The Parliamentary Elite in Transition

The parliamentary elite in transition

LUCA VERZICHELLI University of Siena, Italy

Abstract. Only two years after the critical elections of 27 March 1994, the Italian parliamentary election of 1996 marks another important step in the transformation of the political class. The extent of turnover is declining, and the renewal of the parliamentary elite shows some signs of stabilization. This article inquires into the differences in the sociological configuration of the new elite, and whether this means that new consolidated pathways to the parliamentary elite now already exist. The article analyzes the distribution of freshmen in the political class, the return of old backbenchers in the new political parties, the social and occupational background of MPs and, finally, their local and political experiences. In the final section, the article discusses some hypotheses about the perspectives on the recruitment of Italian MPs, focusing in particular on the effects of the structural crisis of political parties and the introduction of the plurality system. An empirically-derived typology of professionalization patterns is also provided.

1994–1996: A complex period of renewal

The recent Italian transition has re-opened questions that in recent years had been ignored by political analysis, such as the transformation of the political class and of its selection and career models. The central question to be posed here is whether a new political class already exists, and if so, what are its characteristics? The difficulty in finding answers to such questions appears paradoxical in a country where, for almost half a century, the degree of continuity recorded in the characteristics of political elites often frustrated the researcher’s work (Mastropaolo 1994). Moreover, it is a complex problem, whose solution must be sought in social and political phenomena far removed from the beginning of the Italian transition. These phenomena have, in fact, been identified by analysts, and the theoretical framework of reference can be divided into three major arguments. First, the link between parliamentary change and the decline of mass parties – a phenomenon already evident at the end of the last decade – which has impelled analysts to propose new theoretical models of party forms (e.g. Katz & Mair 1995). The second and third streams are linked to the evolution of the Italian case in particular, and refer respectively to interpretations of the recent crisis and the transition that followed, and the effects of the electoral reforms. 122 LUCA VERZICHELLI

More specifically, the organisational crisis of mass parties in Italy cul- minated with the collapse of consensus that swept away the protagonists of the old political order, and forced the principal actors of the opposition to undertake a drastic restructuring at both leadership and programmatic levels (Morlino 1996), and from the recent literature dealing with these themes within the Italian transition we can see a variety of interpretations which focus particularly on change in the political elite. Thus, for example, many ‘negative’ explanations of change emphasise the weakness or lack of useful- ness of the former political class (e.g. Pasquino 1995; Cotta & Verzichelli 1996). By contrast, other authors underline new elements that were already evident for some time, such as the idea of leadership democracy,whichin some way accelerated the decline of elites based on the old party apparatus (Zincone 1995), or the growing demands for change which were illustrated during the fifteen years preceding the elections of 1992 by protest votes or abstentionism, and which developed into the complex of the anti-political class (Pizzomo 1996). Despite their differences, however, all contributions to this discussion are agreed that, from the point of view of the consolidation of the political elite, 1994 was the starting point of the transition, and not the end. The rapid de-legitimation of the old political class had favoured the sort of change centering on an anti-partitocrazia reaction which held the old political formations responsible for transforming Italian democracy from a participa- tory to a protective system (Pizzorno 1996), and an initial way of observing the effects of the anti-party thrust on the construction of the new elite is simply to count the number of movements in the electoral market from 1992 that abandoned both the label of ‘party’ as well as the classic party organisational structure. Indeed, detailed studies have already outlined how anti-party sentiment permeated the entire political spectrum, obliging many actors to emphasise their break with the past, and creating the conditions for new and sometimes anomalous coalitions (Bardi 1996). In more general terms, the ‘renewal of politic’ became the buzz-words shared by proposals for overcoming the crisis as well as by the competing actors – ranging from the newest to even some of the most experienced leaders of the old order who sought refuge from the decimation of the early 1990s. On the other hand, it is also necessary to take into account other constraints and the opportunities, and particularly those associated with the new electoral laws, which are discussed in this is- sue and elsewhere (e.g. D’Alimonte & Chiaramonte 1994), and which had a major impact on the redistribution of political career opportunities and on the organization of the competing alternatives. In other words, and with the help of the four-variable model described by Pedersen in his classical work on the long-term transformation of Danish THE PARLIAMENTARY ELITE IN TRANSITION 123 elites (1976), it could be suggested that the different profiles which can now be identified in the composition of the political class may be due to ‘medi- ated effects’ by virtue of both changes in the opportunity structures within the various parties and the new distribution of seats between the parties. In Pedersen’s model these two intervening factors, intra-party and inter-party change in elite factors, vary together when the independent variable is represented by a complex series of social and political changes, and this may well be the case in the 1990s Italian transition. What is important to note, however, is that although they were intense, the social and political changes did not have any revolutionary consequences, in that the 1948 constitution and parliamentary form of government remained unaltered. Moreover, other planned reforms concerning administrative and fiscal decentralization have yet to be implemented. The uncertainty of the situation therefore generates a series of reactions that further affects the two processes of change noted above, so much so that in three rounds of voting in only four years, changes at both the intra-party (leadership change, internal organization and strategy) and inter-party levels (electoral mobility, mergers, splits) continued to occur. We should also be cautious with respect to any ‘strong’ hypotheses regarding the disappearance of the recruitment models characteristic of the historical experience of Italian democracy. Rather, it is perhaps more useful to differentiate the possible scenarios which might follow from the real impact of the above mentioned variables on the stabilization of the new political class. In particular, and with relevance to the role of party recruitment, we might hypothesise that the acquisition of public positions will be less depen- dent upon internal political socialization and the experience of a party career. But it is also important to see if the decline of the party role will be arrested during the transition, and above all, if such decline is uniformly spread across the different political formations. Different hypotheses can also be constructed in relation to the effects of the majoritarian electoral law. The idea of a total overthrow of traditional, centralized candidate selection procedures was already undermined by initial analyses of the 1994 elections, when the need for renewal and the experience of organizational disarray may have served to enhance the triumph of territorialization (Mattina 1994; Lanza 1995). That said, the recourse to majoritarian competition and to single-member candidatures have led to profound changes in party strategies (Katz 1996), and we can now verify earlier hypotheses on the potential effects of a learning process in the single-member constituency system (Verzichelli 1994) which suggested the possible emergence of a parliamentary class that would be relatively independent of the national political class, and more influenced by the social and economic structures at the local level. 124 LUCA VERZICHELLI

Finally, the real effects of the complex Italian crisis, and of anti-party sentiment in particular, must be measured. For reasons discussed above, the parliamentary elite were transformed in just a few years from being the symbol of Italian stability to being the leadership class most susceptible to change. At the same time, this is still a political class in transition, that is, it remains a heterogeneous group, which includes old and new politicians, as well as elements based on traditional recruitment and those deriving from attempts at innovation, and which also includes persons who are themselves in transit. Successive studies of the 1994 elections illustrated above all the dimension of change, while often expressing doubts as to the homogeneity and stability of the new political class. These studies also inevitably generated more questions than answers. Now, however, following two majoritarian rounds of voting, the perspective has begun to change, and the problem today is to understand if the transitionary political class is being consolidated on a different basis to that which prevailed before, and if innovation can in fact be discerned. Hence, a two-fold comparison is required. On the one hand, we need to see how the proﬁles of the political class in transition differ from those of the old leadership. On the other hand, we need to conduct a more short- term comparison between the 1996 parliamentary class and that of 1994, in an effort not only to clarify the strategies and organizational potential of the new political actors, but also to appreciate the real effects of the majoritarian- single-member rules which, even in a possibly modiﬁed manner, are likely to remain central to the new Italian order. Moreover, and in the process of making these comparisons, I will also clarify the extent to whichpolitical professionalism, which was a fundamental element of the former parliamentary class, is being replaced or maintained (see Cotta 1979; Mastropaolo 1993).

