Rethinking Cold War History Author(S): David Mcknight Source: Labour History, No
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Rethinking Cold War History Author(s): David McKnight Source: Labour History, No. 95 (Nov., 2008), pp. 185-196 Published by: Australian Society for the Study of Labour History, Inc. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27516316 . Accessed: 01/10/2014 14:48 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Australian Society for the Study of Labour History, Inc. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Labour History. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 210.212.93.44 on Wed, 1 Oct 2014 14:48:39 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions RethinkingCold War History DavidMcKnight* Historians have rethought some of the prevailing assumptions employed in writing about the Cold War in Australia. Until recently, the history of the Cold War in Australia was often written with too little detachment and skepticism toward the Left, and with a failure of scholarly empathy toward the claims of the anti-Communist Right. The opening of new and sources as 'Venona' one reason in archival intelligence (such the papers) is for the shift thefield. Another is a reassessment of the link between theUSSR and theCommunist Party ofAustralia (CPA), that leads to questions about theCPA's dogmatic pro-Soviet stance, and towhat degree this was partly responsible for its defeats, rather than simply victimisation. sources some was New archival establish that clandestine political activity undertaken, including espionage and that Soviet funds were given to the CPA over a long period. Not new every historian, however, has embraced this evidence. The present article critiques recent contributions by Cain andHocking, suggesting that discussion of political fundamentalism on the Left and the security response to it is vital ifCold War history is to be understood and to made relevant discussions of contemporary terrorism. The field of Cold War history in Australia has undergone a major shift in to interpretation. This has led less partisan accounts of several events which had previously been the site of significant differences between historians of the Left and Right. This shift confirms Deery's earlier view of the susceptibility of the field to shifting interpretations and his argument that 'the history of communism and anti-communism is [in Australia] being rewritten'.1 Deery also predicted that some controversies from continue this period would for many years. This article discusses one area link such whereby the between the Communist Party of Australia (CPA) and the Soviet Union is subject to differing interpretation. These continuing now occur to differences mainly among historians sympathetic the Left and the more labour movement, rather than the older binary between this group and those to cause. sympathetic the anti-Communist In a new sources part, this shift is consequence of the opening of archival following the collapse of the Soviet Union and its East European satellites. This meant initially the opening of the Communist International records at the Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History (RGASPI) which in turn prompted the opening of the archives of the US National Security Agency including the results of the US-UK decoding operation of Soviet foreign activities (the 'Venona' files).2 Combined with the increasingly liberal release policy of security archives by the National Archives of Australia (NAA), these resources have created the basis for a War notable rethinking of the interpretative frameworks of Cold history. Among the are Ball works indicating this interpretative shift those by Lowe, and Horner, along and with other contributions from Deery McKnight.3 access to This shift began in the early 1980s when historians gained security new was archives under the Archives Act 1983. The first substantial study Marine's detailed 1987 account of the Petrov Royal Commission.4 Manne concluded that as as were Vladimir the Petrovs well intelligence officers truthful witnesses; that 185 This content downloaded from 210.212.93.44 on Wed, 1 Oct 2014 14:48:39 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions LabourHistory Number 95 November 2008 Petrov's defection had not been deliberately timed by the Menzies government for electoral benefit and that the Royal Commission was right in naming a leading as a CPA member, Walter Clayton, conduit for documents from the Department of to account was terms External Affairs Soviet intelligence. Manne's assessed in of the partisanship which saturated the writing of Cold War history in 1987. One of the reviews revisionist account it as 'a was of his described quality hatchet job' which flawed'.5 The reviewer that Manne had trusted sources 'seriously charged which he should not have, including the newly released archives of the Australian Security Intelligence Organization (ASIO). There was 'abundant historical evidence that to In shows security services be great deceivers'. arguing this, the reviewer expressed a strong belief in an overarching interpretive truth which could not be contradicted mere by empirical evidence. Since then there has been something of a paradigm shift in the historiography of Cold War. Manne's are not most the Today, general findings seriously challenged by historians of the Cold War, indicating the distance of the shift. For example, Lowe situates the Venona decoding as one of the keys to the creation of ASIO and to fuelling Menzies' while that the Petrov Commission anti-communism, acknowledging Royal was politically useful forMenzies.6 In the second volume of his biography ofMenzies, Martin acknowledges the usefulness of the Petrov inquiry to Menzies' election while not it as prospects regarding decisive and acknowledging the substantial matters In or espionage before the inquiry.7 Crusade Conspiracy Duncan argues that communists were of 'the most demonic in most willing agents apparatus history' yet were a more driven by 'a desire for just social order'. Duncan adds that the 'threat from communism was real' 'at times but absurdly exaggerated' by Santamaria.8 recent The release of much of the private correspondence of B.A. Santamaria will resources provide for further less partisan accounts of the clash between the CPA and the anti-communist Catholic forces around Santamaria.9 In I areas all centre this article will examine three of continuing debate, of which on the CPA which formed the hub of the Australian Left during the Cold War in a to in one or to way that today is hard imagine. All relate way another the close relationship between the CPA and the Soviet Union. The first concerns the degree to which the CPA was the victim of anti-Communist political forces as opposed to its own The concerns debate over being the author of misfortunes. second the the whether CPA members spied for the Soviet Union and, if so, the historiographical concerns consequences of this. The third particular questions of financial subsidies during the Cold War and the implications of the use of secret members in politics. The 1959 PeaceCongress: Victims or Agents? area concerns to The first of debate the degree which government-inspired was to decline and isolation the CPA and the causes McCarthyism blame for the of account McLaren a event in the Cold War it supported. One important by of key in is a which is The Australia good example of the interpretive shift underway.10 it is a model for the new article discusses the 1959 Peace Congress and in many ways between communism and anti-communism. appreciation of the clash Peace and Disarmament held in Melbourne in 1959 was a The Congress for event of its time and aimed to unite the Left and broader forces significant political a In the of its and of around campaign against nuclear weapons. eyes participants This content downloaded from 210.212.93.44 on Wed, 1 Oct 2014 14:48:39 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 1 McKnight RethinkingCold War History the historians who follow them, the tough political attack launched on the Peace came Congress was the quintessence of the Right's Cold War. The attack from the denounced the as a communist Liberal-Country Party government, which Congress front and from the anti-Communist Australian Congress for Cultural Freedom to Soviet whose members attended the Congress criticize the actions of the Union. Unusually, ASIO Director General, Charles Spry, personally approached one of the more and Congress's respectable sponsors, Professor Alan Stout, convinced him to More ASIO launched a withdraw his sponsorship.11 covertly, major 'exposure overseas to operation' using its contacts in the press, in the RSL and expose the as a Congress 'communist front'.12 an Put this way, the events around the Congress fit interpretation which dominates historical writing on the Cold War. This interpretation is exemplified by an account of the Congress by Saunders and Summy which is subject to criticism by McLaren.13 The strength ofMcLaren's account of the Peace Congress is that it demonstrates that the Communist Party and the people and organisations which it strongly influenced, were own as as victims a both authors of their fate, well of campaign sponsored its was by the Government and security agency. The Congress held three years after the brutal repression of the 1956 revolt inHungary. This repression included the execution of seven writers and the jailing of 25 others. The Congress itself had a were session in which artists and writers expected to express their support for peace.