CEU eTD Collection ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN Committee: GaryJ.Miller,Washingt Thesis submittedinpartial fulfillment of therequirements for the A ComparativeAnalysisofRussia’sRegions Jan-Hinrik Meyer-Sahling, Univ Levente Littvay,CentralEuropeanUniversity(Hungary) Department ofPoliticalScience PUBLIC BUREAUCRACY: Central EuropeanUniversity Degree ofDoctorPhilosophy Supervisor: Tamás Meszerics by MarinaNistotskaya Budapest 2009

OF WELFARE-ENHANCING on UniversityinSt.Louis(USA) ersity ofNottingham (UK)

CEU eTD Collection

I herebydeclare that this workcontainsno other institutions.Thisthesis another person,unlessotherwisenoted. containsnomaterialspreviously writtenand/orpublishedby materials accepted foranyother degrees inany ii

CEU eTD Collection puzzle insocialscience.Whilst dominant regions allowsaninquiryintothereasonsfor adoptionofrealmerit, whichisapersistent that thisdissertation has made. properties ofde-politicizedbureaucracies, whichperhapsis th first empirical verificationofMiller’stheo working of thecausal mechanism. Thesequantit politicized. Twocases-studies from thecontext observed acrossRussia’sregions striking variationinthelevels research. Soviet countriesandmakesawelcome contri first systematicmeasurement oftheorganiza a strikingvariationinde-facto large sample ofRussia’sregions largely de-politicized. The thesis also examines that, from alegalisticpointofview,Russia’s provisions ofRussia’stwomajo (2003, 2006),thethesisemploys theimproved framework tosystematically assessthe governance ofpost-SovietRussia. hazard. This theoretical argument istheninvest by showingthecapacityofindividualelements enhancing propertiesofa Miller’s (2000)theory investigates thisresearchquestionboththeo members ofasociety?’ isaclassical puzzle inthe field of politicalscience. Thisthesis The question‘What typeofbureaucracyismost lik represents boththeoretical andempirical cont conventional wisdom aboutthefactorsthatleadtoadoptionof civilservice,this thesis the most powerfulpredictorofthelevel variable. Controllingforfactorsfromexistingtheo empirical test,usingtheobtaine reaction ofeconomic agentstotheruler’schoices.Thethesis also subjectsth horizons, which reflectstheruler’sstrategic thinkingovertime asaffected by thelikely personnel decisions.Centraltothis conditions underwhichself-interes thesis offers analternative –formal andparsimonious–theoretical explanation as tothe empirically outsidetheAnglo-Saxonworld.Utiliz settings, they fail toexplain interactions among coreconstituen The documentedvariationin Statistical analysis,subject ofchapter4,show Having revisitedMeyer-Sahling’sanalytical ofinteractivesocialproduction,whichadvocatesthewelfare- de-politicized bureaucracy(orcivil service),anddevelopsitfurther ofaggregate economic performa the adoption of meritin autocr de-politicization of Russia’sre . Theexpert-basedevaluationof r CivilServiceActsof1995 d measureofde-politicizatio is accountedforbytheextent ted politiciansopttocurbth explanationistheideaofth cies ofvoters,legislators,andexecutivesindemocratic de-facto Abstract de-politicization ofbureaucracy.Bychallenging ributions tothelitera personnel policyregime canbecharacterizedas iii de-politicizationofbureaucracyinRussia’s tional structureofpublic retical explanation ofthe welfare-enhancing

retically and empirica theimplementation of the lawinpractice in a explanations underscore igated within theempirical milieu ofregional bution tocomparative public administration of civilservice to contain politicians’ moral of post-SovietRussiafurther illuminate the ative and qualitativeanalyses constitute the ing analyticaltoolsfro ries, itisfoundthatrule ely toenable sustaina s that,controllingforrelevantfactors,the framework offormal acies and arenotcorroborated n ofbureaucracyasdependent gional bureaucracy.Thisisthe and 2004.Thisanalysisshows nce andsmall businessgrowth e most importantcontribution eir authorityove e ruler’s discount rate or time e ruler’sdiscountrateortime personnelpracticesrevealed to whichbureaucracyisde- ture onmerit adoption. lly. ItdrawsonGary bureaucracyinpost- theimportance of ble prosperityforall m game theory,this political discretion rs’ discountrateis r bureaucratic is theoryto CEU eTD Collection completion ofthisthesiswouldmost certainlynothavebeenpossible. I am, most however, indebtedtomyhusbandJohn:withouthislo in thecourseofthisprojectandbeyond. I am thankfultomy friendsVictoriaTimo Shalkwyk inSt.Louis. Fóber, NandorHorgosandthelateAnnamá those peoplewhomade me feelwelcome atth As Imade numerous tripsar to theproject. sensitive topicofpersonnelpol I thank all of theexperts whotook part in this research for their courage to speak onthe Studies atGeorgeMasonUniversi The financial contribution of CentralEuropean University andtheInstitute for Humane model discussedinchapter5ofthisthesis. I wouldliketoacknowledgetheconceptualcontri theoretical argument andbetterprepare thefieldresearch. program atUniversityofNorthCarolina(C I oweaspecialwordofthankstothetutors St. Louisandtheirconstantsupport. science discovery,fortheirhelp in facilitatingmy researchstay My gratitudegoestoAlexandraandLeeBenha early stages,hasencouragedmy ideasandthegeneralapproachtoth Tamás Meszerics, whostoodbyme from beginningtoend,andGary potential scientificcontributionofthisprojec I wouldlike tothank allthose ound Russiaandseveralotherplace people whobelieved inthe conceptual maturity, feasibility and icy inRussia’slocalgovernment ty isgratefullyacknowledged. Acknowledgements schuk andMarinaPopovafortheirprecioussupport t. Namely, Iwould liketothankmy supervisor iv

andstudentsofthePh.D.inPublicPolicy ria KóborinBudapestandStephanusvan eir homes. ParticularthanksareduetoRita harlotte), whohelpedme tosharpenmy bution ofVictorLapuen m forintroducingme the worldofsocial atWashington University in and forthetime theydevoted s, Iwouldliketothankall e researchquestion. Miller who,from the ve andpatiencethe te tothetheoretical CEU eTD Collection Groups ofExpertsandAcross Regions, 2006………………………………………… 119 ……………………………………………………………………………………. Table 3.7 Applications byGroupsofExpert Table 3.6 2006 and2000Compared (Nandpercent)…………………………………………… Table 3.5 and AcrossRegions,2004-2006………………………………………………………. Table 3.4 Table 3.3 Table 3.2 Table 3.1 Table 2.11 Bureaucracy, UnderFZ-119…………………………………………………………… Table 2.10 Table 2.9 Table 2.8 Table 2.7 hold) aStateServicePosition………………………………………………………… Table 2.6 Table 2.5 Discretion ………………………………………………………………………………. Table 2.4 Table 2.3 1995, 2000,2006,includingauxiliarysta Table 2.2 On theFundamentalsof Table 2.1 79 ……………………………………………………………………………………… ProportionofCurrentBureaucrats Hi ProportionofInternalApplicantsinthe TotalNumber ofVacancyContest Changeinthe AverageNumberofJobApplicationsper Vacancy,2004- AverageNumberofJobApplicati ProvisionsofFZ-119and OtherExperts………………………………………………………………. RegionalCoverage(Cases)………………………………………………… BasicDutiesoftheStat AppointingSchemes AuthorizedbyFZ-119 ………………………………. ObligatoryQualifyingRequirements ConditionsUnder whichIndividualscannotbeAdmitted to(orcontinue TypologyofPersonnelPolicy Regimes …………………………………….. TypesofDecision-MakingAuthority LegalDefinitionsoftheAuthority EmployedinRussia’sStateOrgansof Russia’sSystem ofStateGovern Russia’sPersonnelPolicyRegime (F Restrictions, Arisingfrom theMembership inRussia’s Public State Service…………………………………………………… List ofTablesandFigures s andAcrossRegions,2004-2006…………………. e ServantunderFZ-119…………………………… FZ-79 Compared(%)…………………………… ff (thousands/percent)……………………… ance, 1995-2003,EstablishedbyFZ-119 ons perVacancy byGroupsofExperts v

StatePosts,stipulatedbyFZ-119…… red viaFormal VacancyContestsby for PostsofCategory“C”underFZ- and DegreesofFormal Political theExecutiveBranchof Power: ormal Merit)UnderFZ-119andFZ- 124 129 121 124 119 123 116 47 62 75 99 69 53 47 49 81 82 58 CEU eTD Collection Regions, 1996-2006……………………………………………………………………. Table 4.4 Table 4.3 Regions, 1996-2006…………………………………………………………………… Table 4.2 Table 4.1 Table 3.19 Experts andAcrossRegions,2004-2006……………………………………………… Bureaucrats wereFiredontheGroundsof Table 3.18 Grounds ofStructuralReorganizatio Table 3.17 a Position ofLesserImportance, 2004-2006, (%)……………………………………... Table 3.16 Table 3.15 Positions ofHigherImportance Table 3.14 Table 3.13 Across Regions,2004-2006…………………………………………………………… Importance Filledvia Formal VacancyContestsby GroupsofExpertsand Table 3.12 Vacancy Contest,2004-2006 (%)……………………………………………………… Table 3.11 2005-2006 Compared to2004and2000(%)………………………………………….. Table 3.10 Regions, 2006…………………………………………………………………………. Table 3.9 Groups ofExpertsandAcross Regions,2006………………………………………… Table 3.8 2006, onSelectedIndependentVariables……………………………………………… Personnel Policy Regime ……………………………………………………………… Meritocratic Recruitment Index Number ofOutcomes ofFormal VacancyConteststhatwerePre-decidedby De-Politicized Bureaucracy andAggr 2SLS Estimates (FirstStage)ofthe De-Politicized BureaucracyandAggr Independent Variables forAggregateGr DismissalbyReorganization FrequencyatwhichCurrentlyWorking BureaucratswereFiredon FrequencyatwhichCurrentlyWorking BureaucratswereDemotedto ReasonsforTemporary Promotions (%)………………………………….. FrequencyatwhichCurrentlyWorking BureaucratswereAssignedto OtherMethods of Filling Bureaucratic Postsof HigherImportance (%) …. PromotionbyContest ProportionofBureaucraticPosts Changeinthe Number ofBureaucrats HiredviaFormal VacancyContests, Distribution ofthe Meritocratic Recruitment Index’ Temporarily,2004-2006,(%)……………………….. : ProportionofBureaucraticPostsHigher n oftheDepartment, 2004-2006,(%)…………… : FrequencyatwhichCurrentlyWorking StructuralReorganizationbyGroupsof byGroupsofExpertsandAcross vi Meritocratic Recruitment Index Higher Importance FilledviaFormal egate Economic GrowthinRussia’s egate Economic GrowthinRussia’s owth Model:BivariateCorrelations s ValuesbyTypesof , 1996- 158 138 129 137 133 130 141 139 133 134 155 159 142 132 141 152 CEU eTD Collection and TotalPercentageChangeinGros Figure 5.2 Figure 5.1 Total PercentageChangeintheNumber Figure 4.2 Figure 4.1 Table 5.2 Table 5.1 Table 4.7 Regions, 1996-2006……………………………………………………………………. Table 4.6 Table 4.5 2006, onSelectedIndependentVariables…………………………………………….. Correlations ……………………………………………………………………………. Determinants ofMeritinRussianRegions…………………………………. Descriptionof theVariable 2SLS Estimates (FirstStage)ofthe De-Politicized BureaucracyandSm Independent Variables forSmall Number ofGovernorsineachRussi The TrustGame inPublicAdministrations ………………………………... Unconditional Correlation betweenMeritocratic Recruitment Indexand Unconditional Correlation betweenthe s RegionalProduct percapita,1996-2006……... s usedintheAnalysis…………………………. of Small Businessespercapita,1996-2006… Business GrowthModel:Bivariate vii all BusinessGrowthinRussia’s Meritocratic Recruitment Index

an Regionsince1991and Meritocracy Meritocratic Recruitment Index , 1996-

186 188 166 163 180 165 187 164 153 CEU eTD Collection 3.1Formal Merit vs Politicized Bureaucracy in CHAPTER 3.RealMerit:A 2.1ChoosingOneTypeofPersonnelRegime …………………………………... Character ofRussia’sPersonnelPolicyRegime …...……………………………………. CHAPTER 2.Russia’sPublicBureaucracy Reform, 1996-2006:AssessingtheLegal CHAPTER 1.ATheoryofWelfare-E INTRODUCTION ………………………………………………………………………. List ofTablesandFigures……………………………………………………………….. 2.6 Conclusion……………………………...... 2.5 BureaucraticReformunderPutin’sFirstTerm.…………………………….... 2.4 PersonnelPolicyArrangements underFZ-119(1996-2005)………………... 2.3 AnalyticalFramework ofForm 2.2 PublicBureaucracy intheStructureof 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.1 3.2 AssessingPersonnel PolicyPracticein Conclusion ………………………………………………………………...… A theoryofWelfare-EnhancingPublicBureaucracy……………………...… Bureaucracy andMacro-Efficiency: Histor The Notionsof‘OrganizationalDesign’ 2.5.3 PersonnelPolicyArrangements underFZ-79 ………………….... 2.5.2 TheStructureofGovernanceunderFZ-79 ……………………… 2.5.1 ChoosingtheNewLaw’sConcept………………………………. 2.4.4 Dismissal ………………………………………………………… 2.4.3 Promotion,Demotionand 2.4.2 Appointment ……………………………………………………... 2.4.1 Admission……………………………………….……………….. 1.3.3 1.3.2 1.3.1 Credible Commitment inModernStates………………………… Limitation of CivilServiceas 1.3.2.2 1.3.2.1 Credible Commitment inStates: TyingtheRuler’s Hands……… Impossibility Theorem …………………….…………………….. Interactive Social Production inFirms: Holmstrom’s 40 ofRussia’sRegions…………………………………….... . RealMerit………………………………..………………... ssessing theExtent of in ModernStates …………………………………………. Other SolutionstotheProblem ofCredibleCommitment Standard OperatingProcedures Commitment inModernStates…………………………... Civil Service asa Solution totheProblem of Credible TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF nhancing Public Bureaucracy…...………………. al PoliticalDiscretion………………………. viii

Horizontal Transfer………………….. Russia’sGovernanceinthe1990s…. Russia:Literatu de-facto and‘SocialWelfare’ Specified…… a SolutiontotheProblem of ical Overview oftheLiterature… Institutionalization of De- andProfessionalism as re Review…………. 104 101 102 76 27 59 32 18 38 65 95 86 40 51 46 88 19 11 80 89 35 59 24 85 40 1 v 7 7 CEU eTD Collection REFERENCES …………………………………………………………………………... APPENDICIES …………………………………………………………………………... ………………………………………………………………………….. CONCLUSION 5.1LiteratureReview……………………………………………………………. CHAPTER 5.PoliticsandMe 4.1SelectingtheDependantVariable…………………...………………………. CHAPTER 4.De-Politici 5.4 Conclusion……………………………...... 5.3 Determinants ofMeritAdop 5.2 AlternativeExplanation:Meritasa 4.4 Conclusion……………………………...... 4.3 De-politicizedBureaucracy 4.2 De-PoliticizedBureaucracyandEconomic Growth……………………….... 3.7 Conclusion……………………………...... 3.6 SurveyFindingsonRealMerit………………………………………………. 3.5 QuestionnaireandSurvey……………………………………………………. 3.4 SelectingCasesandAssembli 3.3 AssessingPersonnelPolicyPracticein Evaluations ofRegionalBureaucracies………………………………...……. 5.3.2 Findings………………………………..………………………… 5.3.1 Data…………………….....……………………………………… 4.3.3 BureaucracyandSmall Busine 4.3.2 Findingsfrom OLSand2SLSAnalyses………………..……….. 4.3.1 Model,DataandMethod………………………………………… 4.2.2 Findingsfrom OLSand2SLSAnalyses………………………… 4.2.1 Model,DataandMethod....……………………………………… 3.6.5 Dismissal ………………………………………………………… 3.6.4 PromotionandDemotion ………………………………………... 3.6.3 Appointment ……………………………………………………... 3.6.2 Admission………………………………………………………... 3.6.1 TheContinuityoftheFormal-Legal Framework………………... from TwoCaseStudies………………………………………….. zed BureaucracyandEconomic Development ……………….. rit Adoption:Evidencefrom Russia’sRegions………….. and Small BusinessGrowth…………………… tion inRussia’sRegions …………….………… ng thePoolofExperts……………………….. ix Function ofRuler’sTime Horizon…….. Russia: theCase ss inpost-Soviet Russia:Evidence for Expert-Based 119 154 194 165 161 149 122 200 140 176 209 132 110 168 161 128 146 142 191 185 173 183 183 114 177 121 149 146 179 121 CEU eTD Collection economic andpoliticalresources important players intheirownri upon therecognitionthatgovernmentsarenotmerely 2 1 governance thatpublicbureaucracy social development, misgove literature claims thatthequalityofgovernan ‘dissipate apolity’s wealthorenhance it’(Lev makers onthe crucial role of thestate for thewelf economic development. Thispremise isbase The startingpremise ofthisdissertationisth organizational cohesionandform an level ofcompetence, (ii)merit-based recr investment. Thisisbecause(i)meritocratic recru de-politic ized bureaucracymattersfairly intuitiveexplanationofwhya foraggregategrowthand link betweenade-politicized of economic growthinthecontextoflessdeve (1999) foundthatnon-politicalmerit-based recruitm century waspowerfullypositively associated with staffing powersof politiciansare considerably limited –intheAmerican cities inthe earlyXXth growth, Rauch(1995)foundthattheadoptionof ci re-emerged. Inoneofthefirstempirical stud the fieldofpublicadministration ‘Whatkindofbur rates wasestablishedempirically(Knack andKe consensus. (Amsden century East Asiain 1989, thelatetwentieth For an overview of the ‘good governance’ literature, see Rothstein and Teorell (2008), (2008), Holmberg Teorell and seeRothstein literature, the ‘good of governance’ Foran overview in and 1982) Japan (Johnson state-led in macropost-war the See, literatureon instance, the for economic planning When thelinkbetween‘thequ rnance –tounderdevelopment.

bureaucracy andeconomic growth,EvansandRauchoffereda 1 andmake the ‘rulesofgame’ (North1990)andeventually ght, whouse theirautonomy toformulate policies,allocate matters forsocialwelfare. ality ofbureaucracy’and econo INTRODUCTION esprit decorps d uponawideconsensusamongscholarsandpolicy- ce matters: goodgovernanceleadstoeconomic and Wade 1990), which is one of the major sources of the the sources of the major isone of which 1990), Wade ies ontypeoforganizat loped countries.Havinges efer 1995,Mauro1995),the i 2006:6).Inotherword uitment andpredictable careers encourage itment ensures that staff haveatleast aminimal at publicbureaucracymatters forsocialand economic growth.Similarly,Evans andRauch are ofitscitizens.This eaucracy islikely to enhancesocial welfare?’ ent andstablecareersar vil service–atypeofbureaucracyinwhich thatcreatesintangiblecostsofengagingin ‘therefereesofaplayingfield’but 2 Itisbybeingan mic growthandinvestment ional designandeconomic consensus inturnrests s, alargeanddiverse tablished anempirical e powerfulpredictors classical questionin integral part of et al (2009). (2009). CEU eTD Collection social welfare. economic rulestotheirownadvant Weingast 1989:803).Itisbyplacingcrediblerest expected returnsfrom investment andthelower more likely itisthat sovereign willalter property This opportunisticbehaviorofpow to aspowerholders)oftenuseit throughout thehistoryof humankind key issueforsocialwelfare(seeNorth1981,Nort minded politicians (316). Manyscholarsrecognized above all,providing‘anenormous presented aformal argument thatade-politicized properties ofade-politicizedbu 3 implementation instrument andenhances the developmental capacityofthestate. rent-seeking behavior.Inotherwords,de-politi public organizations. for theoverallwellbeingofsocietyandshall be Weiss 2001a).Insuchacontexttheproblem of discipline, wasunderdev democracy, whereasystem ofchecksandconstraint massive institutional change wastakingplace inthepolitical environment of anascent literature astheultimate command tomarket economy createdtheabundanceof ‘double transition’ amplified thepoliticians’ moral hazard.Ontheonehand,change from a does indeed seem to bea relationship’ between the two (2007: 515). context inthe reduction and poverty bureaucracy politicized Henderson servants. that career civil worse bureaucrats thatmakes political found appointees Lewis(2007) agencies, U.S.executive the effectiven compared the Having since. has been done little It is important to note that despite Evans and Rauch’s call This, however,isatbestonlypartofthe Miller’s analysisisofspecialinterestfor et al (2007) used the dataset from Evans and Rauch (1999) to explore the link between a de- eloped (Golosov1997,2003; source ofrent-seekingbehavior(s

reaucracy. In2000,GaryMillerpub alterthe‘rulesofgame’ to andbeneficialshield’against the actionsofopportunistically age, Millerposits,thatade-po erholders isatodds people whocontrolthepowerof cization makes publicbureaucracyabetterpolicy post-Communist countries such as Russia, where post-Communist countriessuchasRussia,where political opportunism isofparamount importance 2 ess of career bureaucrats vis-a-vis political appointees in in appointees political vis-a-vis ess ofcareerbureaucrats bureaucracyenhances greatersocial welfareby, for more research on bureaucra rictions onthepoliticians’abilitytomanipulate rights forhisorherown h andWeigast 1989).DouglasNorthnotesthat of less developed countries. They concluded that that ‘there concluded lesscountries. of They developed story withregard tothe welfare-enhancing recognized asacritical in turn theincentive political opportunism ormoral hazardasthe s, suchasthesepara Lambert-Mogiliansky rents, which is considered by the relevant rents, whichisconsideredbytherelevant with sustainedeconomic growthas‘The ee Mauro1995).Ontheother,this maximize theirrents(1981:25). liticized bureaucracy enhances liticized bureaucracyenhances lished anarticleinwhichhe thestate(hereafterreferred tion ofpowerandparty to invest’(Northand benefits, the lowerthe tic structures (1999), very very (1999), structures tic issueinthedesignof et al 2007;Stone- 3 CEU eTD Collection settings (Ahrend2005,Golosov2001,2003,Sh 2005, Mikheeva1999,Kolomak 2006,Popov2001,Slinkoetal (Ahrend 2005,BerkowitzandDeJong2003,2005; Brock2005,Golubchikov2007,Desai cultural terms, Russia’sregionsexhibitanotablevariationasfarsocio-economic development Federation. Firstofall,althoughsharingacommon takes ondifferent values acrossadministrations in theconstituent members oftheRussian withdrawn from political control,ther 4 Busovikov 1997,Gaida administrations may alsovaryacrossRussia’sre Stoner-Weiss 1997)areconcerned. opportunity fortestingMi politicized system of reforms sincetheregime changein1991.Within th 2002, Zaytseva2003,Yuzakov2005)toprovide a individual researchers(Bekov 2001,Huskey TACIS andotherinternationaldonors(N (Tompson 2007),organizationsworkingonRussian been severalattempts bytheWorld Bank autonomous publicbureaucracy?’. the question ‘Why attimes dopoliticians renoun in Russia’sregionsprovidesanopportunitytocontribute toalargeliteraturethatseeksanswer bureaucracy. Moreover, thedifferences in the in allow foraproductiveempiricalprobingofthewe Magun etal public agencies(BrymandGimpelson 2004, bureaucracy showed,there isaconsiderable diffe government through the 1990s (see Stoner-Weiss 1999, 2001b). 2001b). 1999, Stoner-Weiss (see 1990s the through government The reasons for this rest largely in the federative structure of the Russian state and the weakness of the the federal weakness of state the and Russian ofthe structure the federative in reasons for this rest largely The When in1995Russialaunchedbureaucraticreform It shouldbenotedthatresearchonRussia’s A systematic documentation ofthesedifferenc 2003,Monusova2004). nomenklatura et al 1997,Ivanova2002,Osejchuk2002)a ller’s theory.Whilst

toade-politicized 4 Thissuggestedthattheor e wasevery reason tobelieve that (Kozbanenko 2005,World 2006a)andtheOECD Bank and Obolonsly2003,Kotchegura,1999,Obolonsky icolaas Witsen Foundation2005a,2005b)and Chirikova2004,Gimpel 3 stitutionalization of a de-politicized bureaucracy gions. Indeed,asobservations(see,forinstance, leifer andTreisman 2000,Slinko bureaucracy hasremained scarce.Therehave rence intheorganizational structuresacross ce their staffing powersin favor of amore is literatureanumber of lfare-enhancing propertiesofade-politicized de-jure es withafocusonpersonnelpolicieswould denominator inhistorical,informational and ’ administrative reform underauspicesof narrative onRussia’spublicbureaucracy bureaucracy, this aimedattransforming theformer highly hiring,firingandpromotion was 2005)andpolitico-institutional ganizational design of public ganizational designofpublic nd afewstudiesonRussia’s de-facto son andMagun2004, studiesexistthatare represented aunique de-politicization et al 2005, et al al et CEU eTD Collection reform wouldbeanimportan systematic analysis,inkeepingwithrecognized academic standards, ofRussia’sbureaucratic World Bankstudyconcludesthat‘thereform isstilllargelyonpa of theimplementation ofFZ-79onthegroundwerelimited andlackedmethodological rigor,the are scarceanddonotallowforin-depthresearch, implementation ofthe1995lawisprovided.Similarly, ‘required underthe1995 program envisaged the possibilityof introducing Reform oftheStateService inform areinsufficientlyevidenced. Thus,eval Tompson 2007,World Bank 2006).Afeatureofsuchst Russia’s bureaucracy(Bar characterized byanunsystematic, haphazard appro f overview of the relevant literature of both a society asawhole.Part twoprovidesabriefoverviewoftherelevant literatureofbotha political controloverbureaucracy and the notionof‘socialwelfare’asthewell-being ofthe specifies thenotionof ‘organizational design ‘What organizationaldesignofpublicbureaucracyis foundations ofthedissertation.Part real merit adoptionthanothers?’ bureaucracy, thedissertationaims toinvestigate‘Why someregions went furtherwithregardto Thirdly, utilizing theinformation on thedegree link betweentheorganizationalst institutionalization ofade-politi Russia’s regionalgovernments. Secondly,build these legalprovisionswereimplemented inreality politicians andbureaucrats(thereaf only theanalysisofth and received in2004 anewimpetus underPutin’spresidency. Thisaccountshould includenot account ofthepersonnelcomponent ofRussia’s These aims determine theoutlineofdisse Thus, theaim of thisdissertat e provisionsoftheformal-legalfr legislation butneverimplemented abashev andStraussman t contributiontothecompara of theRussianFederation(2003-2005) cized bureaucracythethesis seeks ructure ofRussia’sregionalbur ter referred toasformal merit) butalsothe degree to which ion isthreefold.Firstly, itse oneclarifiesthecentraltheore ofbureaucracy’asa matter ofthe amount of 4 bureaucratic reform, which commenced in1995 commenced bureaucratic reform, which uating theprovisionsoffederalprogram competitive recruitment –something thatwas of theinstitutionalization of ade-politicized and thatqualitativeassessments oftheextent ing upontheobtainedmeasures ofthe ach todetailing theorganizational shape of (thereafter referred toasrealmerit) across rtation. Chapter1discussesthetheoretical most and likelytobewelfare-enhancing?’, having rightlystatedth 2007, Konov2006,Kotchegura1999, udies isthatstatemen tive bureaucracyliterature. amework governingrelationsbetween ’ (2007:18).Noevidenceofnon- eks toprovideacomprehensive per…’ (2006:28).Therefore,a eaucracies and social welfare. welfare. andsocial eaucracies to empirically investigate the tical questionofthisproject: Tompson statesthat the at officialstatistics ts thatpurportto CEU eTD Collection welfare-enhancing public bureaucracy. Itstates theoretical andempirical politicized bureaucracy hasbeen personnel policypracticesin40ofRussia’sregions. questionnaire design,oftheproject.Finally,it methodological issues,suchas previous attempts toevaluate approaches totheassessment ofrealmerit su powerholders andde-facto formal andrealmerit, i.e.betweenamere enactme of Russia’sregionsintheend 1990s period. component ofPutin’spublicadministration reform fully politicizedtoade-politicized promotion/demotion/horizontal transfersanddism The natureofeachthemajor domains Meyer-Sahling (2001,2003,2004,2006)forthesepurposes systematically, theanalytical framework of order toassesstheamountof – FZ-119OntheFundamentalsofStateServiceRussianFederation the chapteranalysespersonnelpo explores whyade-politicizedt welfare-enhancing publicbureaucracies. production, asadvancedbyGaryMiller,andits chapter proceedswithadetailedacc recently dominated bothacademic scholarship andth bureaucracy andgreatersocialwelfare.Majortenetsofprincipal-agency Chapter 3dealswiththeevaluation ofpersonnelpolicyregimes that Chapter 2discussesRussia’spublicbureaucracy Chapter 4subjectstoempirical teststhepr nature. Itconsiders early attempts to institutionalization of ade-pol ype ofpersonnelpolicywaschosen of 2006.Firstly,itdiscussesa power wieldedbypoliticiansove the stateofrealmerit inRussi the structureofcomparison, caseandexpertselection, licy arrangements establishedbyth institutionalized toagreater extent, exhibitgreater rates of ount ofthetheoryanefficien formal politicaldiscretion bureaucracy. Finally, the personnel management bureaucracy. Finally,thepersonnelmanagement of personnelpolicy–admissions, appointment, ggested by theliteratu 5 concludes withaquantit that thoseofRussia’ implications fortheorganizationaldesignof nt oflegislationthatlimits staffingpowersof issals isassessedonascaleranging from a isdiscussedandcompared withthatofthe oposition derivedfrom reforms 1990sand2000s.Firstly,it ofthe e policy arena, areconsidered beforethe isemployed andfurtherdeveloped. iticized bureaucracy,andoutlines findalinkbetween persistent disc in Russia.Thecentralpartof r bureaucratsunderFZ-119 t system ofinteractive social a, it discusses the critical critical the discusses it a, e keylegislationinthefield re. Then,drawingonthe developedbyJan-Hinrik s regionswhereade- de-facto theory,thatupuntil ative pictureofthe Miller’s theory of onJuly1995.In repancy between a de-politicized existed in40 CEU eTD Collection post-Soviet Russiathat further illustrate the causal mechanism of Miller’s theory. analyses. Theconclusionsectionofchapter4disc discussed inlengthbeforethech dependent variable,specificationof models, data been lessfullyincorporated.Thekeymethodological aggregate economic growthandsmall businessfo interactions witheconomic agen explanation thatfocusesonthefuturediscount democracies. Basedoninsightsfromrepeatedgame autocracies andtheirpredictionsarenotco democratic polity.Thedominant explanations,how importance ofinteractionsamong co the review oftheliteratureon renounce theirstaffingpowersadoptingmerit-ba to test thetheory. Finally, chapter5addressesapersistentpuz apter presents themajor findings the topic,weshow thatdominant explanations underscorethe ts. Anempirical testcovering re constituenciesof 6 usses tworeallifeexamples fromthecontextof rroborated empirically rate ofrulers—democratic ornot—andtheir and the choice ofstatistical techniques – are sed bureaucracies instead? Havingconductedsed bureaucraciesinstead? rmation thanthoseprovincesinwhichithas ever, cannotexplainthe theory,weproposeanalternative zle insocial scienc issues–thechoiceofproxiesfor voters, legislators, 40 Russianregionsisundertaken from OLS and 2S e ‘Whydosome rulers outside Anglo-Saxon adoption ofmerit in and executives in a and executivesina LS regression theoretical CEU eTD Collection first clarifythestandpoint from whichweapproachthequestioninhand. solve thisdifficultywelfare economists oftenassume means straightforward to measure asitisinfluenced sensual pleasureandpain andspiritualdeli individual’s wellbeing,ormore explicitly,his that is‘avectorofindividualwelfares’,wher public bureaucracy’and‘soc most likelytobewelfare-enhancin The central questionof thisresearch is“Wha 1.1 TheNotionsof‘OrganizationalD the policyarena.Thechapterproceedswithth tenets ofprincipal-agenttheory,thatupuntilrecentlydominated attempts tofind alink between ade-politicized relevant literatureofbothatheoretical public bureaucraciesasakeyelement, webegi government are most likelyto bewelfare-enhanc As alargenumber of scholarshavetackedthe‘b problem ofpoliticaloppor of publicpoliciesisachieved.Intheend,lim bureaucrats from theday-to-daypol Developing Miller’sargument furtherweshowhow and itsimplications for theorganizational desi of thetheoryanefficientsystem ofinterac and EvansRauch(1999, 2000)researchto the A THEORY OF WELFARE-ENHA OF ATHEORY This dissertation approaches thenotion of ‘social welfare’ inthevein of welfare economics, tunism arediscussed. ial welfare’beardifferent meanings g?” Giventhefactthatnoti itical intervention,therefore ensu Chapter 1 Chapter 1 esign’ and‘SocialWelfare’Specified ght andsuffering’(Ng2004: 2).Happinessisbyno nd empirical nature. We consider earlyacademic tive socialproduction,asadvancedbyGaryMiller, e theconceptofindividua e evaluationofthecont t organizationaldesignofpublicbureaucracyis or herhappiness, withhappinesssubsuming both bureaucracy andgreatersocial welfareandmajor 7 ig question’ of political economy ‘What typesof NCING PUBLICBUREAUCRACY gn ofwelfare-enhancingpublicbureaucracies. ing?’, pointingattheorganizationaldesignof n ourinvestigationwith debate. Finally, weprovideadetailed account itations ofcivilserviceasasolutiontothe byavastnumber offactors.Inanattempt to individual components of civilservice shield that ‘individuals are the best judges of their that‘individualsarethe bestjudgesoftheir to differentresearchers,weshall both academic scholarship and ons of‘organizationaldesign ring thatthewelfareintent ribution ofRauch(1995) l welfare stands for ‘an anoverviewofthe CEU eTD Collection therefore economic growthis de costs; associated any outweigh benefits that literatureholds growth economic the of paradigm dominant the 2003), Whilst the analysis ofthe net benefits of economic growth had developed over the last two decades (Islam renewable resources, increased pace of urban life,increase in Ekins 1993, 1997; de Bruyn 2000), in 2000), Bruyn de 1993, 1997; Ekins economic growth(Meadows and theenvironment (Clarke2003,Landau social welfaretotheappreciation of suchissues the scholarshiphasmoved awayfromapredominan expenditure (Jorgensen1997),cap 1983, Slesnick2001)orsimilar concepts:cons social welfareisconventionallyexpresse as anordinalindicatoroftheirwelfare’(N 1 benefits ofeconomic growthhavebeenthepres economic growthissuchthat“Formostpolic Hufschmidt maternal mortality andmalnutrition (Beck expectancy, employment, leisure Economic growthisthekeytosocietalwell-being opposed toa‘rent-based’economy. Aproductiveeconomy is,aboveall,agrowingeconomy. desirability ofwhatcanbecalleda‘productive material prosperity remains at be happierat welfare andthattheymaximize this contract enforcement) foreconomic growth setting uprulesthatfosterexchange andlowe The NewInstitutional Economics (NIS),inparticul paradigm ofthepost-neoclassicalpolitic 2004: 34).

It should be noted that academic scholarship on economic growth has long recognized the existence of costs of The recognitionthatgovernment An important implication of theinterpretation of 1 et al x than at 1983,Jones1988,Nailon1992).Therecognitionofthebeneficence y . Sowecanusetheir utility function et al sirable for social welfare. 1972), including such issues as pollution (Arrow aspollution issues such including 1972),

the heartofsoci equality (Ayres 1996, Clarke 2003, Clarke2003, equality (Ayres 1996, ital stocks(Daly1996)andsuch time andreducesabsoluterelativepoverty,infant welfare. Sowheneverthey prefer playsanimportant role in al economy (Evans1995,North1990,Stiglitz1989). erman 1995,DollarandKraay2002,Gylfason1999, d throughconsumption(Hueting1980,McKenzies (Menard andShirley 2005,North1990,Williamson g 2004:2).Understoodaspreferencemaximization, et al al well-being. economy’ (Shirley2005:615,Stiglitz2006:7)as y makers, theonlydifferencesofopinionon r transactioncosts(inc 8 criptions foritsachieveme 1996,Sen1998),thedesirabi umer surplus(D.Johnson1996),income and as equity,political liber crime,violence, druguse,su as itincreasesgeneralstandardofliving,life tly materialistic interpretation of thenotionof ar, underscorestheimportanceof thestatein social welfare as societal well-being is the the is well-being associetal welfare social (which represents theirpreferences) Parnwell 1996), exploitation of non- exploitation Parnwell 1996), such aneconomy isagrowing like.Althoughmorerecently luding propertyrightsand x et al toy ty, socialrelationships nts’ (Clarke and Islam nts’ (ClarkeandIslam icide, divorce andanxiety. 1955, Ayres 1996, 1998; 1998; 1996, Ayres 1955, theyareassumed to lity ofsustainable et al

CEU eTD Collection underdevelopment exceptions, nottherule’(Shirley2005:611).Th rules thatfoster economic exchangeandlowe 3 2 state, therebyreducingtheriskofwelfar America sethighcosts‘ofputtingtogetheradecisivecoalition’tomonopolize thepowerof later (803).Similarly, Falaschett among actors)wasthekeytoa‘remarka several the constitutional arrangements inXVIIthcentu the GloriousRevolutionof1688inEngland North constitutional design of thestate and other politicalinstitutions. Thus,intheirseminal workon Therefore, ‘some crediblerestrictionsonthest investment andthelowerintu will alterproperty rights for hisorherownbe powerholders isatoddswithsustainedeconomic growthas‘Themore likel alter the‘rulesofgame’ to people whocontrolthepower structure thateitherenco 1985, 1996).Theserulesortheinstitutional founda the stateorself-imposed bythem advantage of itselfanditscoreconstituents’ mu beimposed onthosewhocontrolthepowerof st these rules’(NorthandWeigas is thedegreetowhichthose transaction costs-loweringrules.Acritical issu the zero-effort Nashequilibrium. make costly assetspecific invest (2002) underscores such factors as the structure of partis 611). literacyrate(2005: 100%adult and 1000 per 10 than rateless mortality years,infant 70 over of atbirth lifeexpectancy have 2000), in $9,266 (above category Discussing the reasons for the adoption of the welfar ofthe adoption for the thereasons Discussing Following Mary Shirley, by developed countries wemean countries that arein the World Bank’s high income Despite theexistingconsensus betweenschola In tacklingtheissueof credible commitment, theneo-institutional literature focuses atthe 2 because theyhave failed not tocrea urages peopletoexercisea‘positiv who controlthepower ofthest

of the state (hereafter referred referred (hereafter state ofthe t 1989:803).AsNorthnotes,thr maximize theirrents(1981:25). ments and toundertakecomplex (NorthandWeingast 1989:808). rn theincentivetoinvest’(North andWeingast 1989:803). i andMillerholdthattheMa e-undermining actionsby the state(2001:405). e here,according tothenewinstitutional account, ate’s abilitytomanipulat 9 e-enhancing constitutional design of the state, Stasavage state,Stasavage the of design constitutional e-enhancing an interests in a society andthe existence ofcross-issue r transaction costs, ‘Developed countries are r transactioncosts,‘Developedcountriesare ble’ economic growthexperiencedbyEngland ry England(thediffusion of political power and Weigast (1989)arguethattheevolutionof nefits, the lowerthe expectedreturns from rs andpolicymakers ontheimportance ofthe e vastmajority ofpeoplelivetodayin tions ofeconomyprovideanincentive te buttosustainexchange-fosteringand e economic activity’(tospecialize,to ate are‘committed toorboundby to aspowerholders)oftenuseit oughout thehistory disonian constitutionof1787in transactions) or This opportunisticbehaviorof e economic rulestothe y itisthatsovereign toconvergeon of humankind 3 CEU eTD Collection solving theproblem ofcredible commitment aris 4 enforced, i.e.imposed and enfor monthat becausethestatehasavirtual opoly onpower, effectiverestrictionsma should besufficiently long to encourage the powerholders to restrain from rent maximizing policies. Shirley stresses role the emphasise (1996) Olson and McGuire coalitions. efficiency asopposedtoamore na with regardtotheircapacitiesenhance societal the utilityfunction (Mishan1969:13),weconsider worse, alternative economic situation opentosoci disabled andothers).Similarly towelfareecono that ismost likely tomaximize social welfare?’ explore herecanbereformulated asfollows:“Is equivalents oftheanalytical Tolbert andZucker1983).Thenotionsof‘patrona personnel, or politicized Rainey 2005). agency cultureandsuchlike(see,forinstance,RaineySteinbauer1999,HanChun a studyofmorenuancedfeatures of publicagencies’designasthe organizational designcouldbeviewedasamatter relationships between bureaucrats andpoliticians.This interpretation of thenotionof thesis. Therefore,by‘organiza elected officialsbeorganizedastoenhancesocial constraining thepoliticians’opportunism?’‘H level ofincome, serviceorothe meaning of‘socialwelfare’s conducive togreatersocialwelfarefrom awelf bureaucracy’ and‘civil service’ We discuss the notion of civil service in greater detail later on in the chapter. chapter. inthe lateron detail in of civil theservice greater notion discuss We As theorganizationaldesignofstatematte To sum up,thefocusofourtheoreticalexplor From thegranddesignpoint , thatispoliticiansretainfull controlov de-politicized ced bythose whocontrol the power of the state (2005: 614). , thatistheirstaffingpowersarelimited (Frant1993,Ruhil2003, uggested bygovernmental actionsth categoryofapoliticizedbur r supporttosuchdisa asade-politicizedone. tional designofpublicbureaucr rrow meaning ofbureaucraticeffi of viewpublicbureaucracies 10 ow shouldrelationsbetweenelectedandnon- well-being. Thiscanbeseenasa‘macro-level’ mists whoevaluate‘onthescaleofbetteror it apoliticizedorde- welfare?’Thesequestionsareexploredinthis of thebureaucracy’s ‘gra er hiring,firingandpromotion ofbureaucratic ety’ with regardtotheir capacity tomaximize of the time horizons perceived by powerholders: they they powerholders: by perceived timehorizons the of are economics viewpoint,asopposedtothe es. ‘Doespublicbureaucr rs, thequestiononroleofbureaucracyin ge’ and‘spoils’areoftenusedasempirical politicizedandde-politicizedbureaucracies dvantaged groups(such ation isonthe form ofbureaucracy thatis 4 Inthelightofabove,puzzlewe eaucracy, while‘meritocratic acy’ we mean, above all, the at seektoprovideaminimum y needtobeself-imposed andself- ciency (micro-level) –thatis structure ofgoalsandtasks, can beviewedeitheras politicized bureaucracy nd design’ratherthan as thepoor,elderly, acy playarolein

CEU eTD Collection Simon, Thompson and Smithburg [1950] 1991; Skowronek 1982; Van Riper 1958. 6 5 was alsoclearlyonthe agendaoftheAmerican However, thequestformacro-efficiency, e.g. 1987, SchultzandMaranto1998,Skowronek term servicewouldleadtoabetterbureau They believed thattheincreasedcompetence, i institutionalization ofde-poli point ofview. U.S. –havebeenextensivelystudied, service – the Northcote-Trevelya Louis XIV(1638-1715). politicized publicbureau century, althoughthefirsthistorical examples public bureaucracies has notreceivedarigoroustheoreticaltreatment upuntilthelate20 It issomewhat paradoxicalthatth andMacro-Efficiency:1.2 Bureaucracy Hist and ‘welfare-enhancing’ar dissertation isconcernedwithbur (Brewer andSelden2000,Gilmour andLewi mission’ (RaineyandSteibauer 1999:13)–whic how wellthe agency discharges ‘the administra public goods,wasclearlyanimpediment tothere bureaucracy, deliveringparticularistic goodstothe politicians’ favoredconstituencies instead of who wantedtopursue‘thepublicinterest’ in end ofthe19-centuryinUSApoliticalpart ies ‘came undersustainedattackfrom reformers 1715) under the whom under 1715) (1638- XIV Louis of France by followed 1957), Marx 1975, Lundgreen and Fischer 1946, (Finer administration Tomention someJohnson andLibecap Hohenzollern Prussia was the first country in modern Eu It iswellknownthatProgr Grand Corps 5 cracy goasfarbackHohenzolle Themost prominent instancesofth e usedinterchangeably. ticized bureaucracy, usedtheargum

receiveda significant autonomy(F n Report(1854)intheU.K.a 1994a, Ingram 1995, Knott and Miller 1987,Shefte e questionofsocietalefficiencypoliticizedvs eaucratic efficiencyatthe‘macr essivists, whoin19-centuryUSAledthecampaign forthe 6 howevernotfrom the‘granddesign’andmacro-efficiency cratic output(Hoogenboom non-partisan ways’(1992:71).Apoliticallyopen 11 nherent inmeritocratic recruitment andalong- 1982, VanRiper1958,Wilson 2003[1887]). s 2006,Lewis2007,Wolf 1997).Sincethis Progressivists. AsThed tive andoperationalfunctions pursuant to the of thetransitionfrom apoliticizedtode- increased wellbeingof thesociety asawhole, orical OverviewoftheLiterature ropean history to introduce meritocratic hiring to its hiring meritocratic tointroduce history ropean h iscommonlyusedinbureaucraticstudies formers’ aim. ‘Theremoval ofpoliticsfrom ischer andLundgreen 1975). rn Prussia(1640-1786)andFranceof e transitionfrom patronagetocivil nd thePendletonAct(1883)in o-level’, thenoti ent ofmicro-level efficiency. 1961, Knott and Miller 1961,KnottandMiller a Sckocpolnotes,atthe r 1994,Silberman 1993, . de-politicized ons ‘efficient’ th

CEU eTD Collection political authoritypreserving features. For himefficiencygains layinthesuccessful professionalization, henever gaveup theideaof In otherwords, althoughWeber advocatedde adapted formforachievingthehighestlevelof accountability (1978:289). Suchabureaucracy,acco hierarchy ofauthority prospects ofadvancement inalifetime career–and bureaucracy included both competence-enhancing feat preserve the ultimate controlof thepoliticalmasters. Weber’s famous ‘rational-legal’ typeof organizational featuresthatwouldallowbureaucr Therefore, Weber’ssolutiontotheasymmetry bureaucracy wouldtake the‘over-towering’ bureaucracy wasinevitable–the‘i for theefficientfunctioningofstate.We bureaucrats) andauthority (located ontheother He anticipated that the taskof combining in facing thetrainedofficialwho ‘political master’ findshimself inthepositionof contemporary academic parlance as‘theasymmetr of theconflictbetween‘c and expropriationinrelationtooneanother(Weber 1978:264).Webe for the most partlatent, conflict betweenchiefs andtheir administrative staff for appropriation 7 bureaucracy studiesMaxWeber. He bureaucrats inachievingmacro-efficiency wa and PendletonAct(1883)remained under-researchedupuntiltheendof20 public interest’. Nevertheless, thewelfare-enha administration’ –oneofthemost Progre important Evans and Rauch (1999) the notion of ‘Weberian state’ or ‘Weberianness’ includes only competence-enhancing nd to overlook in their their rese in to overlook tend of manybureaucracy that scholars issomething This The first scholar whopaid systematic attenti and rigidoperatingrulesproce hiefs’ and‘theiradministrative

stands withinthemanagement ron cage’ofmodernity –andfearedthatafullydeveloped heldthat‘Historicalrealit 7

combination ofbothco 12 performance’ by a capitalist society (1978: 973). performance’ byacapitalistsociety(1978:973). s oneofthefoundingfatherscomparative the‘dilettante’whostandsopposite‘expert’, ncing intentoftheNorthcote-TrevelyanReport theultimate politicalcontrolover bureaucracy. of information problemwasacombinationof of information ber assumed thatthegrowingrationalityof - politicians)wouldinev formation advantage(locatedononeside- power position in governance (1946:232). ssive values – was clearly about achieving ‘the ssive values–wasclearlyaboutachieving‘the ats tobuiltcompetence butatthesame time on totheinteraction between politicians and -politicization ofbur authority-preserving feat y ofinformation’. AsWeber wrote:“The ures –suchasmerito rding toWeber, was‘themostperfectly staff’ isaphenomenon knowninthe dures thatprovideclearlinesof of theorganization”(1946:232). y involvedacontinuous,though r suggestedthatattheheart mpetence-enhancing and arch. Thus, for instance, for itably create problems eaucracy throughits cratic recruitment and ures suchasvertical th century. CEU eTD Collection administration. 8 impressed with adifferent side of We features of Weber’s ideal-type of administration. Carl Friederich (1940) and Herman Finer (1941) were each correct thebehaviorofbur scholars remained largelypessimistic about the po to theoverprovisionof governmental functions(Downs1957,BretonandWi inexpert politicianseitherth and expertiseinadministering specific publicpolicies toobtainfrom relativelyuninformed and launched by William Niksanen,assumed thatgovernmental agencies woulduse the information opposed toromance’ (Buchanan1995).Theearly asymmetry ofinformation, publicchoicescholars self-serving motivations of both politicians andbureaucrats, environmental uncertainty andthe and analysis topolitics(Arrow1951,Buchanan come upuntil the1950-60s, whenpublicchoice sc 1982, 1985,1989;Weigast 1984,Weigastan Weingast 1989;McCubbins,NollandWeinga especially betweenpoliticians between thecitizenryasprin Zeckhauser 1971,Holmstrom 1979),ithasbeenapplie framedachieved. WhereasPATwasinitially as incentives, theagent’sactionsare based incentives andsanctions to control the pe incentives: inacanonical principal-ag The PAT’shallmark solution to theproblem of information asymmetry isoutcome-based (those whohaveinformationadvantages)hasbeen the information asymmetry between principals’ capacity todiscipline bureaucrats. As principal-agent theory(PAT)bypo The title of Niskanen’s latter work (1973) is very telling ‘Bureaucracy: Servant or Master?’ Master?’ or Servant ‘Bureaucracy: latter istelling Niskanen’s titleof work (1973) very The The nextwaveofinterestintherelations The nextgenerationofscholarshipontheto publicgoods,e.g.asociallysub- eaucrats andthereforeachieve e largestpossiblebudget(Niskane cipal andpoliticiansasagen as principalandbureaucrats berian bureaucracy thatsparked a cla aligned withtheprincipal’s interests and agreater efficiency is litical scientistsin principals(those,whoholdfo ency model apowerfulprincipalsets d Moran1983).Inthelatter 13 hips betweenpoliticiansandbureaucratsdidnot Tullock 1962,Downs1957).Byemphasizing the st 1987,McCubbinsandSchwartz1984;Moe withWeber andearlypub liticians’ capabilitytoeffectively monitor and apuzzleinbusinesssettings (Spenceand the major concernofprincipal-agentscholars. rformance ofheragents depicted politic‘more ascommonsense, holars begantoapply thetools ofeconomic publicchoicelitera ntrobe 1975),whichwouldeventuallylead pic, associated with the1980s,wasmore d foravarietyofsituationsinpolitics: socially efficient outcomes. optimal outcome. Earlypublicchoice t (DownsandRocke1994) n 1971,1973)ortheexpansionof agent (Calvert, McCubbins and ssical debate in the field of public rmal authority) andagents case, politicalscientists thedevelopment of ture onbureaucracy, . With thehelp of lic choice theorists, confident aboutthe ex ante 8

outcome-

CEU eTD Collection bureaucracy (1982:198). claimed thatpresidents weresuccessful inach Contrary tothedominant pers bureaucratic outputofthreeregulatoryfederal empirically investigated thelinkbetween theideo 9 entrepreneurial initsspir for apublicbureaucracythatismorepoliti enhanced throughtheapplicationof dominant strategyfortheachievement ofbeneficialsocietaloutcomes. important incentivedevice,andagreaterpoliti Thus, politicians’authority overpersonneldeci politicians align theagent’s actionswithprincipa officials asoneofthem (157-160),implying politicians, Weingastpointedtothecongressionalinfluenceover incentive system foragencies’(1983:768).Inth that theUS Congress’s committees ‘possesssuffi article, titled“BureaucraticDi ‘the fundamental mechanism ofpresidential infl of politico-bureaucratic interaction. conceptualized politicalpoweras involved many ideasandpracticalmeasures, howev Canada, Australiaandsome EUstates.Thisre reform of‘oldpublicadministration’ inmany Right ideologytopowerinmajor Anglo-Saxoncountriesinth of power (2005: 211). 211). (2005: power of the by bureaucrats control to politicians of ability Miller, the from their bureaucratic agents is ‘inherent in our democratic system asawhole’ (1989: 324) or, in words of Gary maximum the extract effort to principals political of that impossibility concludes Moe 1989). undermined (1987, is capacity control to politicians’ the and isenhanced advantage their asymmetriesto information to use bureaucrats of ability the – politics partisan competitive highly and powers of the separation of isa product which – principals Itshould be noted that TerryMoewas one among firstto In hispioneeringresearchontheAmerican presidencyandbureaucracy,TerryMoe(1982) The optimism ofthestudiesthatshowedefficiencyfirms andgovernments may be 9 it (FarnhamandHorton1996,Pollitt Moepointedatthepresidentialpo

scretion orCongressionalControl? pective onthepoliticians’ capac aform ofincentive andusedit asuitableincentivesy form, knownasNewPublicManagement (NPM), countries, includingtheUSA,UK,New Zealand, countries, 14 ieving ‘adegreeofdirectionandcontrol’over agencies overthe32 cally responsive, accountable forresultsand that throughthepolitic l’s interests andtherefore achieve better results. cization of bureaucracywassuggested asthe e 1984paper,analyzingincentivesavailableto logical preferencesofAmerican presidents and sions wasassertedbyPATliterature asan recognizethat inthesitu uence’ (200).Ayearla use of incentives is limited by the system of separation separation of system the by islimited incentives of use er themain trustofNPMreforms hasbeen cient rewardsandsanctionsto createan stem coincidedwithaneo-liberalquest wer toappointseniorbureaucratsas e 1980s was followed by a radical e 1980swas followedbyaradical ity tooverseebureaucracy, Moe 1993). The ascendance of New 1993). TheascendanceofNew ”, Weingast andMoranclaimed the appointment ofbureaucratic as anunderpinningforatheory yearsperiod(1945-1977). ation ofmultiple and warring ization ofbureaucracy ter, in their seminal ter, intheirseminal CEU eTD Collection Finland, France,Germany, (Derlien1996,Schnapp2001,Suleiman JapanandSpain 2003). ontheP USA (Light1995,NationalCommission of politician appointeesinpublicbu bureaucratic personnelwerebroughtbackunderth 10 causal relationsbetween apolitic principal’s proclivity tofollow herown interests is PAT scholars,forwhom‘thephrase“principal’smoral hazard”makes nosense,sincethe many countriesaroundtheglobeim shirked responsibilityorwere to bureaucratic posts those whowere‘willing a hands’ overpersonnelpolicydecisions.AsSchickno results atwhichtheminister andhergovernment executives’ torun theirministries. Inexchange 1989, ministers wereabletohire(onfixed-term New Zealand,forexample,throughtheStateSect of outputswithinafixedperiodatpredeter fashioned hierarchicalterms) agreestosupplyth coordination’ (Pollittand Bouckaert2000:83-84).Namely, ‘the‘agent’ (‘subordinate’ inold- that ‘market forms ofcoordinationshouldwhen inadequate fortheachievement sociallybeneficial outcomes. ofstable alignment ofbureaucraticpreferences withthos North andWeingast1989).Ifpol long recognizedboththeoreticallyandempi 2005: 220).However,thewelfare-undermining effect shirks. politician andabureaucr bureaucracy isthatprincipal-agent relations For a comprehensive critique of principal-agency models see Miller 2005. seeMiller 2005. models principal-agency critique of Foracomprehensive It shouldalsobenotedthereisadearthof The major problem withPATexplanationofth 10 Theproblem ofpoliticalopportunism iscl at whomaximizes herowninterests/

unproductive (Schick1996:41).In ized publicbureaucracy and macr itical opportunism isadangerto reaucracies hasbeenreported incountries asdifferent asthe portant decisionsabouthiring, rically (MillerandHammond 1994,North1981, are normally perceivedasbetweenabenevolent mined cost’(Pollittand Bouckaert2000:84).In 15 e ofpoliticians,advocatedbyPAT,seems tobe e ‘principal’ (supervisor, boss) withadefinedset e ‘principal’(supervisor, for aperformance agreement todeliverspecific were aiming, ‘chiefexecutives’ weregiven‘free contracts) from outsidethebureaucracy‘chief nd abletotake charge’ andshed thosewho presumed tobenatura or Actof1988andthePublicFinance e control of politicians. The increased number e controlofpoliticians. Theincreasednumber empirical researchjus ever possiblebesubstituted forhierarchical ublic Service1989,2003)Australia,Britain, e welfare-enhancingimpa tices, ‘chiefexecutives’wereabletorecruit early notpartoftheintellectualpuzzle ofthepoliticians’self-interesthasbeen the goalsofherorganizationor otherwords,inthe1980s firing and promotion of the firingandpromotionofthe o-efficiency. In NewPublic o-efficiency. socialwelfare,thenthe l andlegitimate’ (Miller tifying theexistenceof ct ofapoliticized CEU eTD Collection and Ingram (1990), Rauch and Evans (2000), Suleiman (2003) and Lewis (2007). Lewis (2007). and (2003) Suleiman (2000), Evans and Rauch (1990), Ingram and Ban 1977), (1975, Heclo 1960), (1956, Kaufman (2006), Lewis and Gilmore of research influential such including 12 11 bureaucracy. provide aseriousjustificationfo de-politicized bureaucraciesremain significant contributiontothefiel 2008,Miller1989). Althoughthesecasestudiesconstituted1994b, KeeferandVlaicu a system thatmaximizes rentsfo same time, number a ofstudiespointedtopatron a keydriverfortheimpressive regional literature asopposedtothe‘resea what MichaelBarzelay(2001)ca Management scholarship thevalueof apoliticized bureaucracy hasbeen primarily discussedin 20 York Authoritydelivering much neededtransport instance, Jameson Doig(1988,1990)providedadetailedaccountofde-poli a de-politicized bureaucracywith research made abig leapaheadoftheoreticalju enquiry intothevalueof 2001, 2004,2006;Nunberg1999,2000).Astosocialscie Eastern Europeafterthechange ofpoliticalregime in of personnelpolicyindevelopedcountries,butwa and afocusofinterestforsocialscientists. Ci both academiaandpolicy-making, a Wood andWaterman 1994). efficiency pointofview(see,forinstan empirical research studied the value ofapo groups and constituencies’ (2003: 265) – would be a good example of the the exampleof former be a 265) – good would (2003: streamresearch. constituencies’ of and groups newideas, aninflux of ensures inertia, latter ‘counteracts There is also a large body of body literatu alarge isalso There Derek Bok’s article –inwhich hearguedthat theciti th century.StevenErie(1992)demonstratedho Despite thepervasivenessof ade-politicizedbureaucr

r theruler,but re exploring the link between de-politicized bureaucracy and micro-efficiency, micro-efficiency, and bureaucracy between de-politicized link the re exploring r theclaim ofwelfare-enhancing d, theextent to whichtheir findi case studies arriving ahead of the ‘incentiverevolu lled the‘policyanddoctrinal ed unclear. Thereforecompara rch’ typeoftheliterature. de-politicized bureaucracycontinue development inthe ce, Maranto,1998,2002;Nathan1983,Randall1979, not public goods provision (JohnsonandLibecap notpublicgoodsprovision vil servicenotonlyremained theprevailingmode zenry isbetteroff with politicized bureaucracy becausethe 16 stification of thewelfare-enhancing properties of liticized bureaucracy primarily fromamicro- age-based administrations asakey element ofa w meritocratic bureaucracyofLosAngeleswas acy forsocialwelfare. d keeps government in touch with a variety of interested witha interested of variety touch in government d keeps s alsoadoptedbythecountriesofCentraland infrastructure intheBigAppleregion inthe tion’ (MillerandWhitford 2006:214)in 1989 (Gaidushek2007;Meyer-Sahling nce, ithasneverabandonedacritical beginning ofthe20 11 comparative research.Thus,for ngs werecharacteristic ofother Outsidethe NPMliterature, properties ofade-politicized tive researchwasneeded to argumentation’ typeofthe 12 d tobeanempiricalfact Surprisingly, empirical ticized Port of New ticized PortofNew th century.Atthe CEU eTD Collection levels of corruption and bu and overall ofcorruption levels pay offuntilafteracouple ofelection cycles(968-971). election, thanonpolicies(suchasinfrastructure service), thereforeincreasingvot preferences tospendmore onpol much more tentativelythough,that bureaucracy incontrollingthepot behavior.Therefor quick returnfrom corrupt term careersofferedbythede- taxation causedbyrent-seeking’of impact ofade-politicizedbureaucracyoneconomic value-added growth(Rauch1994).Interpretingthe which inturn waspositivelycorrelated with the share of municipal expenditure allocated to i 144 U.S.citiesduringthe23ye public bureaucracyandmacro-effici comprehensive comparative empirical research 13 ‘Weberianessness’ enhances thedevelopmen engaging inrent-seekingbehavior.Inother words,EvansandRauchimplied thatthe encourage organizationalcohesionandform an least aminimal levelofcompetence, (ii)merit-based recruitment andpredictablecareers Rauch claimed thatitisthe case predictable, rewarding career survey ofmorethanahundredcountryexperts, collected anoriginaldataset economic agenciesinasample of35lessdevelopedcountriesforthe1970-1990period.Having relationship betweentheextentof meritocratic In their companion study Rauch and Evans found that mer found Evans and Rauch study their companion In A giantstepforwardwasmade in1995, Continuing thisresearchprogram, PeterEv reaucratic quality as measured by country risk agencies (2000). (2000). riskagencies country by asmeasured quality reaucratic

ladders areassociated withhighergrowthrates’(760). on thebureaucraticstructuresof politicization ofpersonnelpolicydi ars oftheProgressiveEra( because(i)meritocrat er satisfactionandenhancingth ential rent-seekingbehaviorof icies that yielded immediate be bureaucrats(1995:968).Namely, a de-politicizedbureaucracywasabletooffsetthepoliticians’ ency. Hefoundthattheinstituti the levelofbothmanufacturing employment and 17 tal capacityofthestatebymaking public on alinkbetweentheorganizationaldesignof e, Rauchsawthevirtue investment) thathadlonggestationanddidnot esprit decorps theyfoundthat‘merito recruitment andcareer stability inthecore nvestment in infrastructu itocratic recruitment is positively associated with lower lower with associated recruitment ispositively itocratic ans and James Rauch(1999)examinedans andJames the central findingRauchstat development is in‘minimizing the implicit when James Rauchpublishedthefirst when James ic recruitment ensures 1902-1931) hadapositiveeffecton thosecountriesthroughamail thatcreatesintangiblecostsof bureaucrats. Healsosuggested, e politicians’ chances forre- nefit (suchaspoliceandfire minish theattractivenessofa onalization ofci credible prospectsoflong- cratic recruitment and re –road andsewer, ofade-politicized ed thatthepotential that staff have at that staffhaveat vil servicein 13 Evansand CEU eTD Collection ‘Weberian’ state apparatuses and their ability to reduce poverty in a sample of developing 29 of asample in poverty reduce to their ability and stateapparatuses ‘Weberian’ of ‘Weberian’ bureaucracy from Rauch and Evans’s research, they established arelationship between countries with is worth noting Henderson Henderson noting is worth over bureaucracy. control the political ultimate preserving underscored the danger of the over-towering position of bureaucratic expertise and, consequently, the importance of argument on the comparative advantage of different forms ofadministrative organizations, which above all countries. countries. agency theorists, Evans and Rauch’s explanation agency theorists,Evansand serve opportunistgoalsasgood 15 14 Gary Miller argues that the tension between the the DesignofPublicAgenci by GaryMilllerinhisinfluential article‘AbovePo A theorythatpersuasivelylinke 1.3 ATheoryofWelfar that wouldconnectthe twowasstillmissing. wererevealedthrougharobus form ofbureaucracy the connection’(1999:753). thereby providingadditionalincentivetoexplore was ‘toestablishabasicconnection betweenbureaucraticstru statement ofrelationships.EvansandRauchthemse social welfareare.The‘Weberian state’isnot explanation isthatitnotclear whatthem de-politicized bureaucracyiswelfare-enhancing. Anothermajorpr threat tosocietalwell-being,thenEvansandRa interest ofcitizens,butalsoem However, itisnotonly theoretically plausible 752, RauchandEvans2000). bureaucracy ‘more competent,purposive,andcohe They also called for more for comparative called research bureau on also They Thisisunderstandable because theintellectual roots of One major caveatofthis explanation isthatamore efficientbureaucraticmachine may et al e-Enhancing Bureaucracy (2007) study in which, having adopted both the analytical approach and the measure measure the and approach analytical the both adopted having which, studyin (2007) 15 es’, publishedin2000andsu

