizes “strengthening the role of information struggle” (p. 12 d)3 and the vital role of “early measures of information warfare” in modern military conflicts. This is necessary for “forming favorable reaction from the world community toward military action.” (p. 13 d). Consequently, “development of informational warfare means” is listed among Russia’s priorities (p. 41 c).
2 Russia’s information politics has deeper roots. In 1992-1994, Russia used disinformation to influence public opinion during the Crimea conflict. The Ukrainian Parliament even discussed the matter. Moreover, one has to keep in mind that the concepts of “truth,” “fact” became relative in the USSR, especially during the 1930’s trials and Stalinist terror. 3 http://kremlin.ru/supplement/461 010
The Doctrine of Information Security of the Russian Federation4 asserts that “secret services of some states are enhancing information and psychological influence aimed to destabilizing domestic political and social environments in different parts of the world, disrupting sovereignty and breaching the territorial integrity of other states”; this is achieved through the massive use of “information technologies.” Sounds like Russia has just described itself — specifically, its “mirror response” to a policy of “some countries” of the western world.
The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation5 (2016) emphasizes that “soft power exerted by civil society, information and communication, humanitarian and other methods and techniques, has become an indispensable part of modern politics and is used for fulfilling foreign policy objectives alongside traditional diplomatic means.” In this case, soft power is not viewed by Russia through a lens of internal reforms for achieving progressive socio-economic models, but only for fulfilling “foreign policy objectives.”
“Strengthening Russian media’s role and mass communication on the global informational landscape and communicating Russia’s point of view to the world community” is defined here as Russia’s foreign policy priority. Additionally, it is clearly stated that the country is “developing its own effective means of influencing public opinion abroad,” and “contributes to the strengthening of Russian and Russian-speaking media on the global landscape providing them with state funding.”
These official documents demonstrate that the Kremlin: а) believes that the modern world is an aggressive and hostile environment, which does not envisage cooperation, solely dominance; b) views western “soft power” strategies and cross-border communication technologies through the lens of foreign policy only; c) mentions “information struggle” and “information influence” among Russia’s defense and foreign policy priorities.
Similar opinions are being voiced in non-official documents. For example, Valery Gerasimov, the current Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia, noted that today it is difficult to “establish whether the world is at peace or at war,”6 and that methods of “information struggle” and “assymetrical influence” (including “information influence”) are used today in addition to classical military action7. In 2015, Sergei Shoigu, the Russian Minister of Defense, called “information supremacy” a new “military power factor.”8 The head of the FSB, Alexander Bortnikov, also mentioned the goal of “information supremacy” in spring 2018.9
4 http://kremlin.ru/acts/bank/41460. 5 http://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2542248 6 https://www.vpk-news.ru/articles/14632. 7 These Gerasimov’s ideas are often considered as elements of a so-called “Gerasimov Doctrine”; however, Mark Galeotti who earlier coined this concept, has recently said this is misleading. https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/03/05/im-sorry-for-creating-the-gerasimov-doctrine/. 8 https://www.interfax.ru/russia/433115 9 http://carnegie.ru/commentary/76662 011
Thus, fighting only separate instances of Russia’s “information struggle” would be a mistake. They should be viewed as a whole, as elements of wider strategy of special operations led by top Russia’s military and intelligence services officials. Like any other operations, information “active measures” have their own “commanders” and always find new ways for spreading instead of those that have been eliminated.
Figuratively speaking, the Russian propaganda machine resembles a Hydra: it is a multifaceted and multifunctional network which unites different channels of communication and influence. The Kremlin is its “heart”; its numerous heads are: a) the Russian media working abroad (RT, Sputnik); b) Russian TV channels available via satellite for Russian-speaking audience abroad; c) Russia-sponsored proxy media in certain countries; d) Fake civil society entities, which promote Russian interests in the form of grassroots initiatives; e) Russian special services operating in western countries through diplomats, members of international organizations, journalists, etc; e) Foreign politicians dependent on Russian money; e) the so-called Putinversteher (German: those who understand Putin) who are echoing Russian stance for numerous reasons.
MORE THAN DISINFORMATION Spreading disinformation is not the only way used by Russia to achieve this “information supremacy” in the ongoing “information struggle.” It also uses a specific discourse to achieve its goals.
This discourse fuses two polarizing theoretical approaches — traditionalism (antimodernism) and postmodernism. It is therefore best described as antimodern postmodernism. While traditionalism with its connotations of hierarchy, power and national / religious identity is used mainly for a domestic audience, postmodernism with its emphasis on relativity of truth and values is employed when appealing to foreign viewers.
Russia is famous for spreading disinformation and fake news – but its strategy goes far beyond these efforts, aspiring to create other “fake” phenomena, in particular: • fake civil society, imitating the role of real civic organizations in democracies; • fake political opposition, which is either simulating opposition or is being controlled; • fake freedom of speech, which is used for attacking democracies and fundamental freedoms; • fake democracy, which the authoritarian regime uses as its disguise; • fake agreements, which are subsequently systematically ignored.
In our research “Words and Wars”10, we noted that Russia likes to use a skeptical and apocalyptic tone. The former fosters cynicism, teaching audiences that “everyone lies”. Even the official Russian media’s slogans, like RT (“Question More”) and Sputnik (“Telling the Untold”) spread this message, which explains why Russia tries to promote “alternative facts.”
10 https://www.ukraineworld.org/articles/infowars 012
Information is not being used by Russia for promoting freedoms and rights; it is used as an instrument of power. Consequently, dominance and “victory” over the others are considered as primary goals, not civil liberties.
To achieve this informational dominance the Russian Federation and its agents use the following means: • Spreading domestic Russian narratives through official Russian-speaking media outlets, like Channel 1, RTR, LifeNews, Zvezda etc; • Systematically weakening foreign countries’ domestic narratives by using Russian “media” aimed at a non-Russian speaking audience (RT, Sputnik); • A diversity of messages centered around one informational campaign; • Tailoring messages and communication channels to a given country’s context; • Sowing “informational disorder”;11 • Funding extremist political groups and initiatives with the aim of weakening society’s trust in democracy; • Using fake civil organizations, pro-Russian network of experts and analysts as well as conferences/meetings where Russian narratives are being promoted. • Using proxy-media with non-transparent funding and imitating foreign countries’ domestic narratives with the aim of destroying them.
In Ukraine, for example, Russia uses media outlets which belong to Ukrainian politicians who have fled to Russia and currently live there. These include, for example, outlets owned by Oleksandr Klymenko (holding Vesti), Sergii Kurchenko (holding UMH) and others. They are used, inter alia, for carrying out Russian disinformation and propaganda campaigns (the latest case concerns the so- called “autocephaly” for the Ukrainian Orthodox Church). Other proxy-media include strana.ua, channels 112 and NewsOne, etc., which often appeal to Ukrainian patriotic values to gain popularity.
“Ukrainian choice”, the movement created by Viktor Medvedchuk (Putin’s closest ally in Ukraine) in 2012, was a prototype of these developments. It was masked as a Ukrainian political initiative. However, in reality it promoted the pro-Russian geopolitical agenda (today, the ultranationalist and antiwestern “Georgian march,” which enjoys Russian support, is doing largely the same in Georgia.) Currently, NewsOne and 112, both possibly funded by Medvedchuk, are once again employing the technique.
Russia is quite agile when it comes to carrying out its information war. It employs simultaneous activities on various fronts.
11 See INFORMATION DISORDER: Toward an interdisciplinary framework for research and policy making https://rm.coe.int/information-disorder-report-version-august-2018/16808c9c77 013
New methods are emerging all the time depending on the technology and socio-political circumstances of target countries. For example, since the printed press is in decline in much of the world, an emphasis is being placed on posts and comments on social media (which has direct access to other users) or video-content (using video-bloggers).