In search of the political class: Parliamentary turnover and recurring phenomena

The ﬁrst point to be made here relates to the stability of the political class. Data on the 1996 elections demonstrate that even though the 1994 levels were not repeated, the extent of parliamentary change remains high, and since the beginning of the Italian crisis (now spanning three elections), is in fact much higher than was the case during the preceding forty years (see Figure 1). We may of course assume that those changes deriving from inter-party competition were particularly signiﬁcant in 1996, in that the elections marked quite a major shift from the centre-right to the centre-left. In other words, a least some sections of the 1994 parliamentary cohort were simply compelled to leave the scene. THE PARLIAMENTARY ELITE IN TRANSITION 125

Figure 1. Parliamentary turnover 1946–1996: Chamber of Deputies (- - -- - -) and Senate

(——).

But other factors were also important, however, and in particular there were the changes which were wrought through the internal choices of party actors in nominating their candidates. In order to shed some light on this latter phenomenon, Tables 1 and 2 reconstruct the fate of outgoing parliamentarians in 1996 – the change of electoral system obviously prevents any longer-term comparisons. What is perhaps most striking here is the high percentage of exit from electoral competition among the newer parties (e.g., Lega Nord and Forza Italia). This may obviously be related to the internal experiences and transformations of the parties themselves, particularly during the 13th legislature,1 but more detailed empirical testing also reveals the existence of precise strategies for changing selection criteria, which derived, in turn, from factors such as the change in the internal power relations in the reformed electoral cartels, and the high degree of centralization of the candidate-selection process in some of the formations. In a situation of major uncertainty, with a large number of colleagues at risk, all actors attempted to preserve the political future of particular leaderships, seeking safe elections and sacriﬁcing many outsiders in weak constituencies. Indeed, only 61 percent of incumbent parliamentarians actually ran again in their own constituency, and even if we leave out those elected in 1994 under proportional representation, more than a quarter of the majoritarian incumbents did not run again in the constituencies in which they had been elected in 1994.2 The data on Forza Italia (where 21 incumbent candidates moved) are particularly striking, in that for many of the 126 LUCA VERZICHELLI

Table 1. Continuity and change of the parliamentary class in the Chamber of Deputies 1994–1996 (as a percentage of parliamentarians of the twelfth legislature)

RC PDS Verdi PPI Lega CCD FI AN Total

Re-electeda 70.0 69.9 81.8 58.8 27.1 38.1 48.7 58.5 52.9 (338) Non-re-elected 10.0 10.6 – 20.7 32.2 33.3 22.7 25.0 21.0 candidates (134) Candidates 20.0 19.5 18.2 20.7 40.6 28.6 28.6 16.0 26.1 that withdrewb (167)

a Includes those re-elected to the Senate. b Includes retired and deceased deputies during the previous legislature.

Table 2. Continuity and change of the parliamentary class in the Senate 1994–1996 (as a percentage of parliamentarians of the twelfth legislature)

RC PDS Verdi PPI Lega CCD FI AN Total

Re-elected 41.1 72.7 46.2 57.6 30.0 23.1 44.4 58.3 50.3 (162) Non-re-elected 15.8 1.3 7.7 6.1 18.3 46.2 13.9 6.3 10.2 candidates (33) Candidates 42.1 26.6 46.2 36.4 51.7 30.8 41.7 35.4 39.4 (127)

parliamentarians this was not a change of destination (from the Chamber of Deputies to the Senate), nor even a simple change of constituency within the same region, but rather resulted from a direct decision by the centre which parachuted many prominent leaders into regions which were distant from their own. From this perspective, the adoption of a single-member constituency system certainly does not seem to have led to a territorialization of political selection (Fabbrini 1996) and a bonus for incumbents. Indeed, if such an incumbency advantage does exist, is not so much linked to individ- ual constituency power – as has been demonstrated in the case of the USA, Canada, Germany and Japan (Somit et al. 1994) – but rather to the strategies adopted at central level by parties or coalitions. Notwithstanding the reduction from three to two large cartels capable of competing for single-member constituency seats, the 1996 elections generally confirm a party-parliamentary system based on about ten groupings. Moreover, the persistence of a considerable part of the political class that THE PARLIAMENTARY ELITE IN TRANSITION 127 appeared on the parliamentary scene in 1992 and 19943 has transformed the challengers of yesterday into the new elite, even though parliamentary seniority remains much less marked than in the past (Table 3). Evident differences remain among the various parties and within the two majority formations, and, in particular, in the Polo per la Liberta, where Forza Italia, which is still not strongly institutionalized either inside or outside parliament, contrasts quite sharply with parties characterized by more experienced personnel. It is also noteworthy that both Rifondazione Comunista and the PDS have a limited percentage of senior members in both houses, but for two different reasons. In the case of Rifondazione, a party which was born from a previously submerged component of the old PCI, and which was consequently barely represented in parliament before 1992,4 the centralized selection typical of the communist model still operates. That is to say, the directive organs of the party explicitly establish even the maximum limit of mandates for its representatives. The PDS has a greater variety of personnel, and while the reduction in the number of experienced parliamentarians is not so marked as in Rifondazione, the overall lowering of the average age in this group clearly indicates the weight of the cohort that arrived in parliament after 1992, that is, the generation of politicians that found a place in the party after the Rimini congress, which marked the birth of PDS. The consolidation of a new leadership class is not so easy, however. Al- though there has been a change in the guard, this has not yet resulted in the sort of equilibrium between inter-party and intra-party factors that is necessary for significant stabilization. This can easily be seen by the data on turnover for the last three rounds of voting alone. Three possible elements are involved here. First, in relation to the inter-party factors, the overall turnover in the political elite of recent years may be attributed to the effects of a ‘triple revolution’ which was initially characterized by the partial crumbling of the old system and the emergence of new party actors in some parts of the country (in 1992). The second phase corresponds to the victory of the centre-right in 1994 and the debut of a completely new formation (Forza Italia) that challenged traditional party selection criteria even within its own political area. The final phase saw the victory of the centre-left in 1996 with a further adjustment in the structuring of electoral alliances which entailed some important changes at the level of political class.5 A second element to consider is the presence of ‘recurring phenomena’ among some segments of the old political class. The number of MPs re- elected in 1996 after an interval outside Parliament is certainly not very high (40 MPs, or just 4.2% of the total), but this figure does become significant in some of the centre formations (CCD, CDU and PPI and party components of the Dini List) that now use their own coalition potential to bring previously 128 LUCA VERZICHELLI Chamber of Deputies and Senate 1996 a prior elections(Chamber ofDeputies) senior members (Chamber of Deputies Deputies) 1996 of prior Total elections senior (Senate)1.2 members 1996 (Senate) 14.6 Total 43 1.1 5.0 20 b Average number of elections prior to 1996 and the percentage of senior members, Party Average number ofRif. Com. Percentage ofPDSVerdi 0.9 ChamberPPI ofLista Dini 1.0 Average numberLega 1.6 NordForza 0.4 Italia Percentage of 0.8 0.8CCD-CDU 0.7 Senate AN 2.9 1.3Others 8.2Total 25.0 1.4 3.8 10.2 1.7 35 2.6 1.0 16.7 146 16 1.8 26 15.8 59 59 123 1.2 30 0.8 8.9 1.1 1.2 0.9 0.5 93 9.1 0.9 10.2 630 7.1 20.0 1.3 17.2 11 0.0 2.1 12.0 1.0 88 14 11 29 16.3 27 47 25 9.5 43 315 Others includes PDS-Sinistra Europea parliamentarians that do not belong to the PDS (but to La Rete, Laburisti, Communisti Here, senior members refers to parliamentarians with at least three elections prior to 1996. The third election is the threshold usually used to define seniority, but given the frequency of elections in the 1990s, we raised this threshold by one. Table 3. b Unitari, Cristiano Sociali and PSDISardo movements), members d’Azione of senator the Pop-SVP-PRI-UD-Prodi andMeridionale alliance deputy other who and are Ulivo the not Movimento independents. in Sociale the Moreover, Fiamma PPI, Tricolore. Valle the d’Aosta Partito and SVP parliamentarians, the Lega of d’Azione a THE PARLIAMENTARY ELITE IN TRANSITION 129