Thus,whereasthewelfare-enhanci pirically evident. d ade-politicized bureaucracywith welfare-enhancing ones.Inotherwords,justlikeprincipal- echanisms thatlinktheir ‘Weberianessness’ and 18 a fullydevelopedtheory,butratheraninductive to assume that politicians may fail toactinthe Ifwerecognizeopportunism bypoliticiansasa uch’s theoryisinadequateforexplainingwhya Evans andRauch explanation arein Weber’s classical benign andmalevolent fa alternative mechanisms thatmight accountfor cratic structures; however, little has been done since. since. It done been however,littlehas cratic structures; litics: CredibleCommitment andEfficiencyin sive’ policyimplementation instrument (1999: does notaccountforpoliticalopportunism. lves emphasized that theaim oftheirresearch t statisticalassociati bsequent research(2001,2005,2007). ng propertiesofade-politicized oblem with Evans and Rauch’s oblem withEvansandRauch’s ctures and economic growth, ctures andeconomic growth, socialwelfarewasadvanced on, anelaboratetheory ces ofthe state–the

and middle income 14

CEU eTD Collection previous research. is creditedasastartingpoint forMiller’s analysis becauseheprovided aformal M attracted 1979, Walker 1978)and 16 A startingpointforMillerwasHolm 1.3.1 InteractiveSocialProductioninFi the stateformation (Miller2000, organizational structureofthemodern nation-state, problem ofcredible commitment, identifiedby theNewInstitutional Economists –laysinthe joint outcome Given this,thequestionHolmstrom askedwas‘…wh identified andtheirnon-cooperativebehavior observable indicatorofindividu individuals, individual is ‘moral hazard’ –while theoutputoft as budgetbalancing.Anothergenericcharacteristicofteam produc work fullyamongthemselves (1982:325).Thelatte of peopleareengagedinmutually interdependent Holmstrom apartnershipequatesto assumed that which ownershipwasseparatedfrom management rationalize theprevalenceamong American corpor plays animportant roleinensuringthatgreate and sustainedsocietalwelfare.However,inthis to theproblemoforganizationaldesignstat Schelling’s researchondelegationtoagents(1960). Millerclaims thatthereisnoperfectsolution production (1982),Eswarm andKotwal’scritique production’ andexploresitdrawingonBengt the problemofpublicgoodsproduc state wascreatedinthefirstplace–probl design ofthestatethatweinhe In fact, the fundamental problem, underlying Holmstro x sothattheresultingnonecooperative contributions cannotbeperfectlyobs

iller’s attention as early as1994(M rit from thepastisdetermined bytheveryproblem forwhichthe al inputs,thenthelowperfo Falaschetti andMiller strom’s impossibilitytheorem (1982). tion isavarietyof thesitu rms: Holmstrom’sImpossibilityTheorem r socialwelfareisach em ofpublicgoodsproduction.Millerarguesthat 19 may yieldaninefficientoutcome (1982:325). second-bestworldade-politicizedbureaucracy eam’s workreflectsthe contribution ofmany asituationof‘teamproduction’–whengroup m’s research, was studied pr m’sresearch, was e, hencetotheproblem ofcrediblecommitment Holmstrom’smoral studyof hazardinteam activities anddivide the whichhadbeensetforthattheveryonsetof of Holmstrom’s analysis(1984)andThomas r characteristicof ations such organizational structure under ations suchorganizationalstructureunder andlaborascompared topartnerships. ether thereisawayoffullyallocatingthe 2001).Furthermore,theorganizational game among theagents hasaPareto iller andHammond 1994). Holmstrom here erved. Sincejointoutputistheonly rming team members cannotbe tion, accordingtoHolmstrom, ievable (2000:290). answertothe questions raised in ation of‘interactivesocial team productionisknown ior to to ior Holmstrom (Hurwicz 16 benefits oftheirteam Holmstrom tried to CEU eTD Collection the output level of theteam, th themselves, therewillalwaysbeateammember theorem showsthataslong asteam members fully interest ofonethepartic budget-balancing Paretooptimal scheme isnotNa that anybudget-balancing Nashequilibrium is Pareto suboptimal (socially inefficient) andany Nash equilibrium andbudgetbalancing.Presenti three mutually inconsistent requirements: Pareto that the designof anincentive scheme thatyiel 17 undertake theactionsthatwould (collective andoutput-based)incentivescheme th optimal Nashequilibrium? corporations, whichisolatesshareholdersfrom efficient outcome. Seenfrom this residual claimant relaxesthebud the efficiencyisexactlyinstayingalooffrom the scheme tobecredible theresidual claimant process but simply claims ashareofbenefitscr production requiresaresidualclai the sizeofbenefitstobedistributed.C involve alargersetofpeoplethanthenumber of budget-balancing requirement, e.g.thedistribut equilibrium) in which they would all they be would better off. inwhich 294). equilibrium) (Miller 2000: agreem in be should members all team when situation a refersto Pareto optimality participants. that other the of herfinds action given own self-interest is maximized, Nash equilibrium refers to a situation when there isat there equilibrium referstoawhen Nash situation Holmstrom’s answertothequestion wasinthe negative.Theessenceofhisargument is Holmstromargued thatthebestsolutionto always hasanincentiveto always capitalize onthis…(Holmstrom 1982: 327). for agents cannotbepenalizedsufficiently cover improper actionsbehindtheuncertainty As longasweinsistonbudget-balancing… 17 ipants) (1982:326).Inotherwo

(1982:326).Inotherwords,Holmstrom waslookingforan erefore preventing theachieveme result intheoutputefficient pointofview,theseparation get-balancing requirement, allo mant –someone whodoesnotta onsequently, Holmstrom argue the production process. The presence of a passive the productionprocess.Thepresenceofapassive eated bytheteam. Holmstrom emphasizes thatfor least one stable outcome in which each member of the team team ofthe member each which stable outcome in least one 20 cannotbeateam member, becausehervalue to actualteam members, whoseactionsdetermined theday-to-dayparticipationinproduction a deviation agent intheoutcome, some ds sociallyefficientoutcome isconstrained by who would prefertoslackonhereffortx whowould ion ofbenefitsproducedbytheteam should we cannot achieve efficiency. Agents can we cannotachieveefficiency. ent that there is no other outcome (other than Nash Nash than (other other outcome isno there that ent optimality (minimal efficiency requirement), ng hisargument formally, Holmstrom shows dividebenefitscreatedbytheirworkbetween at wouldinduceeachme concerningwhowasatfault.Sinceall impossibility theorem wo sh equilibrium (isunstableduetotheself- for theteam asawhole. nt of such Paretooptimalnt ofsuch rds, Holmstrom’s impossibility ownershipandlaborinmodern wing theattainment of the ke partintheproduction d thatefficient team mber of theteam to uld betosacrifice a x . – CEU eTD Collection the residual claimant. the output falls short of the the of fallsshort output the actions that are destructive to social production system isthatitassumes 19 18 time ofanyactions thatcanaffecttheteam prod way theowner can stay detached from theproduc into theteamproductionprocess. credibly efficiency ofasystem ofinteractivesocialpr page longarticle,Eswarm andKotwalpointed problem ofmoralhazardmembers ofthepr residual claimant’s moral hazard to ‘takes adifferentform butremains unsolved’(1 Kotwal concludethatwithth re-imposing thebudget-balancing, efficiency-r team member), theresidualclaimant becomes a 579). Effectively,bytakingactionsthataffectthe bribe oneof theagentstoengageinamargin team members to shirk. Thescheme, therefore, the team does punishment scheme theresidualowne their argument inaformal fashion,Eswarm passive owner‘theclearincentivetoengage schemes, involving apassivere response toHolmstrom notedth behalf oftheresidualclaimant. Asearly enhancing role. process, wasrecognizedbyHolmstrom asplay Group punishment scheme sets the teammembers’ payoff at Forthe purposeof this dissertation the notion of ‘moral The criticism of Holmstrom’s solutionto the pr Continuing EswarnandKotwal’s , i.e. toensure(not assume asHolmstrom di not reach theagreedlevel x , noonemember oftheteamis paidandthe efficiency’ (Miller 2000: 290).

e introductionofthepassiveowne sidual ownerthatwassuggest at thegrouppunishment scheme efficiency isthatitpotentially ‘more devastating’ thanthe r’s shareoftheteam’s benef analysis sixteenyearslater, of thejointoutput ( away theproblem ofmorally hazardous behavior as in1984,MukeshEswarmandAshokKotwal oduction –breakingthebudge al amountofshirking’(Eswarm 1984: andKotwal, in morally hazardousbeha 21 etarding, condition. Consequently, Eswarm and and Kotwalarguedthat and uction (such as giving a bribe to a team member) uction (suchasgivingabribetoteammember) oduction team.Equallyimpor member of the productionteammember ofthe herself,whereby 984: 581).Theirassessment ofthedanger ing abudget-breakingand givestheresidualowne outcome productionprocess(asbribinga ofthe tion processisbyconstr to a possible solution to the problem of the to apossiblesolutiontheproblem ofthe hazard’ refers to the existenc hazard’ refersthe to d) thattheresidual x -level of the team’s collectiveoutput. If, however, oblem oftheefficiencyaninteractive benefits created bytheteam aretakenby x ), theresidualownerprefers ed byHolmstrom –givesthe r theproblem ofmoralhazard its increasesdrasticallywhen Millerargued 19 – oneof the incentive owner does not intervene owner doesnotintervene sinceunderthegroup vior’ (581).Presenting aining herselfaheadof r ‘aclearincentive to e of‘an incentive totake t-balancing constraint t-balancing constraint therefore efficiency- tant, intheirthree that theonly 18 on CEU eTD Collection the compensation contract and therefore honor to commitment owner’s credible form the of institutionalized wasan its residual. severance pay of Therefore, decides to fire an employee, it punishes itself by paying aseverance feeto the laid off worker, thus reducing the size owner established a ‘hostage’ for itself – severance pay for dismissed. If in pursuit of short-term profit the owner assets-specific the make investment, employeesthat to firm. the encourage To outside applicability little had which skills, and knowledge optic-related investto to werereluctant firethem time, can owner any employees the that opportunity to maximize its short-term residual by firing employees who made job-specific investments. Knowing skills. Carl ZeissStiftung the and sole – owner ofthe firm knowledge the investments– optic-related had specific – 20 as KodakorAT&Tsuchagents.Itisthema short-term profit maximization andpoints tothe agent ofSchelling’ssort’ (2000: 300) –someon the avoidanceofanuclearwar(19 Schelling showedthevalueofanagentwhosepr are differentfrom thoseoftheowner.Having delegate theowner’sauthority(tomakecompen that oneofthemost efficientwaystocommit theow employees. Zeiss –setupaseverancepayscheme asa‘hosta at the end of theXIXthcentury CarlZeiss Stiftu Thus, ahistoricalexample,br maximizing motives. commitment –believablecontainment oftheresidual owner’sauthoritytoactonherprofit- problem oftheorganizationaldesign equilibrium at t2iftheownerrenegesatt1(M 297) or,in amore accurate accountofrea as bribing) theteam members eitherwouldnot her persistentmoral hazard;andanticipating oppor members haveeveryreasonnottotrustanyin that the ownercanensure sustainablemaximization team achieved. Paradoxically, Miller argues, self-c (2000: 298).Onlybydenyingtheresidualowneranyoppor compensation decisionsforemployees. Atthesame As any high-tech enterprises, Carl There aredifferentorganizationa 20 DrawingonTomas Schelling’sdelegation

ought totheliteraturebyAbraha Zeiss, which specialized in re specialized optics, Zeiss, which the long-term efficiency ofthe firm. 60). Millerclaims that‘therole offirms from amacro-efficiency point ofview is credible l solutions to the problem ofcredible commitment infirms. 22 accept the contract inthefirstplace(Miller2000: iller 2000:298).Inotherwords,thefundamental centive schemeofferedbytheownerbecauseof nagers ofthosefirms, lity, would convergeonthezero-effort Nash sation decisions)tosomeonewhosemotivations ng –soleownerofafamousGermanfirm Carl e whoisclearlynotcommitted to theowner’s eferences differfromthoseofherprincipalfor managers inpaternalistic American firms such ge’ thatconstraineditfrom arbitraryfiringof extensively studied thestrategy of conflict, tunistic actionsonbehalfoftheowner(such onstraint aheadoftime isalsotheonlyway time,theirowncompensationisnotdirectly ner totheefficiencyof of profit forherself.Itissobecause team to agentresearch( tunity to act, is the efficiency of the tunity toact,istheefficiencyof m andProsch(2000),showshow quired from employees costly assets ofbudgetbreakercallsforan not theowners,whomake the firm credibly is to 1960), Millerclaims CEU eTD Collection make such an offer tothe manager in the firstplace. amount of manager’s compensation inth should be such as to compensate for all the possible losse possible allthe compensatefor asto such be should finding in difficulties considerable have and arrangements be likely most manager: she will the for costs considerable team,th the amemberproduction of with bribing situation not reaching who would bribe ateammember who would engage in a marginal amount of shirking that would result in the team by an owner induces aninefficient outc of managers’ incentives andinduce efficiency-retarding acti 21 equilibrium outcome – that otherwisewouldhave been inaccessibleforthefirm –isachieved. the employees point crediblefromtheemployees’ of managers’ preferencesmakes theirpromise to performance insteadofquickprofitmaximization determine themanagers’ preferences–they compensation’ (Lazear1979).Thesepersonneland employment inthe firm andseniority of their linked totheachievement ofshort-term profits of thepassiveowner owners. AsthelogicalextensionofEswarm an control orsupervisionofanyone, includingthefirm’s sharehol shareholders tosuemanagers forbaddecisions discretion doctrine’, e.g. alegallyentrenched insulated from shareholders’ efficiency-retardin al and Rosen1983;Hucket social welfareas firms’ positive environmental acti increases the productivityofthefirms andeven proposition thatdelayedcompensation ‘binds’ preferences differfrom thoseofshareholde seniority-based promotion anddeferredcompensati efficiency-retarding motives –outofaction.Personnel andcompensation arrangements, suchas governance ofpaternalisticfirms istoput It should be noted that managers are not free from the possible illicit pressure of owners that can alter the structure alter structure can the that of owners pressure illicit freefrom possible arenot managers the that be noted Itshould Managers areinfactthe thirdsetofactors,actingasaso In thelightofHolmstrom’s approach,theprim x -level of joint output and, therefore, bringing the owner asubstantial quick return. Contrary to the problem ofmoral hazard‘takesadi 2004,MahoneyandThorne2005).In

ome for all. Say, the owner can offer ashare of a quick profit to a manger, e ‘quickreturn’ scheme seems being rs andthereforeefficiencyis enhanced. 23 position orwhat laboreconomics calls‘deferred principlethatnotonly‘makes itdifficultfor d Kotwal’sconclusionth make managers visibly committed tolong-run the owners’short-term profitmaximization – (2000: 304)butalsokeepsthem freefrom direct g interests bywhatMiller callsa‘managerial s associated with the breach positively affectsnonmate respectthe compensation scheme agreed with for shareholders,buttothelongevityoftheir ons from them similar to how bribing one team member member team how one bribing to similar from them ons the management totheirfirms inlongrun, another job. Therefore, the owner’s offer to a manager amanager owner’s to offer the another job. Therefore, that is the shareholders’ motives. The structure of view and, therefore,aPareto-optimalof viewand, Nash on playakeyroleinen ons, is wellsupported intheliterature(Eaton e corrupt manager is easily identifiable. This carries This iseasilyidentifiable. manager e corrupt fired after the deal is revealed, lose herretirement isrevealed, deal afterthe fired compensation arrangements, argues, Miller ary rolethatmanagers playincorporate fferent form butremainsunsolved’ lution toacommitment problem by ders’ (BlairandStout1999). prohibitively largefortheownerto addition tothis,managers are at withtheintroduction of agreement andtrust. The suring thatmanagers’ rialistic aspectsof 21 The CEU eTD Collection stockownership (306)and – the power ofprofessionalnorms (307). advisory employeeson ofthe opportunities representational makes its rational for managers to keep ‘the entre array ofstakeholders cooperative and contented’ (2000: 305), like) which such the managers’ life and to make strikes, difficult lawsuits andsuppliers (via slow-downs, employees good aredifficulttoreveal, difficult toobserve(teamproduction)andwhenth 23 22 Leviathan isnotonlyanexternal in returnforashareof bene (mostly athreatofpunishment) tofreeride-minde necessary tosustainefficiency production, socialscientistsargued Miller 2001:393).Thus,justlike agent is‘anecessaryconditiontosustaineffici the stateand firms independentlyfrom eachother 392). Aspeopletendtofreeride individuals facetofreeridewhenactions are the firstplace(2000,2001).Inbothcasespr production bythestate,whichgaverisetoor credible commitment oftheresidual claimant –isidentical Miller’s coreinnovationishisclaimthatthe 1.3.2 CredibleCommitmentinStat interests ofindividualsininteractivesocialor of Eswarm andKotwal’s–thereisnosystem th unilateral, possiblyselfish,actionsofmanagers, both ownersandemployees? AlthoughMillerpoint hazard tothe managers. Thequestion thenis,what (1984: 581),itisplausibletoarguethattheintro however, isquitedifferentinHobbesian SeeMillerand Hammond 1994. managers for th owners and of fiscal responsibility Joint

The role of the Hobbesian external agent – sovereign or Leviathan – is to supply incentives The roleoftheHobbesianexternalagent–sovereign or Leviathan–istosupplyincentives 23 theneedforanexternalagent arises.Interestingly, theorists ofboth

fits createdbyth inpublicgoodsproductio

but also Holmstrom justifiedtheneedforaresidualclaimantinteam – asearlyHobbs(1968[1651]) when theirindividualcontribu es: TyingtheRuler’sHands and Holmstrom’s analyticalframeworks. active ganization’ (2000:290). 24 key problemofefficiencyinteamproduction– costly toobserve’(FalaschettiandMiller2001: e productionofpublic duction ofthethirdset playersrelocatedmoral 22 ency incollectiveendeavours’(Falaschettiand ganizational structureofmodern nation-statein agent, who acts on individuals’ motives tofree agent, whoactsonindividuals’motives e firms as a whole, ‘political constraints’ - the ability of of -the ability e firms constraints’ ‘political asawhole, at can‘perfectly reconcile theconflicting self- d individuals to work towards group objectives d individualstoworktowardsgroupobjectives hisoverarchingconclusion keepsmanagers fromdivertingresources from councils or even the board of directors and employee employee of and board directors the or even councils eir truevaluationsaboutaprospectivepublic concluded thattheexis oblem arisesfrom‘thedominant strategy s toseveralmechanisms thatmay block n. Theroleofthis to theproblem ofpublicgoods tion totheteam’s outputis – thatanexternalagentis goods. Thus,Hobbesian tence ofanexternal is inline withthat externalagent, CEU eTD Collection of thefailuresocieties toexperience reduced transactioncosts andenco structure which maximizedtherents to theruler throughout thehistoryofhumankind business growthandthetaxcapacityofstat connections. Theyalsofoundthatahighlevel legislators andregulatorsin group ofRussianlargefirms thatwasgranted conditions thatdiscourageseconomic ‘greater costsinrecourses,uncertainty,andth be detrimental tothefirm’s investment. Conf and small enterprises topaylargebribes bythreat order ispossible.Ontheothe words, onlybybackingthesovereignforceandth ride whentheirtruepreferences the beginningof19 Weingast 1989,Olson1984,Slinkoetal and Tullock1962,Lambert-Mogiliansky maximize rentattheexpense oftheoveralleffi also playan efficiency-retarding role. Atendency a Leviathan’spropertytobeactive,purposefully the state tomaximise theirresidual, whichisinc production ofpublicgoodsinevitably of theresidual benefits”? The application of Eswarm andKotwal’s analysis suggests that the 2000: 289-290). (capable topunishfreeriding)a interactive social production requiresanextern of theexternalagent forsocialefficiency inits governmental institutionsthatenablessustainable impossibility’ is, according to Mi The questionisthen:“WhyanactiveLeviathan th centuryinAmerica the localrulin 1992-2000performed betterthanlargefirms withoutpolitical r hand,asthediscussionabove nd apassiveownerofth arecostlytoreveal(seeMillerandHammond1994).Inother ller, therootcauseof ourfailure tofind aperfect designof uraged growth.Thisfundamental dichotomy is therootcause therehasbeena“persistent agents fromparticipation.Slinko createsatemptation forpowerholderstousethepowerof sustained economic grow 2005).AnearlyworkofMiller(1989)showedhowin et al 2007,Miller1989,North1981,and ciency hasbeennotedbyotherauthors(Buchanan 25 iscatory extortion of the party machines meant reat topropertyrights’(689),acombinationof onsistent withtheoverallsocialefficiency.Thus, al agent whoissimultaneously an active actor designedwithefficiency-enhancingintent,can e. Inamoregeneralmanner, Northnotesthat ening the firms toenactalegislation thatwould of regulatorycaptureadverselyaffectssmall- prosperity forallmember passivity.Thus,tobeefficientasystem of of thosewhocontrolthe (and hisgroup)andan by Russia’s regional preferential treatment byRussia’sregional cannot beatthesame time apassiveowner e capabilitytopunish anefficient social e residual.Thisinc g partyorganizationsforcedmiddle showed, Holmstrom sawthevalue th.” (1981:25). tension betweentheownership et al (2005) showed that a (2005)showedthata onsistency or‘logical s ofasociety(Miller efficient system that power ofthestateto CEU eTD Collection powers’ was created(818). of the judiciary from the Crown was assured’ (1989: 816) by which ‘the beginnings of division or separations of constitutional check actors. Intheirse residual-maximizing motives.Onewaytodoitis to achieveefficientsocialorderpowerholders must bedeprivedofopportunitiestoactontheir 25 24 coalition’ (2001:405)thateven of aconstitutionaldesignthatmaximizes ‘thetr commitment againstopportunism. multiple veto players rather thanaunitary ag (Falaschetti andMiller2001,Heni a ‘remarkable’ economic (803).Arecent effect in theXVIIthcenturyresulted overall societalefficiency asitisforthefirm as introduction of Schelling’s agentintotheproduction scheme might beasbeneficial for the Rogoff 1985). central banksincementing thecr separate body ofliterature –oncentralbanks –th Shepsle 1989,KeeferandStasavage2003, increase a policy’s credibility atthe stage of commitments. Agrowingbodyofresearchshowedth another institutionalmechanism throughwhichgove campaign promises. Thedelegationofauthorityto individual powerholdersfrom imposition of entities political parties care about their reputa 1995, AlesinaandSpear1988,CoxMcCubbins1994,Gehlbach system seems beinganecessary element for the equates to creating ‘a team whose members must act collectively to benefit from opportunism’ (2001: 401). multiple creating than actorrather asingle within authority It is important to note that unlike other authors Fala other authors that unlike to note Itisimportant TheCrown’s authority was considerab Further applicationofHolmstrom andEswarma Since bothproblems –inteams ofefficiency and minal workNorthandWeingast (1989)sh s onStuartkings

tually disablespowerholders’ increased activityofeconomic agents,whicheventuallyleadto edibility ofgovernment commitments inmonetary policy(see 25 ly diminished, parliamentary supremacy establishedandthe ‘independence sz 2000, Keefer and Stasavage 2003) has demonstrated that sz 2000,KeeferandStasavage2003)hasdemonstrated that FalachettiandMillerunderlin 24 or‘tyingtheking’shands’ tion, theargument goes,and 26 their rent-seekingprefer ent haveagreater capacity toproduce credible schetti and Miller argue for the diffusion of hierarchical of hierarchical the diffusion for Millerargue and schetti its implementation (for success of suchaconstitutional design (Aldrich awhole.Millerarguesth external actors. Diffusing authority within a single agent agent within a single actors. authority external Diffusing ansaction costsofputtingtogetheradecisive todiffusethepoliticalpoweramong multiple at haslong underlinedth independent agencieshasbeen identifiedas rnments canenhancethecredibilityoftheir theoretical contributi nd Kotwal’s research impliesthatinorder states –havethesame rootcause,thenthe at politiciansdelegate 1991). Thisargument isinlinewitha owed howtheenactment ofaset moral hazard.Adevelopedparty during theGloriousRevolution e thewelfare-enhancingnature et al ences andrenegingon instance, seeHornand 2008).Aslong-lived therefore theycontrol e role ofindependent on totheliterature at civil service isan whentheywantto CEU eTD Collection personnel decisionsinherent in executive’ (1993:990). The ideaofa ‘important decisionsabouthiring,firingandpromotion are…notunderthecontrolofchief third approach.Thus,HowardFrantreferstoci bureaucracy (Frant1993,Krauseetal researchers usethenotionsofcivilservice in organizational lineofcommandthatflowsfrom elect U.S. publicagenciesistheisolationof management system’ (2003:49).Sinceakeycharac states that‘Theprevalenceofci structures …werenearlyuniversal recent waveofreforms [PresidentCarter’sadmi however, weshallclarifythe bureaucracy shieldbureaucratsfrom theday-to-daypoliticalintervention. Beforeweproceed, efficiency. Theaim ofthissecti Having saidthis,however,heprovidesarather decision-making, protectingitfrom Miller claims thatcivilservi Service1.3.2.1 Civil asaSolutiontotheProbl in modern states. important element ofasystem of bureaucracy throughthe20 of scholarstreat civil service asthe dominant (meritocratic) civilservi Weder 2002),whileothersmake adistinctionbetw reference totheorganizationa non-elected postswithin scholars treatthe concept ofcivil service as pub The notionofcivilservice hasbeen interprete ces (Gaidushek2007,Meyer-Sahling2001,2004,2006).Anothergroup the government. Moreover,some aut th notion ofcivilservice. century. Forinstance, ToblertandZucker note that‘prior to the ce provides‘anenormous bene and l designofpublicagenciestheystudy(seeVanRijckeghenand on istoshowhowindividualcom vil service was assuch that it organizationalsolutionstothe intheUnitedStates’(1983:24) the interpretationof much ofthe day-to-day politicalinfluence…’(2000:316). degree ofde-politicizationorth 2006, Lewis 2007), which constitutes in our opinion, the 2006, Lewis2007),whichconstitutesinouropinion, the em ofCredibleCommitmentinModernStates personnel policymanagement fromthemain 27 organizational structure vil service as a type of personnel policy where vil serviceasatypeofpersonnelpolicywhere lic bureaucracy, i.e.a collection of allcivilian nistrative reform of1979–MN]civilservice thesense of afully large pictureofhowcivilserviceenhances een politicized(patrona d differentlyintheacademic literature. Some ed politicianstonone-electedofficials,some teristic oftheorganizationaldesign civil serviceasafu hors ofthisgroupdonotmake any was asynonym tohuman resource problem ofcrediblecommitment ponents ofcivilservicetype . Similarly, PatriciaIngraham ficial shieldforbureaucratic e amountofauthorityover of theAmerican public ge) andde-politicized de-politicized public lly de-politicized lly de-politicized CEU eTD Collection bureaucracy inwhichpoliticianswieldthelowest working heretomorrow’ (Nistotskaya 2001:32).‘Eve because ofhim thatIamworkinghere andif that theyshould doasthepatron tellsthem b the 2000s,authorofthisthes devoted topersonnelpracticesinoneofthe mechanism ofpersonalaccountabilitybetweenbur sense ofobligationtoherpoliticalmaster inth and thepower toappoint(from thepool).Theex that attheentrystagepoliticianshave‘dualpo powerholders toestablishfirm controloverburea handful of pre-selected candidates, onewayoranotheraffiliated with thesuperior –enables in whichapoliticalsuperior appoints herbureaucratic subordinates atwill,choosing from a influence theworkofnon-electedgovernmental subordinates atanytime, thesepowersprovidepo decisions. Aspowerholderscan type ofbureaucracy,inwhichpowerholders have is tolookatthecivilservice’sopposite–apoliticized service asananalyticconcept,meaning a beneficial outcomes. Therefore, politicization ofpublicbur politicized bureaucracy, thelogic stipulated bylaw(2006:696). defines adegreeofpoliticians’freedom to‘d combination oftheinstruments availabletopoli choose touseascontrolmeasures inorder relevant legislation‘definesthespecificsetof political influence overpersonnelpolicydecisi bureaucracy, suggeststhatde-politicized bureaucraciesmay varywi A good starting point for the understanding of the welfare-enhancing effectofcivilservice A goodstartingpointfortheunderstandingof Although thereisnodir eaucracy thehigherprobabilityof ect evidencethatMillerrecogni on we employ the notion of civil for thepurposeofthisdissertationweemploynotioncivil is discoveredthatbureaucratshire of hisargument implies thatthegreater thedegree ofde- hire, fire,promote ordemote fully Russia’s regionalgovernments inthebeginningof personnelpolicyinstruments, whichministers can wer’ –thepowertodetermine apoolofcandidates 28 ticians inhiring,firingandpromotion eventually ecause, inwordsofthe respondent O.V.,‘Itis etermine theoutcomes ofpersonnelpolicy’as to achievebureaucraticcompliance…’, anda officials. Thus,patronage-entrytobureaucracy– Idon’tcarryouthisorders today Iwont’ be de-politicizedpublicbu posure tothis‘doublepower’generatesastrong amount overpersonneldecisions. ofauthority e successfulcandidate ucratic behaviorfrom theonset.One cansay ons. Jan-Hinrik Meyer-Sahling argues that ons. Jan-HinrikMeyer-Sahlingarguesthat their ‘hands free’ with eaucrats andpoliticians.InherMAthesis, n ifasacitizenand liticians withaneffectiveinstrument to bureaucracyorpatronage.Patronageisa zes civilserviceasafullyde- the occurrenceofstablesocially d atpatron’swill anyoftheirbureaucratic th regardtothedegreeof reaucracy oratypeof and givesrisetothe professional Iam not regardtopersonnel stronglyfelt CEU eTD Collection explained by thefactthatin 1990sthe exchange offa inevitably leadstosociallysub-optimaloutcomes. strategy forthebureaucratwould bureaucrat, sincepoliticiansare responding tothepowerholder’sdemands wouldmost of thelawinresponsetoinformal pressu incentives would make bureaucrats notonlywork longerhoursbutalsobendtheimplementation responsive totheinstructions authority. High-poweredincentiv with, whatHowardFrant(1996) threat todismiss ordemotea 26 submitted myapplication, andmy knowledgeand individual patron wishedthis, butbecause Paraphrasing thewordsofrespondent O.V.fr Instead candidates areself-ident service’s admission stage.Herepoolsofcandidate been consistently overlooked intheliterature is recruitment, isessentially‘a acknowledged thatsuchanappointingmethod, oftenre basis oftheirprofessionalcred from politicians tobureaucrats. Inaddition jobca U.S. CivilService Commissions) thatstaysisol civil servicetheappointingauthorityisdelegate This istrueasfarbothelements ofentr 46). anything becauseIam heldaccountablebythepe happy aboutthewayhewantsme tocarrything fabric ofthe Russian societyanda deeply entren In addition respondents felt compelled to ‘pay back’ feltto‘payback’ compelled respondents Inaddition 26 In patronageahighlypersonalizedmodeofentry In contrasttopatronage,under

politicseliminator’ bureaucrat, ortopostponeherpr

capable ofpunishingavexatious ified byreplying tovacancy announcements inthemass media. of thepoliticalmasters. Ho be tofully succumb tothe de calls,‘high-poweredincentives’tofullyobeythepolitical entials rather es providedbypatronagemake bureaucraticpersonnel civil servicepoliticia ched behavioral norm (see Ledeneva 1998). y –admission andappointment –areconcerned.Under I sawavacancy announcement inanewspaper, re ofopportunisticallyminded powerholders.Not 29 vors el vors important remained an the favor of employment to the the favor the could employmentpatron, which be of to om our2001research,‘Iam herenot because an ated fromthemain lineofcommandthatruns ndidates’ suitabilityfor thepostisjudged onthe d toanautonomous body(as,forinstance,the the ‘politics eliminating’ properties of thecivil skills gotme throughtheentryexamination’. out, -saysrespondentT. rson whogaveme thejob’(Nistotskaya2001: (Civil ServiceAssembly 1942:5).What has than personalloyalties.Ithaslongbeen s arenotdetermined atwillby politicians. likelyhaveadverseconsequencesforthe to theservice iscomb ferred tointheliteratureasmeritocratic ns donotcontrolentrytobureaucracy. omotion. Thisprovidesbureaucrats mands ofthepowerholder,which wever, thesame high-powered bureaucrat. Therefore a rational bureaucrat. Thereforearational ement ofthesocio-economic G., –Ihardlycando ined withacredible CEU eTD Collection al and Tabellini2007:169-170)thathasbeenobser alternative mechanism ofaccountabili lays thefoundationfora‘lifelongcommitment to makes bureaucrats responsive andaccountableto instructions oftheirpo autonomous bodyreducethe‘incentiveintensity’(Frant de-personalization oftheadmission procedurea consideration oftheappointingau they areunabletoinfluencetheadmissionproce 27 production. oversight, whichisexactly whatweaimatdesigninganefficient system of interactive social ‘attuned’ tothepowerholders’pr such like) or thecourt. This implies thatlife-l the bureaucraticself-government organization bureaucrats canbefiredonlyfo is notfullycredible.Similarly, apay system in civilservice isgroun residual decision-maker, apolitician bureaucrat’s longevityintheservice.Since seniority-based promotions isthat bureaucracies –leavesnoroom for seniority-based promotion –anot Miller (seeWilson 1887). the goalsoforganization–nottheirpoli bureaucracy. Theargumentthatprospectsofal policy goalsistheprosp and Tabellini 2007) 2007) Tabellini and Astandard politico-economic accountview 2004,Kaufmann 1960,Mosher1982,Riccucci1995,Tonon2008). Therefore, undercivilservic Just likeatadmission andappointment po Another importantbuildingblockofthebur litical masters inday-to-daypolicy- ect ofalife-longemployment integraltomany forms ofade-politicized 27 Theprospectsofalife-longem

r agrossmisconduct (asbribery theyoccur in analmost automatic fashionas afunction ofthe e politiciansnotonlyhaveno thority. Incontradistinctiontothesituationunderpatronage, eferences butalsolessrespons political interventionintopersonnelissues.The specificity of ’s promise topromote abureaucrat her central characteristic ofthecivilservice type of ty to‘professionalpe s of politicians as being primarily motivatedas beingprimarily of politicians by re-election(see Alesina s ong careerprospectsnoton seniority-based promo 30 ong-terms careercausebur (such ascivilservicecommissions,Corpsand ss bydetermining thepoolofcandidatesfor tical master –waswell-established wellbefore ved inde-politicized a firm’ (Miller 2000:316)andgivesrisetothe nd thedelegationofpowertoappointan politicians, de-politicizedentrytobureaucracy liticians wieldnodecision-making authority, eaucratic commitment tolargerlong-term 1996:378)forbureaucratstofollowthe at large’ (Alesina ers andtothepublicatlarge’(Alesina making. In otherwords,ifpatronage ployment arecrediblebecause conviction), onthedecisionof control overappointment, but ive tothetheirday-to-day tions donotpresupposea bureaucracies(Bowman orathreattodemote her ly make bureaucratsless ded tothebureaucrat’s eaucrats tointernalize et et CEU eTD Collection 28 legislature) andnotof individual co (aggregated, althoughimperfectlyasArrow’s( bureaucracy carriesoutpublicpoliciesthat reflect threatened whenpoliticiansexercise their c implemented bythebureaucracy(Miller2000:318) bureaucracy butinreachingagr elected ones.Politicians’responsibility is,how over publicbureaucracy: inademocratic state el masters, which isthekeytoefficiency. implies thatbureaucrats aremuch lesssensitive to the bureaucraticladder,norinfluencetheirleve residual decision-maker isnotrequired.Therefore, longevity intheorganizationandherrank.Itis susceptible tothepoliticians’moral hazard. from thepreferencesof thecurrent winnersin the wholecivilservicemechanis admission stage.We arguethatthepublic charac particular attentiontotheoverl bureaucrats nottoactonpoliticia section hasbeeninshowinghowindividualelements of thissolution.The however, providesonlyabroadconceptualization contributionofthis welfare ofpoliticians’moralhazardandadvocates interests inpublic policies; andthat is precisely what civil service guards against. however, threatenedwhenpoliticians pushfor na come about’ (Wildavsky 1979: 35). policy: if the actions we recommend are undertaken, good… consequences rather than bad … ones actually will policies have a welfare-enhancing – rather than faction- or self-enrichment –intent. ‘A promise underlines public Despite the Arrow’s impossibility theorem, following Ar following the theorem, Arrow’s impossibility Despite It shouldbenotedthatMillerdoesnotargueagainsttheoverarchingco To sum up,inhistheoryofinteractivesocialproductionMillerexposes

eement onapackageofpublicgood m asitcontributestomaking bur ooked ‘politics eliminating’ pr ns’ instructionsintheday-to nstituencies orindividual powerholders. 31 ontrol asacollectiveactorand ensurethat politicsandbureaucraticdecision-making less l ofremuneration. This‘politicians’impotence’ 1951) impossibility theorem teachesus,bythe governed byanadministrative procedureanda ter oftheadmission isanimportant element of rrow (i.e.of favored constituencies) orselfish ected officialsarelegitimate masters ofnon- on Wildavsky we assume than democratically agreed agreed democratically weassume than on Wildavsky neither politicianscanre ever, notintheday-to-day oversight of thepreferencesofth theday-to-day oversight bytheir political ofcivilservice createasetofincentivesfor civilserviceasacorrective tosuch.He, . Thisimplies thatsocialwelfareisnot -day policy-making. Ithaspaid operties of thecivil service’s eaucratic careersindependent s andpoliciesthatwouldbe e citizens asawhole locate officialsalong 28 ntrol ofpoliticians the threattosocial Socialwelfareis, CEU eTD Collection twenties of theSenatein oner senators, saidthatthemeeting was‘ashowof William K.Black,oneof four civilservantsw one oftheirmajor politicalcontributors–Char presidential raceof2008 JohnMcCain), whodemanded aspecialtreatment forthebusinessof succumb tothepressureoffivepowerfulUS show how,justifyingtheirdecisions example fromarecentAmerican history–so bureaucrats… andelicitpressurefrom outside like adouble-edgedsword:theyhelp‘toidentify instrument of politicalcontrolthebureaucracy. appreciated bypolitical scientistssinceatleastMcCubbins bureaucrat isrequiredtofollowperforming heroffici societies livinginan Information Agea SOPs, orasystem ofaccountabi enhancing measure. Thus,reform movements of operating procedures(SOPs)andth which politicianscanbecredibility committed to so In additiontocivilservice,Mi Credible Commitment inModernStates 1.3.2.2 Standard Operating Procedures andProf the greateradegreeofde-politicizationbureaucracy. circumstances, andtheexample abovesuggeststhat will. Thestrengthofthewelfare-enhancingimpact of SOPsislikelytovaryunderdifferent (Keating Economics 2008)ofthesenatorsbySOPs, his colleagues beingsufficiently shielded from power ofSOPsshouldnot,however,beoverestimate bureaucrats canbufferthepolicyintentfrom ‘Standard operatingprocedures’refertoase It shouldbenotedthatnotallconsider the promulgation ofSOPsas anefficiency- standard Thus, byreferringtoaprescribedsequenceofactions, oom’ (NowickiandMuller2007). ller argues,therearetwootherin lity throughfollowing rules, as e powerofprofessionalnorms. by thereference to SOPs,four civil servants were able notto nd suggested cuttingredtape and moving to 32 senators (includingthe called theKeatingFivescandalof1987-90–to essionalism as OtherSolutions to the Problemof ho werecalledtoWashington D.C.tomeet the alterations byopportunist andpunishboththeuseofarbitrarypowerby interests’ (2000:318).He force’ asthecivilservantshadtoface‘one- the 1990sheavilycriticized an‘enormouspressure’and‘intimidation’ les KeatingofLincol The point thatMillermakes isthat SOPsare cial welfareintent of suchimpactofSOPsislikelytobehigher d, asitisdifficulttoimagine Mr.Blackand al duties.ThecontrolroleofSOPshasbeen had the senators been able tosackthem at t ofwrittenrulesand procedures thata (1987), who showed SOPs as an et al asan (1987),whoshowedSOPs stitutional mechanisms through inadequate totheneeds of s ofevidenceortimetables, Republic nomineeinthe public policies: standard n SavingsandLoans. ic powerholders.The bringsadramatic theprevalenceof CEU eTD Collection 29 interests. TheKeatingscandal be seenasasafeguard ofthewelfareintent bureaucratic agencieswithintheparameters set into consideration that SOPsareeitherdirectly demonstrated that‘oneperson’sredtapemay be object’ (1993:283)andKaufmann, drawingona only some SOPs couldbequalifiedasredtape, i.e.‘havenoefficacyfor‘therules’functional Kaufmann’s (1977)seminalwork(2006:130). literature onredtape,includingagroundbreaki as PandeyandMoynihannoted,thethinkingofrefo accountability throughachievingresults(Gore from politics. AsMosher noted, bureaucracy populatedbypeoplewhosebehavi (2005: 74-75).Bearingthisinmind, aprofe related professionalethics’,i.e.asystemofvalues, norms, principles, rules,policiesandsolutions members oftheprofession.AsAsa Scarlett 1991).Animportant implic form ofworkinvolvingadis the most contestedanalyticalabstracts insocial according to Miller,aprofessionalized bureaucracy. Although thenotion ofaprofessionisone it gives rise toarelated profe science) and such like. instance, The Federal ReserveSystem (economics), Th regulatory organizations – Corps. In the US federal gover

In France and Spain professionals in different governmentalagenciesare unitedinto It isclear that as an institution thatguideshuman behavior,professi Another organizationalsolutionto (Miller 2000:317). articulated byCongressratherthanbendingthelawinresponsetoinformal pressure are often special interest, likeKeating, w The politicalinterestswhoobjectmost l

tinct bodyofsystematic (Abbot1988,Bledstein1978, knowledge illustrates thispoint well: ssional ethics,whichguidesandc ation oftheexistenceadist Kasher putsit:‘aprofessional the problem ofcredible commitment inmodern stateis, oudly torunawayorunresponsivebureaucrats ho findthatbureaucratsobeyingthelawas or isguidedbyprofessionalethics. et al of publicpoliciesagains 33 e U.S.Environmental Protection Agency (environmental Meanwhile, Bozeman (1993,2000)showedthat by thelegislation(Schne another’streasuredsafeguard’(1977:4).Taken sciences,scholars agreethatprofessions area enactedby legislative statutes or derivedby nment there are many profession-based agencies as,for ssionalized bureaucracyc ng theoreticalworkbyBozeman (1993)and 1993,OsborneandGaebler1992).However, rmers didnottakeintoaccountthe academic classic interestgro inct bodyofknowl onstraints thebehaviorof act isthesubject matter ofthe t narroworself-serving up pluralism approach, ider 1992),SOPscould ons are quite different ons arequitedifferent ould beseenasa profession-based self- 29

edge isthat CEU eTD Collection morally hazardousmotivations ofpowerholde principal-agent theory prescribes). Adensenetof professional pointofview,inst bureaucrat toevaluateapossiblepolitical interf ‘correct’ isdetermined bythepr professions commit bureaucratsto‘correct politicians. Justlikecivilservicecommits Schelling’s agent–itbrings Therefore, theroleofaprofe the dissertationwefocus on‘per financial andotherlimitations aris institutional arrangements that determine social professional norms. Giventhekeyrolethatpersonnel policyplaysinthebureaucracy-related de-politicisation ofbureaucracy professionalization dependsonaty professional norms thanapoliticisedone.This complimentary institutes,ade-politicised bureaucracy under differentcircumstances. Sinceprofessi (Riccucci 1995,Bowman of SpeakingTruthtoPower:HowProfessi Unsung Heroes:Federal ExecucratsMakingaDifference the KeatingFivecasebecame thes recognition recently. Forinstance, theprofessional beginning ofthe1990s,when‘incentiverevolu expediency torightness,heresy solving problems anddoingthing…Politics istotheprofessionsasambiguity totruth, rests uponspecializedknowledge,scienceand ‘There isabuilt-in animosity between th Similarly toSOPs,thepowerof If theargument aboutthepowerofprof et al 2004,Tonon2008). about an actor whosemotivations ssionalized bureaucracy sonnel policyregime’ factor. ofessional knowledgean thestrongerwelfare-enha ead ofimmediately taking them ing from thenatureofdoctoral pe ofpersonnelpolicyexisting ubject ofalleastthre professionalnorms islikely truebelief’(1982:118-119). rs topenetratethepublicgoodsproduction. e professionsandpolitics…Professionalism ’ 34 bureaucrats tolong-term organizationalgoals, erence intobureaucratic ways ofbureaucraticdecision-making, where essional norms quaintinthe1980s– sounded onalism Facilitates Credible Communication professionalnorms makesitmore difficultfor implies thatthestrengthofbothSOPsand welfare, andalsotaking into consideration ons andpoliticsarerivalryratherthan act ofWilliam andhiscolleaguesin K.Black rationality. Therearecorrectwaysof tion’ wasinitszenith,ithasgainedmore allowsfor amore consistentapplication of inpublicgoodsproductionisthatof e recent studies withquitetellingtitles: , d ethics.Professional The ProfessionalEdge, research,intheremaining of aredifferentfrom thoseof in agivenpolicy:thegreater ncing effectofSOPsand asan‘actionsguide’(as to haveadifferentstrength decision-making froma ethics requires a requires ethics and The Costs The Costs

CEU eTD Collection Skocpol 1985:127). and contrastedsharplywithth the ministry’s higherpositions. TheLabourDepartment became acenterofpolicy innovations British civil service legislation to bringpeople from work oftheLabourDepartment’s in reaction totheGreatDepressi also totheirlegitimate quests. bureaucrats may becomeirresponsivenotonlyto first andthefifthmost serious difficulty in rewarding abetter bureaucratic effort heads of847agenciesanddivisions in10Americ service law tosanction inadequate bureaucratic e Libecap (1994b) convincingly demonstrated that effort, therebyarguablypreventingtheachieve Having providedaplausibleexpl States 1.3.3 LimitationsofCivilService asaSolutionto best bureaucraticeffort. Although th constrained initscapacity to effort butalsotoabuse thepowerofstat tradeoff betweentwocornersolu its ownrent-extractingmotives.Inotherwords, of Leviathan’spropertiesasanac if politicians retainagreat dealofcontrol which areimportantforachievingso induce thebest possible bureaucraticeffort also exposesthelimitations ofcivilse producers of thebenefits,enhances theoccurrence between those actorsof asystem The firstconsiderablelimitation isthatcivi To sum up,‘reducedincentiveinte act onitsownprofit-maximizing mo e ‘stodgyconservatism’ ofother Weir andSkocpol(1985)reported on Britishpoliticians, becoming increasinglyfrustrated withthe tions: anactiveLeviathan,capab managerial problems. beenshieldedincivilservice, Having anation howade-politicized tive agent also enhances itscapacity toactmore decisively on bureaucracy, repeatedlytookadva ofinteractivesocialproduc e firstdesignhasthecapacity toyieldthebestoutcome (an cial welfare.Abetterbureaucrat rvice asawelfare-enhancing device. nsity’ (Frant 1996:378)integr over personneldecisions. However,theadvancement . Inasense,itdisablesLeviathan’s 35 theProblemofCredibleCommitmentinModern e for its own benefit, and a Leviathan, who is e foritsownbenefit,and aLeviathan,whois designinggovernmental in ment ofsocially-optimal output.Johnsonand l servicedoesnotinducethebestbureaucratic anddifficultyindiscipliningemployees asthe morally hazardousinfluence ofpoliticiansbut supervisors areseverelyconstrainedbycivil ffort andtorewardsuperiorone.Similarly, an states, surveyedby Elling(1986), ranked outsidethecivil service on fixed contracts to of sociallybeneficialoutcomes, thetheory bureaucracy, bycrea domestic departments (Weir and tion with moral hazard andthe an interestingexampleofhow tives butunabletoinduce the le toinducebestbureaucratic ntage ofthel ic effortiscertainlyinduced al tocivilservicedoesnot stitutions wefacea active oopholes of the oopholes ofthe ting barriers properties, CEU eTD Collection investment andhamper economic growth(Aidt to-day oversight.Indeedcorruptioniswidely other hand,civilserviceprovides and implementation, whichenablesthem totradeth realize theirselfishcalculus:ontheonehand,theypossesssignificantdiscretioninrule-making as wellpoliticians.Indeed,incivil servi production, butmerely relocated.Thisimplies that theorem isthatmoral hazardcannot befullyelimin and notnecessarilytoitsmaximum potential. probability of theoccurrence of socially benefici policies from itswelfare intentbyparticularistic reason tosettleonasolutionthatcontributes production orconvergeonthezero-effo most probable–more andmore unstable. If,however,Leviathansucceeds inacti interests), thecontinuou social production,inducesbest active Leviathaneffectively actsonfree ridemotiv bureaucratic career. compensation integraltocivil servicebrings unprecedented levelof honestywithinbureaucracy’ (2000: 316). Asystemofdeferred compensation withhighcostsof briberyc actions, itdoesgagbureaucraticselfishcalc 2002, Fisman andSvensson2007,Mauro1995).

Miller argues thatjust ascivilservicec Another considerable limitation of civilservice arising from Holmstrom’s impossibility are paid less than their true marginal than theirtrue are paidless Civilservants… compensation. instance ofdeferred is adramatic Civil service promotion, raises,andbenefici pay formakinga are rewarded toa firmopportunities for lifetime by commitment s presenceofLeviathan’srent-seekingmotives makes suchanoutcome bureaucraticeffortbutdoes them withalife-longemployment, exempt from day- effective participants withdraw from a rt Nashequilibrium. Inthelightofthis,thereisagood al retirement plans(2000:316). ce bureaucrats seem beingperfectly positioned to productivity early in their careers. They earlyintheir careers. They productivity 36 et al ulus. Acombinationofasystem ofdeferred perceived asoneofthe onstrains politiciansfr onviction promotes, whatMillercalls,‘an or rent seeking considerations and enhances the or rentseekingconsiderationsandenhancesthe to the prevention of the subversion of public to thepreventionofsubversionpublic al public policies, implemented may beslowly most of thematerials gains at theend of ng onitsself-interests,theworstoutcome is bureaucratsmayofmoralhazard becarriers e powersofthestatefor es ofthemembers ofa ated from asystem ofinterdependent social 2008, Del MonteandPapagni2001,Gaviria 2008, Del notactonits system ofinteractive social om welfare-undermining reasons that discourage reasons thatdiscourage system ofinteractive private gains;onthe own rent-seeking CEU eTD Collection reward tolongevity’ (752). proportional totheexpectedlongevityofmemb corrupt individuals’practices’si (1999) arguethatcareer and deferredlossesapossibilitytorejointh rewarding careerbyreceivingabr for bribery,arationalbureaucratmaynotwant – carriessubstantialimmediate anddeferredmaterial can perfectlyreconcile theconf fully eliminated fromasystem of international organizations–themessage ofMille 1990), improved civiccontrol(Dei actions ofbureaucrats– includingSOPs (Miller 970-971), namely: and alasting competence (EvansandRa solution oftheproblem ofadverseselectionby of moralhazardonthepartpoliticians(andbu • • • •

A briberyconviction–dismissal fr Although relevantliteraturepoint It has been argued thatade-p (Evans andRauch1999:752); skillful individuals,e.g. increa provides adegree of stability (especially atth public managers thatpositively affectsthebureaucratic output (Miller2000: 318); (Miller 2000:322). career), continuity and predicta of politicians ismoved awayfrom theirlawm motivating powerofprofessionalnorms the factthatundercivilservicebureaucratica prospects ofalong-tememployment facilita de-politicization ofentry isanecessary precond meritocratic recruitment en prospects ‘reducetherela interdependentsocialproducti nce thecostsofbreakingorga ibe (unlessthebribe is aslarg oliticized bureaucracy not only mitigates theperverse effects ables theselectionofleas ninger andMpuga2004),theroleofmass media and lict of self-interested individuals ininteractive social ses the qualityofhuman capitalingovernmental agencies s atseveraladditional mechan bility thatis appreciated by uch 1999:752,Miller2000:318,320,325,Rauch1995: om office,oftenwithoutapossi 37 and expectations’ (M and expectations’ 2000), publicservicemotivation (PerryandWise to jeopardizeherprospectsforalong-term and encouraging thedevelopment ofhuman capital e service). Inthe same reaucrats alike), italso contributes toapositive ership intheorganizationandexpected r’s synthesisisthat tive attractivenessofthe quickreturnfrom e end of thepoliticalte nd politicalterms ofservicedonotcoincide losses. Under acredible threat of dismissal aking dutiestoreelectionor apost-political tes job-specificinvestments onbehalfof ition fortheriseof t minimally knowledgeableand on andnoorganizational solution nizational norms are ‘directly nizational norms are e astocompensate allcurrent investors and entrepreneurs investorsandentrepreneurs iller 2000:320) isms thatmay blockselfish bility to returntoservice vein,EvansandRauch moral hazardcannotbe rm whentheattention ‘the constrainingand CEU eTD Collection interactive socialproduction,Miller a de-politicizedbureaucracy forsocial welfare. Approachingtheissueincontextof century oldnormative claim ofMaxWeberandAmer Miller’s theory ofinteractiv 1.4 Conclusion in credibly constraining rent-seeking interests organizations. However,inaworl the overlooked ‘politicseliminati act onpoliticians’instructions in showing howindividualelements ofcivilservicecr problem ofpoliticians’credible engaging inrent-seekingbeha improve bureaucraticcompetenceandgeneratebeha previous research thatsaw the politicians’ moralhazardandadvocat hazard. Indoingso,heexposesthemagnitude of circumstances, Miller looks for solutions that that thebureaucrat is notgoi that thepoliticianisno rent-extracting motives ofbothpoliticiansandbureaucrats.Onecanneverbecompletely certain achieves ratherpessimistic conclu intrinsic propertiesofthepartiesthatareinvo efficiency’ (2000:290)–onbehalfofbothpolit persistent presenceofmoralhazard–‘anince day processofpublicgoods productionby powers ofpoliticians,civilservice reduces thenumber of‘technical’pointsentryintheday-to- that isinvariably presentinasystem ofinte Miller, however, providesonlyabr t goingtomanipulate theru e socialproduction provides arigorous positive explanation fora vior (Evans andRauch1999,Ra value ofcivilservice predominan ng touseherdiscretionfor commitment. Thecontributionof ng’ propertiesofthe day-to-day policy-making. Particul d ofsecond-bestsolutions,civil sions thatsocialwelfarecannot findsthatthefunctioningof es civilserviceasa oad conceptualization of civilservice asasolution tothe opportunistically minded politicians. rdependent socialproducti would reducethenegative 38 on behalfofpowerholders lved inasystem ofso les totheadvantageof ntive totake actionsth icians andbureaucrats.Havingexploredthe eate aset of incentives for bureaucrats not to vioral norms thatcrea ican Progressivistsaboutthedesirabilityof the threattosocialwelfarecontained in civil service’s admission stage. We argue corrective tosuch.This uch 1995,RauchandEvans2000). the stateischar be perfectly protectedfrom the service playsanimportant role self-enrichment. Underthese tly interms of itsabilityto ar attentionhasbeenpaid to thischapter hasbeen in on. Bylimiting thestaffing herself and her group or herself andhergroupor cial production, Miller cial production,Miller consequences ofmoral andbureaucratsalike tes intangiblecostsof at aredestructiveto is in contrast to isincontrastto acterized bythe CEU eTD Collection recognized asacriticalissuen opportunism importance isofparamount fortheoverallwellbeingofsocietyandshallbe Mogiliansky separation ofpowerandpartydiscipline,wa ‘weakly institutionalized democracy’, whereasystem ofchecksandconstraints,such asthe this massive changeinthe‘rulesofgame’ relevant literatureastheultimate sourceofre from acommand tomarket econom where ‘doubletransition’ amplified thepoliticians’moral hazard.Ontheonehand,change careers, making bureaucratic decisi mechanism ofcivilserviceasit that thepubliccharacter institutionalization ofade-politi the dissertation attempts toanswer thequest and small businessgrowth inaseries of OLSa regional governments. Wethenanalyzetheimpact bureaucracy throughexpertevalua decisions inRussianpublic agencies andevaluates provinces inwhichthisorganizationalstru institutionalized toagreaterex straightforward: thoseofRussia’sregions nomenclatura, avariety ofpatronage,toade-poli Russia launchedtheadministrative reform, ai Miller’s analysis is of special importanceMiller’s analysisisofspecial The remaining ofthedissertationassessesth This dissertation subjects Miller’s theorytoem et al 2007,Stone-Weiss2001). Insuchacontextthe problem ofpolitical of theadmission isanimportant elem the designofpublicagencies. cized bureaucracy than others’? cized bureaucracythanothers’? diminishes the politicians’ ability tent, exhibitgreaterratesof on-making lesssusceptibleto tions ofpersonnelpolicypractic y createdtheabundanceofrents,which isconsidered bythe cture hasbeenless fullyincorporated. nt-seeking behavior(seeMauro1995).Ontheother, s underdeveloped(Golosov1997,2003;Lambert- 39 where ade-politicizedbureaucracy hasbeen ion ‘Why some did regionsgofurtherinthe was takingplaceinthepoliticalenvironment of nd 2SLSregressions.The concludingchapterof for post-Communist countriessuchasRussia, ming toconvertitsstatebureaucracyfrom e formal-legal framework governingpersonnel of‘realmerit’ ona de-facto ticized type.Ourem pirical test inarelevantmilieu, asin1995 institutionalization of ade-politicized ent ofthewholewelfare-enhancing economic development thanthose the politicians’ moral hazard. tomake and breakbureaucratic es inasample ofRussia’s ggregate economic growth pirical propositionis CEU eTD Collection amended. 2 1 Not onlydiditregulatethepub major legislativeactsinthesphereofc Fundamentals oftheStateServiceRussian Federation In 1995thefirstlegislatur 2.1 ChoosingOneTypeofPersonnelRegime as beinglargelyde-politicized. chapter isthat from aformal-legal point ofvi reform isdiscussedandcompared withthat in Chapter1.Finally,thepersonnelmanagement law isassessed withthehelpof theanalytical are discussed ingreatdetail, andthe degreeof Fundamentals central partofthechapterfocusesonth constitute thephenomenon ofpublicbureaucracy– 1990s, comparingfunctionsandem discusses thedifferenttypesofstatepoststhat a de-politicized–civilservicetypeofpe called major initiative inthefieldof This chapterdiscussesRussia’spublicbur law (February 1, 2005) it had not been subjected to any meaningful amendment. It is interesting to note thatfrom time law tonote the the Itisinteresting The legislaturethat operated during ASSESSING THELEGALCHARACT On theFundamentalsofState RUSSIA’S PUBLICBUREAUCRACYREFORM,1996-2006: . Legalprovisionsregulating e ofpost-SovietRussia

personnelmanagement the1990s 1991-1993 was elected in 1990 under the Soviet electoral law, though heavily heavily law,though electoral Soviet the under in1990 elected was 1991-1993 lic bureaucracy’s human resource POLICY REGIME POLICY ployment terms ofposts Service oftheRussianFederation came into force (January 1996) until it was substituted a by new itwas came until substituted force into (January 1996) Chapter 2 Chapter 2 ountry’s publicadministration 10years. foralmost eaucracy reforms 2000.Assessingthe of1995and the hiring,firingandpromotionofpublicmanagers ew Russia’sbureaucracy today canbecharacterized framework of formal politicaldiscretion, discussed e personnelpolicyregimeestablishedbythe of the1990speriod.Thecoreargument ofthis 40 existedinRussia’ssystemofgovernancethe rsonnel policywaschoseninRussia.Then,it formal politicaldiscretion containedinthe1995

component ofPutin’spublicadministration ER OF RUSSIA’S PERSONNEL ER OFRUSSIA’S with twoothercategoriesofstateposts.The 1 passedthelawFZ-119,calledOn . Thelawhadbecome oneofthe – thecivilserviceactof1995, category“C”–thosethat management system, italso –itfirstexploreswhy

