Burma Policy Briefing Nr 6 May 2011

Burma's New Government: Prospects for Governance and Peace in Ethnic States

On 30 March 2011, Burma/’s1 ruling junta, the State Peace and Develop- Conclusions and Recommendations ment Council, dissolved itself and handed  Two months after a new government took over power to an elected, quasi-civilian over the reins of power in Burma, it is too government. Than Shwe retired, relin- early to make any definitive assessment of quishing his head of state and commander- the prospects for improved governance in-chief roles, and even his rank – stating and peace in ethnic areas. Initial signs that from now on he would be referred to give some reason for optimism, but the as “U Than Shwe” not “Senior General”. difficulty of overcoming sixty years of Most of the international discussion has conflict and strongly-felt grievances and focussed on whether these changes repre- deep suspicions should not be underesti- sent the beginnings of a process of mated. ‘genuine’ democratic transition, or whether  The economic and geostrategic realities this was merely “old wine in a new bottle”. are changing fast, and they will have a Much of the analysis has focussed on the fundamental impact – positive and extent to which Than Shwe will continue to negative – on Burma’s borderlands. But call the shots on major decisions going unless ethnic communities are able to forward. have much greater say in the governance There has been less analysis on what is per- of their affairs, and begin to see tangible haps the most important challenge facing benefits from the massive development the country: addressing ethnic minority projects in their areas, peace and broad- grievances and resolving the multiple, based development will remain elusive. decades-long conflicts. This paper takes an  initial look at what the prospects are in this The new decentralized governance struc- area, two months after the new government tures have the potential to make a positive took office. Of course, any analysis at this contribution in this regard, but it is early stage can only be tentative, but there unclear if they can evolve into sufficiently have already been a number of sufficiently powerful and genuinely representative important developments – the first sessions bodies quickly enough to satisfy ethnic

of the legislatures, the appointment of nationality aspirations. standing committees, and the appointment  There has been renewed fighting in Shan of local governments – to make such an State, and there are warning signs that analysis worthwhile. more ethnic ceasefires could break down. Two key areas will be assessed: firstly, the Negotiations with armed groups and an composition and functioning of the new improved future for long-marginalized governance structures, particularly the ethnic populations is the only way that decentralized legislative and executive insti- peace can be achieved.

Burma Policy Briefing | 1 tutions, and the impact that these could Areas and National Races – saying that his have on the governance of ethnic minority government must “convince the people areas; and secondly, the status of the from the border areas of the government’s ceasefires and ongoing insurgencies, and goodwill efforts for peace and stability and the prospects for peace. development so that they can come to cooperate with the Union government and POSITIVE INITIAL SIGNALS state and region governments with under- standing”.3 One of the first issues that the new Presi- dent spoke about in his inaugu- This is not a new committee: it was formed ral address to the congress was the ethnic in 1989, and had until now been chaired by nationality question: Than Shwe. But the language has shifted noticeably. Compare Thein Sein’s com- As you know, national brethren remained ments above with Than Shwe’s comments united in the struggles to liberate the to the committee in 2007, where there was nation from the rule of the colonialists no recognition of problems, only talk of and regained independence. But, in the success: post-independence period, national races involved in armed conflicts among them- National race armed groups began re- [selves] for about five decades due to turning to the legal fold one after another, dogmatism, sectarian strife and racism and they are now carrying out develop- instead of rebuilding the nation. In conse- ment tasks hand in hand with the govern- quence, the people were going through the ment. Thanks to extensive implementa- hell of untold miseries. tion of development tasks, there has been mutual understanding and trust between He went on to say that “we will give top one national race and another along with priority to national unity”.2 While it re- stability and peace. … Border areas are mains to be seen how this will be translated enjoying unprecedented development in into concrete policy, it is an important all aspects at present.4 recognition of the importance – indeed, the primacy – of the ethnic question. However, after decades of conflict, ethnic grievances run deep, and events leading up Subsequently, on 23 April the President to the change of government in some cases chaired a meeting of a high-level committee exacerbated those grievances – including tasked with overseeing the issue – the the failure to register ethnic parties in some Central Committee for Progress of Border areas, and pressure on ceasefire groups to