(i.e., pre-1994) experienced figures back into parliament. Nor are some of the other parties, including Rifondazione and Forza Italia, immune from this practice. This may in part be explained by the link that unites some of the new or reformed formations to a leadership that was in some way marginalized within their respective parties of origin.6 Another explanation can be found in the organizational weakness of the new parties which recruit ‘first republic’ politicians. Finally, it is also necessary to underline the withdrawal after only two years of a considerable slice of the political class of the 1994 ‘revolution’ In fact, some 26 percent of outgoing deputies and 40 percent of senators did not seek re-election in 1996. This pattern is particularly marked in the Lega, the Catholic parties and Forza Italia (Tables 1 and 2), and once again these data fall half-way between the absolutely extraordinary peak of 1994, and the very consolidated tendency of the preceding period. That said, these data are also influenced by various phenomena that impact on the various groups in different ways. The high levels of withdrawal among Lega personnel must be related to internal party events during the two years of the 12th legislature, which led to the exile of more than a third of the incumbent parliamentary personnel (42 of the 117 deputies and 20 of the 60 Senators, see Verzichelli 1996). The other tremors endured by the party system in the two years between 1994 and 1996 are unlikely to have affected the re-election ex- pectations of parliamentarians in the various groups affected by such splits.7 Nonetheless, the level of desertion remains fairly high. The case of Forza Italia is particularly relevant here, in that, despite its expected gains, the party severed its connections with a large number of outgoing parliamentarians, often controversially. As noted above, centralised control of candidate selection was also important here. High levels of desertion are also evident in the CCD and Rifondazione. By contrast, the PDS further softened its attitude to the pre-electoral selection of outgoing parliamentarians, thus distancing itself even more clearly from the traditional PCI model. In general, the data on parliamentary turnover and experience demonstrate that the new political class arrived in the crucial phase of a new process of institutionalization, a process that may prove less rapid than that associated with the advent of the republic in the early postwar years, largely due to the weaker penetrative capacity of the current political parties and to the prob- lems stemming from the majoritarian reform. This also raises new questions regarding the problem of institutionalization, and, in particular, regarding the degree of autonomy enjoyed by parliamentary sub-structures and the role of seniority in the selection of political and organizational leadership – all of which led to much continuity in the ‘old’ Italian parliament.8 130 LUCA VERZICHELLI

The protagonists of the Italian transition: Who are the new politicians?

The physical profile of the current political class appears to be much more stable and homogenous than its predecessor (e.g., the general prevalence of politicians with a university education), and the variations which are to be found are also due to different factors than in the past. That past was also relatively unusual by comparative standards, with the differences being put down to factors such as a form of recruitment that combined party personnel with elements of social visibility, or the renewal (for example, recently in the PSI) of elements of clientelist-localist selection, or the relatively meagre impact of post-materialist culture. Moreover, the evolution of parliamentary recruitment models in the fifty years of the first republic, between the polar types of the pure apparatus model and clientelist-party model (Cotta 1979), also led to a political class with similar social traits in its various groups. For this reason the long-term analysis of the pre-political characteristics of parliamentary personnel is neglected here. Nonetheless, it is important to recall that signs of the ageing of the political class were already evident at the sunset of old partitocrazia, and especially among the governing parties, and an initial difference could also recently be seen to emerge between the younger and more educated PDS personnel and those of Rifondazione. Indeed, significant differences among the various parties could already be observed in 1994, and, despite some adjustment, these are now confirmed following the 1996 elections. In particular, reference can be made to data on average age, which show some traces of renewal when compared to the previous decade (Lanza 1995), but not a return to the levels recorded in the legislatures of the first republic. Moreover, the stabilization phenomenon of a ‘new’ but not so young elite is still more evident when data on the age of parliamentary debuts is considered.9 Furthermore, the halt in the growth of female representation, already evident at the end of the 1980s, is also confirmed. The exceptional data on the Chamber of Deputies in 1994 (more than 15 percent female MPs) is therefore attributable only to the regulation that obliged the men and women to alternate in the placings on the proportional lists. Once this clause disappeared, there was a return to the more ‘normal’ pattern of female under-representation, which was traditionally divided rather asymmetrically between left and right Alleanza Nazionale, in fact, has the lowest overall percentage of women in parliament, and DC parties of both alliances continue to be below average. By contrast, the PDS and Rifondazione betray a less prominent gender gap. In relation to education, it is clear that the inheritance of class parties still plays a role, although the differences are now less marked than in the past This greater homogeneity may be attributable to the distribution of ‘old’ party militants across the overall political spectrum, such as in the Rinnovamento List, where the few parliamentarians with a THE PARLIAMENTARY ELITE IN TRANSITION 131 political background (essentially the Italian Socialists, one of the fragments of the old PSI) balance the large number of graduates selected by the Lista Dini. In addition, the parliamentary micro-parties, that were made up almost exclusively of intellectuals and that challenged the large mass formations, have now disappeared. However, in all the lists the education levels are now very high, and with the exceptions of the Lega and the neo-communist party, all groups record more than 60 percent, with the moderate and catholic parties reaching peaks of just less than 90 percent. The Lega’s exceptionalism needs to be highlighted here, since the additional disparities in the data concerning average age and age of access to parliament seems to indicate how this sector of the political class represents the integration of parts of society that were certainly strangers to politics prior to the 1990s, rather than being simply the effect of a generational jump. The other element, that is, the low level of university education, suggests that it is militancy within the organization rather than social and cultural characteristics that qualifies the candidates for selection. Apart from the effects of a generational turnover between 1992 and 1994 (Lanza 1995), however, the sociological profile of the Italian political class does not differ markedly from that of the recent past. Since their political debut, it is really only the Lega personnel who have evidenced some new features, although these are partially echoed (especially in relation to age of entry) by Forza Italia. Other parties, especially Rifondazione, reflect some particular characteristics that can be associated with their historical reference groups, while new and reformed groups within both the Polo and the Ulivo have a parliamentary class characterized by the relatively stable and familiar sociological traits that were also to be found among the parties of the first republic. This suggests a degree of persistence in the classical mechanisms of selection, even among the most renewed sectors of the political class, i.e., those with a low percentage of senior members (Table 3) or with recovered parliamentary careers. This is certainly the case for Rifondazione, a party with a ‘new’ but far from young parliamentary class, that is characterized by a continuity of past social traits, and is also true, albeit to a lesser extent, for the PDS and Alleanza Nazionale. In both the latter cases, the widening of the consensus has facilitated the re-emergence of a large part of the pre- existing political class and the promotion of many intermediate echelons and former outsiders. In other cases, especially Forza Italia, the Catholic parties and the centre lists that appeared in 1994 and 1996, the continuity may owe more to elite persistence rather than the persistence of any organizational apparatus. Those who were outsiders vis-à-vis the ‘ancestral party’, as well as exponents of other old parties who were recovered by the new movements and non-party notables who were converted to active politics, may well be 132 LUCA VERZICHELLI among those whom we can now identify as ‘new’ politicians with ‘old’ social characteristics. A completely different picture emerges in relation to the professional origins of parliamentarians – a picture which not only differs from the recent past but which also reveals considerable internal heterogeneity even in the contemporary political class (Tables 4 and 5). This change has also caught the attention of the popular press, and observers have already highlighted a number of the features involved, including, for example, the emergence and persistence between 1994 and 1996 of ‘new’ professional groups in parliament such as managers, small businessmen, artisans, financial consultants and other non-legal professionals, as well as the reinforcement of university professors, doctors and public functionaries. At the same time, however, the conclusions which have been drawn from these observations are often misleading. The so-called manager party, for example, which is often identified as one of the souls of the Polo, and which is often contrasted to the Ulivo party of public employees or university professors, can in reality be associated only with that segment of representatives elected by Forza Italia, with the remaining component of private managers on the political scene being distributed among all the other formations. Misleading conclusions are not only due to a superficial reading of data, however, for much also depends on how patterns are to be interpreted. The importance of the socio-occupational characteristics common to a group of academics mobilized by an electoral flash movement certainly cannot be treated in the same way as that of the militant intellectuals who divide their life between university and politics. Indeed, within a more ample interpretative framework, data on the professional origin of Italian parliamentarians can be seen to suggest a number of different considerations, particularly since the social transformations of recent decades had already led to some small but significant changes in the socio-occupational background of politicians during the last elections of the proportional era. The data on the growth in the proportion of parliamentarians from the public sector offer a good indicator of this change, in that they signal the clear inversion of a tendency which has already been noted by comparative analyses of the Italian case (Mény 1993: 213), and that is the limited weight of public officials. When the crisis of the historical parties is added to this incremental transformation, recourse to external figures could be seen to become a requirement that almost all the competing actors had to meet, a requirement that was also hastened by the advent of the single-member constituency system. Moreover, it is important to remember that the selection of the new political class represents the end point of a process in which the organizations that carry out electoral campaigning (still) play a part, and this includes first, the parties (or transitional ‘non-party’ movements) that are able THE PARLIAMENTARY ELITE IN TRANSITION 133 to shake the consensus, and second, the electoral alliances. The degree of ongoing change in the parliamentary class may therefore be revealed by the relatively minor influence of a particular class of political professionals, and it is this that represents the true peculiarity of the Italian case (Cotta 1979; Mastropaolo 1990, 1993). Here also the decline in the percentage of full-time political-trade union functionaries10 an be seen as a natural consequence of the organizational ‘slimming’ of the parties, while, at the more general level, the higher variability in the professional origin of parliamentarians found from 1994 onwards appears to indicate an attempt to turn to sectors of society that were once strangers to active politics. Within this general picture, some specific party tendencies which were already apparent in the 1994 results can now be confirmed. In particular, we can see differing degrees of innovation in the representative personnel of the four large parties within the current panorama. From left to right, we find that Rifondazione Comunista is rather comparable with the past in relation to the parliamentary recruitment of political and trade union functionaries (now under 20 percent) as well as working class figures; the PDS still continues to bring into Parliament a large group of political professionals, while at the same time incorporating members11 with very different sociological profiles to those from the traditional communist apparatus, such as professionals, academics and public managers, who together constitute more than a third of its deputies and about a half of its senators; Forza Italia confirms a parliamentary class that is essentially constituted by the industrial and managerial class, and continues to recruit personalities professionally tied to Berlusconi’s group;12 finally Alleanza Nazionale’s representative personnel still seems tied to traditionally ‘visible’ social categories, including in particular the legal profession. It is also necessary to emphasise the exceptional nature of the Lega representatives, who may be distinguished from both the historic parties and those born more recently. Moreover, the Lega parliamentary class contrasts with the Ulivo representatives because of the evident over-representation of private producers, as well as with the two profiles typically found in the Polo – the managerial profile of Forza Italia and the legal profile of Alleanza Nazionale. In the case of the Lega, we therefore see further evidence in 1996 of a political class which is close to the producers of the small and medium bourgeoisie, such as artisans, merchants, small businessmen, and other professionals and consultants.