2

CEU eTD Collection personnel policyregime. firing andpromoting careerbureaucrats,whichha domains of governance.Mostim groups ofstateoffices,andindoingsoitdrew boundariesbetween politicalandbureaucratic 4 3 Romania, Albania(1999), Sl same time Poland andtheBalticcountries, as reform intheCentralandEasternEuropean regi in Table2.1). contributed tothecreationofanentiresystem nomenklatura sentiments, sharedbymostofthemember situation inRussiawas,however,diffe of relations inthestate apparatus, 1995 law,explainsthatthemajor aim ofthere Vladimir Yuzakov,achampion ofcivilservicerefo selecting, andself-servingfrat the 1990sSoviet region toeconomic disaster.Inth of the a de-politicizedtypeofbureaucr of newtrendsinWestern Europe,namely theNewPublicManagement’ (2007:345). ideology andpractice’,thepressure of CentralandEasternEurope(CEE):‘areacti service versionoftheorganiza Gyorgy Gajduscheksummarizedther therefore, adopted revised laws in 1998, 1999 and 2000 respectively. respectively. 2000 and 1999 lawsin 1998, revised adopted therefore, intact. Service Having adopted civil service laws in the mid 1990s, Poland, Latvia and Lithuania failed to implement them and, and, to implement them failed Lithuania and Latvia midPoland, lawsin1990s, the service civil adopted Having on 27.05.2003 FZ-58 Although personal dependence In RussiaasinotherCEE countriesthepref formally introduceda new system of nomenklatura Russia hasbeenoneofthefrontrunnerspersonnelpolicyforpublicbureaucracy 3 The1995lawoutlinedthescopeofauthor typeofpublicbureaucracythateven nomenklatura [emphasis ismine] ofasubordina On the System of State Governance

ovakia (2001)and theCzech RepublicandSloveniain2002. tional designforpublicbureaucracy ernity… thathadplungedthena which wasbasedontheparty-state acy. Thischoicewasprimarily determined byastrongnegation e wordsofEugeniaAlbats,aRussi portantly, thelawintroducedru oftheEuropeanUnionand‘thelackin-depthknowledge waswidelyseenbythenati state governance, themajor provisio easons, speltoutin red fromthatoftheCEEcountries. ofgovernancepost-SovietRussia(summarized 41 after Hungary(1990/1992),butbeforeBulgaria, on. Itadopteditscivilservicelawataboutthe form was to “modernizeform thewholesystem wasto of on tothepreviouscommunist spoils’system erence inpersonnelpolic d distinctive properties of ade-politicized rm inRussiaandaprin s ofRussia’selitea and FZ-79 on 27.07.2004 on 27.07.2004 and FZ-79 the literature,for theadoptionofacivil ity andemployment te on(her)superi tually broughtthecountriesof tion intopoverty…’(2004:5). on as‘self-perpetuating,self- in post-Communist countries inpost-Communist countries les andprocedureforhiring, ns of the 1995 law have remained an investigative journalist, in nomenklatura …thesystem y designwasgivento nd thegeneralpublic

Despite stronganti- or” (2005:17).The cipal drafterofthe terms fordifferent On the State Civil 4

CEU eTD Collection portion oforiginallyconceived f Roskadri Training (knownas reorganize CivilServiceDepa November 1991.Inapresidentialdecree(No Civil ServiceDepartment, establishedbyRSFSR structural unitwithinRussia’s Yeltsin signaled this position as earlyasin November 1991,whenhe,infact,abolished a government work-experiencedexecutives,organizers,andleaders’(Yeltsin1994:126-127). government completely new,young of reforms. Inhisownwords,Yeltsin’sposit comprised thebulkofpublicbureaucracy)and managers wouldbeperceivedasathreatby apparatchik privileges in1986-1988(Skiner nomenklatura He hadnostakeinconducting bureaucracy (Albats2004:5),Yeltsinwasfairlydi anti- 91, whenmanypoliticiansofemerging post-Soviet apparatus hadneverbeenpartofBorisYeltsin’ hasneverbeenenacted(Kozbane USSR, which governmental workinggroup,formedaslate 965), publicadministration reform hadneverb become an importantissueandstrongproponent for example, Hungary,where‘wellbeforethere of theCommunistpartyS politicization of thestateapparatus. Russia’s reformers andthere was alsostrong political opposition to theidea of radical de- in the1990s,needforfundament nomenklatura sentiments, activelysupportedtheidea Unlike some oftheCEEcountries,reform ofthe stateapparatushadnotbeenontheagenda , recollectedthat , BorisYeltsinunderstoodthatamassive in credentials werealread Roskadri Roskadri ). BekovandSkobeyev, thenthe government, responsibleforthec rtment intoaMainDepartme oviet Union’sreform wingprior unctions thatclashedwith the et al a large-scalede-po ’s ‘functionshadtobe matched with itsnewname… A al bureaucraticreform wasatbe y strongbecauseofhiscampaign againstthe and boldpeople,Istillconsid 2007:205-224).Atthesame asanexperienced time, ion wasthefollowing: ‘While bringing intothe the oldSovietbureaucracy(whichin1990s 42 s reform packageeither.Evenasearly1990- s ofreform hademerged’ (Meyer-Sahling 2001: 1989,drafted aLaw onCivilServiceinthe nko 2005:4-5).Aradicalchangeofthestate 242 of 28 November 1991)Yeltsin ruled to 242 of28November gime change in1990,civilservicereform had sinterested intheissue CouncilofMinisters een anissuefortheSovietleadership.A Russia, tryingtogainpoliticalrecognitionon would eventuallyadverselyaffectthecourse liticization ofbur flux ofmeritocratic ofestablishingade-politicized nt forCivilServicePersonnel new name hadtobedropped at onduct ofbureaucraticreform – to theregime change.Unlike, head andadeputy of st ofsecondarypriorityfor ered itpossibletousein of bureaucraticreform. resolution N 16 of 23 resolution N16of23 eaucracy. Hisanti- ally chosenpublic nomeklatura’s CEU eTD Collection Alexander Shokhin were fierce opponents of bureaucratic reform (Bekov 2001). 188). 2003: Kozbanenko 76-81; 60-63, 2003: Skobeyev and (Bekov experts the UK – and Canada from Germany, also Principles of CivilServiceinthe RussianFederation submitted to Russia’spresident in July 1992acomprehensive document, entitled 6 5 enforcing system (World Bank2006a:5-6). had alsocontributed totheproliferation of thebelief that the market waspredominantly aself- neo-liberal economists, whoworkedasadvisers completely al overlooked(Blacket importance of asuitableinstitutional infras allocation. Therefore, the reformers’ focus wason privatization andprice liberalization, whilethe were theheydayofideathatmarket wa went hand-in-handwithastrongbeliefinthe‘i private andprofessional,ofRu was astrongconvictionthatthenewRussianaut bureaucratic reform. formation, andpeakedinanarmed conflictin two branchesofgovernment, whichoccurredin however, hadmade verylittleprog December 1992 toSeptember 1993,whenpresident presented tobothchambersoftheSupreme S largely inthespiritofade representing both legislative andexecutive branch issues ofpersonneltraining. course offivedaystheagendabureaucraticreform shrankfrom alargeinstitutional reform to the stageofapproval thenewagency’sStat reformers. sufficient politicalsupportwasth Asthe head of The Principles were developed in cooperation with abou It shouldbenotedthatdespiteitslimited scopeofauthority Another important reasonwhytheissueof 6 Oneofthedimensions ofthatintellect Roskadri remembers such high-profile figures in Yeltsin’s government as Egor Gaidar and and Gaidar asEgor government in remembersYeltsin’s figures high-profile such

-politicized bureaucracy.On ssian citizens(Yuzakov2005:18).Theseanti-totalitarianfeelings e factthatitrancountertoth ress onthedraft. Itisclear th 2000;KrasnovandSatarov2004) nvisible hand’ofthemarket.The1990sinRussia 43 t 70 Russian and international from– mainly t international France, Russianbut and 70 ute’ (inJanuary1992)( totheRussiangovernment intheearly1990s, tructure, includingpub October1993,adverselyaffectedthefateof oviet –Russia’sparliament. However,from horities shouldintrudelessintothelife,both es ofpower,drafteda s thebestavailableinstrument ofresource the very beginning of Russia’s statehood’s the verybeginningofRussia’sstatehood’s . ual mindset wasanti-totalitarianism. There 5 Yeltsin terminated it, public bureaucracy re Basedonthisdocument, aworkinggroup, 24 November1992,thedraftwas e intellectualmindsets ofRussia’s at abitterconfrontationbetween . TheinfluenceofWestern Roskadri 2003: 45).Thus,inthe lic bureaucracy,was law onCivil Service, theSupreme Soviet, form didnotgain developedand Fundamental CEU eTD Collection completely lackinginRussiaofthe1990sasel knowledge oforganizationalalternativesforcivi have reinforcedtheanti-civil service camp’s suitable contra-arguments. Suitably adjusted, politicians. Thisoppositioncouldhavebeenmo reflecting the existence ofseriousopposition toth July 31,1995.Therefore,thefinalversionofth house ofparliament andbythepresidentbefore Consequently, itrequiredsevenhearingsbyth comments suggestedvariousmechanisms ofgr more than700comments,includingopinionsfr of thelawwasputforwardforapublicdiscu State Service profile politicians, representi Fundamentals oftheStateService LDPR ofVladimir Zhirinovskyontheother,di liberal democratic 8 7 up theircontrolrightsover of theday–many ofwhom weremembers oftheS bureaucracy alsoexisted.Numerous members of parliament, governorsandotherpowerholders could effectivelycampaign fortheintroduction ofafull-bodiedmerit administration. political leaders,whowouldopenlysupportthe group couldneithergarneramajority oftheparl parliament, most likely inorder toincrease the figures Representatives oftwootherfractions–whowe called called and pro-democratic movement, called S. Openyshev from the Agrarian Party and S. Shapovalov from the Party of People’s Unity and Accord. Accord. and Unity People’s of Party from the S.Shapovalov and Party Agrarian from the S. Openyshev O. Zastroznaja, V. Pokhmelkin, B. Titenko, V. Yuzakov – representing an umbrella anti-Communism,pro-market Russia It isverysuggestiveth On theother hand,opposition totheplans fordramatic de-politicizationofthestate 8 –joinedtheworkinggroupjustat , with broad pro-democratic standings, O. Mironov – the Communist Party of the Russian Federation. wasoneofthemost troubledinthehistor Yabloko andtheDemocratic PartyofRu thepublic bureaucracy.T at themajor politicalpartiesof

ng onlythreeoutofeleven Russia’s Choice in1993-1995.TheFZ-119’swork ; I. Murav’ev, V. Ryzkov – a loose fraction in the inthe first fraction aloose Duma, V.Ryzkov – ; I.Murav’ev, sewhere inCEEcountries om 57regions(Yuzakov2005: 44 the NewPublicManagement’s approachcould ssion inJune2004,theworkinggroupreceived e StateDumaandrejectionsbyboththeupper e lawwasmuchweakerthaninitiallyproposed, positioninthedebate l service,namely PublicManagement, New was chances ofpassing the law. Thus,theworking re successfulhaditbeen the lawwasfinallysign eater politicalcontroloverpersonnelpolicy. e ideaoftakingthe staffingpowersawayfrom iament’s political forces,norattractpowerful concept ofade-politic d nottakepartinthedevelopment ofthe re also far from beingsignificant political oviet elite–werenotprepared tofullygive hus, thepassageof stage oftheintroductiondraftto y ofthefirstDuma. Whenthefirstdraft ssia ontheonehandandpopulist the firstDuma, asdiversethe fractions in the first Duma. ing groupconsistedoflow- (Bossaert and Demmke (BossaertandDemmke ed byBorisYeltsinon . However, sufficient . However,sufficient ized bureaucracyand betterequippedwith Fundamentals ofthe 20). Most of these 20).Mostofthese 7

CEU eTD Collection 9604), personnel trainingandre-training(asfor TACIS’s objectives.Instead,inthe1990s from theEUfinancialsupport,hadintroduc the period(Commission oftheEuropeanCommuniti (European Commission 1999).Russia,asthesingle package ofTACISwasspenton ‘public administ Baltic states) and Mongolia. programTACIS –a oftechnicalassistanceforthe The EuropeanUnionhasindeedsupportedpublic compared tothe pressureexertedontheaccession 9 overall impact ofTACISontheintroduction future dissemination as‘goodpractice’.Therefore, helped neithertocoordinatethereform, noracc projects weredispersedamong allthreelevelsof Inaddition, relevant TACIS (interview withA.Zhdanovsky). subject topatronagedistribution very participationinTACIS’s projects,especi value tothe de-politicization of compromise’ theactualpowerconfiguration. (Kozbanenko2005:33),reflecting 2003: 9-14,Gajduschek2007).Theen country, theanti-civilservice importance forRussia’sreformers. Giventhestrengthofanti-n in Russiawasundermined bythefactthatvery possible impactonthedevelopmen force inRussiathemid 1990s.Althoughanti- organizational designofpublicbureaucracyinCEE 2000). 2000). Regulation (Council 2006 and 2000 between million and €3,138 2000:3) Commission (European 1999 and 1991 The cumulative funding of TACIS between 1991 and 2006 2006 and TACISbetween 1991 of funding cumulative The Although theEuropeanUnion’sinfluencehasal In summary, twooutofthreereasonsfor

which beingisolatedfrom otherinitiatives 9

In1991-1999almost 15percent camp couldnotsustainitscase Russia’sbureaucracy.Infact,in t of afully de-politicized a acted law,therefore, instance, projectsEDRUS 9409,9517,9303,9509and of civilserviceinthe1990swaslow. 45 ally studytourstotheEUcountries,wasoften umulate theexperienceof governance–national,re European Union’saidwasmostly focused tion ofameritocratic bureaucracybeenamong reached almost €7.5 billion: €4,226 million between million between €4,226 almost billion: €7.5 reached states through thepolic issueofbureaucraticre ration reform, socialservicesand education’ countries of the former USSR (except forthe USSR(except countries oftheformer biggestrecipientofTACISfundsthroughout the adoptionof acivilserviceconcept of nomenklatura sentiments werestrong,their of administrative reform, addedlittleorno countries, identifiedbytheliterature,wereat despitesubstantialfinancialresources,the administration reform through inRussia es 2000:30)couldcertainlyhavebenefited so beenevidentinRussia,itcannotbe was‘withinthera nd professionalpublicbureaucracy byopenlyarguingforafully some ofRussia’sregionsthe of the€4.2billionfinancial omenklatura y of‘Europeanization’. form wasofsecondary gional andlocal–that reform policies for its nge ofapolitical feelings inthe

on CEU eTD Collection Statistical Service 2007: 56) employees of total in Statistical Service2007: account workers group auxiliary of this the of At 2000 end statepower. of execution to the pertain do not duties whose such, and couriers as typists, drivers, positions and can,therefore, include bothof them. can seethatitdoes not differen 1990s, comparing theirfunctionsinthepo discusses differenttypesofst of the21 public bureaucracyinthe 1990s,itsimpact onthefa While theEU’s involvement renderedaverylimite 10 range ofdutiespertainingtothe look atthe definitionof Gimpelson 2004:93).However,notal categories of stateposts asbureaucratic office municipal levelsofauthority(Tables 2.1,2.2).Th each ofwhichcouldbelongtolegislative,executive system ofgovernance.FZ-119esta order toidentifythephenomenon ofRussia’sp This sectiondissectsthestructureofRussia’s 2.2 PublicBureaucracyintheStructur service properties,italsoallowedforacertain sides couldbefoundintheFundamentalsofStateService were weak,themomentum waswithpro-merit fo members toarguetheircaseusi politicized bureaucracy. Theanti-c In addition to posts that wield state authority, there isa there stateauthority, that wield to posts addition In The conceptofstateposts ( st centuryremains tobeseen. state post,whichisapositioninoneofth

ate poststhatexiste tiate betweenelected (political) ng modernpublicadministration ed for between 25 (Brym and Gimpleson 2004: 96) and 30 per cent (Federal (Federal cent per 30 and 96) 2004: Gimpleson and (Brym 25 for between ed discharge oftheauthor gosudarstvennaja dolznost’ ivil servicecamp wasalsoweakened bythe inability of its blished threecategoriesofstat

l statepostscanbeclassified the executive branch at all levels of authority. authority. of atalllevels branch the executive licy processandemployment terms. e of Russia’s Governance inthe1990s e ofRussia’sGovernance degreeofpoliticalc system ofgovernance, 46 considerable group of workers of workers group considerable ublic bureaucracy–the s ofdiminishing managerial level(Brym and 10 d supporttoacivilservicemodel ofRussia’s rces. Evidence ofconfrontationbetween the

d inRussia’ssystem ofgovernanceinthe andjudicialbranchesoffederal, regionalor e existing literature tendstotreatallthree te ofbureaucraticreform inthefirstdecade ity ofthatorgan(Article1,FZ-119), we ) isabuildingblockofRussia’s : althoughithadpronouncedcivil and non-elected (administrative) discourse. Althoughbothsides e organsofstatepowerwitha e posts–“A”,“B”and“C”, aspublicbureaucracy.Ifwe ontrol overpersonnelpolicy. established byFZ-119,in in the state apparatus, such such stateapparatus, the in subject understudy.It CEU eTD Collection posts of category “A”. “A”. category of posts 11 Source: ROSSTAT, Federal State StatisticsService(2007: 56) legislature, thegovernor, vice- own catalogueofregionalpostscategory“A fell underthecategoryoffedera prime minister, members oflegislature,regional by theConstitution, charters ofth Presidential decree No 32 on January 11, 1995 1995 11, January on 32 No decree Presidential Table 2.2EmployedinRussia’sStateOrgansoftheExecutiveBranchPower:1995, Consider, forinstance, statepostsofcategory Grades/Ranks of“C” Posts Categories of State Posts Levels ofAuthority AuthorityBranches of 2006 2000 1995

The Basis forClassifi Established byFZ-119 Table 2.1Russia’sSystemof 2000, 2006,includingauxiliary staff (thousands/percent) Federal level in Federal level

30,3 (2.9%) 33,1 (2.5%) 33,8 (3.6%) governors andheadsof the indivi cation Moscow l statepostsofcategory“A”. e regionsandmajor laws.Suchpostsas president, federal On theFundamentalsofStateService On the State Posts of the Russian Federation • • • C) B) • • 3) 4) most5) senior level A) • • 1) most1) junior (entry) level 2)

47

State Governance,1995-2003,

localmunicipal or regional judicial rule-making and implementation non-elected posts (career bureaucrats): assistance inlaw-making non-elected(political posts appointees): federal inregions(‘federal regions’) executive making) the content of public policies (law- electedand non-elected posts:defining federal inMoscow legislative ”, normally includingmembers oftheregional chief executives,ministers federal andjudges Main GroupsofStatePosts “A”. Thiscategory included postsestablished Federal level in Federal level 374,4 (36.4%) 616,1 (45.8%) 382,4 (40.4%) regions 11 Similarly, eachprovince hadits dual departments oftheregional (‘federal federal’) Regional and local defines a listof defines full 624,8 (60.7%) 695,5 (51.7%) 529,0 (56%) authorities

CEU eTD Collection gubernatorial posts were also filled directly by the the by president. gubernatorial posts directly were also filled 13 12 throughout themajority ofcate is aprerogative of Russia’s president. Thisfunction – Constitution makes itclearthat takingmajor strate the generalguidelinesofinternalandfo according to theConstitution,oneof theprimary responsibilities ofRussia’spresident is is that they playedaleading rolein defining th particularly theuseofnotion‘execution’ for theexecutionofstatepower(Table2.3) compared topostsofcategories“B”a concerned withthe‘direct governance. Thus,accordingtoArticle1.1.1of authority ofindividualposts Moreover, adetailedanalysisofFZ-119andot beyond theboundaryofpublicbureaucracy, which by made bythe presidentand/orparliament. positions National AuditOfficeare Central BankandElecti ambassadors andpermanent representativesin purpose ofthisdissertationwe president, members ofparliament and regional of stateposts of category “A”isthatitincluded bothelected andnon-elected positions. The government. political appointment fornon-el these posts wasdetermined bythelogicof polit were essentially political. Thepolitical nature of addition, postsofcategory“A”we governmental organizati prime minister. president, the parliament and both to Since February 2005 regional chief executives have been appointed by the president. Before 1995 most of the The relative importance of posts of The presenceofelectedpostsinthiscateg 12 Inaddition,therewerepostsofcategory on the post belongs to. Forinstance, formally [emphasis ismine –MN]dischargeoftheauthority stateorgans’,

however in reality legislature has had inreality legislature averythe littleinfluence over however the of work category “A”is determined bythe fo category “A”,suggests that“A” gory “A”posts(exceptionsbeing auditorsand ected ones.Indeed,appointments to“A2”postsareat full on Commission, theProsecutorGe shall refertothem as“A1”. re notonlythehighesttierin (hereafterreferredtoas“A2”),appointment towhichare nd “C”,whichareonlyresponsiblefor 48 of state power, the essence of category “A” posts of statepower,theessencecategory“A”posts reign policiesofthest e contentofpublicpolici chief executives wereelected posts, andforthe . Whilst thelanguageoflawisunclear, this tier stems from thefact thatincumbency of ics: electoral competition for elected postsand her legalstatutes,whichdefinethescopeof gic decisions inforeign anddomesticpolicies ory undoubtedlyindicatesthatitissituated ternational organizations,Chairmen ofthe FZ-119, statepostsofcategory“A”were “A” atmunicipalleve definition isofanon-elected character. defining publicpolicies–isreplicated Russian primeministers shall be accountable rmal andinformal ‘weight’ of the posts representedthetoptierof the system ofgovernance,but 13 Judges,federalministers, neral, andauditorsatthe ate (Article80.3).The es. Sufficetosaythat, l. Astrikingfeature making provision the like).In defining

CEU eTD Collection for most of public managers (Lewis 2005, 2008; Meyer-Sahling 2006, 2008; Sotiropoulos 2004). 2004). Sotiropoulos 2006, 2008; Meyer-Sahling 2005, 2008; (Lewis managers most public of for personnel management at the senior echelons of public ad countrie In bureaucracy. professional public and politicized service assenior civil known positions agroup of match not a unique feature of Russia’s system of governance. Most of the “A2” posts of the executive branch of authority which accounted for2.5percentofallstatepo 2004:93,99). offices (BrymandGimpelson to year 2000,postsofcategory“A”amounted category “A” essentiallyare,in 14 year 2000,therewereabout19,000suchoffices inthe and conditions. Aidesandadvisorsare most typicalpostsof thecategory “B”.Attheendof the incumbents –determines of“A”posts boththescopeoftheir authority andemployment terms individuals occupying“A”posts(Article1.1.2).This nature of“B”posts– differ from eachother. Thus,thepurpose ofthe pos formally belongingtothesame legalcategory, the subordinatenature oftheseoffices,compar ‘providing’ orsupportingfunctionstotheholdersof“B”and providing forthedischargeofauthorityorgansstatepower”(Artic 1995 lawbringsthem togetherunderthenotionof 1995 31, July of Law N Federal 119-FZ Source: state postsattheregional level) al discretion oftheincumbents oftheelectedposts Category of state post It should be noted that the existence of administrative po ofadministrative existence that the benoted Itshould A C B

In contrast to the positions of category “A”, “B” and “C” posts are strictly non-elected. The In contrasttothepositionsofcategory“A”, “B”and“C”postsarestrictlynon-elected.The Table 2.3LegalDefinitions oftheAuthorityStatePosts,stipulated byFZ-119 Article 1.1.2 1.1.3 1.1.1 Assistance toindividuals– thestatepostsofcategory“A” Assistance incumbents of Direct dischargeoftheauthority of thestate the posts,establishedby Discharge and provision ofDischarge and theauthority ofstateposts otherthanthose and majorcharters and Constitution, regional federallaws established bytheConstitution, regiona

the languageofthisdissertation, one ortogetherwiththelegislature. On the Fundamentals of the State Service of the Russian Federation about33,000,including12,000non-elected that can be found in many countries with largely de- with largely many in countries that can be found 49 ministration coexists with civil service with civil service coexists personnel practices ministration : most oftenbythepresident(orgovernorfor sts, appointments to which are subject to will,is aresubject political which to sts, appointments ed tothepositions ofcategory “A”.Although sts (Brym andGimpelson 2004:99).Normally s as diverse as US, Spain or Hungary politically informed s as informed or asUS,Spain diverse Hungary politically the postsofcategories“B”and“C”critically Scope ofAuthority state service itions ofcategory “B”is executive branchofau “C” positions,thelawunderlined l chartersandmajorfederallaws –“professionalpublicactivity, powerholders. Attheendof 14 le 2.1). Byallocating Therefore,postsof thority atalllevels, todirectly assist assisting the

CEU eTD Collection research. category “B”comprise thatpartofRussia’spublic bureaucracywhichisnotinthefocusofthis anything, dealwiththerule-making andimplemen enjoy responsibilities,relatingtothe “B” arenon-electedpositions, theyareinessen politicians withalargeamount ofauthorityov (Article 2.2).Inotherwords,asfarposts upper boundaryofthetenurefor“B not onlyinselectingbutalsodism individual mustattain soasto employees, it is sufficient tonote thatFZ-119 In ordertoappreciatethehighdegreeofcontrol positions ofcategory “B”isatthediscretion of neither dotheypossessanyrule-makingauthorit policy definition.Theyarenotinvolvedinth aides andadvisersprovideorgani category “C” wereexpertise-based “B” posts,whichwere functionally attached totheincumbents of “A”offices, positions of specificity ofthejurisdiction ofthestateorgan knowledge andskills,stemming from thefunctiona of thejobdescriptionposts bureaucracy (Kerwin2003;PetersandPierre2003: 1- and implementation dutiesofthepolicy-making pr bottom (Article6.1)–undoubtedly federal ministries, regionalandmunicipal administrations atthetop,to range ofthepostsca “A” posts,positions ofcategory “C”donotwieldthe authorityto define of “B”positions(providefordischarge),posts definition of thepowersof“A”pos 1.1.3).Althoughthislegalnormand provisionoftheirauthority’(Article resemblesthe Finally, postsofcategory“C”arethose‘estab tegory “C”–from deputyministers beconsideredfora“B”office.Powerholdershave‘freehands’ ofcategory“C”wasthenotion zational, information andanalytic issing theircabinet members. The ts (discharge of theauthority) andthe definition of thepowers posts. Inordertooccupy a“C indicates thatthese shaping ” poststotheterm inoffice ofcategory“B”wereconcerned,FZ-119endowed ofpublicpolicies’contentandonlymarginally, if er personneldecisions. B 50 individuals,occupying“A”posts(Article 21.7). they belongedto(Article 6.2.).Therefore,unlike e implementation phase ofthepolicyprocess; that powerholderswieldoverthisgroupofstate category“C”differfrombothofthose.Unlike ce bureaucraticposts. However,becausethey specifies noqualificati y. The1995 lawstipulates thatentrytothe tation phasesofthepolicyprocess,posts ocess, whicharekeyprerogativesofpublic lished bythestatebodiesfordischarge l peculiaritiesofi 2). Itisimportant tonotethatattheheart posts arechargedwiththerule-making and headsofdivisionswithinthe ” positionanindividual should al supporttothei of theincumbent theyserve expertise –aset Fundamentals ecause postsofcategory ndividual postsandthe front-desk clerks atthe on standardsthatan publicpolicies. The only limit the r superiorsin of particular CEU eTD Collection regional and municipal bureaucracies in Russia in the 1990s consisted of 12 ‘steps’ (2003: 111). 15 governing bureaucratic personnel policy,deve purpose weapplytheanalytical ultimately, todetermine theextent ofde-poli determine theamount ofauthoritythatpoli Next, weturntotheanalysisofpers 2.3 AnalyticalFrameworkof posts ofcategory“C”,whichisdiscussedin It isthenotionofexpertise,whichgaverise based professionalactivityinthe senior level). according to therankofpostinasystem, rangingfrom 1(entry, most junior level) to5(most relevant officialduties’(Art andothermajorknowledge oftheConstitution legisl (Article 6.3.1-6.3.2).Anothertwowerethe were twooutoffourcorequalifyingrequireme have had‘arelevantprofessionaleducation’(A of lowpoliticaldiscretion. as thefollowingsections ofthechapterargue, were analysis focusesexclusivelyonthisgroupofgovern state postsoftheexecutivebran bulk ofRussia’spublic bureaucracy –atthe end of 2000theyaccountedforabout96 percent of making andimplementation stages of thepolicy Russia’s publicbureaucracysinc of therolethattheseposts playinthepolic “A2”, “B”and“C”arenon-elected Asingle rank could have had more than one post. Magun In sum, ofthefourcategoriesstatepos 15 Thus,theroleofpostscategory“C”asstipulatedbyFZ-119isexpertise- icle 6.3.2-6.3.3).Theactualvalueof ch ofauthorityatalllevels FormalPoliticalDiscretion area ofrulemaking andimplem e onlypostsofthiscategorywe and, therefore,formally bureaucraticposts.However,inview approach for theassessment offormal-legal frameworks onnel policyarrangements underFZ-119soasto greater detailinthesectionsthatfollow. to aspecificpersonnelpolic y process,onlypostsofcategory“C”represented ticization ofRussia’spubl loped byJan-Hinrik 51 ticians wieldedoverpersonneldecisionsand, length ofjob-relatedexperienceandagood rticle 6.3).Theleveland et al nts fortheholdersofcategory“C”positions process. Posts of category “C”constituted the ts introducedbyFZ-119,postsofcategories mental officials.Themajority oftheseposts, de-jure ative acts,‘applicabletotheperformance of found out thatanaverage bureaucratic ladder in (Brym andGimpelson 2004:99).Our subjecttoapersonnelpolicyregime entation ofthepolicyprocess. Meyer-Sahling (2003,2004, re responsiblefortherule- theserequirements varied y regime, relating tothe ic bureaucracy.Forthis the fieldofeducation CEU eTD Collection constraints imposed upon the bureaucracy to restrict amount the of for procedural adjusted to agents, the bureaucratic principals by political delegated authority bureaucrats (Meyer-Sahling2006:697) provided inlaw,forapoliticiantodeterm Meyer-Sahling developsthenotionof 17 16 decisions. and 2)byproceduresrequirementsthata discretion) intwoways:1)bysharingauthoritypersonneldecision-making withotheractors who getsappointed,promoted anddismissed (ordeterminethedegree personnel withinbureaus,i.e. One of thetwomajor domains inwhichpolitical framework offormal politicaldiscretionanddisc 2006). Thesectionthat followsoutlines themajor tenets ofMeyer-Sahling’s analytical desirable outcome may berestrict unitary andcollective actors. Inparticularly, heargues that the powerof apoliticiantoachieve actors involvedinpersonneldecision-making. Implic residual decision-maker, as,forinstance,seniority-b some casespersonneldecisionsmay betheresult direct lineofpoliticalsubordi authority overpersonneldecisions outcomes withotherpoliticaloradministrative making arrangements thepowertodecidepersonnelpolicy inwhichpoliticiansshare decisions toaminister ‘civil service legislation rarelydelegates unilateralauthority overdifferent kindsof allocation determine the extent ofde-politicization The second domain – the determination of the levels of ofthelevels of the determination – second domain The This is in contrast to the classical notion of discretion, which is conceptualized asthe amount of policy-making Drawing ontheso-called ‘delega In otherwords,Meyer-Sahling explicitlydist With regardtothedistributionofdecision- Meyer-Sahling arguesthatthelawmay limit th per se’

(2006:697).Heargue nation (asisthe U.S.civilservicecommissions). Moreover, in appointments, promotions, latera ed throughtheneedtogeti isdelegatedtoan tion studies’literature(for

. 17 formal politicaldiscretion

the publicbureaucracy withgreater accuracy. its leeway (Epstein and O’Halloran 1999: 109). 109). 1999: O’Halloran and itsleeway(Epstein ine theoutcomes ofpersonnelpolicy(2006:699). 52 bureaucratic pay – is outside the thesis. –isoutside focus this of pay bureaucratic politician hastofollowwhilsttakingpersonnel making authority,Meyer-Sahlingnoticesthat inguishes between political andadministrative usses itsfurtherdevel actors. Therearealsosituations whenthe ased promotion inaclassical civil service. of administrative rule autonomous body,whichisseparatedfrom a discretionisexercisedtheallocationof itly, however,healsodifferentiatesbetween s thatitismore commontoseedecision- e possibility forapoliticiantodetermine nvolved incollectiveaction(2006: an overviewseePollack2002), l transfersanddismissals of , whichisthepossibility, opments that permit to s thatdonotrequirea of formal political of formal 16

CEU eTD Collection 18 Table 2.4TypesofDecision-Making Authority a determine the outcome ofpersonneldecisions(Table 2.4). produces ahierarchy of decision-making authorities withregard tothe abilityof politiciansto 697). Adistributionofthesefourproperties–unitary, collective,politicalandadministrative – low becauseformally politiciansareexcludedfrom thedecision-making process. constitute thedecision-making aut said tobe lowerthaninthefirst twocases are assumed tobedifferent thanthose of politicians), the degree of formal political discretion is made upofbothpoliticalandadministrative acto the preferredcandidateto abureaucratic post). Therefore, for individualpoliticianstoachievethedesirableoutcome in Sahling 2003:46).Themorethepreferencesof th other partiesinvolvedintheappointment procedure willsharethesame preferences’(Meyer- ‘a minister willonlybe ableto bureaucratic post,creatingdifficul representing thesame political control theprocessfully(Meyer-Sahling2006: need togetinvolvedincollectiv group ofpoliticianstobeadecisi politicaldi as thehighest.Thedegreeofformal unilaterally, thepossibilityfora subjecting the administrative membersofthedecision-making subjecting may that politicians same recognizes the he rightly time, It should be noted, that Meyer-Sahling discusses the notion the Meyer-Sahling notion discusses that benoted, Itshould Thus, whenthelawauthorizesaunitarypo Collective Politico-Administrative Actor No Formal ResidualDecision-Maker Collective Administrative Actor Unitary Administrative Actor Decision-Making Authority Collective Political Actor Unitary Political Actor

appoint acivil servant withmatchingpreferences tothe extent that party may disagreeabout,say,th politician todetermin e actioncreatesconsiderableobst ties foreachother’scandidates hority, thedegreeofformalpoliticaldiscretionisthoughttobe on-making authorityinpersonnelma . Consequently,whenonlyadministrative actors exercise a sort of informal political discretion asort by, say, of discretion exercise informal political 53 697, Falachetti andMiller 2001).Two politicians rs (whosepreferencesab scretion islowerthanthis,if lawauthorizes a nd DegreesofFormalPoliticalDiscretion of formal, i.e. prescribed in law, political discretion. At in formal,of discretion. law, i.e.prescribed political e decision-makers diverge,the moredifficult authority to informal political influence (2003: 50). (2003: influence informal to political authority e theoutcome ofpersonnelpolicyisranked litical actortotakepersonneldecisions Degree personneldecisions(say,toappoint if thedecision-making authorityis of Formal PoliticalDiscretion to getappointed.Consequently, e best candidate foracertain acles forindividualactorsto The highest The lowest tters. It is so because the tters. Itissobecausethe out personneldecisions | | | | 18

CEU eTD Collection types of personnel policy regimes. regimes. policy of personnel types Although we do not include this domain in the present analysis, this does not change the nature of the identified structure the way theyar acce structure arrangements that regimes as ‘institutional exercise of political power (O’Donnel and Schmitter 1986), Meyer-Sahling suggests the concept of personnel policy of personneldecisions,orthedegreeformal politicaldiscretion,diminishes. procedural constraintsbecomemo dense webofformalized standardsandprocedures’ (Meyer-Sahling2003:50).Inotherwords,as qualification and/orexperience. Procedural constr politician’s appointingauthority specific proceduralconstraints’(Meyer-Sah making authority butalsoby‘theextenttowhich only bytheextentof therepresentation ofthecurrentholders of politicalpowerinthedecision- 20 19 in fourdomains ofpersonnel policy (initialhiring,promoti personnel allocationdomains (initialhiringandfu outlines fourarchetypesof typology ofpersonnelpolicyregimes. a formal residualdecision-maker. procedures orwhendecisionsaredetermined by making authorityisofanon-politicalnature actors andstipulatesaminimum discretion: rangingfrom thehighest,whenlaw procedural constraints,personne He also assesses the discretio assesses the degree of formal Healso political regimethe notion ofpolitical Following The freedom ofpoliticians todetermine theoutcomes ofpersonnel policyisrestrictednot Based ontheideaofdegreesformal po Thus, bydetermining thecomposition ofthede •

the decision-making authorityandintroduces multiple andconfining procedures; formal politicaldiscretion,aspersonnelle De-politicised PersonnelPolicyRegime, wh e exercised (2003: 51). 51). (2003: e exercised personnelpolicyregime:

degrees of formal political l legislationmayallowdifferentdegreesofformal by requiring successfulcandidate re restrictive,the politicians’ , whichisthe institutionalarrangements thatstructurethe accesstoand the or noproceduralconstraints, 19 Focusingonthedecision-making authorityintwo ling 2006:699-700).Forinstance,lawmay limit a ss to the specific set of personnel policy instruments and instrumentsand ss the specific personnelpolicy to set of 54 n in the remuneration domain of personnel policy process. process. in policy n personnel domain the of remuneration andoperateswithin administrative ruleswithouttheinvolvement of rther promotions) andonproceduralconstraints grants decision-making authoritytopolitical aints varyfrom beingminimal orsoftto‘a litical discretion,Meyer-Sahlingdevelopsa the exercise of thisauthority issubject to cision-making authority gislation assignspoliticiansnoplacein ich ischaracterizedbyalowdegreeof on, transfersanddismissals), ability todetermine the outcomes to lowest, whenthedecision- s to have acertainlevelof multiple and confining andthestrengthof 20 he CEU eTD Collection with theinitialappointment, the laterrecognizes thepre-appointment stageasanimportant classifications isthatwhilst theformer consider promotion/demotion/horizontal transfersanddi dismissals –wesuggestthefollowingfourdomains: admissions, appointment, admissions (initialappointment), furtherappoi personnel allocationisconcerned.Insteadof policy regimes. personnel policy. Thisdistinction, therefore,s action limits thepossibilityfrontier for indivi difference tothenatureofsuchanauthorityb collective political actor representing thedecision-making authority makes aconsiderable regimes. However,asdiscusse authority (2006:697),hedoesnotusethisdistinctioninhistypologyofpersonnelpolicy statement onthedistinction between theunitary framework offormal politicaldiscretion.Fi Secondly, wesuggestadifferentclassification We furtherdevelopthistypol • • •

through adensewebofnorms andprocedures. least some ofwhom administrative are ac legislation makes politicians onlyco-decision-makers togetherwithother actors (at characterized byalowtomedium degreeof procedural constraintsupontheexercise unitary politicalactors totakepersonnel highest levelsofformal politicaldisc Personnel PolicyRegimeofUnboundedPoliticiz its exercise. making authority topolitical to highlevelsofformal politicaldiscreti Personnel PolicyRegimeofOpenPoliticisat Personnel PolicyRegime ofStructured unitary political actor and a d above,thedifferencebetweenaunitarypoliticalactorand ogy byrevisitingtwoimportant actor(s)andstipulatesoft ecause therequirement tobeinvolvedincollective rstly, althoughMeyer-Sahlingmakes animplicit hould finditsplaceinthetypology ofpersonnel the fourdomainsidentifiedbyMeyer-Sahling – 55 s thattheprocessofpe dual politicians todetermine theoutcomes of smissals. Thekeydifferencebetween thetwo andcollective nature ntment (promotions), lateraltransfersand of thepersonnelpolicydomains asthe asfar ofsuchanauthority(2003:52-69). retion, aspersonnellegislationauthorizes on, aspersonnellegisla decisions intheabsenceofanymeaningful tors) andregulatestheirdecision-making (or Bounded)Politic formal politicaldiscretion,aspersonnel ion, whichischaracterizedbymedium ation, whichischaracterizedbythe proceduralconstraintsupon elements oftheconceptual rsonnel allocation begins rsonnel allocationbegins of thedecision-making tion grantsdecision- isation, whichis CEU eTD Collection and thoroughlyanalysedwhenthecharacterofapersonnel admission shouldbeincludedinth to determine thenatureofa each ofwhichhasadistinctive decision-making aut Consequently, analyzingentrytobureaucracy at theadmission stagemay behigherthanat with regard totheappointment decisions. Inothe law may requirethepoliticians inquestion toengage oversees aparticularbureaucratic character –fromthepoliticized/de- contained inTable4.2)andthestrengthof differentiate differenttypesofdecision-mak residual decision-maker. Thus,at publicize theinformation aboutbu administrative rules(i.e.formal eligibilitycrite contrast topatronage,incivi the requirement topublicizeth unitary politicalactorwhoseactions or softerproceduralconstraints.Thus, forinst admission power)may beexercised byavarietyof with anyotherpersonnelaut differs fromotherpersonnelpowerssuchas,forinstance,thepowertoappointordismiss. As authority. Theabilitytodetermine thepoolofcandidates isinitselfadistinctivepower,which appointing stageistodetermine thepoolofca integral phaseofpersonnelpolicyprocess.Aschapter1argues,thefunctionpre- promotions), itaccountsforfour decision-making authorityinonly twopersonnelal Meyer-Sahling’s typology, which making authorityandproceduralcons The revisitedcategorizationofpersonnelpol For instance,thelawmay only hority thepowertodetermine l service admission relating decisi personnel policyregime withagr e information aboutbureaucraticjobsinthemass media. In properties ofthedecision-making post todetermine thepoolofca the admission stage ofthe personn politicized pointofview–may e typologyofpersonnelpolicyregi reaucratic jobsin areconstrainedneitherbyformal distinguishes betw traints oftheappointingstage. loosely regulatetheadmissio the appointmentstageand,obviously,viceversa. 56 procedural constraints as twophases(i.e.admission andappointment), ing authority(according totheclassification ndidates fortheconsiderationofappointing ance, inpatronagethis r words,the degreeoffo ria andthedetailedrequirements toregularly actors andmay besubject icy regimes isreportedinTable2.5.Unlike hority and proceduralconstraints, permits us location domains (initialhiringand further withother political or the publicdomain) thatdonotrequirea een apoliticalandanadministrative policy regime isassessed. the poolofcandidates(or ndidates. Atthesame timethe n, allowingthepolitician who be differentthanthedecision- authority (andthestrength of ons aretheresult ofstrict eater precision. Therefore, el process it mes asadistinctivestage. eligibilitycriteria, not by upon itsexercise,whose rmal politicaldiscretion authority belongstoa administrative actors ed eithertostronger is possible to CEU eTD Collection the characterofRussia’spersonnelpolicyregime constitutes ausefulcontributionto improved framework, andthenewtypologyofpers researchers todetermine with politicization of thepublic capacity todetermine thedegreeof formal political domains. Thisrevisionhasimproved theprecision ofthis analyticalframework asfarits categorization ofthedecision-ma public bureaucracies.Wereconsideredtwoim analytical tool forasystematic and comparative analysis of theextent ofde-politicization Tolbert andZucker1983),Meyer-Sahling’s framewor powers arelimited –wasnotal control overhiring,firingandpromotionade staffing powerswieldedbypoliticians–i.e.apolit determine the character of apersonnel coherent way,thenewtypologypermits thoseenga extent ofde-politicizat including admission.foralargerset Accounting procedural constraintsuponitsexercise)ateach In summary, whilst the ideatodifferentiate

ion ofapublicbureaucracy bureaucracy under considerationareconcerned.Byenabling greater accuracy thecharacterof ien topublicbureaucracyschol king authorities and the classification of the personnel policy king authoritiesandtheclassificationofpersonnelpolicy the literature.Itserved usasaguideline fortheassessment of policy regime withgreateraccuracy. 57 , establishedbyFZ-119andsubsequentacts. of phenomena thatmatter forunderstandingthe individualstageofpersonnelpolicyprocess, and organizingtherelevantvariablesinamore portant elements oftheframework –the bureaucracies onthebasis oftheamount of onnel policyregimes deve ged incomparative bureaucracyresearchto discretionandultimately theextentofde- icized bureaucracy if politicians retainfull -politicized bureaucracy,iftheirstaffing k offormal political arship (Frant1993,Ruhil2003, the public bureaucracy this discretion offered an offeredan discretion loped onitsbasis, Authority Authority Constraints Procedural Authority Regime Type/ Authority Appointment: Appointment: Appointment:

Admissions: Admissions: (demotions/ (demotions/ Promotions Promotions transferss): Dismissals: Dismissals: Constraints Constraints Constraints Procedural Procedural Procedural transfers): Attributes

Unitary political actor actor political Unitary Unitary political actor actor Unitary political politicians’ will) politicians’ No (employment at actor Unitary political No right to appeal initiative; own to seek employment on their Citizens do not have the right jobs; bureaucratic about information the publicize No requirement to criteria; No formal eligibility actor Unitary political without giving reasons; reasons; giving without Possible atalltimes atwill No right to appeal bureaucrat; consent of Transfers do notrequire No right to appeal No formal procedure; giving reasons; Possible atall times without Unbounded Politicization/ Politicization/ Unbounded Patronage (Band A) CEU eTD Collection actor orcollective) (unitary Political

No right to appeal No formal recrui requirements; Minimal qualification/experience No right to appeal initiative; seek employment on their own Citizens do not have the right to applicants; job by provided Formal check of theinformation jobs; bureaucratic about information the Minimal requirements to publicize criteria; Formal eligibility No right to appeal bureaucrat of consent require not do Transfers No formal procedure; requirements; Minimal qualification/experience circumstances are possiblerange undera of dismissals but tenure, Permanent actor actor actor Political (unitary or collective) orcollective) (unitary Political Political (unitary or collective) orcollective) (unitary Political Political (unitary or collective) orcollective) (unitary Political Table 2.5TypologyofPersonnelPolicy Regimes Open Politicization Open Politicization (Band B) tment procedure;

58

actor politico-administrative A collective actor politico-administrative A collective appeal Rejected candidates have rightto Formal vacancy contests; requirements; Compulsory qualification/experience actor politico-administrative A collective own initiative; initiative; own No right to seek employment on their applicants; job by provided Formal check of theinformation jobs; bureaucratic about information the publicize regularly to Formal requirement criteria; Formal eligibility actor politico-administrative A collective Right toappeal Right toappeal; bureaucrat; of consent require Transfers Formal procedure; requirements; Compulsory qualification/experience Right toappeal of clearlydefined circumstances Dismissals possible undera small set Permanent tenure; Structured Politicization Structured Politicization (Band C)

No residual decision-maker No residual decision-maker Rejected candidates have righttoappeal Formal vacancy contests; requirements; qualification Compulsory actorno or residual decision-makers Administrative collective)or (unitary Right toappeal their initiative; on employment own the seek have to Citizens right isproved); otherwise true until considered provided by job applicants (information is No formal check of theinformation jobs; bureaucratic about information the publicize regularly to Formal requirement criteria; Formal eligibility No residual decision-maker Right toappeal bureaucrat; of consent require Transfers promotions; only, internal Seniority-based, convictions) convictions) cases (such as bribery and other criminal exceptional in only Dismissal possible Permanent tenure; Fully De-Politicized/ Fully Civil Service Service Civil (Band D)

CEU eTD Collection 21 drawn intoprivate, almost secretive, relations that agencyinlateSeptember 1995. An informal interview withthe head of thedepartment resulted intheauthor’s employment at regional government, privatelycommunicatedtoher of thisstudy received information aboutavacancyinoneofthedepartments oftheKrasnodar to appointanddismiss rank-and-fi relatives, friends andacquaintances of politicians andhigh-ranking bureaucrats, whocontinued that information aboutvacancies inthepublic the same. Thedelayintheadoptionofanewset the beginning of the1990s, despitethechange of substantial partinthe recruitment process,butwe Soviet citizens.Thosewho reason acareerinthe state apparatuswassimply exist (Afanas’ev2000,Atamanchuk 2002:29-49, Voslensky 1984,Willerstone 1992). Forthis recruitment procedure, compulso politicized personnelpolicy,wherepublicinfo nomenklatura system ofpersonnelmanagement wa whose higherranksdistributed In theSovieteraentry topublicbureaucracy 2.4.1 Admission PolicyArra 2.4 Personnel bureaucrat tocomplete c power ofthesuperiortolayoffabureaucratat rule, the absence ofpublicandtransparentad servant subject toformal and especially inform nature oftherelationshipsbe the prevailing form of filling the v The subsequent two years of work for ontrol bypowerholders. acancies atthatand ot managed togetinto the‘

ngements underFZ-119(1996-2005) ngements tween thebureaucratandher supe that state agencyconfirmed thatthe ry qualificationrequirements and le bureaucratsattheirwill.Thus,inSeptember 1995theauthor bureaucratic postsattheir 21 Underrulessuchasthese,ajobseekermay findherself her departments inthe regional administration withherpotential boss. any time. Itis this combination whichcondemns a 59 bureaucracy remained private, distributed among was tightlycontrolledbytheCommunistParty, mission proceduresgoeshand-in-handwiththe al pressuresintheworkingenvironment. As a al politicalregime, thesituationremained largely re mere recipientsofthepowerholders’will.In of rulesforhiring,firingandpromotionmeant rmation aboutjobopportunities,aformal notaviable choice for themajority of the by oneofthedepartment s aclassicinstanceofanunboundedly nomenklatura machine’ didnotplayany way the author entered the service was riors makes aprospectivecivil will. TheParty-administered the righttoappealdidnot Thehighlypersonalized ’s senior officials. .

CEU eTD Collection 22.7). contests inthemass media –desi for thegovernmental organizations contests as amajor hiring mechanism tostateposts ofcategory “C”, (Article 9.5)andprotect the lawenabledindividuals toseek admission tothepublicbureaucracyontheirowninitiative powerholders intheadmissionprocess.Twoprovisi 22 upon whichtherelationshipsofpe via publiclyavailableinformation, i.e.independen (Afanas’ev 2000,Voslensky1984).Asjobseekers b between powerholdersandbureaucratsunderthe Sovi capacity toconsiderably upsetdeeplyentrenched implication oftheopencharacteradmi of poweroractsasa‘politics eliminator’ (Civ arbitrary actionsofpowerholders.The pursuing bureaucraticcareersa longer mere recipientsofpoliticalwill,buta capacity topopulatetherecruitmen legal actions), political rivalsand themass bureaucratic vacanciesputs thepolitician’s actio arbitrarily dismissed bypowerholdersbecause process (Ivanova2002:30).Consequently,suchanapplicationcouldnotbeblatantlyignoredor filing anapplication implied that ajobseeker automatically becomes apartytotherecruitment could fileanapplicationforapubliclyannounced criteria –notonlyarelativ posts ofcategory “C”remained exempt from vacancycont Moscow) and 35.8% (regionally stationed federal bureaucracy Only entry-level positions, which at the end of 2000 accoun 2000 atthe end of which positions, entry-level Only FZ-119 authorizedaset

In practicethis meant that anyRussian citi this rightincourt(Art e, friendormember ofa privileged group(suchas

of rulesthatsubstantiallytransf nd possessingthetoolstoprotect rsonal dependencybetweenthe gnated newspapersandwebsites t processwithalargenumberofjobseekerswhowereno of alllevelsandbranches openness icle 9.2).Secondly,asFZ-119authorizedvacancy media. newadmission ruleshadthe Therefore, il ServiceAssembly 1942:5).Anotherimportant 60 ssion processasstipulatedbyFZ-119wasits ests.For further discussion pro-active typeofjob oftherecruitment processchanges thebalance thepubliccharacterofinformation on ns underthe scrutinyofjobseekers(including bureaucraticpost.Fromalegalisticstandpoint, relationsofpersonal tly ofthepowerholders’ will,theverygrounds ted for between 11.8% (federal bureaucracy situated in situated bureaucracy (federal 11.8% between for ted and bureaucracy of regionaland bureaucracy of zen meeting formally established eligibility ons wereparticularlyimportant here.Firstly, ecome engagedintherecruitmentprocess et ruleandinearlypost-Soviet period ormed the roles ofjobseekersand authorityto their pursuit from thepossible job-receiver andthejob-giver of the stateorgans (Article 22 see the next section. theymade itcompulsory dependency thatexisted applicants, purposefully governments) ofallstate publicize vacancy nomenklatura) – CEU eTD Collection principle than a directaction norm. 23 a de-politicizedbureaucracyinRussia. into considerationupondesigningtheinstrument fo the admission processbyofferingapretenceofth with strongpatronagepreferencescoulduseth and Parison2003,Sotiropoulos2004).Therefore,itis enforcement practicestothearbitrarydeci action rulesandmechanisms andloopholesinthere 199). Asitiswellknow from thehistoryofcivil other lawsandregulationsthatwouldbring itsprovisionsintoaction(Kozbanenko 2005:198- containing 42referencestotheexistingstatutory implementation of thisrule. for obligatory vacancyadvertisement, FZ-119di enabled independentjobseekerstopresentthemselv Regular circulationofinformation onbureaucratic 22.7) shouldhaveplayedanimportant roleinach ability of politiciantoapply informal a rest areeradicated.When suchanindependent other) andthosecitizens whorefuse acting officials(iftheservice criminal (2)andsecurity(4,6)considerations public bureaucracy.Ascanbeseenfrom Table2.6in were supplemented bysevenconditionsunderwhich anindividualcouldnot available postsinthepublic years ofage,whohadagoodcommandthe Ru unconditional. FZ-119limited itbyminimal eligib The entire clause on The rightofindividualstose According tothelegislativeintent,regular vacancy advertisement consisted bureaucracy (Article21.1).Thesemi 23

FZ-119wasdesignedasso-called‘framework law’:besides involves directsubordinationor lf-present themselv d todisclose their financial st dverse pressureissignificantlyreduced. sions ofpowerholders(Gajduschek2007,Manning of only20 words that seemedmo 61 , thelawforbadeimmediatefamily members of e law’simprecision tosuppresstheopennessof jobseeker attainsthestatusofemployment, the service adoptiontheabsenc acts, itrequired theenactment ofmorethan35 ieving theopennessofth d notsetaclearmechanism forthepractical e implementation ofArticle22.7.Wetakethis job announcements inthemass media (Article vacanciesinthepublicdomains shouldhave es totheappointingauthority.Despitecalling r theassessment oftheinstitutionalization ility criteria.AnyRussiancitizenover18 levant legislativestat ssian language,was eligibletoapplyfor additiontoratherst plausibletoassume es totheappointingauthoritywasnot controlofonepersonoverthe nimal eligibilityrequirements atements toapplyforjobs in re likea declaration of the andard medical (1,3), utes oftensubjectlaw e recruitment process. e ofdetaileddirect- be amemberofthe thatpowerholders CEU eTD Collection involved inanyotherpaidact requirement forade-politicizedbureaucracy,whichprohibitspublicmanagers from being Russian Federation 1995 31, July of 119-FZ N Law Federal 21.3, Article Source: minimized. Similarly, theclauseondisclosure decision-making, includingthose to-day bureaucraticproductionpr welfare-enhancing public bureaucracy: inorder toen public bureaucracy. The ‘immediate relatives’ clauseisentirely inaccord withthetheoryof residual decision-maker, which,following thelogi Table 2.6ConditionsUnderwhichIndividualscanno 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Thus, keyadmission criteria–eligibility –weresetforth by anadministrative act,nota agreements) to thestateservicehasbeenadjusted which hasbeenconfirmedbythe If theindividualhasanillness,whichpreven legally incompetent orpartially incompetent If theindividualisrecognizedbyacourtdeci incomes andpropertythatbelongs If theindividualrefusestosubmit tothest person overtheother “C” or“B”),iftheirservice spouses) withcurrentmembers ofthestate If theindividualisinclosekinship(parents specific time)byacourt decision thathasentered intolegalforce If theindividualisdeprivedrightto individual, isassociatedwith information making statesecret,ifth upa If theindividual refusestoundergoth If theindividualhasacitizen

ivity (Meyer-Sahling2003:60). ocess theiropportunitiestoinfl opportunities thatstem from relations,shouldbe family a StateService Position is associatedwithdirectsubordination orcontrolofone theuseofsuchinformation ship otherthanRussian (except forthecases whenaccess medical institution inwriting toherbyrightofownership onamutual basisbyintergovernmental e authorizationprocedure foraccessing 62 hold publicofficesinthecivilservice(during

e dutiesofthepost,contestedby of thejobseeker’sfinanc ate taxserviceinformation aboutthetaxable On the Fundamentals of the State Service of the c ofthetheoreticalframework for employed service (e.g.holdersofpostscategories , spouses, siblings, ch sure thatpoliticians st ts hercarryingoutofficialduties,and sion thathas entered intolegal force as t beAdmittedto(orcontinuehold) uence toinfluencebureaucratic ildren andch ay away from theday- ial situationsatisfies a ildren of CEU eTD Collection tax return and medical certificate. ID, educational certificates,officialrecord of court caserequiringeviden to blatantlyexcludecandidatesonthegroundsofeligibility.Todo conditions containedwithinFZ-119weresufficient in thepublicdomain. Therefore,despitethefailur applicants, but alsoof acourtof lawwiththepo given inwriting,andwould thereforehavetost politicians’ preferences. for additionalandpotentiallydiscriminatory cr the publicdomain andwereknowntoallconcerne constraints wouldpreventthisfrom was thecase thatthe verificationauthority coul undesirable candidatesfrom thead powerholders withtheopportunitytousurpverifi adopted, whichleftanimportantverificationauthorityunspecified. procedure establishedbyafederallaw’ 24 bureaucracy, individuals wereentitledtoactonthei features ofafullyde-politici documents providedbytheapplicant procedural guidelines fortheverificationprocedur in favorofthepoliticia the setofeligibilitycriteriaestablishedbyFZ-119 and‘stackthedeck’ofadmissionprocess secondary authorityoverthiscomponent ofthe law. Thiswasimportant for pr clear that no additional eligibility requirement this analysis, represents asignificant constraint Thisincludes the statement onthe absence ofacitizensh To sum up,asetofadmission rules,establ Having clearlyspecifiedeligib ns’ preferredcandidates. Secondly, rejectionofanapplicant ce-based justification. zed bureaucracy.Firstly, intheir

ecluding theemergence ofare mission processonthegroundsofel happening.Firsofall, theaccept employment –acountry-sp ility criteria,FZ-119, however 24 wassubjecttoverification‘ (Article21.5).Therequiredlawwas,however,never on politicians’ discretion. Moreover,FZ-119 was 63 d beusurped,theexistenceoffollowingtwo wer toenforceeligibility criteria alreadyexisting could beestablishedbyanyfederalorregional admission process,whichcouldpotentiallyalter ip other than Russian and immediate relatives in relatives office, immediate and Russian ip than other iteria tobeintroduced e topassthere cation authorityanduseitfortheexclusionof and thescrutinynotonlyofdisappointed d parties.Furthermore, FZ-119didnotpermit e. Thelawstipulated that all information and r owninitiative. Asfili ished bythe1995law,exhibitedimportant to severelylimit theabilityofpowerholders ecific document called on groundsofeligibilityhadtobe pursuit of employment inpublic quired follow-uplegislation,the This wouldappeartopresent sidual decisionmaker asa ed eligibility cr so couldresultinacostly , failedtoprescribeclear igibility. Infact,evenifit in accordance withthe in ordertosupportthe ng anapplicationfora trudovaja knizka trudovaja iteria werein – CEU eTD Collection blatantly excludecandidateson the groundsofeligibility. suggests that theeligibilityclauseofFZ-119 be seenasanopportunityforpowerholdersto seize theverificationauthority),ouranalysis discretion. Despitethefailure tolegally establis political discretion analytical framework repres by anadministrative act,notaresidualdecisi openness of theadmission process.Finally,keyadmi patronage preferencestosabotage information onbureaucraticvacancies couldhave beenusedbypowerholderswithstrong some controloveradmissions. Thelackofclearly However, the‘framework’ nature the relationshipsofpersonaldependencybetween information, i.e.independentlyofthepowerhol making. jobseekersbecome inthe As engaged powerholders withfeweropportunitiestointerv transform therelationsofpersonaldependency in theworkingenvironment, thusproviding abuse ofjobseekers’rightsbypowerholders.Secondly,theadmi number of‘awkward’ (from power the vacancies inthemass media hadthecapacity control overthepersonnelpolicy’soutcomes. More oversee dueimplementation oftheadmission rule own initiative and toappealirregularities incourt. obligations, theemphasis ofthelawwasonjobseekers’ rights–toseekemployment ontheir monopoly overadmissionAlthoughbothpartieswereendowedwithrightsand wasover. vacancy automatically made ajobseeker aformal the properenforcement ofthis ofFZ-119createdopportunitie holders’ pointofview on-maker, whichfollowingthelogicofformal 64 severely limited to theabilityofpowerholders ders’ will,iteradicatesthegroundsuponwhich h theeligibility verifica to populatetherecruitment processwithalarge Thisencouragedthejob applicants toactively ene intheday-to-daybureaucraticdecision- ents asignificant constraint on politicians’ specifiedrulesandproceduresforpublishing party to therecruitment process, thepolitical over, alegalrequirementtopublicizemost of recruitment processviapubliclyavailable thejob-receiverandjob-giverrest. s, furtherdiminishing thepowerholders’ ssion criteria –eligibility wereset forth ) job candidates, preventing large-scale requirement andtosuppressthe ssion ruleshadthecapacityto s forpowerholderstoretain tion protocol(thatcould CEU eTD Collection category “C” were to subjected formal vacancy competitions. patronage-civil servicecontinuum. Russia’s legislationwithregard regulating the exerciseof “C” (Article22.9).Theworkofboththeauthor as vacancycontestjury,wasmade theappointingauthorityfor posts ofcategory“C”totheheadrecr FZ-119 authorizedamixed appointingregime: it service (band C)position ofagivenpolityalongth arrangements andprocedural constraints determines other politicaland/oradministrative acto 25 vacancy contests (Article22.4). 5.5). Asthecoremechanism ofmeritocratic achievements anddemonstrated capabilities tocarry appointing issues,wheremerit wasunderstoodas principle ofmeritocracy. FZ-119proclaimed me poles therearepersonnelpol commission), whosefunctioning is encasedinto strictproceduralstandards. Inbetweenthese to appointbelongsacollectiv with minimal ornoproceduralc classical patronage,theauthority the proceduralconstraintsuponit employed analyticalframework, thefocusison tied or free –istheessential attribute of ape candidates forbureaucraticposts,theirroleinth Although lawcansignificantlylim 2.4.2 Appointment In the executive branch of federal and regional levels of governance appointments to as many as80% of posts of The keytounderstandinghowpublicmanagers their powers. Thesection thatfollows evaluates indetail the content of icy regimes whereapoli