During the 2016 US elections, Russia showed a glimpse of these newly-developed technologies which included: • creating profiles and groups on social media for fragmenting local communities, creating an artificial divide between “us” and “them.” • Using artificial intelligence in the form of multimillion bots’ network which spread Kremlin- generated messages; • Using sponsored content for spreading messages.
It is important to keep in mind that information channels can be easily substituted. If a country bans Russian TV channels, Russia turns to: a) the internet; b) satellite; c) local proxy-media.
New channels spring up all the time; new “armies of trolls” are as easily deployed. Yet if a country tries to protect itself from this destructive influence, Russia immediately appeals to democracy, insisting that these restrictions violate freedom of speech. Using the hydra metaphor once again: if you cut one head off, a new one grows immediately. The same point holds for Russian propaganda techniques.
Given Russia’s unwillingness to have a meaningful dialogue with democracies, it is important to keep pressure on Russia and make it reduce significantly the financial resources it is spending on information warfare.
Thus, the international community should: a) extend sanctions and other restrictive measures against the Kremlin; b) restrict Russia’s opportunities of making money, for example, on gas supplies; c) issue more laws like the Magnitsky Act in different countries; d) mobilize as many resources as possible in order to create a diversified response to Russia’s diversified “information warfare”; e) vigorously investigate how Russia funds pro-Russian media and block illegal channels of funding. 014
RESPONSE: DE-WEAPONIZING INFORMATION
The primary task in this context is to prevent the weaponization of information. Information issues should be regarded not solely in terms of freedom, but also in terms of security risks.
This approach should never entail curtailing freedoms. On the contrary, it should protect freedoms from abuse and from attempts to undermine them. It is indeed difficultto strike a balance between freedom and security: crossing the thin line is extremely easy. In Ukraine, the imbalance toward security is sometimes present when attempts are made to restrict freedoms. Concurrently, western countries are often exhibiting a different type of imbalance by underestimating the security aspect of the problem.
One should keep in mind that protecting freedoms is only appropriate when all adhere to the same playbook. The players cannot change the rules of the game all the time. Moreover, if one of them is a card shark, avoiding rules or setting their own, then s/he should be deprived of the right to enjoy freedoms. Russia is that card shark – and it exploits the rules when it sees fit.
HELSINKI SPIRIT In light of this, the European security pillars, introduced in the 1970s, specifically in the Helsinki Final Act, which envisages a path toward security, peace and disarmament, should be reconceptualized in order to combat a Russian simulacrum, its idea of the so-called “Helsinki-2.”
Considerations of security, peace, and disarmament need to take into account current information weaponization, and the subsequent need of de-weaponization and disarmament in the information field.
When information is weaponized, it is used for restricting freedoms, rights, and citizens’ knowledge in order to dominate, demotivate, demoralize and destroy an opponent.
Accordingly, de-weaponizing information should entail an international struggle against information warfare, aimed at exposing and neutralizing its key instruments and channels. It should also result in additional sanctions on entities who spread it. 015
RECOMMENDATIONS
Our recommendations on a policy of de-weaponizing information call for: 1) A better understanding of the threats; 2) Increasing the transparency of media and social media, including the identification and exposure of agents of information influence; 3) Increasing the transparency of political and information campaigns; 4) Creating a new regulatory framework for combatting disinformation; 5) Coordinating cooperation between public authorities and civil society; 6) Reducing room for malicious agents to maneuver; 7) Strengthening democratic narratives; 8) Developing media literacy.
WHAT SHOULD THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY DO?
UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT AND ADDRESSING IT For a solution that is strong and proportional, one first has to understand the problem — but today, the international community does not always properly acknowledge the nature and the scope of informational threats.
For example, when Yandex, the Russian internet giant, introduced its service Yandex.Taxi onto the Lithuanian market, top officials — including the head of Lithuania’s national cyber-security service, and eventually its PM12 — immediately warned about potential data theft. In contrast, another Russian company famous for cyber-security threats — Kaspersky Laboratory — has successfully formed a partnership with the Council of Europe, which ensues the “spread of respect for human rights.”13
12 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-07-31/lithuania-warns-russian-taxi-app-could-be- snooping-on-users. 13 https://www.coe.int/en/web/human-rights-rule-of-law/-/council-of-europe-partners-with-leading- technology-companies-to-promote-respect-for-human-rights?desktop=true. 016
Both companies are dependent on the Russian government (the Russian authorities took hold of the biggest internet and IT companies in 2010s, especially after 201414). The users of these services are thus vulnerable, since Russia’s intelligence service may get access to their data. But as we see from this example, various actors have different level of awereness of information security risks.
More enlightenment work is therefore necessary. Decision-makers must be aware of the threats present in various spheres and countries. They should investigate the extent to which Russian law allows intelligence services to obtain user data, for example within the so-called “Yarovaya laws,” which factually abolish Russia’s privacy rights and establish total controlling mechanisms.
Better daily monitoring is also needed in order to expose Russian information influence. This type of monitoring should not only trace messages and their sources but also consider: a) What audiences they cover; b) Messages’ volume and the quality of their channels; c) How these messages are united into one campaign.
Moreover, research into the Russian propaganda network, specifically on the influence of Russian soft power in Europe and America, should be constantly carried out.
The Ukrainian experience shows that Russia had begun spreading its soft power in Donbas and Crimea long before the annexation and war. Pro-Russian civil organizations, media, cooperation and books had been used in this process. Little attention was paid at the time: the attempts were too “soft” and unnoticeable. However, they had prepared the ground for subsequent serious and tragic events.
Additionaly, today it is necessary: • To carry out comparative research of Russia, ISIS, Iran, and China’s antiwestern and antidemocratic disruptive strategies. Other actors should also be taken into account (these strategies often employ the same approach); • To investigate what techniques and mechanisms they use; • To understand what technologies they use, and how flexible they are.
14 See Битва за Рунет: Как власть манипулирует информацией и следит за каждым из нас – А.Солда- тов, И.Бороган. 017
WHAT SHOULD NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS DO?
MEDIA TRANSPARENCY, ESPECIALLY ONLINE Non-transparent information websites are a common problem both for Ukraine and other countries. New sites are being created for sharing various types of information; a lot of times they do not provide information about themselves. This creates an ideal environment for those who want to influence behind the scenes.
In light of this, we advise national parliaments to develop and adopt new legislation on media transparency — especially web media, which will allow the public to identify owners, editors and funding.
Two considerations should be kept in mind here. Firstly, WHOIS, the database for the owners / renters of domains, should be open with regard to identity.
Secondly, these information sites, just like the printed press, need to provide data on ownership, affiliation, funding sources, editors, and contact information. All internet-media, regardless of their affiliation, should adhere to these demands.
Social media is another important consideration. SM allows people to communicate information directly without an intermediary. Online anonymity, however, opens the door to manipulations. Thus, there is a need of new social media rules which will help identify people behind profiles and prevent the emergence of bots and trolls “armies.”
Social media companies themselves will most likely never introduce these rules because they entail tangible financial losses. Yet unhindered disinformation and hate speech, which flourish under anonymity, are undermining social media businesses’ reputation in the long-term. This is why it is necessary to find common ground with social media companies and secure both their business model and society’s ability to defend against information warfare.
TRANSPARENCY OF POLITICAL AND INFORMATION CAMPAIGNS Special attention should be paid to political and information campaigns’ transparency, specifically during the election period.
