Policy Brief Foreign Policy Program November 2014

Summary: Only with the adop- The Lasting Impact of the Process tion of the Helsinki Final Act, in Helsinki, in August1975, by Martin Sletzinger did it eventually become stan- dard international practice, not just in Europe but around the world, to hold governments accountable for the manner in Introduction long-held Soviet post-World War II which they treated their popula- In the 21st century, human rights and ambition for a pan-European security tions. On issues covered by the the whole process of the promotion conference that would formally ratify Helsinki Final Act, and not just of human dignity in all of its forms human rights and humanitarian the post-war borders and security concerns, traditional diplomacy is taken for granted. It may come as realities in Europe, combined with a has now given way to a more a surprise to some that the practice NATO-led desire to exploit this Soviet public diplomacy that includes of calling into question respect for imperative by seeking the inclusion of both diplomats and public human rights and freedoms in other Western visions of respect for human leaders. states — publicly and in international rights and the human dimension. The fora — was virtually unknown until Soviets hoped such a new world order 1975. would eventually undermine the NATO alliance in favor of a toothless Only with the adoption of the pan-European security order. Helsinki Final Act, in Helsinki, Finland in August1975, did it eventu- Soviet desire for a treaty-like docu- ally become standard international ment ratifying post-war borders was practice, not just in Europe but understandable. Their borders had around the world, to hold govern- undergone whole-sale and serious ments accountable for the manner changes, all of them, it goes without in which they treated their popu- saying, favorable to the . lations. This took time and many Germany was divided into two states, difficult negotiations, both East-West Finland deprived of its historic and within the Western alliance. province of Karelia, and Romania Acceptance of raising human rights stripped of its province of Moldavia, issues, whether bilaterally, publicly, just to name a few. However, the most and internationally, in the CSCE, dramatic change, one with huge rami- the OSCE, and the United Nations, fications to this day, was the move- gradually became standard diplomatic ment of the entire country of Poland practice. hundreds of miles to the west so that post-war Poland lost its eastern Human Rights as a Legitimate provinces, now informally known 1744 R Street NW Focus of International Attention as western Ukraine centered on the Washington, DC 20009 How did this happen? As Ambas- ancient multi-ethnic city of Lvov. This T 1 202 745 3950 sador Javier Ruperez so clearly and is the very region that has supplied F 1 202 265 1662 expertly detailed in his paper, the Ukraine with its post- Viktor Yanu- E [email protected] origins of the CSCE arose from a kovich leaders and supporters whose Foreign Policy Program Policy Brief traditions and dialects differ so markedly from those of international community and in no way could be dismissed more Russian-oriented provinces in eastern Ukraine. as simply interference in in internal affairs (Principle VI) as When Russian President Vladimir Putin maintained in the Soviet Union and its unwilling allies originally claimed. September 2014 that eastern Ukraine used to belong to the From this significant breakthrough emerged several Russian Empire, he neglected to also observe that western seminal events in Eastern Europe, which had become, Ukraine used to belong to Poland, and before that to the despite Soviet efforts to the contrary, the focal point of the Hapsburg Empire, just to mention another failed and unla- Helsinki process. mented relic of the past. The emergence of the Solidarity movement in Poland in All these border changes notwithstanding, this tension 1980 was the first, large-scale effort in Eastern Europe since between security concerns and human rights was reflected Czechoslovakia in 1968 to defy communist leadership and in the nearly three years it took to negotiate the Helsinki break from Soviet domination. During this tense period, Final Act first in Geneva, Switzerland, and finally in the avoidance of a possible large-scale Soviet invasion Helsinki in the summer of 1975. The Helsinki Final Act was in 1981 was facilitated, among other important factors, not a treaty or a statement of international law, but rather by the Helsinki process, which was meeting at that time a political, public document signed by the heads of state of in Madrid. U.S. and NATO warnings to the Soviets were the 35 participating states (since enlarged to 57 as of 2014). conveyed not just bilaterally but repeatedly through high- Nor was the original intent of the signatories for there to level diplomatic representations at the CSCE meeting. (It be a formal institutionalization of the process. Rather the is worth noting that the build-up of Soviet forces around CSCE/OSCE was intended to unfold in a “review process” Poland at that time dwarfed that which is going on around held by the 35 states periodically beginning in Belgrade, eastern Ukraine today.) The founders of the Charter ‘77 Yugoslavia in June 1977. Envisaged as lasting for a few movement in Czechoslovakia directly linked its growth months, the meeting did not end until February 1978 with to the Helsinki process. Significantly, the leaders of this very little agreed upon except to meet again in Madrid in movement later emerged as the leaders of a free nation, 1980. That protracted meeting lasted until 1983 and led to a including Vaclav Havel as president and Jiri Dienstbier