Ukraine in the Poroshenko Era Ebook2017
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IT DOES NOT MUAkraTinTeE inR t hHe OW SPLorOosWhe nYkoO EUra : GO ThLNeG PAoS YliOtUic DsO No'Tf SPToOwP er, Reform, and War M PONARS Eurasia Policy Perspectives September 2017 Ukraine in the Poroshenko Era THE POLITICS OF POWER, REFORM, AND WAR PONARS Eurasia POLICY PERSPECTIVES SEPTEMBER 2017 PONARS Eurasia is an international network of scholars advancing new approaches to research on security, politics, economics, and society in Russia and Eurasia. PONARS Eurasia is based at the Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies (IERES) at the George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs. This publication was made possible in part by a grant from Carnegie Corporation of New York. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the authors. Program Directors: Henry E. Hale and Marlene Laruelle Managing Editor: Alexander Schmemann Senior Research Associate: Sufian Zhemukhov ResearchPONARS Eu Assistant:rasia Minhaj Abdullah Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies (IERES) Elliott School of International Affairs The George Washington University 1957 E Street NW, Suite 412 Washington, DC 20052 Tel: (202) 994-6340 www.ponarseurasia.org © PONARS Eurasia 2017. All rights reserved Contents About the Authors vii Foreword ix Marlene Laruelle, George Washington University I. Ukrainian Foreign Policy Perceptions and Its Interactions with the West The Demise of Ukraine’s “Eurasian Vector” 3 AND THE RISE OF PRO-NATO SENTIMENT Olexiy Haran, University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy Mariia Zolkina, Democratic Initiatives Foundation Will Europe Blink First on Ukraine? 11 Arkady Moshes, Finnish Institute of International Affairs Coercion and Financial Secrecy in Ukraine’s Emerging Economy 17 WHAT THE IMF APPROACH MISSES Andrew Barnes, Kent State University Is Ukraine a “Client State” of the United States? 23 Volodymyr Dubovyk, Odessa National University How Can the EU Help Ukraine Build the Rule of Law and Fight Corruption? 27 ROMANIA AND BULGARIA AS GUIDEPOSTS Maria Popova, McGill University v II. Ukrainian Politics: Stability and Changes Decommunization in Post-Euromaidan Ukraine 35 LAW AND PRACTICE Oxana Shevel, Tufts University Ukraine’s New Government POSSIBILITY OF PROGRESS OR ANOTHER PRE-TERM ELECTION IN SIGHT? 39 Olexiy Haran and Oleksii Sydorchuk, Kyiv-Mohyla Academy Memory and Language 45 UKRAINE’S DIVERGENT POLICIES ON TWO CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES Volodymyr Kulyk, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine; Yale University Old Political Habits Die Hard in Ukraine 51 Yuriy Matsiyevsky, Ostroh Academy National University, Ukraine Ukraine’s Semi-Managed Democracy on the March 57 Oleksandr Fisun, Kharkiv National University III. The Donbas Unresolved Conflict Domestic Sources of the Donbas Insurgency 65 Serhiy Kudelia, Baylor University The Tale of Three Legitimacies 73 THE SHIFTING TONE AND ENDURING SUBSTANCE OF MOSCOW’S UKRAINE POLICY Mikhail Alexseev, San Diego State University A Poisoned Chalice 79 HOW THE MINSK ACCORDS DESTABILIZE UKRAINE Mikhail Alexseev, San Diego State University Is There a Way Out of the Minsk Agreement Deadlock? 87 Oleksandr Sushko, Institute for Euro-Atlantic Cooperation, Kyiv Warfare in a Post-Truth World 91 LESSONS FROM UKRAINE Yuri M. Zhukov, University of Michigan vi About the Authors Mikhail Alexseev is Professor of Political Science at San Diego State University. Andrew Barnes is Chair and Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Kent State University. Volodymyr Dubovyk is Associate Professor in the Department of International Relations at Mechnikov National University, Odessa, Ukraine. Oleksandr Fisun is Professor and Chair of Political Science at Kharkiv National University (Ukraine). Olexiy Haran is Professor at the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy and Head of Research at the Democratic Initiatives Foundation, Ukraine. Sergiy Kudelia is Professor of Political Science at Baylor University. Volodymyr Kulyk is Head Research Fellow at the Institute of Political and Ethnic Studies, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine. He is Visiting Professor for 2016-2017 at the MacMillan Center, Yale University. Yuriy Matsiyevsky is Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Ostroh Academy National University, Ukraine. Arkady Moshes is Program Director of the EU Eastern Neighborhood and Russia Research Program at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs. Maria Popova is Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science, McGill University. Oxana Shevel is Associate Professor of Political Science at Tufts University. Oleksandr Sushko is Research Director at Institute for Euro-Atlantic Cooperation, Kyiv, Ukraine. Oleksii Sydorchuk is a PhD candidate at the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy and Political Analyst at the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation. Yuri M. Zhukov is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Michigan. vii Foreword Marlene Laruelle George Washington University Since the Euromaidan revolution, Ukraine has been facing both deep transformations and “business as usual.” The country’s interactions with the West have been evolving as the United States and Europe have been engaging it with a quite unsuccessful game of carrots and sticks aimed at reforming Ukraine’s political system and economy and at fostering pro- Western and—in particular—pro-NATO sentiment among Ukraine’s population. The Ukrainian domestic scene has changed less than its foreign policy. Controversial decommunization laws have been put in place and the Poroshenko government's policies on historical memory have been quite radical, while its language policy has remained ambivalent. In terms of political habits, Ukraine has continued to be shaped by a tight interweaving of political and business circles, and by patronal, clientelist patterns. The Donbas conflict does not help improve the situation at the national level, on the contrary “justifying” suspending rule of law with reference to the war situation. PONARS Eurasia experts offer diverse explanations of this instance of asymmetric war, debating the primacy of either the external element—Russia—or the domestic sources of local grievances. Yet, all agree that exiting the deadlock of the Minsk I and II agreements will not be easy, as many involved actors in fact have no genuine interest in finding peaceful solutions. ix I. Ukrainian Foreign Policy Perceptions and Its Interactions with the West The Demise of Ukraine’s “Eurasian Vector” Olexiy Haran and Mariia Zolkina The Demise of Ukraine’s “Eurasian Vector” AND THE RISE OF PRO-NATO SENTIMENT PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo No. 458 February 2017 Olexiy Haran* University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy Mariia Zolkina† Democratic Initiatives Foundation Before 2014, the majority of Ukrainians did not view the goal of European integration as a “national idea.” Even so, most Ukrainians had positive views about developing relations with and integrating into the EU. And even though former Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych refused to accept the idea of joining NATO, he officially maintained EU integration as a priority. In fact, the Yanukovych administration helped finalize and initialed the text of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement. Yanukovych’s sudden refusal to actually sign it, under Russian pressure, was the spark that set off the mass protests in late 2013 that would become the Euromaidan revolution. The success of the Euromaidan and the ensuing long-awaited signing of the Association Agreement signaled a shift among Ukrainians at both the national and regional level in favor of the EU. In addition, after Russia’s annexation of Crimea, Ukrainians came to favor joining NATO for the first time since independence. Simultaneously, support plummeted for Ukraine’s “Eurasia vector,” i.e., joining Russia-led institutions like the Customs Union/Eurasian Economic Union (EEU).‡ Ukraine’s Foreign Policy Dualism Has Now Disappeared Ukraine’s dilemma, whether to pursue a European or Eurasian vector in its foreign policy, is now off the agenda. The share of EU supporters in Ukraine has increased in recent years, despite some ups and downs (see Figure 1). Support for the Eurasian vector has decreased dramatically in Ukraine, as indicated by the low preference for joining the EEU. The percentage of those in favor of non-alignment has increased, and given Ukraine’s ongoing conflict with Russia, it is unlikely this segment would return to * Olexiy Haran is Professor at the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy and Head of Research at the Democratic Initiatives Foundation, Ukraine. † Mariia Zolkina is Analyst at the Democratic Initiatives Foundation, Ukraine. ‡ EEU members are Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Armenia. Before 2014, it was the Customs Union of Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. 3 The Demise of Ukraine’s “Eurasian Vector” Olexiy Haran and Mariia Zolkina choosing the Eurasian vector. In general, mistrust of Russian geopolitical projects pervades. Figure 1. What Foreign Policy Path Should Ukraine Choose? (%, Feb. 2013–Dec. 2016) Source: Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) Before 2014, only among respondents in the 18- to 29-year-old age group was there an absolute majority in favor of joining the EU. By May 2014, according to polls by the Democratic Initiative Foundation (DIF), more than 50 percent of respondents in all age groups were in favor (with the exception of those over 60 years old, where the number of supporters was slightly less). The Hope for Simultaneously Joining Both