Political advertisements and information campaigns should be “trackable”. Like any other product or service, consumers should know where their information comes from. 018
A new regulatory framework should contain provisions regarding political ads and information which demand information regarding: 1) ownership; 2) funding source; 3) country of origin; 4) which political parties or groups it is affiliated with.
LEGISLATION ON HATE SPEECH AND DISINFORMATION Hate speech Russia’s information activities today are often aggressive, military-like, contain hate speech and create a war climate. In our research “Words and Wars,” we indicated that Russia views information as a means of winning a war, not as a means of education.15
The recent research carried out by the Ukrainian Media Crisis Center on the image of European countries on Russian TV demonstrates how negatively the top three Russia channels depict life in the European Union16. These issues are regularly raised in the monitoring conducted by Detector Media.17
Aggression and violence are often present on Russian entertainment shows, which diminishes the Russian audience’s level of tolerance to violence.
In light of this, EU and NATO institutions, as well as international civil society organizations, should: • Continuously monitor key Russian media; whether it contains hate speech and war messages aimed at western democracies and/or specific countries; • Analyze domestic media landscape and sanction outlets which continuously spread hate speech and xenophobic language. Should the financial police act simultaneously, a link between xenophobic language and Russian funding might be disclosed; • Adapt laws on hate speech according to the current information circumstances.
Some countries use legislation on hate speech to combat Russian information warfare. For example, in 2015 and 2017 the Lithuanian government temporarily banned Russian TV channel RTR Planet (it was transmitted to Lithuania via Sweden) because it contained hate speech. The European Commission approved the decision, which was in line with the EU law, specifically Audiovisual Media Services Directive 18.
15 https://medium.com/@ukraineworld.international/more-than-fake-news-lessons-learnt-by-ukraine- volodymyr-yermolenko-45f1705f371d 16 http://ucmc.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/TV-3.pdf 17 https://ms.detector.media/monitoring/advocacy_and_influence/ 18 https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/decision-suspend-broadcast-russian-language- channel-rtr-planeta-lithuania-complies-eu-rules. 019
The German prosecution office also appealed to hate speech when reviewing the notorious “Lisa’s case.” Back then, the Russian media (specifically, Channel 1) spread a fake story which claimed that Middle Eastern migrants raped a teenage Russian girl. Martin Luithle, a German prosecutor who dealt with this case, primarily focused on the fact that Channel 1 promoted hate speech and inter-ethnic hatred.
The fact that the news piece was extremely popular was deemed an argument proving the significance of the case. Thus, Russia’s main propaganda weapon, its mass scale and diversity, backfired.
In light of this, national regulators should intensify cooperation, monitor hate speech and react to it jointly, especially in Europe.
Disinformation The French draft law on combatting “information manipulation” is a notable attempt aimed at countering disinformation and manipulation.
The proposal envisages: a) combatting deliberate information manipulation; b) sanctioning conscious and repetitive manipulation; c) special attention to disinformation during elections; d) giving a key role to special judges (juges des référés) entitled to make prompt decisions and impose sanctions; e) rules on more transparency with regard to online platforms.
The discussion around this draft law showed that the existing French legislation already contains provisions aimed at combatting disinformation. It is possible that other countries have these rules as well.
Thus, the legislators should: 1) Analyze domestic law, establishing whether it contains provisions which cover the dissemination of misinformation and deliberate deception; update it accordingly, introducing a requirement that social media companies share responsibility to combat systematic disinformation. 2) Using some provisions of the French law, for example, when it comes to the role of special judges (juges des référés). The latter do not make a final verdict, yet they allow making prompt and temporary decisions, in order to defend citizens’ rights and freedoms. 020
WHAT SHOULD THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS DO?
NATIONAL INFORMATION SECURITY STRATEGIES Russia’s central tactic in its information war is its targeted geopolitical marketing. This marketing entails the examination of audiences’ interests and needs, and tailoring its messages to certain states/societies/groups’ vulnerabilities. In Ukraine, for example, these vulnerabilities include declines in social welfare, the ongoing war in eastern Ukraine, reform fatigue, civil unrest, distrust in the government. Its latest focus is related to religion, specifically the decision to bestow the Ukrainian Orthodox Church with independence from Moscow.
Precisely for this reason, the Russian propaganda messages are trying to convince Ukrainians that they live in a failed state; that the pro-Western reforms reduced the well-being of its citizens; that the Church’s independence will divide the country, etc.19
Concurrently, when targeting western countries, it brings up and exploits the downsides of migration, multiculturalism and liberal policies. Russia’s information strategies are therefore asymmetric, i.e. they form a pool of issues that matter most to a certain society. Consequently, the defense strategy needs to contain localized peculiarities in a given country. Thus, countries which are being targeted by Russian propaganda should outline their own information security strategies. They should contain defense principles against information influence, and define red lines that warrant a response if crossed.
SANCTIONS AGAINST INFORMATION INFLUENCE AGENTS To date, no sanctions have been introduced against high-profile Russian propaganda figures. Solely Dmitriy Kiseliov, the head of the state mediaholding Rossiya Segodnia, is subject to EU sanctions (not the U.S. ones). Other top managers, like Konstantin Ernst (Channel 1), Anton Zlatopolskiy (Russia TV Channel), Aleksey Zemskiy (NTV), Aleksey Pimanov (Krasnaya Zvezda), Margharita Simonian (RT and Sputnik) are not on the sanctions list.
Countries which are targets of Russian propaganda should hold a tougher stance, following the example of U.S., Canada, the UK and the Baltic States. For example, they could adopt their Magnitsky acts, which allow governments to restrict the rights of individuals responsible for dire human rights violations and corruption.
19 See our research Words and Wars: https://ukraineworld.org/articles/infowars 021
Additionally, it is important to sanction Russian information agencies acting in Crimea. These include Russian TV and radio companies, which illegally seized pre-annexation Ukrainian TV channels’ frequencies (indicated in brackets): • NTV (Inter) • Pervyi Kanal (1+1) • Rossiya (First National) • Zvezda (STB) • TNT (Channel 5) • TNV-Planet (ICTV) • Rossiya 24 (Chornomorska), etc
Unfortunately, there has been no proper action at the level of the ITU (International Telecommunications Union). Russia has not born any responsibility whatsoever for seizing Ukraine’s radiofrequency space nor for enhancing its transmitters’ power. Sanctions are necessary in this case too.
BRANDING RUSSIA’S STATE “MEDIA” Russia-sponsored quasi-media organizations, first and foremost holding Rossiya Segodnia which includes RT (former Russia Today), Sputnik, RIA Novosti, Golos Rossii, play a central role in the Russian strategy of information dominance.
Generally, RT and Sputnik should not even be regarded as media20. The term “media” suggests editorial responsibility and independence. Instead, RT, Sputnik and other government-controlled Russian outlets are fully dependent on Russian official information policy. They do not simply inform; they aim to create informational disorder, demotivate and demoralize, and encourage distrust in socio- political models of democratic countries.
In order to counter this the following actions could be undertaken: • Political decisions, for example, depriving these “media” of accreditation. • Branding requirements, requiring RT and Sputnik to clearly and publicly state their affiliation with the Russian authorities (“funded by the Russian government”) in their brands. • Attention to content, i.e. monitoring these proxy-media and analyzing their role in spreading disinformation or manipulation, but also in spreading militarizing messages, anti-western and anti-democratic rhetoric.
FOLLOW THE MONEY It simply scratches the surface to combat influence of quasi-media directly linked to the Russian government. It is much more complex to combat the communication channels whose dependence on Russia is hybrid, non-linear or hidden.