The political socialization of parliamentarians

The analysis of the professional composition of the new political class puts into perspective those hypotheses that suggest the substitution of a class of 134 LUCA VERZICHELLI 2.7 3.4 7.7 6.7 17.4 21.4 5.1 8.3 3.6 8.4 5.1 8.1 2.92.9 1.4 5.4 4.1 12.5 3.0 13.6 3.8 17.4 7.7 10.0 7.8 12.8 9.3 14.8 1.7 12.8 23.1 2.5 26.3 10.6 11.3 1.8 1.1 3.5 3.3 2.6 5.7 3.9 3.4 12.5 4.3 5.1 7.7 4.3 6.7 7.0 6.8 5.9 5.0 3.6 6.3 5.7 5.9 RC1994 1996 1994 PDS 1996 1994 1996 Verdi 1994 1996 1996 1994 PPI 1996 1994 1996 Dini 1994 CCD-CDU 1996 1994 Forza Italia 1996 Lega Nord 1994 1996 AN Total 42.1 20.0 44.6 36.3 18.2 11.9 3.8 13.0 10.018.4 3.5 20.0 0.9 10.2 11.0 5.9 3.3 24.3 18.8 18.9 24.2 21.2 18.6 15.9 4.3 16.7 5.2 2.6 10.2 10.0 9.0 3.2 10.2 9.5 Professional origin of deputies, 1996 (N and %) Political-trade 16 7 57 53 – 6 7 1 3 3 4 1 7 2 27 18 134 100 omre– 3– 468 2365– – 1–12– 111 55 –2 21 5– 221 35 5661 109 – – –1––– ––2–– 17153– –– 4 119642 11 1– 1113 1218 Union46 workersCommerce/–– artisans 10.5 17.1Entrepreneurs – 3.9Managers–1 – 3.4Lawyers – 96 2.3Other 2866 – 4 26professionals 61259 514 25 1 3 3038 1Teachers 5.3 36212 –65645 8131– 2 11.4University34 7 7 – 4 1.7 8.6professors 55 11.6 6 7Public21 11 – 7.9managers 3.0 2 13 11.4 17 13212Public32 2 88 73employers 5.3 16 46 6.6 9.4 3637 2 2Other12 2.9 12.3 3.8 7.9 6.1 – 1 1 7.0 8.7 10.2 5.7 11.5 4.1 3 2 8 3.9 25.0 13.0 2 20.0 9.6 20 33.3 1 8 9.6 6 15.3 17.4 25 0.8 11 6.3 0.9 4 23.1 17.9 3 1.7 17.4 19.5 18.8 – 9.1 3 6 30.5 3 10.0 6.7 10.2 0.9 40.0 1 5 9 7.7 6 4.5 8.7 23.7 10.2 5 4.3 15.8 15 7.7 4 20 23.1 6.7 1.8 17.4 16.2 6 11 21 4.2 8 16.7 2.1 7.3 16.5 7.0 3 1 36 11.2 32 1.3 1.7 24 12 25 0.8 5.1 2.7 51 25 5.3 23 6 5.1 20.0 15 8.8 10 67 1.8 4.5 102 9.7 71 5.3 3 9.5 104 4.8 64 4.5 6.0 60 10.5 Table 4. THE PARLIAMENTARY ELITE IN TRANSITION 135 3.7 2.3 1.0 1.3 2.8 3.7 2.3 0.3 0.7 1.1 12.5 10.3 10.0 15.4 11.7 22.2 10.6 25.4 14.8 2.1 2.3 10.5 5.7 1.3 2.2 3.1 3.4 10.0 13.9 12.8 1.7 2.1 2.3 2.9 9.6 5.6 18.2 6.5 4.5 7.1 9.4 13.8 15.4 17.6 8.3 12.8 6.8 3.7 27.7 23.3 10.2 11.4 11.1 18.2 3.9 4.5 7.7 14.3 6.3 6.9 10.0 11.7 17.7 6.4 11.9 11.1 4.3 7.9 7.6 RC1994 1996 1994 PDS 1996 1994 1996 Verdi 1994 1996 1996 1994 PPI 1996 1994 1996 Dini 1994 CCD-CDU 1996 1994 Forza Italia 1996 Lega Nord 1994 1996 AN Total 16.7 18.2 16.9 21.3 3.1 3.4 10.022.2 18.2 10.4 12.4 23.1 21.4 6.3 6.9 23.1 2.1 11.7 4.7 8.3 7.0 4.3 8.9 8.5 18.5 12.8 9.3 10.8 9.8 Professional origin of senators, 1996 (N and %) omre– –– –– ––––– 1– –1 –1 12 Political-trade 3 2Commerce/–– 13artisans 19Entrepreneurs – – – – – 1 1 1 – 1 – – 4 – 3 – 1 – 2 – 2 – 8 1 5 2 15 22 4 28 1 1 33 18 no1 12 12 –– –– ––––– –– 111–– –1 56 56315 –1 1– 69 34 11 51 911 44 5457 54 –1 202075 34–23Union1– 36 41workers 13103236 5.6Managers–– 55112 17 5.3 21 65 3136 Lawyers12 2.2 131121 Other3–88–15224436137894742 professionals 57 –1 16.7Teachers 43––1 –3 73 55 1327 University11 4professors 34 10.4 12 221–2 2Public1– 63 9.0 73 5.6managers 2– 2524 8 9.1Public22 employers 5.6 11 26.0 7.1Other22 22.5 11.1 15.6 18.2 3 53.6 16.9 6.9 35.7 6.6 3 12.4 20.0 15.6 7.9 30.8 15.4 20.7 2 23.5 7.1 30.0 2 8.3 15.6 7.7 7.1 12.8 17.2 29.4 – 10.0 12.5 22.0 16.7 3 10.3 7.7 25.9 19.1 11.7 2 17.0 8.5 20.9 2.8 3.7 3 14.9 14.9 8.5 13.3 5.8 2 3.4 9.3 3.7 5 17.1 12.8 18.1 6.4 11.6 5 11.9 9.8 11.1 6 11.4 10.7 4 11.6 34 4.1 31 8.6 Table 5. 136 LUCA VERZICHELLI professional politicians with a composite group of amateurs coming directly from civil society, and parachuted into parliament by electoral reforms and political creativity. Indeed, there are now sufficient elements to assume that the new leadership group may be consolidated on the basis of rather different requirements than that in the past. To verify such an hypothesis, however, we need to look at evidence of both local political experience and party positions prior to the parliamentary debut,13 and Tables 6 and 7 report these data with respect to the Chamber of Deputies. Here again, the tendencies that had already emerged in 1992, and which became even more evident two years later, are also now confirmed. Experi- ence in national party organs as a pre-requisite for parliamentary access is clearly less relevant than in the past (Table 6). This is particularly striking given that the fragmentation of the current parliament is likely to have facilitated a greater ‘occupation’ of the Chamber by groups of national party leader groups. Yet, more than 10 percent fewer parliamentarians now come from the top leadership of parties. In the disaggregated data, it is evident that this reduction is also more or less characteristic of all parties. For example, the percentage of deputies with a party background at leadership level prior to their first election falls to below 50 percent in the formations that are heirs to the historical parties, and is consistently low in the newer groups. The explanations for this change do vary, however. In some cases, the intra-party transformation process streamlined the internal leadership and completely renewed its personnel,14 while in the case of Alleanza Nazionale in particular, the increase in parliamentary representation led to the national leadership quota among deputies being reduced. By contrast, both the Lega and Forza Italia have relatively few top political leaders within their parliamentary groups, which may be due to the fact that both also have very small executive bodies, especially Forza Italia. That said, few among the restricted circle of about fifty persons of which the leadership of the two movements is com- prised have actually later reached parliament.15 Finally, while the members of the Lega executive come largely from among the first wave of parliamentarians, a large part of the political leadership of Forza Italia did not have a prior parliamentary career.16 This impression changes if one looks at all party positions that were held prior to first election, however. With the sole exception of Forza Italia, at least 50 percent of politicians in all the parties have had an active experience in their party internal structures, or at least in the parties considered as the forerunners to the current formations. After a decline of 1994, Alleanza Nazionale in particular returns with a very high percentage of politically socialized parliamentarians, probably constituted by a large group of politicians with vast experience who had been excluded up to now by the old THE PARLIAMENTARY ELITE IN TRANSITION 137

Table 6. Deputies with previous party experience (in %)

1976 1979 1983 1987 1992 1994 1996

RC none 12.9 12.5 17.1 low positions 12.9 10.0 28.6 intermediate positions 29.0 27.5 17.1 high positions 45.2 50.0 37.1 PCI-PDS none 14.1 19.6 20.0 14.7 21.7 31.1 24.7 low positions 12.7 14.1 8.2 9.8 4.8 5.9 29.4 intermediate positions 44.4 38.6 46.5 47.2 36.1 35.3 17.8 high positions 28.2 27.7 25.3 18.3 37.3 27.7 28.1 PSI none 9.6 19.3 12.2 9.5 9.6 low positions – 1.8 1.4 3.2 1.2 intermediate positions 34.6 17.5 20.3 21.1 25.3 high positions 55.8 61.4 66.2 66.3 63.8 Verdi none 66.7 63.6 56.3 low positions 6.7 9.1 18.8 intermediate positions – – 12.5 high positions 26.7 27.3 12.5 Lista Dini none 57.7 low positions 15.4 intermediate positions 7.7 high positions 19.2 PPI none 54.5 35.6 low positions 3.0 20.3 intermediate positions 15.2 15.3 high positions 27.3 28.8 DC none 21.7 22.4 23.2 29.0 23.9 low positions 4.2 5.4 7.3 7.4 7.2 intermediate positions 41.7 40.2 38.2 29.4 36.7 high positions 31.5 32.0 31.4 34.2 32.2 CCD-CDU none 33.3 30.0 low positions 33.3 40.0 intermediate positions 14.3 13.3 high positions 19.1 16.7 138 LUCA VERZICHELLI

Table 6 (continued)

1976 1979 1983 1987 1992 1994 1996

Forza Italia none 86.3 74.4 low positions 6.0 15.7 intermediate positions 4.3 5.0 high positions 3.4 5.0 Lega Nord none 32.7 37.6 31.0 low positions 11.5 13.7 36.2 intermediate positions 29.2 28.2 15.5 high positions 26.5 20.5 17.2 MSI-AN none 11.1 15.4 14.3 6.9 – 21.0 18.9 low positions 3.7 – 2.9 – – 12.4 21.1 intermediate positions 3.7 3.8 8.6 3.4 7.4 19.0 9.5 high positions 81.5 80.8 74.3 89.7 92.6 47.6 50.5 Chamber total none 17.2 22.5 22.0 24.5 20.4 44.0 36.7 low positions 6.8 7.0 5.6 5.6 5.6 9.1 24.2 intermediate positions 36.5 32.7 32.0 27.7 27.3 20.4 12.1 high positions 39.5 37.0 40.4 42.7 46.7 26.5 27.0 Note: Low positions refer to all local level positions except provincial secretary, intermediate positions to provincial secretaries and regional positions and high positions to regional secretary and obviously all national level positions.

