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Legal Notice No SECOND SUPPLEMENT TO THE GIBRALTAR GAZETTE No. 4355 of 27 March, 2017 LEGAL NOTICE NO. 54 OF 2017. UKRAINE SANCTIONS (NO.2) ORDER 2014 NOTICE OF AMENDMENT (NO.17) In exercise of the powers conferred upon me by paragraph 3(4) of the Ukraine Sanctions (No2.) Order 2014, I have issued the following Notice- The Schedule to the Ukraine (Sanctions) (No.2) Order 2014 is amended as follows- (a) the entries for individuals “Gennadiy Nikolaiovych TSYPKALOV” and “Arseny Sergeevich PAVLOV” are deleted; and (b) by replacing all the entries corresponding to persons, entities and bodies with the following- “ Name Identifying Reasons Date of listing information Vladimir Andreevich DOB: 19.11.1956 As speaker of the 17.3.2014 KONSTANTINOV Supreme Council of the POB: Vladimirovka Autonomous Republic of (Владимир Андреевич (a.k.a. Vladimirovca), Crimea, Konstantinov КОНСТАНТИНОВ) Slobozia Region, played a relevant role in Moldavian SSR (now the decisions taken by the Volodymyr Andriyovych Republic of Moldova) ‘Supreme Council’ KONSTANTINOV or Bogomol, concerning the Moldavian SSR ‘referendum’ against (Володимир Андрійович territorial integrity of КОНСТАНТIНОВ) Ukraine and called on voters to cast their votes in favour of Crimean independence in the ‘referendum’ of 16 March 2014. He was one of the co-signatories of the ‘treaty on Crimea's accession to the Russian Federation’ of 18 March 2014. Since 17 March 2014 ‘Chairman’ of the ‘State Council’ of the so- GIBRALTAR GAZETTE, No 4355, Monday 27 March, 2017 called ‘Republic of Crimea’. Rustam Ilmirovich DOB: 15.8.1976 As former Deputy Prime 17.3.2014 TEMIRGALIEV Minister of Crimea, POB: Ulan-Ude, Temirgaliev played a (Рустам Ильмирович Buryat ASSR relevant role in the ТЕМИРГАЛИЕВ) (Russian SFSR) decisions taken by the ‘Supreme Council’ Rustam Ilmyrovych concerning the TEMIRHALIIEV ‘referendum’ of 16 March 2014 against the territorial (Рустам Iльмирович integrity of Ukraine. He ТЕМIРГАЛIЄВ) lobbied actively for the integration of Crimea into the Russian Federation. On 11 June 2014 he resigned from his function as ‘First Deputy Prime Minister’ of the so-called ‘Republic of Crimea’. Denis Valentinovich DOB: 15.7.1974 Berezovskiy was 17.3.2014 BEREZOVSKIY appointed commander of POB: Kharkiv, the Ukrainian Navy on 1 (Денис Валентинович Ukrainian SSR March 2014 but thereafter БЕРЕЗОВСКИЙ) swore an oath to the Crimean armed forces, Denys Valentynovych thereby breaking his oath BEREZOVSKYY to the Ukrainian Navy. (Денис Валентинович He was then appointed БЕРЕЗОВСЬКИЙ) Deputy Commander of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation. Aleksei Mikhailovich DOB: 13.6.1961 POB: Chaliy became ‘People's 17.3.2014 CHALIY Moscow or Mayor of Sevastopol’ by Sevastopol popular acclamation on 23 (Алексей Михайлович February 2014 and Чалый) accepted this ‘vote’. He actively campaigned for Oleksiy Mykhaylovych Sevastopol to become a CHALYY separate entity of the Russian Federation (Олексій Михайлович following a referendum on ЧАЛИЙ) 16 March 2014. He was one of the co-signatories of the ‘treaty on Crimea's accession to the Russian Federation’ of 18 March 2014. He was acting ‘governor’ of Sevastopol from 1 to 14 April 2014 and is a former ‘elected’ Chairman of the ‘Legislative Assembly’ of the City of Sevastopol. Member of the ‘Legislative Assembly’ of 136 GIBRALTAR GAZETTE, No 4355, Monday 27 March, 2017 the City of Sevastopol. Pyotr Anatoliyovych ZIMA DOB: 18.1.1970 Zima was appointed as the 17.3.2014 new head of the Crimean (Пётр Анатольевич POB: Artemivsk Security Service (SBU) on ЗИМА) (Артемовск) (2016 3 March 2014 by ‘Prime renamed back to Minister’ Aksyonov and Petro Anatoliyovych Bakhmut/Бахмут), accepted this appointment. ZYMA Donetsk Oblast, He has given relevant Ukraine information including a (Петро Анатолійович database to the Russian ЗИМА) Intelligence Service (FSB). This included information on Euro- Maidan activists and human rights defenders of Crimea. He played a relevant role in preventing Ukraine's authorities from controlling the territory of Crimea. On 11 March 2014 the formation of an independent Security Service of Crimea was proclaimed by former SBU officers of Crimea Sergey Pavlovych DOB: 28.9.1953 or As Vice Speaker of the 17.3.2014 TSEKOV 28.8.1953 POB: Verkhovna Rada of Simferopol Crimea, Tsekov initiated, (Сергей Павлович together with Sergey ЦЕКОВ) Aksyonov, the unlawful dismissal of the Serhiy Pavlovych TSEKOV government of the Autonomous Republic of (Сергій Павлович Crimea (ARC). He drew ЦЕКОВ) Vladimir Konstantinov into this endeavour, threatening him with dismissal. He publicly recognised that the MPs from Crimea were the initiators of inviting Russian soldiers to take over the Verkhovna Rada of Crimea. He was one of the first Crimean Leaders to ask in public for the annexation of Crimea