20 This is why they should not be publicly characterized as “the media.” Instead, terms like “proxy-media” or government-organized media (similarly to GONGO, government-organized non-governmental organization) should be applied. 022
The experience of Ukraine and other post-Soviet countries is crucial for the international community in this case. Even though some Russian communication channels in Ukraine were restricted in 2014-2017, Russia’s information influence in Ukraine is still very strong. This is because Russia and pro-Russian actors are using communication channels with non-transparent funding.
Websites such as ukraina.ru or strana.ua, media holdings Vesti or UMH, news TV channels 112 or NewsOne and numerous other national and local websites, social media accounts and bloggers are disseminating pro-Russian messages in Ukraine on a very large scale. But it is often uneasy to establish direct link with Russian authorities, as these “media” claim they are simply providing an “alternative” viewpoint.
Quite often Russian and pro-Russian actors use dirty information tricks. For example, they often use a technique of “paid news.”
A recent survey by the Institute of Mass Information, a Ukrainian media NGO, has shown that pre-paid content in July 2018 had numerous Russian traces. The topics included either pro-Russian messages against the independence of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church or articles which promoted Viktor Medvedchuk (Putin’s closest ally in Ukraine) .21
Usually, these quasi-media are financed in a non-transparent manner — which makes them a vulnerable target for financial check-ups. In Ukraine, the Vesti holding is an exemplary illustration: its non-transparent funding, including undeclared millions of hryvnias in cash that has been found during a police investigation, demonstrate these problems.22 They are widespread among agents of Russian information influence.
Another relevant issue is tax evasion. Both in Ukraine and in the EU, pro-Russian media are often sponsored with “black cash”. The magazines/newspapers might not contain ads and be distributed for free, which means that they have separate, extremely big funding resources. Thus, law enforcement agencies should heed these types of outlets.
Internet instruments such as search engines can present another vulnerable issue. A curious Ukrainian example is the meta.ua search engine which is part of the holding owned by the “Russian fund” and Mail.ru Group23; this holding also includes finance.ua and other media. Russian influence might be exerted through them as well.
21 http://imi.org.ua/news/upts-mp-ta-medvedchuk-najbilshe-dzhynsuvaly-v-internet-zmi-v-lypni- doslidzhennya-imi/ 22 https://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/articles/2014/06/25/7030071/ 23 See Sergey Vasiliev’s book «How we purchased Russian internet» - Alpina Publisher, 2016 023
It is also important to analyse how Russia can financially influence global social media companies. The Paradise Papers have disclosed that the Russian Gazprom Invest holding invested close to $1 bln in Facebook through off-shore companies. Additionally, it turned out that the Russian state-owned VTB bank invested $191 million in Twitter24. Services which enjoy Russian funding can potentially be used by Russian stakeholders. This calls for serious attention.
The funding of radical parties, pro-Russian or West-skeptical quasi-activists, public events (conferences, round-tables), “think-tanks” and other agents of influence should be also looked into. Both in Ukraine and the West this hidden funding undermining Western democracies often has Russian roots.
It should also be examined what PR agencies certain individuals or campaigns turn to. It is important to limit cooperation with Russian PR agencies, as well as the cooperation of international PR agencies with the Russian government.
Quite often Russia funds political entities and information outlets indirectly, acting through local intermediaries. It is important that law enforcement services monitor their activities.
In Ukraine, for example, one of the most notorious examples are people like Victor Medvedchuk, Putin’s best ally. According to reports of Ukrainian media, he earns his money through Glusco gas stations25; his wife, Oksana Marchenko, reportedly owns one of the biggest oil fields in Russia26. This gives these people “legal” funds to finance their information campaigns.
Western journalists, politicians and analysts should also note that business and government do not function independently in Russia, and therefore business funding might have political goals.
The interplay of politics and information business in Russia is best illustrated by such companies as Vkontakte, Yandex, Kaspersky Laboratory and others. After Pavel Durov resigned as Vkontakte CEO in 2014, the platform has been subject to the influence of the Kremlin and its proxies, like Sechin and Usmanov. Yandex is following the same path after German Gref, CEO of Sberbank of Russia and Putin’s ally, joined the board of its directors in 2014.
MEDIA LITERACY Enhancing citizens’ media literacy should be among the main responses to the information warfare and disinformation challenges. Governments should play a central role here, specifically ministries of education.
24 https://www.theguardian.com/news/2017/nov/05/russia-funded-facebook-twitter-investments-kushner- investor 25 https://hromadske.ua/posts/kompaniia-nablyzhena-do-medvedchuka-kontroliuie-blyzko-tretyny-rynku- dyzelnoho-palyva-v-ukraini-zhurnalist 26 https://lb.ua/news/2018/09/06/406914_supruga_medvedchuka_vladeet.html 024
Media literacy and media hygiene should be included in modern societies’ to-do list along with environmental consciousness, fighting smoking, promoting healthy lifestyle etc. In light of this, the governments should implement long-term strategies of developing media literacy and critical thinking, introducing these types of classes at schools. Some elements of media literacy should be included into history and other humanities classes, for example. Critical thinking with a specific focus on media products should be taught at schools, while fact-checking techniques should be explained at universities. The latter should become a separate course for students in journalism.
These classes should also teach elements of information hygiene that will encourage people ask the following questions when consuming media: • Who owns the media, which is disseminating specific messages; is its ownership structure transparent? • Does the headline correspond to article’s content? • Is the source of information mentioned? • Is the outlet/person known? • What did the user share on social media before the specific post? • Did well-known newspapers report on the story? • Does the article contain emotion manipulation (igniting aggression, anxiety etc)? • Does the video content match the voiceover narration? • Does the video contain strong and emotional language? • Was the video really filmed in the alleged region? • Are speakers allocated the same amount of time (during talk-shows)? • Does the show employ artificial attention-grabbing techniques (fights, aggression)? • Does the piece contain unfounded abstract claims impossible to check? • Does the piece humiliate the audience or other individuals? • Is user’s behavior continuously aimed at sparking aggression and delusion etc.?
All possible types of communication channels should be used for spreading media literacy skills. It is important that TV and radio spread this knowledge, but alternative platforms (online TV, online universities) should also join. Media literacy classes should not only debunk fakes (fake news, fake accounts, fake audio and video content) but also analyze the main manipulation techniques — demotivation, demoralization, distrust etc. 025
WHAT SHOULD UKRAINE DO?
PRIMARY APPROACH: EXPLAIN, DO NOT LIE When approaching information problems, Ukrainian authorities should remember that any lies are sooner or later revealed.
It is extremely necessary to avoid copying Russian approaches to propaganda and disinformation. Instead, one should tell the truth and communicate openly — paying attention to both the positive and negative aspects of specific processes that are taking place in Ukraine.
It is also necessary to explain the government’s activities more actively and extensively in a simple and understandable language. For example, it is crucial to explain the government’s sanctions against certain information influence agents. And it is important to understand the consequences of not explaining previous actions — which cast doubt on Ukraine for the rest of the world.
It is also important to establish channels of long-term communication with international audiences. The objective here has less to do with persuasion regarding certain arguments, and more to do with building lasting relations based on trust. Trust is a long-term resource that is more important than agreements or disagreements on a specific issue.
WHAT SHOULD PRESIDENTIAL ADMINISTRATION AND GOVERNMENT DO?
INFORMATION SECURITY DOCTRINE Ukraine has developed a document aimed at achieving information security goals — the Information Security Doctrine27. It contains a lot of important ideas, distributes powers and authorities among various governmental institutions, and envisages involvement of civil society organizations. Today, one should work on its practical implementation.