MSI guard and the limited share of seats. Those in the second ranks in the MSI constitute the spine of the new right-wing parliamentary group which has a higher degree of continuity vis-à-vis its historical antecedents than do the post-Christian Democratic parties, in which two-thirds of representation is made up by politicians with practical experience. The alternative model of selection to that of party access certainly does not disappear, but it is everywhere reduced, except in parties that compete with the post-Christian Democrats for the centre of the political spectrum (Forza Italia and the non- socialist component of Rinnovamento). Once again, it is worth underlining the data regarding Berlusconi’s movement. Considering that the small percentage of Forza Italia deputies with party experience is also accounted for by many former parliamentarians from the PLI, DC and the Radical Party, we can then see a cohort that is characterized by extremely weak levels of THE PARLIAMENTARY ELITE IN TRANSITION 139

Table 7. Deputies with experience of local elected positions (in %)

Party 1976 1979 1983 1987 1992 1994 1996

Rif. Com. 57.5 50.0 40.0 PCI-PDS 67.7 61.0 55.0 58.4 53.3 46.2 61.7 PSI 71.2 59.6 64.0 70.5 70.1 Verdi 42.9 52.9 45.5 50.0 Lista Dini 38.5 PPI 27.3 47.5 DC 60.7 60.2 62.4 61.9 70.1 CCD-CDU 56.9 48.3 Forza Italia 15.7 19.7 Lega Nord 60.0 30.5 55.2 MSI-AN 62.5 67.7 71.4 75.0 84.8 77.5 67.4

Total 63.5 57.3 56.6 58.9 65.1 41.3 48.6

political socialization. In this regard, the Lega appears in sharp contrast, since a large majority of its deputies come from the intermediate echelons, that is, from the ‘local’ heart of the party. Similar considerations emerge from the data on the local experience of the elected politicians (Table 7). The decline in this type of experience which was evident in 1994 has now stopped, bringing the general level to around 50 percent, or mid-way between the tendencies recorded in the 1980s and those of the first majoritarian election. The PDS and PPI in particular now include a substantial proportion of parliamentary personnel with experience in local elections.17 The intensity of pre-parliamentary administrative experience also changed with respect to the past. If we take account of some more qualitative studies, then three typical paths of parliamentarians with prior local positions can be seen: first, the more ‘traditional’ pre-parliamentary career of a rather long series of electoral and administrative commitments; second, that of a group of politicians whose careers were interrupted by the 1990s crisis but that took off again directly at the parliamentary level after a period of total non-involvement; and finally, that of new politicians who held local elected positions only in the majoritarian era, and thus immediately prior to parliamentary entry. Roughly speaking, the first group of parliamentarians is concentrated in Rifondazione, the PDS and Alleanza Nazionale,18 while many cases belonging to the second group are found in the former DC parties, with many of the third type being in the Lega, Forza Italia and elements of the centre-left. 140 LUCA VERZICHELLI

Table 8. Deputies with a political background (local elected and party positions) prior to election, 1992–1996 (in %)

Party 1992 1994 1996

RC 52.5 45.0 40.0 PDS 42.5 43.7 54.8 PSI 60.9 Verdi 47.1 9.1 25.0 Lista Dini 30.8 PPI 15.2 39.0 DC 56.8 CCD-CDU 42.9 41.4 Forza Italia 7.7 13.0 Lega Nord 38.2 22.2 44.1 MSI-AN 69.7 69.8 62.1

Total 51.4 32.9 41.1 Note: All local administrative positions are calculated here, from local councillor to member of the regional executive.

A ﬁnal evaluation of the political socialization of new parliamentarians can only be undertaken in light of further research, but those data which are available already give us a general indicator of political backgrounds constituted by the percentage of parliamentarians with both party and local experience prior to their election (Table 8): ‘expert’ politicians have been strengthened since the crisis of 1994, but still level off to below 50 percent, which is also the level which pertained at the end of the ﬁrst republic. Left- wing personnel have the highest level of political socialization due to both Rifondazione and the parliamentary sector of the PDS. Theses are followed by the Catholic parties (about 45 percent), and a very composite centre-right The leap of the Northern League towards the levels reached four years ago offers a further sign of the return of personnel (and a recruitment criterion) based on party militancy.

