Congressional Record—Senate S 18575
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Load more
Recommended publications
-
Journal of Current Chinese Affairs
China Data Supplement March 2008 J People’s Republic of China J Hong Kong SAR J Macau SAR J Taiwan ISSN 0943-7533 China aktuell Data Supplement – PRC, Hong Kong SAR, Macau SAR, Taiwan 1 Contents The Main National Leadership of the PRC ......................................................................... 2 LIU Jen-Kai The Main Provincial Leadership of the PRC ..................................................................... 31 LIU Jen-Kai Data on Changes in PRC Main Leadership ...................................................................... 38 LIU Jen-Kai PRC Agreements with Foreign Countries ......................................................................... 54 LIU Jen-Kai PRC Laws and Regulations .............................................................................................. 56 LIU Jen-Kai Hong Kong SAR ................................................................................................................ 58 LIU Jen-Kai Macau SAR ....................................................................................................................... 65 LIU Jen-Kai Taiwan .............................................................................................................................. 69 LIU Jen-Kai ISSN 0943-7533 All information given here is derived from generally accessible sources. Publisher/Distributor: GIGA Institute of Asian Studies Rothenbaumchaussee 32 20148 Hamburg Germany Phone: +49 (0 40) 42 88 74-0 Fax: +49 (040) 4107945 2 March 2008 The Main National Leadership of the -
12 Inside Tibet Report.Cdr
HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT TIBET TIBET CHINA Centre For Democracy, Pluralism And Human Rights HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT TIBET Writer Nartam Vivekanand Motiram Editor Prerna Malhotra Nartam Vivekanand Motiram is working as an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Shyam Lal College, University of Delhi. His areas of interest include International Human Rights, International Political Theory, India’s Foreign Policy, and Tribal Life and Culture. Prerna Malhotra teaches English at Ram Lal Anand College, University of Delhi. She has co/authored six books, including the one on Delhi Riots 2020 and articles in journals of repute. She is currently pursuing a research project of ICSSR, Govt. of India on Maoism related issues. © CDPHR No part of this report may be reproduced or transmitted in any form without giving due credit to the Centre for Democracy, Pluralism and Human Rights. About CDPHR Introduction Centre for Democracy, Pluralism and Human Rights (CDPHR) is an organisation broadly working in the area of human rights. Our motto is- equality, dignity and justice for every individual on this planet. We are committed to advocate upholding values of democracy and pluralism for a conducive environment for equality, dignity and justice. We endeavour to voice out human rights violations of individuals, groups and communities so as ultimately viable solutions maybe worked on. We dream of a world that accepts pluralistic ways of life, tradition and worship through democratic means and practices. Vision CDPHR envisions an equitable and inclusive society based on dignity, justice, liberty, freedom, trust, hope, peace, prosperity and adherence to law of land. We believe that multiple sections of societies are deprived of basic human rights and violation of their social, political, economic, religious and developmental rights is a sad reality. -
Journal of Current Chinese Affairs
China Data Supplement May 2007 J People’s Republic of China J Hong Kong SAR J Macau SAR J Taiwan ISSN 0943-7533 China aktuell Data Supplement – PRC, Hong Kong SAR, Macau SAR, Taiwan 1 Contents The Main National Leadership of the PRC .......................................................................... 2 LIU Jen-Kai The Main Provincial Leadership of the PRC ..................................................................... 30 LIU Jen-Kai Data on Changes in PRC Main Leadership ...................................................................... 37 LIU Jen-Kai PRC Agreements with Foreign Countries ......................................................................... 42 LIU Jen-Kai PRC Laws and Regulations .............................................................................................. 44 LIU Jen-Kai Hong Kong SAR ................................................................................................................ 45 LIU Jen-Kai Macau SAR ....................................................................................................................... 52 LIU Jen-Kai Taiwan .............................................................................................................................. 56 LIU Jen-Kai ISSN 0943-7533 All information given here is derived from generally accessible sources. Publisher/Distributor: GIGA Institute of Asian Studies Rothenbaumchaussee 32 20148 Hamburg Germany Phone: +49 (0 40) 42 88 74-0 Fax: +49 (040) 4107945 2 May 2007 The Main National Leadership of the PRC -
