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Taming the Hydra: How to Resist Kremlin’S Information Aggression

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TAMING THE HYDRA: HOW TO RESIST KREMLIN’S INFORMATION AGGRESSION RECOMMENDATIONS FOR INFORMATION POLICY Kyiv – 2018 TAMING THE HYDRA: HOW TO RESIST KREMLIN’S INFORMATION AGGRESSION RECOMMENDATIONS FOR INFORMATION POLICY This analytical publication was compiled by NGO Internews Ukraine with the support of the European Union and the International Renaissance Foundation within the framework of the Civic Synergy Project and under the auspices of the Ukrainian National Platform of the Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum. Its content is the exclusive responsibility of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union and the International Renaissance Foundation. This project is funded by the European Union. Kyiv – 2018 002 Initiative group (Internews Ukraine) Latvia (Baltic Centre for Media Excellence). Andriy Kulakov — Ukrainian media Author of number of reports on psychological expert, PR consultant, programme director operations, Kremlin propaganda, and media of Internews Ukraine NGO. Editor and in EaP region, Central Europe and Balkans. co-author of “The Reforms Guide” and “Words and Wars: Ukraine Facing Kremlin Igor Solovey — Ukrainian journalist Propaganda” publications. covering international issues, the head of international department at LB.ua. Volodymyr Yermolenko — Ukrainian Media expert, consultant of “How Russian philosopher and journalist, director of Propaganda Works” publication. European projects at Internews Ukraine NGO, editor in chief at UkraineWorld.org, Vitalii Moroz — Head of New Media at journalist at Hromadske.ua. Editor in chief of Internews Ukraine NGO. Responsible for “Words and Wars: Ukraine Facing Kremlin strategy planning and implementation of new Propaganda.” technology and media projects. Oversees programs aimed to promote digital security, Vitalii Rybak — coordinator of EU-related fact-checking, Internet freedom and digital projects at Internews Ukraine, analyst at rights for journalists and civil society. UkraineWorld.org, co-author of “Words and Wars: Ukraine Facing Kremlin Propaganda” Pavlo Belousov — expert of Internews book, contributor to Ukraine Alert (Atlantic Ukraine NGO, consultant of Digital Security Council) and Ukraine Verstehen (Zentrum School 380. Liberale Moderne). Peer reviewer Expert group Ihor Rozkladay — lawyer of the Centre Tetiana Popova — Ukrainian media expert, for Democracy and Rule of Law (CEDEM), blogger, Advisor to the Minister of Defense leading expert of the “Media Reform” group of Ukraine (2014-2015); Deputy Minister of of the Reanimation Package of Reforms, Information policy of Ukraine (2015-2016); member of the Independent Media Council. strategic communication expert at Information Security NGO, managing partner at Arena Media Expert (Havas group). Editor Kateryna Kruk — Ukrainian Volodymyr Yermolenko communications specialist and political scientist focusing on Ukrainian post-Maidan Translators transition, international affairs and analyzing Valeria Mendez, Lesia Dubenko Russian disinformation campaigns in Ukraine. She is an external fellow at European Values Literary editor Kremlin Watch program and an analyst at Jacob Fawcett Stop Fake. Design Roman Shutov — Ukrainian political Nadiya Machkarina-Mykhailichenko scientist and media expert, Advisor of the EED Content Fund. In 2014-18, worked in Illustrations think tanks in Ukraine (Detector Media) and Artem Mykhailichenko 003 TABLE OF CONTENTS 004 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY • More Personnel and Resources • Monitoring Efficiency of Public Policy 006 HOW WE MADE THIS DOCUMENT • Public and Cultural Diplomacy • Work in the East and South of Ukraine 008 PROBLEM DESCRIPTION: • Work with Technical Giants WEAPONIZING INFORMATION • Cooperation with Civil Society • Support for International Journalists 014 RESPONSE: DE-WEAPONIZING INFORMATION 032 WHAT SHOULD UKRAINE’S PARLIAMENT DO? 015 RECOMMENDATIONS • Legislation on Countering Information Threats 015 WHAT SHOULD THE INTERNATIONAL • Support for Public Broadcasting COMMUNITY DO? • Equal Access to Media • Understanding the Threat and Addressing It 034 WHAT SHOULD EU INSTITUTIONS DO? 017 WHAT SHOULD NATIONAL • Act, Not Just Study PARLIAMENTS DO? • Development of the East Stratcom • Media Transparency, especially Online TaskForce • Transparency of Political and Information • Focus on Information Issues in the EU – Campaigns Ukraine Dialogue • Legislation on Hate Speech and • Common Digital Space Disinformation • Eastern Partnership • EU Programs 020 WHAT SHOULD THE NATIONAL • European Convention on Transfrontier GOVERNMENTS DO? Television • National Information Security Strategies • Sanctions against Information 037 WHAT SHOULD CIVIL SOCIETY Influence Agents AND MEDIA DO? • Branding