Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), Based on Information Received As of 19:30, 10 May 2018

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region, compared with the previous reporting period. The SMM observed fresh damage caused by shelling in a residential area of Myronivskyi. The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske; it recorded ceasefire violations inside the Petrivske disengagement area, as well as near the Zolote and Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement areas. Its access remained restricted in all three areas.* The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line. The Mission continued to facilitate access to the Donetsk Filtration Station for Voda Donbassa water company employees; it heard ceasefire violations in the area despite security guarantees. The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor repairs to high-voltage power lines near Almazna and a water pumping station near Artema.

DAILY REPORT Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 10 May 2018

This report is for the media and the general public.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations[1], including about 220 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 900 explosions).

On the evening of 9 May, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 110 undetermined explosions and about 280 shots and bursts of small-arms and heavy-machine-gun fire, all 3-7km at directions ranging from east to west.

On the evening and night of 9-10 May, while in Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 20 undetermined explosions and about 70 shots and bursts of small-arms and heavy-machine-gun fire, all 0.3-6km south-south-west and west.

On the evening and night of 9-10 May, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, 18 projectiles in flight from north to south, five undetermined explosions and two projectiles from south to north, all 1-3km west. Positioned at the DFS for about three and a half hours, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion and seven shots of small-arms fire, all 1km north-north-east and north, despite security guarantees.

During the day on 10 May, positioned about 1km north-west of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk) for about five and a half hours, the SMM heard about 30 undetermined explosions 3-6km south-west and north-west.

Positioned in Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk) for about three and a half hours, the SMM heard about 30 undetermined explosions 2-4km east-south-east. (The SMM assessed that it heard the same explosions when positioned about 1km north-west of Yasynuvata (see above)).

Positioned about 1km south-east of Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard an undetermined explosion 2-3km north, four undetermined explosions 7-8km south, an undetermined explosion 1km east, as well as four shots and a burst of small-arms fire 1-3km south and west.

On the evening of 9 May, while in Mariupol city centre (government-controlled, 102km south of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 40 explosions (23 assessed as outgoing rounds and the remainder undetermined), all at undetermined distances east.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 30 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (26 explosions).

During the day on 10 May, positioned 1km south-south-west of Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard ten undetermined explosions 5-6km north-west.

The SMM followed up on reports of fresh damage caused by shelling to civilian properties in a residential area of Myronivskyi (government-controlled, 62km north-east of Donetsk). On 10 May, at 19 Enerhetykiv Street, the SMM saw a fresh crater in the yard of a one-storey house. The SMM assessed it as caused by a mortar (120mm) round (it could not, however, assess the direction of fire). The SMM also saw fresh shrapnel damage to the north-facing outer wall and four shattered windows (three north-facing and one east-facing) of the house at 19 Enerhetykiv Street. At 15 Enerhetykiv Street, the SMM saw fresh shrapnel damage to the north-facing outer wall of a one-storey house and two north- facing shattered windows. At 17 Enerhetykiv Street, the SMM saw fresh shrapnel damage to the north- facing outer wall and a north-facing part of the roof of a one-storey house, as well as two north-east- facing shattered windows. At 16 Matrosova Street, the SMM saw one south-east-facing shattered window of a one-storey house. The SMM assessed all the aforementioned damage as caused by a mortar (120mm) round, but it could not assess the direction of fire.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

During the day on 1 May, the SMM camera in Petrivske recorded an undetermined explosion 1.5km south-south-west (assessed as inside the disengagement area).

On the evening and night of 9-10 May, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded, in sequence, seven projectiles in vertical flight 3-5km east (assessed as outside the disengagement area) and an illumination flare in vertical flight 3-5km south-east (unable to assess whether outside or inside the disengagement area), followed by a total of 18 explosions (six assessed as impacts and the remainder undetermined), a shot of small-arms fire and two projectiles (including one assessed as a round of a rocket-propelled grenade launcher (RPG-7)), all 0.5-7km east, south-east and south and assessed as outside the disengagement area.