27 https://www.president.gov.ua/documents/472017-21374 026
It is also important to develop strategic communications, specifically as it is prescribed by the Doctrine: a combination of “public diplomacy, public relations, military connections, information and psychological operations, and activities aimed at promoting the state’s objectives”.28
COORDINATION AMONG KEY INSTITUTIONS In the framework of Information Security Doctrine implementation, there is a need to ensure better coordination among key state institutions that address the issues related to information security, information policy, and strategic communications. These institutions include: the Ministry of Information Policy, the National Security and Defense Council, the National Police, the Security Service, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the National Council on Television and Radio Broadcasting, the State Service for Special Communications and Protection of Information, the National Public TV and Radio Company of Ukraine, the Verkhovna Rada Committee on Freedom of Speech and Information Policy, and others.
Pursuant to the Doctrine, coordination tasks are vested in the National Security and Defense Council. In this context, it could be useful to resume activities of the Information and Analytical Center under the National Security and Defense Council, which coordinated Ukraine’s information activities in the toughest times - most of all, in 2014 (at the beginning of the war in Donbas, MH17 downing, etc.).
In today’s realities, it is important to restore such coordination structure. The center could work either under the National Security and Defense Council or under the Administration of the President of Ukraine. This should be an independent body, and not a structural unit of some agency.
This center should become a framework forum for communication among the Ukrainian state authorities, but also among central executive bodies, civil society and the media. On the basis of this framework platform, ad-hoc groups on specific issues can be created.
The center should have its own set of instruments for monitoring information threats (or gathering maximum prompt monitoring data from civil society organizations, law-enforcement agencies, Ministry of Information Policy, etc.), for collecting necessary information, forecasting, developing messages and creating its own information product designed for dispelling myths or manipulations.
The center should receive all necessary powers for achieving its goals, and not be just an advisory agency dependent on the will of other central executive bodies. It should: • Detect information attacks and respond promptly to detected attacks, both for domestic and foreign audiences; • Select and employ groups of experts responsible for:
а) monitoring information attacks; b) developing messages in response to attacks or in a proactive mode; c) producing multimedia materials based on these messages (preparing short textual or audio
28 Ibid. 027
and visual products demonstrating why certain information constitutes an information attack, what (hypothetical) purpose it has, and which disinformation or manipulation it contains).
There is also a need for ongoing communication and coordination with representatives of the Ukrainian civil society and media dealing with the issues related to fighting against the Russian information war. These include organizations such as StopFake, UkraineWorld, Ukrainian Crisis Media Center, Internews Ukraine, Information Security NGO, InformNapalm, Euromaidan press, Detector Media, the Institute of Mass Information, Vox Ukraine; and Ukrainian media that is active in this sphere, such as Public Broadcasting, Hromadske, Lb.ua, Channel 24 (the Kremlin News show), ICTV (Antizombie and Secret Front shows) as well as individual bloggers involved in the information fight against Russian aggression.
It is recommended to create a state and civil society coordination platform, which will become a linking element between the respective state authorities and representatives of non-governmental organizations. A partner of the government center can be a civil association of experts that will have a sufficient level of freedom from bureaucratic procedures, and at the same time will help the center with providing a prompt response.
The need for such cooperation between the state and civil society structures is based on the following considerations: a) bureaucratic structures are often less mobile and operative, they do not have enough of their own instruments for actions, and they have limited capacity and limited audience; b) media and civil society organizations have proven their added value in detecting information threats, mobilizing society, providing flexible and prompt responses to threats, building trust with internal and external audiences, and creating and disseminating their own information materials. Also, the state’s cooperation with civil society institutions is provided for in the Ukrainian Information Security Doctrine.
Below are examples of centers with experiences that can be studied: А) Center against Terrorism and Hybrid Threats under the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Czech Republic, which was founded in early 2017 for countering disinformation, external information influences, terrorism, etc.29 В) The Strategic Communications and Public Affairs Department of the Ministry of Defense of Lithuania30. It has demonstrated its capacity of providing active, prompt responses. For instance, in February 2017 Russian information resources were sharing a story about a 15-year old girl allegedly raped by NATO soldiers31 (a story similar to “Lisa’s case” in Germany). At that time, this department detected disinformation quickly. It is important to mention that the department not only has resources for detecting threats, but also for providing a prompt response to them.
29 The Center’s web-site: http://www.mvcr.cz/cthh/Default.aspx 30 https://kam.lt/en/structure_and_contacts/kontaktai_eng/283.html 31 https://www.dw.com/en/lithuanian-authorities-launch-investigation-into-fake-german-rape- story/a-37608180 028
MORE PERSONNEL AND RESOURCES Powerful personnel and resources must be provided to strengthen central executive bodies involved in countering Russian propaganda: the Ministry of Information Policy, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the National Security and Defense Council. Today, these institutions have extremely scarce human and financial resources for performing their tasks in the sphere of combating information threats.
MONITORING EFFICIENCY OF PUBLIC POLICY Today, it is important for Ukraine to monitor how successful / unsuccessful the state’s steps are in the information security field. Regular studies should be conducted that would demonstrate efficiency of the implemented steps as well as the niches that still have to be filled. For instance:
1) How many people continue to watch Russian TV channels after their disconnection from Ukrainian cable networks? What is the level of trust to them?
2) How many people continue to use Russian social media and internet services? What are the most popular pages and groups in the Russian social media (Vkontakte, Odnoklassniki) among the Ukrainian citizens, and which topics are discussed in them?
3) Measuring the efficacy of Russian narratives — to what extent have they reached Ukrainian citizens?
Ukraine has the advantage of a better understanding of threats. Its disadvantage is its weakness of knowledge, research, and analytics for exploring individual aspects of these threats. Therefore, it is extremely important to strengthen its analytical and monitoring capacity.
PUBLIC AND CULTURAL DIPLOMACY Ukraine needs to develop public and cultural diplomacy and to ensure efficient work of the Ukrainian Institute, the Ukrainian Book Institute, and the Ukrainian Cultural Fund.
It is furthermore necessary to eliminate the current financial limitation for carrying out cultural diplomacy activities abroad. The strategy of public and cultural democracy has to include regular film shows, art campaigns, meetings with Ukrainian intellectuals, journalists, activists, volunteers, artists, etc. in the key cities that are important for Ukrainian foreign policy. It is important to promote the Ukrainian communication brand, UkraineNow.
WORK IN THE EAST AND SOUTH OF UKRAINE It is necessary to carry out more active communication with citizens of Eastern and Southern regions of Ukraine. There is a need to increase the number of transmitters, construct new towers for broadcasting the TV and radio signal. It is important to make special information products for those citizens who live on the temporarily occupied territories in the East of Ukraine and Crimea.
Citizens of the region need support through cultural campaigns, which would promote the feeling of solidarity. Checkpoints need to be conducted with maximum comfort in mind, with all procedures carried out in a positive and friendly manner. 029
WORK WITH TECHNICAL GIANTS In the modern world, information has become increasingly channeled through social media. These platforms have become arenas for the information wars. It would be a mistake to allow the technical giants that run social media to regulate themselves, however, since they do not always have specific competencies relating to the international issues at hand.
Therefore, it is important for Ukraine to strengthen work with tech giants (such as Facebook, Google, Twitter) and take the following steps: - To conduct a dialogue with Facebook, Twitter, and Google about increasing the expertise of people coordinating the area of Ukraine / Eastern Europe — namely those who are responsible for monitoring area content, banning users for hate speech, etc. It is recommended to work on developing trust-based partnership for improving network policies and prompt responses.
- To work with these tech giants on including Ukraine in the transparency practices they have already launched. In particular, Facebook has begun to require administrators of large pages in the US to confirm theiridentity . This is important since malicious information influences are frequently spread by the agents hiding their identity.