Box 1: Chief Ministers of the States

State Name and party Kachin State U La John Ngan Hsai [USDP] Kachin businessman U [USDP] Prominent Kayah individual Kayin State Brig-Gen Zaw Min [Military legislator] Ex-Chairman, Kayin State PDC Chin State U [USDP] Ex-Chairman, Chin State PDC (retd. Brig-Gen) Mon State U Ohn Myint [USDP] Ex-Minister for Mines (retd. Maj-Gen) Rakhine State U Hla Maung Tin [USDP] Retired army Colonel U [USDP] Retired Lt-Col, Light Infantry Division 66

2 | Burma Policy Briefing join the controversial Border Guard Force legislative functions, including during scheme without any resolution of the the periods when the legislatures them- underlying political issues. Furthermore, selves are in recess; they mostly include brutal counterinsurgency tactics continue legislators from ethnic parties. (So far, to be used by the military in the ethnic committees that have been established borderlands, meaning that conciliatory are the Legislative Committees, the language from central government in the National Races Affairs Committees and Burmese capital of Nay Pyi Taw will be the Representatives Vetting Committees.) insufficient to convince many citizens and communities of “government goodwill”. 3. Through their positions in state govern- ments. A number of ministerial portfo- PROSPECTS FOR IMPROVED ETHNIC lios in the seven states have been given to legislators from ethnic nationality par- GOVERNANCE ties. (A list is provided in box 3 on p. 4.) Under the 2008 Constitution, which came into force on 31 January 2011, certain legis- Under the constitution, the decentralized lative and executive powers were decentral- powers are rather limited. Nevertheless, ized to the region/state level. Thus, the they include a number of areas that can seven ethnic-minority states (like the seven have a significant impact on people’s lives: Burman-majority regions) now have their land (including allocation of land and own state legislatures and state govern- agricultural loans), local business (small ments. business loans and some taxation), cultural promotion, and municipal issues. These structures are dominated by the government’s Union Solidarity and How this decentralization process will Development Party (USDP). All of the function in practice remains uncertain. speakers of the state legislatures are from While the division of powers is defined in the USDP, as are the chief ministers, who general terms in the constitution and in head up the state executives (with the legislation, the detailed implementation – exception of the Chief Minister for Kayin and, in particular, how administrative [Karen] State, who is a military legislator). functions will be divided and coordinated See boxes 1 and 2 for details. The situation between central government ministries and is thus very far from the federal autonomy regional governments – has not been or self-governance demanded by many worked out in practice. It seems that it will ethnic leaders. be resolved on a gradual, ad hoc basis, and it could be a source of contestation and Nevertheless, ethnic political parties will have some limited influence over these structures, in the following ways: Box 2: Speakers of the State Legislatures

1. Through their seats in the legislatures. State Name and party None of the ethnic nationality parties Kachin State U Rawan Jone [USDP] have legislative majorities, but they Kayah State U Kyaw Swe [USDP] control sizeable blocs. In three states – Chin, Kayin, Rakhine – the ethnic par- Kayin State U Saw Aung Kyaw Min [USDP] ties collectively control more seats than Chin State U Hauk Khin Kham [USDP] the USDP. Mon State U Kyin Pe [USDP] 2. Through their membership of legislative Rakhine State U Htein Lin [USDP] standing committees. Standing commit- Shan State U Sai Lone Saing [USDP] tees are appointed to carry out certain

Burma Policy Briefing | 3 confusion, in the short term. views of figures such as Buddhist abbots, leaders of other religions, and civil so- Confusingly, different regions and states ciety leaders may carry considerable have chosen to establish different – and weight locally, but not necessarily at a somewhat idiosyncratic – sets of local national government level, something government ministries. It is understandable which limited their ability to influence that Kachin State (which has abundant decisions in the past. mineral resources and where there is much mining) has a ministry for mines while 3. The voice of local people. If decision- Chin State does not. It is less obvious why making becomes more local, and has Kachin State has a health ministry but no greater input from local community separate education ministry (it is included leaders, this implies that local people in the combined “Education/social and could have a greater voice in governance religious affairs/culture” ministry), while – directly, though local political leaders, Chin and Kayah states have neither or indirectly, through community lead- (although the responsibility of the social ers. In such a context, service delivery affairs ministries in these states may well can improve, through improved under- extend to health and education). And the standing of local needs, and because creation of a combined “Meat, fish, mines accountability is also at that local level. and energy” ministry in Rakhine State appears odd and without precedent. 4. Resourcing. Decentralization could lead to greater resources being available in What is significant, though, is that these previously-neglected ethnic minority local legislatures and governments offer the areas. Local governments will be able to possibility for ethnic populations to have a raise revenue directly (in the sectors much greater say in the governance of their where they have revenue-collecting affairs. There are several reasons why authority5), and will be able to request decentralization has the potential to bring central government budget allocations. improvements over the previous, highly With all Chief Ministers sitting on the centralized, system: Financial Commission, there will be opportunities to lobby for funding, and it 1. Local decision-making. Some decisions will be more difficult than in the past for on governance issues will now be taken ethnic minority areas to be neglected. at a local level, which will be a major change from the highly centralized 5. Political competition. Local elections decision-making of the past. Previously, will over time create a culture of political those decisions that were taken at the competitiveness. This can promote better local level were made by the regional governance in obvious ways, by giving military commander, who had a military incentives for politicians to deliver on and security focus, and who did not have key areas of concern to the local to explain his decisions to anyone except populace. Governance may therefore his military superiors. Now, local govern- shift a little along the continuum from ments will have at least some account- authoritarianism to populism, but it ability to elected local representatives, would be naïve to expect such a shift to through the state/region legislatures. be sudden or dramatic.