Towards a new political professionalism? The parliamentary class in movement

The central questions that this first-reading of the data on the political class in transition sought to answer were first, do the conditions exist to allow us to speak of a qualitative renewal in parliamentary personnel?, and second, do THE PARLIAMENTARY ELITE IN TRANSITION 141 these conditions suggest the development of differing recruitment patterns to those of the early 1990s? There is also a two-fold reading of the data involved here: first, a long-term reading which compares the current profile of the political class with that of the past, and second, a short-term reading which contrasts two close moments – 1994, marking the culmination of the transition, and 1996. These yield the following elements. In the first place, the exceptional renewal phase of the last fifteen years has tended to fade, but higher turnover rates than those in the proportional era are still being maintained. The phenomenon of the ‘recycling’ of segments of the old political class, which had already been emphasized by some observers after the elections, applies to few cases. Nevertheless, these are significant if they are read together with the re-introduction to the electoral circuit of a large segment of new parliamentarians who were socialized by the old parties and who have vast prior political experience. In particular, the data on experiences in party and local administration become stabilized, especially among the more organized political formations. The overall configuration of the totality of some 1,000 persons that now make up the parliamentary class has also stabilized, and confirms some features that were already evident in the political elite during the final phase of the first republic (e.g., the gender and age balance) while at the same time confirming some new elements that had emerged in 1994. We can note here in particular the decline in the proportion of parliamentarians with a political-trade union professional origin, the continuing presence of other groups (including academics, managers, public and private directors, non- party journalists), as well as the declining importance of a pre-parliamentary phase of political socialization. Within this overall picture, and judging from the comparison between 1994 and 1996, the differences between the various parties are also stabilizing, and the analysis of professional background in particular suggests the consolidation of a fragmented elite even within the majoritarian cartels (Verzichelli 1995). What we also see is the sheer lack of reliability regarding some of those hypotheses which suggested that pre-existing, political selection criteria would be completely dismantled. The replacement of the parliamentary class, which is so far the only definite outcome of the Italian transition (apart from the falling apart of the old party system), does not necessarily eliminate the old access routes. From this perspective, the 1996 elections simply mark an adjustment of what had already been observed in 1994, confirming the tendency of all those parties that are ‘heirs’ to the first republic to produce a political class with a party stamp (Recchi 1996). Nonetheless, the new elements that have emerged (and are now confirmed) are sufficient to verify other hypotheses on change. Thus, we can reply in the affirmative to the first of the two 142 LUCA VERZICHELLI questions posed above. The persistence of an alternative channel of party recruitment such as that of Forza Italia, and of a model that is not comparable to those traditionally in operation (the Lega), are clearly important here. The (negative) demands for the replacement of the traditional political class, and the (positive) demands for a re-definition of parliamentary personnel that could be modelled according to the requirements of the single-member constituency system, do really exist, and they are common right across the political spectrum. The former demands can still be linked to the crisis of the old political class, while the latter are reflected in the greater weight which now attaches to local administrative positions (which, by now, are all based on majoritarian electoral systems). Finally, a reduced party role can perhaps be seen in the smaller quota of functionaries and professional politicians. To adopt the terms of a well-known typology, we therefore see some evidence of an emphasis on the career politician rather than the professional politician (Mastropaolo 1993). Lateral entry into politics, the possible absence of full-time commitment, a young age at election, and a qualified professional background may be the most relevant characteristics here.19 However, it is still important to underline that this change represents a withdrawal of the party apparatus role rather than its abandonment. In the two party realities that are clearly indicated by the data as being the most ‘structured’ (the PDS on the centre-left and Alleanza Nazionale on the centre-right), the shift in the modes of selection does not seem to be the result of any removal of the old internal paths, but rather of their gradual modification. In the case of the PDS, recruitment is expanded to include different social areas with more established criteria regarding circumstances and type of constituency.20 By contrast, and from a party control perspective, Alleanza Nazionale seems to offer a ‘mixed’ process of recruitment that is not unlike that traditionally employed by the DC and the PSI, in which the requirements of political socialization (in particular, through the acquisition of intermediate local positions) and administrative experience are added to a certain social and local ‘visibility’ It is not at all coincidental that one generally innovative characteristic – the increased presence of academics – remains close to traditional levels in both these parties. The analysis of Lega personnel merits a separate comment. The newpada- nians in parliament illustrate and strengthen the idea of a career politician who is certainly more expert and professional than those that once constituted the historical vanguard of this party. Today, the ideal-typical Lega representative is, in fact, a territorially-based politician, that is, one with a presence in the small local administration and in the citizen party. A pure League member21 as semi-professional origins rooted in the productive sectors of society and is selected for his/her capacity to operate in the constituency and THE PARLIAMENTARY ELITE IN TRANSITION 143 within the local population. This model continues to be uneasily comparable to traditional types of personnel selection because of its indisputable link with the party’s social base, but in fact the forms of political mediation that it involves are found only in limited areas and gain maximum benefit from the majoritarian mechanisms and from the anti-party protest which is associated with the federalist-secessionist message of the current Lega strategy. These considerations may pre-empt the answer to the second question posed above, however, for it appears evident that the transformation in the recruitment criteria is anything but finished, and that the process itself remains quite heterogenous. In the first place, analysis of the socio-professional characteristics clearly demonstrates the diversity of the recruitment strategies. In 1996, this diversity seemed even more accentuated, demonstrating the profound differences between paths within the Ulivo and the Polo, and thus also the substantial variation in the characteristics of the political class, which, by virtue of the geographical distribution of seats, then accounts for the over- and under-representation of particular categories.22 These are paths rather than models, however, and they refer to the prospective strategies followed, not by party actors, but by vast coalitions