AEROBATIC COMPETENCY EVALUATION PROGRAM: HOW WE GOT HERE Since Those Guidelines Were Developed, No Spectator Has Been Killed by an Aircraft
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AEROBATIC COMPETENCY EVALUATION PROGRAM: HOW WE GOT HERE Since those guidelines were developed, no spectator has been killed by an aircraft n his autobiography, Air Show Hall vive, Cole testified before CAA investigators performing of Fame member Duane Cole wrote, and Congress, ultimately convincing them I“In 1946, the CAA [Civil Aeronautics that air shows could be continued with reg- at a U.S. Authority, the Federal Aviation Admin - ulatory changes that would assure spectator is tration’s predecessor organization] didn’t safety. Shortly thereafter, industry profes- require a waiver of regulation to put on an sionals working with federal regulators es - air show. air meet [air show]. The only requirements tablished the skeleton of the program under were a letter notifying them of the event which U.S. air shows have been conducted and observing of some loosely written rules. ever since: minimum set back distances for To say the rules were inadequate would be different types of aircraft and a sterile aero- an understatement.” batic box. Since those guidelines were de- This very loose regulatory situation con- veloped, no spectator has been killed by an tinued until the September 1951 when an aircraft performing at a U.S. air show. Air National Guard AT-6 crashed into the But, even with the establishment of crowd at an air show in Flagler, Colorado, those rules, the creation of the Federal Avia- resulting in the death of 19 spectators and tion Administration (FAA) in 1958 and the the pilot. consolidation of authority on all domestic aviation issues, federal regulators paid very An Industry on little attention to air shows. ICAS member the Precipice and long-time air show performer Walt The political fall out from the Flagler inci- Pierce remembers that when he flew his dent was serious. All air shows were can- first air show in 1963, the only documenta- celled and the future of the industry was in tion you needed as a performer was a copy jeopardy. As the industry struggled to sur- of the waiver from your last show. The re - 4Q 2007 31 Chart 1. Fatal Air Show Accidents, Pilots, Military and Civilian, North America, 1988-2007 16 14 12 10 8 6 ACCIDENTS 4 2 0 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 quirement for your first show? Walt is hazy the Aerobatic Competency Evaluation “It’s a serious situation and we have to on this one, but thinks all that was required (ACE) program. In this early program, the deal with it seriously. Unfortunately, if was the endorsement by an established aer- ACE was a pilot, usually an active air show the industry is not able to deal with it, we obatic pilot. performer, who assumed the responsibility (the FAA) are going to put in some kind of But by the mid-1960s, the evaluation of a of advising the local FSDO as to the compe- ‘fix’ that will not be very popular...because pilot’s aerobatic competency had become tency of aspiring and renewing aerobatic we are going to be talking about altitude more formal and was conducted by the performers. But the program was voluntary, restrictions, speed restrictions and that kind local Flight Standards District Offices there were no established standards or pro- of thing.” (FSDO) where an inspector would evaluate cedures for conducting evaluations, and So, in the winter of 1990-91, in a gen- a potential or renewing air show performer. individual inspectors were still permitted to uinely groundbreaking government/asso - This system worked well while the FAA had issue Statement of Aerobatic Competency ciation partnership, the FAA designated a cadre of experienced pilot/inspectors that (SAC) cards without consulting with an ICAS and its more experienced pilots as the were familiar with aerobatics, but as FAA established air show performer. “peer reviewers.” Beginning in the spring of inspectors with aerobatic expertise began to 1991, every pilot would be obligated to be retire, the in-house expertise in aerobatics Desperate Times, evaluated each year by an experienced air left with them. As a result, in many cases, Dramatic Measures show pilot who would be able to distin- FAA inspectors with no aerobatic training Over time, this lack of qualified evaluators guish good from bad, dangerous from safe. were assessing the aerobatic competence of began to have consequences. By the late ICAS also assumed most of the administra- prospective air show pilots. 