2. Influence of local civil and religious Experiences of decentralization in diverse leaders. In a situation where some deci- developing-country contexts in recent years sion making and power is decentralized, have demonstrated that such a process has the influence of local non-government the potential to bring positive changes. But authority figures can be enhanced. The this is certainly not to be taken for granted,

4 | Burma Policy Briefing Box 3: State Ministers from Ethnic Nationality Parties

State Ministry Name and party 1. Kachin Industry U Sai Maung Shwe [SNDP] Shan National Race Affairs Daw Khin Pyon Yi [SNDP] 2. Kayah (none) 3. Kayin Transport U Saw Khin Maung Myint [PSDP] Energy U Min [AMRDP] Social Affairs, Education and Health U Saw Christopher [KPP] Forestry U Saw Kyi Lin [PSDP] Mon National Race Affairs U Nai Chit Oo [AMRDP] 4. Chin Economics U Yam Man [CNP] Energy, Electric Power, Mines & Forestry U Kyaw Nyein [CPP] 5. Mon Energy and Electric Power U Naing Lawe Aung [AMRDP] Social Affairs and Culture Dr Min Nwe Soe [AMRDP] 6. Rakhine Industry/Labour/Sports U Tha Lu Che [RNDP] Meat, Fish, Mines and Energy U Kyaw Thein [RNDP] Culture/Social Welfare and Relief U Aung Than Tin [RNDP] 7. Shan Industry and Mines U Sai Aik Paung [SNDP] Kayan (Padaung) National Race Affairs U Lawrence [KNP] Intha National Race Affairs U Win Myint [INDP] Wa Area U Khun Tun Htoo (aka U Tun Lu) [WDP] Pao Area U San Lwin [PNO] Palaung Area U Maung Kyaw (aka U Tun Kyaw) [TNP]

and in a situation like Burma, where there enced a mixture of positive and negative is an entrenched culture of authoritarian impacts of democratization and decen- (in some cases almost feudal) attitudes to tralization during their transitions from governance, and hierarchical social dictatorship to more democratic rule. structures, a considerable degree of caution Burma can expect something similar. is warranted. A particular issue in the short term will be There are certainly risks that local decision capacity constraints. Local officials may not making will impose an inefficient and bur- have all the experience and skills needed to densome additional layer of state bureau- take on their new governance responsibili- cracy, that it will promote the emergence of ties. Understanding of market economy corrupt or predatory local power holders, principles, evidence-based policymaking, and that elections, instead of promoting and finance and budgetary skills are likely accountability, will lead to cronyism and to be particular issues (indeed, constraints vote-buying. Other countries in the region, in this area exist at the national level also). such as Indonesia and Thailand, experi- The situation is similar for the legislative