25 onstraints (bandA),whileinthe to theappointment soastode Avacancycontestisa formal procedure inwhichacollective over appointmentdecisionsbelongs e administrative actor(as,for s exercise.Inanopenlypoliticizedregime, such asoneof it powerholdersintheirabilit uiting agency,whileaco rs. Aspecificcombination ofpower-sharing rsonnel policyregime. Follo 65 entry topublicbureaucracythelawauthorized the distributionofdecision-making authorityand e appointment process–whethertheirhandsare ities wasencasedintoanumber ofprocedures, e rangeofpersonnelpolicy regimes. InRussia assigned thepowertoappointentry-level themore pro-patronage(bandB)orpro-civil ritocracy asthemain principleregulating acombination ofi out a specific, expertise-based job(Article tical actorsharesthe arehiredincontemporary Russiaisthe termine itspreciselocationonthe civil service(bandD)thepower instance, theUScivilservice rest ofstatepos y todetermine thepoolof toaunitarypoliticalactor llective inst ndividual’s educational wing thetenets of the power toappointwith itution, known ts ofcategory CEU eTD Collection holders. to direct-action rules), inevitabl aspects ofhuman resourcemanagement remained autonomous bodywasamajor setbacktobureaucr were meant (ManingandPariso councils whichcame intobeingin1996-1998have never performed thefunctionsforwhichthey organizational meetings andbytheendof1997 emerged asautonomous merit protectionbodies:wh Russian provinces(Article27).However,neit methodologically (Article26.2).Similar Councilss public managers, (re)-trainingpublicmanagers and assisting recruiting agencies bureaucracy andevenperform someday-to-dayfunc monitor itsenforcement asto ensure competence state personnelmatters. Notonly the federalgovernment andthehigherjudicial consisting ofequalnumbersrepresentatives the auspices ofRussia’spresident (Article26). The legislation, whichwouldbedevelopedbyasp these and many otherissuesrelatingto thec neither thecomposition ofthevacancycontest their decisionsconstitutetheultimate groundfor theappointment (Article22.9),FZ-119clarified organization tocontroltheprocessfully (Meye involved inacollectiveaction) service end ofthecontinuum sincethecollective the distributionofdecision-making authority,th knowledge andskillsofeligible appointing authority–vacancycontestjuryev However, apartfrom proclaiming thecollective nature of the juries and stressing that y subjecting law enforcement toth entrants anddetermines thewinne n 2003:55).Thefailuretoinst creates considerableobstacles would itadoptthere ecial agency–theCouncilonCivilService r-Sahling 2006:697,FalachettiandMiller2001). authority, wasdesignedasthehigherauthorityon 66 onduct of vacancyconteststothefollow-up juries, northeirmodus operandi.Thelawleft her federalnorregionalcouncilshaveever the president,bothchambersofparliament, is appointing scheme leans towards thecivil aluates formal professionalcredentials and/or disappeared altogether,ahandfulofregional in theformofgeneralprinciples(asopposed and safeguard the political neutrality of the hould havebeenestablishedineachofthe ile thefederalcouncil atic reform inthemid 1990s,sincesome nature ofvacancy juries(theneedto get Fundamentals tions suchaskeeping quired sub-statutoryle for individualmembers ofthe itutionalize ame r. Thus,from thestandpointof e arbitrarydecisionsofpower stipulatedthattheCouncil, had onlyacoupleof a registerofcareer gislation, butalso rit protection

under CEU eTD Collection decide onthe composition of thejury, the head of on thejuries’composition unilaterall were eitherpoliticiansor politicalappointees(hol already clear, the decree, infact, permitted theheads of therecruiting agencies, most of whom (Article 11).Inth both arelevantCouncilonCivilServicetogether vacancy contests came intoforce). power foralmostnineyears( contests inRussia’sgovernmental contained inpresidential decreeN604constituted alegalframework, regulatingvacancy structure, reproducingitsgene describes them asbeing ‘mostly consistent’ with the federal law,being similar to it‘in form and containing the‘federal’standard. Havinganalyzedregionalci years aftertheadoption ofthedecreemost regi guidelines for developingtheirbureaucraciesbased onuniform principles.Within acoupleof enactment ofbothFZ-119andpresidentialdecr to followthe‘federal’norms andprocedures contests inthefederalstateorgans,Article3of to thevacancycontestconduct. provided recruitingagencieswith 2004: 12),itrepresentedasignifi the unequivocalpracticaluseofprinciple presidential decreeN604 hasbeen vacancy contests intheorganizations of into force,untilthe endofApril,whenpr situation oflegalvacuum onthematter,whic According tothedecree,make-up oftheva Although formally presidentialdecreeN604 With regardtotheappointment powers,thefailuretoestablishCouncils ledtoa e lightofthefactthat until thebeginningof2005when ral-regulation provisions’(2003:202).Therefore, therules a number ofcleardirect-acti organizations atfederalandregion rightfully criticized for the lack cant steptowardsade-politicizedpublicbureaucracyasit y. Itisplausibletothink th by thetime thedecreewasi the federalgovernment, waspublished.Althoughthe esidential decree N 604, regulating theconductof esidential decreeN604,regulating h lastedfromJanuary1996,whenFZ-119came 67 thedecreerecommended theregional authorities of meritocracy (Koich ee N604providedtheregionallawmakers with inconducting their vacancycontests. The ders ofstatepostscategory “A”),todecide therecruiting agency wouldbeable to bring onal authoritiesenactedrelevantlegislation, with theheadofrecruitingstateorgan cancy contestjurieswastobedecidedby authorized theconductofvacancy authorized on rules and mechanisms related another legislativeactgoverning vil servicelaws,Kozbanenko at endowed withtheright to of clearcriteria,necessary for ssued theCouncils’fatewas al levelsofallbranches umanov andLukashenko CEU eTD Collection the appointingprocess. created considerable obstacles forthe head ofth members, achievedbythepresenceofbothadmini because ofthecollective nature established byFZ-119,fallsintoth Hence, fromthestandpointof Miller andFalaschetti 2001), the appointing decisionsconsider diverge and itismore difficult to getthem a enhancing bureaucracyitisdesirableforprefer which thepreferences ofthedecision-makers vacancy jury wasnotsimplyacollectivedecision function oftheirprofessional judgment andnotof politicalconsiderations. Therefore, the relatively independent faction of the jury. Second relations (formal andinformal) existingina givenpublicbureaucracy andconstituting a both politicalandadministrative domains independent expertsdidnotform apartofthepower appointing authorityoftheheadrecruiti 26 independent expertson recruiting agency’sright to decidethemake-up ofthevacancy authority disappears.Presidential decree N60 being acollectivebody andthepositive effectof outcome as desiredbythepowerholder.Insuch aboard loyalists–those process. Themajor setofconstraints stemmed that couldconstrainorenhancetheabilityofpow power isstructured.Forthiswehavetolookatformal-legal procedur of theappointingregime fully,itisalsonecessary The decree did not specify the exact number of experts. It implied, however However, theaboverepresentsonlypartof who wouldassist(ratherthanimpede juries (Article 11).

ably diverge(HammondandH the distributionofdecision-maki of vacancyjuriesandthedivergence ofthepreferencestheir presence ofindependentexpertsplaysawelfare-enhancingrole. e categoryofastructuredpolit 26 Theindependentexperts’ 68 ences betweenpoliticians e recruiting agencytode ng agencywastwofold.Firstly,asoutsidersto 4, however,placedlimitsonthe headofthe ligned ifthepreferences the equation.Inordertocomprehendnature -making authority,butaco erholders toinfluencetheoutcome ofthehiring from theprincipleofmeritocracy, whichwas ly, experts’assessment ofjobcandidateswasa a case, vacancycontestjurieseffectivelystop considerably diverged.Sinceinawelfare- to takeinto considerationhowtheexerciseof strative actorsandtheindependentexperts, thecollective nature oftheappointment ill 1993,Meyer-Sahling2003:46, ) the achievement ofthecontest’s jury byrequiring , thatmore than one was required. ng authoritythehiringscheme, icization (bandC).Itisso es authorizedbyFZ-119 termine the outcomes of and publicmanagers to ability to constrain the ofthosewhomake llective institution in llective institutionin the presence of CEU eTD Collection 27 that itprecludedthemost blatan criminal charges.Therefore, oneofthemajor welfare-enhancingachievements ofFZ-119was the chairofjury,normally theheadof consequences fortheprincipaldecision-maker (inthecaseof thevacancycontestjuries itwas appointing authority. for theevaluationofjobseekers,but aslegal 1995 31, July of Law N Federal 119-FZ Source: Article each grade of postsofcategory“C”(Table2.7). also introducedanumber ofspec institutionalized inlaw.Havingproclaimed mer and professionaltraining’(Artic could monitor theenforcement of qualifyingrequirementsvein, minimal provideda limiting the menu oflegitimate actionsofthose knowledge of the current legislation). legislation). current the of knowledge proof for the level and field of education and the length of experience) or the result of her performance (test on to the compulsory qualifying criteria areassessed by a straightforward check of her credentials (such as documentary 6.4.1 6.3.3 6.3.2 6.3.1 An important characteristic of these cr ofthese important characteristic An Table 2.7ObligatoryQualifyingRequirements forPostsofCategory“C”underFZ-119 Thus, eachpostobtainedameasurable definition rank andspecializationofthepost post the fieldofprofessionaleducation,accoun post’s duties the knowledgeoffederalandregionallegisla post the levelofprofessionaleducation,accoun the length ofpreviouspractical experience 27 Thefailuretomeet theserequirements presupposedseverelegal

t instancesofpolitic iteria is that they do not involve any deliberation: a candidate’s compliance compliance a candidate’s anydeliberation: involve iteria they do not is that le 5.5)andchallengeincourt their righttobecome publicmana ific qualifyingrequirements –ob On the Fundamentals of the State Service of the Russian Federation 69 recruiting agency),includingdismissal, finesor

Content requirements thatmust havebeenmet bythe itocracy asthemajor hiringprinciple,FZ-119 who wielded appointing powers.Inthesame ting fortherankandsp ting fortherankandsp to thenatureofpost,accounting forthe ally informed appointments byconsiderably useful referencepointforjobseekers,who tions, applicableto of merit, notmerely servingasabaseline the actionsofappointing gers byvirtueof‘capabilities ligatory intheir nature –for the dischargeof ecialization ofthe ecialization ofthe

CEU eTD Collection of thelaw. compulsory qualifyingcriteriadidnotoccurtotheex reasonable toexpectthat‘stackingthedeck’ oftheappointment processbyalteringnon- of thepreferredcandidate).Inlight the changes allinterested parties,including inde than otherjobcandidates,toau as to identify her skills andabilities that would division neededtoperform aseri criteria, itwas also acomplex ‘business’,inwhichtheagency’s head anditshuman resource recruiting agency,whoisconsiderablyconstr alterations ofnon-mandatoryrequirements seem draws theattention ofjobseek amendment oftherelevantlegislationinfede powerholders tomodify thepost’ powerholders’ capabilitytoachievetheprefe criteria tobeimposed atthelevelaslow qualifying requirements infavorof regain controlovertheappointment bycontinuous The clauseondiscretionarycriteriaformally crea desirable competences,skills,abil regional laws,ortherecruitingagencyina discretionary qualifying criteria to ‘tiepoliticians’hands’byaddi authority. Similarly to the admissi considerations? Thespecialstatusofindependent considerations? authorize anyprocedures thatenabledindepend important tolookatthosethatregulatedthebehavior ofi Considering formal-legal proceduresthatgov In additiontocompulsory qualifyingrequireme ers, thepoliticalopposition andthemedia.Although repeated thorize anewcombination ofdesi . Discretionarycriteriaareth ng publicscrutinytotheprocess. es ofinterrelatedact ities andattitudes,bothprofe on domain, jobseekershadthepotenti theirpreferredcandidates. By s criteria atthelevel of theoperational unitthan viathe the recruitingagency,FZ- allow her toperform in 70 ddition tothecompulsory ones.They include ained inherappointingpowersbycompulsory pendent experts,andtomonitortheperformance ral/regional parliament, whoseworkinevitably costs associatedwithrepeatedalterationsitis ted anopportunityforpowerholderstopartially ent expertstosuccessfu s likearationalstrategyfortheheadof s rred appointingoutcome. Itiseasierfor expertsastheproviders oftheauthoritative erned thehiringprocessin1990s,itis tent that itinvalidated themeritocratic spirit ly alteringthenon-ma ions (toassessthepr nts, FZ-119alsoauthorizedwhatwecall ndependent experts.Did FZ-119 ssional andpersonal(Article6.5). ose establishedbyfederaland permitting thosediscretionary rable criteria, to inform about rable criteria,toinform about 119 certainlyenhancedthe the vacancycontestbetter al toactinsuch awayas lly holdbackpolitical eferred candidatesso ndatory partofthe CEU eTD Collection appoint obedientonesinstead. – from politicians’ point of view–members of N 604innowayrestrainedthehead ofther may getthemajority byinfluencing othermembers of thejury. Similarly, thepresidential decree independent experts’positionbyputtingeachdisput members ofthejury,lawlaiddownapossibilityforpowerholderstooverturn preferred candidates,itseems that deck’ ofthehiringprocessby achieve welfare-enhancingrecruitment outcomes? special status ofindependentexperts totheextent thatitmakes impossible foravacancyjuryto vote (Article14).Havingmade thevotingpowers impossible toovercome experts’position,FZ-119pr appropriate votingentitlements. Insteadofallo independent expertscouldhavebeenevenstro likelihood ofthewelfare-enhancingrecruitmen such a‘watchdog’createdsignifican the applicationofselection fair consideration,e.g.thatallcandidateswereevaluatedagainst work (Article11).Inpractice, e that the professional judgments of independent counterbalance topoliti commitment to(or even, incritical cases, violati the arbitrarinessofjury incourt,butal to thepowerholders’actions(firs situation ofopenconfrontationw jury. Mostimportantly,however,su need todeliverthe‘patron’sfavo costly for politicians. Firstof all,loyalty is Do thevotingprocedureandpowertoreshufflevacancy juryinevitablyoverridethe cally informedpersonneldecisions xperts’ role was toensurethat criteria wasconsistent across alljobseekers.Thepresenceof tly, ofjobseekersthemselves, w ith independentexperts,which wouldinevitablydrawattention r’ inexchangeforthe‘right vote’ofthe loyalmembers ofthe thefrequentrepetitionofthis ch actionsonbehalfofpowerholdersarepossibleonlyinthe repeated alterationofthe discre t barrierstothesmooth flow so bythemedia) andexposethepowerholders’ low never free,andthepowerholders arefacedwiththe ecruiting agency fromreplacingthenon-cooperative 71 nger hadtheirspecialstatusbeensupportedby on of)thelegallyrecognized wing arightofvetoth the jury,including independent experts, andto t outcome. Thewelfare-enhancingimpact of experts constitute the standards for the jury’s Similarly tothesituation with‘stacking the ovided forasimple (secretoropen)majority ed issuetothevote,inwhichpowerholders ofindependentexpe was achievedbyformally recognizing eachcandidacy received due and ho may toappealagainst choose the same setofcriteriaandthat courseofactionwould betoo of patronageandenhancesthe tionary criteria infavor of at wouldhavemade it rts level withother experts’ roleinthe CEU eTD Collection spirit ofthenotionformal political discre powerholders byFZ-119 allowedfo regime ofopenpoliticization. structured politicization, howeverthe firstcasefa succeeds. In bothcases thebehavior ofpowerholde decides tousethesediscretionarypowers,thenca an inbuiltmajority tooverruletheexperts’ recruiting agencies faceanopti exclude candidateA,leavingcandidatesBandCinthebattleground.Itisherethatheadsof compulsory qualifyingrequirements, qualifying requirements. CandidateBisthe politician’s preferredcandidate considering anexample withthr locate itasawholealong thepa the band“C”).Givencomplex natureofthe had thecapacityforhighlevelofpoliticaldiscre service –boundaryoftheband“C”),discretionary qualifyingrequirements andvotingrules right ofrejectedcandidatestoap administrative andautonomous actors.While th which exhibited aconsiderable divergence ofpr politicization. Itisachie the constraintsuponitsexercisemeetproperti outcome by co-optingindependentexpert that, itisimportant tonotethat ascenario inwhich powerholders achieve thedesired recruitment by thepolitician.Firmly constrainedbythelegalna meets thecompulsory qua politicians’ preferencestopatr recruitment process. Therefore, To sum up,boththenatureof ved throughtheinstitutionalization lifying requirements andisfavoredbytheindependent onage distributionofjobsare on: theycaneither usediscreti Since personnelpolicyinstrument ee jobcandidatesenteringavacancy from aloyaltystandpoint,but therepeatoffence ismore peal in court firmly ‘tiedpolit tronage-civil service range? This the decision-making authorityinthisappointingscheme and butisnotfavoredbythei r ascenariowhencandidate B s isnotentirelyimplausible. professionalopinionornot.Ifthepowerholder tion, theappointingscheme asawholeshall be 72 elements ofthisappointingscheme, wheredowe tion (theleft–openpoliticizationboundaryof eferences through thepart e compulsory qualifyingrequirementsandthe ndidate Bisappointed,ifnotthencandidateC lls into the regime’s end thatborders withthe politician’s second-best choice;shemeets es ofapersonnelpolicyregime ofstructured ture ofcompulsory crit rs does notcross the lines ofaregime of of acollectiveappointingauthority, onary qualifyingrequirements and exceptionally strong.Having said ndependent expert who doesnotmeet compulsory icians’ hands’(theright–civil likely underconditionswhen s made availabletoRussian gets appointed,then,in the contest.Candidate Aisthe canbebestillustratedby icipation ofpolitical, eria, thejuryhasto experts, butnot s. CandidateC CEU eTD Collection effectively givingthedecision-making authority‘free hands’ inappointment. When thisis experience atall.In other wo educational qualifications andmi practical experience andnimal ma regard tothelatterpoint,th carries the lowestvalue of the structured thechoiceof theappointing authority.It (Table 2.5). However,unlikethesituation with political/administrative actorinhiring junior For thepurposeofthisdissertationweshallca located inthatendofthebandC,whichborders more politicizedendofpersonnel decision-making authoritypointof them asaunitary regional governments couldbe,asdiscussedprev political discretion.Atthesame time, asheadsofstructuralunits actor andtheappointingscheme posts, whichthenqualifythedecision-maki recruiting agency. Inmost ofthecases theseoffi of therecruiting agency inthemanagerial cap posts wereassignedtothe‘appropriateofficial’(A of therecruitingagency bureaucratic posts(Brym andGimp scheme, while the appointment toentry-leve many as80 percentofpostscategory“C”wassubjectedtotheabovediscussedappointing which powerholdersusethei candidate Btypeofjobseekersappointedorca politicization’. Theprecisedist Similarly tothesituation with In theexecutivebranchoffede political (Article21.7).More authority for entry-level posts. Th r discretionarypowers. e majority oftheentry-level qualifying requirement withinthera ribution ofappointingoutcomes rds, qualifyingrequirements were policy regimes (bandsAorB). under considerationasbelonging view, itplacestheentry-level vacancyjuries,FZ-119constrai elson 2004:99),wasleftlargely ral andregionallevelsofgove ng authoritytheyrepresent asaunitary bureaucrats byobligatoryqualifyingrequirements specifically, the l posts,accounting forabout 20percentofthe 73 withopenlypoliticizedpersonnelpolicyregime. cials arebureaucratsthemselves –holdersof“C” ll suchanappointingsc acity: from gradethree uptotheheadof the ndidate Ctype)depends vacancy juries, these constraintsonlyweakly rticle 21.7), who formally could be any official couldbeanyofficial rticle 21.7),whoformally iously, holdersof“A2”posts,thisqualifies issobecause the juniornature oftheposts posts requiredonlyschool-level appointing powersforentry-level erefore, from thedistributionof under thishiringscheme (more appointing scheme closertothe ny ofthem didnotrequireany withinfederalministries and ned thepowersofunitary nge. Thus, for example, with nge. Thus,forexample, with onlyofanominal nature, rnance theappointment toas to aregime oflowerformal at thediscretionofhead heme ‘weakstructured on theintensity with administrative

CEU eTD Collection qualified asopenpoliticization. Therefore, theappointingscheme operatingatth of informal decision-making au regard tooutcomes oftheappoint relations existinginagivenbureau,theymay ex administrative appointingauthorityarenotautonom are (Meyer-Sahling2003:50).Inotherwords,ashol political discretion,thelessconf politicization. Itissobecausepowerholders administrative characterofdecision-making author authorities –unitarypolitical can bequalifiedas as farproceduralconstraint vacancies nor aformal recruitment procedure(inf combined with thefactsthatFZ appointing decisionswithin thelimits, imposed by collective juries, whichconsist of political, and aregime ofstructuredpoli groups ofbureaucraticposts.It institutionalized different degree component ofRussia’spersonnelpolicyregime underFZ-119. Asonecanseethelaw chapter. to therulesgoverningsystem ofpromotion, whic entry-level thiscohortitwasnotabletoautoma answer to this question isinthenegative, becau bureaucratic system, allowingacohortofpatronage As framework offormal politicaldiscretion Table 2.8 Does thismean thatthisappointingscheme

summarizes theformal-legal fram open politicization. s areconcerned,apersonnelpolicy is aregime ofopenpol -119 institutionalizedneitherthe s on a personnel policy decisions ining theproceduralconstraintsonapersonnelpolicydecisions and unitaryadministrative, desp ticization for therest of thepos s of politicalcontrolinappoint ment process.Powerholdersaremo thority, the less restrictive theprocedural constraints are. ‘may beable toexercisesome kindof 74 perience some influencefrom with powerholders tically progressassuchupthecareerladderdue tically administrative andautonomous actors, make se even ifacohortofpatronage formed atthe suggests thisholdsunderbothdecision-making ormal interviewinstead), itbecomes clearthat, qualifyingrequirements andother procedural e levelofmost juniorbureaucraticpostsis undermines themeritocr ous actors but form apartofwebpower ous actorsbutform ders ofthepostscat ity isapropertyofregime ofstructured h arediscussedingreater toform We andprogress? arguethatthe iticization atthelevel ework governing appointment-relating public disclosureofentry-level regime oftheentry-levelposts ment issuesacross different ite thefactthataunitary ts (80%). Inthe latter case re likelytoassume therole egory “C”actingasan of most juniorposts atic nature of the atic natureofthe detaillaterinthe indirect

CEU eTD Collection 1995 31, July of Law N Federal 119-FZ Source: junior) most 1 (entry-level, 2 (junior) 3 (intermediate) 4 (senior) 5 (most senior) Rank ofthePost Table 2.8AppointingSchemes,Authorized byFZ-119 experts) and independent actors administrative political and (collegial, including contestjury Vacancy (“C” official) (“C” official) actor administrative official) or political(“A2” Unitary Appointing Authority On the Fundamentals of the State Service of the Russian Federation 75 have rightto appeal candidates Rejected votes, Jury Formal examination, Informal interview have rightto appeal candidates Rejected votes; Jury check; Formal credentials Procedure Appointing of thelegislation Significant knowledge experience; Significant practical the post; relating tothe natureof education inthefield Higher professional legislation Knowledge ofthe practical experience; Minimal ornone the post; relating tothe natureof education inthefield Middle professional legislation Good knowledge ofthe Practical experience; ‘Public management’; nature ofthe post orin education relatingtothe Higher professional Discretionary: Obligatory: Selection Criteria Obligatory: Discretionary: Obligatory: personal professional and attitudes, both skills, abilitiesand desirable competences, personal professional and attitudes, both skills, abilitiesand desirable competences,

CEU eTD Collection is limited tothebottom ofth policy regime toanother.Consider political discretionsuggests,the policy –promotion,demotionandhorizontaltransfer This sectionanalyzestheprovisionsofFZ-119 2.4.3 Promotion,DemotionandHorizontal Transfers level poststhanforotherranks. lower ranks(Bossaert while inmost ofthedevelopedc feature, assimilar patternswereobservedac levels offormal politicization w administrative actor,isonlyminimally restrained constraints. Intheformercase appointment rules. careers iseffectivelyafunction ofadegree from thepromotionprocess,andimportance of accordance withtheexistinghiringru are opentobothexternalandinternal candidatesandadvancemen specific setofrules.Instead,inaposition-based a position-based system doesnot is aso-calledposition-basedsyst times. In-betweenthesetwosche demoted ortransferred toaposition inanother st openly politicizedperso which effectively excludes politicians from thepr career ladderisgovernedbythepr et al nnel policyregime, inwhichbureaucra 2001), Russiaexhibitsahigherdegreeofpoliticalcontrolforentry- e ladderandlateral , theappointingauthority,repres ithin thesame personnel policy regime is notaunique Russian em (World Banks2006b).Incontrast ountries thedegreeofpol mes, governingpost-hiringdomain ofpersonnelpolicies,there constitute adistinctive pers degree ofpoliticaldiscretionin aclassicalcivilservicesystem inciple ofseniority(e.g.the les. Therefore,herepoliticians arenotcompletely excluded ross theworld(PageandWrite 1999).However, 76 political discretion inbuilt intotheadmission and system allvacantposts,regardless of theirrank, relating toapost-hiring ructural unit) atthepowerholders’ willatall theirroleinmaking shapingbureaucrats’ and in its decisions. The existence of different initsdecisions.Theexistenceofdifferent entries arelimited. Here progressalongthe omotion process.Thisisincontrasttoan s. Astheanalyticalframework offormal itical controlisge onnel policyarea,governed bya ts canbepromoted (aswellas ented byaunitarypoliticalor inwhichentrytobureaucracy length ofcontinuousservice), theseareas differs from one t inrankiscarried outin toaclassical domain ofpersonnel nerally lowerforthe civil service, CEU eTD Collection candidates atalllevelsof dominance oftheSoviet-eracad seemed asanoptimal solution: itwouldinhi hands ‘aretied’throughtheope apparatus capableofhandlingthetask inhand.Th alienate theSovietbureaucracy,hisenormous program ofreformrequiredpeopleinthestate candidates, educatedandsociali decades. Atthesame time, Parshinsays,itwouldimpede theinflux,aboveentry level,of recruits, whowouldprogressup interview with theauthor that theadoption of a State RegulationoftheEconomy atRussia’sMi Economic FoundationsofStateServiceReform option forRussia’spolitical leader Bank 2006a).Amore plausibleexplanationis,howev bureaucracy orfrom outside,tofillthepos of aclassical justification that this system enables the best-suited candidate, be itfrom withinthe contest between bothexternaland system inwhich all vacancies, apart from theentry-level ones, weresubjected to a competitive exposure tothepoliticalpressure.Thedevelope powerholders from thepromotion process,thuscred would havefittedthis purposebetter than bureaucratic subordinateandher of Russia’spublicbureaucracy reform wasto system doesRussia employ? Andwhywasthispart initiative (Article(9.1.5). In 9.1.6) andmatchedthis bytheright of bureaucrats to FZ-119 thatrelatedtopromotion. With thisin mind thefirst questions this se Russian legislators putbureaucr thebureaucraticladder. other words,FZ-119treated prom zed inthepost-Sovietera.Although BorisYeltsinwantednotto n characteroftheadmission pro The lawguaranteedbureaucrats th internal candidates. Theofficialexplanation followedthelogic the bureaucratic ladde res, allowing atthesametime for theinflow of qualified political master (Yuzakov2005: ship oftheday.Maxim Parshin, ats andnotpoliticiansatthe center ofthoseprovisions t (Koichumanov Lukashenko2004:41-43;World and 77 bit boththeopenpolitical rs ofFZ-119, however,optedforaposition-based a position-basedsystem because itexcludes eradicate thesystem ofdependencebetweena closed system wouldhavebenefitedSoviet-era and Anti-CorruptionPolicyoftheDivision erefore, aposition-system inwhichpoliticians’ nistry ofEconomic Deve ction seekstoanswer icular design chosen?” Sincetheprimary icular designchosen?” aim ibly isolating bureaucrat participate invacancy contestsontheirown er, thataclosedcareersystem wasnotan r anddominate the stateapparatus for cess andmerit-ba otion notastheprivilege of 17),acareer-basedsystem e righttopromotion (Article headoftheDepartment of are: “What promotion intervention and the interventionandthe ic subordinatesfrom lopment saidinan sed selection CEU eTD Collection inactive during Yeltsin’s presidency. presidency. Yeltsin’s during inactive any case, the provision for cadre reserves as a promotion instrument has never been further developed and remained or was it apersonnel instrument meant to compensate for the powerholders’ diminished control (Huskey 2004)? In to institutionalizeseniority-based Was 2003). attemptit an hasremained unclear (Lobacheva instrument this for The of personnel purpose promotion’. mechanisms hadthecapacitytoinhibitopenpolitic established byFZ-119andthePresidentialde and proceduresofpromotion,theywereinfactthemechanisms ofadmissionandappointment, 28 in herabilities todetermine the outcome ofthevacancycontest. should havefacedaformal recruitment processin to theservice (hand-picked, informal andnon-competitive jobinterview), junior bureaucrats freely climbing the‘rungs’ ofthe is, itprohibitedacohortofpatr adoption ofaposition-basedsystemhadanadded of promotion hadnoadverseaffect (internal andexternal) bythevacancycontest rulesandprocedures. powerholders buttherightofbureaucrats,limite such additionalworkmust havebeenavailable possibility, itseems thatinprac career pathofchosen,andth powerholders wereable toplace preferred candida her astronger contender forsuch posts when of thiskindcouldalsoallowth could make abureaucratreceptiveto theinformal capacity ofre-creating promote’ apreferredpublicservant.The same level).Inotherwords,thatprovisional additional dutiesofanotheradministrative postin of Article21.9FZ-119.Accordingtothisartic It should be noted that Article 8.2 of FZ-119 mentioned cadre reserves as pools of acting bureaucrats ‘nominated A further pointtoconsider isthe potential im a kindofenvironment pertainingto promotion, when long

erefore dependent,individuals. onage, whichcouldpotentiallybeformed attheentry-level,from e bureaucrattoaccumulate apos tice theopportunitiesfor bureaucratic ladder.I onthenatureofthisarea ad hoc lowed powerholdersanopportunityto‘temporarily -serving officials receivea regime ofmost favoredtreatment 78 cree N604.Since,asdiscussedabove,those d onlybythesimilar rightofotherjob-seekers whichtheirpolitical pa pressureoftheformer. Temporary promotion le abureaucratcould,byconsent,takeonthe for powerholders tooffer ittothe preferred the given agency (duties of a lower, higheror the givenagency(dutiesofalower, tes inthe position of influence, and shapethe al intervention,theirapp they become opentocontest.Inthisway value fromade-politicizationviewpoint,that pact onthepowerholders’roleinpromotions natureof‘temporary promotions’ hadthe ndeed, afterarelativelyeffortlessentrance this tooccurwerelimited. Firstofall, patronage, e.g. a politician’s favor patronage, e.g.apolitician’sfavor Whilst Article21.9made thisa personnelpolicy.Moreover,the ition-related experience,making 28 Astothespecific rules tron waslimited in law lication tothedomain CEU eTD Collection of aposition-based bureaucracy inwhichpromotion didnotconstitute aseparate personnel policy degree, invalidatingitslargel unlikely tochangethecharacterofpromoti prolonged illnessesandmaternity cover.Inot available thehigherupranks youascendandmost likely subordinate. Giventhepyramidal st politicians’ abilitytoinfluence downgrade bureaucratorsendhertoanother agen personnel policyregime establishedbyFZ-119.The lo absolute minimum. Thesepersonnel policyareas horizontal politicaldiscretionisclosetothe transfersasareasinwhichthedegree of formal latter isentitledtodefendin would beaseriousbreachofthelaboragreemen manager fromherregularorganizationfortemporary assignment elsewherewithoutherconsent obligation oftheemployer –the bureaucrat. Importantly, FZ-119qualifiedtheneed require’ (Article21.10).However,th distinctive personnelinstrument th demoted horiz official(Article9.2).Temporary to relegateabureaucrat,sheexposesherself legal the lawdidnotfurnishpow bureaucratic remuneration andevendismissal (Ar arise (Article24.1),FZ-119legislat bureaucrat’s qualificationsandcompetenciesdo mobility withinthepublicbureaucracy. Althoughth horizontal transfers.Astode almost completelystrippedpoliticiansofsu To sum up,from the1990supto2000s,Russi In additionto‘tyingpoliticians’ hands’ on erholders with thispolicy instrument y de-politicizednature. motion, thelawdidnotprovideforanymechanism ofdownward thecourt(Article9.2).Therefore,weevaluatedemotion and the day-to-dayworkofbureaus. at canbeusedbythebureaucrat’s state (Article15.1.6).Therefore, ed totacklethei e lawruledthatitcouldbedone ructure ofthebureaucraticranks,thisislesslikelytobe ch personnelpolicyinstruments asdemotion and on component ofthepersonnelpolicyregime toa 79 her words,theapplicat ontal transferswerementioned byFZ-119asa t betweenthe stateandtheemployee, whichthe notcorrespondtothepost’srequirements can the issues relating toupward mobility, FZ-119 ticle 14.1)butnotrelegation.Inorderwords, toobtainthebureaucrat’sconsentas ssue throughtraininga ere wasrecognitionthatasituation whena are clearlyde-politici cy worksasaconsiderable constrainton w credibilityofthepow prosecution which can be initiated by the prosecution whichcanbeinitiatedbythe an publicbureaucracyfollowed thetenets . If a politician, however, decides . Ifapolitician,however,decides under circumstances suchas thedetachment ofapublic superior when ‘office needs superiorwhen‘officeneeds onlywiththe ion ofArticle21.9was zed elements of the the of zed elements nd theadjustment of erholders’ threatto consent ofthe CEU eTD Collection regime. classifies these personnel policyareasasade-p allowed politiciansaverylimited accesstodemo their careers–astheyhadto political influence –towhichju personnel regime. Moreover,aposition-basedprom of apoliticizedpe powerholders. If theabilitytofire abureaucrat at Dismissals constituteanotherdistinctivesetofpersonnelpolicyinst 2.4.4 Dismissal bureaucraticranks,thoserulesha (out offive) arena, butwasregulatedbythe politicians hadanextended accesstothedismi reorganization ofastate body, hada Article 16, whichdealt with the legal status bureaucrat canalsobelaidoffupontheattainme the abovementioned circumstances, Article25–devotedtodismissals –stipulatedthata restrictions (Table2.10)imposed bylawonthest (Table 2.6),nineconditionsst dismissed byhersuperior.Sevenconditionsrelatedtothecompliance totheeligibility criteria to assessthenatureofthiscompone conditions establishedbyFZ-119, politicians’ authorityandotherpr this toolislimited. Itisachievedthroughth The sheernumber oftheconditionsunder which FZ-119 specifiedthirty-one

rsonnel policyregime, thendepoliticized climb upthebureaucraticladderthroughformal contests.FZ-119 emmed from theobligations (Table2.9) andthirteen from the norms ofadmissions andappoint nior bureaucratswere under whichpowerholdersmay exer ocedural constraints.Thesecti nt ofRussia’spersonnelpolicyregime. conditions underwhichabureaucratcouldbelawfully clause ondismissal aswell. e imposition oftheconditio 80 oliticized constituent of tion andhorizontaltran of bureaucrats in case of the liquidation or of bureaucratsincasetheliquidationor nt ofthemaximum limit age (60).Inaddition, ate employees. Inadditiontotheemergence of ssal tool.However,the useofthedismissal will at any pointof timeisakeycharacteristic d thepropertiesofast otion system hadthecapacitytoinhibit a bureaucratcouldbela supposedlyexposed bureaucracies powerholders’access to ons thatfollowslooksatthe ment. Governingthetopfour Russia’spersonnelpolicy sfers, whichundoubtedly cise their authority so as cise theirauthoritysoas ruments availableto ructurally politicized nality clauseonthe in thebeginningof id offsuggeststhat CEU eTD Collection 1995 31, July of Law N Federal 119-FZ Source: as tomake theuseofthispersonnelinstrument prohibitive restriction onbureaucratsconductingentrepreneur court. However,intheoverw information onherincome wouldhavebeensuffi problem powerholders.Amissed deadlineby for would losethecase.Insome cases,theprovisi had therightstoappealinc powerholder hadto have evidence thatthe conditionality was met. Givenalso that bureaucrats authority was alsoconstrained asforeachof nn 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

information (Article10.6) implementation offederalandregi To ensurethe supremacy of thenormsof theConstitution of theRussianFederationand the that belongstothebureaucratbyth To submit annuallytothestate 10.7) To maintain aqualification leveladequate for the with thenorms andprocedures organizations, stateorgansandlo To considerinatimely fashionrequests To executetheordersofseniorofficial To protecttherightsandlawfulinterests ofRussianci Not todisclosuresensitiveinformation, incl To properlyperform thepost’sduties (Article 10.2) To comply withtheinternal Table 2.9BasicDutiesoftheStateServantunderFZ-119 ourt theevidencemust belegally helming majority ofcases, i regulations ofthestateorgan established bythefederalandre tax serviceinformationaboutth cal selfgovernment authorities On the Fundamentals of the State Service of the Russian Federation onal legislation (Article10.1) e rightofownership(Article12.1) s, exceptforillegal ofcitizens,non-governmental andforprofit 81 on oflegallysoundevidencedidnotrepresenta theaforementionedgrounds fordismissal the

uding classifiedinform Content ial activity,theburden a bureaucratfortheannualsubmission ofthe cient forapowerholder tosustain thecase in

proper fulfillment of thepost’sduties (Article tizens (Article10.3) sound; otherwisethepowerholder and rulesforhandlingofficial llustrated, for instance, bythe ones (Article10.4) e taxableincome andproperty gional legislation(Article10.5) and addressthem inaccordance ation (Article10.8) of proofwassoheavy

CEU eTD Collection powerholder looses the case. official in question either gave up her Russian citizen or acquired citizenship of another state, otherwise the 30 29 1995 31, July of Law N Federal 119-FZ Source: fire abureaucrat(onthegrounds completely excludedthe possibility succeed withcontrived evidence,themajority of bureaucrats couldbelaidoff. this assumption isplausible,itnotuniversa on the executive (see Lambert-Mogiliansky executive the on 30 nn 13 12 11 10 For example, in order to fire a bureaucrat under the citizenship condition a powerholder must have proof that the the that a must proof powerholder have to Forexample,fire condition the in order under citizenship a bureaucrat Especially, when you consider such a settingasRussia wh 2 1 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 orbringaboutprotractedlitigation becauseweak evidencecould beinsufficientto instantly One may saythatpoliticianscouldproduce

Not totakepartin 11.9) foreign organizationswithoutthepermission ofth Not toaccept decorations, honoraryandspecialtitl Not toreceivepayment forpublicationorpublicta employed (Article11.5) Not toactan agent/representative of thirdparties toa stateorgan where abureaucratis Not toconductentrepreneur (article 11.1) Not toengageinanyotherpaidactivity,except To placeintrustmanagement securitiesand/or Not tobepaidbyindividualsorlegalenti groups, includingnon-governmental organizations (Article11.12) government legislativeorgans(Article11.2) Not tobeamember oftheFederalorregional by legislation(Article11.4) Not tobeamember ofthegoverningbodya property availabletoapub Not tousefornon-officialpurposesequipment, financeandinformation andanyotherstate Not togoonbusinesstripsabroadattheexpens Not usetherightsandprivileges Table 2.10Restrictions,Arisingfrom strikes (Article11.11)

If undersome circumstances thepowerholder could verywell lic servant(Article11.6) Bureaucracy, UnderFZ-119 of, say,abureaucratactingasthe ial activitypersonallyorthrough agents(Article11.3) forthepowerholdertosustain et al of astateservant inthe interest 2007). 2007). On the Fundamentals of the State Service of the Russian Federation lly applicableacrossallthe conditions underwhich 82 ties forcarryingoutpost’

ere judicialauthority hasbeen reported being dependent weak evidence andstillwinthecase. Content theconditions fordismissal eitheralmost theMembershipinRussia’sPublic legislatures orlegislativeorganoflocalself- shares abureaucrat may own(Article11.13) for profitorganization,unlessotherwise isruled e ofindividualsorlegalentities(Article11.10) for teaching, researchorothercreating activity e PresidentoftheRussi lks deliveredasapublicservant(Article 11.7) es offoreignstates the caseusingweakevidence agent ofathir s ofpoliticalparties,interests s duties(Article11.8) or internationaland an Federation(Article d partyinthe 29 While

CEU eTD Collection bureaucrats. powerholders wouldextensivelyuse difficult forthosebureaucratswho – thatare difficult, if notimpossible, toovertu motivated dismissal decisionsintoarguments –suchasbudgetconstraintsandapolicy’schange allows powerholders(notonlyin circumstances underwhichsuchachangewouldbeacceptableaslegally soundevidence. This in thepolitical(rather thanlegal)field, itisdiffi a needforchangeinthe formal structureofanindividual bureau orgovernment asawholelies condition fordismissal fromade-politicizedbureaucracy viewpoint.Sincetherighttodetermine 32 31 cadres reserve(Article16.2). employ abureaucratinanother responsibilities ofthepostshe made redundantshould havebeenoffered apositi staff reduction,FZ-119introduceda‘safetynet’measure. First prolonged litigationmade theblat state organs).Therefore, from theformal politicaldiscretionviewpointAr (Article 3). candidate from thereservewasoneoftwopre-c posts forthe members ofcadres reserves. In partic Presidential decreeN604thatspecifiedthemechanism ofthepriority accesstobureaucratic access tonewly availablebureaucraticjobs reserves hasbeenasthepoolsofformer bureau the cadres reserves’ membership carried, the predominant legal interpretation of thecadres The existence of the vacancy itself was another precondition. precondition. itself was another the vacancy existence of The also beof A bureaucrat shall Reorganization ofbureaus,authorizedbyArti In ordertoprotectbur 32 Becausethe membership incadres reserveswaslimited toex-bureaucrats only, boththenecessitytopr fered atraining course when su eaucrats from unfair 31

Althoughthelawdidnotmake itcl held –inanotheragency(Artic bureau immediately, ant useofpoliticaldismissals Russiabutaroundtheworld)to are dismissed byreorganization,it this clause asaformal excuse 83 (Lobacheva 2003).ItwasnotFZ-119butthe rn. Astherecourse tolegal action is extremely esent legallysoundevidenceandtheprospectof onditions forthecalling ofthevacancycontests cult toenvisagetheexistence ofaformal listof dismissals throughstruct ticle 3ofPD-604didnot expandthescopeof on –withdueaccount toherqualification and crats whopossessedtheprivilegeofpriority ch is available (Article 16.2) (Article16.2) ch isavailable cle 16ofFZ-119,wasthemost problematic ular, itruled that the she shouldhavebecome amember ofa prohibitiveforpowerholders. le 16.1).Ifitwasimpossibleto of all,bureaucratswhowere ear whatrightsandprivileges forgettingridofvexatious ‘wrapup’theirpolitically is plausibletoassume that ural reorganization or ural reorganizationor absence ofasuitable CEU eTD Collection by reorganizationbriningmuch ofthe an areabelonging toastructured politicization t of formal politicaldiscretionand 33 personnel. Althoughthenumber offo attractiveness ofthispersonneltool the dismissed officials,e.g.thedismissed the powerholders’ authority over admissions. Atthesame time, asthelawrequiredtore-employ initiate reorganizationor toput the endon public agenciesallowedpoliticianstheeasiest acce of politically motivated dismissals prohibitive. court bythedismissed bureaucrats.Theburdenof powerholders tohavelegallysoundevidence,as theirdecisionscouldhavebeenbechallengedin federal legislation,e.g.as Federation thatadopted specialstatutes oncadre re servicelaw2003theoverwhelming of thenewcivil preferred candidates.Atthesame city’s cadres reserve and then that usingthisstatuteasaformal excuseSt.Petersburg’spower nominate representativesformember December 2001thecity passedthe ordinanceN occurs. Considertheexample oftheauthorities of St.Petersburg,report they prefertoseeastheirbur bureaucrats. Ifpowerholdersmanage tograntthecadrereverses’ membership incentives forpowerholderstoexpandthememb permitting the fillingof bureaucr dismissal by reorganization personnel tool by powerholders. remain unemployed or up to 12 months. These financial considerations were also a factor preventing mass abuse of Manyregional laws required that the dismissed bureaucrat To sum up,FZ-119made itdifficultforpowerhol With regardtocadrereserves,itshouldbe pools ofex-bureaucrats.

eaucratic subordinates, agreate employ withoutholdingformal c time, Lobacheva(2003)reportsth the strengthofproce atic positions withoutholdi for powerholdersmay havediminished. rmal reasonsfordismissal was ship ofthe city’s cadres reserv ‘politicization’ tothisdomain. did notleavethebureaucracypermanently, the 84 existing bureau altogetherbelonged topoliticians The provisiononreorganization (liquidation) of ype ofpersonnelpolicyre evidencewasheavyenoughastomake theuse s were to continue receiving their pay aslong as they 1406-ra allowinglocalyouthorganizationsto ss tothedismissal instrument sincetherightto ership of thecadres noted that Article 3 of PD-604 – effectively noted thatArticle3ofPD-604–effectively serves interpreted them asinlinewiththe majority ofthose21regionstheRussian dural constraints charact ders toarbitrarily r politicizationofthebureaucracy holders wereabletopopulatethe ng vacancy contests–created at bythetime oftheadoption ontests acertainnumber of rather high,thelawrequired e. Itisplausible toassume reserves beyondtheex- ed byHuskey(2004).In gime, with dismissals lay offbureaucratic 33 tothoseindividuals erize dismissals as Overall,thelevel CEU eTD Collection 34 bureaucracy reform thathadstalled duringYeltsin’slastyearsofpresid authorities, operating procedures).Althoughformally separa into placestandardizedproceduresformaki government, elimination ofunnecessaryfunctions delimitation ofpowersandclarification measures aimed torationalizethe performan tenure, payanddiscipline.Anotherone,known as‘administrativereform’, includedvarious the issuesofpersonnelmanagement, includingi reform oftwocomponents. Oneofthem, consisted knownas‘stateservicereform’, focusedon initiative andguaranteedallforms to createabureaucracythatprotected private economic reformwas crisis,andtheaimof inefficiency ofthestateapparatus wasthe ma 2004). InhisfirstpresidentialaddresstotheFederal AssemblyonJuly82000,Putinsaidthat State governancereform wasamajor priorityofVladimir Putin 2.5 BureaucraticReformunderPutin’sFirstTerm result ofastructuralreorganiza and waslargelyunconstrained.FZ-119provided membership. subordinates getan unproblematic accessto bureaucrats astoensurethatt created theincentiveforpower could behiredtoanewlyavailabl membership inthecadresreserve. Asthelawstipulatedthat themembers ofcadresreserves post inanother agency, re-trainingorapriv The first component was overseen by the Executive Office of President, while the second by the prime-minister. 34 bothpolicydomains representedapurposef

hose individualswhotheypreferre tion oftheagencyorstaffreduc e bureaucraticpostswithouttaking holders toextendthepoolofcadresreservesbeyondex- of ownershiprights(Putin2000). ng, approvingandimplementing decisions(standard ileged accesstonewlyavailable poststhoughthe 85 in reason forthe protracted anddeep-reaching the bureaucracy through thecadresreserve’ revenue sourcesbetweenvariouslevelsof ce ofgovernmental organizations,suchas ted, andevenformally overseenbydifferent and wasteful duplication of work, and puttingand wastefulduplication ofwork,and ssues of recruitment, promotion, securityof bureaucrats, whoweremade redundantasa ul attempt toreinvigoratethepublic tion, witha‘safetynet’:similar ’s firstpresid d tohaveastheirbureaucratic

part inavacancycontest,it Putin’s publicbureaucracy ency. The section that ency. Thesectionthat ential term (2000- CEU eTD Collection FZ-58 was only about n about only was FZ-58 discharge ofthe statepowers carried out Putin ( (then thedeputyheadofExecutiveOffice by aworkinggroupattheExecutiveOfficeofRussia’sPresident,chairedDmitry Medvedev 36 35 translated into twofederal laws– in mid-2001 when The personnelmanagement component ofthepub 2.5.1 ChoosingtheNewLaw’s Concept with thatofthe1990speriod. evaluate the nature of the pers follows analysesthepersonnelmanagement component since January2005. management issuesinorganizationsofpublic law – subject ofjointjurisdic central government, civilse while thearmyandlaw-enforcement serviceare types ofthestate servicesubordinatedtothe having commonlegalandorganizationalfoundations (civil service, intheparlance of thelaw),military andlaw-enforcing services (Article 2),all fulfillment ofthepowers of bringing toitscentrethenotion system post asthebuildingblockofRussia’s Presidential Decrees,adopted 58, 27.05.2003)andOntheStateCivilServiceSystem It is important to note that although FZ-58 did not distinguish between professional activities pertaining to the Fora detailed account see Huskeyand Obolonsky (2003). Пр On theState CivilServiceSystem -1496 ofAugust15,2001). The on-elected officials.

Concept oftheStateServiceReformRussianFederation tion ofthecentralgovernment andre thestate(Article1.1). rvice canbeoffederal law renounced the idea of the state inthefollowingyears.Thefirstlawrenouncedideaofstate

onnel policyregime currentlyexis by elected and non-elected by elected On theSystem ofStateServicetheRussianFederation of stateservice–professiona 35 Mostof theideas contained inthe Concept –isalegalstatutethathasgovernedpersonnel 86 bureaucracy atbothcentraland regional levels ofgovernance,containedinFZ-119,instead Russia’s President), was lic bureaucracy reform was formally launched lic bureaucracyreformwasformally 36 or regionallevels,with Stateserviceconsists ofpublicbureaucracy ofPutin’sadministrative reform soasto (Article 3.1).FZ-58alsostipulatedthat officials, law made Article1.2 the of itclearthat (FZ-79, 27.07.2004)–andanumber of gional authorities.Anotherfederal ting in Russiaandtocompare it l activity pertaining tothe approved byPresident thelatteronebeinga , developed (FZ- were CEU eTD Collection Kasyanov see State Duma onJuly72004andsignedbyPresiden agenda –tomodify thedraftin effort –usingitsstatusoftheengineforchange however, upuntilsummer2004astheMinistry of Economic DevelopmentandTrade putalotof draft andsubmit ittoparliament bymid Ap recruitment toretirement. ‘revolutionary act’that willcomprehensively c 38 37 April 3,2003,receivedtheapprova Vremia MN2003).Thedraft,pres vacancy contest juries (30-50%)and secret elimination ofpoliticalappointments tobureaucratic posts, more externalrepresentatives in bureaucrat’ (Vremia MN2003).Atthesame time, dismissal procedurethatwould‘exemptthestat component making up50%inthestructureof basic lawonpublicbureaucracy. tosee during Putin’sfirstterm.MEDTwanted the Ministry ofEconomicDevelopment andTrad not come intobeing(Arkhangelskaya2003). the governmentshouldinsteadworkonthose40 drafter ofthe1995lawVladimir their doubtswhetheranewlawisnecessaryatall. changes wereofsuchaminor naturethatmany the jury)andveryrestrictedoppo promotion system, vacancycontestjurieswith provided for thecompetitive entry tomost of thepostsinpublicbureaucracy, position-based Asimilar view was expressed by some scholars of public administration (see Starilov 2004: 15). Mikhail law the with prime-minister of authors meeting the the of of press-coverage listof Foracomprehensive FZ-79 wasdraftedbytheMinistryofLa http://www.garweb.ru/conf/president/20030313/smi/index.htm 37 Thedraft,however,wasverysimilar totheexistingFZ-119. It

accordancewithitsownvision. Yuzakov saidthattherewasnopoi rtunities forpowerholderstodismiss bureaucrats.The proposed ented bytheMOLtoprime-minister MikhailKasyanovon l oftheprime-minister, who or Specifically, MEDTarguedfor‘payperformance’ voting procedures (Bekker 2003b, Semenova 2002, voting procedures(Bekker2003b,Semenova 38 ril 2003(Bekker2003b).Ithadnotbeendone, , thedrivingforcebehindmuchofpresidential 87 TheMOL’sdraftwasalsostronglyopposedby independent experts(25% ofthecomposition experts inthegovernment andoutsideexpressed over allstages ofpersonnelmanagement from more NewPublicManagement elements inthe bureaucratic pay (Bekker 2003b) and such a bureaucraticpay(Bekker2003b)andsucha e from responsibilitiestowardsanineffective statutes thatwererequiredbyFZ-119andhad Thus,aparliament member andtheprinciple e (MEDT)–the center t PutinonJuly272004,wasmuchcloserto bor (MOL),andwaspromised tobea in civil service spirit MEDT argued for the in civilservicespiritMEDTarguedforthe .

The finaldraft,passedbythe dered the MOL to finalize the dered theMOLtofinalize nt in adopting a new law, and nt inadoptinganewlaw,and of reform initiatives CEU eTD Collection category “A” under FZ-119) and therefore, inthe 40 39 119. therefore the bureaucratic ladderhasbeenexte of posts,representingdifferentlevelsresponsib bureaucracy functions ofthepolicyprocessa of the1995law.Thesepostsarechargedwith elected officialschargedwithpolicyformulation responsibilities), category ‘managers’correspondtothepostsof of thecategoriesposts(Article9)cont categories: managers, advisers,sp The lawOn theState CivilService System 2.5.2 TheStructureofGovernanceunderFZ-79 2005 andisthestatusthatgove the originalMOL’sversi considered indetailbelow. hands inpersonneldecisionsrelatingto hire, fireandpromote ofthecategory‘m employees political judgment. Whilst elected 22.2.2 ofFZ-79stipulatethatappointments toa information andanalyticalsupportto‘manag ‘advisers’ match thepostsof careers overalonger time-horizon The extended bureaucratic ladder was seen as offering be ofthe posts holding the administration (just asindividuals in public areemissariesofpoliticians ‘Managers’ 40 Another twocategories–‘specialists’and‘suppo Thesepostsaresubjecttoseparatesets per se . ‘Specialists’and‘supportingspecialists’ on thantotheonethatMEDTstoodupfo (interview with M. Parshin).

rns thepersonnelpolicyinRussi the category“B”ofFZ-119(provision oforganizational, ecialists andsupportingspecialists nd, inthelanguageofthisdi officials suchasthepresident, the postsofcategory‘advisors’. language of this dissertation, ‘powerholders’. ‘powerholders’. dissertation, this of language (FZ-79)dividedallbureau 88 ers’). Similarly toFZ-119,Articles22.2.1and ained in the law suggests that positions of the ained inthelawsuggeststhatpositionsof nded byafurther 3ranksascompared toFZ- tter incentives for bureaucrats to plan and develop their develop and plan to bureaucrats for tter incentives of hiring,firingandpromotionrulesthatare the category‘A2’of therule-making andpolicyimplementation nd dismissal from postsaresubjectto these ility. Eachsubsetismade upoffourranks, anagers’ attheirwill,‘managers’ havefree rting specialists’–match thecategory“C” are twosubsetsofthesame category a’s publicbureaucracycurrently. theprime-minister orgovernors ssertation, constitutethepublic r. Itcame into forceinJanuary 39 whilstpostsofthecategory (Article 9).Thedescription FZ-119 (thesearenon- cratic posts intofour CEU eTD Collection Similarly toFZ-119,FZ-79endowsa 2.5.3 PersonnelPolicyArrangementsunderFZ-79 bureaucrats andrepresentatives of regime. Thevacancy contests,adjudicated by opportunities forcontrolthantheyhadunderFZ-119. properties ofade-politici discretion stageoftheappointi decisions by the written requirements for the a jobseeker,withthepost’srequirements. Performed entails atechnicalcomparison betweeneducatio of professionalcredentials (interview withM. cost ofinterviewingthosecandidateswhohaveno the ‘compliance totheminimal pos discretion compared tothesitu recruitment process on thegrounds of eligib possibility forpowerholdersto The removal oftheresidualdecision-maker atth statements thatareconsideredtruthful aslong instead requiring jobseekers tosubmit anumber FZ-119: itdroppedtheideaofaspeci (Article 22.5). Inrelation totheeligibilityte the eligibility testorher professional creden jobseeker shall notbeadmitted tothe vacancycontest stage of therecruitment processifshe fails professional credentials ofjob-s principal hiringandpromotion devise,specifying state service ontheirown initiative (Article21.1) Article 16andidenticaltothose Hiring hasalsoremained alargely de-politi zed public bureaucracy, allowing powerholders even fewer zed publicbureaucracy,allowingpowerholders evenfewer ng process.Insummary,theadmission rulesunderFZ-79 exhibit ation thatexisted underFZ-119. Anewconditionality criterion– stop jobcandidatesprogressingto eekers’ (Article22.1).Inaddition contained inFZ-119) withtherighttoseekemployment inthe ‘educational, scientific and t’s requirements’ –wasintroducedwith theinte ll Russiancitizens(meeting eligib al authoritythatverifiesthe tials donotmeet theminimal post’srequirements st, FZ-79simplified theprocedure comparedwith 89 Parshin).Theimplemen as contraryevidencedoesnotbecomeavailable. nal certificates andot acollective body,consisting ofpoliticians, of documentsandtomake anumberof written post, the credentials check isalow political ility, thussignificantly cized component ofRussia’spersonnel policy andprovidesforthevacancycontest asthe is stageofhiringeffectively eliminated the chance totakethepostduetheirlowlevel that the contest is the‘assessment of the bytheclerical staff thatisguidedintheir other organizations…acting as a vacancyconteststageofthe to this,thelawrulesthat the eligibility of her documents, suppliedby ility criteria, tation ofthisprovision diminishing political diminishing political job candidates, nt tohaltthe stipulated in CEU eTD Collection as theyguidethejuries’decisi evaluation ofjobcandidates,st that PD-112doesnotcontaintheprovisionaboutth political considerations, making surethatthey consisting ofninemembers. Thisarrangement members, twoexpertsinjuriesfeaturingfive or sevenmembers andthreeexpertsinjuries opinion members (Article17). There should beatleast contests juries,which,according modus operandi.Animportantchangerelatesto changes wereintroduced intothe workofthev political and administrative actors aswell independent experts.Atthesametime, afew belongs toacollectivebody,whos 2005. PD-112haspreservedthe central ideaofthe specified inthePresid to bethemajorhiringinstrument. Adetailed independent experts’(Article17,Presidential DecreeN112,February1,2005),havecontinued contest: the category‘specialists’ and‘supportingspecialist formal politicaldiscretiona and theconstraints upon itsexercise, theinstitute ofvacancycontestsallows for alowlevelof both openandsecretballot.Overa the major votingmechanism (Article20),compared toYeltsin’sdegree N604thatpermitted occurred concerningthevotingprocedure–open political discretion,allowsforagreaterde-polit maker (thejury)toadministrative act,whichis One might thinkofthischangeas the juries’evaluationcriteriatobespecifiedin FZ-79 authorizessixconditionsunderwhichth abouttheapplicants’fitness ential DecreeN112(P nd fallswithintheband“C” ressing insteadtheimportance of on-making (Article19).Inother to PD-112,cannotbelessthan25% redistributiontheevaluationaut ll, bothfrom theviewpointof for job serving as the evaluation standards, FZ-79 authorized for jobservingastheevaluation standards,FZ-79authorized e diversityofpreferencesis D-112), signedbyVladimirPutinonFebruary 1, 90 mechanism ofthe vacancycontestsconductwas , according to theanalyticalframework offormal an impersonal fashion and ahead of the contest. animpersonal fashionandaheadofthe do notdominate theprocess.Anotherchangeis icization ofthebureaucracy.Achangehasalso one independentexpertin thenumber ofindependentexpertsonvacancy acancy contests, compared totheYeltsin’s-era provides aconsiderablecounterbalancetothe s’ atherdiscretionwithout runningavacancy vacancy conteststhat simple majority vote wasinstitutionalized as e specialroleofindependentexpertsinthe e headoftheagencyappointspositions – structuredpoliticization. the posts’writtenrequirements achievedbythe the ownership oftheauthority words, insteadoftheexperts’ hority oftheresidualdecision- of thetotalnumberjury the appointing authority juriesfeaturingthree inclusion of CEU eTD Collection commissions), experimentalposts with ‘pay for performance’remuneration scheme. scheme, service in diplomatic missions, cases where bureaucratic organs are created for a fixed-term period (special and other statutory cases when an absent employee is substituted by a fixed-term contractor, graduate employment the formal politicaldiscretionpointofview? brought aboutandwhatisthenatureofthispe future. Twoquestionsarisehere that theycannottakeimmediatel the vacancy contestsand entryexams isthatin thelattercase jobcandidates compete forposts passed theentryexams tocertainposts thatare to newlyavailablebure While the1995lawtreated Article 22.2.5ofFZ-79in condition, relatingtotheappointme regimes andthefifthexhibitsth first fourofthemfallwithin month, includingastatutory30days with theauthor that‘whiletheorganization ofavacancycontest normally takes between 2and 3 Burov from theCivilService Depa personnel policypractitionersadvancedthebett 42 41 Articles 22.2.3, 22.2.4, 22.3, 22.4, 22.2.5. 22.2.5. 22.4, 22.3, 22.2.4, 22.2.3, Articles Article 25 presupposes that fixed-term contracts are concluded under the following circumstances:maternity leave Answering thefirstquestion,boththosewhowere The firstfiveaforementioned conditionsaresi • • • • • •

decree); duties due to thestateof herhealth; as astate secret(in accordan similar responsibilities; appointing of amember ofacadrere appointing tothelowestgradeofposts appointing toapostwhichdutiesareconnected re-appointing ofthebureaucratwhoca re-appointing ofthe bureaucratwhose postwasmade redundanttoapositionof appointing topostsonfixed-te aucratic jobs,the2004 terpreted thenotionofcadresreservedifferentlythanFZ-119did. cadres reservesaspools

the‘structuredpoliticization’ y afterthecompletion oftheentr : whywassuch achange inthemeaning ofcadrereserves e propertiesoftheregime of rtment oftheRostovregionalgove periodbetween thefirstcallfo nt ofthemembers ofcadres ce withthelistofsuchpos rm contracts(Article25); 91 rsonnel policyinstrument from thestandpointof not vacant yet.Thereforethedifferencebetween law sawthem aspoolsofjobseekerswhohad er ‘successionmanagement’ argument. Andrey serve, formed on thecompetitive basis of thecategory‘suppo of ex-bureaucratsentitled milar tothose that existedunderFZ-119:the nnot anylongerperfor involvedinthedesignofFZ-79and totheuseofinfo categoryofthepersonnelpolicy y exam butinthe(unspecified) ‘open politicizat reserves, wasnewinsofaras r applicationsandtheclosing ts, approved byaPresidential 41 rnment saidin

rting specialists’; m thepost-relating tofast-trackaccess rmation classified ion’. Thelast aninterview 42 . CEU eTD Collection prospect of a deferred (and unspecified time-wise) employmentmight discourage some job seekers from staffing powersarejust thesame asinthevacancy contests –constrained. cadres reserveandvacancy contests isthesame politicization’ personnel policy regi circumstances. Italsoappears thatthis perso seems likearationalpolicyresponsetoth apparatus between2002and2012.Therefore,thetransf 45 44 43 2003-2005 Thus, thepreamble tofederalprogram process to bemore flexible similar lines,Konovarguesthatpoolsofpre-qua for asmoothandtimely replacement ofthebureaucrat re-shaped cadrereversesarenothingmore but‘a technicaltoolofthe Trade echoedtheargument ofthe wish, hirepeopleinadvance’.MaximParshinfr person fitforthepostandreadytogoonwithjob allows usto domuch better. Recruiting tothe of thebureaucraticpersonnel…We [thedepartme 2000s, itwasnotasurprisethat consideration the[high–MN]tu day forapplications,department nature asthehiringdecision waseffectively made earlier. politicians’ authoritytoappoint 21 personnel intime…’ (2006:2). collective bodyagainstaset of para Asin the case with the vacancy contests,in cadres reserv 19, 2002. November of N 1336 Decree the Presidential by Approved