Furthermore, it is important to have a dialogue with Facebook and Twitter about adaptating their requirements for transparent advertising to Ukrainian realities, for example by requiring anyone who wants to launch Facebook advertising campaigns targeting Ukraine to prove their Ukrainian citizenship. - It is also important to work with technical giants on the specific features of their algorithms. For instance, there are questions about why the Russian content on YouTube, especially propagandist content, reaches Ukrainian consumers so easily and extensively as “recommended” videos. In this light, it is important to study the specific features of these algorithms and to change them.
- It is important to create a regular platform in Ukraine for discussing information security and the role of technical giants. Such a platform should be established either on the basis of already available platforms (such as YES or the Kyiv Security Forum) or through the creation of a separate annual conference (for instance, the Kyiv Information Security Forum). Top managers of technical giants should be invited to participate in these activities.
- There is a need to develop national legislation in a dialogue with tech giants and in cooperation with other countries that would be aimed at limiting malicious information influences on these platforms, taking the national context into consideration. Recently, tech companies have been paying more and more attention to the legislation of other countries. Ukraine needs to develop its own legislation to present to them.
- Information should be gathered and provided to tech giants about the real or virtual users who regularly spread disinformation, hate speech, calls for the violation of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine, and so on.
- Work should be carried out with the US government and the EU and UN management bodies for developing international instruments, for instance, international conventions, which would ensure an efficient international legal mechanism of working with social media — by analogy with maritime, air, and other conventions. 030
COOPERATION WITH CIVIL SOCIETY One of the chronic problems of the Ukrainian state is an absence of sustainable support for the activities of civil society, in particular in the field of countering information warfare. States don’t just execute policy — they help create it, often by supporting non-governmental initiatives. This form of interaction between the state and the non-governmental sector is still very weak in Ukraine, but it can be an extremely effective dynamic for enhancing information security. One can look to the experience of some of Ukraine’s western neighbors, for example: in the Baltic states, governmental structures are an active source of financing for non-governmental initiatives, based on transparent competition. Such mechanisms should be implemented in Ukraine.
SUPPORT FOR INTERNATIONAL JOURNALISTS It is important for Ukraine to create conditions for providing the maximum support for the work of international journalists in Ukraine (particularly those from the EU and NATO member states). To do this, it is necessary to organize professional services for translation, consultations, and finding contacts for journalists working on Ukrainian issues. There is also a need to support state and civil society cooperation with non-governmental organizations working in the sphere of communication and networking with foreign journalists.
It is also necessary to create possibilities for international journalists to receive documents for long- term stays in Ukraine.
Additionally, there is a need to protect international journalists from psychological attacks and harassment, especially by representatives of state authorities or structures associated with them. We must do everything possible to avoid situations like that in 2016, when foreign journalists had their personal data published by the Myrotvorets group: this was a step that presented a threat for international journalists and damaged Ukraine’s image abroad greatly.
Ukraine must also restore embedded journalism programs, which give journalists a right to remain for extended periods at a contact line together with Ukrainian military units. In 2015, a contract was developed for embedding journalists, coordinated with the Ministry of Defense, the General Staff, the Security Service of Ukraine, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Ministry of Information Policy. The contract includes detailed information about the terms of their work, rules for processing information, for ensuring their life and health, and it was developed according to NATO standards. It is important to restore this practice and give journalists the opportunity to work with Ukraine’s United Forces Operation; there should also be an advocacy campaign through the Ministry of Internal Affairs for involving foreign journalists.
Furthermore, grant support should be introduced for international journalists and experts planning to work in Ukraine (making documentaries for leading Western TV channels, preparing reports, carrying out surveys, etc.), and regular press tours provided for international journalists in Ukraine. In addition to that, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ukrainian embassies in other countries must work together to establish cooperation and maintaining working contacts with foreign media and individual journalists. It is important to build long-term relations with journalists for developing sustainable relations based on trust. It is also important to coordinate the work on spreading the signal of Ukrainian media with embassies. 031
WHAT SHOULD UKRAINE’S PARLIAMENT DO?
LEGISLATION ON COUNTERING INFORMATION THREATS The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (Ukraine’s Parliament) should analyze the applicable legislation on fighting information threats in accordance with the Information Security Doctrine, and adapt it to current circumstances. It should also take into consideration the problems with Draft Law 6688, especially the language that permitted law enforcement agencies (namely, prosecutors and investigators) to use sanctions against the media (up to blocking, stopping traffic, etc.) without a court decision. This legislative regulation attempt should be recognized as a failure.
At the same time, legislation should be drafted, in which sanctions against those who regularly spread disinformation, hate speech, calls for changing the constitutional order in a violent way, information containing violations of the territorial integrity of Ukraine or threatening national sovereignty have to be approved by courts.
However, one should be careful with such regulations, in order to: • Avoid that court decisions, especially in the conditions of corrupted and dependent judiciary in Ukraine, become another instrument for manipulating, influencing or oppressing freedom of speech; • Ensure the unbiased and objective examination of cases; • Limit courts’ powers in such a way that would prevent them from infringing freedom of speech.
In this light, one should take into consideration the experience of France’s draft law on combating manipulations with information (see above).
To this end, it is important for Ukraine to train special judges who would receive deeper knowledge about free speech issues and European Court of Human Rights case law, especially with regard to Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, as well as to introduce a prompt (one week) procedure for examining cases similar to those applied during elections.
Furthermore, when evaluating this experience in other countries, including Ukraine, one should bear in mind the dangers of such an approach — namely, the huge number of cases that can emerge, especially during the pre-election period, thus overloading the courts.
A system of gradating sanctions should also be introduced. Closing or blocking an information resource may not be the first option: if the content runs contrary to law, the first step should be to fine those who spread such content and to demand they should retract it, followed by other steps. Bans would be used only in response to regular and deliberate violations. 032
The provisions of the the French draft law that demand transparency of information actors on the Internet should also be considered.
When adopting decisions on disinformation, courts have to involve experts in this sphere, such as representatives of civil society and factchecking organizations and projects. A public council should be created, which would examine respective cases to ensure an objective and unbiased nature of court decisions.
SUPPORT FOR PUBLIC BROADCASTING The key role in spreading knowledge and skills about media literacy should be played by public broadcasting — both television and radio. The Ukrainian parliament has to increase (and not decrease, as is happening now) funding for public broadcasting, and it should also become one of the main actors in spreading media literacy skills.
EQUAL ACCESS TO MEDIA There is a need for regulations guaranteeing equal access to media, namely those media that are owned by oligarchs.
Oligarch-owned media in Ukraine is a reality that is unlikely to be changed in the near future. Nevertheless, it is important to create a regulatory framework that would require they should adhere to basic standards of journalism and unbiased presentation of information.
To this end, it is necessary to: • adopt legislative norms that would require TV channels to equally distribute the time of appearance of political forces on air (in the news, studio, etc.) thus creating information balance among them; • monitor the information policy of oligarch-owned channels to see if they spread messages with Russian information influences and broadcast toxic information products made in the Russian Federation (series, talk shows, entertainment shows and the like). 033
WHAT SHOULD EU INSTITUTIONS DO?
ACT, NOT JUST STUDY Today, the European Union, its member states, and the European social and political model as such have become targets for Russian information attacks.
In “Words and Wars,” we demonstrated the abundance of anti-European statements in the Russian discourse — for instance, statements saying that the Western world wants to destroy Russia, that the EU and Schengen area will soon disappear, that Western values are decadent, and so on. The majority (five out of six) of the principal messages of Russian television about the West that we analyzed in 2016 were negative32.