2008 UPRISING in TIBET: CHRONOLOGY and ANALYSIS © 2008, Department of Information and International Relations, CTA First Edition, 1000 Copies ISBN: 978-93-80091-15-0
2008 UPRISING IN TIBET CHRONOLOGY AND ANALYSIS CONTENTS (Full contents here) Foreword List of Abbreviations 2008 Tibet Uprising: A Chronology 2008 Tibet Uprising: An Analysis Introduction Facts and Figures State Response to the Protests Reaction of the International Community Reaction of the Chinese People Causes Behind 2008 Tibet Uprising: Flawed Tibet Policies? Political and Cultural Protests in Tibet: 1950-1996 Conclusion Appendices Maps Glossary of Counties in Tibet 2008 UPRISING IN TIBET CHRONOLOGY AND ANALYSIS UN, EU & Human Rights Desk Department of Information and International Relations Central Tibetan Administration Dharamsala - 176215, HP, INDIA 2010 2008 UPRISING IN TIBET: CHRONOLOGY AND ANALYSIS © 2008, Department of Information and International Relations, CTA First Edition, 1000 copies ISBN: 978-93-80091-15-0 Acknowledgements: Norzin Dolma Editorial Consultants Jane Perkins (Chronology section) JoAnn Dionne (Analysis section) Other Contributions (Chronology section) Gabrielle Lafitte, Rebecca Nowark, Kunsang Dorje, Tsomo, Dhela, Pela, Freeman, Josh, Jean Cover photo courtesy Agence France-Presse (AFP) Published by: UN, EU & Human Rights Desk Department of Information and International Relations (DIIR) Central Tibetan Administration (CTA) Gangchen Kyishong Dharamsala - 176215, HP, INDIA Phone: +91-1892-222457,222510 Fax: +91-1892-224957 Email: [email protected] Website: www.tibet.net; www.tibet.com Printed at: Narthang Press DIIR, CTA Gangchen Kyishong Dharamsala - 176215, HP, INDIA ... for those who lost their lives, for -
Rebirth Control in Tibetan Buddhism: Anything New? – Petr Jandáček
Research Paper 4/2014 Rebirth Control in Tibetan Buddhism: Anything New? – July 2014 Rebirth Control in Tibetan Buddhism: Anything New? – Petr Jandáček* July 2014 *Petr Jandáček works as a civil engineer by profession and private researcher in the field of Tibetology. This paper was elaborated for the educational project ALYAS - AMO Lectures for Young Asia Scholars (www.amo.cz/alyas). © 2014 Association for International Affairs. All rights reserved. Views expressed in the paper are not necessarily the official attitude of publisher. Research Paper 4/2014 Rebirth Control in Tibetan Buddhism: Anything New? – July 2014 Motto: As the Yellow Church inside and outside of China proper is under the supreme rule of these two men, all the Mongol tribes bear allegiance to them. By patronizing the Yellow Church we maintain peace among the Mongols. This being an important task we cannot but protect this religion. Lama Shuo Pronouncement of Emperor Qianlong, 1792 AD Chinese religious policy towards Buddhism in general From the historical and cultural background (see below) it is obvious that the attempts to gain control over reincarnation and reincarnated religious authorities are a part of a broader context of both religious and secular politics which is not typical only to China and/or to the Chinese communism. In fact, there are only two possibilities for secular authorities when they try to control a society with a strong connection between worldly and religious affairs. The first of them is to control numerous monks, which was more or less successful during the Chinese occupation of Tibet. Nowadays, in those parts of ethnic Tibet which are controlled by China, there are 46 000 monks in 1700 monasteries (Ma Rong, pp. -
China's Provincial Leaders Await Promotion
Li, China Leadership Monitor, No.1 After Hu, Who?--China’s Provincial Leaders Await Promotion Cheng Li China’s provincial leadership is both a training ground for national leadership and a battleground among various political forces. Provincial chiefs currently carry much more weight than ever before in the history of the PRC. This is largely because the criteria for national leadership have shifted from revolutionary credentials such as participation in the Long March to administrative skills such as coalition-building. In addition, provincial governments now have more autonomy in advancing their own regional interests. Nonetheless, nepotism and considerations of factional politics are still evident in the recruitment of provincial leaders. Emerging top-level national leaders--including Hu Jintao, Zeng Qinghong, and Wen Jiabao--have all drawn on the pool of provincial leaders in building their factions, hoping to occupy more seats on the upcoming Sixteenth Central Committee and the Politburo. At the same time, new institutional mechanisms have been adopted to curtail various forms of nepotism. The unfolding of these contradictory trends will not only determine who will rule China after 2002, but even more importantly, how this most populous country in the world will be governed. During his recent visit to an elementary school in New Mexico, President George W. Bush offered advice to a child who hoped to become president. “If you want to be President, I would suggest you become a governor first,” said President Bush, “because governors make decisions, and that’s what presidents do.”1 What is true of the career path of American leaders seems also to be true of their counterparts in present-day China. -