to Russia. Member of the Federation Council of the Russian Federation from the so-called ‘Republic of Crimea’. Sergei Vladimirovich DOB: 30.7.1970 Former Deputy Speaker of 17.3.2014 ZHELEZNYAK the State Duma of the POB: St. Petersburg Russian Federation. (Сергей Владимирович (former Leningrad) ЖЕЛЕЗНЯК) Actively supported use of 137 GIBRALTAR GAZETTE, No 4355, Monday 27 March, 2017 Russian Armed Forces in Ukraine and annexation of Crimea. He led personally the demonstration in support of the use of Russian Armed Forces in Ukraine. Currently Deputy Chairperson of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the State Duma of the Russian Federation. Leonid Eduardovich DOB: 4.1.1968 POB: Former Chairman of the 17.3.2014 SLUTSKI Moscow Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) (Леонид Эдуардович Committee of the State СЛУЦКИЙ) Duma of the Russian Federation (member of the LDPR). Actively supported use of Russian Armed Forces in Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea. Currently Chairperson of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the State Duma of the Russian Federation. Aleksandr Viktorovich DOB: 22.3.1958 Former Commander of 17.3.2014 GALKIN Russia's Southern Military POB: Ordzhonikidze, District (‘SMD’), the (Александр Викторович North Ossetian ASSR forces of which are in ГАЛКИН) Crimea; the Black Sea Fleet comes under Galkin's command; much of the force movement into Crimea has come through the SMD. SMD forces are deployed in Crimea. He is responsible for part of the Russian military presence in Crimea which is undermining the sovereignty of the Ukraine and assisted the Crimean authorities in preventing public demonstrations against moves towards a referendum and incorporation into Russia. Additionally the Black 138 GIBRALTAR GAZETTE, No 4355, Monday 27 March, 2017 Sea Fleet falls within the District's control. Currently employed by the Central apparatus of the Russian Ministry of Defence. Sergei Evgenevich DOB: 27.10.1954 Former Speaker of the 21.3.2014 NARYSHKIN POB: St Petersburg State Duma. Publicly (former Leningrad) supported the deployment (Сергей Евгеньевич of Russian forces in НАРЫШКИН) Ukraine. Publicly supported the Russia- Crimea reunification treaty and the related federal constitutional law. Currently Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation as of October 2016. Permanent member and Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation. Alexander Mihailovich DOB: 27.3.1963 Former Deputy- 21.3.2014 NOSATOV Commander of the Black POB: Sevastopol, Sea Fleet, Rear-Admiral. (Александр Михайлович (Ukrainian SSR) НОСАТОВ) Responsible for commanding Russian forces that have occupied Ukrainian sovereign territory. Currently Vice-Admiral, Acting Commander of the Russian Baltic fleet. Mikhail Grigorievich DOB: 10.10.1955 Chair of the Crimea 21.3.2014 MALYSHEV POB: Simferopol, Electoral Commission. Crimea Responsible for (Михаил Григорьевич administering the Crimean МАЛЫШЕВ) referendum. Responsible under the Russian system Mykhaylo Hryhorovych for signing referendum MALYSHEV results. (Михайло Григорович МАЛИШЕВ) Valery Kirillovich DOB: 21.8.1946 Chair of Sevastopol 21.3.2014 MEDVEDEV Electoral Commission. POB: Shmakovka, Responsible for (Валерий Кириллович Primorsky region administering the Crimean МЕДВЕДЕВ) referendum. Responsible under the Russian system Valeriy Kyrylovych for signing referendum MEDVEDIEV results. 139 GIBRALTAR GAZETTE, No 4355, Monday 27 March, 2017 (Валерій Кирилович МЕДВЕДЄВ) Elena Borisovna DOB: 9.12.1954 Former Deputy in the 21.3.2014 MIZULINA (born State Duma. Originator DMITRIYEVA) POB: Bui, Kostroma and co-sponsor of recent region legislative proposals in (Елена Борисовна Russia that would have МИЗУЛИНА (born allowed regions of other ДМИТРИЕВА)) countries to join Russia without their central authorities' prior agreement. As of September 2015, a Member of the Federation Council from Omsk region. Oleg Yevgenyvich DOB: 15.9.1949 POB: Former Plenipotentiary 29.4.2014 BELAVENTSEV Moscow Representative of the President of the Russian (Олег Евгеньевич Federation into the so- БЕЛАВЕНЦЕВ) called ‘Crimean Federal District’, Non-permanent member of the Russian Security Council. Responsible for the implementation of the constitutional prerogatives of the Russian Head of State on the territory of the annexed Autonomous Republic of Crimea. Currently Plenipotentiary Representative of the President of the Russian Federation into the North Caucasus Federal District. Sergei Ivanovich DOB: 22.8.1960 Former Governor of the 29.4.2014 MENYAILO Ukrainian annexed city of POB: Alagir, North- Sevastopol. (Сергей Иванович Ossetian Autonomous МЕНЯЙЛО) SSR, RSFSR Currently Plenipotentiary Representative of the President of the Russian Federation to the Siberian Federal District. Member
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