Russia uses asymmetric and extremely diverse steps in this effort, taking a “trial and error” approach. Certain messages are tested on the market; effective projects are developed further; ineffective projects are ended. The EU, in turn, pays a lot of attention to discussing the effectiveness of different steps — but the time has come for action and for testing possible options. In this context, it is important to move from talks to specific actions as soon as possible.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE EAST STRATCOM TASKFORCE At present, a very important attempt to respond to Russian information influences is the work of the East Stratcom Task Force, namely the EUvsDisinfo within the European External Action Service.
The EUvsDisinfo was founded by a decision of the European Council in March 201533. Its work became a major breakthrough in terms of how the EU sees the information threat from the Russian side. It became very useful for Ukraine as well by demonstrating the overall European scope of Russian influence.
Today, however, EUvsDisinfo case shows how disproportionally little attention is paid to countering external information attacks (namely those from Russia) in the European Union. Russian information aggression in the EU institutions is analyzed only by a small unit consisting of 3 (three!) persons. This small group cannot of course trace the full scale of Russian information attacks — much less respond to them in a timely manner. Therefore, it is necessary to strengthen the work of EUvsDisinfo, which includes taking the following steps:
32 Words and Wars, https://ukraineworld.org/articles/infowars/words-and-wars-ukraine-facing- russian-propaganda, p 22. – See also the study by the Ukrainian Crisis Media Center, Image of European Countries on Russian TV http://ucmc.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/TV-3.pdf 33 https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/2116/-questions-and- answers-about-the-east-stratcom-task-force_en 034
• establishing analytical networks for each EU member state and Eastern Partnership states; • creating national analogs of EUvsDisinfo at the level of specific EU members states; • creating platform versions in the languages of each EU member state and Eastern Partnership states; • cooperating with local media for better content distribution; • establishing similar units not only in the relevant institution dealing with foreign policy (European External Action Service) but also in the institutions dealing with the domestic situation in the EU — the European Commission, the European Parliament or in the EU Council. The issue of fighting disinformation is not an issue pertaining exclusively to external policy of the European Union: this is also (first and foremost) an issue pertaining to domestic policy and the fight against domestic threats. • supporting civil society projects that fight against Russian information threats.
FOCUS ON INFORMATION ISSUES IN THE EU–UKRAINE DIALOGUE Ukraine at present is not an EU member state although it declares the EU accession objective as the priority of its foreign and domestic policy.
At the same time, today there is an ongoing process of sectoral integration of Ukraine to the European Union based on the Association Agreement. An important component of this process are the five priority spheres of integration announced by Ukrainian President Poroshenko34: integration into the common energy, customs, digital, and air space as well as association with the Schengen area.
Steps toward such sectoral integration can help to integrate Ukraine better into the European digital and information space.
COMMON DIGITAL SPACE Since the EU is currently creating a common digital market, it is important for Ukraine to become part of it from the very beginning. This will help better fight cyber-attacks that can be spread significantly faster than ordinary information attacks: in this sense, Ukraine is a testing platform for Russian actions that can be disseminated to other European countries. (An example is the Petya virus and other cyber-attacks.) This will also help to establish uniform rules for fighting disinformation, hate speech, for developing the audiovisual sector, etc. — it will ensure coordination among regulators in this sphere.
Today, the countries most affected by Russian cyber-attacks — such as Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova — do not have sufficient level of cooperation with the EU in this field. Ukraine, since it is not a member of the EU, cannot become a full participant of the ERGA (the European Regulators Group for Audiovisual Media Services). Searching for a model of cooperation through bilateral agreements between individual states or between Ukraine and the EU, as well as establishing mandatory examinations of compaints of regulators from partner states, would allow us to more effectively combat information threats, such as cyber attacks, hate speech etc.
34 https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/articles/2017/09/13/7070861/ 035
EASTERN PARTNERSHIP It is important to make the issue of information security one of the priorities for the Eastern Partnership. The Eastern Partnership states that gained independence after the USSR collapsed — but that continue to experience Russian influence — are the closest and the most vulnerable targets for Russia’s information war. Therefore, it is important to work actively through bilateral association bodies with the three countries that signed the Association Agreements (Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia), and also with those that do not have such agreements (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus). This topic has to become the key for parliamentary cooperation within the EuroNEST framework.
EU PROGRAMS It is important to take advantage of the opportunities offered by EU programs for Ukraine on developing media literacy and information hygiene. This may include: • developing joint educational projects on media literacy within the framework of Erasmus+; • developing joint research and analytical projects within the framework of the Horizon 2020 program; • developing creative responses to information threats within the framework of Creative Europe; and • supporting initiatives on media literacy by public broadcasters.
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON TRANSFRONTIER TELEVISION Russian information influence actors are constantly seeking possibilities to abuse democratic achievements in the field of freedom of speech. One of their tactics is to get registered in Western countries, receive national licenses, and broadcast inside the country as a national broadcaster. This makes fighting them significantly more complicated because it allows them to avoid being categorized as an “external threat”.
Using the place of their registration, they enjoy the rights granted to them by democratic rules of the game — namely, the European Convention on Transfrontier Television. Unlike Ukraine, which signed and ratified this Council of Europe Convention, Russian did not ratify it — therefore, it did not come in force in the territory of Russia35. This asymmetry provides a justification for EU states and Ukraine to withhold rights granted by the convention from countries that did not join it.36
At the same time, Russia is trying to register its agencies of information influence in EU member states and in other European countries in order to protect its propaganda bodies using European rights and freedoms. In light of this, national agencies should remember this strategy and make it more difficult for Russian information influence agents (RT, Sputnik or Russian proxy-media) to receive national licenses.
35 https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/132/signatures?p_ auth=eEfgLf50 36 Ukraine’s Information Security Doctrine indirectly says this: its priorities include “optimization of legislative mechanisms of implementation of Ukraine’s commitments within the framework of the European Convention on Transfrontier Television with regard to the states that are not signatories to this Convention” 036
WHAT SHOULD CIVIL SOCIETY AND MEDIA DO?
IDENTIFY AGENTS OF INFORMATION INFLUENCE The key role to be played by civil society and media in this process is identifying malicious information influences, messages, communication channels, and share information about them with society and with decision makers.
They can do something that state authorities often cannot do, and that is difficult to do at a legislative level — to name the influence agents and to show the methods of their work, in other words, to do the “naming and shaming” work.
In this context, it is important to introduce regular surveys and demerits for mass media, politicians and top bloggers who were noticed creating or sharing: а) disinformation; b) hate speech; c) Russian propaganda messages.
Surveys have to be carried out by leading non-governmental organizations with grant support from national or international funds. As an example, one can refer to the practices of Ukrainian civil society such as: a) VoxCheck, which carries out regular studies of politicians’ statements with regard to disinformation or manipulations; b) studies of “jeansa” (materials with signs of paid journalism) by the Institute of Mass Information37; c) the work of StopFake, which is one of the leading world projects on analyzing disinformation; d) regular monitoring that is carried out by Detector Media: for propagandistic information influences38 as well as Russian media39.
Anti-ratings should be applied to the top TV channels, web-sites, press, and first of all alternative media — recently launched web-sites or newspapers, popular bloggers, YouTube channels, etc.
It is also important to examine so-called opinion leaders, especially in the online space. Respective surveys should include the questions: а) which messages do they share with their audiences; b) are these messages accepted by the target audience, c) is their popularity natural or inflated by bots and special promotion.