Burma Policy Briefing | 5 branch. In ethnic states, nationality parties Second is the fact that, according to some have some legislative and executive autho- reliable sources,6 the military has given rity, but in many cases are severely lacking orders that all “self-reliance” business acti- in financial and human resources, and in vities and income-generation schemes by experience of the basics of legislative func- military units must stop, and that only the tioning and democratic and accountable two official military companies – the Union governance. of Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited (UMEHL) and the Myanmar Economic Given its powerful role, the military has the Corporation (MEC) – may conduct such potential to be a spoiler in such a context, activities. This would reduce the army’s in different ways. First, the army has economic role at a local level. become accustomed to having full control over all decisions, military and civil, at the If true, ending the “self-reliance” strategy is local level (just as it did at the national potentially very significant. In the early level). It can be anticipated that the new 1990s, when the military budget was under batch of regional commanders will not give pressure due to the rapid increase in the up such power easily. Second, military size of the army, it introduced a policy of regional commands and individual battal- self-reliance, whereby units in the field had ions have built up considerable economic to find ways to finance their own opera- interests. This makes the army a significant tions. This led to all kinds of abusive activi- economic actor at the local level, raising the ties, including forced labour, land confisca- prospect both of it using this economic tion, and ‘informal taxation’. The burden power to promote its political interests, and has been particularly heavy in the ethnic using its political power in the furtherance borderlands, where many military units are of its economic interests. stationed. But for any new policy to allevi- ate this burden, it is necessary for orders to These are real concerns, and the national end self-reliance activities to be accompa- armed forces (“Tatmadaw”) will certainly nied by sufficient additional resources to remain a very powerful force at local level, army units. Otherwise, it will merely lead to just as it will at the national level. But the different forms of abuse, as units struggle to military’s role will be curtailed somewhat find new ways to obtain finances, food and by two important factors. support other operational needs. It is un- known whether such additional resources are being made available. First is the fact that the new batch of re- gional commanders are relatively young/ PROSPECTS FOR PEACE junior officers, whereas many chief ministers are powerful former military Just as important as improved governance figures. of ethnic nationality areas is the fundamen- tal issue of resolving the decades-long In the Burman heartland, this has probably cycles of conflict and violence that have been a deliberate strategy in order to ensure afflicted the borderlands, taking a large that the military regional commanders are human toll and impeding the development subordinate to the new quasi-civilian of these regions. Can the transition to the structures headed by the chief ministers. new government help to promote peace, or Thus, for example, the Region (formerly will it merely represent another chapter in Division) chief ministers are mostly former the history of the conflict? lieutenant-generals or major-generals. In the ethnic states, however, the chief minis- Prior to the elections, tensions rose signifi- ters do not have the same military creden- cantly. The military junta put considerable tials (see box 1). pressure on ceasefire groups to transform

6 | Burma Policy Briefing into Border Guard Forces under the com- further to the south, Pyathonzu (Three mand of the Tatmadaw. After a series of Pagoda Pass), was also briefly overrun by deadlines passed without agreement by renegade DKBA troops. These actions, and most of the major groups, the junta set a the ensuing retaliation from the Tatmadaw, final deadline of 1 September 2010 for all caused significant displacement of ceasefire groups to transform into Border civilians.9 Guard Forces. In addition to the military’s strong reaction While some groups did make the transfor- to the actions by DKBA renegades, there mation (including most units of the Demo- have also been renewed clashes in Shan cratic Kayin Buddhist Army, the New State, with the Tatmadaw attacking Democratic Army-Kachin, and the Karenni SSPP/SSA positions from March 2011. But Nationalities Peoples Liberation Front), there were no military moves against other most of the larger groups did not – includ- ceasefire groups such as the UWSA, KIO or ing the United Wa State Army (UWSA), NMSP, who were also refusing to join the the Kachin Independence Organization Border Guard Force scheme, but who were (KIO), the National Democratic Alliance not taking any offensive actions. It seems Army, the New Mon State Party (NMSP) that the military government leadership and part of the Shan State Army-North, preferred not to engage in any major which now calls itself Shan State Progress military operations when it was at the point Party/Shan State Army (SSPP/SSA). of completing its political roadmap and Following the deadline, the State media transition to a new generation of leaders. began referring to the ceasefire groups who had not transformed as “insurgents”,7 This interpretation was reinforced by an raising concerns that the government incident in Kachin State in early February. might take military action against them at A Tatmadaw battalion entered an area some point, as it had done in 2009 against controlled by the KIO, leading to a clash the Kokang ceasefire group.8 with Kachin soldiers that left the Burma battalion commander dead.10 The incident Tensions had also risen because of the could easily have been used to justify an refusal of the election commission to escalation, but instead the government register the main Kachin parties that reacted cautiously, apparently determining intended to contest (including the Kachin that its battalion had acted improperly by State Progressive Party in Kachin State and entering KIO territory unannounced, and the Northern Shan State Progressive Party took no further action.11 in Shan State). Members of these parties who subsequently tried to register as It is too early to tell what the new govern- independent candidates were also barred, ment’s policy towards the ceasefire and leaving the Kachin without any distinctive insurgent groups will be, and the extent to representation in the elections. which the executive will be able to rein in or determine Tatmadaw activities. Initial A reminder of the reality of ethnic griev- statements from the new President have ances, and the violence that can result, been conciliatory, and it seems unlikely came even on the day of the elections. A that the government is planning to adopt a Democratic Kayin Buddhist Army (DKBA) belligerent stance, at least in the short term. leader who was disgruntled at the prospect of transforming into a Border Guard Force Neighbouring governments are also wor- (Col. Lah Pwe, also known as “N’kam ried about the unresolved ethnic and secu- Mweh” or “Mr. Moustache”), briefly occu- rity challenges. The Chinese government, pied the Burma border town of Myawaddy. especially, is concerned about the prospect The following day, a second border town of renewed conflict on its shared border

