U.S.-Austrian Relations in the Pre-Anschluss Period: FDR's Unwillingness for War

University of New Orleans ScholarWorks@UNO University of New Orleans Theses and Dissertations Dissertations and Theses 12-15-2007 U.S.-Austrian Relations in the Pre-Anschluss Period: FDR'S Unwillingness for War John S. Berteau University of New Orleans Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.uno.edu/td Recommended Citation Berteau, John S., "U.S.-Austrian Relations in the Pre-Anschluss Period: FDR'S Unwillingness for War" (2007). University of New Orleans Theses and Dissertations. 630. https://scholarworks.uno.edu/td/630 This Thesis is protected by copyright and/or related rights. It has been brought to you by ScholarWorks@UNO with permission from the rights-holder(s). You are free to use this Thesis in any way that is permitted by the copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses you need to obtain permission from the rights- holder(s) directly, unless additional rights are indicated by a Creative Commons license in the record and/or on the work itself. This Thesis has been accepted for inclusion in University of New Orleans Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UNO. For more information, please contact [email protected]. U.S.-Austrian Relations in the Pre-Anschluss Period: FDR’S Unwillingness for War A Thesis Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the University of New Orleans in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts In History By John S. Berteau B.A., University of New Orleans, 2001 December, 2007 Acknowledgements I would like to thank my father and mother, Winbon and Dathyl Berteau, for their emotional and financial support throughout my university studies. Without them I would never have been able to achieve as much as I have. My brother and sister-in-law, Lee and Lindsay Berteau, also deserve many thanks for keeping me entertained and encouraged during the long process of developing this manuscript. I also wish to thank Liane Bales for assisting in various stages of the development of this work by editing and proofreading many drafts. Thanks to Steve and Amy Moseley who have been the best friends for which anyone could ever ask. The final push of encouragement to finish this manuscript came from my fiancée Mary Beth Hutchinson. She is truly a woman who inspires me to get out of bed in the morning and do something productive with my day. I would also like to thank the professors that instructed me, and had the most impact on me in my undergraduate and graduate education: Dr. Gerald Bodet, Dr. Raphael Cassimere, Dr. Joe L. Caldwell, Dr. Michael Mizell-Nelson, and my thesis advisor, Dr. Günter Bischof. In all there are many people who helped bring this work together, and although my name is on the title page, all of the above listed share in its birth; to them this work is dedicated. ii Table of Contents Abstract…………………………………………………………………………………………..iv Introduction………………………………………………………………………………………..1 Domestic Policy…………………………………………………………………………………...3 Foreign Policy……………………………………………………………………………………21 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………….44 Notes……………….…………………………………………………………………………….47 Bibliography……….…………………………………………………………………………….59 Vita……………………………………………………………………………………………….62 iii Abstract This paper evaluates the United States’ decision not to come to Austria’s aid prior to and during the Anschluss of 12 March 1938. The uniqueness of this work is the two- front evaluation of both the internal/domestic affairs of the United States and the foreign policy of the US Government vis-à-vis Hitler’s aggressive foreign policy. As this paper will show, Anschluss might have been prevented, but at a cost neither the United States nor European powers were willing to pay. The domestic situation in the United States was too fragile, as was the lack of public support for war for FDR to have any leeway in militarily aiding Austria. American, and to some degree European, opinion held that the Austrian question was a European matter, and to that end American domestic policy dominated foreign policy in hopes of reestablishing the United States economy prior to attempting to aid anyone else. Keywords: Anschluss, Austria, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Great Depression, Interwar Diplomacy, U.S. Foreign Relations iv Introduction It is the purpose of this work to try and understand why the United States did not come to Austria’s aid prior to its annexation by the Germans on 12 March 1938. By examining both the domestic and international fronts, and the political posturing therein, the reasons supporting the United States’ course of action becomes clearer. The focus, then, is on the primacy of domestic policies in President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s thinking To date there is no work, which addresses the United States’ position on the Anschluss in such a way. It is my hope to prove that because of current American domestic situation President Roosevelt’s options