37 http://imi.org.ua/news/upts-mp-ta-medvedchuk-najbilshe-dzhynsuvaly-v-internet-zmi-v-lypni- doslidzhennya-imi/ 38 https://ms.detector.media/monitoring/advocacy_and_influence/ 39 https://ms.detector.media/monitoring/ru_zmi/ 037
Another strategy can be to simply draw the public’s attention to the toxic nature of some media resources, practices or messages. It can be based on the example of anti-smoking information campaigns — instead of prohibitions or fines, citizens are informed about the dangers of consuming dubious information or disinformation.
An example can be taken from practices of Scandinavian countries where the governments warn citizens about the danger of information influences, including Russian40. Such actions have a result: in 2016, the Finnish-language editorial office of Russian agency Sputnik was closed because of small audience. In Sweden, Norway, and Denmark, Sputnik closed its Twitter accounts in national languages41.
Such actions, which include clearly identifying official Russian media as being controlled by the Russian government, can have a cumulative effect — for instance, in the advertising sphere. Advertisers will be more careful when placing advertisements on Russian resources knowing that the audience believes that they are harmful in terms of information hygiene.
STRENGTHENING DEMOCRATIC NARRATIVES As we mentioned in the introduction, it would be a mistake to see the problem of the Russian strategy of “information struggle” only from the point of view of disinformation or fakes. Disinformation is only one of the instruments of actions used by the agents of Russian information influences. They are guided by a general objective: to create a discourse aimed at а) disseminating information chaos, b) demoralizing and demotivating public opinion, and c) promoting total “cynical mind”42 and apocalyptic thinking.
Therefore, in response, democratic societies should not only dispel Russian narratives and fakes but also formulate democratic narratives that will explain the values on which modern democratic societies are based in an interesting and untrivial way.
In this context, one has to analyze the spheres in which the Russian propagandistic machine is most active — history, economics, human rights, geopolitics, and so on. In these spheres, it is necessary to work proactively by developing and sharing interesting and creative content: by digitizing archives, visualizing data, and generating content for various categories of citizens, from viral videos to animations and educational programs. These narratives have to be based on carefully examined facts; accuracy and objectivity is something that will distinguish them from Russian propagandistic narratives. Of course, it is necessary to preserve the diversity of the narratives and to maintain the dialogue between them. It is also important in contemporary conditions to combine critical thinking with understanding the danger of “cynical mind”.
40 See on the role of the security service of Sweden and the Ministry of Emergency Situations of Sweden https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-42285332 41 https://yle.fi/uutiset/3-8738882 42 A notion introduced by German philosopher Peter Sloterdijk 038
Whereas the 20th century propaganda was focused on promoting certain ideologies and creating an exaggeratedly positive picture, in 21st century propaganda is often aimed at destroying the “opponent’s ideology” and hence creates an exaggeratedly negative picture.
However, both an exaggeratedly positive and an exaggeratedly negative picture distort information — and therefore, the focus should be on an objective presentation of both success stories and problems. It is important to develop constructive journalism, which not only demonstrates problems but also shows stories of successful solutions, success stories, and so on.
Furthermore, we think it is not correct to separate fact-checking (examining the narratives of others) from the development of democratic narrative. Without fact-checking, narratives remain fake; however, dry facts without narratives will remain just an unorganized set of data, which citizens forget very quickly.
ROLE OF HISTORY Modern neo-authoritarianism — not only Russian — often bases its narratives on “alternative” interpretations of history and imposing its own vision.
Russian propaganda is active in Baltic states where an information ghetto is created for the Russian- speaking population, which is filled with Russian (and often anti-European and anti-Western) messages.
In the worldwide context, Russia also promotes “alternative” messages, namely those that demonstrate the USSR’s actions during World War II exclusively in a positive way (omitting the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the occupation of Eastern Poland, war crimes, etc.); they interpret the invasion to Czechoslovakia in 1968 as an action against “former fascists, SS officers, supporters of Hitler”43 or describe revolutions in Eastern Europe (from 1989 until today) as organized by Western secret services.
For countering such revisionism, the role of professional historians, the academic community, National Memory Institutes (if available), and associations of historians is very important. They can share the truth about history, in the first place — of the 20th through 21st centuries. Cooperation should be established between professional historians and the media producing stories about historical topics.
In the Ukrainian context, it is important to organize regular communication between the National Memory Institute and communications experts for ensuring mutual feedback by: 1) providing consultations to communication experts by historians about controversial aspects of Ukrainian history, 2) providing consultations to historians by communications experts on the communication effect of specific actions of the National Memory Institute abroad.
43 See the movie, Warsaw Treaty: Declassified Pages on channel Russia 1. https://www.youtube. com/watch?v=bwKGHMbwVaQ. 17.01 – 17.07. 039
In the Western context, Russian-centrism of some historical schools is still a problem since they tend to view Ukraine through the prism of Russian understanding. Therefore, it is important to develop educational and research programs that would focus on more pluralistic research of the region and step away from domination of Russian history and the Russian view.
It is furthermore important to pay attention to the role of church and religion. Russia often spreads its narrative through its powerful “soft power” in Ukraine and in other former Soviet states — Russian Orthodox Church. Through it, a lot of anti-Western and anti-Ukrainian messages are circulated. An indicator of how important the church issue is for Russian propaganda can be found in a powerful (dis)information campaign against granting the Tomos of Autocephaly to Ukraine, which we could observe in 2018.
SELF-REGULATION AND CO-REGULATION In Ukraine, it is important to strengthen self-regulation and co-regulation (between the state, civil society, and business) of the information and media sphere. To this end, it is important to define the role of self-regulation institutions (for instance, of such institutions as the Independent Media Council, the Commission on Journalism Ethics, and others) at a legislative level. If such institutions make some important decisions, the state has to respond with respective policy.
FACT-CHECKING Fact-checking and information verification will become increasingly necessary in the modern world with the growth of possibilities for manipulations. Even such forms of sharing information as photo, video and audio recordings, which in the past were believed to be the most objective forms of presentation of information, today become subject to fraud and manipulation. Further on, the situation can become even more complicated, and therefore fact-checking will be an important requirement in the work of media’s editorial offices.
In this context, it is important to а) share knowledge extensively about a basic examination of information, and b) ensure coordination between fact-checkers and editorial offices; organize training for journalists by fact-checking initiatives.
Of key importance is large-scale expansion of fact-checking projects and initiatives. Today, such initiatives are very local and, of course, they cannot cope with the flows of information (for instance, in Ukraine alone, there are dozens — if not hundreds — of web-sites that share not only unverified but even fabricated news). It is important that fact-checkers should have sufficient technological tools for monitoring and analyzing a large amount of data and other facts in order to increase the scale of their work. 040
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we proposed steps that should be taken on international and national levels to counteract Russian information warfare. This document is written based upon Ukrainian discussions and the Ukrainian experience of facing Kremlin propaganda. However, we also took into account other national experiences, by interviewing experts from various countries.
The summary of our recommendations are presented in Executive Summary section in the beginning of this book. The list of experts who worked on this paper and who were interviewed for this paper are mentioned in the methodology section (How We Made This Document). We thank all experts who participated, and the donors (EU/IRF Civic Synergy Project) who supported this work.
The key challenge now is how to take systematic steps in response to Russian information warfare. As explained, Russia’s strategy is hybrid and flexible, it has multiple facets and multiple layers, it has a unique capacity to mimic democratic forms and even national narratives. It uses democracy against itself. This is what makes it so unique, and what makes fight against it so difficult. But in a time when information is increasingly used as a war instrument, we have no other option than to counteract it, de-weaponize malign acts, and tame the hydra. This analytical publication was compiled by NGO Internews Ukraine with the support of the European Union and the International Renaissance Foundation within the framework of the Civic Synergy Project and under the auspices of the Ukrainian National Platform of the Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum. Its content is the exclusive responsibility of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union and the International Renaissance Foundation.