Algemeen Ambtsbericht Irak

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Algemeen Ambtsbericht Irak Algemeen ambtsbericht Irak December 2019 Pagina 1 van 80 Algemeen ambtsbericht Irak | december 2019 Colofon Plaats Den Haag Opgesteld door Afdeling Ambtsberichten (DAF/AB) Pagina 2 van 80 Algemeen ambtsbericht Irak | december 2019 Inhoudsopgave Colofon ..........................................................................................................2 Inhoudsopgave ...............................................................................................3 Inleiding .........................................................................................................5 1 Politieke ontwikkelingen en veiligheidssituatie ........................................... 7 1.1 Politieke ontwikkelingen ...................................................................................7 1.2 Veiligheidssituatie ............................................................................................9 1.2.1 Bagdad ........................................................................................................ 13 1.2.2 Noord-Irak.................................................................................................... 15 1.2.3 Zuid-Irak ...................................................................................................... 21 1.2.4 Koerdische Autonome Regio (KAR) .................................................................. 23 1.3 De Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) ............................................................... 24 1.4 Buitenlandse actoren/interventies .................................................................... 27 2 Identiteit en nationaliteit .......................................................................... 29 2.1 Documenten ................................................................................................. 29 2.1.1 Identiteitsdocumenten ................................................................................... 29 2.1.2 Overige documenten ...................................................................................... 31 2.1.3 Ongedocumenteerden .................................................................................... 33 2.1.4 Documentfraude ............................................................................................ 34 2.2 Nationaliteitswetgeving .................................................................................. 34 3 Mensenrechten .......................................................................................... 36 3.1 Toezicht en rechtsbescherming ....................................................................... 36 3.2 Naleving en schendingen ................................................................................ 38 3.2.1 Vrijheid van meningsuiting ............................................................................. 38 3.2.2 Vrijheid van godsdienst en levensovertuiging .................................................... 39 3.2.3 Bewegingsvrijheid ......................................................................................... 44 3.2.4 Doodstraf ..................................................................................................... 45 3.2.5 Bloed- en eerkwesties .................................................................................... 45 3.3 Positie van specifieke groepen ......................................................................... 47 3.3.1 Etnische groepen ........................................................................................... 47 3.3.2 Religieuze groepen ........................................................................................ 50 3.3.3 Militairen ...................................................................................................... 53 3.3.4 LHBT (Lesbiennes, homoseksuelen, biseksuelen en transgenders) ....................... 54 3.3.5 Vrouwen ....................................................................................................... 56 3.3.6 Minderjarigen ................................................................................................ 59 4 Ontheemden en vluchtelingen ................................................................... 61 4.1 Ontheemden ................................................................................................. 61 4.1.1 Aantallen en locaties van ontheemden ............................................................. 61 4.1.2 Voorwaarden voor vestiging ............................................................................ 62 4.1.3 De verblijfsomstandigheden van ontheemden ................................................... 64 4.1.4 Ontruimen van kampen en gedwongen terugkeer .............................................. 