Russia’s State “Media” • Identify Agents of Information Influence • Follow the Money • Strengthening Democratic Narratives • Media Literacy • Self-regulation and Co-regulation • Fact-checking 026 WHAT SHOULD UKRAINE DO? • Primary Approach: Explain, Do Not Lie 040 CONCLUSIONS 026 WHAT SHOULD PRESIDENTIAL ADMINISTRATION AND GOVERNMENT DO? • Information Security Doctrine • Coordination Among Key Institutions 004 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY This publication is a follow-up to the book “Words and Wars: Ukraine Facing Kremlin Propaganda”1 which Internews Ukraine published in 2017 with the support of the EU/IRF Civic Synergy Project. While in “Words and Wars” we aimed at describing the challenge of Russian information warfare with regard to Ukraine, in this publication we discuss what to do about it. Since this question has become increasingly urgent worldwide, it is important for us to give a perspective based upon Ukrainian experience. In this publication we argue that: • Russia is using information as a tool of domination and warfare; this conclusion can be made from both analyzing Russia’s official documents and monitoring its information practices; • In a situation when information is increasingly weaponized, national governments and parliaments, as well as international community should search for ways to de-weaponize it when it is used with malevolent purposes; • As security and disarmament were the key principles of Helsinki process in 1970s, which became a milestone for European security, it is important to pursue an approach of disarmament in the information field, i.e. of fighting against aggressive disinformation practices in the information area; • This “info-disarmament” should take into account that the tools used by the Russian information warfare are extremely flexible. In this regard we address our policy recommendations to the international community as such, to national governments and parliaments, to Ukrainian government and parliament, to civil society (both national and international) and to EU institutions. We advise national governments and parliaments to: • Increase the transparency of media, in particular online media, which can ensure that the traceability of malign influences, and that information resources are held accountable; • Increase the transparency of political and information campaigns, especially during the election period; ensure that internet platforms make the technologies providing for this transparency accessible worldwide; • Increase legislative action against the conscious spread of disinformation and information manipulation; • Increase legislative action against hate speech, in particular systematic hate speech on Russian information resources; • Adopt information security strategies and implement them at the national level; • Impose sanctions (travel ban and asset freeze) on actors of information warfare; • Impose sanctions on Russian “media” companies that violate previous sanction regimes (i.e. the Russian “media” companies that took over Ukrainian media frequencies in Crimea or Donbas); 1 https://ukraineworld.org/articles/infowars 005 • Impose special branding requirements on Russian state-owned “media” (requiring them to disclose that they are “funded by Russian government”); • Better do the “follow the money” research, i.e. checking sources suspected in spreading disinformation, hate speech, with regard to their funding; • Proceed more systematically with media literacy, not only in formal but also in informal and non-formal education. We advise the Ukrainian government and parliament to: • Always follow the approach of telling the truth and explaining. Avoid any temptations to bend the truth; • Fully implement the Ukrainian “information security doctrine”; • Ensure stable coordination of key public institutions with regard to information security issues; create a government office that would monitor, analyze and respond to information attacks; • Provide more personnel and resources to these institutions; • Monitor the efficacy of public policy with regard to measures already taken in order to improve their efficacy in the future; • Work with technical giants (such as Facebook, Twitter, and Google) to establish partnerships which will take into account Ukrainian concerns; • Cooperate with civil society on fact checking, monitoring and naming the agents of malign information influencers; • Facilitate the work of international journalists covering the Ukrainian issues; • Adopt legislation taking into account security concerns, but also ensuring fundamental rights and freedoms; • Increase support of public broadcasting; • Ensure equal access to media, including the oligarchic media. We also advise the EU to: • Inject more resources into the EU East StratCom TaskForce; • Cooperate with national teams (both government and non-government)
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