were extremely limited in the realm of foreign affairs. FDR’s primary concern continued to be the Great Depression and its effects on the country. His main goal in the early part of his first administration had been to halt the country’s downward economic spiral. Roosevelt attempted to do this through the New Deal. It is only because of the heavily Democratic majorities in both houses of Congress that President Roosevelt’s New Deal acts could be passed so quickly, and with such little debate. Another factor to be kept in mind as part of the domestic context of FDR’s foreign policy formulation was the isolationist and pacifist sentiment in the United States. These groups had significant influence on, at first, public opinion, and later on Congressional leaders. The work done by these anti-war groups caused the passage of a series of Neutrality Acts, all aimed at keeping the United States out of any war. In the midst of both campaigning every two years and fighting to end the long economic depression, Franklin Roosevelt was also attempting to modify the Supreme Court. Throughout the 1930s FDR continually combated the United States Supreme Court, whose justices regularly invalidated his New Deal acts. They left the President scrambling to alter what the court found 1 unconstitutional. Subsequently, the President passed new laws that ideologically were similar to the ones invalidated by the court. FDR wanted to alter the court so that his New Deal acts would not continue to be invalidated due to the court’s conservative reading of the United States Constitution. The main goal of the New Deal, however, was to hopefully put an end to the Great Depression, and ultimately bring the country back on an economic upswing. In analyzing the domestic situation some events will be given further in depth treatment than others. For example, the economic theories behind the Great Depression will not be covered in detail. The classic works of depression economists such as John Maynard Keynes, Milton Friedman, and new scholarship by modern-day economists such as Ben Bernanke are sufficient to provide an in-depth economic picture of the United States in the 1930s.1 The New Deal and the early years of FDR’s presidency have also been covered extensively by many historians.2 This paper will go into greater detail on these domestic events, because it is very important to understand what legislation was being passed and invalidated, and what Roosevelt’s passions were in trying to prop up the U.S. economy. It is this very passion that drove the President’s domestic policy, and it is the reason why the domestic policy took precedence over foreign affairs. I also intend to show that more than enough justification can be found for the United States to have come to Austria’s aid prior to the Anschluss. The correspondence between the U.S. ambassadors and the U.S. State Department proves that as early as 1935, and perhaps even earlier, many European powers correctly anticipated Germany’s aggressive moves both against Austria as well as other Central European nations. In analyzing U.S. foreign policy through the international context, it is important to examine the diplomatic correspondence available, as Gerhard Weinberg notes that “American 2 diplomats in the 1930s were often extremely well informed—even if the government in Washington did little with their reports except file them.” Weinberg continues, “American diplomats often obtained information difficult or impossible to obtain elsewhere…on such matters as…the developments in Austria.”3 It is also important to analyze the Anschluss by way of the secondary scholarship. Works by young scholars such as Alexander Lassner and classic works by scholars such as Alfred Low utilize the diplomatic traffic only available in foreign languages, otherwise unavailable. Through both primary and secondary sources, a clear picture emerges of not only the desperation of the Austrian situation, but also the diplomatic acknowledgement of the existence of this tragedy. Both the archival and printed diplomatic records also show that there is no excuse for some combination of the Western Powers (the United States, Great Britain, and France) not opposing Nazi aggression and securing Austria’s independence. Domestic Policy: Depression & New Deal In the United States, in the post-Versailles era, most Americans experienced prosperity and were most concerned with tax relief and disarmament. In 1920 when Americans went to the polls, they voiced their concerns and voted in Republican Warren G. Harding by an unprecedented majority. Harding was an isolationist and against the Wilsonian vision of collective security. He suggested instead the League of Nations a more loosely tied international organization that would only meet when an aggressor threatened the peace. Harding offered America an alternative to internationalist Wilsonian vision.4 In America, the 1920s was a decade of unheralded prosperity during which small scale internationalist movements began.

Load more