1980s, the air show industry was suffering tive responsibilities for the ACE program. In 1977, Bernie Geier, then manager of through a large number of accidents each In the first year that ICAS ran the pro- the FAA’s General Aviation and Commercial year. A demonstrable cause/effect relation- gram, air show accidents were cut in half Division, recognized that the FAA lacked ship was never established, but there were (see Chart 1). In subsequent years, the the in-house expertise to evaluate aerobatic strong indications that the annual aerobatic number of accidents dropped dramatically pilots and suggested the first evolution of evaluations were not rigorous enough and again. And, since 1993, the ACE program were not being conducted by the right peo- has helped maintain that lower accident ple. Nearly a dozen air show pilots were rate. During the last three years that the ICAS ACE Committee dying in accidents at air shows every year FAA ran the program on its own in 1988, Chairman Gregory Poe, Boise, Idaho and the FAA was on the verge of shutting 1989 and 1990, there were an average of Eddie Andreini, Half Moon Bay, California the whole system down. During the 1990 twelve accidents per year. From 1996 Bob Carlton, Albuquerque, New Mexico air show season, the industry suffered through 2006, there was an average of just Bud Granley, Bellevue, Washington through 14 fatal accidents at air shows. As 2.5 fatal air show accidents each year. Wayne Handley, Groveland, California one highly placed FAA manager said, “[It] During that same period, aircraft designs Scott Lesh, Nevillewood, Pennsylvania seems like every Monday morning, CNN changed and other developments con- Major Mark Proulx, Hill AFB, Utah brings news of another air show fatality.” tributed to the dramatic decrease in fatal air In October of 1990, Roger Baker, the show accidents, but most industry profes- FAA’s National Air Show Coordinator said, sionals agree that the single biggest cause of 32 AIR SHOWS Chart 2. Statement of Aerobatic Competency Card Holders, 1993-2006 450 400 350 300 250 NUMBER OF INDIVIDUAL SAC CARD HOLDERS 200 1993 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 this decrease has been the ICAS administra- ICAS Aerobatic Competency Evaluators tion of the ACE program. Eddie Andreini, Half Moon Bay, California Vlado Lenoch, Countryside, Illinois Curt Arnspiger, Gahanna, Ohio Scott Lesh, Nevillewood, Pennsylvania Controversial from Bob Bishop, Tucson, Arizona Walt Linscott, Alpharetta, Georgia the Beginning Ed Bowes, Lincoln, Nebraska Bill Lumley, Delray Beach, Florida The ICAS ACE Program has not been with- Richard Brand, Henderson, Nevada Dan McClung, Arley, Alabama out controversy and problems. Indeed, Fred Cabanas, Key West, Florida Dan McCue, York, Maine many pilots performing today were dead-set Bill Carter, St. Albert, Alberta John Mohr, Vadnais Heights, Minnesota against the idea of ICAS stepping into this Matt Chapman, Kennett Square, Paul Pitch Molnar, St. Catharines, Ontario quasi-government role when the idea was Pennsylvania John Mrazek, North Vancouver, initially proposed in the fall of 1990. Dur - Bill Cherwin, Crystal Lake, Illinois British Columbia ing the 1990 ICAS Convention at the Rivi - Jan Collmer, Dallas, Texas Jim Mynning, Chelsea, Michigan era Hotel in Las Vegas, the ICAS leadership John Collver, Lomita, California Howard Pardue, Breckenridge, Texas faced a largely hostile audience as they Bill Cornick, Thousand Oaks, California James Parker, Warren, Vermont explained to air show pilots the proposal Dave Dacy, Harvard, Illinois Carl Pascarell, Jacksonville, Florida under which ICAS would assume responsi- Dan Dameo, Bridgewater, New Jersey Olin Pash, Harlan, Iowa bility for administering the ACE program. Bob Davis, Lake Geneva, Wisconsin Mark Pfeifler, Little Elm, Texas At the time, guidelines for the program Stewart Dawson, Galveston, Texas Warren Pietsch, Minot, North Dakota were still being developed. It was not yet John Ellis, Columbia, Missouri Kent Pietsch, Burlington, North Dakota clear who would serve as Aerobatic Com - Paul Entrekin, Pensacola, Florida Gregory Poe, Boise, Idaho petency Evaluators (ACEs) and how the first Bill Finagin, Annapolis, Maryland Vernon Ricks, Greenwood, Mississippi ACEs would be selected. Many pilots were Ken Fowler, Rocky Mountain House, Alberta Debbie Rihn-Harvey, La Porte, Texas concerned that the program would be used Debbie Gary, Friendswood, Texas Jim Roberts, Chicago, Illinois to discourage newcomers from becoming Michael Goulian, Maynard, Massachusetts Ryland Roetman, Arley, Alabama involved in the business. Others were angry Bud Granley, Bellevue, Washington Frank Ryder, Metairie, Louisiana that pilots would be obligated to pay ICAS Keoki Gray, Fernandina Beach, Florida Larry Schlasinger, Chetek, Wisconsin for a service that they had previously Steve Gustafson, Birmingham, Alabama William Segalla, Canaan, Connecticut received at no cost from the FAA. Ed Hamill, Goodyear, Arizona Greg Shelton, Collinsville, Oklahoma Rumblings about ICAS administration of Wayne Handley, Groveland, California Harry Shepard, St. Augustine, Florida the program persisted for more than ten Rob Harrison, Claremont, California Ed Shipley, Malvern, Pennsylvania years as ICAS faced and solved a nearly con- Randy Henderson, Frisco, Texas Dale Snodgrass, St. Augustine, Florida stant stream of problems and challenges. Alan Henley, Birmingham, Alabama Gene Soucy, League City, Texas Over time, though, many of the initial con- William Hunsaker, Grand Junction, Colorado Sean Tucker, Salinas, California cerns proved to be unwarranted.