Burma Policy Briefing | 7 with Burma, both in terms of border stabil- old regime will be hard for the new govern- ity, and because of its massive infrastruc- ment to back away from. Agreement from tural investments in Burma. These include the election commission to register the several hydroelectric schemes, and an Kachin State Progressive Party, or allow its enormous investment in the energy and senior members to run as independent transport corridor through Burma to the candidates in the by-elections expected Indian Ocean – which will include twin oil later this year,14 could go some way to and gas pipelines, a highway, and a high- ameliorating the KIO’s concerns, but is speed rail link. China has therefore sent unlikely to be sufficient. Other kinds of clear messages to the ceasefire groups and assurance will be needed to convince the the Burma government that it would like to Wa to bring their armed forces under see these issues resolved peacefully. This government command, and it is hard to see message was reiterated to the new govern- this happening any time soon; fundamen- ment during the 2 April visit to Nay Pyi tally, they are unhappy with the status of Taw by Jia Qinglin, the fourth ranking their area under the new constitution. Chinese leader, to welcome the new Burma government. The safety and security of There are already warning signs that more Chinese citizens in Burma is another ethnic ceasefires could break down. In par- concern. ticular, in early 2011 the ceasefire KIO, NMSP and SSA/SSPP resumed relations in The Thailand government, too, is watching the newly-formed United Nationalities the situation with caution, not only because Federal Council with the Karen National of the major refugee and migrant worker Union (KNU), Karenni National Progres- challenges on its western border, but also sive Party (KNPP), Chin National Front because of major Thai investment plans in (CNF) and other non-ceasefire groups. No Burma. In particular, the Dawei joint actions have been agreed. But the Development Project in contested areas of intention of armed opposition leaders is to southern Burma is likely to reshape the prepare for renewed conflict – an eventual- regional political geography forever, as is ity, however, they say that they want to discussed further below. avoid.15

For the moment, President Thein Sein’s It is thus equally critical how the new conciliatory statements have been taken government will deal with the KNU, KNPP, positively by ceasefire groups. The UWSA Shan State Army-South and other non- has welcomed the President’s remarks, and ceasefire groups who continue their reiterated its position, set out in a 26 March longstanding insurgencies. The political statement, that it wished to solve the cur- and military strength of these groups has rent disagreements with the government been on the decline, but although they now through dialogue.12 And at a two-day meet- control little fixed territory, they can ing in Yangon in April 2011, five ethnic operate across large swathes of the south- parties issued a statement saying inter alia eastern borderlands. The Tatmadaw’s that peace is the key prerequisite for brutal counterinsurgency strategies, which development in ethnic areas.13 target not only the armed groups them- selves but also the civilian population in the However, it is unclear how the current areas they operate in, continue unchanged. deadlock can be resolved, now that posi- tions on both sides have become en- While Thailand is putting increasing pres- trenched. The major ceasefire groups had sure on these groups, by denying them safe grave reservations about the Border Guard haven and rear-supply routes (and raising Force scheme, which they have rejected, the prospect of closing the refugee camps whereas an ultimatum already issued by the which provide support bases for the