It should be noted that ‘hiring inadvance’ is st century Russia’spublic bureaucracy faced a This argument isnotentirely implausible inthe 43 statedthat‘about and‘letgovernmentbodies f meters and compared with the cr

weoftenfoundourselveslaggi 50% ofthebureaucrats a member ofthecadresreserve s needpersonnelassoonth rnover ofstaffthatwehadinthelate1990s–beginning regional practitioners(represent me. Itissobecausetheprotocol not the sameas hiring for an existing vacancy. The Reforming theStateService Reforming 92 nnel toolhastheproperti e accumulated experience andthechanging om theMinistry ofEconomic Development and e contests a jobseeker’s credentials areevaluated by a cadres reservemeans thatwehaveavailablea , in cadres reservecontests the powerholders’ as soonthepostbeco nt –MN]simply couldnotcope.Thenewlaw massive retirement ofbureaucraticpersonnel. lified candidatesallo light of the fact that in the beginning of the thatinthebeginningof light ofthefact ic staff’(interviewwithM.Parshin).Along ormation oftheinstitute ofcadresreserve inkeyposts’would edentials of other job seekers. seekers. job other of edentials ill vacantpositions withqualified ng behindthesmooth replacement 45 Therefore,thenature ofthis e vacanciesarise.Takinginto to a post is only of technical to apostisonlyoftechnical ed by Andrey Burov) that the ed byAndreyBurov)thatthe ofboththeentryexam tothe of theRussianFederation, personnel policy,allowing 44 mes vacant. We, ifyou wed the appointment wed theappointment Atthesame time, the es of the ‘structured be leavingthestate CEU eTD Collection scheme, assessment indicators, medical insurance, working hours and others (Articles 24, 25, 25, 29). citizen who istaking on abureaucraticpost. job contract,concludedbetweenth the post’sresponsibilitiesreferto 28.4), where‘post’sresponsibilities’isalegalte bureaucrat ispossibleonlyifthe official ismoved toapostof written consent(Article28.1).Atthesame time, another agency withinthesame locationorin authority to permanently transfer to horizontal transfers hasalsoremained la within the‘boundedpoliticization’ governed insuchawaythatopen promotions are administered inthesame wayas 46 capital. human agency’s ofthe quality affect the adversely consequently, and, candidates applying for the positions in the cadre reserve. This in turn could produce a weaker pool of job prospects ofthebureaucrat who discussed inmobility upthebur 2.3.3.,temporary transfers –upanddowntheladderwithoutbur terms, islimited. FZ-79alsopermittedpowerholde posts, whosedutiesare similar tothe current du bureaucrat toanotherpostwithout Russia’s personnelpolicy. constraints uponitsexercisepermit ustoevaluate Overall, boththescopeof instrument falls within the‘structured politiciz the scopeofpowerholders’authorityoverprom secondments areonlyasecondarypersonnelpolicyinstrument withatrivia A job contract also includes other job’s terms andconditions, including: rights and obligations of the parties, pay FZ-79 hasmaintained theposition-basedpr politicians’ authority abureaucrattoanotherposition the professionalconten have heldamoreseniorpost the latter’swrittenc sector ofthepersonnelpolicyre e headoftherecruiting agency political interventionisinhib 46 rgely intact. Nowadays powerholders have the rgely intact.Nowadayspowerholdershavethe 93 Therefore,thepowerholders’ability tomove a another geographical area) only with the latter’s another geographicalarea)onlywiththelatter’s ation’ bandofthepers ties ofthebureaucratand, speakinginpractical rm, specified by FZ-79. Article 24.3 states that rm, specifiedbyFZ-79.Article24.3statesthat omotion system,introducedbyFZ-119,where hiring asalargelyde-po first-time appointment atransferwithoutwrittenconsentofthe otions. Overall,thepr eaucratic laddermay enhancethepromotion eaucratic consent(Article 30).Although,as rs toexercisetemporary(uponemonth) over appointments andthestrengthof onsent isconditionalon t ofthejobthatisparticularizedin similar responsibilities(Article for abriefperiod,short-term (within thesame agencyorin ited, thepromotion alsofalls onbehalfofthestateanda gimes. Aset ofrulesrelating onnel policiesspectrum. s. Andsincehiringis liticized componentof omotion (andrelated l capacitytoextend the availabilityof

CEU eTD Collection bureaucrat to cease the performance her official duties in her duties official to order(Article 17.15). ceasethe tosettlea performance bureaucrat dispute job-relating the within and other associations parties public political use the advantages of the state postfo to itisa the state arestriction unless performance the part to the of officialof organizations, (Article 17.10); duties ofinterests conflict (Article of a situation of the torestriction statementsinrespect 15.12); makemanagement public to inform the an obligation included: conditions new fundamentally The citizenshipinanother. Russian the 2004, clarifying the case having/acqui the of clarifying 2004, in the the citizenship clauses on two by lawissubstituted 1995 the in citizenship tothe related clause eligibility the nature rather than the issue of the increased scope of the powerholders’ authority over dismissals. Thus, for example, dismissals. Atthesame time, the‘reorganizati decision withlegallysoundreasonsprevents th litigation. Thehighcostassociat powerholders totheriskofachievingundesira the bureaucraticrightofappealincourt.Th allowing thedismissal ismet. Thisnecessityis to dismiss isconstrainedbythenecessityto producelegallysoundproofthatthe condition that couldbeinterpretedasa Altogether FZ-79providesforforty-fourconditionsunderwhich 31) andifabureaucrat doesnot permits powerholderstofirebureaucratsincase the workplaceandmismanagement offinancea correspondingly). restrictions stemming from thenatureof bureaucrat can belaid off relates to the eligibil other procedural constrains.Similarly toFZ 79 haskeptthepowerholders’ authority over admi dismissal procedurethatwouldallowthestateto 47 of alcoholic,narcoticorotherin bureaucrat canalsobelaido policy regime ofboundedpoliticization. demotion andhorizontaltransfer)arrangements u Currently there are 39 conditions ofth are conditions there 39 Currently Despite theeffortofMinistry Economic 47 Besidesthis,Article37–exclusivelydevo ff underthefollowingcircumstances: turningupforworkinastate

high degreeofpolitical r electoral agitation (Article 17.12); set a restriction to branches not up of (Article 17.12); agitation r electoral toxication; grossviolationofthe ed withtherequirement tos is sort,compared to 29 underFZ-119. ring acitizenship of another state in accept substantialchanges inhe -119, thebulk oftheconditions under which a public bureaucracy (Article 17.14) and a prohibition a for a and prohibition (Article17.14) bureaucracy public thecivilservice(Articles15,16and17 ble outcomes –from losingthecasetoprolonged grounded intheprospectof 94 e use of with weakevidenceincourtexposes e useofwith on ofbureaucraticagenci of abureau’sreorganization/liquidation(Article ity criteria, basic duties ofpublicofficialsand nder FZ-79exhibitthequalitiesofpersonnel quickly getridoff‘ineff ssions encased inthe conditionality clauseand nd/or otherstateassets.Finally,FZ-79also e profusionofblatant Development andTrade discretion.However, upport thepoweholder’sdismissal ted todismissals –stipulates that a one clause andthe case of denouncing The rise is,however, of a technical health andsafetyregulationsin a bureaucratmay bedismissed r job contract(Article29). ective’ bureaucrats, FZ- es’ conditionprovides alawsuitarisingfrom the politicians’ power the politicians’power politically motivated to establish such a to establishsucha CEU eTD Collection Indifference, oppositionandeventu 2.6 Conclusion falls withinthecategory fired onsuspectgrounds.Overall,thedismissa bureaucrat andsuggeststhatthe to newly available administrative posts. Thismakes the dismissal especially costlyfor a bureau. Itisimportant tonoteth considerations couldbe justified as legitimate reasons for thereorganization/liquidation of the powerholders withasafepretextforpoliti process: admission, appointment, promotion (demo and thestrengthofprocedural typology ofpersonnelpolicy regimes byclassifying when thenatureofapersonnelpolicyregime is hold thatadmission isanimportant stageofpe regimes. Anotherrevisionisconcernedwithth and multiple actorsand toinclude thisdiffe of actorscomprisingthedecision-making authority,wesuggesteddifferentiatingbetweenunitary That is,inaddition tothe established distinctio –theconceptof analytical toolsoftheframework (2003, 2004,2006).Toassistwith the lensoftheoreticalframework offormal politicaldi bureaucracy. bureaucracy between1996- legislations, theformal-legal framework that Russia’s publicbureaucracyinth We arrivedatthisconclusion of boundedpoliticization. 2006 ischaracterizedasenabling at FZ-79 doesnotgrantthefired fired bureaucratwouldproactivel constraintssystematically acros e post-Sovietera.Althoughthis by analyzingtheprovisionsoftherelevantlegislationthrough al compromise marked theproc the analysiswefurtherdevelopedoneoftwocore governed thepersonnelpo 95 e classificationofpersonnelpolicydomains. We n betweenthe political and administrative nature l component ofRussia’spersonnelpolicyfirmly rsonnel policyandshouldberecognizedassuch rentiation inthetypologyofpersonnelpolicy cally motivated dismissal asmany political thedistributionofdecision-making authority. tion, horizontaltransfer analyzed. Astheresult the natureofdecision-making authority scretion, developedbyMeyer-Sahling the creationofade-politicized bureaucrats aprivileged access s allstagesofpersonnel policy y defendherselfhadshebeen ess ofbureaucraticreform in left itsmark ontheenacted licy ofRussia’s public s) anddismissals. of this,therevisited CEU eTD Collection features ofcivilservice. continuum andlowpoliticaldiscretion andentren political discretion andlittleor structured politicization (C)to personnel policyonacontinuum runningfrom subjected toanalysis.Ouraim wastoloca around 80%ofallpoststhat rule making and implementation ofpolicyproce and otherrelevantlegalactsthat level offormal politicaldiscretion andthelatt distribution ofdecision-making au (vacancy contest juries)responsiblefor allother appointments (around 80%).Thus, from a posts, and a collectiveinstitution, consisting of The legislationinstitutedtwoappointingschemes, withaunitaryactorres the natureofthispersonnelpolic empirical evaluationofpe bureaucracy, wesingledoutthisparticular areaofadmission pro the opennessofadmission process,therefor considerable loopholesa procedures forpublishing information onbureaucraticvacancies theformal-legal framework had ‘politics eliminator’. Atthesame time, ouranalysis revealed thatwith regard tothe rulesand mass mediawascrucialinachievingtheopenness balance of powerawayfrom politicians.Likewise party, jealouslyguardingtheirne criteria were met, andthe protection of this righ essentially fullyde-politicized. The refinedtheoreticalframework wasappliedtothoseprovisionsofFZ-119andFZ-79 As faras With regardto appointments admissions nd lackedprecision.Asweakenfor rsonnel policypractices. wildstateauthorityin are concerned a fullyde-politicizedbureaucracy The righttoself-admission, providingthatminimum eligibility y domain wasmorecomplex than no proceduralconstraintscharac wereconcernedwithnon-elected wly acquiredrightstotherecrui , ouranalysisshowedthat thority pointofview,the former scheme signifiesahigher , our analysis showedthatthesituation withregard to 96 te Russia’slegal-formal framework governing patronage (A)through t incourt, established jo er –alowerlevelofpolitical discretion. The political, administrative andautonomous actors ss. Thisspecificgroupofposts,making up e suppressingthede-pol , arequirement topublicize vacancies inthe theRussiansystem of ched operatingproceduresarethe dominant of theadmission process,whichisakey cement ofthelawcouldjeopardize the personnelpolicyregime was or civilservice(D),wherehigh terize thepatronageendof tment process,and shifted the that oftheadmissions process. cess asaspecial taskfor the officials activeintheareaof unbounded/open(B)and bseekers as apro-active ponsible forentry-level stategovernance,was iticization of public iticization ofpublic CEU eTD Collection characterize promotion asbelong this, theoverall levelof formal favor couldmake abureaucratreceptive tothe had thecapacitytore-cr promotions thatallowedpowerholderstotemporarily formal contests.Atthesame time,ouranalysisrevealed thattheclauseonshort-terms in thebeginning oftheircareers–ascareer progresswassubject totheoutcomes ofopen Thus, weevaluatedtheexistence powerholders toinfluencetheoutcomes ofthea constraints ontheappointingauthoritywere posts isclassifiedasbelongingto the personnelprocess.Th non-restrictive character,enablingpowerholders to analysis ofproceduralconstrai capacity toinhibitthepoliticalinfluence– seniority-based promotion beenadopted.Moreov cadres, thatwouldhaveeffortlesslyprogressedupthebureaucraticladder,hadasystem of admissions andmeritocratic recruitment, aswell political discretion than aclassical civilservice, itsadoption safeguarded theopen character of through competitive contests. Although thissystem ischaracterizedby ahigherlevelofformal posts areopen tobothinternalandexternal job seekersand advancement inrankis carriedout weak, politicization. legal challenge,wouldlo bolstered bythepresenceofindependentexperts,obligatoryqualifyingcrit rules. Despitethese complications, thecollective character ofthejuryregime, as particularly the independent statusofexpertson vacancy for powerholdersto‘tailor’ thesele Although inthecaseofschemeinvolving Promotion -wise, Russiaadoptedaposition-basedsystem, inwhichseniorbureaucratic eate thesortofenvironment conduci erefore, theappointingscheme atth cate themajority ofa nts thatsurroundedtheunitaryappoi politicaldiscretionand thestre ing toa structurallypoliticized of discretionaryqualifyingcriter a regime of openpoliticization. ction processinfavoroftheir juries wasnot supported bytheappropriate voting which juniorbureaucratsc 97 ppointing processwasnotcompletely eradicated. ppointments intheband much more confining, theopportunityfor informal pressureofthepowerholder. Despite er, aposition-basedpromotion system hadthe as precludedthedomina assert their preferences over theoutcome of appointabureaucratto the collectiveinstitu e levelofmost juniorbureaucratic ve topatronage, personnelregime. BothFZ-119 preferred candidates.Similarly, ia effectivelyas ngth of proceduralconstraints nting authorityrevealedtheir ould havebeenexposed of structured,although nce oftheSoviet-era eria, andrecourseto tion, theprocedural a seniorpostatwill, e.g. a politician’s e.g. apolitician’s anopportunity CEU eTD Collection regime, withdismissals byreorga characterize dismissals asan contest. Overall,thelevel of formal political di reserve, apool offormeremployees withprio dismissed bureaucratswere offeredanalternative dismissed bureaucrats. Intheseco right tomake suchdecisions makes therecourse bureaus duetobudgetaryconstraintsorachangeof alternative mechanism forpoliticallymotivated made theuse of politically motivated dismi However, asouranalysisshowed,thebuiltin bureaucrat may bedismissed suggeststhatpoliticianshadextendedaccesstothispersonneltool. towards this thatwenowturn. appointments, promotion/demotion, anddismissal. Thisisforanumberof reasons,anditis simply tottinguptheprogresstowardsameritocrat totality ofthetransformation wroughtisfargreat personnel policyregime. asade-politicizedcomponentorganization) whichundoubtedlyclassifiestheseareas ofRussia’s demotions and FZ-79allowedpoliticiansvery limited acce the personnelpolicyregime createdbyFZ-119,DP times, borderingwiththeregime of characterized asopenpoliticizatio structured politicizationwithonlyoneelemen shows thatthepersonnel With regard to Furthermore, itcanbearguedthattakingth Application oftheframework offormal politic and horizontal transfers dismissals policyregime createdbythelegi area belongingtoastructuredpolit , the existence ofdozenslegalconditions underwhich a nization bringingmuch ofthe‘ n (Table2.11).Thismay bew nditions thelegislationprovided openpoliticization,butonthe (temporary assignments outsi ssals generallyprohibitiv scretion andthestrengthof 98 rity access tonewposit constraint ofbureaucrats’ t –appointment toentry-levelposts–being toalegal challenge extremely difficult for the position or entitledtomembership of thecadre -604, FZ-79andDP-112isreasonablyrobust. er thatthesum oftheparts,as suggestedby dismissal isthroughthere-organizationof ss tosuch personnelpolicyinstruments as ic system ineachof theareasof admissions, e impactofthe legislation asa whole,the policy.Theclearlypolit al discretiontoFZ-119andsubsequent acts slation islocatedinandaround icization typeof politicization’ tothisdomain. eak structuredpoliticizationat whole, thiscategorization of de thebureaucrat’sregular a safety net, ensuring that e for powerholders. The e forpowerholders.The ions, without avacancy access to legal action proceduralconstraints ical characterofthe personnelpolicy CEU eTD Collection Regime Type/ Appointment based job,atthecenterofre individuals’ educationalachievement anddemonstr minimum eligibilitycriteria aremet, alongside a This hasbeenachieved bythe patronage, dependentontheirpoliticalmasters, longer inabsolutecontrol,reform hashelped unboundedly politicizedbureaucracy,toamore ope and jobseekers.By character oftheprocesses ofadmission thathas condition forthecreationofawelfareenhanc appointment intothe areaofpromotion extends within agivenpolity.Furthermore, theexte the roleofpowerholdershereis factors isclearinrelationtotheappointment process, whichisparticularlyimportant giventhat Thecentralityofthese independent experts,allofwhichconstrainthepowerspoliticians. establishing ofclearqualifyingcriteria,thecrea Horizontal Promotion Admission Dismissals Attributes Demotion Transfers Table 2.11Russia’sPersonnelPolicyRegime Nevertheless, placingmerit atthecenterofth Firstly, thelegislation placedthenotionof

Politicization/ Politicization/ Unbounded Unbounded Patronage (Band A)

moving from theclosed form process.ThenotionofMe adefiningcharacteristicofth

(entry level positions)

introduction oftheright tose Open (Bounded) Politicization Politicization (Band B) X

thereachofthesefactorsevenfurther. 99 nomenklatura transform jobseekersfrompassiverecipientsof ing bureaucracy.Equallyimportant istheopen nsion oftherulesandregulationsgoverning

transformed therelations to pro-active,independentcareercivilservants. requirement topublicizevacanciesin the mass (FormalMerit)UnderFZ-119 andFZ-79 tion ofvacancycontestsandthepresence ated ability to carry outaspecific, expertise merit, recognizedasacombination of e reformisanecessarybutnotsufficient n system inwhichpowerholders areno

X posts) entry-level (above X Structured Politicization Structured Politicization

system, aclassicalexampleofan (Band C) e type of personnel policy regime e typeofpersonnelpolicyregime rit isinstitutionalizedthroughthe X

lf-admission, providingthat hip betweenpoliticians Fully De-Politicized/ De-Politicized/ Fully

Civil Service Service Civil (Band D) X X X

CEU eTD Collection point ofviewRussia’sbureaucracytodaycanbe limitations ofthelegislationthatgovernedRussi and amajor amajor steptowards civilservice. the day-to-dayoperationofbureaus. independent of political favor. Ithasconsequentlyreducedthe abilityof politicianstointerfere in encouraging them topursueopportunitiesenter up ofactorswithdiverse preferences.Inef media, and appointment throughvacancycontests process. considerable constraintsonpowerholders’abilit bureaucrats tobelievethat the system ofmerit is dismissal stagesofthepersonnelpolicyprocess. bureaucrats tochallengeperceivedabusesof These transformations represent asignificant departure from sevendecadesofpatronage Moreover, athirdelement reinforcesthisproc 100 a’s personnelpolicyin1996,from aformal-legal theadmissions, appointment, promotionand characterized asbeing largely de-politicized. protectedbythepowerof y todetermine theoutcomes ofthepersonnel fect thereform hasempoweredjobseekers, Recoursetolegalactionnotonlyencourages Anddespiteconsiderableimperfections and ess, andthisisaccesstolegal action,enabling adjudicated byacollectiveinstitutions,made the serviceandtoprogr the law, butitplaces ess withinitsranks, CEU eTD Collection two regions(IvanovoandAmur) laggingc regions (Rostov,Samara, Novosibir politicization progres distribution ofourkeymeasure –the Russia’s regionalbureaucracyinthetenthyear evaluation ofpersonnelpracticesre quantitative pictureofthepers the sequenceofresearchactions assembled forthisstudy.Section in sectionthree.Secti (section two), theargument foranexpert-based a Based onthe criticaloverview ofthe earlyschola complimented withtheevaluationof nature ofapersonnelpolicyregime theanal discretion, does notconstitute de-politicization the mere passageofpersonnellegislation,pr of powerholdersand formal andrealmerit, i.e. betweenthemere en Russia’s regionsintheendof Chapter 3 deals withthe assessment ofpersonnel policy regimes that

ASSESSING THEEXTENTOF DE-POLITICIZED BUREAUCRACY DE-POLITICIZED sed unevenlyacrosstheterri on fourdiscussesthecaseselectionand de-facto institutionalization of ade-politi onnel policypracticein40ofRussi 2006.Sectiononediscussesape five presents criticalissues in undertaken withinthisproject. Sectionsixconcludeswitha sk, Belgorod,Tomsk andTula) vealed astrikingvariationin personnel practice REAL MERIT: Meritocratic Recruitment Index Chapter 3 Chapter 3 onsiderably behindtheaverage. de-facto 101 actment of legislationthatlimits staffingpowers

oviding for a low degree of formal political oviding foralowdegreeofformal of bureaucracy.Inordertounderstandthetrue ssessment ofthepersonnelpracticeisdeveloped of Russia’sadministrative reform. Thespatial torial unitsoftheRussianFederation,withsix ysis offormal-legal framework shouldbe rly attempts toassess IN 40 OF RUSSIA’S REGIONS REGIONS IN 40OFRUSSIA’S INSTITUTIONALIZATIONOF , i.e.theactualactionsofpowerholders. the propertiesofpoolexperts questionnairedesignandoutlines cized bureaucracy. Itargues that a’s regions.Theexpert-based being considerablyaheadand rsistent discrepancybetween de-facto –indicatesthat de-facto the stateofrealmerit de-politicizationof existedin40of de-facto

CEU eTD Collection politicization ofpersonnel policy,conditionedthat discretion, hearguesthat personne between formal andrealmerit. Drawingonhistheoretical framework of formal political during the19 introduction of trulyde-politicized bureaucracies – probablythetwomost quotedexamplesofciv Although theNorthcote-TrevelyanReport (1854)in institutionalization ofa call for the purposeof thisdissertation ‘forma legislation allowingalowdegreeofpoliticaldiscretionoverpers However, ascomparative publicadministration literature suggests, amere enactment of restricted theformal authorityofRussia’s As chapter2argued,FZ-119(31.07.1995)andsubsequentFZ-79(27.07.2004)significantly 3.1 FormalMerit vs.RealMerit subverted insome Southe Sotiropoulos (2004)showshowformal rules puzzles inthedevelopment ofcivilservices professional, de-politicizedcivi 2003: 49-50).Meyer-Sahlingholdsthatthediscre government isnormally accompanied bysignificant found thatalthoughPoland’scivilserv almost directandunrestraine Gajduschek concludesthat ‘behindthelargemerit- (2007: 151-152).Havingstudiedthestateofpub nor other laws ledtothe institutionaliza Northcote-Trevelyanunlike theBritishreport,neither1852Decree Report.Inpractice,and meritocratic recruitment andguaranteed lifetenure during the19 several statutesestablis Meyer-Sahling hasmade animportant contribution tothe literature thatdistinguishes th th century ornowadays.Forinstance,Vi century,includingthe1852RoyalDecree de-facto hing ade-politicizedty rn Europeancountries. d politicalinfluence” de-politicized bureaucr l service anditscontinuing polit l legislationonlyprovides ‘institutionalconditionsforthede- ice is‘intheorymerit based tion of ade-politici powerholders overbureaucraticpersonneldecisions. 102 in East-CentralEurope pe ofpublicbureaucracywerepassedinSpain , thesame doesnotholdformany otherreforms il serviceadoption–arecommonly seenasthe that limit powerholdersstaffingpowersare forallpublicemployees twoyearsbeforethe like legalfaçade there isasystem thatallows l merit’) doesnot necessarily leadtothe (2007: 351).Similarly, aWorld Bankstudy the UK and thePendletonAct(1883)inUS theUKand pancy betweentheattempts toestablisha lic bureaucracyinHungarythe1990s, senior staffturnover(Manning andParison it incorporates a low degree of formal itincorporatesalow degree offormal acy (thereafter referred to as ‘realmerit’). ctor Lapuentereportsthatnotonebut zed bureaucracyin19 ofBravoMurillothatintroduced onnel decisions(whatweshall icization isoneofthe‘major and depoliticized’,changeof ’ (2006:693).Likewise, th century Spain CEU eTD Collection (Meyer-Sahling 2004:74). in theextent towhichpoliticiansexercise th point ofview,thekeytounderstandingth instruments available topoliticians regulated thoughformalized standardsandproce amount ofstaffingauthorityassignedtopoliticiansandthemore determine personnelpolicyoutcomes’ (Meyer-Sahli minimize theavailabilityofdiscretionaryinst 1 of theformal-legal infrastruc 12). Therefore,inordertounderstandhowRussia’ function coherentlyhasbeensubvertedbyapower and enforcement mechanisms, includingcourts,existin Alena Ledenevaassertsthatalt How RussiaReallyWorks:theIn 2006, Lonkila1997,Panejah2001,ZaslavskayaandShabanova2001).Inherinfluentialbook practices remains paramountin particular importancefor Russia.A relevant body of informal Theneedtoaccountfortheinform way. 2006). acting legislationwerereveale administrations, complied withthecurrentlegislat which personnelpracticesingovernmental ag the ProsecutorGeneralofRussianFederation powers bysimply violatingtheprovisionsofpersonnellegislation.Indeed,in2006Office political discretion,author political discretion’(2006:700). personnel policy’ (2006: 713). 713). (2006: policy’ personnel of for de-politicization condition is a asufficient neither necessary nor legislation service civil ‘implementing Having analyzed four civilservice la On theotherhand,politiciansmay determine theoutcomes ofpersonnelpolicyacting inan In addition,itisplausibleto ized bylegislation.On ture ofpersonnelpolicymanagement shouldbecomplimented with

hough ‘requisitecomponents oftheru post-SovietRussia(Afanas’ev ws that Hungary adopted in the 1990s, inthe 1990s, adopted that ws Hungary d, including600thatqualifiedas formal PracticesthatShapedpos (thereafter referredtoasdiscre 1 assume that politiciansmay actbeyondthescopeof formal Therefore,personnellegislationmay only‘eliminate or 103 e availablediscretionaryinstruments inpractice ruments thatgovernment e natureofagivenpersonnelpolicyregime lies dures, thesmaller themenupolicy ofpersonnel ion. During this audit 47 000 violations of the ion. Duringthisaudit47000violationsofthe the onehand,theymay re ful setof[informal – s publicbureaucracyreallyworkstheanalysis al ‘rulesofthegame’ conducted alarge-scaleauditoftheextentto ng 2007:713).Inotherwords,thelesser encies atalllevels literaturesuggests thattheroleofinformal Russia, ‘the abilityof theruleof lawto 2000,Chirikova 2004,Ledeneva he goes as far asconcluding that tionary instruments). From this acriminal offence(Kulikov t-Soviet PoliticsandBusiness exercise ofthisauthorityis le oflaw’,i.e.formal laws MN] practices…’(2006: (North 1991:97)isof politicians canuseto , including regional , includingregional -claim theirstaffing

CEU eTD Collection circumvented. also forapossibilitythattheimplementation of account notonlyfortheextenttowhichpoliticiansuti actions withinandbeyondthescop be complimented withtheevaluationof personnel policyregime theanalys discretion, cannotbetakenas enactment of personnel legislation, eventhose 1995, Ruhil2003)–contemporary scholarshipof relevant legislationwiththein Within thisbodyoflitera provide anarrativeonRussia’spublicbureaucr Bekov 2001,HuskeyandObolonsly2003,Obolonsky2002,ZaytsevaYuzakov2005)to (Nicolaas Witsen Foundation2005a,2005b)a andotherinternationaldonors Russian’ administrative reformunderauspicesofTACIS World Bank(Kozbanenko2005)andtheOECD Research on Russia’sbureaucracy has remained s PolicyPracti 3.2 AssessingPersonnel the assessment of howthelegislation is provided. Similarly, havingrightlystat but neverimplemented’ (2007:18). Noevidenceofnon-implementation ofthe1995lawis introducing competitive recruitment –something thatwas‘requiredunder the1995 legislation Federation (2003-2005) program evaluating theprovisionsoffederal of suchstudiesisthatstatements thatpurpo Straussman 2007,Konov2006,Kotchegura1999,Tompson 2007,World Bank2006a). Afeature haphazard approachto detailing To sum up,unlike earlier lite ture anumber ofstudiesexistthat Tompson statesthat theprogra stitutionalization of realmerit ameasure ofrealmerit. the stateofrealmerit inRussia(Agh 2003,Barabashevand is offormal-legal framework rature onbureaucracy–thatof e offormal politicaldiscretion. ed thatofficialstatistics ar enforced, violatedandcircumvented. personnel practice ce inRussia:LiteratureReview 104 rt toinformareinsufficientlyevidenced. Thus, nd individualresearchers(Atamanchuk 2002, acy reformssincetheregime changein1991. carce. Therehavebeenseveralattempts bythe thepersonnellegislationcanbeviolatedor containing alow degreeofformal political (Tompson 2007),organizationsworkingon Reform oftheStateServiceRussian lize discretionalpersonnelinstruments, but bureaucracyrecognizesthatthemere

In order to understand the nature of a In ordertounderstandthenatureofa are characterizedbyanunsystematic, (see, forinstance,Horn1995,Rauch . This includes the powerholders’ . Thisincludesthepowerholders’ m envisagedthepossibilityof governing personnel e scarceanddonotallow forin- ten equatedthepassageofa In otherwords,weneedto issues shall issues shall CEU eTD Collection defined hierarchy of positions (2004: 91). 91). (2004: of positions hierarchy defined education and higher skills with professional personnel meritocratic recruitment of personnel, predominantly internal promotions based on merit, ahigh proportion of Weberian as ideal of is largely a de-po bureaucracy (p feature preserving authority political and politicization) the stateofrealmerit inRussiaasof dismissal practicesinthe Russian 1994-2000. As,intheopinionofauthors,suchdatareflectedrecruitment, promotionand short questionnaire,designedbyth posts ofcategory“C”inallbodiesstateaut tenure...’ (2004:92).Brym andGimp the gapbyproviding‘thedistributionof stated thatresearchonRussia’sbureaucracywas‘p composition, anddynamicsoftheRussianstatebu bureaucracy’, wroteBrym andGimpelsonin 2 Russian civilserviceapproachestheWeberian Evans (2000)researchontheeff employees’ (2004:111).Havingbeeninfluenced pers overabundance ofSoviet-era lower ranks;rapidemployeeturn ‘the reform isstilllargelyonpa the groundwerelimited andlackedmethodological depth research,andthatqualitativeassessments ideal. Gimpelson compared thediscoveredstateofRussi investigate thestateofrealmerit inRussia. of studiesthatuseamorerigorousmethodol Although as it is argued in Chapte asitisargued Although 2 ‘It issurprisinghowlittleweactuallyknow Although Brym and Gimpelson’s research provi Although BrymandGimpelson’s gendersegregation,with The scholarsreported‘significant Theiroverallconclusionwasthat‘much distance remains tobecoveredbeforethe r 1,Weber’sidealin ofbureaucracy

per…’ (2006:28).Havingsaidthis ect oftheWeberian bureaucracy public bureaucracy, itallowed them todrawconclusions about onnel; theemployment ofasi e stateandcompleted bythis over atthelowerranks;lack the beginningofyear2001(2004:108). elson usedtheaggregateofficial liticised, involving such characteristics as competitive and and ascompetitive characteristics such involving liticised, and transparent and and transparent and 105 ideal ofbureaucraticefficiency’(2004:111). hority of the Russian Federation, derived from a hority oftheRussianFederation,derivedfrom a personnelbyrank,gender,age,training,and oliticization), Brym and Gimpelson’s interpretation of the the of interpretation Gimpelson’s and Brym oliticization), of theextentim ogy, inkeepingwithaca 2004 intheirpioneeringarticleonthesize, reaucracy inthe1990s(2004:92).Theauthors by Evans andRauch(1999) byEvans rigor,theWorld studyconcludesthat Bank ractically non-existent’ a’s state bureaucracyw aboutthatcountry’s[Russia-MN]state des ameaningful insightonthestateof volved bothcompetence enhancing (de- predictable career paths in a clearly in a careerpaths predictable oneconomic growth,Brym and category ofstateemployeesin zable number ofpensionable , thereisalsoasmall number of qualifiedpersonnel;an women concentratedinthe statisticsontheholdersof plementation ofFZ-79on demic standards,to and attemptedtofill ith that of Weber’s CEU eTD Collection (Brym andGimpelson 2004:112)isinsufficient pre-FZ-119 recruits constituted alarge fraction bureaucrats (86.3%)werehiredbefo later BrymandGimpelson reportstatisticsthat show thattheoverwhelming majorityofthese case, canone besurethat aviolation oftheformal ruletookplace.Moreover, acouple ofpages statement aboutwhetherthis20%we specified bylaw’(2004:106).Suchdata,howev level inMoscow‘almost afifthhavelessthan second most seniorpostsofcategory“C”(Table2.1 time periodbeforeoraftertheenactment ofFZ 3 evidence derivedfrom aggregated’data ‘highly young peopletoremain employed inthestate of clearandpredictablerulesforadvancement throughtheranksmakes itundesirableformany cohorts’ ofbureaucrats(2004:102).It from ade-politicizedbureaucracypointofview the beginningofyear2001,wh 1994; Kellough1990;Kerr concentrated inlower-echelonjobs(Bullard in countrieswithlargelyde-politicizedbur sector jobsandtheintegrationofwomen into governmental managerial rankssuggeststhateven recruitment asBrym andGimpelson suggest(2004: bureaucratic levelsisnot necessarily the lead totheconclusionsdrawnbyauthors.Thus,concentrationofwomeninlower institutionalization ofcivilservi post-Soviet Russia’sbureaucracy, 2007, Hanson and Teague 2005, Oleinik 2006, Tompson, 2005, 2007). 2007). 2005, Tompson, 2006, Oleinik 2005, Teague and Hanson 2007, This is also a study published in the English language that has made it apopular point of reference (see Hanson A featureofRussia’sbureaucrac More importantly, however,most ofthedatareportedbyBrym wasasat andGimpelson et al

2002; Lewis and Nice 1994; Naff 1994; Newman 2002;LewisandNice1994;Naff 1994). ce. Firstof all,some of the ich makes itimpossibletoattri 3 re theadoptionofFZ-119.Itis itdoes nottell us much re hiredinthepre-orpostFZ-119period.Only isplausibletoassume, asthe y, reportedbythescholars,that andWright 1993;CornwellandKellough1994;Guy outcome ofnon-meritocratic andnon-competitive 106 in those20%withouthigher education. eaucracies, suchastheUS,women remain higher education,whichiscontrarytothenorm -119. Thus,theystatedthatamong holdersof bureaucracy forlong’(2004:104).However, isan‘exceptionallyrapidturnoverofyoung that ‘coveronlyafew er, doesnotenableus on gender in public 102).Avastliteratureongenderinpublic refers tothem asgrad to corroborateorfalsifythisandother discovered factsdonotnecessarily bute aparticularfindingtothe authors did,that‘theabsence aboutadegree ofthe looksthemost problematic , therefore,verylikelythat rudimentary variables’ e orrank2)atfederal to make anycertain inthelatter CEU eTD Collection study revealsthe powerholders’ or bureaucrats’,albeit senior, pointof view. However, asthe author provided just afew methodological remarks to her study, it remains unclear whether her 2002, i.e.almost5yearsaftertheadoptionofFZ-119. assessment oftheextentinstitutionaliza now thisresearch provided themostcomprehensive quantitative datasetsallowing for the whether theentrytoserviceand promotion acro federal ministries weresurveyedin2002.Among and threemunicipalitiesofRussiawereinte Academy ofSciencesin2001-2002.Inspring20 of young(upto35yearsold)bureau 6 5 4 that althoughabureaucrat’scareerdevelopment to authorities byChirikova(2004)correspondto thoseof the quantitativestudies. meritocracy (2004:146). personal loyalty tothe headoftheagency, w principles were behindasuccessf organizations. Furthermore, expl external candidates hadequalchances tobeappo Magun showedthatthosewhoalreadyworkedin public bureaucracyconsider considerations (‘structuredde-politicization’).Thus,withregardtopromotion,Gimpelsonand candidates dependedonnon-politicalconsidera dominated bypoliticalconsider The overallconclusionofthesestudieswasthat higher rankingbureaucratsinthesame public (2004) supplemented thequantitativ (2004) combined thequantitativedatafrom propositions aboutthestate development in a given public agency. Their re 2001). Kapeliushnikov 2001, Lippoldt and (Gimpelson the 1990s in young personnel across all industries, and not only among state bureaucracy, was afeature of Russia’s labour market Chirikova interviewed about 60 high-ranking in officials high-ranking about 60 interviewed Chirikova among choose 16 wereasked fact to respondents The sameis Atthe there an time, array of The authorsthemselves, perhaps,understoodthis While Brym et al (2003)reportedthe 5 Theresults ofthequalitative re of realmeritinRussia.

alternative explanations. For instance, re ul careerdevelopment byinternal oratory factoranalysisrev ations (‘openpoliticization’)andpromotions ofinternal crats conducted bytheInstitute ofSociologytheRussian e researchwiththeanalysis sponses were subjected to factor analysis. both researchandChirikova(2004)Monusova ors that, according to their opinion, career opinion, facilitated their ors that,to according results ofthe2001survey;Gimpelson andMagun rviewed. Afurther819youngbureaucratsin10 107 agencies whereyoungbureaucratsweresurveyed. tion ofade-politicized 3 regional governments and 3 municipalities (2004: 73). 73). (2004: 3 municipalities and governments regional 3 01 638bureaucratsinthreeregionalgovernment asof2001-2002entryto inted tomoresenior vacant posts withintheir 4 ith personal loyalty lagging slightlybehind agreatextentdepends ss theranks weremeritocratic or not. Uptill other thingsthesurveysaimed toestablish tions slightlymore thanonpolitical , astheywerebehindalarge-scalesurvey search ofregionalandmunicipal ealed that two major underlying ealed thattwo search showed that rapid turnover of candidates –meritocracy and of in-depthinterviewswith bureaucracyasof2001- on her loyalty to her onherloyaltyto theserviceremained ed thatinternaland 6 Chirikova finds Chirikovafinds CEU eTD Collection before the enactment of FZ-119. 2004: 132-133). 8 7 appeared to beacharacteristic lenses ofFZ-119.Thus, although descriptive statistics suggest. through thevacancycontests was were hiredbeforeandaftertheenactment of to theservice.Anobviouscomparison between had theauthorscontrolledex from ade-politicized bureaucracy point ofview an outcome ofvacancycontests(Brym andGi depending onthebranchofauth rules andapossibleresponseby boss, thelatterisnotabsolutelyfreeinherpromotion decisionsandhastoaccountfor theformal center. Thismeans thatfora manner suchasthrough vacancyannouncement inthemass media orby beingreferredbyajob ‘from thestreet’(Gim governments) and20%(municipalities) oftheres limited useofthesediscretionaryinstrument widespread (Brym practices ofhiringonfixed-term specified bythelaw.Secondly,itwas foundthat, ladder), suggesting that theinstit politicization forinitialandsubsequentappointme FZ-119 (thatallowedforamore contests more frequentlythanotherposts (2004: education andcomplex skills–such aseconomists orlawyers–weresubjected tovacancy the most part, de facto political appointments’ (2007: 377). (2007: appointments’ mostthe part, de facto political This is contrary to an to iscontrary This Brym etal With regard tothe entry tobureaucracy,ason A more detailedpictureonrecruitment emerges (2003) reported that each fifth su 8 Similarly, Chirikovareportedthatposts ad hoc ad et al pelson andMagun2004:135),i.e.appl 2003: 151-152,Chirikova2004:73-74), statement by Barabashev and Straussman that ‘senior public service positions are, for positions service public ‘senior and Straussman that Barabashev by statement 7

ofhiringtohigherra sizable number th ofyoungofficials other bureaucrats(2004:74). tent ofhiringthroughthevacancy contracts orthroughthemembership utionalization ofmerit taking was politicized recruitment atthebo more consistent forthepost-F the useofvacancycontests ority, statedthattheyobtained rveyedin regional bureaucrat or s bypowerholders.Finally 108 mpelson 2004:132),thisis,indeed, apoorresult FZ-119 –couldhaveshowedwhetherentering two differentgroupsof . Thepicturecould,however,havebeenclearer 73). Thisisinaccordancewiththeprovisionsof pondents stated that they entered the service pondents statedthattheyenteredtheservice nts atthemiddle andtopofthebureaucratic at leastregi ther than lowerranks (Brym andGimpelson ly between2%and12% if welookattherepo requiring higherleve municipal bureaucracy was hired was found tobe limited, they ied forjobsinanimpersonal onal andmunicipal levels,the which isclearevidenceofthe ttom ofthehierarchyandless Z-119 recruits assome ofthe their firstbureaucratic posts as e opportunitytoworkinthe contests bytheyearofentry root inpreciselytheareas, incadrereserveswerenot , between10%(regional respondents –thosewho rted datathroughthe of therespondents, ls ofprofessional CEU eTD Collection a method to correct for systematic error ininformants’ responses (Van Bruggen random error in individuals responses, provides the opportunity to analyze the impact of error sources, and provides 9 discretionary personnelinstruments andinformalpracticeswasencouraging. of view,thereported after theadoptionofrelevantlegislation.Atth there wasno reasontoexpecttheappearance ofa fully de-politicized bureaucracy just fiveyears failure. Inthe lightofthecomparative experien politicization ofbureaucracyasitwasdocum of authority.Unliketheauthors root inRussia,albeitslowlyandunevenlyacrosspub of ade-politicizedbureaucracy. public bureaucracywasnotbestowedasamark of because information drawnfrom thesame informati bureaucrats inmid-level managerial positions)carries Seidler 1974,VanBruggen with establishedstandardsofempirical orga Thirdly, although thosesurveys used evidencefr produced adataset thatshedmore light on the st Straussman 2007:374).Therefore,itisnotsurp terminology havechangedsince inconsistent acrosstime becausethe terminology the understandingofadegreede-politicization(f aggregated andcoversmostlythosedimensions public bureaucracycollectedbyROSSTAT–theFede practices aremost likelyto the implementation of theenactedrulesandpro governing personnelpolicyisrequired.Suchanunderstandingenablesa state ofrealmerit, adeepunderstandingofth Gimpelson andothersmade itclear informed researchdecisionsofthis important The multiple-informants approach‘red The early studiesonrealmerit inRussiawere evidence ontheenforcement of occur.Secondly,theres et al

2002), All theseshowthatde-politic uces thecorrelation between systema early real merit research we c the databegantobecolle thatinordertomake an 9 theirrelianceonasingle cate nizational analysis(Hill1982,JohnandReve 109 ce ofmerit implementation acrosstimeandspace, ented in2001-2002wasasuccessratherthan om multipleinformants, whichis inaccordance of thepublicbureaucracy project. Firstof all, e same time,from the‘d cedures. It alsooutlines areaswhere informal personalfavor, whichisanimportant attribute e parameters oftheformal-legal framework earch showedseverelim used bythestatisticalservices andthelegal ate ofrealmerit than theofficialstatistics. onal sourceis likely toreflectabiasinherent rising that a survey of acting bureaucrats rising thatasurveyofactingbureaucrats lic agenciesofdifferentbranchesandlevels or instance,genderdist ral Statistical Service. Notonly itishighly instrumental tothisdissertation as they arisk tovalidityof thedata.Itisso FZ-119’s provisions,theuseof ization ofbureaucracywastaking affirmative conclusionaboutthe tic errorcomponents, averages out cted in1994(Barabashevand at al onsider thattheextentofde- 2002: 471). gory of informants (acting gory ofinformants the experience ofBrym, systematic istance travelled’point itations of thedataon that aresecondaryto ribution), itisalso evaluationof CEU eTD Collection community ofpublicbureaucracy experts,forme bureaucratic personnel. This researchdecisionwas powerholders, aswell as informal practices appropriate legislation,theexte components ofrealmerit–theenforcement of the personnel matters ofspecificpublic agencies, wouldbeabletoprovide evidence onallthree and foremost becausewebelievedthatexpert selections. This section justifies thes task posedtwochallenges–theselectionofth current research thatinformed thedecision tobuild Statistical Service. Itwas theincompatibility of the considerable limitations of thedataonpublic One ofthemostimportant conclusionsdrawnfrom Evaluation ofRegionalBureaucracies PolicyPracticesinRussia:theCaseforExpert-Based 3.3 AssessingPersonnel the subsetsofRussia’spublicbureaucracywouldofferanopportunityforameaningful analysis. authority. Therefore,giventheconstraintsofadi (regions), regionalandmunicipal differed notonlyacrossdifferenttypesofpublicbureaucracy – federal (Moscow), federal researchers from theRAS’InstituteofSociol practices in Russia’ssocial fabric.Finall assessment ofrealmerit inRussiaisofparticular gathering onorganizationaldesi validity. Equallyimportant, in-depth interviewing pr under study)wouldenabletominimize thesource- bureaucrats, scholars,peopleandorganizations thathave regular contacts withthe public agency multiple informants representing in thissource,whichundermines thevalidityof the data.Therefore, drawingonevidencefrom We optedforanexpertsurveyastheprincipalmethod ofdatacollection.Itwasdonefirst nt oftheapplicationdisc gn ofpublicbureaucracies.The – butalsoacrosspublicagencies e twoimportant researchdecisions. different information sources (e.g.differentsubsetsof y, theexperienceofBrym,Gimpelson andthe bureaucracy collectedby s, aspeoplewhopossessextensiveknowledge on 110 surroundinghiring,firing andpromotion of ogy showedthattheparameters ofrealmerit importance duetotheomnipresenceofinformal e principalmethod ofdatacollectionandcase d, aboveall,arounduniversities andthenation- ssertational research project,afocusononeof official statistics with earlyresearchonreal also prompted bytheexistenceofa credible a new,original data setfor thisproject. This formal rulesandproceduresstipulated by formal oved tobeanimportant toolofinformation relating errorinthedataandimprove its retionary personnelinstruments by value ofthismethodforthe withinthesame levelof ROSSTAT –theFederal the specific aims of the merit inRussiaisthe CEU eTD Collection possessed bytheexpertscouldproviderichdataonstateofrealmerit. contest juries(Chirikova2004,Savva2006).Therefor 2005, 2006)ortorevealthetypesofinformal through vacancycontestsinacertainpublic administration atTomsk stateuniversity,wasable Lobacheva 2003).Others,suchas,forinstance discretionary personneltool Ivanova 2002)orspokeabouttheuseoffixe studied theenforcement ofthevacancy civil servicelegislations(Gafarovetal commentaries relevanttotheaims ofthisstudy. through publicationinspecia wide networkoftrainingcenters Rauch’s research(1999, 2000).Facingachallenge navigate, dull,notupto date and standards of information availability online, secrecy’ (2005:59).Inadditi government andbetweenthegover and information revolution,Peterson characteristic oftheoperationRussia’sgove denying accesstodocuments. Information hoard enquiries theofficialsnormally used‘personal resource departments ofdifferentgovernmental in 2003-2004 wemade severalunsu addition, thoseinformation resourcesprovedtobeha the useofdiscretionarypersonnelinstruments bypowerholders,let accurate dataontheextentofenforcement offo application forms ofjobcandidatesorvacancy compared toevidencegainedfrom documents. Considering ouroptions about themethod ofev One may arguethatexpert assessments ofreal s bypowerholders(Gaida on, governmental agenciesdonotmeet thelegallyestablished lized ormass media outlets forstateandmunicipal servan unhelpful’ (Peterson2005: 60-62). nment andthepublic,‘officials statesthatwhenitcomes to ccessful attemptstogatherrelevantinformation inhuman 1998,Ponomarev 1998,Shajhatdinov1998)orcase- contestsprovision(Busovikov1998,Ershov2000, 111 agency atdifferenttime points(Osejchuk2002, consequently, theirwebsitesareoften‘hardto We, however,holdthatwhiledocuments suchas influence thatpowerholdersexertedonvacancy rnmental agencies.In Some ofthem analyzedthenorms theregional data protection’concernastheargument for toestimate thepropor agenciesandarchives.Inresponsetoour , Vladimir Osejchuk,aprofessorofpublic contest minutescould indeedgive themost d-term contracts,cadr rmal legislation,they arelesslikelytoreflect ing and secrecyremain idence gatheringwealso drewonEvansand merit inRussiaarea‘weak’typeof dataas toassessthedegreeof ‘Weberianess’ of rd toreach.Inpreparat e, collectedsystematically, theinformation et al 1998,Huskey2004,Lebedeva2006, ts. Theexpertsoftengopublic– theinformation flowswithin – withbureaucracy-relating alone informal practices.In still demonstrate a‘cultof a special study on Russia a specialstudyonRussia tion ofbureaucratshired e reservesandother ion forthisresearch s, unfortunately,a CEU eTD Collection political informal pressure). questions(suchas,forinstance,types of would bedifficulttocapturethroughclosed-ended survey of expertswithin-depth interviews withth thereby increasingtheaccuracy ofthedata. We journalists. Thisdiminishes thebiasthatcouldbeinherentin would representdifferentinform Rauch weconsiderednot onlyemploying multiple informants butalso making surethatthey improve themethodology ofexpert-basedassessm and Nistotskaya2009)replicated estimate theimpact ofade-poli selection, throughout thisprocessweremained guidedbytheultimate goaloftheresearch–to was caseselection.Asseveralim disciplines, andtheir data set has b Evans articlesbasedonthissurveyhavebeencitedmore than dataset, thevalidity ofwhichhasstoodthe ‘gratifying’ (EvansandRauch1999:754).Thissi The costof themail surveywasrelatively lo assessments, at leastthreeexpert countries’ coreeconomic agencies of meritocratic recruitment, career opportunities matters in those countries.Theexpertsanswered public bureaucraciesin35developingcountries,th policy, thatprecludescro on specificfeaturesof the administrative outputs international andbusinessorganizationshavede bureaucracies (EvansandRauch1999,Kisera scholars havelongpointedoutthe lackofcomparative dataon Several reasonsdetermined ourdecisionsinfa we hadtodecidebetween‘within-country’vs. Another methodological challengeofthisproject (Knack and Keefer 1995, Mauro 1995),yetthere (Knack andKeefer1995, Mauro ss-country comparisons. Atthesame ticized bureaucracyoneconomic deve ation sources,say,scholars,acti s percountrywere selectedandtheirresponseswereaveraged. portant decisionshadtobema een usedbyotherscholars(Hendersonetal . Inordertocounterbalance in otherempiricalsettings(Court structure scrutiny oftheacademic community. Rauchand 112 and thelevelofbureaucra nd Hechter1991:10,Lapuente2007).Several w andthelevelofexperts’cooperationwas veloped datasetsonthe ‘between thecountries’modes ofcomparison. alsoconsidered itimportant tosupplement a a setofclose-endedquestionsabouttheextent mple buteffective researchmethod produceda e keyinformants soastoilluminate issuesthat vor ofthewithin-count ey assembled apoolofexpertsonbureaucratic , suchasthedegreeof meritocracy in staff ent of real meritent ofreal pioneeredbyEvansand , aswithanyothercomparativeresearch, is adearthofcross-country indicators time, earlyrealmerit researchon 200timesacrosssocialscience a particularinformationsource, ng and former bureaucrats and the subjectivity of individual the subjectivityofindividual the characteristics of public the characteristicsofpublic de inconnectionwithcase lopment. Inthefirst place, et al tic compensation inthe quality of bureaucratic quality ofbureaucratic ry approach.Firstly, 1999). Inaneffortto 2007, Lapuente CEU eTD Collection subject oftheanalysisfocusingonimp authorities lackthepowertodirectlyinfluence produce distinctiveoutcomes, whicharedifficu in analyzing federalandmunicipal bureaucracies. regional development hasbeensizable(2006).Thes certification, andtheirim subsidies, directpriceregulation,licensingand regional authorities economists onthesub-federal regulationofecono 2006, Slinkoetal authorities wieldsignificantpow across allconstituentmembers oftheRussi regional bureaucraciesrestsondistinctivepolicyar the impact of ade-politicized bureaucracy oneconomic development. First of all, thestructure of regional andmunicipal –onlytheregionalbureaucracy research. Magun 2004).Itisthisvariat bureaucracy acrosspublicagencies (Brym andGimpelson 2004,ChirikovaGimpelsonand Russia showed thatthere wasaconsiderable diffe (Ahrend 2005,Knack2002, RuhilandCamões 2003). phenomenon understudyinstead of researchers toconcentratetheiranalysisonth attitudinal andcultural differences. Thefocus the main criticism ofcross-country historical, informational andculturalterms. Therefore,focusi Treisman 2000,Slinko 2005) andpolitico-institutionalsettings Golubchikov 2007,Desai socio-economic development 2005,Be (Ahrend Of the four subsetsofRussia’sbureaucracy Of thefour It isimportant tonotethatRussia’sregionsex 2005, Zhuravskaya2000).EugeniaKolo extensively used suchmeasures assub-regional taxexemptions and et al et al 2005,Stoner-Weiss 1997),butstillsh ion thatprovidestheopportunity 2005, Mikheeva1999,Kolomak 2006,Popov2001,Slinko ers withregardtotheregul studies,namely thattheyfail controllingforbroader di act ofbureaucracyoneconomicdevelopment. (Ahrend 2005,Golosov2001,2003,Shleifer and 113 an Federation.Secondly,Russia’ssub-federal the economic sphereinsuchawayastobethe rkowitz andDeJong2003,2005;Brock2005, e factorswithsoundtheo on localities within a singlecountry enables lt tocomparebetweeneachother.Municipal my, statesthatthroug eas within aframework, whichiscomparable e twodistinctiveadvant –federalinMoscow,regions, rence intheextentofde-politicisation At the federal level distinctive ministries hibit anotable variation intheirlevels of lendsitself to thecomparative analysis of ng onRussian’sregionsweavoid ation of the economy (Kolomak ation oftheeconomy(Kolomak mak, leading oneofRussia’s foraproductivecomparative toaccountproperlyforlarge are acommon denominator in fferences betw hout the 1990s and 2000s hout the1990sand2000s ages are not available ages arenotavailable pact onthelevelof retical linkstothe een thecases et al CEU eTD Collection accuracy. assessments, pioneeredbyEvansandRauch(1999, that enabletheircomparison. Inth Russia’s regionalgovernments havesimilar manda economic development (department ofeconomic po regional economic performance, optedforthe we of economic policyand,asarguedabove,decisions department so asto get moreaccurateevidence. narrow theunitofexpertevaluationsfrom re 49oblasts, sixkrays,tenautonomousRussian Federationin1996-2006, including21republics, The totality ofthepopulationunder considerati 3.4 SelectingCasesandAssemblingthePoolofExperts differences betweenthecases. enables researchers to focus ontheoretically releva analysis contributestotheimprovements ofthee actions of theregional authorities. Also,asgrowingliterature showed,thecross-regional mode of economic development andbytheexistenteviden notable variation inboth thedegreeof de-politicization of regionalbureaucracies and thelevelof analysis oftheimpact ofbureaucracyoneconomic public agency –improves theaccuracyofda experts, representingdifferentinformational sour same time, themultiple-informants andthe single public agency approaches – that isseveral We arguethatexpertsurveyhasth of anexpertsurveyastheprincipalmethod of experience ofearlierresearchon As ourdataisbasedonsubjectiveassessments In summary, thespecificaims oftherese real merit inRussiaandcross-countrydetermined boththeuse e potentialtocaptureallthreedi e past,the‘thesinglepublic 114 gional administration asawholetoonepolicy Aseveryregionalgovernment hasadepartment data collectionandthestructureofcomparison. on isthe 89constituent unitsthat formed the ces, evaluate personnel practiceataspecific ta. Ourdecisiontofocusonacross-regional nt variablesinsteadof development wasdetermined, firstofall,bya xplanatory powerofstatis licy). Departments ofeconomic policywithin arch andtheconclusionsdrawnfrom the taken bylocalauthoritiesimpact thelevelof 2000) provedtoproducedataofsatisfactory tes, operatingenvironments andconstraints ce thatthelatterhas department thatisre ofrealmerit,thedecisionwastakento agency’ approachtorealmerit mensions ofrealmerit. Atthe controlling forbroader sponsible forregional been affectedbythe tical analysis as it CEU eTD Collection dealing with the taxation of Russia’s largest Russia’s largest taxpa of with thetaxation dealing ente Russia’s largest of headquarters the also hosts Moscow was madeFederation Russian the ofterritorialunits. up 83 only

precluding theirinclusioninco for elevenregions(tenautonomous okrugsand following thecollapseofSovietUnion,major higher than thenational average, 2005: 29).Asthepost-Sovieteconomic developm Soviet Russia,isoftenexcludedfrom Russia’s cross-regional studies(BerkowitzandDeJong Moscow-city, whichenjoysauniquepositionin missing, excludedthemfromthepoolofcases we back totheyear1995,whenFZ-119wasenacte 2005; Desai have toexcluderegionsforonereasonor an idealscenariowouldinvolveall89regions would beinadequatetojustifyth it was reasonable tothinkthatth 2004, Saglibaev2008)seem tobeat sometimes eventaking precedence over)the between ‘us’and‘them’,system andthe of Lieven 1998,Saglibaev2008).Aschar political development oftheNorthCaucasus 11 10 to 71cases.Considerationsof because oftheirdistinc In addition,oftheremaining77regions,six and economicdevelopment,theinclusionofMoscowwouldnotbejustifiableonthesegrounds. okrugs, oneautonomous oblastandtwofedera Therefore, given thattheaim of determined byitscapital statusto agreater InMoscow the share of small enterp 1, 2008 them,March asof so that surrounded theregions with merged were okrugs autonomous six In 2006-2008 Therefore, afterthese exclusi et al 2005,Popov2001,Slinko tive clan-based socialstructure th

rises in total employment is twice the national average (Popov 2001: 869). 869). 2001: (Popov average istwicethe national rises in employment total theresearch istoidentify th mparative studies thatrequire eir inclusionintheanalysis. e extentofthede-politicization theproject’s feasibility and ons the totality ofthe population 11 oddswiththecivil Moscow’sextraordinaryeconom acteristic featuresof‘clancap yers, are situated inMoscow (Pleshanova 2008). another (Ahrend2005,Ber et al 115 since thecollapseofth l cities(Moscowa bloodtiesbeingnolessimportant than(and law (Cheloukhine andKing2007,Rozmainskii , many quantitative econo regions oftheNorthCaucasus wereexcluded degree than bytheactions the war-tornRepublicofChechnya),therefore rprises: seven out of nine specialized tax inspection units, units, inspection oftax out specialized nine rprises: seven the economic andpolitic 2005).Forexample, foranumberofyears from thesample wasdrawn.Similarly, which socio-economic indicatorswerenotrecorded d, andthedatafortheseelevenregionsis ent ofMoscow-cityhasbeenseveraltimes service principlesof at hasdetermined the economic and e relationshipbetweenbureaucracy such data.Sinceourstudydates of bureaucracyintheseregions nd St.Petersburg). maintenance ofdataquality to beconsidered was limited italism’, suchasthedivision kowitz andDeJong2003, e USSR(Naimark 2001, ic successis mic studiesofRussia personnelallocation, al structureofpost- of itsauthorities. 10 said tobe Although CEU eTD Collection quantitative research on informal personnel po personnel informal researchon quantitative of thetwelveeconomic zonesofRussia. oblasts, kraysandrepublics,coverstheterritory 12 and sixexpertalumni networks: identified through thescreening ofthemajo selected forthestudyandtogaintheirconsent to possessed athoroughknowledgeofthegovernment problem ofassembling Our apoolofexperts. Orlovskaya obl Moskovskaya obl Lipetsk obl Kostromskaya obl Kaluzskaya obl Ivanovskaya obl Voronez obl Vladimir obl Bryansk obl Belgorod obl sample provides agoodvarietyof difficulties indatacollection.Table 3.1 containsafu 5 caseswereincludedso astosafeguard thestatistical integrity of thesampleagainst unforeseen of thesample wasdecidedbytheminimal require population, consistingof71regions,asimple rando determined the needforasample ofRussia’sre This goes back as far as 2001 when, as part of her Having dealtwiththeissuessu • •

organization, thatexistedbetween The MoscowSchoolofPoliticalStudies Eastern Europe (NISPAcee), The NetworkofInstitutesandSchools PublicAdministration inCentraland Pskov obl Vologodskaya obl Novgorod obl Leningrad obl Yaroslavl obl Tver obl Ryazan obl Smolensk obl Tulskaya obl Murmansk obl Table 3.1RegionalCoverage(Cases)

theconstituentuni rrounding thecaseselection,wenow licy practices in several regions ofRussia. several regions licy practicesin

MA qualification, the author of this thesis conducted a conducted thesis ofthis the author MA qualification,

r regionalnewspapers andacademic publications

116 as awholeandincludesre gions onwhichtobasethestudy.From thetotal

1992-2006 andtrainedmorethan6000young primary aimherewastoidentifypeoplewho Penzenskaya obl Chuvashia Republic Volgograd obl Astrakhan obl Stavropol kray Saratov obl Samarskaya obl Nizhegorodskaya obl Tatarstan Republic Rostov obl ments forOLS regression(35cases).Afurther participateintheresearch.Theexpertswere m sample of40cases wasselected.Thesize ll listofregionsincluded intheanalysis. The al bureaucracy in one of Russia’s regions al bureaucracyinoneofRussia’sregions ts oftheRussianFederation,including , non-governmentalandnot-for-profit turnoutatte presentation from each Omsk obl Kemerovo obl Altaj kray Cheliabinsk obl Ulyanovsk obl Tomsk obl Novosibirsk obl Irkutsk obl Tumen obl Amur obl ntion tothe 12

