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NATIONAL SECURITY & DEFENCE CONTENT π 1-2 (177-178) THE WAR IN DONBAS: REALITIES AND PROSPECTS OF SETTLEMENT ................2 2019 1. GEOPOLITICAL ASPECTS OF CONFLICT IN DONBAS ............................................3 Founded and published by: 1.1. Russia’s “hybrid” aggression: geopolitical dimension ................................................ 3 1.2. Russian intervention in Donbas: goals and specifics .................................................. 6 1.3. Role and impact of the West in settling the conflict in Donbas .................................12 1.4. Ukraine’s policy for Donbas ......................................................................................24 2. OCCUPATION OF DONBAS: CURRENT SITUATION AND TRENDS ........................35 UKRAINIAN CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC & POLITICAL STUDIES 2.1. Military component of Donbas occupation ...............................................................35 NAMED AFTER OLEXANDER RAZUMKOV 2.2. Socio-economic situation in the occupied territories ................................................42 Director General Anatoliy Rachok 2.3. Energy aspect of the conflict in Eastern Ukraine .......................................................50 Editor-in-Chief Yuriy Yakymenko 2.4. Ideology and information policy in “DPR-LPR” .........................................................56 2.5. Environmental situation in the occupied territories ...................................................62 Editor Hanna Pashkova 3. DONBAS: SCENARIOS OF DEVELOPMENTS Halyna Balanovych AND PROSPECTS OF A PEACEKEEPING MISSION ..............................................65 Photo-editor Andriy Khopta 3.1. Scenarios of developments in Donbas ......................................................................65 3.2. Prospects of the UN peacekeeping mission in the East of Ukraine ...........................67 Layout and design Oleksandr Shaptala 4. SUMMARY AND PROPOSALS ............................................................................76 Tetiana Ovsianyk 4.1. Geopolitical component of the armed conflict in the East of Ukraine ........................76 Technical support Volodymyr Kekukh 4.2. Current realities and processes on the occupied territories ......................................78 Yevhen Skrypka 4.3. Possible scenarios of events and prospects of deploying the peacekeeping mission ........................................................................80 This journal is registered with the 4.4. Proposals ..................................................................................................................81 State Committee 4.5. Reintegration of Donbas: some conceptual approaches and practical steps ............86 of Ukraine for Information Policy, Appendixes registration certificate KB №4122 1. Some regulatory and legal acts of Ukraine concerning Published since 2000 in Ukrainian and English aggression of the Russian Federation in Donbas .........................................................89 Circulation: 1,000 copies 2. implementation of the Minsk Agreements: “Red Lines” for Ukraine. Joint Expert Statement .........................................................95 Editorial address: 3. Declaration from the participants of expert conference “Minsk Agreements – 16 Lavrska str., 2nd floor, Path to Conflict Resolution or a Recipe for Disaster” on the unacceptability Kyiv, 01015 of imposing limited sovereignty on Ukraine through tel.: (380 44) 201-11-98 the implementation of Minsk Agreements .................................................................. 97 fax: (380 44) 201-11-99 4. The concept for introduction of the International Provisional Administration (IPA) in the territories of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts of Ukraine, e-mail: [email protected] occupied by the Russian Federation ......................................................................... 100 web site: www.razumkov.org.ua 5. Monitoring of events on the occupied territories .......................................................104 Reprinted or used materials must refer to PEACEKEEPING MISSION IN DONBAS: WESTERN EXPERTS’ OPINIONS “National Security & Defence” (Interviews) ..........................................................................................................110 Richard GOWAN, Aleksander DULEBA, Steven PIFER All photographs in this publication are taken from the public sources. THE WAR IN DONBAS: PROBABLE SCENARIOS AND THE LINE OF ACTIONS (Interviews) ..........................................................................................................116 © 2019 Razumkov Centre Leonid POLYAKOV, Volodymyr FESENKO, Yevhen MAHDA, Kostiantyn KONONENKO, Serhii HARMASH, Oleksandr KHARA, Maksym ROZUMNYI, Vitalii MARTYNIUK The Project “Donbas Conflict Resolution: THE CONFLICT IN THE EAST OF UKRAINE: EXPERT OPINIONS AND POSITIONS ....130 Progress Report and a Way Forward” is funded by THE “DONBAS COMPONENT” OF THE RUSSIA-UKRAINE CONFLICT: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands CITIZENS’ OPINIONS AND ASSESSMENTS ................................................................. 