8 | Burma Policy Briefing 16 KNU) , and the Tatmadaw is limiting their List of Registered Political Parties scope of operation, in the end no military Referred to in this Report action can fully resolve the situation. Negotiations and an improved future for  All Mon Regions Democracy Party long-marginalized populations is the only (AMRDP) way that peace can be achieved.  Chin National Party (CNP) Whatever the short-term developments, in the medium term it is probably the  Chin Progressive Party (CPP) changing geostrategic and economic  Inn National Development Party (INDP) context that will have the biggest impact on Burma’s border areas and the prospects for  Kayan National Party (KNP) peace. The economic boom experienced by  Kayin People's Party (KPP) Burma’s neighbours (particularly China and Thailand) over the past 20 years meant  Pao National Organization (PNO) that the previously isolated border regions ended up adjacent to areas of phenomenal  Phalon-Sawaw [Pwo-Sgaw] Democratic economic growth. This represented a kind Party (PSDP) of centrifugal force, with these areas being  Rakhine Nationalities Development pulled closer to neighbouring economies Party (RNDP) and away from the centres of power in Burma.  Shan Nationalities Democratic Party (SNDP) This is a trend that was criticised by Presi- dent Thein Sein in his comments to the  Taaung (Palaung) National Party (TNP) border areas committee, when he noted the  Union Solidarity and Development Party tendency of some people in these areas (USDP) “relying on the other country” and the need for “cultivating the spirit of cherishing their  Wa Democratic Party (WDP) own country and regions”.17 It is indeed possible that the next phase in the econo- mic development of the region – increased alleviated, or that violence will end in the economic integration and “connectivity”18 short term. In fact these developments are – will mitigate those centrifugal forces. likely to build an additional set of new Many border areas will find themselves no grievances. longer merely adjacent to areas of growth, but strategically located on major economic A lack of consultation with affected com- corridors: Dawei to Thailand through munities, and a sense among those com- Tanintharyi Region; Kyaukpyu to China munities that they are not being accorded a through Rakhine State, central Burma, and fair share of the benefits, can potentially Shan State; Sittwe to India through Rakhine heighten tensions. This has already been State and Chin State; and the reconstructed experienced in the context of the major Ledo road from China to India across hydroelectric schemes currently under Kachin State. construction along the Chinese border, which have been the target of violent The size and importance of these projects attack. Local people have strong feelings will ultimately ensure that the continuation about these developments, which will see of insurgencies in most border areas be- them displaced from their ancestral lands comes untenable. But this certainly does and denied their source of livelihoods, not mean that the underlying grievances of while the electricity is sold to China, ethnic minority populations will be profiting only the central government.

Burma Policy Briefing | 9 CONCLUSION revenue, taxes on locally-managed dams and reservoirs, tolls from locally-managed roads and Two months after a new government took bridges, royalties on fisheries, transport taxes, over the reins of power in Burma, it is too proceeds and rents from locally-managed early to make any definitive assessment of properties, taxes on services enterprises, the prospects for improved governance and revenue from fines imposed by local courts, peace in ethnic areas. Initial signs give interest and profits on investments/disburse- ments, non-teak wood taxes, forest-product some reason for optimism, but the diffi- taxes, registration fees, salt taxes, and others. culty of overcoming sixty years of conflict and strongly-felt grievances and deep 6. TNI interviews, Yangon, April 2011. suspicions should not be underestimated. 7. Most recently, an article in the New Light of Myanmar referred to the United Wa State The economic and geostrategic realities are Army as an “insurgent group” (1 May 2011, p. changing fast, and they will have a funda- 16). mental impact – positive and negative – on 8. For more detailed analysis, see Tom Kramer, Burma’s borderlands. But unless ethnic “Burma’s Ceasefires at Risk: Consequences of communities are able to have much greater the Kokang Crisis for Peace and Democracy”, say in the governance of their affairs, and TNI September 2009. begin to see tangible benefits from the massive development projects in their 9. For a detailed analysis of these events, see Ashley South, “Burma’s Longest War: Anatomy areas, peace and broad-based development of the Karen Conflict”, TNI–BCN March 2011. will remain elusive. 10. See Wai Moe, “Burmese Officer Killed in The new decentralized governance struc- Clash with KIA”, The Irrawaddy, 7 February tures have the potential to make a positive 2011. contribution in this regard, but it is unclear 11. TNI interview with a Kachin community if they can evolve into sufficiently powerful leader, Burma, April 2011. and genuinely representative bodies quickly 12. See Ko Thet, “UWSA will Welcome enough to satisfy ethnic nationality Dialogue”, Democratic Voice of Burma, 3 May aspirations. 2011. 13. These parties were RNDP, AMRDP, CNP, NOTES PSDP and SNDP. See “Peace Must Precede Development: Ethnic Party Reps”, The 1. In 1989 the military government changed the Irrawaddy, 27 April 2011. official name from Burma to Myanmar. They 14. Under the constitution, appointees to can be considered alternative forms in the certain executive position at the national level Burmese language, but their use has become a are required to resign from their legislative politicised issue. The UN uses Myanmar, but it seats, triggering by-elections. These by-elections is not yet commonly used in the English are expected to be held late in 2011. language. Therefore Burma will be mostly used in this publication. This is not intended as a 15. This view was expressed to BCN-TNI by political statement. several ethnic leaders during March and April 2011. 2. For a detailed analysis of the speech, see “President Thein Sein’s Inaugural Speech”, 16. See: “Burma’s Longest War”, op. cit. Analysis Paper No. 2/2011, Euro-Burma Office, 17. New Light of Myanmar, 24 April 2007, p. 7. Brussels, April 2011. 18. This is a phrase that has been used by the 3. New Light of Myanmar, 24 April 2007, p. 7. Thai government to describe several sub- 4. New Light of Myanmar, 29 March 2007, p. 8. regional infrastructure projects. 5. As set out in Schedule 5 to the 2008 Constitution, these include land revenue, excise