CEU eTD Collection commentaries, and a CV (when available). majority experts), record (the of the 13 entries. experts in40ofRussia’sregionswhoagreed features regional scholars and educators insuchdisciplinesas features regionalscholarsandeducators governance (former centersforthetrainingandre-t representatives ofhighereduc members ofdepartments ofpublicadministration first group,hereafterreferredtoas representatives oftheregionalde participants inthepersonnel policyprocess–in prospective respondentsofthestrictlyc in mind thescopeofupcoming survey.Weal the expected dateofitsexecution. The experts we about theformat ofthesurvey, the regionalgovernment inquestion.Theprosp knowing howbureaucratsarehired, respondent toexplaintheaims oftheresearch lengthy conversation(oftenseve to them. The list ofsecondary take partinit.‘Initialcontact person –explainingtothecontacte Each entry in Eachentry the has the name the database expert, of By thebeginningofsummer2006,whensurv Between 2004-2006wemade about700initial 13 Thepoolofexpertsconsistedseveral • • • •

reform projectsfinancedbyEU and thebeginningof2000sasconsulta A largeRussianbusinessconsultancyfirm programs; The alumni networkofCentralEuropean The alumni networkoftheexchangeprograms oftheU.S.Department ofState; The expertsocietyoftheCarnegieMoscow democracy, ruleoflawandcivilsociety. politicians, journalistsandbusinessleaders s’ werealsoaskedtoadvise of experience inpublic bureaucracy is

including theexamples ofthequestionsinquestionnaire,and or‘snowball’contactsachievedabout250names. We hada ation institutions that are speci partments ofpersonnelmanagement ral) eitherinpersonorvia d expertstheaims ofthe resear fired andpromoted atthedepartment ofeconomic policyof independent experts onfidential natureoftheirresponses. and otherintern 117 her official affiliation, mailing address, telephone, emails telephone, address, mailing affiliation, her official and therequirements totheexpertisewesought– dependent members ofvacancycontest juries and ective expertswereprovi to takepartinthestudyincludedabout280 re askedtocontinueth in Russian institutions of highereducation and raining ofadministrative personnel).Italso groups of informants whowereeitherkey contacts –inwriting,bytelephoningand so madeaconsiderable efforttoassure ey tookplace,thedatabaseofbureaucracy nts andpolicyadvisorsonadministrative University anditssp Center(RegionalMonitoringProgram), whose employees whose workedinthe1990s , ispredominantly made upoffaculty us onotherbureaucr and civilsociety activists on issuesof ational donors. sues,such aspublications or media telephone witheveryprospective alized instate andmunicipal economics, finance,political ch projectandinvitingthem to – or its keen observers. The – oritskeenobservers.The eir observationskeeping ded withinformation ecial and extension acy expertsknown CEU eTD Collection independent statusonvacancyjuries. concerned withtheissue of confidentiality, and dissertation withadviceandgui they made answering in closed-ended questions provided asubstantialamountofsupplementary these expertsrespondedtothesurveymost favo regional authoritiesthatisrequir firms thatassist(forafee)re personnel policypracticesfromlia juries,theyalsogaintheirknowledgeon source oftheirexpertiseisserviceonvacancy science andsociology. Thisis of the local scholars,journalistsandacting andformer officials.A detaileddescriptionofeachsubgroup lease andother‘services’ from authorit theregional examples. interviews, theyansweredquestions withco write orotherwiseactinawaythatwouldrev confidentiality issue. Abouthalf recommendations. Amongallrespondents,this from thisgroupwererecruited by‘snowballing’ andthrough highly personalized exception ofthreeregions)producedanegativere reluctance ingivinginformation. Aninitial‘cold bureaucracy, including informal practices.Atthe same time, theydemonstrated agreat deal of they arebest situated toassessallaspects group ofinformants. Giventheircloseproximity to as HR experts The thirdgroupofexperts, Representatives oftheregionaldepartments of Other ExpertsgroupisgiveninTable3.2. , constitute thesecondgroupofexperts.This gional entrepreneurstoobtainlicen a well-informed andaccessiblegroup ed atthestage of studentintern hereafter referredtoasotherexperts dance throughouttheproject.Th oftheHRexpertswereinterv ison withtheirgraduatesand 118 nfidence, supporting theircaseswithmultiple

eal their identity. Howeve of theinstitutionalization of ade-politicized documents andexamples tosupportthechoices rably, answeredquestions . Manyofthemsupportedtheauthorthis calling’ approachalmost this istakenasadditional evidence of their ies; aides and advisers to regionallegislators, ies; aidesandadvisers personnel management, personnel hereafterreferredto theprocessofhirin sponse. Therefore, most of the respondents sponse. Therefore,mostoftherespondents groupwasmostconcernedwiththe isawellinformed but‘hardtoreach’ ship andjobplacement. Mostof iewed face-to-face,refusingto the close cooperation with the the closecooperationwith ses, statepropertylease,land is groupofexpertswasleast , includesrepresentativesof of experts. While themajor g, firingandpromotion, r, duringface-to-face withconfidenceand invariably(withthe CEU eTD Collection questions were closed-ended,offe personnel policydomains: admissions, appointment interviews. Thequestionnaire(A by means ofaself-administrated The expertevaluationsofpersonne 3.5 QuestionnaireandSurvey Others Local journalists regional legislators Aids andadvisersto businesses Representatives of Sub-Group bureaucrats, andrepresentative their researchonRussia’spublic This multifarious groupincludesloca of respondentstoaboutadozen. practice atthechosendepartment, not alloftherespondentscouldco regional politicalmatters. Havingbeen networks thatpreviouslysolicited experts. Mostofthere Aids andadviserstoregionallegi examples. answers toclose-endedquestionsweresupplemented withshortandclear confident statements onthestateofr with thedepartments ofeconomic po changes overtime aretraced.Thefirms havehadcloseworkingrelations relations withbureaucratsatreleva The verynatureofthe‘middleman’ businesspresupposesthatpersonal and landleasesother‘services’ assist (forafee)regional entrepre This groupofexpertslargelyconsists questions withconfidence, informed about‘whoiswho’intheregionaladministrati bureaucratic structure information, thoughtheirknowledgeisnotalwaysfocusedonthe group ofrespondents.This groupof merit. ‘Snowballing’ wastheprimary recruitment instrument for this A number offeredtheirexpertise ofregionaljournalists onthe stateofreal questionnaire, whichwasalsoused ring aselection ofspecific – s ppendix A)wasdesignedaroundthefourearlie r indentified l practicesatthedepartment Table 3.2OtherExperts per se.Atthesame time,journalistswerewell spondents wererecruitedthroughdifferentexpert 119 providing variousexamples. , promotionanddemotion, andfiring. Most s ofpoliticalparties. Description bureaucracy, currentandformer slators representanothergroupof neurs toobtainlicen mment onpersonnelpolicypracticeor expertise fromtheseindividualson therefore reducing theoverall number nt department arebuiltandpersonnel from theregionalauthorities. expertspossessesveryrich eal merit there. Inmany instancesthe licy thatenabledthem make to l scholarsand educators, knownfor arathernumerous groupinitially, representativesoflocalfirms that of economic policywereobtained ubstance-related – answers, as asaguideinface-to-face ses, stateproperty on, andanswered CEU eTD Collection the reason. directed themtotheonlineversionofquestionnaire. and confidentiality oftheresponde department ofPolitical Science,which emphasized accompanied byapersonalizedcoveringletterin second stage221questionnairesweremailed toth 14 answer optionsforclose-endedquestionsand experts andmeaningful interms oftheinformation required.Italsohelpedtoformulate the helped toimprovethedesignofquestionnaire, making surethatthequestionswereclearto interviewing, whichproved theiradequacy interm personnel policypractice.Thepilotstudyemployedbothmail andface-to-face survey representing arange oftheregi proportions orasafrequencyof respondents wereaskedtoassesscertainpe same time, five outof thirteen well asthe‘Don’tknow’,‘Difficult the survey, availability forface-to-face the requirements regarding the expertise, conf telephoned theexpertsfrom thedatabase,remi inaccuracy andthereforecompromise ( between differentgroupsofexperts group ofexperts(hereafter referredtoaswithin-the-group of thedata.Awidedispersion were given‘freehands’inofferingtheirestimates. Thiswasemployedasacheckonthevalidity number ofjobapplicationspervacancyat questionnaire reads:‘Thinking aboutthelasttw The fear that the personal data provided by them would be given to the third parties was mentioned repeatedly as It wasplannedtorunthe surv The fieldwork took placebetweenMay In November2004thequestionnairewaspre-test 14 andafurther forty-four experts preferre interview. Duringthisstage thirteen

of respondents’assessments, incl ons inquestion,answered15que theiroccurrence.Fo questionsweredesignedasquantitative evaluations nts’ identity. We alsocontactedtheexpertsby email, which to say’,‘Variestoomuch tote ey untiltherequired thevalidityofdata. between-the groups the department ofeconom to improvethesequenceofquestions. 120 nding themabout there identiality clause and clarifying theexperts’ rsonnel relatingfactsinabsolutenumbers, o years,approximately whatwastheaverage and Augustof 2006.Atthebeginning we s oftheaims ofthere e identified experts. The questionnaires were e identifiedexperts.Thequestionnaireswere thepurely academic natureoftheresearch Russiansignedby thehead oftheCEU d tobe interviewedface-to-face. Atthe r example, one of the questions of the r example,oneofthequestions ed inapilotsurvey.Forty-twoexperts, response rate–3experts perregion– dispersionorstandarddeviation)and dispersion), would signify their dispersion),wouldsignifytheir uding dispersion within the same uding dispersionwithinthesame experts opted nottotakepartin ll’ and‘Other’ stions ondifferentaspectsof search, updatingthem on ic policy?’ Respondents Respondents policy?’ ic search. The pilotsurvey options. Atthe , i.e. , i.e. CEU eTD Collection principles andmajor provisionsof ‘FZ-79 isanentirely differentpieceoflegi provisions ofthelawsbeingmore prominent than 79 hasbeenacontinuationofFZ-119onlytosome extentwithdifferences between themajor between themajor provisionsofth ‘pretty much thesame’. Afurther15.1%ofthee overwhelming majority ofexperts(82%)consider provisions. Theresponsestothisquestionar First ofall,weaskedrespondent 3.6.1 TheContinuityoftheFormal-LegalFramework 3.6 SurveyFindings for theremaining 2regions. (response rateis47.6%), respondents wereinterviewedface-to-face.Therefore,theeffectiv department ofeconomic policy(whichwereexclude response rate),including5questi was achieved.BytheendofAugust200687completed questionnaireswerereceived(39.4% legal framework thatwasconsistentacross th The expertevaluations suggest thatbothFZ Total Entirely different More differentthansimilar More similar thandifferent Very similar Pretty much thesame Table 3.3ProvisionsofFZ- on Real Merit onReal including 3expertsfor36regions,4 s toassessthedifference/similarity betweenFZ-119andFZ-79’s onnaires inwhichexpertsevaluate the lawshavenothingincommon’. e lawsthandifferences.3.2%(4 e period understudy(1996-2006). Thisisinaccord e summarizedinTable3.3,whichshowsthatthe 121 slation compared withFZ-119:thefounding xperts believedthatthereweremore similarities 119 andFZ-79 Compared(%) similarities. Finally,noexpertchosetheoption ed FZ-79andFZ-119tobe‘verysimilar’ or

-119 andFZ-79constituted asingle formal- d from theanalysis). experts for2regions,and5

e numberofrespondents is126 d astructuralunitotherthan experts)consideredthatFZ- 50.8 15.1 100 3.2 31 0 No ofvalidresponses126 In additionforty-four CEU eTD Collection 2.5 and 7.5. and 2.5 15 estimates. experts witharangeofpossible applications pervacancy atdepartments of vacancy the weakerthepoliticians’ ‘grip’ scrutiny ofpersonnelpolicyprocess.Inotherwords, powerholders, alargernumber ofjobapplicants to protect theircareer domain (themass media) sufficien winners inregionalpoliticsandinformation onbur would signifythatrecruitment tobureaucracy is reasoned thatifdepartments managed toattracta degree towhichpoliticianscontroladmissions. In vacancies atthedepartments ofeconomic policy. Next, respondentswereaskedthreequestions 3.6.2 Admission of bothlegalacts.Basedonthiswe with theconclusionsofchaptertwodissertation, whichanalyzedandcompared provisions averaging individualassessments conservative andhomogenous estimates (Table consistent acrossdifferentgroupsofinformants 8 applicants pervacancy (Belgorod, Moskovska administrative reform since1996. middlehelp ofexpertevaluationsasthe 2006, Many answers were given as a range, such as for example, 2-3 or 7-8 candidates. Such responses were recorded as The individualexpertassessments rangedbe The first questionof thissectionof thequestionnaire related totheaverage number of job 15

pursuit inpublicbureaucracy from thepossiblearbitraryactionsof

answers; insteadthey weregiven‘freehands’inofferingtheir of expertsfromthesame region, fluctuatedbetween1.8(Amur) tly regular.Inaddition,giventhe thereforetreatthestate ofreal overthis stageofpersonnelprocess. economicpolicyin2004-2006.We didnotprovide 122 on the number of job candidates applying for on thenumberofjobcandidatesapplyingfor wouldsignifyagreatercapacityforthepublic large number ofjobapplicants pervacancy, this tween noapplicantsatall(Ivanovo,Amur) and withindependentexpertsofferingthemost not limited tothe ‘inner circle’ of thecurrent the lightofdiscussiononformal merit,we as thecumulativeoutcome oftheattempts at ya, Rostov). Theindividualestimates were These questions werede 3.4). Theregionalaverages,calculatedby the larger the number of job applications per thelargernumber ofjobapplications eaucratic jobs is circulated in the public eaucratic jobsiscirculatedinthepublic merit, reconstructed with the statutory rightsofjobseekers signed toclarifythe CEU eTD Collection achieved the cross regional average of 4 or more. 16 experts from betterperforming regions. answers butnoneofthe‘Dramatic Cross-regional (N=40) Others (N=46) Independent (N=40) HR experts(N=40) six regions attractingfiveormore j applicants perpostis4.3with24regionsattracti and 7.5(Rostov)applicantsperpost(Appendix of worse performing regionstointensifyth of worseperforming the cross-regional averageofjobapplicants per ‘Considerably more’ optionwassele progressed withde-politicizati difficult tomake acomparisonovertime. 2006. Notably,noneoftherespondentschoseth respondents statedthattheaverag dramatically becausethere wereno vacancy selected the‘Nochange’option.3.2%ofexpertsreportedthataveragenumberincreased increased andanother15%feltth attempts atadministrative reform), themajority changed comparedtotheyear ‘Better performing regions’ stands for the regions in which the average number of applications per vacancy Table 3.4AverageNumberofJobApplicationsperVacancybyGroupsExpertsand It isimportant to note that When askedhowtheaveragenumberof

Min 1.8 2.5 0 3

on of bureaucracymuch further the overwhelming major 2000 (whichistakenasaproxy e number ofjobapplicantss Across Regions,2004-2006 at itincreasedconsiderably ob applicantspervacancy onaverage. ally more’ and‘Considerablymore’ answerswere givenby cted onlybyexpertsfrom thos Max 7.5 7.5 8 7

16 Thissuggeststhatby2000 e speedofbureaucraticreform 2000. after 123 contests in 2000atallandafurther3.2%of ng onaveragefourormorecandidates,including Mean

vacancy, signifying aneffortonbehalfofsome oftherespondents(38%) 4.3 4.3 4.4 4.1 B). The cross-regional average number of B).Thecross-regionalaveragenumber of

job applicationspervacancyin2004-2006 e ‘Considerablyless’option;6.3%foundit ity (32outof48or ‘within-the-group’ ‘within-the-group’ Std. Deviation lightly decreasedbetween2000and (Table 3.5). 34% of respondents (Table 3.5).34%ofrespondents 1.2 1.4 1.4 .98 than otherregions.Also,the for theoutcomes ofYeltsin’s e regionsthatdidnotachieve a groupofRussia’sregions 72%) of‘Nochange’ said thatitslightly Std. Deviation ‘between-the- groups’ 0.15

CEU eTD Collection 33.5% and 19%. and 33.5% 17 Cross-regional (N=40) Others (N=33) Independent (N=40) HR experts(N=40) Experts weregiven‘freehands’in applications werefiledbybureaucratswhoal received bythedepartmentof * performing regions worse Experts from performing regions better Experts from allregions Experts from number ofinternalapplicantsintheto between 18.8(Rostov)and58.3(A applicants, obtainedbyaveragingresponsesof 3.6). Theregionalvaluesofthenumber ofin informants withHRexpertsofferingthemost assessments variedbetween 17.5and75percent.Theywereconsistentacrossdifferentgroupsof say’. to know/Difficult =‘Don’t less’, 7 ‘Considerably Table 3.5ChangeintheAverageNumberof 1 = ‘Dramaticallymore’, 2 = ‘Considerably more’, 3 = S Many answers were given as a range, such as for example, 30-35% or 18-20%. Such responses were recorded as Table 3.6ProportionofInternalApplicants in theTotalNumberof VacancyContest Lastly, respondentswereasked:

Applications byGroupsofExpertsandAcrossRegions, 2004-2006

18.8 17.5 Min 20 19

economic policyin2004-2006,approximately howmanyofthose 2000 Compared(Nandpercent) (3.2%) 1* 0 4 4

mur) percent(AppendixB).Thecr offering theirestimates aspercent. 58.3 Max 75 60 50 tal number ofapplicationsis32.5percent.

‘Thinkingaboutallapplica (15.1%) 19 19 2 0

124 JobApplicationsperVacancy,2004-2006and conservativeandhomogenous estimates (Table lightly more’, 4 = ‘No change’, 5= ‘Slightly less’, 6 = Mean

32.5 34.2 32.2 31.1 ready worked for the regional government?’. ready workedfortheregionalgovernment?’. the expertsrepresenting ternal jobcandidatesin

(38.1) 32 16 48 3

‘within-the-group’ ‘within-the-group’ (34.1%) Std. Deviation 31 12 43 4

10.9 13.6 11.2 9.9 tions for vacancycontests oss regional average of the oss regionalaverageofthe (3.2%) 17 5 3 1 4

Theindividualexpert thetotalnumber of the region,fluctuated No ofresponses126 (0%) Std. Deviation ‘between-the- 6 0 0 0

groups’ 1.6

(6.3%) 7 2 6 8

CEU eTD Collection is circulated sporadically, reflecting theminimalist reflecting nature sporadically, is circulated regime,policy such information personnel type of politicized In openly information. such requirements to publicize here more consistentlythananyw the legal requirements to advertisebureaucratic mass media. Thus,A.H.,theHRexpertfrom the direct functionoftheregularitywithwhichbureau the admission processwas awaybe per vacancy istwicelargerthestatutory minimum, thissuggeststhatthedegreeofopenness ‘undesirable’ candidate’(int be surethatsomething wentwrong[forpolitic one, nevermind, twoormore additi candidates inpre-determined contests.They[polit the regionheevaluated was‘rather animitation thanreform’ said:‘Thereare alwaystwo O.R., M.P.andM.Sa).Thus,M.Sa.,whowaspartic was alsosuggestedbymanyexpertsduringin-depth there wereinvariably twocandidates,carefully se is notonlyplausible inthelightof Russia’s recent past,wheninso-called ‘competitive elections’ limited thenumber of jobapplicants tothestat powerholders wantedjusttomimic theopenne regular, attractingcandidatesfr bureaucratic vacancies wascirculatedinthepub one inthreejobseekersonaveragewasinternal ca value ofthecross-regional averageofjobappli which vacancy-relating information wasdistributed outside thebureau. average ( number ofjobcandidatesaret 18 In patronage job related information normally does not reach the public domain, reflecting the absence of legal legal of absence the reflecting domain, public the reach not relatedinformation does normally job In patronage What dothesefindings tellusabout theadmission process? Firstof all, weinterpret the It isimportant to note that re Moreover, expertcommentsindica r =-.694, p =.000),suggestingthata erview withM.Sa).Asthecross-re

hose thathavelargernumber of om outsidebureaucracyandwithoutpoliticalconnections.If gions with asmaller number of internal jobseekers in the total here elseinthecountry.Andthis yond politicizedtypesofbureaucracy. onal candidates.Ifthereareth ted thatthenumber of jobapplicationspervacancyis 125 utory minimum oftwocandidates.Thisargument of formal requirement to publicize such information. information. such publicize of formal to requirement jobs regularlyinthemass media areimplemented possible linkbetweenthetw lic domain (such asthe mass media) sufficiently cations pervacancy(4.3) andthefactthatonly ians –MN]andoneof icians –MN]couldnotbebotheredtofabricate ss ofentrytobureaucr Tomsk region,says:‘Iam absolutelysurethat ndidate as evidencethat lected by theappropriate Party’s officials,it interviews (more thanot ularly concernedthatbureaucraticreform in cratic vacanciesarea gional average of job applications gional averageofjobapplications jobapplicationspervacancy ree candidatesinthecontest, directlytranslatesintothe 18 acy, theywould have information relating to dvertised inthelocal the job seekers isan

hers byO.V.,P.Kh., o isintheextentto CEU eTD Collection be publishedin…[the name ofa marginal me have tobepublished inaprint media aswell. S advertisement? Itellyou,they areverylow.Butthisisnottheendof story.Jobvacancies category…‘Procurement’. What arethechances have tonavigatethrough severalpages beforeyoufindit[avacancyadvertisement –MN]inthe website. Asmart move… Tobegi what doeshedo?They skillfully hidtheinformation inthelabyrinth of theadministration’s interested in openandcompetitive contests, buthe provides agoodrepresentationofwhatwassaid by other experts:‘Ourgovernorobviouslyisnot the admission stage.TheobservationofM.Sa.,an bureaucracy. concerned. Thissuggests thatlitigations may not included managers from sixtopregionsasfa jobseekers. Interestingly,three directly asked)ofhavingexperiencegoing by 15of23interviewed human manage resource applicants and,especially,complaints’ (interview of jobseekersindeedtranslatesinto‘more troubl relating to theadmission. Firstly, from human res brought thisregionastheexample ofthepr Altogether fourteen experts from outsideToms forerunner of bureaucraticreform asfarthe re is more thanacoincidenceasma Service andAdministrative Reform across alldepartmentsgover ofTomskregional by theexpertsfrom Tomskregionwas 4.67,theaver average number ofjobapplications pervacancy attheDepartment ofEconomic Policy,reported economic policy–MN]butacrossth [large –MN]number of Secondly, ourexpertscommented onhowpoliticiansmanage tocircumvent theopenness of The data obtained from in-depth interviews also helped to clarify other important issues job applicantspervacancythatweha out offivehuman resourcemana ny expertsthattookpart n with,notall[citizens–MN] 2006:4).Thefactthatthenumbers areofsimilar magnitude e board’(interviewwithA.H. oper implementation oftheadmission rules. 126 o, he[thegovernor –MN]orders jobvacancies to dia outlet,publishedby the regionalgovernment r astheaveragenumber ofjobcandidatesis gular publication ofjob vacanciesisconcerned. ‘other’expertfrom worseperforming a region, k andallthreeexperts,representingTomsk, ource managers welearntthatalargernumber necessarily beindicative ofamore politicized to courtresolveadmission disputeswith nment 4.3(TomskDepartmentofState was with T.M.).Thispointofviewwasexpressed e forme asthereismore queriesfrom the also cannot notbreach thelawblatantly.So, rs, fiveofwhichadmitted (withoutbeing age numberofjobapp for anaveragecitizentofindthisjob inthissurveyme ve, notonlyatthisdepartment [of gers whohadcourtexperience have Internet...Secondly, you ). Indeed,whilstin2006the ntioned Tomsk asthe lications pervacancy CEU eTD Collection convictionwhat would represent a benchmark a ‘healthy’ for numberapplicants of pervacancy. personnel policypracticesacrossRussia’sregions. of jobseekerspervacancyisconcerned,suggesting stage) representtheregions situated inthebottom experts (that commented onhowpoliticians manage tocircumvent theopenness of theadmission media wasusedmore oftenthanth suggest thatthesubversionofth formal politicaldiscretion soasto regainth acting legislation.Inotherwords,thereisev of jobadvertisements arewithhe publicized inthemass media even advertisements areprinted is concerned.Threeothe corroborated theevidenceasfar difficulties infindingjobadvertisements onlin 19 per vacancy andtheratioofinternalexternal contests remained populatedbypre-selected candidates’ (interview of thatoutlet. Asa result, thelegal requiremen monthly in1200copies–MN].Thegeneralpublic, variation inthedegreeof progre and afurtherresearchisrequired. competitive system. Ourdata,however, doesnot permit arobust evaluation of thesealternatives, number of time wereonlyslight, thismay signifythat thisaveragewaseithernearto theoptimal As fluctuationsintheaveragenumberofjobapp the circulationofrelevantinformation inthepublic domain overtime wasfarofbeingsporadic. period ofsixyears,thissuggeststhattherewasaconstantinflow number applicants ofjob pervacancy (4.3)di In the absence of cross-national data ofcross-national absence the In Thirteen experts(ofallcategories)corroborat Third important conclusiondrawnfrom theda Returning to thequantitative analysis, asthree 19 orindicativeofacertainconj

on the onaverage number admissions with of establish to itisdifficult e formal requirement topublicize job advertisements inthemass ss ofbureaucraticreform inRussia’s regions.Thedatamakes it as thelimited circulationofth ld from thecirculation,thisis though allthecriteriafortheirpublicrelease e directviolationofthelaw.Itshouldalsobenotedthat17 uncture of eventsatthis stage inthedevelopment ofthe eir control over admissions. Thequalitative data idence thatpoliticiansactedbeyondthescopeof 127 d notchangeorchanged onlyslightlyoverthe e areconcerned,twoamongthethirteenalso t is formally observed, lications pervacancyover applications isabout part ofthetableasfaraveragenumber r expertsinsisted that that theremay beasystematic differencein of course,hasnotacl quarters ofexperts believed thattheaverage ed the evidence presented above as far as ed theevidencepresentedaboveasfar ta ontheaverage numbe e mass media outlet where thejob anunambiguous breachofthe of jobseekers.Inotherwords, withM.Sa.). not alljobvacancies are but ‘so-called’vacancy the considerable spatial the considerablespatial ue abouttheexistence a considerableperiod r ofjobapplicants are met. As some CEU eTD Collection 20 from informal powerholders’ influence. changed overtime) andtheextenttowhichou degree ofthe institutionalizatio This sectionofthequestionnaire 3.6.3 Appointment depoliticized bureaucracy.Thisin policy regime intherestofregionscouldbe far asadmissions areconcerned,canbechar scope offormal politicaldiscreti statutory average(2).Inotherwords,onlyinoneregion(A clear thatinallbuttworegionstheaveragenumbe between zero(Voronez, Amur) and were given‘freehands’ inofferingtheirestim number ofvacancies,wedidnotprovideexperts contests (thereafter referred toas working bureaucratsatthedepartment ofeconom bureaucratic reform fasterthan of jobapplications,some of and 2006most ‘betterperforming’ regionsexperiencedaslightbut the average number applicants ofjob pervacan was aconsiderable cross-regional variation intheprogressofbureaucraticreform measured as regional averageofjobcandidatespervacancyma Tumen –that leanmore towardsanopenlypoliticizedbureaucracy. applications pervacancyormore) andsixregi Belgorod andRostov–thatleanmore toward Theyare Brynask, Vladimir, Kostroma Firstly, respondentswereaskedtoevaluate Finally, thedistributionofan

otherregionsofthiskind. n ofvacancycontests as ahiring mechanism (andhowthatdegree the ‘worseperforming’ regions on and,therefore,thepersonnel pol contained threequestionsthatwe ‘meritocratic recruitment’). Just cludes sixregions–Tula,Novos , Murmansk,, Chuvashia, Altajkr., Orel. swers tothequestiononte 60 percent(Rostov).The evalua acterized asunboundedpolit ons (Ivanovo,Altajkr.,Irkutsk, Bryansk,Oreland 128 cy. Moreover,itseems thatwhilstbetween2000 ates. Theindividualexpert assessments ranged classified aswithintherangeofopenandfully- the proportionofcurrently(summer 2006) with arange ofpossibleanswers; insteadthey kes itclearthatalre r ofjobapplicationspervacancyexceededthe s afullyde-politicized ic policywhowerehiredviaformal vacancy tcomes ofvacancycontests wereindependent 20 mur) politiciansactedbeyondthe re designedtocaptureboththe likewiththequestionon steady increase in the number steadyincreaseinthenumber advanced thiscomponentof ibirsk, Moskovskaya,Lipetsk, mporal change inthecross- icy regime in this region, as tions were consistent across across consistent were tions ady bytheyear2000there icization. Thepersonnel bureaucracy (5job CEU eTD Collection 21 Cross-regional (N=40) Others (N=45) Independent (N=40) HR experts(N=39) Cross-regional (N=40) Others (N=46) Independent (N=40) HR experts(N=40) regions is25.4percent(Table3.7) average ofthesizebureaucr varied between 3.33(Ivanovo)and52.5percent recruitment indicator, obtained conservative andhomogenous estimates (Table3.7) different groupsofinformants, withindepe (Table 3.8). (Moskovskaya obl).Theexperteval number ofpre-decidedoutcomes rangedbetweenzero(atleastoneexpertin26regions)andtwo outcomes aredecidedinadvance vacancy experts wereasked:‘Even ifformal similarly1= 0.9, 1-2= 0.85,= 0.8. 2 Forthe ofthe th of purpose representation results, better Table 3.8NumberofOutcomes FormalVa Table 3.7Proportionof CurrentBureaucrats In ordertoevaluatetheextentofinformal

Groups ofExpertsandAcrossRegions,2006 Groups ofExpertsandAcrossRegions,2006 .867 Min Min 3.3 .85 .85 .8 0 5 0

byaveragingresponsesoftheexpertsrepresentingregion, atic personnelhiredviavacancy , withseventeenregionsachiev __casesoutof10.’Theindividual expertasse uations wereconsistentacross 52.5 Max Max 55 55 60 1 1 1 1

129 e answer ‘zero number of cas e answer‘zeronumberof ndent members of juries offeringthemost ndent members ofjuries Mean Mean

25.4 24.6 25.7 25.8 .93 .94 .92 .93 contests take placeatthisdepartment, their political interventioninto cancy Conteststhatwere Pre-decidedby

Hired via FormalVacancy Contestsby (Rostov) (AppendixB) . Theregionalvaluesofthemeritocratic ‘within-the-group’ ‘within-the-group’ ‘within-the-group’ ‘within-the-group’ Std. Deviation Std. Deviation .034 12.8 12.5 14.3 .056 .051 .053 13.5 ing thisorahighervalue. contests across40ofRussia’s different groupsofinformants 21 es’ was converted to ‘1’, to‘1’, converted was es’ appointment affairs, . Thecross-regional Std. Deviation Std. Deviation ‘between-the- ‘between-the- ssments ofthe groups’ groups’ .012 .65

CEU eTD Collection vacancy contests are not predetermined inadvance. 23 22 Cross-regional (N=40) Others (N=46) Independent (N=40) HR experts(N=40) the Nizhegorodskaya obl,Penza). independent members, agreedthatthis by politiciansinadvance(Belgorod,TverandPskov) cases didallthreeexpertsagreethattheoutcomes 10 cases,withtwenty-oneregionsachievingthisorhighervalu through theexpertsurvey. remarkable variation in the organization desi between themid-1990s, whenpatronagewas‘the (Table 3.9),withnineteenregions makes up23.8percentofthetotalbureaucratic per cent(Appendix B).Onaverageandacrossre politics’. Theregionalvaluesofthe was hiredwithoutunduepolitic Index variable(Table3.9). informal political intervention and 45% *0.9 case (1out of10)40.5%, =10% *0.85 (1-2cases out of10)= 8.5, 30% *0.8cases outof= (2 10)24. members fromtwo regi to independent this, addition In Table 3.9 Meritocratic Recruitment Index Across regionsandonaveragetherewasapprox It isimportant tonotethatthisvariable re We thenweighedtheindividualscoresof

Meritocratic RecruitmentIndexbyGroupsofExpertsandAcrossRegions,2006

23 Min 3 0 4 0 Byaveragingindividualscoreswe

22

reachingthisorhighervalue. al inferenceor,usingMiller , whichquantifiesthesizeof obtained individualvaluesofthe Meritocratic Recruitment Index Max 50 55 55 60

was thecase(Vladimir, Lipetsk,Volgograd, 130 ons ons Amur)(Kostroma the and that reported outcomes of gn ofregionalbureau 22.58 Mean

23.8 24.9 24.3 only game intown’,andthemid-2000s, whena of vacancycontests wereneverpre-determined staffatthedepartments ofeconomic policy flects the‘distance travelled’ bythe regions

gions ‘abovepolitics’bureaucraticpersonnel meritocratic recrui andinfiveregionstwoexperts,including imately onepre-decidedoutcomeevery in ‘within-the-group’ ‘within-the-group’ Std. Deviation calculated theregional valuesof ’s (2000)metaphor, is‘above 12.2 e (AppendixB).Onlyinthree 13.8 11.7 14.4 the bureaucratic personnel that the bureaucraticpersonnelthat fluctuated between3and50 Meritocratic Recruitment cracies wasdocumented tment bythe degreeof Std. Deviation ‘between-the- groups’ 1.23

CEU eTD Collection politics’ bureaucrats( number jobseekers ofinternal personnel thatishiredwit average number ofjob applicat number applicants ofjob pervacancy ( 24 by means ofexpertevaluationsstandsuptorealitychecks. Meritocratic Recruitment Index Ministry’s contest,whichtookplaceinApril20 the (Ministry of Economic Development andTrade,2006) excluding personnel policy). Forty-six regions took financial assistancetoregions Development and Tradeheldacompetition among bureaucratic reform progressinRussia’sregion across allregions. ‘Considerably decreased’,suggestingthatmeritocr correspondingly. Notably,noneoftherespondents se supported bytheproportionof‘Nocha number of‘abovepolitics’bureaucratsconsid than in2000andalmost 60%thoughtitwasmore contests steadilyincreasedovertime: about90% majority ofrespondentsthoughtthatthepro contests in2005-2006changed The table of coefficients of bi-variate correlation between measures of realmerit is reported in Appendix C. Meritocratic Recruitment Index Finally, respondentswereaskedhowthenumbe The A strongpositive correlation between the Meritocratic Recruitment Index r =-.746, hout unduepoliticalinference.

in thetotalnumber ofjobcandida p =.000). ( advancingpublicadministration reform (12reform areas, r in comparison to2004and2000.AsTable3.10shows,the ions pervacancytendtohave =.645, ( r =.572, r =.850, is highly positively correlated with othermeasures of p =.000).Thereforethevalidityofdataobtained nge’ answersfor 2000and2004:4%37% 131 = .001). The results of the second round of the p =.001).Theresultsofthesecondround erably increasedbetween2000and2006isalso portion ofpublicmanagers hiredviavacancy s. Thus,in2006Russia’sMinistryofEconomic 07, arealsohighlypositivelycorrelatedwiththe Meritocratic Recruitment Index

ofrespondentsthoughtthatitwasmorein2006 p =.000)suggeststhatregionswiththelarger in2006than2004.Th atic recruitment advancedsteadilyovertime the Russianprovincesthataimedprovide to part inthecompetition andreceivedascore lected theoptions‘S , whichishighlypositively correlated with r ofbureaucratshiredviaformal vacancy 24 Likewise,regionswithasmaller tes tendtoemploy more ‘above larger corps ofbureaucratic lightly decreased’and e argument thatthe andthe average CEU eTD Collection 2004 2000

external candidates?’ Respondent external candidates?’ of economic policythatwerefilled viaformal proportion ofbureaucratic postsofhigherimportan particular, respondentswereasked:‘Thinkingaboutthelasttwoyear personnel policyinstrument contests asvacancy demotion. Thefirstquestionrelatedtopromotion by This sectionofthequestionnairecontainedf 3.6.4 PromotionandDemotion regions withoutmajor setbacks. this component of Russia’scivil service re average. With regardtothete being considerablyaheadandtworegions(Iva Russian Federation,withsixre of thereform,asfar admissions areconcerne spatial distributionofthevalues regions provesthatthedataobtainedinoursurveystandsuptoexternal validity checks. The Meritocratic RecruitmentIndex contests withoutunduepolitical departments ofeconomicpolicyin40Russia’ Table 3.10ChangeintheNumberofBureaucrats Dramatically Dramatically To sum expertevaluations up,the

More 3.2 0 Considerably Considerably More 13.5 77 2005-2006 Comparedto2004and2000(%) mporal changesintheappointment gions (Rostov,Samara, Novosibi and alternatives measures ofbureaucraticreform inRussia’s interference.Ast s were offered eightoptionsfromwhichtoselect.The s wereoffered Slightly More 11 46 Meritocratic Recruitment Index suggest thatabouta form advancedsteadilyovertime acrossRussia’s 132 our questionsonpromotions andaquestionon No Change novo andAmur)laggingconsiderablybehindthe d, wasunevenacrossthete s regions was hired through formal vacancy s regionswas hiredthroughformal vacancycontests,open 37.3 4 ce (thetwohighestgrades) atthedepartment forfillingseniorbureaucraticposts.In contests, namely tothedeployment ofsuch Hired viaFormalVacancyContests, rong positivecorrelationbetweenthe quarter ofallbureauc Slightly Less 0 0 rsk, Belgorod,TomskandTula) processourdatasuggeststhat s, approximately whatisthe indicatesthattheprogress Considerably Considerably bothtointernaland Less No ofresponses126 rritorial units of the 0 0 ratic staffatthe Difficult to say Don’t know/ 4.8 3.2 CEU eTD Collection 25 Cross-regional (N=40) Others (N=45) Independent (N=40) HR experts(N=40) groups ofinformants. deviation, reportedinTable3.12,s the groupandbetween-the distribution ofanswersisreported inTable3.11.It should befilledviacontes requirements onpromotion thatrequired thateac were filledviaformal vacancycontests. These of allpostshigherimportanceatthedepartme individual expertassessments at contests. of expertsstatedthatbetween50and100percent Filled via FormalVacancy ContestsbyGroupsofExperts andAcrossRegions,2004-2006 1= ‘Less than 1/3’, 2 =‘About 1/3’, 3 = ‘About half’, 4 = ‘About two-thirds’, 5=‘About 90%’, 6 = ‘About 100%’. Table 3.12 Vacancy contests The crossregionalaverage ofthe Having assignednumerical values toindividualanswers,

Table 3.11ProportionofBureaucratic Promotion byContest

1.6 100% ts opentobothinternaland externalcandidates. Min 1.3 -groups assessments. Themean valu 0 2 0

Formal VacancyContest,2004-2006(%) theregionallevel,is3.7(Table

23 About : ProportionofBureaucratic how thatexpertassessments ar Max 5.3 5 5 6

90% Promotion byContest

34.1 About

133 2/3 Mean nts ofeconomic policyin40ofRussia’sregions h bureaucraticvacancy,buttheentry levelones, 3.66 3.51 3.58 3.93 findings arelargelyinaccord withtheformal

shows thattheoverwhe of suchpostswerefilledviaformal vacancy 25.4

About Posts ofHigherImportance Filledvia

‘within-the-group’ ‘within-the-group’ Half Std. Deviation 25 3.12).Inotherwords,about68% 12.7 variable,obtainedbyaveraging wewereableto compare within- About 1.04 1.18 1.01 1.18 es andthevaluesofstandard Posts ofHigherImportance

e consistentacrossdifferent 1/3 Less

.8 lming majority (84%) than 1/3 No ofresponses126 Std. Deviation ‘between-the- groups’ 1.6 None .23

Don’t .8 know CEU eTD Collection the Above vacancy contests. Hence, the if more senior posts were filled by none of the ‘othermet addition, the‘Noneofabove’opti appropriate authority’and‘Vacancy contests frequently, followedby‘Atdiscretionofthehead shows thatappointment fromtheregionalgov many options asapplied.Thedistributionofe department ofyourexpertise?’Respondentswere methods of fillingvacant bureaucratic postsofhi Promotion byContest posts ofhigherimportance more oftenthanothe bureaucrats withoutundue political Recruitment Index 26 promotion isconcerned.Asthespreadof other words,thedataprovidesclearevidenceof instrument. Options2and3arepo option placed by experts fromthe same region. Indeed, the correlated with the correlated with relations between the two variables. This statistical test evidences for internal validity of the of data. statistical validity for internal two This variables. testevidences the between relations The ‘None of the above’ option was designed as a check on the onthe asacheck designed was option above’ of the ‘None The In addition,expertswereasked‘Thinking aboutthelast twoyears,whatwerethe other The It shouldbenotedthatonlyappointment from Total does not equal 100% as respondents were able to select any number of options

Table 3.13OtherMethods ofFilling Burea variable, constructed by aggregating the number of ‘ Promotion byContest 6 5 4 3 2 1 Promotion by Contest by Promotion Other Vacancy contests forcurrently employed bureaucrats only Appointment from thecadrereserve None oftheabove At discretionoftheheaddepartment Don’t know/Difficulttosay ( r =.795, variable seem tosignifyamore Promotion by Contest = .000). This means that those regions that hire a larger number of p =.000).Thismeans thatthoseregionshirealargernumber of

variable ( variable ishighly positively correlated withthe licy toolsthatwereauthorized interferencetendtoemploy formal vacancy contests to fill on waschosenby13.5%ofrespondents. variable would be highly positively associated with the the with associated positively highly be would variable = .570, p r =.570, internal contests 134 hods’ (options 1-3),then they forcurrentlyemployed bureaucratsonly’.In xperts’ choicesisreportedinTable3.13,which Nonethe Above of ernment’s cadrereservewasmentioned most gher importance (thetwo highest grades) at the the violationofpersonnellegislationasfar provided withsixoptions = .000), which is in accord with the hypothesized

ticks’ in theanswer box fo cadre reserveisalegitimatecadre personnelpolicy r regions. Therefore, higher valuesofthe ucratic PostsofHigherImportance(%) ofthedepartment orotherofficialwith de-politicized personnelpractice. Promotion by Contest by Promotion instrument (option3)waslimited, variable appeared to be positively to be positively appeared variable neitherbyFZ-119orFZ-79.In should haveshouldvia been filled variable. We reasoned that r the ‘None of theabove’ No ofresponses126 andcouldselectas 26 25.4 13.5 15.1 4.8 7.1 Meritocratic Meritocratic 0 None of CEU eTD Collection discretion of thehead of th department’ option, Murmansk’s score is 1. If none of the region’s experts ‘ticked’ the answer box for the ‘At only the independent expert from Murmansk ‘ticked’ the answer box for the ‘At discretion of the head of the theof headthe of department’option, Vladimir’sscore for the the lightofquantitativedata. oriented regions.Inotherwords,thenatureof politicized bureaucracies, atthesame time itsa .333, variable shows amoderate negative correlation withthe personnel policytool. meritocratic promotion wereweak,itseems to at discretionwasemployed more frequentlyinthoseregionswheremerito Promotion byContest 27 development sometimes .108 andr Meritocratic RecruitmentIndex no correlation existsbetween the constructed inthesame wayasthePromotionatDiscretion negatively correlatedwith merit (Appendix C).Theanalysis revealedthatthe discretion we focusedourfurtheranalysisonthe reserve belongedtobureaucratswhoweremade posts) weresupportiveofit.Theyunanimously consultation useofcadrereserves arises (which isaprovisi more oftendepartments department’ optionplacedbyexpertsfrom thesame region, aggregating thenumber of‘ticks’intheanswer For instance, as only HRand ‘other’ experts, representin From in-depthinterviewswith44experts A similar analysiswas carriedoutforthe p =.036).Thismeansthattheuseofthispersonnelpolicytoolwasnotcurbedinmore de- variable and subjecteditto =.224, p =.164correspondingly).However,theAppointmentfromCadreReserve ( e department’, that region receives ascore ofzero. r =-.672, consult recruit on introducedbyFZ-79 in2004) such indicators as the

andthe with theregional cadrereserve li to theregion’scadrereservepoolpriormoment avacancy p =.000and (notonlyinthecontextofa Appointment fromCadreReserve a testofstatistical associati Promotion byContest promotion atdiscretion r 135 thispersonnelpolicytoolremains ambiguousin =-.716, g Vladimir ‘ticked’ the answer box for the the ‘At for discretion box answer the g Vladimir ‘ticked’ pplication was alsolimited inmore patronage- boxforthe‘Atdiscreti stated themembership intheregion’scadre redundant andrecognizedcadrereserveasa be indicative of thepolitical nature of this Appointment from Cadre Reserve Appointment fromCadre PromotionDiscretion at we learntthatdepartments ofeconomic Promotion atDiscretionvariableishighly Meritocratic RecruitmentIndex p =.000correspondingly).Aspromotion variable ( Promotion atDiscretionvariable variable. Thestatisticaltestrevealed 27 ontheotherhand( . Sixexpertswhoreportedthe weobtainedthe ppointment tohigher,butall st when avacancy arises. Much on withothermeasures ofreal instrument (option2).By ontheonehandand variable is 2. Similarly,as is 2. variable on of the head of the on ofthehead cratic recruitment and Promotion at r =.258, variable, and the andthe r =- p =

CEU eTD Collection he candowiththecadrereserv jury togive‘dueconsideration’ is noroomformaneuver atall.Theboss[thegov and interview withthejury.Theroomfor political vacancy contest. Acandidate, even verywellconn M.G. istypical inthis respect: ‘Ithinkcadre an example ofpoliticians usingthis policy inst net’, yetunderdevelopedasarecr with A.Z.). vacancy contests’ … and Iwould saythatthequalit as ‘Thereis clearlyfewerpeopleapplyingforpl expressed theirdoubtsthat‘hiring helps personnelchangestobesmooth andquick’ reserves use.Some (17out ofthem bureaucrats-members ofcadrereserves interms of (interview withT.M.).Importantly, responde ‘mechanism servingthepurposeofgettingformer reported inTable3.14, suggest that asked toassessthefrequency atwhichthis department ofeconomic policyorelsewhere w assignments ofcurrentlyworkingbureaucratsto does notfindsupportinthedata. politicians couldhaveus the boundariesofmore de-politicizedtype actions againsttheadministration (i with twohuman resource managers admitting thatex-bureaucrats were threatening withlegal Experts werelessunanimousintheirperceptions Another promotion-related issuesubjected Therefore, inthelightof thisqualitativedata, It shouldalsobenotedthat ed cadre reserves as amodifiedversionofnomeklatura e’ (interviewwithM.G.). tosuchandca ten expertsreportedcadre uitment tool.Mostimportantly, in advance’bringsthebestout of44)heldthat‘hiringinadva nterviews withP.Kh.andT.M.). temporary promotions occurredbetween2004 and2006.Theirevaluations, s ofpersonnelpolicy.And apropositionthat 136 ithin theregionalgovernment. Respondents were nts underscoredthepro-activeposition ofex- rument inpatronagepurposes.Theresponseof reserve contestisnotmuchdifferentthanthe ernor –MN]canalwayssend‘amessage’ tothe maneuver islimited. Iamnotsayingthatthere aces inthe cadrereservethanforthe‘proper apositionofhigher pursuing theirrightofre ected politically,still ndidate…but beyondthisI think thereislittle (interview withA.Pa.).However,11experts y ofthe candidatesisal the useofcadrereserves seems tobewithin to experts’evalua oftherecruitment dimensionofthecadre bureaucrats back tothe service well’ reserves tobe ‘dormant’ asa‘safety arebynomeans none oftheexpe nce’ wasan‘excellentideathat of theideava has topassassessments importance withinthe tion wasshort-term turning to theservice, so lower’(interview an alienpersonnel (Huskey2004) rts couldbring cancy contests CEU eTD Collection good performance in the past’ (2 counts). counts). (2 inthe past’ performance good exercise’, ‘to retain apromising official atthe department’, and ‘a wayto 28 assignments ofcurrentlyworkingbureaucr largest structuralunitswithinregionalgovernmentsmay involve alimited number ofshort-term used 1-2times years.Itisplausible overtwo instrument was deployedseems tobelimited: a phenomenon. Atthesame time, frequencyatwhichthisdiscretionarypersonnelpolicy the practice inRussia’sregionalgovernments: 85% term promotion washiredatpol motivated decision,especia 3 –‘Toenhance current employees’ chancesforupw rather thantherule,asonlyasmall proportion 6.3% ofexpertsselectedthe‘Other’option thought thatshort-term careerad used toenhancecurrentemployees’ chancesfo in post’.Atthesame time, about17%ofexperts operational needsofthedepartme majority ofexperts(48%) believ Among eight respondents who chose the ‘Other’ option, only four specified their answers: ‘team building It istempting toconcludethatpatronage-dri Indeed, asthedistributionofanswerstoth Table 3.14Frequencyatwhich CurrentlyWorking Bureaucratswere Assigned to Total Don’t know/Difficulttosay More than5 times 5 times 3-4 times 1-2 times Never came across ofsuch acase Positions ofHigherImportanceTemporarily,2004-2006,(%) lly ifabureaucratwhose chances

itical discretioninfirstplace. vancements signifiedapowerhol nt andafurther38%ofresponde ed thatshort-term promotions were determined bytheurgent ats topostsofhigherimportance. 28 and12%the‘Don’tknow’option. 137 of experts(11%)chose r upwardmobility. Eight to assume that operational needs of one of the to assume that operationalneedsofonethe bout two-thirdsofthere of experts acknowledged coming across sucha of expertsacknowledgedcoming across considered thattemporary promotions hadbeen

ven short-termpromotions aretheexception e next question revealed (Table 3.15), the e nextquestionrevealed(Table3.15),the ard mobility’ – could also reflect politically- financially reward bureaucrats for their are soughttobeimproved byshort- der’s personalfavor.Afurther nts thoughtitwa option 4.However, spondents stateditwas een respondents(11%) 68.3 15.1 11.1 100 1.6 4 0 No ofresponses126

s ‘aprobation CEU eTD Collection correlated with thele 30 29 others (elevenexperts) spirit ofpersonaldependency’betweenthepoliti interviews as ‘damaging theneutrality of bureau importance (albeitonlytemporarily) wasexplicitly support this conclusion. Whilstthepractice ofsel regain theircontroloverburea more de-politicizedmode tendtodeploy answers tothequestiononfrequencyofshort-term promotions promotions signifyapoliticizedbur variable ( the time, same promotion bycontest promotions sitsverycomfortablywithsuchi with othermeasures ofrealmerit. Itshowed regional level. The The negative sign of the correlation implies that the less frequent deployment of temporary promotions = 4 ‘Never’. = 3 ‘1-2’, = 2 ‘3-4’, times’, =‘5 1 Thus, thequantitativedatasuggeststhatpolitici In anattempt toanswerthequestion‘Does thefrequentdeployment ofshort-term Total does not equal 100% as respondents were able to select any number of options 6 5 4 3 2 1

r Other experience relevanttoseniorposts succeed invacancy contests formore seniorposts byadvancingtheir It isdone toenhancethe chancesof developments andotherurgent It isanemergency measure, caused bysome unplanned personnel-related not relatedtotheofficeneeds It isapersonalfavourofthehead with theduties inanewpost It isakindofprobationinpost,te Don’t know/Difficulttosay =-.348, Temporary Promotion ss frequent use of promotion at discretion. p =.028). Temporary Promotionvariablewassubjected to ( r =.486, Table 3.15ReasonsforTemporaryPromotions(%) praised itas a‘flexible managerial

30 p =.001)and Inotherwords,thoseregions ucracy. Thequalitativedata, eaucracy?’, we assigned numerical variable isassociatedwiththe short-term promotions lessoften. needsofthedepartment meritocratic recruitment st ofabureaucrat’s capacity tocope the currentlyemployed bureaucratsto 138 the departmentorot that thelessfrequentdeployment oftemporary cian andthe bureaucrat(i ndicators ofade-politicized bureaucracy as cracy’ (interviewwithO.V.)and‘revivingthe ective promotion ofstafftopositions ofhigher condemned bysevenexpertsintheirin-depth ans indeedusedshort-term promotions to tool’ (interviewwithM.K.),seeing wherepersonnelpolicytookona however, doesnotunequivocally her seniorofficial, 29 valuestoindividualexpert and averagedthem atthe a bivariatecorrelationtest ( r Promotion atDiscretion =.489, nterview withP.Kh.), No ofresponses126 p =.001).Atthe is 47.6 11.1 38.1 11.9 6.3 23

CEU eTD Collection option ordidnotanswerthequestionaltogether. never came acrosssuchacase.Afurther20%of conditions underwhichshort-term promotions be appointments tendedtobemore politicized.Furt personnel policyinstrument wasusedmore of control aswell asapurelymanagerial tool.Thedata 31 experts reporteditsuseasofte discretion was rarelydeployedinRussia’sre distribution ofanswersisrepor be notedthatnoneofthe rele lesser importance atthe discretion of respondents wereaskedhowoftencurrentlywork with P.Ko.). also used[bythepoweholder–MN]togetwho policy tool‘couldbeharmless [forneutralityof with O.R.).Yet,thelargestgroupofexperts ‘nothing wronginwantingtopromotesomeone Demotion, therefore,isan 19 respondents, representing all types of expertise. Thus, thedatasuggeststhattemporary promot The finalquestionofthissectionwasonde Respondents wereoffered5optionsandinst Table 3.16Frequencyatwhich CurrentlyWorking Bureaucratswere Demoted toa Total Missing Don’t know/Difficulttosay More than5 times 5 times 3-4 times 1-2 times Never came acrosssuch acase Position ofLesserImportance, 2004-2006,(%) illegal policyinstrument.

vant legalactsprovided for n as1-2times overtwoyearsand ted inTable3.16,whichshowsthatdemotionatpowerholders’ theheadofdepartment or 31 139 recognizedthattheapplic gional bureaucraciesin2004-2006:only4%of bureaucracy - MN] in some cases,butcouldbe bureaucracy-MN]insome come aninstrument ofpoliticalcontrol. experts chosethe‘Don’t ten inthoseregionswhereadmissions and ing bureaucratsweredemoted toapositionof who youworkedpreviouslywith’(interview he wantstothepostcomfortably’ (interview

motions. With clearre alsorevealed thatin theformer capacity this her researchisrequiredastoclarifythe ions couldbeaninst ructed to select one option only. The ructed toselectoneoptiononly.The a mechanism mobility. ofdownward a further 75% stated that they a further75%statedthatthey other seniorofficial.Itshould ation ofthispersonnel 75.4 16.7 know/Difficult tosay’ 100 ference to2004-2006 0 4 4 0 0 No ofresponses126

rument of political CEU eTD Collection 32 dismissals. concerns thatstructuralreorga into thelegislation – at whichthis toolcoul although dismissals byreorganizatio of economic policywasdeployedtofirebureau the frequencyatwhichsuch argument astheneed The last section ofthequestionnai 3.6.5 Dismissal variable. This variable iscorrelated withnone The distributionofanswers and thePromotionbyContest including suchindicatorsofa require further research. political discretion,adefiniteconclusionabout fact thatinin-depthinterviews all44experts provide clear-cutevidence demotions areanillegalpersonnelpolicyinstrument .114 andr bureaucracy suchasthe 1= ‘Atleast oneinstance of demotion at discretio Having dichotomized theexpertassessments, Respondents wereprovidedwith6answeroptions =.128, p =.430correspondingly).Althoughfrom Temporary Promotion of thepoliticalnaturethispers is reportedinTable3.17.

de-politicized bureaucracyasthe ( nizations may beusedasapre- r re containedaquestion =-.186, n isalawfulpersonnelpolicyin n’, 0 = ‘No instances of demotion at discretion’. atdiscretion’. of demotion instances 0=‘No n’, reported notcoming acrossinstancesofdemotion at p =.252, 140 d havebeendeployedbypoliticiansraisedour andthe of theabovediscussedm crats during2004-2006.Itshouldbenotedthat the natureofthispersonnelpolicyinstrument for structuralre-organizationofthedepartment

32 , atthispointthequantitativedatadoesnot weobtainedthe and instructedtoselectoneofthem only. r Promotion atDiscretion =-.176, on dismissals. Itwasdesigned to assess onnel policytool.Inthelightof Meritocracy RecruitmentIndex text for politically motivated a formal-legal pointofviewa formal-legal p =.278)andapoliticized strument, theease–in-built Demotion atDiscretion easures ofrealmerit, ( r =-.252, p =

CEU eTD Collection 33 Cross-regional (N=40) Others (N=42) Independent (N=40) HR experts(N=40) was deployedareconsistentacrossdi 3.18 suggeststheindividualexpertestimates ofth of twoyears.Itisimportant happened atafrequencyofbetween structural reorganization reported nevercoming acrosssuchacase,and97% personnel policytoolintheRussianregionalgovernments. Thatis,noneoftherespondents It showsthatfiringonthegr political interference ( reorganization occurred in there numerical valuestoindividualresponses ‘More than5times’. Weobtainedthe Bureaucrats were FiredontheGroundsofStru 1= ‘More than 5 times’, 2= ‘5’, 3 = ‘3-4’, 4 = ‘1-2’, 5 = ‘Never’. A testofbivariateassocia Table 3.18 Grounds ofStructuralReorganizat Table 3.17Frequencyatwhich CurrentlyWorking Bureaucratswere Firedon

Total Don’t know/Difficulttosay/Missing More than5 times 5 times 3-4 times 1-2 times Never came across such acase Dismissal by Reorganization r =.686, Min 2 2 2 2

to notethatnoneofrespondentsse

p =.000).Thereisalsoa strong ounds ofstructuralreorganiza and AcrossRegions,2004-2006 gions withthelargernumber of bureaucratshired withoutundue tion revealedthatfewerdi 3.75 Max fferent groups of informants. fferent groupsofinformants. 4 4 4

and averagingthem attheregionallevel. Dismissal byReorganization 141 ion oftheDepartment, 2004-2006,(%) Mean 2.85 2.83 2.78 2.95 : Frequency atwhich CurrentlyWorking e frequency at which this personnel policy tool e frequencyatwhichthispersonnelpolicytool ctural Reorganization byGroupsofExperts

of expertsstatedthatfiringongrounds ‘within-the-group’ ‘within-the-group’ Std. Deviation one andfivetimes overthecourse tion wasafrequentlyemployed lected the maximum frequency – frequency lected themaximum association betweenfewer cases .408 .537 .577 .504 smissals onthegroundsof variablebyassigning 66.7 22.2 100 3.2 7.9 0 0 No ofresponses126

Std. Deviation ‘between-the- groups’ 33 .087 As Table AsTable

CEU eTD Collection practices in40ofRussia’sregions. discretion ortranscendthem. Thischapter,therefore,hasfocused ontheanalysisofpersonnel whether theactionsofpowerholdersremain with measure ofthenature apers legislation containingalowdegreeofformal Contemporary scholarshipofbureaucracyrecogni 3.7 Conclusion reorganization. Atthesame time,the often tendtohavefewercasesoffiring regions whereappointment tohigherbureaucra of firingbyreorganizationandthe expert evaluationsofpersonnel policypractices Evans (1999,2000)and theearlyst Novaya Gazeta dismissed publicmanagers andpoliticiansalso during in-depthinterviewsaboutcoming acrosssu reorganization arechallengedbythedismissed bureau enhances ratherthanrestrict that firingonthegroundsofstruct promotion with measures thatsignify apoliticizedbureaucracy, i.e. process. outcomes theydesirebecause oftheeffect politicians crossthebordersofformalpoliticaldi restored intheirpostsbythecourtdecision(Lebedeva2006).Thisshowsthatalthough of theliquidationtheirbureau Drawing ontheresearch ofrealmerit in It shouldbenotedthatevidenceexists (AppendixC).Inotherwords,thedatasupportsconclusionachievedinchapter2 reportedhow44bureaucrat s politicalcontro onnel policyregime. Ratheritisnecessaryto also understand , wonacase against the headof ural reorganizationofbureaucracy Promotion byContest udies onrealmerit inRussia, Dismissal byReorganization s inRepublicofKalmykia, l overbureaucracy. politicaldiscretioncannotbetakenasa 142 less-developed countrie public managers onthegroundofstructural thepublicscrutinypresent inpersonnelpolicy reaches themass media.Thus,inJanuary2006 at thedepartments ofeconomic development in scretion, theiractionsdo tic postswasexecutedthroughcontestsmore decisions tofirebureaucratsonthegroundsof ch cases.Information aboutlitigationsbetween in theboundariesofauthorizedscope zes thatthemere enactment ofpersonnel crats incourt.Thus, variable ( variable promotion atdiscretion variable sits wegroundedouranalysis in r theirorganizationandwere =.654, might beaninstrument that s conductedbyRauchand dismissed onthegrounds not alwaysachievethe eight expertstoldus p =.000),i.e.those very comfortably and temporary temporary de-facto

CEU eTD Collection 34 Novosibirsk, Belgorod, Tomsk andTula) areatthet Meritocratic Recruitment Index information inthepublic domain). (informally influencing vacancycontests juries by contestsforinternalcandidatesonly)andthe circulation inthepublicdomain, promotion and open breach oflegalprovisions(such asthewit personnel policyinstruments (suchastemporary boundaries offormal politicaldiscretion.Thelatte within thescopeofdiscretion practice acrossRussia’sregions. and externalvalidity,experta 40 constituentmembers oftheRussianFederation. politicization ofburea regime, weusethe by discretion. Thiswillrequire further research. the natureofsuchpersonnelpol of apoliticizednature.Atthesame time, ourda classify theformer groupofinstrumentsasbeing combined withtheconclusions oftheanalysis instruments exhibitahighnegati reorganization. Atthesame time,thesetwoclearlydefinedgroupsofpersonnelpolicy positive correlation between interference positive correlation between level andsubjected them toatestof statistical a obtained sevenindicatorsofth bureaucracy and highly negatively correlated with i correlatedwith negatively and highly bureaucracy Meritocratic Recruitment Index The Recruitment Meritocratic Given thatthenatureofappointment pro By averagingindividualasse (the Meritocratic Recruitment Index)and Meritocratic Recruitment Index ucracy inaregion.

promotion bydiscretion ssessments revealedasystematic differenceinpersonnelpolicy is also highly positively correlated with other indicators of a de-politicized ofade-politicized indicators with other correlated positively isalsohighly e applicationof differentpers icy instruments asappointment from cadrereserveanddemotion authorized bythelegislation,in appointment byvacancy weconcludethatsevenregions(Lipetsk, Rostov,Samara, Thus, whilst in some regions politicians’ actions werelargely ve correlationwitheachothe ssments oftheexpertsrepresentingsame region,we ndicators of a politicized bureaucracy (Appendix C). (Appendix bureaucracy a politicized of ndicators 34 Basedonthedistribution 143 ta doesnotpermit usto ssociation. Thetestrevealedthat thereisahigh circumvention oftheim and obstructing thecirculationofjob-relating of theformal-legalframework, enabledus to demotion atpoliticaldi hdrawal ofvacancy-relatinginformation from promotions anddismissalsbyreorganization), cess isthekeyattributeofapersonnelpolicy astheprincipalindicatorofextentde- ade-politicizednature r includestheextensive op oftheleaguetable bureaucraticreform Exhibiting asatisfactorydegreeofinternal promotion byvacancycontest,andahigh , temporary promotion

contests without undue political contests withoutunduepolitical onnel policytoolsattheregional otherstheywentbeyondthe r. These correlation patterns, establish withconviction plementation of thelaw scretion andpromotion andthelatterasbeing of thevalues use ofdiscretionary and dismissal by dismissal by Cross-Regional

CEU eTD Collection Average 23.78 and staffprofile,represents afairlytypicalex Giventhat thedepartmentwhole? understudy,from the in Russia’sregions,followedbyanothertwelveregi the rest ofRussia’sregions fittingthe Index (IvanovoandAmur) canbeclassifiedasun politicization end.Twore service endofthedistributionpersonne the bounded(structured)politicizat service stateoftheirad Meritocratic Recruitment Index To whatextent canthesefindingsbegeneralizedtoRussi Table 3.19Distributionofthe 10 20 30 40 50 60 0 Politicization Unbounded ministrations, theirpublicbureaucracies gions thatachievedthelowestvaluesofMeritocratic Recruitment Open Politicization Bounded Politicization Bounded Politicization Open ion type,withtheformer group Personnel Policy Regime . Althoughnoneofthesenineteenregionsreachedthecivil openly politicizedtype(Table3.19). Meritocratic RecruitmentIndex’ 144 l policyregimes andthelattertowardsopen ample ofanadministrative unitinpost-Soviet boundedly politicizedtypeofbureaucracy,with