Political Succession and Leadership Issues in China: Implications for U.S
Order Code RL30990 Report for Congress Received through the CRS Web Political Succession and Leadership Issues in China: Implications for U.S. Policy Updated September 30, 2002 name redacted Specialist in Asian Affairs Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress Political Succession and Leadership Issues in China: Implications for U.S. Policy Summary In 2002 and 2003, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) will be making key leadership changes within the government and the Communist Party. A number of current senior leaders, including Party Secretary Jiang Zemin, Premier Zhu Rongji, and National Peoples’ Congress Chairman Li Peng, are scheduled to be stepping down from their posts, and it is not yet clear who will be assuming these positions from among the younger generation of leaders – the so-called “fourth generation,” comprised of those born in the 1940s and early 1950s. It is expected that new leaders will be ascending to positions at the head of at least two and possibly all three of the PRC’s three vertical political structures: the Chinese Communist Party; the state government bureaucracy; and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). During a period likely to last into 2003, the succession process remains very much in flux. Some who follow Beijing politics have raised questions about how vigorously China’s current senior leaders will adhere to their self-imposed term limitations. Party Secretary Jiang Zemin, for instance, is expected to try to keep his position as head of China’s military on the grounds that the global anti-terrorism campaign and internal challenges to Chinese rule create a special need now for consistent leadership. -
Severe’ Repression in Tibet in 2017 Human Rights Report
State Department notes ‘severe’ repression in Tibet in 2017 Human Rights Report https://www.savetibet.org/state-department-notes-severe-repression-in-tibet-in-2017-human-rights-report April 20, 2018 The State Department’s latest Human Rights Report, released on April 20, 2018, documents pervasive repression and high levels of deployments by the paramilitary People’s Armed Police in Tibet. Among other issues, the report tracks the many fronts Chinese authorities have opened in their attacks on the Dalai Lama, including strengthened punishments for Chinese Communist Party (CCP) members who secretly harbor religious beliefs, and the detention of Tibetans who express support for him. “The U.S. report on the situation of human rights in Tibet confirms the information that the International Campaign for Tibet has reported about the deteriorating situation in Tibet,” said Matteo Mecacci, President of the International Campaign for Tibet. “This message from the Administration complements a series of legislations before the United States Congress, including the Reciprocal Access to Tibet Act, and their approval would strengthen the call for human rights in Tibet,” Mecacci added. Examining the ethnic dynamics of Chinese rule in Tibet, the report notes that ethnic Chinese CCP members hold “the overwhelming majority of top party, government, police, and military positions” in Tibet, and that on the national level, none of the members of the CCP Politburo or the Standing Committee of the Communist Party are Tibetan. The report describes disappearances; torture by government authorities; arbitrary detentions, including political prisoners; and government curtailment of the freedoms of speech, religion, association, assembly, and movement as the most significant human rights issues in Tibet. -
Here." Although To- Vajrapani; an Energy Field Ema- Lama Asia
m i Bulk Rate 1 U.S. Postage Paid Ithaca, NY 14851 MMMP ^^ Permit No. 746 WAAOTIPO Box 6483, Ithaca, NY 14851 607-273-8519 SUMMER 1995 NEWSLETTER AND CATALOG SUPPLEMENT Statement from A Treasure for Our Time His Holiness the H.H. Orgyen Dalai Lama on the Kusum Lingpa Reincarnation of the Teaches in America Panchen Lama by Victoria Huckenpahler Today is the auspicious day the recent years, I have with great when the Buddha first gave the care performed all necessary reli- His bulldog face can vary its ex- Kalachakra teaching. The Kala- gious procedures for this purpose pression from wrath to radiant chakra teachings have special con- and have made supplications to the compassion to childlike glee in nection with the Panchen Lamas. infallible Three Jewels. rapid succession; he calls himself On this occasion, which also hap- I am fully convinced of the a "beggar lama" and a "son of pens to be the Vaisaki, it is with unanimous outcome of all these Vajrapani." These apparent contra- great joy that I am able to proclaim recognition procedures performed dictions are but facets of one wis- the reincarnation of Panchen strictly in accordance with our re- dom display continually enacted Rinpoche. I have recognized ligious tradition. according to the needs of students Gedhun Choekyi Nyima, born on I have given Rinpoche the name by one of Tibet's greatest living la- April 25, 1989, whose father is of "Tenzin Gedhun Yeshe Thrinley mas, H. H. Orgyen Kusum Lingpa. Konchok Phuntsog, and mother Phuntsog Pal Sangpo" and have To be in His Holiness's presence H.H. -
Mapping China Journal 2020