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Burma Policy Briefing | 11 TNI-BCN Project on Ethnic Conflict in Burma Burma Policy Briefings

Burma has been afflicted by ethnic conflict and civil war since Burma in 2010: A Critical Year independence in 1948, exposing it to some of the longest run- in Ethnic Politics, Burma Policy ning armed conflicts in the world. Ethnic nationality peoples Briefing No.1, June 2010 have long felt marginalised and discriminated against. The situation worsened after the military coup in 1962, when mino- Burma’s 2010 Elections: rity rights were further curtailed. The main grievances of ethnic Challenges and Opportunities, nationality groups in Burma are the lack of influence in the Burma Policy Briefing No.2, political decision-making processes; the absence of economic June 2010 and social development in their areas; and what they see as the Unlevel Playing Field: Burma’s military government's Burmanisation policy, which translates Election Landscape, Burma into repression of their cultural rights and religious freedom. Policy Briefing No. 3, October This joint TNI-BCN project aims to stimulate strategic thinking 2010 on addressing ethnic conflict in Burma and to give a voice to ethnic nationality groups who have until now been ignored and A Changing Ethnic Landscape: isolated in the international debate on the country. In order to Analysis of Burma's 2010 respond to the challenges of 2010 and the future, TNI and BCN Polls, Burma Policy Briefing believe it is crucial to formulate practical and concrete policy No. 4, December 2010 options and define concrete benchmarks on progress that Ethnic Politics in Burma: The national and international actors can support. The project will Time for Solutions, Burma aim to achieve greater support for a different Burma policy, Policy Briefing No. 5, February which is pragmatic, engaged and grounded in reality. 2011 The Transnational Institute (TNI) was founded in 1974 as an Burma's New Government: independent, international research and policy advocacy Prospects for Governance and institute, with strong connections to transnational social Peace in Ethnic States, Burma movements and associated intellectuals concerned to steer the Policy Briefing No. 6, May 2011 world in a democratic, equitable, environmentally sustainable and peaceful direction. Its point of departure is a belief that solutions to global problems require global co-operation.

BCN was founded in 1993. It works towards democratisation and respect for human rights in Burma. BCN does this through Other Briefings information dissemination, lobby and campaign work, and the strengthening of Burmese civil society organisations. In recent Burma's Longest War: years the focus has shifted away from campaigning for economic Anatomy of the Karen Conflict, isolation towards advocacy in support of civil society and a by Ashley South, TNI, March solution to the ethnic crises in Burma. 2011

Burma’s Cease-fires at Risk; Transnational Institute Burma Centrum Netherlands Consequences of the Kokang PO Box 14656 PO Box 14563 Crisis for Peace and 1001 LD Amsterdam 1001 LB Amsterdam Democracy, by Tom Kramer, The Netherlands The Netherlands TNI Peace & Security Briefing Tel: +31-20-6626608 Tel.: 31-20-671 6952 Nr 1, September 2009 Fax: +31-20-6757176 Fax: 31-20-671 3513 E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected] Neither War nor Peace; The www.tni.org/page/tni-bcn- www.burmacentrum.nl Future of the Cease-fire burma-project Agreements in Burma, Tom www.tni.org/drugs Kramer, TNI, July 2009

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