as series of specialized meetings and one more review confer- foreign minister. ence held in Vienna starting in 1986. Not every new human rights-related development in the The protracted nature of these follow-up review confer- CSCE/OSCE experience proved positive and effective. ences reflected the great difficulty in advancing the As is often the case, unfortunately, the Balkan countries Helsinki process but also the tension within the Western, proved the exception to the rule on the principle of respect NATO-led group of nations, which tried to reconcile for ethnic, cultural, and religious rights. Notably, the top considerable differences within its ranks on the inten- CSCE human rights cases (especially for the U.S. Helsinki sity and specificity of its critique of the Warsaw Pact. Commission) that emerged in the former Yugoslavia were Such differences still exist to this day and can be seen for those of Franjo Tudjman and Dobraslav Paraga in Croatia instance in the differing approaches to the Russian takeover and Vojiislav Seselj, a Serb from Bosnia. While Tudjman of Crimea and pressure on Ukraine in general. A key factor went on to become the first President of an independent in the success of the process in those early stages was the Croatia, his rule was marred by nationalist excesses (he mediating influence of the informal group of Neutral and plotted to divide Bosnia with Serbian President Slobodan Non-Aligned countries, consisting of traditional neutral Milošević) and a tendency to downplay the significance nations that at the time remained outside of the two blocs of Croatia’s World War II Nazi-aligned Ustasha move- (Sweden, Finland, Switzerland, and Austria together with ment. Paraga became the president of the Croatian Party Yugoslavia and Cyprus). of Rights, a successor to the war-time fascist party of the same name. Seselj became the poster boy for those who The direct result of these early negotiations from around opposed Titoist anti-nationalist crackdowns, particularly 1975-90 was the establishment of an unwritten but lasting in Bosnia. When released from prison, regrettably, he principle of international discourse: the manner in which became the intellectual and spiritual leader of a brand of a government treats its own citizens (from Principle VII of vicious Serbian nationalism that later caused havoc during the Final Act’s Decalogue) is of legitimate concern to the the wars in Bosnia and Croatia. He founded the far-right 2 Foreign Policy Program Policy Brief nationalist Radical Party, the forerunner of Serbia’s current Under the leadership of Rep. Fascell, the commission and leading party, the Serbian Progressive Party, which has its staff envisaged cooperation with the State Department controlled power there for the past four years and has just in the oversight of Helsinki provisions. Not unexpect- been given a fresh mandate in parliamentary elections. edly, at first the State Department under Henry Kissinger True, its leaders have now embraced the EU membership refused to engage in such cooperation on the old fashioned process and a negotiated settlement of Kosovo’s status, but principle that foreign policy is best left to the experts, i.e. many of the rank and file of the party retain their retro- the diplomats. Involvement by parliamentarians and the grade positions. Seselj himself still sits at The Hague War public could only lead to misunderstandings and needless Crimes Tribunal as his trial continues, seemingly without tensions, a view shared by most other nations at the time. end. The lesson for OSCE: not all victims of human rights Inquiries into specific violations were best made privately, prosecutions are created equal. behind the scenes, not in public fora. But Rep. Fascell and his forceful and indefatigable chief The New Public Dimension of the CSCE/OSCE of staff, R. Spencer Oliver, got their way. The Helsinki The development of the Helsinki process has not simply Commission held public hearings on all facets of the enshrined human rights issues as a legitimate subject in process and were invited (despite much kicking and international and intra-governmental discourse. It has screaming by the State Department) to participate in gone one step further, first in the United States soon after U.S. delegations to all key sessions of the CSCE/OSCE, a in most Helsinki states, through the rise of the political and first in international diplomacy. The presence of Helsinki public dimension of international affairs and its intersec- Commission members and staff in all subsequent CSCE/ tion with the human dimension. Put simply, the Helsinki OSCE meetings was instrumental in securing the critical states began to realize that human rights were not simply focus on human rights by official U.S. delegations. It was under the rubric of diplomatic exchange. Rather, such primarily significant pressure exerted by the Helsinki issues were of direct concern to individuals and groups that Commission that resulted in the U.S. focus on specific had a vested interest in the promotion of human rights not human rights abuses in specific countries. This practice was only in their own countries but throughout Europe and the eventually followed by nearly all Western countries in the world. OSCE process. What has become known as the “public dimension” of the The Helsinki Commission and its staff also ended up Helsinki process consists of the creation and participation supplying needed expertise to U.S. delegations in the field. of parliamentary and non-governmental organizations Diplomats move to new assignments every three or four (NGOs) in the process. The first manifestation of this ever- years. The staff of the Helsinki Commission on the other widening