M A P P I N G C H I N A J O U R N A L 2 0 2 0 MAPPING CHINA JOURNAL 2020 J I E L I No 8 The 1990s Chinese Debates over Islamic Resurgence in Xinjiang by PRC Soviet- watchers ABSTRACT Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, China panicked and began to analyse the potential root causes. China, like the Soviet Union, is a multinational country with religious diversity. Chinese Soviet-watchers paid particular attention to the impact of the Islamic resurgence in the newly independent Central Asian republics on China’s Muslim populations in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. Those writings tended to define the Xinjiang minorities fighting for religious freedom as political dissents opposing socialism. They also perceived that after the Soviet collapse, international forces would move against China. Xinjiang was seen as the most vulnerable to foreign conspiracies, owing to this Islamic resurgence and Western influence. These viewpoints justified the agenda of the CCP after the Cold War, when the Party believed that Western countries had a master plan to undermine China.To summarise, the debates of Chinese Soviet-watchers emphasized the importance of the Chinese government to take a firm hand in combating Xinjiang’s Islamic resurgence. The strategies that arose from these debates may inform readers of China’s present state policies and actions. AUTHOR Jie Li completed his PhD in History at the University of Edinburgh in 2017. His research covers many fields, including modern and contemporary Chinese history, China’s international relations since 1949, the histories of communism and the former Soviet Union, and the Cold War. -
STUDENTS for a FREE Tlfiff 545 EIGHTH AVENUE, 23RD FLOOR HK-9J989 NEW YORK, NY 10018 USA TEL (212) 594-5898 FAX (212) 594-6536
jd STUDENTS FOR A FREE Tlfiff 545 EIGHTH AVENUE, 23RD FLOOR HK-9J989 NEW YORK, NY 10018 USA TEL (212) 594-5898 FAX (212) 594-6536 http://www.tibet.org/sft. [email protected] December 9, 1999 H.E. Mr. Kofi Annan The Secretary General of the United Nations, The Office of the Secretary General The United Nations New York Dear Secretary General, On behalf of Students for a Free Tibet, a network of nearly 500 student chapters in over thirty countries dedicated to supporting the Tibetan people in their nonviolent struggle for human rights in freedom, I would like to present you with this appeal. More than 200 organizations from thirty-four countries have signed the appeal, asking you to use your leadership to assist the people •of Tibet. I will be happy to provide you with any additional information you may need to move forward, either about Tibet or the signatory organizations. I thank you for your careful consideration of this appeal, and look forward to hearing from you. Sincerely, John Hocevar Executive Director THE OFFICE OF TIBET 241 EAST 32ND STREET, NEW YORK, NY 10016 iol4JJJ.l; 11 -"**~-tv • i December 9,1999 His Excellency Mr. Kofi Annan Secretary-General The United Nations New York, NY 10017 Your Excellency, I have the pleasure and honor of forwarding here the appeal letter addressed to Your Excellency from over 200 Tibet Support Groups in 34 countries in the world. As Your Excellency will be aware, the current situation in Tibet continues to remain grim and critical. Various international reports indicate a continuing suppression and repression of religious, political and social rights of the Tibetan people. -
Projecting the Next Politburo Standing Committee
Projecting the Next Politburo Standing Committee Alice Miller1 Analysis of appointments to the Politburo Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party shows that over the past two decades three simple rules have been followed. These rules offer a means to project appointments to the Standing Committee at the upcoming 19th Party Congress in 2017. Whether in fact the Xi leadership follows the precedents set down in past appointments or instead sets them aside offers a key benchmark against which to assess Xi Jinping’s strength as party leader. The Politburo Standing Committee has been the party’s key decision-making body since the beginning of the reform era in the late 1970s. Appointments to the body are routinely made at the party’s national congress, held every five years, and the subsequent first plenum of the new Central Committee appointed by the party congress. The party has never publicly explained how it makes decisions as to whom it appoints to the Politburo Standing Committee. Observers outside the party in China, Hong Kong, and elsewhere have filled this information vacuum with speculation based on presumptions of factional competition, bargaining among factional chieftains, and intense jockeying among potential candidates in the run-up to a party congress. Three Rules Close analysis of Standing Committee appointments over the past four party congresses, however, sheds different light on leadership procedures in this highly sensitive area. Specifically, examination of Standing Committee leader retirements and appointments at the 1997 15th, 2002 16th, 2007 17th, and 2012 18th Party Congresses shows that three basic rules have been followed: • First, retirement of both Standing Committee and regular members of the Politburo has followed a defined age limit.