The Origins of the Hispano-Ottoman 'Peace' of the 1570S and 1580S
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From the ridiculous to the sublime: the origins of the Hispano- Ottoman ‘peace’ of the 1570s and 1580s Professor M. J. Rodríguez-Salgado, The London School of Economics and Political Sciences Budapest, May 2012 Periods of war are often, paradoxically, a time when enemies have more frequent contact. This was certainly the case in the 1570s. The war required both sides to pay for any scrap of information, making even the greatest king beholden to the lowliest and most disreputable spy. Battles led to mass exchanges of captives. At Lepanto in 1571 thousands of ottomans were taken; the capture of La Goleta by the ottoman-corsair forces under Euldj Ali resulted in large numbers of Christian captives being sent east. Its recovery by the hispano-italian troops of Philip II in 1573 led to mass movements the other way, before its fall in 1574 to Euldj Ali’s forces redressed the balance and added to the flow of human misery. Captivity provided an unwelcome but often valuable opportunity to get to know the enemy, and it led to the creation of networks to ransom, rescue and succour captives, opening doors to a two- way traffic. Often, high-ranking captives were used by both sides to test the waters for peace negotiations. Peace was born from the ashes of war. The Ottoman Grand Vizir, Mehmet Sokolli, identified three peace initiatives originating from Philip II in the 1570s which involved captives: the missions of Jaime Losada, Giovanni Bareli and don Martín de Acuña. Bareli was a knight of St John of Malta, Losada and Acuña were fairly high-ranking military commanders in Philip II’s forces. It is striking, however, that at least two of these so-called peace envoys - Bareli and Acuña - had persuaded Philip II to fund their plans to destroy the arsenal in Istanbul. That was the primary reason they had returned to the Ottoman capital. Losada had been sent to secure the defection of the leading naval commander of the Ottoman state, Euldj Ali. How could peace have arisen from such deliberate acts of war? Well over half a century ago, Fernand Braudel attempted to trace the history of the Hispano-Ottoman peace, which he believed had transformed the Mediterranean. Instead of the usual wealth of documents and formal embassies, he found major lAcuñae in the records and the intrusion of non-diplomatic personnel. It appeared ‘that Spain used, for her diplomatic initiatives in the East, her army of spies and hired ruffians who had contacts with the twilight world of the renegades.’ It was a world of ‘renegades hoping to be received back into grace, former captives claiming to be experts on the Levant, Greeks ‘who must always be watched’, (as a Spanish report puts it) knights of Malta, Albanians, imperial envoys; and their interlocutors; Jews, Germans like Doctor Solomon Ashkenazi, dragomans like Horembey: in the no- mans-land between two civilizations, it was this strange army not always officially recognized by its employers which handled diplomatic matters.’ Yet Braudel retained a sharp sense of the niceties of diplomacy and drew a distinction between an ‘intelligence agent’ and ‘a negotiator’. Braudel did not explain why or how this curious situation had arisen. He set succeeding generations a challenge: ahe put it when discussing ‘the Bareli affair’, the topic ‘offers and opportunity for some more detective work’. That is precisely what I set out to do many years ago. This paper is a result of those investigations. Lack of space and time account for the fact that I will focus on the early stages of the negotiations between Philip II and Murad III. 1 II PRECURSORS OF PEACE? Bareli’s mission in 1569-70 was to destroy the arsenal in Istanbul and to coordinate a massive Greek revolt. It was a costly and dismal failure and we still do not how the Grand Vizir came to deal with him or why he should count his exchanges with this adventurer as a peace initiative. Perhaps he was just lying so as to make the point that Philip II had desired peace for a long time. It could also be the case of mistaken identity: the Grand Vizir did not name Bareli, but merely alluded to a Knight of Malta. He might have been thinking of other contacts that had taken place during the summer of 1573 which do reflect a desire to explore peace although they originated not in the royal court in Madrid, but at the initiative of the king’s half brother and leading naval commander, Don Juan. Don Juan dispatched four officials to Istanbul, one of whom, Antonio Avellano, we will encounter again later. They were sent to escort the son of Ali Pacha, the ottoman admiral at Lepanto, whom don Juan gallantly returned without ransom. According to the French ambassador while these envoys were in