On the evening of 9 May, the SMM camera at Prince Ihor Monument south-east of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk) recorded two undetermined explosions 5-10km north (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

During the day on 10 May, positioned near all three disengagement areas, the SMM observed a calm situation.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Memorandum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas, the SMM saw a self-propelled howitzer (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) and three anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) at the junction of roads T0504 and H20 near Berestok (63km north of Donetsk) heading south-west, as well as ten self-propelled howitzers (2S3) being unloaded from flatbed trains at the railway station in Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk). An SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted on 9 May 16 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) stationary at the railway station in Kostiantynivka. In a non-government- controlled area, the SMM saw two multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) about 2km north of Azarivka (32km south-west of Luhansk) heading south-west.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in government-controlled areas, on 9 May, an SMM mini-UAV spotted six surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10) at the railway station in Kostiantynivka. In a non-government-controlled area, the SMM saw five towed howitzers (D-20, 152mm) about 2km north of Azarivka heading south-west.

The SMM revisited a heavy weapons permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region, whose location was beyond the respective withdrawal lines, and noted that two MLRS (BM-21) were missing for the first time and that an additional weapon was present for the first time.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles[2] in the security zone. In a government-controlled area, the SMM saw an armoured personnel carrier (BTR-70) near Stanytsia Luhanska.

The SMM continued to facilitate the access of Voda Donbassa water company employees to the DFS in order to keep the station operational. On 10 May, positioned at the DFS, as well as in nearby areas of Avdiivka, Yasynuvata and Kamianka, the SMM heard undetermined explosions as well as small-arms fire (see ceasefire violation section above), despite security guarantees.

The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor repair works to high-voltage power lines near Almazna (non-government-controlled, 55km west of Luhansk) and to a water pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk).

The SMM visited two border areas not under government control. While at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about 45 minutes, the SMM saw two buses with Ukrainian licence plates and – each with approximately 40 passengers on board – 18 cars (three with Ukrainian, nine with Russian Federation and one with Georgian licence plates, as well as five with “DPR” plates) and nine pedestrians (three men aged 50-60 and six women aged 20-60) entering Ukraine. The SMM saw three buses with Ukrainian licence plates – each with approximately 40 passengers on board – 21 cars (seven with Ukrainian and nine with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as five with “DPR” plates), six mini-vans (two with Ukrainian and two with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as two with “DPR” plates), three large cargo trucks (two with Ukrainian licence plates and one with “DPR” plates) and six pedestrians (five men aged 40-60 and one woman aged 50- 60) exiting Ukraine.

While at a border crossing point near Ulianivske (61km south-east of Donetsk) for 15 minutes, the SMM saw a pedestrian (a man aged 40-50) entering Ukraine and two pedestrians (men aged 20-40) exiting Ukraine.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO), and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (see SMM Daily Report of 10 May 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

Related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[3]

The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.4

The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. An armed formation member positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Delay:

Armed members of the armed formations stopped the SMM at a checkpoint 1km south of Smile (non-government-controlled, 31km north-west of Luhansk) and prevented it from proceeding, saying that the area was unsafe for the SMM. After about 50 minutes, the armed men allowed the SMM to proceed. Conditional access:

Armed members of the armed formations stopped on two occasions an SMM patrol at a checkpoint on road H15 east of Kreminets (non-government-controlled, 16km south-west of Donetsk) and requested to see the inside of the SMM’s trailer. On both occasions, the patrol was permitted to proceed only after complying with the request.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report. The SMM cameras at the entry-exit checkpoints in Marinka, Maiorsk and Pyshchevyk were not operational during the reporting period.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[3] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

For PDF attachments or links to sources of further information, please visit: http://www.osce.org/special- monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/380950

Contacts:

Tetiana Tesliuchenko 26 Turhenievska Street 01054 Kyiv Ukraine Office: +380 44 392 0988 Mobile: +38 067 828 15 78 Mobile: +38 050 334 14 54 [email protected]

Liudmyla Palamar 26 Turhenievska Street 01054 Kyiv Ukraine Office: +380 44 392 0965 Mobile: +38 067 828 06 79 Mobile: +38 050 387 93 98 [email protected] forward to a friend unsubscribe from this list update subscription preferences