process was the 1976 formation within the U.S. hand has remained relatively stable over the years. This staff Congress of the Commission on Security and Coopera- with expertise in many of the languages and cultures of the tion in Europe, better known as the Helsinki Commission, CSCE signatories has gained invaluable experience serving just one year after the signing of the Helsinki Final Act. as election monitors and has proved extremely useful to the Inspired initially by the plight of Jews in the Soviet Union State Department for expert support in OSCE monitoring wishing to be reunited with relatives abroad, particularly activities, especially in the former Yugoslavia following the in the United States and Israel, Sen. Clifford Case and Rep. wars in Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo. Millicent Fenwick of , together with Rep. Dante Fascell of Florida, introduced legislation leading to the The Commission also helped develop the public dimen- foundation of a special commission consisting of members sion with its insistence on the participation of “public of both the Senate and the House of Representatives members” in U.S. delegations to OSCE sessions and by the together with representatives of the Departments of State, publication of periodic implementation reports, detailing Defense, and Commerce appointed by the president. The the state of implementation of all facets of the Helsinki commission was charged with monitoring and encouraging accords, including that of the United States. Several other all facets of the Helsinki Final Act. countries have since followed suit and established various forums for public accountability for the OSCE process associated with their parliaments or in other public institu-

3 Foreign Policy Program Policy Brief tions. On issues covered by the Helsinki Final Act, and not secure a satisfactory settlement to the drama in Ukraine just human rights and humanitarian concerns, traditional will help prove its vitality all over again. If there were no diplomacy has now given way to a more public diplomacy OSCE, we would have to invent one anew. that includes both diplomats and public leaders.

Why the OSCE is Still Relevant Today The accomplishments of the Helsinki process were by no means confined to the realm of respect for human rights and public diplomacy. The focus on human rights evolved, as participating states gradually implemented free move- ment and family-reunification procedures that facilitated one of the primary goals of the : the free flow of people, goods, and ideas across all borders. With the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the diminution of East-West tensions in the 1990s, the attention of the Helsinki process shifted to new problems and challenges, notably the need for monitoring the many new elections being held in Eastern Europe. The OSCE remains the mainstay of this critical function. The current crisis in Ukraine represents perhaps the greatest challenge to stability, security, and cooperation in the 25 years since the end of the Cold War. The OSCE will be an integral part of the implementation of any resolution The views expressed in GMF publications and commentary are the of this crisis. It has already been called upon to provide an views of the author alone. observer mission — now at 100-strong within Ukraine — About the Author including military as well as civilian observers throughout the country. The four-sided talks held in Geneva on April Martin Sletzinger is an expert on Balkan issues, specifically the 17, 2014, called for disengagement and the disarmament of history of Kosovo and Albania. He is the former director of East all unofficial militia groups, especially those pro-Russian European studies and a senior scholar at the Wilson Center. groups operating in eastern Ukraine, all of this to take place under the supervision of the OSCE observer mission. About GMF The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) strengthens The CSCE/OSCE process was never intended to be a transatlantic cooperation on regional, national, and global challenges provider of military peacekeeping forces of the type the and opportunities in the spirit of the Marshall Plan. GMF does this by UN, NATO, and the EU have provided for Bosnia and supporting individuals and institutions working in the transatlantic Kosovo as well as certain missions outside of Europe. sphere, by convening leaders and members of the policy and business Despite its institutionalization with headquarters in communities, by contributing research and analysis on transatlantic Vienna, the 57-nation OSCE, which still operates for the topics, and by providing exchange opportunities to foster renewed most part by consensus, has not been the proper vehicle commitment to the transatlantic relationship. In addition, GMF for such operations. The UN includes virtually all nations. supports a number of initiatives to strengthen democracies. Founded NATO and the EU are more limited. Only the OSCE in 1972 as a non-partisan, non-profit organization through a gift from includes all the key members of Europe, which dictates that Germany as a permanent memorial to Marshall Plan assistance, GMF it focuses its attention on all European issues. maintains a strong presence on both sides of the Atlantic. In addition The OSCE, with its unique history and institutional adapta- to its headquarters in Washington, DC, GMF has offices in Berlin, tions, remains well-prepared to help meet new challenges Paris, Brussels, Belgrade, Ankara, Bucharest, and Warsaw. GMF also to security and stability in Europe. Its role in helping to has smaller representations in Bratislava, Turin, and Stockholm.

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