137 THE STRATEGIES AND GOALS OF RUSSIAN INTERVENTION IN DONBAS Andrii HOLTSOV ................................................................................................................. 165 SOME ASPECTS OF DECISIONS IN THE DOMAIN OF STATE LAW FOR THE OCCUPIED AREAS OF DONBAS Viktor MUSIYAKA ............................................................................................................... 168 THE WAR IN DONBAS: REALITIES AND PROSPECTS OF SETTLEMENT Russian occupation of Donbas is a part of hybrid war against Ukraine, which began in February 2014 with illegal annexation of the Crimea. At the same time, Russia’s expansion in the “Ukrainian direction” should be considered in the context of the Kremlin’s global aggressive neo-imperial policy. According to the UN, the conflict in the East of Ukraine “is already one of the deadliest in Europe since World War II”. During five years of war, 13 thousand people were killed and 28 thousand wounded, with about 1.8 million residents of Donbas and the Crimea being displaced by the conflict. 17 thousand sq.km. of the Donetsk and Lugansk oblasts were occupied, which together with Crimea makes 43.7 thousand sq.km., or 7.2% of the territory of Ukraine. 409.7 kilometres of the Ukrainian-Russian border remain uncontrolled. Ukraine sustained tremendous financial and economic losses. Occupation resulted in the fall of country’s GDP, while parts of the region’s industrial potential were illegally moved to Russia. The puppet pseudo-governments of “DPR” and “LPR” – read the occupation administrations – were set up in the East of Ukraine against the large-scale militarisation of the region. The occupation forces amount to more than 30 thousand militants, with one-third being the Russian contingent. It is a combat-capable, well-armed military formation, which is equal to armed forces of many European countries by its size and military efficiency. Sweeping political and ideological “Russification” along with alienation of occupied territories from Ukraine is underway. The Kremlin seeks to “implant” pseudo-republics back in Ukraine in their current form to disintegrate Ukrainian statehood, block its course towards the EU and NATO, and instil control and subordination to Russia. Not recognising itself as a party to the conflict on the East of Ukraine, the aggressor consistently derails peace initiatives and tries to legitimise puppet “DPR” and “LRP” as rightful parties to the negotiation process. Years-long political and diplomatic talks in various formats largely failed to produce any positive results. Due to its aggression against Ukraine, Russia was kicked out of G8 and deprived of its PACE vote since 2014; the West introduced a range of anti-Russian sanctions (personal, targeted, sectoral); Russian aggression was condemned by respected international organisations (UN, OSCE, PACE, EU, NATO). Western nations demonstrate solidarity with Ukraine at the political and diplomatic level and provide military, financial, economic and humanitarian aid. It is clear that the sanctions policy has a cumulative effect and the price of aggression grows, but it is yet to affect the Kremlin’s general geopolitical course, including Russia’s actions in the Donbas. Despite efforts of the Ukrainian government to resolve the conflict peacefully, actions of the official Kyiv have lacked strategic approach, comprehensiveness, efficiency and consistency. Decisions are made with critical delays; there is no holistic strategy regarding Russia. Moreover, during the election campaigns, the topic of Donbas acquired an outright populist colouring. Obviously, the time of continuing occupation plays against Ukraine. People’s consciousness, attitudes and behaviours change under the influence of invaders, while the new generation is raised in the spirit of the “Russian World". This situation requires new approaches to the policy of de-occupation and reintegration of Donbas, taking into account external circumstances, processes inside Ukraine and trends in the occupied territories. This report was produced by the Razumkov Centre within the project supported by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands. The first looks into some geopolitical aspects of the Russian intervention in Donbas; reviews goals and pecu- section liarities of Russian aggression in eastern Ukraine; studies the role and impact of the West in resolving the conflict; and assesses the “Donbas”
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