66 4.1.5 Verhinderde terugkeer van ontheemden ........................................................... 66 4.2 Vluchtelingen ................................................................................................ 67 5 Terugkeer naar Irak .................................................................................. 69 Pagina 3 van 80 6 Bijlagen ..................................................................................................... 71 6.1 Geraadpleegde bronnen ................................................................................. 71 6.2 Kaart van Irak ............................................................................................... 80 Pagina 4 van 80 Algemeen ambtsbericht Irak | december 2019 Inleiding Dit ambtsbericht is opgesteld aan de hand van de in de Terms of Reference (ToR) gestelde vragen en genoemde aandachtspunten. Deze ToR is opgesteld door het ministerie van Justitie en Veiligheid en vastgesteld op 11 juli 2019. Een geanonimiseerde versie van deze ToR is tezamen met het ambtsbericht gepubliceerd op de website van de rijksoverheid. In dit algemeen ambtsbericht wordt de situatie in Irak beschreven voor zover deze van belang is voor de beoordeling van asielverzoeken van personen die afkomstig zijn uit Irak en voor besluitvorming over de terugkeer van afgewezen Iraakse asielzoekers. Dit ambtsbericht is een actualisering van het algemeen ambtsbericht van mei 20181. Dit ambtsbericht beslaat de periode van mei 2018 tot en met november 2019. Relevante ontwikkelingen tot aan de publicatie van dit ambtsbericht zijn zoveel mogelijk meegenomen. Dit ambtsbericht is gebaseerd op informatie van openbare en vertrouwelijke bronnen. Bij de opstelling is gebruik gemaakt van informatie van verschillende organisaties van de Verenigde Naties, (internationale) niet-gouvernementele organisaties ((i)ngo’s), vakliteratuur en berichtgeving in de (inter)nationale media. Een overzicht van de gebruikte openbare bronnen is opgenomen in paragraaf 6.1. Daar waar openbare bronnen zijn vermeld, wordt de tekst in veel gevallen ook ondersteund door informatie die op vertrouwelijke basis is ingewonnen. Geraadpleegde bronnen tijdens een fact finding missie in juli 2019 naar Bagdad en Erbil, berichtgeving afkomstig van de Nederlandse vertegenwoordiging in Irak en andere niet-gepubliceerde informatie worden als vertrouwelijke bron behandeld. In dit ambtsbericht is de vertrouwelijk ingewonnen informatie voornamelijk gebruikt ter ondersteuning en aanvulling van passages die zijn gebaseerd op openbare informatie. Daar waar vertrouwelijke informatie als enige verantwoording van passages in het ambtsbericht is gebruikt, wordt dit expliciet in de tekst vermeld. Gezien de fluïde en complexe (veiligheids)situatie in Irak dient de in dit ambtsbericht opgenomen informatie niet als uitputtend te worden beschouwd. De accuraatheid van informatie is beperkt, omdat er sprake is van tegenstrijdigheden in de berichtgeving en informatie slechts in beperkte mate onafhankelijk kon worden geverifieerd, waardoor informatie in sommige gevallen slechts op basis van één bron is opgenomen. De aantallen doden en gewonden die genoemd worden bij aanslagen of demonstraties zijn slechts een indicatie, omdat berichtgeving daarover vaak uiteenloopt en in de meeste gevallen niet (op korte termijn) onafhankelijk kan worden geverifieerd. Daarnaast is het onbekend in hoeverre personen die later aan hun verwondingen bezwijken gerekend worden als dodelijk slachtoffer van een bepaald incident. Waar Irak geschreven wordt, wordt het gehele land bedoeld. Met centraal Irak wordt geheel Irak bedoeld met uit zondering van de Koerdische Autonome Regio (KAR). De KAR wordt afwisselend aangeduid met de term KAR of de Koerdische regio. 1 https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/ambtsberichten/2018/05/24/algemeen-ambtsbericht-irak Pagina 5 van 80 In hoofdstuk één worden politieke en bestuurlijke ontwikkelingen en de veiligheidssituatie in Irak, inclusief de verschillende veiligheidstroepen en gewapende groepen, beschreven. Het tweede hoofdstuk gaat over Iraakse documenten en de nationaliteitswetgeving. Hoofdstuk drie beschrijft de mensenrechtensituatie in Irak met een focus op de positie van specifieke groepen. Het vierde hoofdstuk gaat over de situatie van ontheemden en in Irak verblijvende vluchtelingen. In het vijfde hoofdstuk wordt ingegaan op de praktische omstandigheden voor Irakezen die terugkeren naar Irak. Pagina 6 van 80 Algemeen ambtsbericht Irak | december 2019 1 Politieke ontwikkelingen en veiligheidssituatie 1.1 Politieke ontwikkelingen Irak is een federale staat. De regering in Bagdad bestuurt het centrale deel van Irak en is verantwoordelijk voor het buitenlandbeleid van het hele land. In het noorden bestuurt de Koerdische Regionale Regering (Kurdistan Regional Government,
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