(Open Politicization (Open ons that achievedabove theaveragevaluesof thepointofviewboth itsfunctionality Boundary) canbeclassified a’s regional bureaucracy asa leaning more toward thecivil Bounded Politicization Bounded (Civil Servince (Civil s ValuesbyTypesof Boundary) asbelongingto

CEU eTD Collection to whichweproceedinthenextchapter. multivariate regression analysis of theimpact of ade-politicizedbureaucracy on social welfare, stay ‘above politics’, itfacilitates the interpretati Recruitment Index through theexpertsurvey,permits itsuseinapanel(data)analysis.Asthe remarkable variation in theorganizational de between themid-1990s, whenpatronagewas‘the of de-politicization.Thefactthat politicized bureaucracy onsocialwelfare,using the de-politicized bureaucracy,wenowturntothest regional governance, there isev Russia’s regional bureaucracy asawhole. Having establishedthatRussia’s

variablestandsforthepercentageof ery reason to believe thatthes thisvariablereflectsthe‘dis regions variedwith 145 sign of regional bureaucracies was documented sign ofregionalbureaucracieswasdocumented on ofthecorrelationcoefficientsobtainedin only game intown’,andthemid-2000s, whena

Meritocratic Recruitment Index atistical analysis of theimpacts of ade- thecurrentlyworking bureaucrats that regard tothe institutionalization of a tance travelled’bytheregions e findingscanbeextendedto asameasure Meritocratic CEU eTD Collection this reason,andafterconsidering avarietyof measurement oftheimpact ofade-politicizedbureaucracywould beofaneconomic nature.For incentives for potentialeconomic ag actively participate ineconomic activity(to invest bureaucracy –thatisade-p scientific productivity(Lapue investment toinfrastructure(Rau terms ofaggregateeconomic growth(E Although theimpact ofade-polit 4.1 SelectingtheDependentVariable of de-politicizationontherate techniques – before presenting major findings from conditional correlation analysisof theimpact three discusseskeymethodological issues–model sp discussed before sectiontwoproceeds withthefindingsfromOLSand2SLSregressions.Section model. Theissuesofthepotentialimpact of literature ongrowth,whichinformed theselecti growth wereselected asindicato fully incorporated.Sectiononeexplainswhy aggregate economic growthandsmallbusiness economic growthandsmall businessformation than bureaucracy hasbeeninstitutionalized toagreater enhancing publicbureaucracy.It This chapter subjects toempirical test theproposition derived from Miller’stheory of welfare- DE-POLITICIZED BUREAUCRACY DE-POLITICIZED s ofsmallbusinessformation. nte 2007),theessenceofth rs of social welfare. Section tw Section welfare. rs ofsocial oliticized bureaucracy icized bureaucracyonsocietalwe statesthatthose ofRussia’ ch 1995),povertyreduction(Henderson ents toentereconomic activity Chapter 4 Chapter 4 vans andRauch1999,Evans 2000), 146 theoutliersandendogeneityproblem are factorssuitabletocapture thephenomenon of on of control variables for the economic growth on ofcontrolvariablesfortheeconomic growth ANDECONOMICDEVELOPMENT

more, toexpandtheirbusinesses)andprovides extent,exhibitgreater rates of aggregate ecification, dataandthe thoseprovincesinwh encouragesexisting o providesabriefoverviewofthe s regions where ade-politicized ll-being hasbeenmeasured in –suggeststhatanadequate eory ofwelfare-enhancing ich ithasbeenless economic agentsto choice ofstatistical et al 2007)and CEU eTD Collection killed. major catastropheontheUlianovskayamine 2007inwhichmore inspring than100miners were maximized theirprofits atthe expense ofhealth property rights,thattheownersof Similarly, AntonOleinik (2007)ar we’d betohaveitstolenfrom ther us,so authorities. Inparticularly Mu intention to sell global media tycoonwhoownsth guarantee againstopportunisticbe et al Miller 1989),butitmay evenbenefitfrom itbyco politics. Consequently, this willbe translated regional population,particularly developmental (anti-predatory) policies fromtherent-seeking those subject tothat power. If meritocratic problem ofopportunism intherelationsbetween of Miller’s theorythat de-politicization of bureauc 1 on crediblecommitment in gene entrepreneurship asthe Low andMacMillan’s path-breaking article theentrepreneurship research defines inhabitants) asaproxyforsmall businessdevelopm the consequencesofmoralhazardthansmall andmedium business(Chepurenko aggregate regionalgrowthasdependent increased economic participa ‘unrealistic given the lack of modern accounting methods atmany firms’ (Brock 2005: 329). Russian regional capital stock and investment data is ‘of particularly low quality’ (Ahrend 2005: 290) and 2005: (Ahrend low particularly quality’ is‘of data investment and stock capital regional Russian at the size of the firm is by no means a 2005).Havingsaidthis,itshouldbenotedthatthesizeoffirmisbynomeans a The focus ontherates of small business formation permits ustotestthecausalmechanism We usethetotalchangeinnumber ofsmall businessorganizations (per1000 We focusonsmall businessbecause large businessisnot only arguably lesssusceptible to News OutdoorsRussiabecauseofthepredatory position oftheRussian ‘creation ofnewenterpri tion, suchasinvestment,

rdoch said:‘Themoresuccessful we’dbe,themore vulnerable properties wouldberecognizedbytheentrepreneurial-minded by thosewithoutconnectionsto ral andthetheoryofwelfare- havior of politicians. Thus, in August 2008 Rupert Murdoch, a havior ofpoliticians.Thus,inAugust2008RupertMurdoch,a motivations of bothpoliticians gues thatitwasbecauseofuncer e largestoutdooradvertisingfi one ofRussia’slarg variables fortheempirical analysis. e wesellnow’(Chaffin andEdgecliffe-Johnson2009). into increased rates of small business growth. 147 bureaucracy indeedeffectivelyconstrainspublic se’ (1988:141).Secondly,as and safety measures, whicheventually ledtoa lluding withholdersofpoliticalpower(Slinko those whocontrolthepowerofstateand racy serves as an institutionalsolutiontothe ent forseveralreasons. 1 weselectedsmall business growthand est mining company enhancing publicbureaucracy in the current winners in regional the currentwinnersinregional and bureaucrats,thenits rm inRussia,declaredhis tainty withregard totheir Firstly, sinceatleast thelargeliterature Yuzkuzbasugol et al 2005,

CEU eTD Collection register inthe offi official sector reduce state revenue, which reduces publicly provided services and further reduces the incentive to key governmentalas enforcement servicessuchofcontracts. 3 2 (2006b, 2007,2008). Russian Federation’sannualpublicationsonsocio- period between datacomes 1996and2006.The from business growthasthetotalpercentagechange in thenumber ofsmall businessesper1000inthe an indirectproxyasitaccountsonlyforapart employment fortaxevasionpurposes(Slinko accounting standards,small-business employme considerable limitations: invest business start-ups.Inaddition,feasiblealterna welfare-enhancing bureaucracyshould betranslated into theincrease oflegallyregistered small entrepreneurs prefernottoregist Zhuravskaya 2000,Johnson bureaucrats hasdrivenalargenumberofbusi in EasternEuropeandtheformer SovietUnio particular predict,apredatory literature. We selected totalpercentage growth of GRPpercapita de-politicized bureaucracy inanew empirical milieu wouldbeanimportant contributiontothe municipalities inthefirsthalfof infrastructure development)oftheadoption 2000), Rauch(1995)providesempirical evidenceof ascertained byEvansandRauchinthecontext the direct positive impact of and reducesabsolute relativepoverty, infant andmaternal mortality andmalnutrition. Whilst economic growthimproves generalstandardof of economic development andtherelativeprosperi e are a number of techniques which allowed researchers toestimate allowed this which techniques e areanumber of ther levels. Although regional and In the Russian statistics calculation of GDP in constant prices (real GDP) is still unavailable both at the national national atthe both of (realGDP)isstillunavailable constant prices GDP in statisticscalculation the Russian In Johnson As farasaggregateeconomic growth isconcer et al 1998 argues that most of the ex-Soviet Union countries ended up in a ‘bad’ equilibrium: firms leaving firms equilibrium: a‘bad’ leaving in ended up countries Union thatmost the argues ex-Soviet of 1998 cial sector(387).

government leads tolowerlevelsofeconomic activity.However, et al meritocratic recru er theirbusinesslegally,nottopa ment data, asmentioned earli theXXcentury.Therefore,astatis 1998).Instead ofexitingeconomic activity altogether, et al et 148 n the opportunistic behavior ofpowerholdersand n theopportunisticbehavior of less-developedcountriesin1970-1990s(1999, living, lifeexpectancy,employment, leisuretime of what small businessesdo.We smallof whatsmall measure of civilserviceoneconomic growthinUS tive measures forsmall businessgrowthhave nesses intotheunofficialeconomy(Fryand nt –becausemany small firms underreport itment oneconomic growthwasempirically 2005:304)andretailtur economic characteristicsofRussia’sregions ty ofasociety.Aswa ned, itisauniversallyacceptedmeasurement indirectpositiveimpact(mediated viathe ROSSTAT – Federal State Statistics of the ROSSTAT –FederalStateStatisticsofthe 2 Therefore,theemergence ofa er, is unreliable due to poor er, isunreliableduetopoor y taxes and not to benefit from y taxesandnottobenefitfrom tical test on the impact of a 3 asourmeasureofthe s arguedinchapter1, nover isatbestonly CEU eTD Collection researchin onRussia’sregions (Slinko macroeconomic parameter inconstant pr Golubchikov 2007,Popov2001,Slinko human capitalendowment(Ahrend2005, natural resources,export regional economies thatwereinheritedfrom the income, industrialoutputorFDI,waslargelyde economic development inRussia’sregionsthe1990s-2000s,measured aschangeinGRP, the interregionaline fragmented spatialcharacter, andanumber of It iswell-knownthattheeconomic developm 4.2.1 Model,DataandMethod Growth 4.2 De-PoliticizedBureaucracyandEconomic characteristics ofRussia’sregions(2006b,2007,2008). Federal StateStatisticsoftheRussianFederation’sannualpublicationsonsocio-economic flows betweenRussia’sregions(Popov2001: changes inregionaloutputbutalsofrom acomp considered tohavesignificant limitations, asch instance, realincome, whichis research, butalsogiventheconsiderablelim aggregate economic growthnotonlyforthepurpose ofcomparison withEvansandRauch’s with BerkowitzandDeJong’s findings,Popov(2001) the regional formation of newenterprises, whichinturnpositively affected growth.Engaging (measured aspercapitaincome) in1993-1997and large-scale privatization affected positively differences inpriceliberalizationpoliciesexhibitedapositivedi aggregate growthinRussia’sregions.Thus, In contrast, scholarsappeared todisagreeon qualities ofthecountry’seconomic deve capabilities andi usedintheresearchofBe et al ices (Mikheeva 1999), change in GRP 2005). 2005). et al ndustrial structure),aswe 2005,VanSelm1998). Berkowitz andDeJong2003,2005;Brock2005, Berkowitz andDeJong(20 149 scholars haveexamined thedrivingforcesbehind itations ofthealternativemeasures. Thus,for lex scheme ofprivateandgovernment financial ent oftheRussianeconomy hashadavery 873-876). Thedatacome anges inrealincome resultnotonlyfrom the theimpact ofregionalreform packageson pendant onthestructural Soviet era(measured astheavailability of argues thatalthoughthere isnoevidence rkowitz and DeJong (2003, 2005) is rkowitz andDeJong(2003,2005)is lopment. Theyshow rect correspondence with growth rect correspondencewithgrowth per capita has been extensively used ll asbyurbanizationand 03) foundthatregional s fromROSSTAT– s characteristicsof ed that relative ed thatrelative

CEU eTD Collection region. 5 4 capture affectedaggregategrowth inRussia’sregionsthe1990s. large firms in73ofRussia’s capture, measured asanumber andconcentration collection tobudgetexpenditure.Similarly, having population ortheinstitutionalcapacity,proxiedbyta factors, suchasthepoliticalorientationofits no evidencethataregion’sperformance inthe matter’ hypothesis(Ahrend2005,Popov2001,Slinko Russia’s regionaleconomic growthmade severalat dynamics intheperiodbetween that economic reforms oftheearly1990shasled in 1995ortheshareofoilandgastota following controlvariables:‘pre-existingconditions’ (measured alternatively asGRPpercapita classical growthliterature (2001: 865). rate, Popovconcludesthatin output, privatelyconstructedindice different proxies for institutions, suchastheshareof theshadoweconomy intotalregional performance thatwewouldhaveexpected’(2005:311). economic reforms seemedtohaveplayedafar regional economic performance, suggestingthat Ahrend holdsthateconomic reform which became thekeydriverforeconomic growth reform packagesonaggregategrowthwasindire differences inpercapitaincome change.Inother construct their original, most often, survey-based, data sets (Fry 2004, Slinko sets Slinko data (Fry 2004, survey-based, most their often, original, construct the context of Russia’s region. asetof requires matter’hypothesis the ‘institutions adjudicate This difference in the conclusions achieved by the author same Atthe Slinko time, Based onthisrecenteconometric In additiontothe‘pre-existingstructures’, 5

et al The lack of such indicators in the domain of the official statistics prompts scholars to scholars statisticsprompts the official of domain the in indicators lack of such The (2004) found that capture af capture that found (2004) (Barro 1995,BarroandSala-I-Mar

regions preferentially,Slinko stitutions hada‘considerable 1990 and1997,thereform,however s ofinvestmentriskandeven variables explain relatively little workongrowthinRussia’sregionsaswell onthe 150 leaders/legislature, thepol 1990s wasinfluencedby s demonstrates that ameaningful attempt toempirically ct, throughthestimulation ofdomestic demand, human capitalandreformpackages,scholarsof less prominent roleinexplainingitseconomic fected small business growth and the tax capacity of the the capacityof tax the and growth smallfected business words, theimpactofdifferencesinregional inthe2000s(Litwak2006).Atsame time, l output),ini ‘the degreetowhicharegionimplemented quality indicators, which are not readily available in available readily arenot which indicators, quality of lawsandregulations to abetterindustrialoutputandinvestment tempts toempirically test the ‘institutions x collectionpercapitaandtheratiooftax constructed anoriginaldata-setonstate et al 2005).Thus,Ahrendt(2005)found et al et impact’ onregionalperformance et al tial levelofre (2005)foundnoevidencethat small businessgrowth orcrime tin 1997),weconsideredthe 2004, Zhuravskaya 2000). 2000). Zhuravskaya 2004, oftheobserveddifferencein 4 Usingasetof completely , indeed affected regional , indeedaffectedregional itical preferencesofthe its politico- that treated selected gional education institutional CEU eTD Collection variation in the organizational design of regional bureaucracies was documented. between the mid mid( 2000s the and 1990-s town’ game in was‘theonly (t-1) patronage when thank EkaterinaZhuravskayaandDanielBerkow date onpro-reformist votingin1995iscomi education andtheshareofoil/gasintotaloutput in1995 comes fromSlinko comes from ROSSTAT(2006b,2007,2008).Whilst th 6 * [GRPpercapita elections of1995). reformist activity (measured asthe shareofvot as logpopulation),urbanization(measured asth (measured astheshareof laborforcethatattain analysis of conditional correlation patterns. found betweentwoproxiesforthe‘pre-existingst for thevariables that correlationcoefficientsbe of theRegion+b Recruitment Index 1990s voted for pro-reformist parties in the first parliamentary elections in 1995. the of beginning the in more coherently implemented had been initiatives privatization and liberalization price which The last measure was informed by an empirical finding, reported in Berkowitz and DeJong (2003) that regions in The The has properties of panel data as it reflects the ‘distance traveled’ by the regions regions traveled’ bythe of asit has ‘distance Index properties panel data reflects the Recruitment Meritocratic Table 4.1reportscorrelationpa Our estimations arebasedonthefollowingequation: t 5 Urban and –GRPpercapita (t-1) Urbanization +b 6 ThedataontheGRPper ]* + b 2 Pre-Existing Structure +b Pro-Reform Vote

tween allpairsofindependentva (t-1) 6 Initial Reformist Activity+Error tterns measured amongtheinde ] = α

+b ng from BerkowitzandDeJong(2003,2005).We capita in1995,sizeof 151 (0.562).Astrongbivariat 1 ed highereducation), sizeoftheregion (measured [Meritocratic RecruitmentIndex e shareofurbanpopulationin1995)andinitial itz forkindlysharing e castforpro-reform partiesinparliamentary ructure’, whichareusedalternativelyinthe 3 Initial Levelof HumanCapital+b e dataoninitialle riables arelessthan0.5,except population andurbanization pendent variables. It shows pendent variables.Itshows t the datawithus. e correlation(0.710)is t ) when a remarkable t et al vel of regional vel ofregional – Meritocratic (2004),the (1) 4 Size CEU eTD Collection direct associationwithaggregategrowth. the same factor,usingatwo-stageleast unobserved both theextentofde-politici We dealwiththepotentialendogeneityproblem, deal withtheformer issue,weconductedouranalysis withandwithouttheidentifiedoutliers. of outliers and potentialsimultaneity betweende controlling for othervariables, special care wasgiventothefollowing issues: the potential impact unconditional correlationbetween for asub-sample of thedataset that excludesthr growth. Figure4.1Bplotsaggreg regions –Leningrad time periodunderconsideration.Therangeofgrow Growth Table 4.1IndependentVariablesforAggregateGrowth Model:BivariateCorrelations Meritocratic Recruitment Index Note: *Significant at p *Significant Note: Figure 4.1Aplotsthecorrelationbetween In quantifyingtherelationships 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

. Onecanobserve thatall regions inthe sample experienced positive growthduringthe Merit Oil/Gas 95 GRP_95 Pro-reformVote EDUC 94 Urban 95 Pop 95

oblast < 0.1,at ** .229 -.056 1 -.106 .184 -.126 .139 , theoil-richTumen andMoscow zation ofbureaucracyandaggreg 1 ate growthagainstourmeasure theseriesfrom0.13to0.36. p < 0.05, at *** p isinstrumented withvariable .214

1 .710*** .111 .425** .283 betweenade-politicizedbu 2 152 ee potential outliers.Their exclusion increases the .133

1 .124 -.001 .203 <0.01. squares (2SLS) estimation procedureinwhich 3 arising from thequiteplausibledependenceof -politicization of bureaucracy andgrowth.To th, however,considerablyvaries,withthree Meritocratic Recruitment Index .364*

1 .238 .209

4 ate economic performance onthe oblast reaucracy andeconomic growth,

.255

.562** 1 of ade-politic s thatarethoughttohaveno 5 – showing above-average –showingabove-average

.231

1

6 ized bureaucracy

1

and GRP 7 CEU eTD Collection B A Figure 4.1UnconditionalCorrelation between the Percentage ChangeinGrossRegi Total Percentage Change in GRP per Total Percentage Change in GRP per capita, 1996-2006 capita, 1996-2006 1000 1200 1400 1000 1200 1400 1600 200 400 600 800 200 400 600 800 0 0 1 0 10203040500 02 Meritocratic Recruitment Index (%) Index Recruitment Meritocratic Meritocratic Recruitment Index (%) Index Recruitment Meritocratic 03 153 onal Productpercapita,1996-2006

Meritocratic Recruitment Index 04 05 R 2 R = 0.1301 = 2 = 0.3566 = 0

andTotal CEU eTD Collection Recruitment Index magnitude. Tumen. The existing conditions’matter forahandfulofRussi square to31percentandthe estimation coefficients.However,theexclusio regression. Wefirstregressedth aggregate growth,controllingforselectedva We beginouranalysisbyexploringtherelationshipbetweenade 4.2.2 FindingsfromOLSand2SLSAnalyses the department of economic policyhired inde Meritocratic Recruitment Index Meritocratic Recruitment Index predictor of growthafter the Table 4.2suggest,the of Model2compared toModel1.Secondly,asthe of adjustedRsquare–from 44toabout65percent measure oftheextentde-pol Recruitment Index 2 andthe equation (1),usingGRPpercapitain1995 powerful predictor,followedby Voting andUrbanization–appearedtobesignificant,withthe out offivevariablesinour growth explain44%oftheinterregional variationinaggregateec Recruitment Index relevant literatureaskeyexplanatory Next, weintroduced our measure ofade-politicized bureaucracy –the The exclusionofMoscowandLeningradoblast Share ofOil andGasIndustry Pro-Reform Voting toModel 2changes the estimates of thebasicmodel ofgrowth.Firstly,our –tothebasicmodelofgrowth.M (Table4.2,Model1).Fiveindependent Meritocratic Recruitment Index basicgrowthregression–GRP1995, GRP 1995 iticization ofpublicbureaucracyc (representingan12.3% increasein Pro-Reform Voting. , isalsosubstantial: aone-sta e aggregategrowthonthesetof Urbanization and GRP 1995variable.Thequantitativesignificanceof the variablebecomes insignifican factors ofgrowth, asameasure forthe‘pre-existing structure’ inModel inModel3.Theintroductionofthe 154 n ofTumen from thesample decreasestheR riables usingordinary pendently from politicalconsiderations) is . Italsoalmost doubles Log Population a’s regions suchasnaturalresources-rich values ofthestandardizedcoefficientsin s (aloneortogether)doesnotchangethe odels 2and3report becomes thesecond mostpowerful without includingthe variablesofthisbasicmodel of ndard deviationincreaseinthe onsiderably increases thevalue onomic growthinRussia.Four thenumber ofbureaucratsin variablesconsideredbythe Log Population -politicized bureaucracyand retain theirsignificance and GRP 1995beingthemost t, suggestingthatthe‘pre- least squares (OLS) the valueofF-statistic estimates ofthe , Meritocratic Meritocratic Meritocratic Pro-Reform Log Population F-statistics Urbanization GRP percapita,1995 Education Recruitment Index Meritocratic Adjusted Rsquare Pro-Reform Voting Industry Share ofOil/Gas and standardanderrors (in parentheses). *Significantat p Note

: This table reports the result of OLS regressions of aggregate economic growth on selected independent variables. Each column Table 4.2De-Politicized BureaucracyandAggregat Model 1 (89.647) (14.141) .561*** -.479** (2.656) (3.541) .549** -.230* (.004) 6.808 CEU eTD Collection -.103 ------.44

Model 1 (90.922) (14.568) -.516** without (2.728) (3.693) Tumen .632** -.256* (.009) 4.213 -.101 .254 .309 ------

< at 0.1, ** Unrestricted Model 2 (11.350) (72.820) .610*** .474*** -.330** -.325** (1.273) (2.194) (2.889) 12.294 .423** (.003) -.171 .647 ----

p < 0.05, *** at <0.05,*** Model 2 (10.873) (69.572) .589*** .521*** -.392** -.287** without (1.273) (2.781) (2.145) Tumen 10.719 (.006) -.154 .618 .119 ----

p 155 < 0.01.

e EconomicGrowth inRussia’sRegions, 1996-2006 Unrestricted (112.723) Model 3 (14.527) (91.578) .-275** (1.647) (3.707) (2.764) .505** .392** .408** 5.738 -.193 -.157 .435 ---

(119.922) Model 3 (11.112) (69.995) .605*** .574*** .-395** without (1.246) (2.838) (2.103) Tumen 10.520 -.267* -.117 -.080 .613 ---

Parsimonious Model 4 (74.245) .448*** .590*** .-351** -.344** (1.294) (2.961) (2.244) 13.470 .410** (.003) .628 ------

reports standardized coefficients Parsimonious Model 4 (69.991) .574*** .-413** -.296** without (1.274) (2.823) (2.176) Tumen 12.088 .515** (.006) .606 .090 ------

Restricted Restricted Model 4 (69.462) .593*** .537*** .-414** (1.230) (2.733) (2.059) 15.210 -.266* Fully Fully .612 ------

CEU eTD Collection predictor ofthegrowthinModel3,when based ontheunrestrictedsample. The increases from 5.7to10.5,suggestingthatthedata is ranontheunrestrictedsample, to61percent, exception of Industry the sample, changesthemagnitude andsigni research (Golubchikov2007,Slinko endowment intheeconomic growthofRussia’sre regions thanthenaturalresources capita gives abetterrepresentation totheentiresp compared toModel2(from almost 68to44percent) at thevery least suggests that the initial GRPper industry intheregionaloutput.As Model 3(Table4.2),in whichthe‘pre-existing conditions’ areproxied bytheshareofoilandgas estimates ofModel 2.However,theexclus independent variables:whilst Meritocratic Recruitment Index associated witha5.7percentage- and explainabout63% of thevarian existing conditions’), contains fivevariables– the insignificant increase intheregionalgrowth. bureaucrats inaregion’sdepartment ofeconomic of the variables behavinginthesame way insignificant andthe significance, themeasure of theinitial human capital remains tobeinsignificant. Finally, inthespiritofgeneral-to-spe The The exclusionofMoscowandLeningrad becomes insignificant. Atthesame time, the Meritocratic Recruitment Index Meritocratic Recruitment Index Education Education Meritocratic Recruitment Index Pro-Reform Voting,Log Population variable was eliminated from there ) aresignificant. TheRsquare increases MeritocraticRecru Log Population does not change the significan endowment. Itmay alsopointata point increaseinaggregateGRP as theydid intheunrestrictedsa ce inthedependentvariable. The et al 2005).Indeed,theexclusionof ubstantial decreasein thesampleisreducedto39cases. Meritocratic Recruitment Index alsoimproves:theadditi isthemost powerful predicto ion ofTumen fromthedatamakes the ficance of the predictor inquestion: the , itment Index,GRP1995 Pro-Reform Voting oblast when Tumen isexcluded.Thevalue ofF-statistic ectrum ofthe‘pre-existi cific strategyofmodeling(Hendry2000),the gions in1996-2006,assuggestedbysome recent without Tumen fitsthem becomes the most powerful predictor with other policy correspondswitha s (aloneortogethe and rest oftheexplanatory variables (withthe gression model. TheparsimoniousModel4 the valueofRsquareModel3as . All of them are significant Urbanization.Allofthemaresignificant from 45percent,whentheregression ce levelandmagnitude of other mple. Thequantitative significance growth. Theintroductionofthe limited rolefor natural resources and on 12.3% of ‘above politics’ on 12.3%of‘abovepolitics’ Meritocratic Recruitment Index (asbetter reflecting the ‘pre- oilandgasrichTumenfrom remains themost powerful r oftheaggreg ng conditions’ of Russia’s ng conditions’ofRussia’s Urbanization retain their r) does not change the r) doesnotchangethe odel betterthanthedata 6.5 percentage-point GRP 1995variable Share ofOil/Gas ate growthin

CEU eTD Collection total GRP. hired independently from political considerations is A one-standard-deviation increase inthenumber of 2006). share ofnon-Russianpopulati Meritocratic Recruitment 4.2) aspredictorsforaggregate first-stage regression, and thenuse specifications and,therefore,shallbeexcludedfr concerned. Thirdly,themeasure ofhuman capital gas richTumen oblastchangestheestimates as faras Leningrad oblasts–exertonlymarginal influenceon both significanceandmagnitude ar Meritocratic Recruitment Index estimates ofModel 4.However,theexclus remains the secondmost powerfulpred 7 statistics of.357indicates thatth Recruitment Index is 15.2)withtherestofindependentva from Model4withoutTumen slightlyimproves themode only slightly:from 63to61percentand point increase inthe regional growth. Atthesame time, thevalues of RsquareandF-statistic decrease politics’ bureaucratsina of the variables behavinginthesame way insignificant andthe

Number ofGovernors publicationsonsocio-economic characteristics Russia’sof regions (2006b, 2007, 2008). Forthe full descriptionthe of The data on the firsttwo variables comes from ROSSTAT – We nextconducta2SLSanalysis We drawsome preliminary conclusionsfrom these The exclusionofMoscowandLeningrad Meritocratic Recruitment Index 7 Theestimates ofthefirst stage of2SLSre variable seeTable 5.1. becoming themost powerfu Meritocratic Recruitment Index region’s department ofeconomic po Index wasinstrumented withthreevariables–unemployment in1995,the

on in2002andthenumber ofgover –behavesconsistentlyacrossdifferentmodelspecifica e variablesusedasinstruments pr economic growth.Consideringthefi e concerned.Secondly,whilsttwo its predictedvalueswiththevariables from Models2and 3(Table as theydid intheunrestrictedsa alsoimproves: theadditionofaone-standarddeviation‘above inwhichweinstrument the ictor ofgrowth,after from 13.5to12.1.Theelimination ofthe ion ofTumen fromthedatamakes the riables retainingtheirsignificanceandthe l predictorofgrowth. om thegrowthanalysisina2SLSframework. 157 oblast Federal Statethe annual Russian Federation’s Statisticsof bureaucratsinthedepartment ofeconomic policy gression arereportedin associated witha 5.4 percentage-point increase in becomes the most powerful predictor with other the estimates, thepresenceorabsenceofoiland themeasures ofthe‘pre is consistently insignificant across all model OLS regressions. First, s (aloneortogethe l fit(theRsquarehereis.612andF-statistic the initiallevelofeconomic development. licy correspondswitha6.5percentage- ovide asatisfactorycharacterization Meritocratic Recruitment Index mple. Thequantitative significance nors thataregionhadin1991- potential outliers–Moscowand rst stepof2SLSanalysis,the Table 4.3.TheRsquare r) does not change the r) doesnotchangethe -existing structure’are our keyvariable–the GRP 1995variable GRP 1995variable tions as far as tions asfar Meritocratic ina CEU eTD Collection Model 1(comparedto5.4percentage-point political considerations isassociated witha 5pe change inthenumber ofbureaucratsinthedepartment ofeconomicpolicyhiredindependentlyfrom significance ofthe predictor. Despiteaslightlydecreased magnit powerful predictorofa explaining thevariance inregional growth.Name the five variablesarestatisti suggesting thatOLSestimates couldbebiaseddue deterioration infitcompared totheOLSresults( statistic weobtaininunrestric the ‘pre-existingstructure’inModel1and Unrestricted doesnotchangethe estimates. Models 1and2containestimates oftheequation(1),using and of the variable insignificantand slightly misspecified. statistic givesnoindicationthat Table 4.32SLSEstimates(FirstStage)ofthe Meritocratic Recruitment Index F statistic6.670 R square.357 population Share ofnon-Russian Unemployment, 1995 1993-2006 ofGovernors, Number Non-Russian Population The exclusion of Moscow andLeningrad The exclusionofMoscow Estimates ofthesecondstep2SLSanalys Meritocratic Recruitment Index Meritocratic RecruitmentIndex ggregate growthandthe cally significant,theexclusionofendogenouscomponent inthevarianceof are statisticallysignificant. The sta Coefficient (B) Coefficient (B) the modelusedtopredict the ted Models1and2is.495.279correspondingly.Thisa improvesthemagnitude ofthe Selected IndependentVariables -1.657 -3.629 -.274 changesthecontributionofindividual explanator

. Thecoefficientsofthe inthecorrespondingOLSregression). However, theexclusion ofTumen makes the Share ofOilandGasIndustry oblast Meritocratic Recruitment Index 158 rcentage-point increase in unrestricted Models2and3)reportedinTable4.2, Std. Error Meritocratic Recruitment Index ude vis-à-visotherpred

to theendogeneityproblem. 1,whilstall InModel is arereportedinTabl 1.213 ly, initial reformist activitybecomes themost .122 .687 remains substantial:aone-standarddeviation s (aloneortogether)from thedatafor Model1

GRP percapitain1995 Meritocratic Recruitment Index Number of Governors, Unemployment Number ofGovernors,Unemployment ndard errorsappearreasonable,andF Meritocratic Recruitment Index t Statistic -2.245 -2.414 -2.992

inModel2.TheRsquare aggregate GRPgrowthin e 4.4,whereunrestricted ictors, thequantitative is theleast powerful , 1996-2006,on asameasure for p .031 .021 .005 Value y variablesin

GRP 1995 values is with CEU eTD Collection variables retainingtheir Tumen improves themodel fit (the Rsquarehereis restricted sample. Theelimination of theinsignificant statistic decrease,suggestingthatth a 6.8percentage-pointincreaseinth deviation of‘abovepolitics’bureau significance ofthe other variablesbehavinginthesame wayasth explanatory variable,compared totheOLSestimat component inthevarianceof conditions, fouroutof five vari *Significant at independent variables. Each column reports standardized coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses). Note Table 4.4De-Politicized BureaucracyandAggre : This table reports the result of the second stage of 2SLS regressions of aggregate economic growth on selected In Model2,inwhichthenatu Urbanization Industry Share ofOil/Gas 1995 GRP percapita, Log Population Recruitment Index Meritocratic F-statistic Pro-Reform Voting Adjusted Rsquare p < 0.1, ** at

Meritocratic Recruitment Index p significance andmagnitude. < 0.05, *** at *** <0.05, Unrestricted Model 1 (84.369) .535*** -.477** -.267** (2.520) (2.453) (3.405) .250** .481** (.004) 8.253 .495 ---- ables arestatisticallysignificant.

e datawithTumen fits Model1 slightly betterth crats inaregion’sdepartment of Meritocratic RecruitmentIndex e regionalgrowth.Atthesame time, thevaluesofRsquareandF- p < 0.01. ral resourcesendowment istake Model 1 (82.320) Without -.473** -.309** (2.504) (2.597) (3.380) Tumen .371** .589** (.008) 6.299 1996-2006 .073 .424 ----

159 ey didintheunrestricte

alsoimproves:the a es. In2SLSregression it isonlythethirdmost gate EconomicGrowth inRussia’sRegions, .438andF-statisticis8) Parsimonious GRP 1995 Model 1 (81.291) -.453** -.308** (2.382) (2.369) (3.260) .396** .605** 8.018 ------.438 ----

The exclusion of the endogenous Theexclusionoftheendogenous diminishes themagnitude ofthis economic policycorrespondswith variablefrom Model1without Unrestricted (123.139) Model 2 (99.950) n asaproxyfortheinitial (2.956) (2.932) (4.097) .489** -.244* -.345* .269* 3.868 -.204 .279 d sample. Thequantitative ddition ofaone-standard- ---

withtheexplanatory an thedatafrom (138.176) Model 2 (77.823) Without .675*** -.497** -.313** (2.306) (2.337) (3.205) Tumen .458** -.254* 7.789 ------.485

CEU eTD Collection regression). mechanism ofde-politicization,i. without Tumen) themodelfit improvesandallvariables does notchangetheestimates. However,whenTumen aggregate GRP growthinModel1(compared to hired independently from political considerations is one-standard-deviation increasein predictors, thequantitativesignificanceof similar OLSregression (Model3Unrestricted). powerful explanatoryvariableinth dependent variablethat wouldcaptu order tobringMiller’sca aggregate economic growthisavariable thatreflect purposefulness ofbureaucracy, whichisthemechan also claim thatthe major benefits effort thatisassociatedwitha‘productiveeconomy’ and,consequently,greatersocial welfare.Onecan therefore providing economic actorswithincentives to growth, whichshouldbetakenintoaccountwheninte that the endogeneity problem islikelytoexist be organizational designofbureaucrac expect that atleast some ofthosetransformations wouldhavehad astronger effectthan the transformations oftheeconomic a The lattercanbepartiallyexplaine Index isrobusttodifferentmodeling choices,although organizational structurehas institutionalized to agreater extent performed support inthedata.Ouranalysisshowedthatre Recruitment Index and Rauch1999,Hendersonetal The problem withthisanalysis Overall, thepropositionthata andLeningrad The exclusionofMoscow remains thethirdmostimportant explanatory. usal mechanism tolightbymeans ofast been less fullyincorporated. The effectofthe 2007,Rauch1995)anduponconducti ofde-politicizationareinthe e. thatade-politici thenumber of bureaucratsinth d bythefactthatasour analysis e unrestricted Model2,whilstitisthe most powerful predictor ina nd politicalfoundations ofpost-Sovi y. AslightdifferencebetweenOL de-politicized bureaucracyfoster re the readinessofeconomic agen is, however,thatitdoesnotdir Meritocratic Recruitment Index oblast tween de-politicization of 160 on averagebetterthanprovincesinwhichthis s toomany storiesaboutthesociety itrepresents.In gions inwhichade-pol ism advocatedbyEvansandRauch(1999). Indeed, a5.6percentage-point associated witha 5.4 percentage-point increase in Despite adecreasedmagnitude vis-à-visother rpreting findingsofthepr zed bureaucracydisables s (aloneortogether)fromModel2Unrestricted participate ineconomic exchangeatalevelof oblast it isnotalwaysthemost powerfulpredictor. become significant.The is excluded from thedataset (Model 2 atistical analysis weneedto employ a increased competence, cohesion and covers theperiodofrevolutionary e department ofeconomic policy s economic development findsits ectly corroborateMiller’scausal S and2SLSestimates suggests ng newempirical research. et Russia,itisreasonableto ts topursueactionsthat are bureaucracyandeconomic iticized bureaucracywas Meritocratic Recruitment in acorrespondingOLS politicalopportunism, remains substantial: a evious research(Evans Meritocratic CEU eTD Collection robustly associatedwiththeincreas Therefore, unliketheeconomic grow Basareva 2002,Slinko university educationaremixed, though,asel desire toshapetheirowndestiny(2002:25).The education canbetakenasameasure ofthepeople’ businessBasareva arguesthatinthecontextofsmall formation intheearly1990sRussiahigher education ofthepopulationunderstudy(Bartik 1989,Basareva2002,Slinko psychological/cognitive predispositionsareoftenlabeledas‘human capital’andproxiedbythelevelof Shaver andScott1991).Inempirical studiesinwhich control, apersonalneedtoexcel(Bygrave19 entrepreneurs withrespect tovarious aspects of pe psychological/cognitive perspect (Low 2001:20)andempirical researchonthe The current stateofthetheoretical development ofentrepreneurship researchisknown asa‘catchall’ recently the fieldwascharacterized by‘weaktheo psychological/cognitive, innovation andgrowth,‘entre Although entrepreneurshipsinceat 4.3.1 Model,DataandMethod 4.3 De-PoliticizedBureaucracyandSmall Business Growth credibility of thepowerholdersin eyesofactiveandpotentialentrepreneurs. decisions thatentrepreneursmake, business formation willservethis purposewell.Asstarting afirm isoneof themost important associated witha‘productive economy’. Assection culture, socialclassethnic ormigrant groupaff The secondperspective –thesociologyofentrep Recent entrepreneurship scholarship hasprimarily utilizedthree conceptual perspectives: et al 2005). sociological andinstitutional(Djankov preneurship researchis ive underscores the difference between entrepreneursandnon- ive underscoresthedifference ed ratesofentrepreneurship. the rate of thesmall business formation isa crudetest of the least Schumpeter(1934)isco th literature,there topic is‘surprisinglylimited’ (Djankov sewhere (AidisandEstrin2006,Barberis 89, Hatten1997),andcogniti ect entrepreneurialbehavi 161 ry development’ (Low andMacMillan1988: 157). empirical findingsforRussiaabouttheimpactof rsonality, suchasattitudestowardsrisk,locusof s abilitytoembrace newideas andrisk their in itsadolescence’(Low one of this chapter argued, the rates of small one ofthischapterargued,theratessmall the levelofanalysisis reneurship –hasexamined howattributes of are no‘corevariables’ nsidered bymany asthekeyto or (Bates1997,Hoang and ve process(Baron1998, et al above individuals,these 2001:17).Untilvery thatprovedtobe et al 2005). The 2005).The et al 2005).Thus, 2005: 587). 2005:587). et al et 1996, CEU eTD Collection variation in the organizational design of regional bureaucracies was documented. between the mid mid( 2000s the and 1990-s town’ game in was‘theonly (t-1) patronage when Social Policy(2004). (2006b, 2007,2008).TheMigrantPopulation only negligiblyovertheperiodunderstudy.Thedata as aregion’s fixedeffectvariable because the di 2006 per10000inhabitants,includinginte non-Russian populationin2002,andtheaveragenumbe education, 1994)andthesizeofaregions’ethnic 1000 inhabitants,1995),human capital(measured as entrepreneurial activity(measured asthenumber of Russian context, informed theselection of thefollowing control variables: initial levelof Russia attheindividuallevelofanalysis(Batjargal2003,Djankov of socialrelationships (AldrichandMartinez2001: tradition’ of thesociology of entrepreneurship perspective, which emphasizes the instrumental benefits Antoncic 2002,LightandBhachu1993,Thornton1999, * Communities +Error Community α [Number ofSmallBusiness Enterprises located withinthisarea of thedebate.Itisbysubjecting the Safavian entrepreneurial activity(Barkha property rightsandtheruleoflaw entrepreneurship in Russia has extensively utilized the importance of institutions in fostering or this field. empirical test in relation tosmall business growth that

The The +b 1 has properties of panel data as it reflects the ‘distance traveled’ by the regions regions traveled’ by the of asit has ‘distance Index properties panel data reflects the Recruitment Meritocratic Our estimations arebasedonthefollowingequation: The reviewofrecentliterature onentrepreneurship, including empirical studiesconducted inthe The thirdperspective,increasingly popularinthefieldofentrep

[Meritocratic Recruitment Index et al t – SizeofMigrantCommunity 2001,Slinko t et al tova 2000,Basareva2002,FryandZ 2005,Radaev2002,Yasin and statecapture havebeenexamined inrelation tothelevels of t – Meritocratic Recruitment Index t –NumberofSmallBusinessEnterprises (t-1) rnational migration). We treatthe ] + b variablewasobtainedfrom 162 fference intheregion’s ethnic composition changed 3 47), hasbeensuccessfully appliedinthecontextof nd migrant communities (measured astheshareof InitialLevel ofSmallBusiness+b legally registeredsmallbusinessorganizationsper thwarting entrepreneurship. The literature on this approach: thecostofentry, thesecurity of weaim tomake acontribution totheliterature in onallbutonevariable the shareoflaborfor r of people whoarrived/leftaregionin1996- r of Zimmer andAldrich1987).The‘network et al 2003).Theobjectiveofthisthesisis et al Meritocratic RecruitmentIndex huravskaya 2000,Kolomak 2006, 2005). reneurship research,underlines (t-1) the IndependentInstituteof ] * Non-Russian Population +b t come from ROSSTAT ) when a remarkable ce thatattainedhigher (t-1) 2 [ ] = Size ofMigrant 5 SizeofEthnic (2) to

CEU eTD Collection instrumented withvariablesthatarethoughttohave stage least squares (2SLS) estimation procedure in which the affected bythesame unobservedfactor.We deal from aquiteplausibleassumption thatde-politiciz we conductedouranalysiswithandwithouttheid issues ofthepotentialimpact ofoutliersandthee 0.31. bureaucracy andsmall businessgrowth,controllingforot Pskov (153%).Theirexclusionincr growth againstmerit forasub-sample ofourdatase minimum of-50%andBelgorodisatthesample’smaximum of204%.Figur sample: whilsttheaveragegrowthoverperiodunde Growth only weakly correlatedbetween each other.

Table 4.5IndependentVariablesforSmallBusiness Growth Model: BivariateCorrelations Figure 4.2A plotsthecorrelationbetween at p *Significant Note: Similarly toaggregategrowthanalysis,inquant The coefficientsofbivariateco . Awiderangeofexperienceswithregard tosmall business formation is observedinthe 5 4 2 1 6

Ethnic Communities Migrant Community EDUC 94 Merit capita 1995 per Small Business < 0.1,at **

p eases theunconditionalcorrelation < 0.05, at *** p rrelation, reportedinTable4.5,s 1 .152 .347* -.029 .083 1

-.107 1 -.080 .184 ndogeneity problem. Todealw <0.01. 163 with thepotentialendogene ation ofbureaucracyandsm Meritocratic Recruitment Index nodirectassociationwithsmall businessgrowth. t thatexcludestwopotentialoutliers:Belgorodand entified outliers.Thee 2 ifying therelationships

r studyisabout43%,Tumen isatthesample’s her variables, special at

1 -.090

.385* 4 Meritocratic Recruitment Index how thatindependentvariables

1

-.158 between theseriesfrom 0.27to 5 ndogeneity problem arises ity problem usingatwo- between ade-politicized e 4.2Bplotsaggregate ith theformer concern, tention waspaid tothe all businessgrowth is

1 andSmall Business 6 is CEU eTD Collection B A

Figure 4.2UnconditionalCorrelation between Percentage ChangeintheNumberof

Total Percentage Change in the Number Total Percentage Change in the Number of of Small Businesses, 1996-2006 Small Businesses, 1996-2006 100 140 -60 -20 100 140 180 220 20 60 -60 -20 20 60 1 0 1 0 02 02 Meritocratic Recruitment Index (%) Index Recruitment Meritocratic Meritocratic Recruitment Index (%) Index Recruitment Meritocratic 03 03 164 Small Businesses percapita,1996-2006 Meritocratic Recruitment IndexandTotal 04 04 05 05 R 2 R = 0.3113 = 2 = 0.2695 = 0 0

CEU eTD Collection regions, whichisasatisfactory fitformode Size ofMigrantCommunity adjusted Rsquare(to19percent)andslightlyre Community Two outoffivevariables–theinitialle variables ofthisbasicgrowthm the First weregressed the 4.3.2 FindingsfromOLSand2SLSAnalyses (representing a12.3%increase inth small businessgrowth.Aone-standa to about46percent.The extentof de-politicization Index. Thischange,asModel2Table *Significant at errors (in parentheses). aggregate economic growth Note : This table reports the result of OLS (Models 1 and 2) and the second stage of 2SLS (Model 3) regressions of of 3) 2SLSregressions the 1and secondstage 2) of and (Model (Models of OLS result the reports table : This Meritocratic Recruitment Index Next, weintroducedourmeasure of Table 4.6De-Politicized BureaucracyandSma –appearedtobesignificant. p < 0.1, ** at Businesses pc,1995 ofSmall Number Recruitment Index Meritocratic Adjusted Rsquare Migrant Community Ethnic Communities EDUC 1994 Small BusinessGrowth on selectedindependent variables. Eachcolumn p < 0.05, *** at *** <0.05, variable. odel explain31%ofthevariationin (Model1,Table4.6),usingOLS p e number ofbureaucratsinthe Model 1 4.6, showsincreasestheadjustedR < 0.01. -.547** (4.445) .439** rd deviation increase inthe (.211) (.459) (4.64) OLS .083 .074 .31 --- Theexclusionoftwopotential vel ofsmall business development andthe

a de-politicizedbureaucracy–the ls onsmall businessgrowthinRussia(Slinko onthesetofselectedcontro 1996-2006 duces themagnitude andthesignificance levelofthe 165

Model 2 of bureaucracyissignificantly positively relatedto -.463** (4.186) (4.298) .439** (.534) (.218) (.408) .246* -.054 OLS .458 .118 ll BusinessGrowth inRussia’sRegions,

reports standardized coef Model 3 -.516** (1.093) (4.327) (4.501) .310** (.230) (.475) .279* 2SLS -.009 .355 .053 small business growth inRussia’s Meritocratic Recruitment Index

department ofeconomic policy outliersreducesthevalueof procedure. Fourindependent l variables,withoutincluding square ofthemodel from 31 Meritocratic Recruitment Model 3 Without Outliers -.503** (3.643) (3.564) .395** (.889) (.197) (.380) -.023 .307 .153 .147

ficients and standard Size ofMigrant et al 2005).

CEU eTD Collection 2006). in 1995,theshareofurbanpopulatio regression. The variables –theSizeofMigrantCommunity changes thevalueofadjustedRsquare(from .458to.449);however,oneofth independent variablescontinueto Small Businesses Recruitment Index number oflegally registeredsmall busin suggesting thatOLSestimates couldbebiaseddue to theendogeneity problem. square statisticweobtainhere( first-stage regressionandthenuse hired independentlyofpoliticalcons 8 errors andFstatisticsappear tobe reasonable. the variables explainabout30%

Number ofGovernors publicationsonsocio-economic characteristics Russia’sof regions (2006b, 2007, 2008). Forthe full descriptionthe of The data on the firsttwo variables comes from ROSSTAT – Table 4.72SLSEstimates(FirstStage)ofthe Number ofGovernors F statistic5.054 R square.296 population, 1995 Share ofurban Unemployment, 1995 1991-2006 ofGovernors, Number Estimates ofthesecondstep2SLSanalysisarereportedin Model 3Table4.6.ThevalueofR We nextconducta2SLSanalysis 8 Theestimates ofthefirststag Meritocratic Recruitment percapitain1995andthe variable seeTable 5.1. doesnotaffectthesignificanceofot and the ofthevariancein

Coefficient (B) Coefficient (B) .355) isadeteriorationinfitcompar be insignificant.Theexclusion Selected IndependentVariables -1.661 -2.954 its predictedvaluestogetherwith Unemployment -.249 n in1995andthenumber ofgovernorsthataregionhadin1991- e of2SLSregressionarereporte iderations) isassociated witha

inwhichweinstrument the Index wasinstrumented with –becomes insignificance. Size ofMigrantCommunity ess enterprises.Theintroductionof theMeritocratic 166 Std. Error Meritocratic Recruitment Index Meritocratic RecruitmentIndex

Federal Statethe annual Russian Federation’s Statisticsof variables arestatistically 1.211 .204 .719 her independentvariables:whilstthe

of BelgorodandPskovonlyslightly Meritocratic Recruitment Index t ed totheOLSresults(Models2), Statistic d inTable4.7.Three independent othercontrolsinasecond-stage -1.221 -2.311 -2.438 1.7 percentage-poi three variables–unemployment retaintheirsignificanceother

significant. Thestandard e previouslysignificant After theexclusionof After . Thecoefficientsof , 1996-2006,on p .230 .027 .020 Value nt increasein

Number of Number of ina CEU eTD Collection de-politicized bureaucracies. the firstempirical verificationof in thecapacityofde-politicized confiscatory actions,these growth reflects theentrepreneurs’ perception of where thisstructuralfeatureof institutionalized toagreater extent thoseprovincesofRussi business growth.Namely, is concerned,thereastrongrobu some decreasein themagnitude andthesignificance levels as faras the its supportinthedata.AlthoughOLSand2SLSregressionsproducedslightlydifferentresults,with third most powerful explanatory after theinitialle a significantfactorinexplaining the endogenouscomponent fromitsownvariance,the Community regression). number oflegallyregisteredsmall businessen increase inthenumber of‘abovepolitics’bureaucrats regional outliers. statistic deteriorate,sugg a 2.2percentage-pointincreaseinth standard-deviation of‘abovepolitics’ significance ofthe with othervariablesbehavinginthesame wayasth Overall, thepropositionthatade The exclusionofBelgorodandPskov Size ofMigrantCommunity variable insignificant, but im Meritocratic Recruitment Index esting thattheunrestricted findings directlycorroboratetheideathat bureaucraciestoconstrainpolitic bureaucracy was onlyweaklyinst the varianceinregionalsmall busin Miller’s theoreticalexpl , exhibithigherratesofsmall bus st impact ofade-politicizedbur e regionalgrowth.Atthesame time, thevaluesofRsquareandF- , itsquantitative significance issizeable: aone-standard-deviation bureaucratsinaregion’sdepart -politicized bureaucracy encouragessmall businessgrowthfinds proves themagnitude ofthe (Model 3withoutou 167 tities (comparedtoa1.7%impactintheOLS thecredibilityof powerholdersnottopursue data fits themodel better thanthe datawithout the ey didintheunrestrictedsample. Thequantitative vel ofentrepreneur activ also slightly improves: theaddition of a one- a, inwhichade-politicizedbureaucracywas Meritocratic Recruitment Index leadstoa2percentage anation ofthewelfare-enhancingproperties ians’ opportunism. Thisconstitutes eaucracy onregionalratesofsmall tliers) makes the iness formation thanthoseregions ess growth.Althoughitisonlythe theimpact ofde-politicizationis ment ofeconomic policyleadsto itutionalized. Assmall business Meritocratic Recruitment Index Meritocratic Recruitment Index ity in aregion and the -point increaseinthe Size ofMigrant continues to be continues tobe , CEU eTD Collection refused andthisdecisioneven Reshetkin with aproposaltoplaceit with participated inSt.Petersburg’sle Motherland/Pensioners/Life signedAt theendofJanuary2007Reshetkin acontractwithpoliticalparty of 2007heowned68streetmerchandising standsin suburbs ofSt.Petersburgandemployed4people. contemporary Russia.In2003Reshetki 2007) isoneofmany examples illustratingthesoci media outlets, includingthereputable welfare. study showinghowde-politicization containspoliticians politicians usedapatronage-basedbureaucracyas illustrate the causalmechanism This section providestworeallifeexamples fro 4.3.3 BureaucracyandSmallBusinessinpost-Sovi 9 Indeed, withinthenext22 daysReshetkinwassubject his streetstands,otherwise Motorin Reshetkin toannulthecontractwith Reshetkin’s businessisofficially registered –invite Eugeny Motorin,thefirstdeputy Russia leader. Peterburgh’s, andfeaturedmany of develop, Putin (seeKonitzerandWegren power inthehandsofa InApril2008 Vladimir Putinbecame theoffici Fair Russia In theafternoonofsame da United Russia entrepreneurAlekseyReshetkin,reportedbyseveralRussian The storyofaSt.Petersburg’s alsoexercisedatightcont 9 ‘Thepartyofpower’asitis oftenreferredtointhe pressandacademic literature, United Russia wassignedarepresentativeofanotherpoliticalparty, isgenerallyperceivedasaKremlin-designed instrument forconsolidatingpolitical firmly controlledthe majority of group ofpeopleassociated toplacetheirelectioncam

tually costhim hisbusiness. rol overlocal authorities. gislative electionsscheduledfor 2006). Bythetime whenthestory of Miller’s theory.The firstcase-study,whichdiscusses how head oftheadministration of theregionalgovernorsasitsmembers andVladmir Putinasits threatened Resetkin todo everything toclosethelatter’sbusiness. y whenarepresentativeof Fair Russia s electioncampaign postersinsteadof Novaya Gazeta n startedasmall outdooradvert al leader of the party. andtoplace 168 m thecontextofpost-SovietRussiathatfurther an instrument ofextortion,isfollowedbyacase- d the entrepreneur ‘for achat’.Motorindemanded et Russia:Evidence fromTwoCase-Studies (Vishnevsky2007)and ed towhatsome called‘anadministrative racket’ ally adverseeffectof with ex-presidentandpr ’ threattopropertyri paign postersonthestands. United Russia’scampaign materials on United Russia regionallegislatures,includingSt. March 2007.Adayafte Petrodvorec ising firm and bythebeginning of AlexeyReshetkinbeganto United Russia, approached paidavisit toReshetkin, Novaya Politika Fair Russia’s.Reshetkin ghts andenhancessocial political opportunism in ime-minister Vladimir – thedistrict where Fair Russia: r thecontract Fair Russia (Il’insky (Il’insky United CEU eTD Collection damaged. Inotherwords,thebusinesswa dismantled. Moreover,thedismantlement wasconductedin dismantled. Whenhefiledacomplaint andacompen streetmerchandisingsecretly andunderthecoverofnight,abouthalfReshetkin’s standswere terminated contractswithReshetkin.Theinstantr bankruptcy. Inaddition,severalmajo almost allrules regulatingthe (NTV 2007)bytheregulatoryagenci route taxi.Itnormally seats15-20 public transitspecif in alarge-scaleconfiscatorycampaign. First,afewwords on was abletoresisttheinformal pressurefrom politi costs (rangingfrom andlicensesuspen fines practice in it became clearthat theuseofregul entries in the RussianLiveJour (user such as ‘what happened toReshet was extensivelydebatedintheRussianLiveJourna incident heclearlystated Reshtkin’s merchandising stands,butalsohisentrepre appointments and dismissals’ famous for itsclan politics’ (interview withY.P.), character ofits personnel policy regime, allthree expertsagreed that our poolrepresentingLeningradskaya they operatedunderthe‘highpowered marshruka route topickupapassenger if route thatmayor notbethesame asan estab The actions of thelocalpolitical bosses and However, bureaucraticharassment wasnotthee In contrasttoReshetnikov’scase,thestoryof kwasek… s existedintheSoviettimes, Petrodvorec ) wererathercommon. Moreover,between ic tomany countriesoftheformer-USSR. Essentially, , andthattheactions that itwasunlikelyhe (interview withO.N.). nal commentingotheractionsof there isspaceinsidethecabin,or kin isexactlywhyIneverdaredto people dependingonthe capacityof outdoor advertisement businessan atory agenciesasatoolofexto r clientsofReshetkin,predominan es ofthedistrict’sadministration. Hewasfoundinviolationof incentives’scheme. Indeed,whenweaskedthreeexpertsfrom they boomed inthe1990sproviding anefficientsolutiontothe oblast s destroyed,justlikeMotorinpromised. sion tobribes)onma oftheadministration imposed , towhichthedistrict 169 lished publictransitroute. It stops anywherealongits where‘several politicalfigurescontrolbureaucratic cians withwelfare-undermining motivestotakepart bureaucrats irrevocablyda eaction ofthebureaucratic wouldreturntobusiness. l –acommunity ofInternetbloggers,comments marshrutkas showshowagroupofcivilservants neurial spirit. Inseveral interviews following the nd ofReshetkin’sordeal.OnFebruary21,2007 sation claim, theotherhalf of thestands was March andApril2007 suchawaythatthestandswereirrevocably Petrodvorec marshrutka ny localbusinesses. rtion andharassmentwasacommon toletapassenger out.Although become anentrepreneur myself’ theminibus andfollowsafixed tly statecontrolledenterprises, d threatenedwithfinesand belongs, tocomment onthe marshrutka isashared fixed- Petrodvorec uncertainty and transaction s. administration from which maged notonlyAleksey Marshrutka isatype of Inaddition,asthestory agencies suggeststhat we tracedabout150 is‘notoriously CEU eTD Collection their vehicles. serve certainroutesinacity.Cooperativesarepartnershipsof minibus ownerswhonormally alsodrive business, byissuingcommercialtransportlicenses population, withhighdemand both individualdriversand any othermeans ofpublictr overcrowded andunderfundedpublictransport. Because of therespondents,allnames, including th the officersfrom themunicipal depa journalist, whohelpedusinorgani welfare-enhancing effectofa business intimidation campaign. Thestorybehindthis we foundoutthatthedepartment oftransportdi when weinterviewedrepresentativesofseveral c in theendofAugust.Initiallyit this thesislearnt about itwhilstbeing onafield research visit associated withth and more comfortabletripsby the number ofpeopleusingbuses,trams andtrolleybuses cooperatives. Within acoupl trolleybuses byastaggering33pe the useofpublictranspor authorities, whoownthecompanies th department oftransport, by 25percent,otherwise,thecooperativesweretold, thecasewouldbepasse between thecity’sauthoritiesandcooperatives, ‘voted with theirfeet’for persuade the suspensions andcancella The storywithmarshrutka Today everylargeRussiancityhasadensewebof The cooperativesrefused,reporting marshrutka tion oflicenses. marshrutka cooperativestoraisethei tation by citizens –raised the costsof marshrutka backtothestate-ownedpublic e ofweeksfollowingthepricerise,th marshrutka for theirservices. marshrutka ansportation, theyremain very de-politicized bureaucracy. Wede-politicized bureaucracy. w s happenedinoneofRussia’slarge looked likeanotherexam zing interviewswithboththerepr r centtothelevelof s’ main regulatoryagency,which rtment oftransport.Topreserve at provide thecity withpublic transport andalso setthe costs for cooperatives,whichisthemain legalformofthistype e name ofthecity,havebeenwithheld. the casetolocalnewspapers,wherefrom theauthorof . Thereactionofthemunicipali ooperatives, whogladlycomme 170 d notcarryouttheplanne r prices,thusbringingbackthosepassengerswho (individual drivers) and permits (cooperatives)to (individual drivers)andpermits latter wastoldtoraisethepriceofasingletrip cancellationisaremarkable example ofthe . Forthesame pricespeoplepreferredquicker marshrutka marshrutkas areconsiderably quicker than ple ofanadministrative racket.However, marshrutkas’ tariff, whichissetbythe popularamong theRussianurban asingletripon e citywitnesseda ould liketothankO.B.,alocal esentatives ofthecooperativesand therequestedanonymity ofsome routes.Local authorities regulate cities. In summer 2006 thecity would ‘persuade’throughfines, transportation.Atameeting ty wasquitepredictable –to d andwidelyannounced d tothemunicipality’s is projectintheregion nted onthesituation, busses, trams or sharp declinein CEU eTD Collection [about 50percentofthestaffdepartment command tobeinwritingshouldseehim inhisoffice. R.S. andK.B.).‘AfterA.P.’sdemarche, –recolle very top’,A.P. saidthathewoul continued dialogwiththecooperativ objected (interviewswithA.P.,R.S. was sanctionednotonlybythemayor butbythegover vice-mayor, calledtogetherthedepart (interview withA.P.).X.X. spoke would inevitablycross. I, therefore,stucktoth really nasty.Afterall,he wasresponsibleforthe to antagonisehim bysayingthathis four yearsago.Tofiresomeone lik not withX.X.orY.Y.[thename ofthemayor – fire me. Iam onapermanent contract.Iwashiredby and whatheaskedmedowasbeyondmy to jobdescription.Iknewthathedid fired fornotperforming my duties.Isaidthatmy suspension orderbythe endofthenextworking day, shocking’ (interviewwithA.P.). cooperatives to‘cooperate moreacceptableMN], butsomething forthecoopera higher priceforatripby of thesolutionstoproblem, I same time, lettingtrams andtrolle Marshrutkas gaveusallagoodlessoninthemarket econom A.P., ‘many ofusfeltthatessentially thepos the departmentoftransportandonecentral to issuebigfinesatleast150driversof has beenmade that,startingfrom tomorrow,allthe A.P. went first to see X.X. ‘X.X. said thatif A.P. wentfirsttoseeX.X.‘X.X.said clearthatthedecisionwasmadeX.X. made ‘a it About a week afterthemeetingAbout aweek betweenthemunici marshrutka ’ byinflictingfinancial d only carry itoutif there wasawr ybuses tosimply dieovernightwa toseveralothertransport officer stress, justoneofmany, wasto e me isvery-verydifficult…Old andE.Y.).A.P.however,openlyobjected theorder,calling fora threat tofireme isempty. Idid es. AndafterX.X.repeatedthat . Nottheridiculous25 percent [demanded by the municipality – ment oftransport forateam mee marshrutkas aday’,saysA.P.,theheadofdivisionwithin – MN] gathered in front of X.X.’s office’. – MN]gatheredinfrontofX.X.’soffice’. transport inthe[city–MN] government andourpaths ition of theauthorities overthetariffswaswrong. e job description and the written request argument’ e jobdescriptionandthe writtenrequestargument’ 171 MN] whowerenotevenherewhenIstartedmy job dutieswereexactlythepointIwastryingtomake, cts K.B.,‘X.X.saidthat figuresinthestory.‘Itwasshocking,–continues I don’tbringfivepenaltyreceiptsandonelicense penalties for‘non-coopera employees ofthedepartme I willfaceaseverepunish Thissoundedlikeathreat,butstillfifteenofus a jury.Isignedcontractwiththemunicipality t theverytop’–i.e.‘150aday’operation nor oftheregion–and tives andpassengers! However,toforcethe pal authorities and the cooperatives, X.X., the pal authoritiesandthecooperatives,X.X., y thatthemostefficientsurvives.At s, includingE.Y., K.B.,andR.S., s, ofcourse,alsowrong.Andone negotiate withthecooperativesa days aregone.ButIdidnotwant not wanttheconversationtoturn theorderwascoming from‘the itten instruction (interviews with ting. ‘Hesaid,thatthedecision everyone whoneeded the tion… thatwassimply nt willgoonthestreets therefore couldnotbe not havethepowerto ment andevencanbe CEU eTD Collection (interviewK.O.). with isabou the MN]turnover in – daily passenger share together month to restore alicense…Yes, our actions planned‘We this because in our business th to minibuses stay their at home, for – said were stillpaying the next day. the operation starting officers, among those who were prepared to obey X.X., called the cooperatives with a warning that the department was with P.T.). department did notgoona‘finespree’,asrepresen why theauthoritiescalled‘150aday’operationoff, interviews withtherepresentative neither nextdaynorafterwards.The issuequietly push ussomehow, butactuallynothinghappene acquired 22 and28new minibuses whichisalso theirrecord highestreplacement rate. since thecooperativewas register consisting of havebeenoperating 121members, new interview inNovember 2007,A.S.toldusthatsi screen, –saidthechairpersonofcooperative [minibuses –MN],theytoldme today.Normall ever beforeexpressedtheirread important, accordingtothetestimonies normally show’,-saidP.T.,therepresentative called off–MN].Somearestillskeptical, butthere profitable business.‘Ihavenotseentheguysasexc that theauthorities’ actionspositively affectedth work. ‘Honestly,Iexpectedsomething tohappenne seven transport officers whowerestillwaiting fo whose accounts oftheirencounterwithX.Xareverysimilar toA.P.’s. ThenX.X.lettheremaining 12 11 10 can arguethatthegeneraleconomic growththatRu reaction toit. users whowerenotadversely affectedbytheexecuti of thecity’sdepartment oftransport.The The information on how many new minibuses were acquired by other city’s cooperatives is unavailable. who asto letat so the routes, least those minibuses on very minimum only the of to put we wanted operation the ‘During transport X.X.several of instruction thedirect because under a operation ‘150 day’ aboutthe knew cooperatives The There areseveralwelfare-enhancin 10