that are still anything but consolidated. Nevertheless, there is an evident objective that is common to the different paths, and that is to replace the traditional professional politician model with a new model characterized by both social visibility and a sufficiency of the politico-administrative experience required to maintain consensus. Within this framework, it is important to point to the lack of a strong selection model which could be seen as offering a substantial alternative to the party model, or at least to point to the weakening of such a model in the case of Forza Italia. Moreover, it is also clear that, while constituting the leadership of a very important actor and a relevant part of the new political class, Forza Italia has not created a model which could be exported to the other components of the centre-right alliance. A similar scenario is likely to play in the Ulivo, where the various ‘non-professionals’ find themselves subjugated to the resources of the still powerful ‘pure’ politicians of the PDS, the PPI and some other smaller elements within the coalition. The common task facing the various sectors of the Italian political class is therefore to re-consolidate the relationship between organizational actors (parties, electoral committees, cartels) and the supply of political personnel; in other words, they must re-define some political recruitment models. If a new parliamentary class is to be consolidated, then this particular route will have to be followed, thus ensuring a degree of stability in the socio-political characteristics of the personnel within each movement. This is also likely to lead to a new level of political professionalism. Certainly the weight of party organizations and the consensus strategies pursued by all of the actors 144 LUCA VERZICHELLI are likely to influence the possible patterns of recruitment, and it is likely that the professionalism of the Italian political class will be characterized in particular by the presence of managers and professional staff incorporated into relatively loose party structures (von Beyme 1996). However, the persistence of organizational forms that, despite their sometimes extravagant names, continue to be centralized national parties, as well as the weak territorialization of electoral campaigns, seem to indicate that in many sectors of the political spectrum a ‘mixed’ representative cohort will be consolidated. It is also likely that the present inter-group variations will remain, not least by virtue of an electoral law which, while certainly favouring coalitions, does not favour cross-party fusion. Within the majoritarian component, many area-based non-professionals could then persist, while in the proportional component in elections to the lower chamber parties could continue to line up their core elites. On one hand, this suggests that there will be limits to any overall evolution towards a ‘looser’ and more changeable political class, which would be sensitive to the ever-changing demands of civil society, and which would be territorialized through the single-member constituency system. On the other hand, it could also lead to a shift in the relative weights of the parliamentary elite and the party elite, with the former becoming relatively autonomous of the latter – a pattern which has already emerged in recent years.23 Both the intensity of the political socialization process and the level of professionalization may be used to distinguish, at least prospectively, the recruitment models pertaining to the two coalitions. Adopting Cotta’s (1979) conceptualization, I would suggest that within the centre-left (and particularly the PDS and Rifondazione), there are clear signs that a pronounced career professionalization will prevail, while in the Catholic parties of the Polo, as well as in Alleanza Nazionale, the professionalization of activity is likely to prevail. The case of Forza Italia, in which we can confirm an emphasis on homines novi (Recchi 1996), and in which the party leadership and parliamentary class are quite separate, is clearly a case apart, as is perhaps that of the Lega. More generally, I would therefore suggest that the prospects for a consolidation of the political class in the coming years today will revolve around three theoretical types of professionalization: Thefirstoftheseisparty controlled professionalization, and this is also the model which is most closely linked to the past, since both the entry of political elites and their career prospects are tied to the selection by central party leaders. What is new in this model are the shortening of pre-parliamentary careers and the possibility for ‘lateral’ recruitment, which may allow a significant number of outsiders into parliament, often in competition with party elites. Parties that are heirs to the old order are more oriented towards this pattern, THE PARLIAMENTARY ELITE IN TRANSITION 145 although here too there are distinctions that, in general, separate the left-wing formations from the centre-right, and, in particular, Rifondazione Comunista (and to a lesser extent, the PDS) from Alleanza Nazionale. The second is a corporate controlled professionalization,inwhichthe party role is essentially concentrated in the personnel selection phase, pro- ducing an ever more expert parliamentary class which is at the same time autonomous of the movement leadership, and which betrays certain of the characteristics of the career politician who intends to maintain social connections and possibly even return to them on a full-time basis. The growth and level of centralization of the party movement which seeks this professionalization may lead to the development of very different kinds of parliamentary recruitment. However, the only party that currently evinces a tendency for this type is Forza Italia, an organization in which the leaders are the party, and therefore also the only actors who manage the political socialization of parliamentary personnel. In any case, for these actors also, the problem of social visibility remains, that is, the extra-political requirements that can guarantee the reliability of a parliamentary class within the context of a greater and more heterogeneous electorate than that backing the party with which the candidate is identified. The third type is a locally-controlled professionalization in which party experience plays a central role in the construction of the leadership class. In this case, however, it is militancy rather than a party career that is important in the selection process. Moreover, this is also a model of local control that is best suited to a parliamentary cadre that is the expression of an isolated and non-cooperative political force, in which representation is closely identified with the constituency or even with the smaller areas that constitute the movement’s core. Given the data which have been presented here, it is clear that the first model prevails among centre-left parliamentarians (especially due to the weight of those parties that are heirs to the PCI), and the second (due to Forza Italia) in the Polo. But the clear diversity which can be found even within these camps (the contrasts between Alleanza Nazionale and Forza Italia, for example) may yet lead to the consolidation of the ‘mixed’ models that are now emerging. We can only wait to see if these models will prove to be genuinely applicable, or if further adjustments in the party system (perhaps in addition to further partial reforms of the electoral law) will lead to the development of new solutions.

Translated by Claire M. O’Neill 146 LUCA VERZICHELLI

Acknowledgments

The data discussed in this article are the property of theCentre for the Study of Political Change (CIRCoP) at the University of Siena. The research was sup- ported by a grant from the Italian National Research Centre (CNR), Contract No. 97.00650. CT 09.