Istanbul they bribed Turkish officials and proposed peace talks which lasted during 1573 and 1574. The Grand Vizir, Mehmed Sokolli, confirmed these contacts and said they would require Philip II to abide by the usual diplomatic norms and pay annual tribute to the sultan. They had also demanded he hand over parts of Sicily as the price of peace. Braudel fused this initiative with contemporaneous negotiations in Istanbul by Jewish merchants from Turin and by the duke of Savoy and the republic of Lucca, all of whom sough preferential trading agreemets with the Ottoman empire. He appreciated, that there was no firm evidence that Philip II was engaged in serious peace negotiations but pointed out that when Murad III succeeded to the sultanate, the viceroy of Naples, cardinal Granvelle, argued in favour of making peace overtures. The viceroys of Naples and Sicily had a special role to play in such relations, being expected to advice the Spanish king on policy and operational matters since they governed on his behalf lands that were closest to the Ottoman empire and were most frequently attacked by Muslims. This also gave them the opportunity to launch independent initiatives. That is how Jaime Losada came to be in Istanbul. Early in 1575 the viceroy of Sicily, the duke of Terranova, sent him on a rescue mission for some of the remaining captives from the fort of La Goletta. Losada arrived in May and went straight to Euldj Ali whom he knew well. He had been taken captive along with his galley by Euldj Ali many years previously and had been his captive. But their relations were cordial. After his rescue he had been sent back by Philip II to entice the corsair leader to defect. Euldj Ali refused. As he put it, he had got everything that he wanted. He had considerable respect for Losada, and kept himself informed of his activities. He knew, for example, that Losada had commanded the galleys of Sicily during the war, and had become one of the highest-ranking officials of Philip II’s naval forces. Yet he received Losada warmly and took charge of his accommodation in Istanbul, securing an audience for him with the Grand Vizir. Losada was, as most envoys were, on a multiple mission. First, and the only part to be made public, he was there to rescue captives. Second, and secretly, he had orders to test Euldj Ali’s resolve once again, and try to bring about his defection. Thirdly, he was to find out as much information as possible about the sultan and his forces and evaluate the propensity of the enemy for war or peace. At the receiving end, the envoys were accepted on several levels too. Both Euldj Ali and the Grand Vizir, Mehmed Sokolli, expected him to give them details of the whereabouts of 2 Christian fleets and Philip II’s intentions, as well as to answer questions relating to what he had observed on his journey. They too wanted to gauge whether Philip II was inclined to peace or planned further hostilities. Mehmed Sokolli held two meetings with Losada, one at least in the presence of a ‘Dragoman from Granada’. The Grand Vizir stressed the desirability of peace, and his perception that the king of Spain needed to be at peace with the ’Gran Señor’. Losada responded that he believed Philip II would listen to proposals for a truce from which long-term amity might result between the two monarchs. He assured Ottoman officials that the Spanish king would welcome an approach from them. In response, both Mehmed Sokolli and Euldj Ali stressed that the Porte (doorway) to the sultan was always open, and that if the King of Spain wished to enter, they would not close it. Although these exchanges were conducted on general, almost abstract terms, they did not prevent the communication of essential information. They established that both monarchs were willing to consider peace and that neither side wanted to initiate the process. This was crucial as it was a matter of honour. Peace talks were always requested or initiated by the weaker party. The Ottoman officials invited Losada to press Philip II to follow the path of the Emperor and Venice, both of whom had peace with the sultan and paid annual tributes. Losada let it be known that this was inappropriate since Philip II was a much greater ruler than them, and did not need peace in the way that both the emperor and Venice needed the sultan. It was clear that negotiations would challenge both sides, but particularly Ottoman diplomacy, since relations with all Christians at the time were grounded on their acknowledgement of the superior status of the sultan. When Losada reported back, he stressed that the Ottomans had the means and a sufficiently powerful navy to strike further blows against Philip II, but that dearth, financial problems, the impending conflict with Persia and the sultan’s character inclined them to peace.