Notes

1. Lega Nord parliamentary group was the most evident case here, being forced to renew its lists following the desertion of many parliamentarians. But it is also interesting to observe how the other cartels have also changed following their absorption of these deserters. Five former Lega parliamentarians were re-elected as part of the Polo, which had also nominated another five. In addition, Pierluigi Pietrini was re-elected on the Dini list. Another seven former League deputies were candidates of smaller parties in 1996. 2. 606 incumbents were candidates in single-member constituencies. Of these, 93 ran in a different constituency than two years previously, 34 went to the other house of parliament, and 107 were elected under proportional representation. Thus, 372 are constituency ‘faithfuls’. 3. The total number of current parliamentary deputies that made their debut in 1994 is 198 and in 1992, 85. In the Senate, they amount to respectively 95 and 57. The percentage of parliamentarians that entered during the crisis years and today are confirmed in parliament is therefore 47 percent in the Chamber of Deputies and 48.3 percent in the Senate. 4. This tendency was even more evident after the break-off of the Unitary Communists, which took away some of Rifondazione’s most experienced parliamentarians. 5. The most simplistic reading of this evolution identifies a new actor (the Dini List) that contrasts with the traditional parties. In reality, the situation is more complicated. Within the Dini List there are formations and small groups that have already been tested and which bring some personalities with a fairly long political experience into parliament. The Popular party (PPI) has a small number of parliamentarians with a non-DC origin. Finally, the PDS, which is still in the process of internal restructuring, combines political personnel from the communist party period with a number of personalities from the more widely spread progressive areas that were already active in other political initiatives in recent years. 6. This is especially visible in the three Catholic parties and in the socialist component of the Dini List, where we see the return of some persons who were already in parliament in the 1970s. Forza Italia has also recruited some former pentapartito parliamentarians, while Rifondazione has brought into parliament the former secretary of Proletarian Democracy and three former communist MPs. 7. The former Popular Party members that went to the CDU found an ample ‘quota’ of candidatures in the Polo lists and in the common proportional lists of the CCD, while the Unitary Communists officially entered the PDS quota. 8. These are the classic indicators of parliamentary institutionalization that have been used by Polsby and others. In Cotta’s work (1976, 1979), there is a specific refinement of these indicators as well as a series of evaluations about what they can reveal with respect to the Italian case. THE PARLIAMENTARY ELITE IN TRANSITION 147

9. The average age of a parliamentary debut in the Chamber of Deputies is about 45, and is in line with that recorded for 1992 and 1994, but clearly superior to that recorded in the past (Lanza 1995: 223). Forza Italia (over 47) and the Rinnovamento group (49) in particular account for an increase in the average age of deputies at their first election. Among parties tied in some way to formations of the first republic, the PPI (47) and Alleanza Nazionale (45) currently record the highest age for parliamentary debuts. 10. Cotta’s study (1979) showed a growth in the percentage of professional politicians-trade unionists until 1976, when about a third of deputies had this professional origin. The PCI had the highest amount (with about 50%) but overall growth was also attributable to the increase of professional politicians in the DC and Socialist parties. Surveys of the 1980s already indicated that the general rate had decreased, levelling off at about 20%, while differences among parties remained unaltered: the PCI showed a higher incidence of this category than the PSI and DC. 11. It is important to recall that the data reported in the tables are calculated only with regard to parliamentarians that are attributed to the PDS. To these, area independents and exponents of parties close to the PDS that joined the proportional list of the European left and subsequently the parliamentary groups of the democratic left (172 deputies and 98 senators), must also be added. 12. It is difficult to quantify the significance of what might be defined as the ‘company party’ within Forza Italia’s parliamentary groups. Using a restrictive criterion (that is, counting those employed in Berlusconi’s group only), no more than 15 parliamentarians were present in 1994. But personalities in some way tied to the fortunes of Berlusconi’s economic empire (Fininvest lawyers, economic advisors, journalists etc.), may also be added. Today the situation does not seem to have changed, and the entry into parliament of Fininvest leaders, or other very close collaborators of Berlusconi, illustrates once again the attempt to force the ‘company-ization’ of personnel by Gianni Pilo, who was responsible for the 1996 selection. Moreover, once again the pressure of the company core is contrasted with a series of internal forces in the movement, demonstrating the divisions and weaknesses of an ‘electoral’ party which has evident characteristics of other party models (Gray & Howard 1995; Maraffi 1996). 13. We need to point out two important limits to this approach as adopted in the more classic analyses. First, the analysis of party careers of elected politicians has not traditionally taken account of possible changes in political affiliation – a phenomenon which was practically non-existent until a few years ago. By contrast, it is now very important to observe whether the leadership class of the new formations has prior political socialization in other political environments, as well as the duration of such experience. Second, the use of classical indicators of political socialization risks failing to capture the new weight of some local authority elected (and non-elected) positions. The introduction of new electoral systems based on the direct election of executive positions, and inspired by the majoritarian principle, has clearly modified the structure of opportunities traditionally available to the career politician, and, in particular, has forced a re-evaluation of directly elected positions vis-à-vis those obtained by nomination. 14. This is the case of post-Christian Democrat parties and, in particular, the PPI, whose national leadership is largely made up of personalities that held a minor role in the old organization. A part of the PDS leadership was directly promoted to the national elite when the new party was born. Entry to parliament of many of these new politicians preceded their taking up national party positions, thus emphasizing more the parliamentary phase of political careers then the older PCI model (Cotta 1979). 148 LUCA VERZICHELLI

15. For the purposes of this analysis, I considered members of the Political Committee and Regional Co-ordinator to be those holding senior positions in Forza Italia, and those in the Presidency and the Federal Secretariat (including the national secretary) in the case of the Lega. 16. Forza Italia’s Political Committee had originally only five members, two of whom were elected in 1994. After increasing to eleven members (in May 1994), four parliamentarians were Committee members, and now ten Committee members sit in parliament. However, some of the remaining members were elected to the European Parliament in 1994. 17. Over 41 (68.3%) of new PDS deputies have prior experience in local administration, with 21 (51.2%) in the case of the PPI. The percentage of newly elected politicians without party positions is similar: 19 (31.7%) in the PDS and 12 (29.3%) in the PPI. 18. A further distinction might be made given the small percentage of former local adminis- trators among Alleanza Nazionale parliamentarians. However, this difference is obviously due to the fact that the old MSI remained excluded from the executive even at the local level. 19. As we have seen, the average age at first election in Italy continues to be older than the 40 which, according to Mastropaolo, is the threshold that distinguishes a career politician from a professional or apparatus politician. However, the comparison between specific groups, such as the DC and Forza Italia, or the PCI and PDS, suggests that in some significant sectors of the political class, pre-parliamentary political training is reduced and is substituted by a ‘social visibility’ requirement. 20. The data reveal that the current Pds has a political class not unlike that of the PCI, even if it lost an entire generation of earlier leaders in the turning point at the end of the 1980s. Moreover, it must be recalled that certain parts of the leadership still play central roles in both local government and in the national executive. 21. In light of the information collected to date, Lega personnel have the lowest incidence of previous party experience. Only in six cases (from a total of 59 deputies and 29 senators) have we found a previous party affiliation. This differs substantially from Forza Italia, which recruited some former parliamentarians of the centre-left, as well as a number of former local politicians and many former ‘semi-professionals’ (such as academics and journalists with political experience) from the new left to the old MSI. 22. When the data on professional origin are aggregated into three large categories (representatives of the public sector, the private sector, and the professional politicians/trade unionists), we can see a clear imbalance in territorial distribution, with the private sector being strong in the north (60%) and in the southern and island regions (51%) as against 40% in the centre. 23. Note here the proliferation of parliamentary groups, some of which are non-party, and their fluidity during the first majoritarian legislature (Verzichelli 1996), as well as the (always fruitless) recourse of many incumbent parliamentarians to ‘do it yourself’ lists both in 1994 and 1996.

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Address for correspondence: Dr Luca Verzichelli, Dipartimento di Scienze Politiche, Giuridiche e Sociali, Università di Siena, Piazza San Francesco 7, I-53100 Siena, Italy Fax: +39 577 298754; E-mail: [email protected]