11 Secondly,andmore importantly

iness toinvest.‘Myboys[thedr ed in1999.Similarly, twoothercoope s ofthecooperativesit e minimal fineequalstoseven days of would have definitely affected the peop oftherepresentativescooperatives,moredrivers than g consequencesoftheactions most immediateeffect , alreadyintheaf d. Notasingleemployee wassenttofine y, youcannotmake themeventoreplaceasplitwind nce September2006,36driversfrom hiscooperative, the chairperson of the cooperative ‘4’ (interview with ‘4’ N.S.). (interview cooperative the of chairperson the 172 of thecooperative‘9’inSeptember2006.Equally t 40 per cent, – the representative of the cooperative ‘7’ said cooperative ofthe representative the t 40 per cent, – e entrepreneurs’ perception of the prospects for a e entrepreneurs’perceptionoftheprospectsfora r theaudience inhis reception areato goback to ‘2’ (interviewwithA.S.).Indeed,inatelephone ssian witnessedbeforethe2008crisiscontributed ited asthosedaysafterth xt day,–saysA.P.,‘I tative ofonethecooperativesputit(interview fadedaway’(interviewwithA.P.).Fromthe on ofthe‘150aday’plan and thecooperatives’ is onlyhalfofthegloomaboutfuturethey minibuses. Thisisthehighestreplacement rate buttheywere,obviously,veryrelievedthatthe became clearthatthey ivers – MN] think of buying new cars ivers –MN]thinkofbuyingnewcars termath oftheincidentonecouldsee was thewelfareofmany marshrutka a driver’s work.It will takeatleasta le, becauseour[ofa ratives of98and139members, A.P.andothercivilservants though X.X.wouldtryto e ‘150aday’plan[was didnotknowexactly 12 ll thecooperatives Ofcourse,one marshrutka s

CEU eTD Collection contribution of Miller’s de-politicized bur mechanisms areatworkintheca complement, ratherthancontradict eachother, theref with theconfidence tomake costly investments. credibly commits powerholders toth credibly commitspowerholders and Rauch’smechanism ofamore competent, c welfare isachieved.Itnotclearwhether de-p models arenotperfectlyconclusive enhancing publicbureaucracyistwofold. Onth The empirical evidence wehavepresentedinthischap 4.4 Conclusion campaign, therebyboostingtheconfidenceofentrepre motives ofpoliticiansandnottoactupontheirinfo The abilityofagroupmeritocra politicized bureaucracy onsmall bus welfare-enhancing consequences. it isplausibletosuggestthatthe November 2007only13and18minibuses two cooperativesofacomparable size(79a other cities.Thus,inanotherlargecityoftheFe cooperatives werereplacingtheirminibuses wasex to therenewal of the potential entrepreneurs. Havingemployedthesm the credibilityofpowerholders nottopursu employed adependentvariablethatbetter captures the ke bureaucracy isroutinelyusedbypoli in contrasttothesituationdiscussedfi local authoritiesandpositivelyaffectingtheentreprene In ordertobringMiller’s causalmechanism to This case-studysupportslarge-Nst marshrutka actions ofA.P.andhiscolleaguestr se ofeconomic growth.However,th tically recruitedbureaucratstosay ‘no’tothewelfare-undermining business’sfixedassets.However,therateatwhichcity’s withregardtothecausalmechanism throughwhichgreatersocial iness growthandshowshowwelfar ticians asatoolofextortion. e legislativeintentofpublicpol eaucracy tosocial welfare remained. atistical evidenceof correspondingly(interviewswithA.T.andS.Z.).Therefore, nd 111members) acquiredfrom September 2006to rst casestudy,whichshowed oliticization enhanceseco e onehand,thefindingsfrom theeconomic growth 173 deral Districttowhichth e confiscatoryactions asperceived byactiveand From pointofviewbothmechanisms atheoretical ohesive andpurposefulbureaucracyorbecauseit ceptionally highwhencompared tocooperativesin all businessgrowthvariable asaproxyfor rmal instructionspreventedalargeconfiscatory urs’ propensitytomake costlyinvestments. This ore itisplausible toassume thatboth causal ter withregard toMiller’s theory of awelfare- neurs inthenon-confiscat light bymeans ofastatisticalanalysis we y propertyofhisexplanatory mechanism – the welfare-enhanci icies, providingeconomic agents iggered aseries e taskofsheddinglightonthe e-enhancing effectisachieved. nomic growththroughEvans e cityunderstudybelongs, thatapatronage-based ory characterofthe ng effect ofade- of actionswith CEU eTD Collection properties of de-politicizedbureaucracies,whichis constitutes thefirst empirical verification of Miller and their associates but will reap benefits to th overnight asaresultofpoliticians those without connections tothecurrent powerholders, politicization isgreat Russia. Theincreasedratesofsmall business form the strikingvariationinnumbe differences intheinstitutionalizatio entrepreneurs’ perceptionofpow contributes toalargerliterature thatemphasizes operate can spellthedifference between therates of entrepreneurial activity. Finally, ourresearch characteristics oftheorganizational structure of would clarifywhatcausal mechanism isatwork. bureaucracy findthemselves increasinglyconcernedw design ofpublicbureaucraciesatbothnational and Barro andSala-I-Martin1997).This determinants ofeconomicgrowthth bureaucracyvariab the organizationaldesignofpublic between ade-politicizedbureaucracyandeconomic grow number ofcontexts(EvansandRauch1999, complement theevidence forthewelfare-enhancing politicians asatoolofextortion. discussed inanothercasestudy,whichshowedthat affecting the entrepreneurs’ inclinationtomake costly the confidenceofentrepre not toactupontheirinformal instructionspreven meritocratically recruitedbureaucrat 4, further illuminate theworking of Miller’s causal mechanism. Theability of agroup of Likewise, ourfindings c More generally,ourfindings,from theem Two cases-studies from thecontext er suggestthatde-politiciza neurs inthenon-confiscatorycharacteroflocalauthoritiesandpositively ontribute totheentrepreneurship literature, pointing out that the ’ manipulation oftherule erholders’ commitment nottoconf r ofsmall businesstart-upsobser n of a de-politicizedbureaucracy n ofa s tosay‘no’thewelfare-unde at havebeenagreedbyeconomists inrecentstudies(Barro1995, requiresgatheringsystematic of post-SovietRussia,discussed tion raisestheconfidenceof e entrepreneur, herfamily andher community.This 174 the roleofstateapparatu bureaucracies incountries andregionswherefirms ted alargeconfiscatory an important contributiontotheliterature. ’s theoretical explanation a patronage-basedbureaucracyisroutinelyusedby 2005). Therobustassociationthathas role ofade-politicizedpublicbureaucracyfrom a ation inthoseregionswh pirical backgroundof a transitioneconomy, ith (Teorell 2008)–andinnovativeresearchthat investments. Thisisin contrast tothesituation that theircostly investments willnotdisappear sub-national levels–ataskthatscholarsof le is a potential addition to the set of core le isapotentialadditiontothesetofcore th inthisandpreviousstudiessuggeststhat s of thegame tothe rmining motives ofpoliticians and ved acrossregionsofpost-Soviet iscate, itwasfoundthatregional is arobustexplanatoryfactorfor evidence on the organizational evidence ontheorganizational in thefinalsectionofchapter campaign, therebyboosting s ineconomic development of thewelfare-enhancing entrepreneurs, especially advantage ofpoliticians ere theextent of de- been found CEU eTD Collection alternative totheanalyticallyunsatisfying of de-politicizationpublicbur (see Amsden 1989,Evans1995,MauroRothstein and Thisquestionisaddressedin powers thaninotherregions?. ‘Why insome regionsdidpoliticians gofurther withregard tolimiting theexercise of theirstaffing If ade-politicizedbureaucracy

eaucracy providesatheory-based, parsimonious andreplicable is conducivetogreatersocialwe argument ofthe‘qualitybureaucracy’. 175 the nextchapter. Teorell 2008).Thediffe lfare, thenthequestionarises rence intheextent CEU eTD Collection 1 systems, refusingtoenjoy th commissions). Thepuzzleweaddressinthischap of publicmanagers, delegatingth followers, adoptingcivilservicesystems instead. democratic andauthoritarian)haverenouncedthedistribution countries formost oftheirhistory,whatisst The wordsof SenatorWilliam Marcy capture what has beenthenorm inmostdeveloped rulers’ discountrates section threeanalyses therelationship between themajor explanatory factorofthetheory– agents. Utilizing ourmeasure of de-politicizati focuses ontherulers’(democratic ornot)security repeated game theory,insectiontwowepropos the factorsthatleadto far backas Prussiain the17 selected undertheruleofform protégées. Itseems naturaltopreferyourown new incumbent(either democratic orauthoritaria pervasive norminmany developingones:apatr conceptual contribution of Victor Lapuente to the theoreticalmodel is gratefully acknowledged. This chapter is a revisited vers isarevisited chapter This successful, they claim,matter ofright,theadvantages asofsuccess. they successful, When they are contending for victory, avowthethey intention of enjoying the fruits ofit.Ifthey are Section oneprovidesabriefliteratureoverv – andmerit adoptionacrossRussia’sregions. EVIDENCE FROM RUSSIA’S REGIONS REGIONS RUSSIA’S FROM EVIDENCE POLITICS AND MERIT ADOPTION: POLITICS ANDMERITADOPTION: ion of an article published in articlepublished ofan ion e spoilsoftheirvictories? adoption ofde-politicizedbureau

er (andverylikely)opposingincu th eir staffingpowerstoautonomous bodies(e.g.U.S.civilservice centuryatleastfortheWe Chapter 5 Chapter 5 176 supporters assubordinates ill thenorminsome of

on ofbureaucracyasth onage-based statebureaucracy,inwhichevery ter isthus,whydosome They havetiedtheirhandsinthemanagement inofficeandtheirinte (Lapuente and Nistotskaya 2009). The The 2009). Nistotskaya and Governance (Lapuente e analternativetheoreticalexplanation that n) replacesmost publicmanagers withher iew, challenging conventional wisdom about iew, challengingconventionalwisdomabout that to thevictorbelong the spoilsofthe enemy 1

cracies. Basedoninsightsfrom stern world,many rulers(both mbents. Nevertheless,startingas They see nothing wrongintherule They seenothing of patronage jobs to their of patronagejobstotheir them, andwhatisthe ractions witheconomic William (1832) L.Marcy rather thanbureaucrats politicians adoptmerit e dependentvariable, "

CEU eTD Collection 1173). 1173). 2 involves culturalfactors.Trad The firstdominant approach,existing withinth 5.1 LiteratureReview merit overpatronageashappened inAmerican officials suchasintra-citydisagreement between powers ordiffusionofpower(e.g.dividedgovernment authority inthatinputside democracy. Inparticular,NPEliteratureemphasi policy implementation ormore orlesscorruption),butonwhatcanbecalledthe would notbedepende system asawhole’(Moe1989:329).Thechoi democratic settings.Autonomous merit bureaucra interactions among politicalactors (namely, in Russia’s regions. Political Economy (hereafterrefe This chapteraddresses theshortcomings ofth merit reforms,suchas,forinstance, theoneswe cannot sufficientlyaccountforwith from thoseoftheU.S.,U.K.orSweden (Silberman 1993:8).Furthermore, culturalfactors Germany enduppossessingsimilar stateadministrative structureswhich,inturn,aredifferent also facesthe problem ofhowtoexplainsu French asaresultofthe‘strongstatetradi civil serviceisfrequentlyexplainedasa‘guarantorofthepublicgood’(Goetz2000:87)and result, theytendtobemoresubjectiveanddesc cultural underpinnings,resistbui explanations that,byemphasizing somuch thei The core of this approach would probably be what Mille bewhat probably would core thisapproach The of The firstprediction,emerging fromthisview, is that,facedwithgreaterseparation of The seconddominant explanationtendstosee meritocratic bureaucraciesastheresultof nt onthedifferent ofademocraticpolity.

itionally thestudy lding testabletheo rred toasNPE)perspective in-country differences(intiming outputs tion’ (Meininger2000:189).Theculturalapproach 177 e considerablebodyofliteratureonmerit adoption r labelled ‘positive political theories of bureaucracy’ (1997: (1997: ofbureaucracy’ theories political ‘positive labelled r theyproduce(interms of is approach,embracing aninstitutionalorNew findamong U.S.citiesor states(Ruhil 2003:28) riptive thananalytical.For example, theGerman ce betweenmerit andpatronageadministrations ch widelydifferingsocietiesasJapan, Franceor nherent complexitiesofbureaucraciesandtheir national andsub-nationa mayor andcouncillors), terest groups,legislat of bureaucracieshasbeenmonopolized by cies wouldbe‘inherentinourdemocratic zes theroleoffragmentation ofpolitical retical propositions(Moe1997:455).Asa atfederallevel,conflictbetweenelected 2 andtestingitspredictionsacross as wellinthedepth)of ors andexecutives) in a more orlessefficient l politics(Frant1993, politicians w input ill prefer sideof CEU eTD Collection politicized merit system.Anothe bureaucratic agentsobtainthei political principalsthereare,themore istocontrolbureaucraticagents.Consequently, difficultit 245) considerthatoneofthebestestablishedhypotheseswithinliteratu (Hammond 2003).Intheirreviewofdelegati politicians aredividedamong themselves, thenthebureaucratsmay beabletoconquer to thereplacement of politici Ruhil 2003).Therearetwomain mechanisms through of political authority and political uncertainty classical empiricalcomparative analysis seeGeddes1994). appointments (e.g.forarecent theoretical elabora precludes thenewrulingcoali that increased politicalcompetition political coalitions(Horn1995;Williamson 1999). public managers, legislatorsprotecttheirpublic By removing politicalappointeesfrom thebureaucr powered’ political incentives byisolating itthrou interest groupssupportingthem, over theorganizationaldesignofbureaucracy incumbency forlong)isthedrivingforcebehindth political fragmentation. Politicaluncertainty (i.e. legislatorsdonotknow iftheywillremain in fragmentation, theypointtowardswhat onema explaining merit asaresultof different parties(i.e.Cong struggle tocontrolthebureaucracywhenopposi (1994b), merit emerges asasecond-bestsolution authority (executive)whichisinthehandsofpartyB.Similarly, forJohnsonandLibecap groups whichsupportthem, willtrytoisolate one branchofauthority(e.g.legi In sum, PoliticalEconomy New mostly seesmeri The secondpredictionof NPEliteratureissi ress andthe Presidency). zed bureaucracies by meritocraticzed bureaucraciesby r mostpreferredpersonnelsystem: anautonomous andde- legislators willtrytomake bu r mechanismsuggests that,with tion from exerting itspolitical influence through patronage whatcouldbecalledrealtime orintra-temporal political slators ofmajority partyA),in may reducethechoiceofpatronageinfavourmerit sinceit on theories, Bendor, Glazer andHammond(2001: on theories,Bendor,Glazer 178 – or,asonemay callthem, intra-temporal and (Moe 1989:273-275).Inordertoprotectthe y labelinter-temporal –acrosstime periods– gh theenactment ofcivilservicearrangements. policies from rapidreversalsbyfuturehostile tion ofthis argument, seeMueller2007;fora e preferencesofinterest public bureaucracy from anotherbranchof ng branchesofauthority that reducesthecosts acy and replacingthemwith‘untouchable’ Similarly, severalauthorshave underlined milar tothefirstone;however,instead of which thisfragmentation ofauthorityleads t systems astheresult offragmentation reaucracy lessresponsiveto‘high- fragmented politicalauthority, ones.Tobeginwith,when ordertoprotecttheinterest groupsandlegislators associated withthe areinthehandsof re isthatthemore CEU eTD Collection Lapuente andNistotskaya(2009),follows. adaptation ofGibbons’game forexplainingtheim ruler andtheruledthatexplainchoiceof the organizational designofpublicbureaucracy.An developed byRobertGibbons(2001),graspssome insights ofVictorLapuente(2007 may influencecurrentbehavior,oftenleading 1990; Miller1992).Thecoreofthegame isthatth relationships betweenpoliticiansand citizens –iscapturedintheso-calledTrustGame (Kreps One of the main dilemmas of socialinteractions 5.2 AlternativeExplanat their bureaucracies produce. something thatallrulers,irrespectiveofhow thefocusofattentionfrom authoritarian settings.Itdoessobyshifting an NPE-basedmodel forexplainingmerit a not partoftheintellectualpuzzleNPEauthor democratic) incumbent? managing public bureaucracyinordertoprotectherpo difficult toconceiveindictator open negotiationbetweenlegislatorsandtheir the MeijiRestoration,BrazilofGetulioVargas high concentration ofpoweracrosstime andspace,su empirical setting seems verylimited. Many merit economic agentstake(e.g.more orlessinvestment This choiceisaheuristic device to captureth of merit within thecontextofAnglo-Saxondemo inter-temporal politicalfragmentation. Althoughth The firstactor,theEconomic Agent,must choos What determines designof theorganizational ion: Merit asa Functionof ships. Canwereasonablyimagine ) wecontendthattheTrustGame theycome topower,haveincommon: 179 constituencies assumed byNPEauthorsseems to undesirablesocialoutcomes. Followingthe s. Thischapteraddressesthisgapbyproposing doption whichcoversbothdemocraticand e myriad ofsubtleday-to-day decisions that or the Spain of Francisco Franco. The kind of ortheSpainofFranciscoFranco.Thekind reats andpromises concerningfuturebehavior systems havebeenadoptedunderregimes of inphysicalorhumancapital), whichmay be cracies, theirexplanator plementation ofmerit systems, developedby ese factorshavehelpedexplaintheadoption –withinorganizations publicbureaucraciesinnon-democracies is essentials intherelationshipsbetween ch asthe FranceofLouisXIV,theJapan e eithertoTrustor Ruler’sTimeHorizon licies from afuture (maybe a dictatortyingherhandsin , initsrepeatedform version input y poweroutsidethis Not TrusttheRuler. -side explanationsto as wellasinthe outputs that CEU eTD Collection rulers. 1281). Therefore,themodelissufficientlygenera people torevealtheirprivateinformation,workandsa from economic agents(Levi1988);“andtoobtain this issue(e.g.North1981).Dictators,evenifth subject toopportunistic defec private goods tocoreconstituencies). Thatis, advantage oftheirsituation (e.g.extractivetaxes, made (e.g.fairtaxes,respectofpropertyrights, they donottrust.Thisrepresentsatemptationfo If economic agentstrusttheirgovernments th Trust Administrations Game inPublic Figure 5.1TheTrust ECO (Merit are A>B>C. version ofthegame. The Economic Agent’sand Ruler’soutcome rankings Mistrus

means “devoting moreeffortsmeans “devoting totheproductionoftaxable goods”and

AGENT ) isthe equivalent of“Violate Trus t “devotinglesseffortsto theproduction of taxable goods”. tions byrulers.Institutional economists haveextensively studied Mistrust Trus t RULE R Patronage 180 provision of public goods) have incentives to take provisionofpublicgoods) haveincentivestotake in nodetwothe Rulerobtainsa higher payoff by Merit ey arepredatoryautocrat r rulerswho,despitethepromises theymay have expropriation ofproperties, l tocapturebothdemocratic andauthoritarian t” (“HonorTrust”)inMiller’s(1992) cooperation, theymust ey produceabiggertaxa Eco Agen Eco ve” (GandhiandPrzeworski2007: A C B t Patronage Rule A C B s, alsoneedcooperation r provide incentivesfor

ble basethanwhere deliveryoftargeted

CEU eTD Collection 3 result issymmetrical for bothactors, thisdilemma is term lossfrom punishment, againstthepresen strategy atsome point,shemust weightheshort-term gainfr meet againafterthecurr reflects notonlythe time-related preferences of theactors, but alsothe probability that they will “persistent tensionbetweentheow commitment problem byNorth–thatthroughout violating thanbyhonoringtrust.Th interest rate – breaks atanypoint,theythenpuni repeated versionofthegame. Thatis,actorsco for behavioralrealism), intheTrust Game actors several interactions.Therefore,similar toGibbons (2001:5),foranalyticalsimplicity (butalso (2007), amore accurate description ofrealitymust public goods provision(Johnsonand Libecap1994a, KeeferandVlaicu2008). administration isakeyelement ofasystem that Teorell 2008,Tonon2008).Atthe welfare (EvansandRauch1999,Miller2000, Nistotskaya2007,Rauch1995,Rothsteinand firstly, thatmeritocratic bureaucr argument isbasedonthegrowingbodyoftheore service andpatronagerepresentsanessential economic growth”(1981:25).Throughoutthisdissert fundamental dichotomy istherootcauseof his group)andanefficientsystem thatreduced would bebetteroffwiththesoci latter. TheresultwouldbeaPareto-suboptimal Na violation oftrustbyarulertempted totakeopportunistic starting tomorrow starting is$1/r Initssimplestinterpretation, this If theTrustGame wereaone-shotinteraction,theEconomic The outcomeofthesetriggerstrategies,as r , withwhichactorsdiscount ent time period.Ifoneofthetwoactors interest discount rate means that the

ally optimal outcome (Trust/Mer acy isacrucialcomponent ofa sh fortherestofgame. nership structurewhichmaximized us, thegame capturestheclassica same time, severalauthorsha 181 their payoffsacrossperiods. t valueofcontinued transaction costsandencouragedgrowth.This operate inthefirstperiodand,ifcooperation ‘maximizes therents totheruler’, butnotthe part ofthis‘fundament are assumed playing‘trigge sh Equilibrium (NoTrust),sincebothofthem Gibbons (2001:6)points thehistoryofhuma tical and empirical literature, whichclaims, failure ofsocietiestoexperiencesustained solved for the player Ruler –since this isthe alsotakeinto accountthe possibility of ation weholdthatthechoicebetweencivil ex post present value of $1received every period om defection,followedbythelong- wantstodeviatefrom thetrigger actions, wouldrefuse totrust the ve shown how patronage-based ve shownhowpatronage-based it). However,Lapuenteargues system thatencouragessocial Agent, anticipatingthelikely l formulationofthecredible cooperation. Althoughthe therentstoruler (and nkind there has been a nkind therehasbeena al dichotomy’. This 3 Theinterest rate out, dependsonthe r’ strategies inthe r

CEU eTD Collection 4 Continued cooperationwillthus give ahigherpr from cooperation,shemustevaluatetwo-time (Patronage), andCfrompunishment one subjectedtoempirical analys discount rateofaruler, empirical scrutiny could simply bewrittenas follows: ceteris paribus, thelower thefuture each economic agentwithinacountry, thetheore impossibility of finding aparticular threshold(value of short-term dominates overlong-term calculus, of usingpatronagenowandwillopt then thelong-term considerationdominates, and r A +1/ bureaucracies, but the lack of appropriate data prevented us Further research should address the impact of the other half of the equation – (B-C/A-B) – over meritocratic <(B-C)/(AB).When Ruler’sfuturediscount rate r C. That is,RulerwillchooseMeritifherfuture

the higherprobability sheenforcesamerit system.

is. RulerobtainsBfrom coopera formerit. If, onthecontrary, (NoTrust)–whereA>BC.IfRuleraims atdeviating 182 esent valuepayoffthandefectionifB+1/ she willprefer toforgo theshort-run temptation from analysing that within the scope the within scope this that of project. from analysing paths of payoffs (A,C,C…versus B,B,B…). paths ofpayoffs(A,C,C…versusB,B,B…). Rulerwillprefer patronage. Giventhe discountrateisbelowagiventhreshold: tical hypothesis that wesubject tofurther r ) foreachinteraction between arulerand r issufficientlylow(e.g.closetozero), tion (Merit),Afrom defection r >(B-C)/(AB),andthus 4

r B> CEU eTD Collection of theformal legislationhasvari largely de-politicized bureaucrac subsequent legislationeliminated theformer 5 and historicalterms. AfocusontheRussianprovin political andsocio-economic conditions,butwhich theories ingeneralandfuturediscountrate Russia’s bureaucraticreform ofthe1990srepresen 5.3.1 Data 5.3 DeterminantsofMerit A agents andrulers,betheyde unique settingfortestingourtheoretical model, whichstresses non-elected regionalchiefexecutivesandourdata-set the same time, asinitspost-Soviet historyRu a regionhashadduringtheperiod the periodunder study).Forthisreason,wehaveto period understudy,although of thedatasetallowsustoconf organizational designofregiona was ‘theonlygame intown’,andthemi differences reflectthe‘distanc merit intheAmerican statesandcitiesinanewsub-nationalcontext.Last butnotleast,these explanatory powerofthe socio-economic andpoliticaldatafortheRussi quantitative analysisofsub-nati governors from February 2005. Putin President in March 1996. were reinstated governors unauthorized regional elections in the Tyva Republic and the Sverdlovsk Oblast. Democratic contests for all during that period Yeltsin authorized elections in more moratorium aone-year Yeltsin’s for president request wh Russian regions held elections. This process wasinterrupted in November 1991 when the Supreme Council honoured It is important to remark here that that the elections of regional chief executives formally began in 1991, when 11 These differenceswereobservedamongsubjects factors identifiedby mocratically elected ornot.

we cannotattributetheadoptionof e traveled’bytheregionsbetw doption inRussia’s Regions onal variationinmerit adoptionout l bureaucracieswasdocumented. Th ed acrossthe Russianprovinces. idently locatetheadopt y. Infact,asour survey-based under study(andnotonlythecurrent than a quarter of regions and there were alsotwo avastliteratureasres nomenklatura 183 hypothesis inparticular ssia experienced alternationbetweenelectedand ich was extended until the beginning of 1996. Nevertheless, Nevertheless, 1996. of beginning the until was extended ich d-2000s, whenaremarkable variationinthe reversed this process by effectively appointing most an provincesmade it ces allows ustoundertak ts auniquesettingfortestingmerit adoption account forthediscount ratesofalltherulers still shareacommon b includesbothtypesof 5 which exhibitanotable

ion ofcivilservice /patronage system andestablisheda een themid-1990s, whenpatronage theexchangebetweeneconomic data showed, the implementation merit toacertainruler(within side U.S.Theavailabilityof is usefulpaneldataproperty ponsible fortheadoptionof ruler’sdiscount rate). At . Formally, FZ-119and possible toprobethe ackground incultural e thefirstsystematic rulers,itprovidesa within thetenyear variationintheir CEU eTD Collection by virtueofelectio i.e. hadlongertime horizons,andthosewhoacqui started being implemented) had survived presidential appointment andelections or twoelections, order tomore accurately differentiatebetw number ofgovernorsin1991–f had intheperiod from 1991until2006 (Table1in theendofthischapter). We startcountingthe governor, isamore suitableproxyforrulers’tim For thesereasons,wearguethatfocusingonthe cases the formal maintenance ofthesame party changes ofthepartyingovernment allegiance frequently orposition themselves asi Solnik 1998).Russianpoliticians, characterized byweakpart party tenure,insteadofthatthegovernors.However,in average conditionsforrulers’time horizonsin governors aregionhashadduringtheperiodunderstudycanbeunderstoodasmeasure ofthe leads totheshortertimehorizonsofpower-holders,asargued possessed, suchpowersarerarelyexercised’(2001: legislative powers ‘such as participation incab administration. AsGrigoryGolosovnotes,onlyafewoftheregionallegislationshavenon- the governor,notregionalassembly,whois time horizons ofregional chief executives because, new (Clague simply, thatwhichhassurvivedforalongtime ise concept of‘tenureinoffice’–similar tootherpo 6 longevity ofthetime horizonsofgovernorswith 1996. 1996. Surikov of Altaj kraj or Alexander Chernogorov of Stavropol who both won elections for the first time in the end of Mintimer Shaimiev of Tatarstan, who won election in both 1991 and 1996, had longer time horizons than Alexander who were appointed by PresidentBori Forexample, by1996Mikhail PrusakVictor Kr ofNovgorod, Regarding measurements forru The variable et al 1996:249).We narrowouranalysisofth ns orappointment). Number ofGovernors reflectsthenumber ofchiefexecutives aregion has y institutionalisation andhi

s Yeltsin in 1991 andin 1991 wongubernats Yeltsin our years before the adoption of FZ-119 in 1995. We do so in yearsbeforetheadoptionofFZ-119 in1995.Wedoso our couldhidethepersistenceof including governors,donothe lers’ futurediscountrateor 6 Thisapproach,aboveall,allowsustocapture the een thosegovernors whoby1996(thetime FZ-119 184 a region.Alternatively,we ndependents. Inother words, whilesome formal e horizonsinthecaseofRussianregions. a continuousperiodinoffice,e.g.thosewhoby could imply atotalrenewaloftherulingelite. inet formation andcabinetdismissal; even if litical economists’ approachestothe issue.Put replacement ofthechie responsible for the organization of a regional responsible fortheorganizationofaregional red gubernatorialofficeforthefirsttime (beit xpected tobemore likelytolastthanwhatis according toRussianregional charters,itis ess of Novosibirsk and Leonid Polezaev of Omsk, 48).Giventhatfrequentrotationinpower gh personalization(Gehlbach orial electionsin December 1995or e ruler’sfuturediscountratebythe above,thenumber ofdifferent thesame rulinggroupinother Russianregions,politicsis time horizons, weusethe sitate tochangetheirparty f executiveofficer,the couldhavereliedon et al 2007, CEU eTD Collection 7 literature controlling forthreedifferentgr as entire period.Table5.2exploresmore deeply present lowerlevelsof relevant negative relationship:thoseregions for Figure 2plotsthecorrelationbetween explaining 5.3.2 Findings merit adoption. as from sources(Table other 5.1). The datacome fromROSSTAT,Russia’sFederal number of controlvariables, associated withdifferent strands of theliterature onmerit adoption. as aresultofourexpert-based 1996 wereservingtheirsecondconsecutiveterm. democratic politicsor not. not showanysignificantimpact. Itdoesnotseem tomatter ifdecision-making isbasedon more meritocracy inthose regionswith higher le regions alongademocracy-autocracy scale.Acco variable either appointedbythePresident thatsomeall, wecontrolforthefact regional this analysis. analysis. this and extensive explanation. Given the constraints of the dissertation format we opted not to include such avariable in However, capturing the diversity of regional circumstances in one variable requires case-by-case between difference alsoforthe inofficebut longevity We recognize the limitations of this approach, as ideally we should have controlled not only for the governors’ governors’ for the not only have controlled weshould asideally approach, this of limitations the recognize We Model onecontrolsforpolitical Level of Democracy of Level meritocracy than those regions ruled by few or one single governor for the meritocracy thanthoseregionsruledbyfeworonesinglegovernorforthe captures the relative distribution of thepolitical climate inRussia’s

survey,isemployed asthedepe oups ofexplanatoryfactors,traditionallyconsideredbythe or throughelectionsthatfailto inwhichtherehasbeenmore Meritocracy factors: theavailable proxies elected and appointed governors throughout the period. governors might not be electorally accountable, but governors might notbeelectorallyaccountable,but 185 vels of democracy, but,again,thisvariabledoes vels ofdemocracy, 7 The rding toNPEexplanations,weshouldexpect andNumberofGovernors therelationshipbetweenthesevariables, State StatisticsService(2006a,2007)aswell Meritocratic Recruitment Index ndent variable.Wealsousea rotationofgovernorsseem to be fairandcompetitive. The for theNPE factors.Firstof . Onecanobservea ad hoc ad decisions , obtained Employees The dataforUnemployment 1995, UrbanPopulation 1995 Russia’s Statistics Office(R census by post-secondary that finished high schoolandreceivedatleastsome Higher Education Independent Institute ofElections, availableonlineat online at for whichwehavefulldatathetwo main contests.Toensureequaltreatme missing dataforsomeelectoral nominations. asystemofpresidential Mostregionsheld chosen by communist period.Russiangubernatorial electionswereheldfro Electoral Competition online at end of2005. It isbasedon the resultsa Level ofDemocracy and August 2006. provinces,gatheredbetweenMay Russia’s Index Meritocratic Recruitment Independent Institute ofElections, availableonlineat at fromAugust 1995(time oftheCivilServiceActadoption)until2006.The data come from Number ofGovernors1991-2006 http://www.politika.su/vybory/rre91t.html http://www.politika.su/vybory/rre91t.html http://www.freepress.ru/publish/publish043.shtml 2005 come fromROSSTAT (2006b,2007)

is theshare of thepopulation fifteen oldand years higher asof1994 isacomposite indexofeight indicators oftheleveldemo

CEU eTD Collection betweenthewinnerand runne difference measures theaverage ispartofadatasetbuiltoncomparable experteval and ussia’s StateCommitteeon Statistics1995). ussia’s 1995-2006 hashadin reflects ofchiefexecutivesaregion thenumber periodfrom 1991oralternatively nd expertsevaluationsofall federal and Table 5.1DescriptionoftheVariablesusedin theAnalysis , Inter-Regional Electoral Network of Assistance, availableonlineat ElectoralNetworkofAssistance, , Inter-Regional candidates andtheirresults.Thedatacome from , Inter-Regional Electoral Network of Assistance, available onlineat ofAssistance,available , Inter-RegionalElectoralNetwork http://www.vibori.ru/elects/lead_r_2000.html http://www.vibori.ru/elects/lead_r_2000.html . . , Non-Russian Population2002 m June1991 through to February 2005, since thenregional execut nt for each region, we calculate the average of thefirsttwo theaverage for eachregion,wecalculate nt two electionsduring theperiod whileothers heldfour oreve training.This variablewascollectedin the1994Russianh regional electioncampaigns inRussiaduring 1995-2005. Available cracy, published areputable by think-tankcracy, Public Expertise inth uations of meritthe institutionalizationofreal in40of r-up in the gubernatorial electionsheldinthepost- Politika , Population of theRegion Politika . . : Electronic Periodic Resource, available online : ElectronicPeriodic Resource, available : Electronic Periodic Resource, available : ElectronicPeriodicResource,available http://db.irena.org.ru 1995 http://db.irena.org.ru elections in the region , NumberofPublic ousehold micro- n five. There are ives havebeen , and , and e CEU eTD Collection 8 margins of70–orevensometimes of95–percentthevotes. the existence ofamore organizedopposition thaninthose regionswhere the winner leadsby those regionswithsingle-digitdifferencesbetw degree ofpoliticalfragmentation in during theperiodunderstudy, facto variable seeTable1).Thereare in thegubernatorial elections held inthepost Lambert-Mogiliansky regional legislatures’ (2001: 719). On regional chief executive exerting influence over the regional judiciary see Hyde notices that many ofRussia’s regions are“dominat Figure 5.2NumberofGovernorsineach absenceofsignificantpolitic Electoral Competition et.al (2007). (2007). measures theaverage differencebetweenthewinnerandrunner-up

8

Electoral Competition two main reasonstoincludeth al constraints ontheexecutives apolity(forthedescriptionof 187 Russian Regionsince1991and Meritocracy een the winner and the runner-up we may assume een thewinnerandrunner-upwemayassume ed by their governors or presidents, who marginalize the the marginalize or who presidents, governors their by ed -communist period(for is a

measurement, whichcapturesthe is variable.First,giventhe ataregional level in Russia the variable see Table1). In the descriptionof

de de CEU eTD Collection *Significant at Note : Standard errors in parentheses. N R Constant Employees Number ofPublic Population Region Population % Non-Russian % Urban Population % Higher Education Unemployment 1995 Electoral Competition Level of Democracy Level ofDemocracy Number ofGovernors Independent Variables Square p < 0.1, ** at Table 5.2Determinantsof p < 0.05, *** at *** <0.05, Political Factors 31.314*** -4.076*** Model 1 (9.744) (0.107) (1.825) (1.395) 1.2572 -0.035 0.193 0.459 0.472 40

-0.289** -0.356** 1.346 -1.663**

p < 0.01. : 188 Merit inRussianRegions Patronage Demand Political Factors+ 67.135*** -4.465*** Model 2: (20.981) Factors (0.136) (0.200) (1.110) (0.703) (0.099) (1.815) (1.288) -0.068 0.366

Patronage Demand Political Factors+ Organizational 67.129*** -4.283*** Factors + Model 3: -1.637** (22.101) -0.367* Factors (0.001) (0.002) (0.171) (0.210) (1.257) (0.778) (1.882) (0.106) (1.341) -0.001 -0.245 -0.047 0.002 1.014 0.560

CEU eTD Collection Modeltwointroducesagroupoffactorsusedtoexplaindiffe sub-national levelforU.S.–mostly is farfrom beingsignificant. U.S. literature –themore differencebetween One cansee inTable 2 thatthecoefficient of more proneshewillbe toinsulate her policies from possibleinterferences bythefuture winner. and Camoes 2003:34).Themore likelyitisthat in thegubernatorialraces,recognizedbenefi reason toabandon patronage while“ time (JohnsonandLibecap1994b).Thear within-country differencesinmerit forU.S.: 9 unemployment (orothermeasur ‘patronage demand’: onedirect intractability: onecanalwaysfi difficult tofulfill(Ruhil2003:161). Themain pr allowed politicianstoshirkpatronagedemands argument ofthisliteratureisthatmerit becam from theeducated middle classes(Tolbertan Anotherrelevantvariable,identified bytheU.S. patronage mostlybenefitedlow-ed people, themoregovernorschoos for theyear1995exertsanegativeandsignifi Russia’s regions, itseems thattheformer (o the lattereffecthasbeenfoundtobesignifica and selection involvestoohighcostsforpoliticians negative effectinaneraofdwindlingspoilswhenrulershave for patronage. Thiscouldhaveapositive effect onthelevel of patronage (direct impact)ora number of business creations. accurate proxy given that a high number of business failu RuhilandCamoes (2003)use Secondly, electoralcompetition onitsownhas Business Failures

nd twoopposingeffectsonmerit of es ofastrugglingeconomy) e patronageovermerit. ucated job-seekers, and anotherindirect. Inthefi politicians whofacedstiffelectoral competition, particularly forthefirstdecadesof20 instead. We contend that the level of unemployment isamore level of unemployment thatthe We contend instead. gument isthatpoliti r directeffect)isat Electoral Competition across states(RuhilandCamoes 2003)oracross- winner andrunner-up, the lessmerit – but againit 189 d Zucker1983:31).We introduce the variable, res could be compensated in dynamic regions with ahigh when such demands were becomingwhen suchdemands increasingly were ts ofblanketingpublic-s nt (RuhilandCamoes 2003).Inthecontextof e afeasiblealternative topatronage becauseit cant impact onmerit. Themore unemployed anincumbent may losethe next election,the (indirect impact). ForthecaseofU.S.states, supporters ofmerit reform tendedtocome oblem ofthisapproach isitsempirical been foundtoberelevantforexplaining literature, isthelevelofeducation.While literature, 9 cians inone-party may engenderincreaseddemands work:thevariable too many applicantsperposition hasthesignpredictedby rst place,higher levels of thevariablesthatcompose rences inmerit adoptionat ector employees” (Ruhil th century.Thegeneral settings see little settings seelittle Unemployment

CEU eTD Collection early 20 entities. Theproxymost extensivelyusedfortheex enjoying theirprivileged accesstotargetedprivat ethnic-cultural groups.Theytake national differencesinpatronage opposite tothepostulatedbydominant theories. each Russianregionisasignificantpredictorofthemerit adoption, thesignofcorrelationis meritocracy). Although theanalysisshowedthatth development ofpatronage-hungryvestedinterests Thepercentageof important bytheliterature.Bigcities,on model twoshows,itseffect isstatistically insignificant. which measures percentageofpeoplewith Number ofEmployeestheregionaladministration nor the However, forRussianregions, th strong correlationbetweenthe becomes graduallymore costlytoincumbents to organizations enlarge,Johnson andLibecap(1994b) administrations. Buildingontheorganizationaleconom economics thathavealsohelpedexplainthehistoricalspreadofmerit acrossU.S. we controlfor organizationalvariablesinmodel three. effect ofNon-RussianPopulation diminishes sli of the‘directeffect’explanation(moreNon-Russian Population,lessMerit).Nevertheless,the exerts asignificantnegativeimpact –although for theexistence ofethnic-based patronageconst The percentageof threat totheregional/stategove meritocracy) and,ontheotherhand,bigcitiesar Finally, oneofthemost pervasivearguments The aim of model three is to introduce tw th -century U.S.isthepercentageofcertain Non-Russian Populationwithinaprovinceisoneof Urban Populationwithinagivensettinghas number ofemployees ofanad is organizationalhypothesis doesnot isthatrent-seekingnetworks advantageofsocietalcollec rnments (which couldhavean HigherEducation 190 ghtly –becoming statistica only at10%level–inmodel twoalongthelines effectively control their appointees. They find a effectivelycontroltheirappointees.Theyfinda ituencies inRussia’sregi e goodssuch aspatronagejobsinsub-national e hand,representappropria e counter-balancing forcesandmay impose a (which couldhaveadi foreign populations(mostlyIrishandItalian). e percentageofcitizenswholiveincities istence ofthese‘patronageconstituencies’in arguethat, aspublic bureaucraciesgrow,it o explanatoryfactors withinthe demand-side literature onsub- ics notionthatthereisalossofcontrolas intheregionforyear1995.As Population oftheRegion tive actionproblem prosperamongcertaincohesive ministration andmerit adoption. indirect positiveimpact on seem towork.Neitherthe thefewavailableproxies also been considered as also beenconsidered rect negativeimpact on ons. Onecanseethatit lly insignificant – once lly insignificant–once from organizational te settingsforthe s tocontinue (usedin CEU eTD Collection politics’ and,therefore,it ‘isnotde argue, isrulers’ politicalcalculus. AsTerry analyzing (almost exclusively)merit reforms inAnglo-Saxondemocracies. What matters, they delivery. During thelastdecades,NPEscholars it Weber’s famousformulation, administrative comparativists haveexplainedmer determinants of theemergence of de-politici key independentvariablestaysc variables seen as relevant in the literature. Ev Number ofGovernors is that tenure inoffice seems tobethesingle mostconsistentdeterminant of realmeritocracy. any significanteffect other U.S.analysesasaproxyfortheorganizati administrations asakeyelement. government aremost likelytogenerateeconomic A largenumberofscholarshavetackledthe‘big 5.4 Conclusion not includeproxiesforrulers’time horizons. underlying assumption ofmerit reform asaby-p systematically controlled forallthese factors. different culturalsettings–couldsimply be alternative reason–takingintoaccount thatthe a or cultural divergences between tw to workfortheRussianregions. the political organizational In sum, twofindingshaveemerged from theanal factors,underlinedbycomparativ factors,highlightedbyresearchonUSsub-nationaldifferences –donotseem onmeritocracy. remains strongly significantirresp onsistent. Asecondaryfindingisth One explanation for thesedivergent results couldlieinnational s ‘technicalsuperior o settingssoseparatedgeogra signed tobeeffective’(Moe 1989:267).

An important partofthisin e NPEauthors,aswellthe en asagrowingnumber of 191 Moe openlyremarks, bureaucracy ‘arisesoutof zed bureaucracies. Traditionally, historiansand onal complexity ofagivenbureaucracy)exhibits Mostparticularly,andprobablyduetotheir that studies focused on the U.S. have not thatstudiesfocusedontheU.S.havenot question’ ofpoliticaleconomy: “Whattypesof it systems bytheirhigherefficiency–or,using bove cross-countryanalysesalsoincluded very roduct ofdemocratic fo development”?, pointingtowardsmeritocratic development”?, have rejectedefficiency arguments after ity’ (1978:973),–forpublicservices ysis of Russia’s regions. Themain result ective oftheincl phically andchr tellectual puzzleconcerns the at theselatter controls are added, our controlsareadded,our patronage demandand rces, NPEanalysesdo

usion ofseveral onologically. An variables –the CEU eTD Collection system, buttheinteractions inthe of voters,legislatorsandexecutives–thatis,thedynamics oftheinput long rulersareinoffice factors donotseem tobe merit reforms. However,unlikeprevious NPEstudies,weshowedthat other hand,akintoNPEapproaches developmentalist autocraciesin descriptive accounts(many be asufficientcauseformerit adoption, itseems tobeanecessaryonewhennumerous to historiansandunlikeNPEscholars,weconten scholars attheoreticalandempiri between youngandold democracies –i.e.youngerdemocracies delivermore targetedpolicies, unconsolidated democracy. AsPhilipKeefer(2007) power –cannotbeinferred from whic aresearch, on theadvantagesofhavinglong-term rulers vis-à-visdemocratic authoritarian rotationsin instead oftheshort-term firstpreferenceofpatronage. investment climate, givingthem anincentive to them, wearguethatlonger-liv emphasizing theadvantages of politi well astheoretical(Besleya political uncertainty.Nevertheless, our by NPEscholarsonmerit adoption:thatitistheresult accounts, we relyonquantitative instead ofqualitative analysis. approaches, welookatrealmerit insteadof authority (Rothstein andTeorell2008:169-170). end ofthe19 have tendedtotakeplaceinemerging market cap underline theexistenceofwidesp Here wehaveprovided evidence that, tosay This chapter attempted tobridgethisgap Finally, itis important toremark onwhat th century, Japan’s MeijiRestoration, Ea . Therelevantinteractions herear how rulerscometopower of whicharefrom developingand/ nd Persson2007)developments wh countries in the 1990s. On the the 1950-60sorEasternEuropeancountriesin1990s.On cal levelsand,perhaps,tomove ed rulersreapthe read socialpreferencesforme output cal stabilityoverthenature anddynamic of politics.Similar , wecontendthatanexplicit findings engagewithempirical (Clague side of thepolitical system –intheexercise of public formal merit; and,likeNPE andunlikehistorical 192 to chooseasecond-bestoptionlikemeritocracy d that,althoughtheefficiencyargument may not italist economies, likeBritain andthe USatthe h hasfocusedonwithin-country analysesofan we arenotarguing.Normative implications – Empirically, likehistoricalandunlikeNPE the least, contradicts mainstream predictions between administrative historiansandNPE showsinhiscomparison oftheperformance long-term economic gainsofanattractive or how policydecisions e notthoseamongcoreconstituencies ofeitherfragmentation ofpoweror stern AsianandSouthernEuropean or non-democratic environments) thediscussionforward.Similar rit. Inaddition,meritreforms political calcul ich havebeenincreasingly sideofthepolitical the relevantpolitical aretaken,but et al et us liesbehind 1996)as how CEU eTD Collection the spoils. they acquire suchdemocratic mechanisms, tothe proto-democratic settingsofRussia’sregionsma autocrats. Yetpartyreputations (e.g. respecting meritocratic rules)can take time tobuild,and lengthen theshadowoffutureforrulers, less publicgoods,andaremore corrupt–democraci 193 which may bemore effectivethan long-tenured

y have been incapable so far of doing so. Until y havebeenincapablesofarofdoingso.Until short-sighted victors willprobably stillbelong es havemechanisms (e.g.partyreputation)to CEU eTD Collection impossibilities’ (2000:290)intheorganization of the state.Inordertoachieveefficientsocial actions thataredestructive tosocial welfare isconstant anddueto‘certain logical Eswarm andKotwal’s(1984)research,Millerfi nds thatthepropensityofpoliticians totake and advocatescivilserviceasacorrectivetosuch.DrawingonHolmstrom (1982)and theoretical approach,Mi length, weadoptedGary cohesion andpurposefulnessofa social welfare.ForEvansandRauch efficien Rauch (1999).Thisadvocatesmerit-based and politicized side of thedebate there is the‘W seems tobeinadequate for the the alignment ofbureaucraticpreferences with North 1981,andWeingast1989),then empirical 1984, levels(MillerandHammond opportunism isadangertosocialwelfare,as this perspective is that itassumes awaythe politicians (seeWeingast 1984).Followingtheliterature,weshowedthatmain problem of creation ofincentive systems thatwouldalign bureaucracy, arguesthatthefundamental problem The principal-agency perspective, thatimp contributions tothedebate –principal-agent th Weber’s searchforthe‘ideal politicized or de-politicized administration scholarship–thedebateregardin both theoreticallyandem making ameaningful cont personnel policydecisionsinfavorofamore members ofasociety’?and‘Why attime bureaucracy ismost likelytobewelfare-enhanc This thesis hasexplored twoclassical puzzles in The studybeganwithanoverviewoftheliter Having discussedthelimitations ofbothPATandthe‘Weberianness’ explanationsin Miller’stheoryofin ller exposesthethreattosocial pirically inthecontextofregiona ribution to theliterature, weinvestigated these research questions bureaucracy tosocialwelfare, which goesbackasfarMax achievement socially ofstable beneficialoutcomes. Onthede- type’ ofbureaucracy.Inpartic de-politicized bureaucracy. CONCLUSION eberian state’argument 194 s dopoliticiansrenounce teractive socialproducti eory (PAT)andthe‘Weberian state’argument. licitly advocatesagrea problem ofpoliticalopp long-serving bureaucracyas cy gainscome from increased competence, autonomous With bureaucracy’? aviewto g theimportance ofthecontributioneither thoseofpoliticians,asadvocatedbyPAT, the preferencesofbureaucratswiththose ing i.e.enablessustainable prosperity forall hasbeenarguedatboththeoreticaland the field of political science ‘What type of ature ontheclassicalcontroversyofpublic withachievingsocialwelfareisinthe welfare ofpoliticians’ moral hazard l governanceinpost-SovietRussia. ular, itdiscussedtworecent revitalized byEvans and on (2000).Inhisformal ortunism. Ifpolitical ter politicizationof their authorityover thekeytogreater CEU eTD Collection obstacles forindividualactors tocontrolthe collective character.As then making authority,asMeyer-Sahling explains,but differentiation notonlybetweenthepolitical and administrative natureofthedecision- has enhancedMeyer-Sahling’stypologyofth procedural constraintsuponits administrative natureofthedecision-making au powers formally wieldedbypoliticians differentiating betwee Sahling (2003,2006).Thisenablesustosyst utilizing theanalytical framework of formal authority that politicians exercised inreality (realmerit). Thefirsttaskwasachievedby relevant legislationassigned politicized nature.Thisinvolvedconsidering exercise itwasfirstnecessarytomake sure regard to the nature of Russi literature on Russia’sbureaucracy islimited, relevant empiricalmilieu inwhichtomake properties ofade-politicizedbureaucracy, the politicians’moral hazard. make andbreakbureaucraticcareers,making bureaucratic decision-making lesssusceptible to welfare-enhancing mechanism ofcivilserviceas argues thatthepubliccharacte the overlooked‘politicselimina day-to-day oversight,thereforedisablingtheirmora bureaucrats less‘attuned’tothe appointment system, promo seniority-based argued thattheopenness and de-personaliza the capacityofindividualelem solution. Thecontributionofthisdissertationto over personneldecisions.Miller,however,prov day-to-day oversightofthebureaucraticprocessbylimiting th act ontheir particularistic motives. Onewaytodo soistokeeppoliticians awayfrom the order, hisargument goeson,power This thesisalsosoughttoofferempiri an publicbureaucracy,priortoengagingwithth eed togetinvolvedin collectiv to politicians(formal merit) ents ofcivilserviceincontai exercise inmajor personnelpo r of theadmission is an impor powerholders’ preferencesand ting’ properties of thecivil holders must becrediblyconstrainedfrom opportunitiesto process fully(Falachetti political discretion devisedbyJan-HinrikMeyer- 195 both theamount ofpersonne that Russia’s bureaucracywasindeedofade- and post-SovietRussiaseemed toprovidea tion andlife-longcare e decision-making authoritybysuggestinga tion oftheadmission process,merit-based impressionistic andofte appropriate tests.However,asthe existing thority and by evaluating the strength of the thority andbyevaluatingthestrengthof ematically evaluatetheamount ofstaffing thetheoreticaldebate cal verificationofthewelfare-enhancing ides onlyabroadconcep it diminishes the politicians’ capability to l hazard.Ithaspaidparticularattentionto alsobetween itspotentialunitary and ning political opportunism. It has ning politicalopportunism.Ithas andtheamount ofpersonnel licy domains. Thisdissertation e actioncreatesconsiderable service’s admission stage.It also lessresponsivetotheir e amount oftheirauthority tant element ofthewhole and Miller2001,Meyer- hasbeeninshowing n thepoliticaland n contradictory with with n contradictory er prospectsmake l authority that the l authoritythatthe tualization of this is empirical CEU eTD Collection analysis showed that,controlling forfactorsiden proposition aboutthewelfare-enhancing roleof revealed byfieldresearch, en dissertation makes contributiontothecomparative animportant bureaucracy scholarship. provinces ofRussia.Giventhatth expert assessments revealedasystematic countries was obtained.Exhibiti systematic measurement oftheorganizationalde their expertiseinregion studies inRussia,weoptedfo documenting theorganizationalstructuresofpub in practicealargesampleofRussia’sregi addition tothis,this thesis investigated how established bytwomajor civil dismissals –wewereabletocategorize the process –admissions, initialappointment and uponitsexerciseacrossfourdomainsof theproceduralconstraints of personnelpolicy useful contributiontotheliterature. politicization ofthepublicbureaucracy unde By enabling publicbureaucracy scholars to determ Taken togetherthesetwomeasures haveimpr that admission andappointment constitute twodistinctive phasesofthe personnelprocess. classification ofthepersonnelpolicydomains to determine theoutcomesofpersonneldecisions.Furthermore, wehaverefinedthe authority allowsusto more accurately capture Sahling 2006:697),thedifferen empirical measurement oftheorganizationalst legal framework governingpolitico-administrativ providing thefirstcomprehensive, systematic andtheory-informedanal Russia’s regionalbureaucracy isawelcome c and Hechter1991:10,Lapuente2007:301),anewda in thedevelopment ofcomparative publicad The variation intheextent of the institu By systematically assessing the nature of al bureaucracymatters tookpart.Asa r anexpert-basedsurveyin abled aproductiveempirical te service actsof1995and2004,as tiation between,say,politicaluni ng asatisfactoryde e availabilityandreliabilityof ons. Havingconsideredme 196 difference inpersonnel those formal-legal provisions wereimplemented r study, this improved framework constitutes a oved theanalytical preci ministration research(Brans2003:426,Kiser the decision-making author tionalization of ade-politicized bureaucracy, nature of Russia’s personnelpolicyregime,nature ofRussia’s promotion/demotion/horizontal transfersand ade-politicizedbureaucracy. Ourstatistical ructure ofRussia’spub sign ofpublicbureaucracyinthepost-Soviet tified bythe relevant literature, theextent of incorporate theidea,di lic bureaucracies, including earlyrealmerit ontribution totheliterature. Overall, by theextent ofthepoliticians’abilityto e relationsinpostSoviet Russiaandthe ine withgreateraccuracy the extentofde- gree ofinternala ta setontheorganizationalstructureof which 126individualsknownfor result ofthisex data isindeed‘asorepoint’ st ofthemain theoretical tary andpolitic largely de-politicized.In policy practiceacross sion oftheframework. thodological issuesin nd externalvalidity, scussed inchapter1, lic bureaucracy,this ysis oftheformal- ity and thestrength ercise thefirst al collective al collective CEU eTD Collection of bureaucracy.However, giventhattheem whose positiveeffecton socialwelfare isfairly suggest thatthenotions ‘goodgovernance’,‘sta contributions thatthisdissertationhasmade. properties ofde-politicizedbureaucracies,and the first empiricalverification Soviet Russia further illuminate the workingof Miller’s causal mechanism. Thisconstitutes the entrepreneur,herfamily andhercommunity. Twocases-studies fromthecontextofpost- rules of the game totheadvantageof politicians costly investments willnot disappear overnight as entrepreneurs, especially thosewithout connec de-politicization ofbureaucracy. has beenfoundbetweentheincrea perception ofpowerholders’commitment notto politicized bureaucracy tosocialwelfareremained. economic growth.However,thetaskofshe therefore itisplausible toassume bothcausalmechanisms that areatworkinthecaseof theoretical pointofviewboth providing economic agentswiththeconfiden because itcredibly commits powerholdersto and Rauch’smechanism ofamorecompetent, achieved. Itisnotclearwhetherde-politic conclusive withregardtothecausalmechanism throughwhichgreatersocialwelfare is growth andthefirstempirical studyin empirical studiesontherelationshipbetween research (Evans andRauch 1999,Rauch1995).Furthermore,thisisoneofonlyafew endogeneity problem andproducemore convincin employing thetwo-least-squaredregressionanal politicization isrobusttodifferentmodelingc economic performance observedacrossRussia’sre de-politicization ofbureaucracy At thesame time, the findingsfromtheec The findingsofthisdissertationhaveimporta Having employedthesmall businessgrowth of Miller’stheoreticalexplan mechanisms complement, rather accounts forthestriking This suggeststhatde-politiciz sed ratesofsmall businessform thecontext oftransition society. ization enhanceseconomic growththroughEvans 197 dding lightonthecontri hoices andstatisticalte ade-politicizedbureaucracyandeconomic undisputedtoday,equate tode-politicization tions tothecurrentpowerholders,thattheir pirical evidence onth confiscate, apositiveandrobustassociation and theirassociates butwillreap benefits to ce tomake costlyinvestments. From a this isperhaps themost important of all te capacity’,and‘qual cohesiveandpurposefulbureaucracyor onomic growthmodelswerenotperfectly aresultof politicians’ manipulation of the the legislativeintent ysis we wereable tocontrol for the gions. The effectofourmeasure ofde- nt policyimplications in sofar as they variable asaproxy g resultswhencomp variationinthele ation ofthewelfare-enhancing ation raisesth than contradict eachother, ation andgreaterextentof chniques. Moreover,by bution ofMiller’sde- ofpublicpolicies, e welfare-enhancing ity ofbureaucracy’, for entrepreneurs’ ared toprevious vels ofaggregate e confidenceof CEU eTD Collection policy-making communities. Asthevalidity ofthedataisanother critical issueof dearth ofthe datathat thescholarship faces Although thisresearch pr availability andreliabilityofthedataon need istosortout the ‘sorepoint’ of th the roleofbureaucracyinenhancing socialwelf represents onlyaninitiale ‘rediscovery bureaucracy’age literature onmerit adoption. of civilservice,thesefindingsrepresentboth bureaucracy. Bychallengingconventionalwisdom that rulers’discountrateisthemost powerfulpredictorof bureaucracy asdependentvariab subjected this theory to empirical test,usingtheobtainedmeasure ofde-politicization time asaffectedbythelikelyr the ruler’sdiscountrateortime whic horizons, their authorityoverbureaucratic theoretical explanationastounde analytical toolsfrom game th New PoliticalEconomy’s account of merit adoption limitations of thedominant theoretical explanations, namely thelimited applicability of the Having conductedanoverviewofthelitera regions openedupanadditional line ofinquiryin has notbeenaddressedfully todate. for theacademic communityin‘building the necessarydatainfrastructure’ (1999: 761)that should givefullconsideration the impact ofdifferent typesofbureaucracyon organizational structureofstatebureaucracies thatwould enableasystematic assessment of bureaucracy. Instead,thisdissertationargues donors toimprovethe‘qualityofgovernance’shouldbefocusedonde-politicization seems tobeinsufficient groundsfortheclaim th properties of ade-politicizedbureaucracy isessentially limitedtoahandful ofstudies,there Although thisthesiscangenuine The documentedvariationin oject demonstratedthat individua nquiry andseveralavenuesopen to thenow10-yearoldappeal nda (Olson2005)thathasbeen eory, weofferedanalternative–formal andparsimonious – eaction ofeconomic agentstoth personnel decisions.Centraltoth le. Controllingforfactorsfr r what conditionsself-interested de-facto ly claim tohavemade impor e comparative bureaucracy scholarship, i.e.the organizational structure 198 requires acoordinatedeffortbyacademic and de-politicizationofbureaucracyinRussia’s social welfareisneed theoretical and empirical contributions tothe ture onmerit adoption, weidentified the at theeffortofgovern are. Inmore general terms, themost pressing h reflectstheruler’sstrategicthinkingover thatmore andbetter evidence on the to thereasons fortheadoptionofrealmerit. about thefactorsthatleadtoadoption outside stabledemocracies. Utilizingthe byEvansandRauchforsupport to improve ourunderstandingof the levelofde- l endeavorcanbefruitful, the om existingtheories,wefound onascendinginthe2000s,it is explanationtheideaof e ruler’schoices.Wealso politicians willopttocurb ed, andfundingagencies tant contributions to the tant contributionstothe of publicbureaucracy. ments and international politicization of CEU eTD Collection bureaucracy. professionalism –shouldalsobe a welfare-enhancingbureaucrac achieved. Last butnotleast,whilstthisthes studies, whichwouldclarifythemechanismsare throughwhichthepredictedeffects rulers’ discountrateandtheex relationships betweende-politicizationandgreat development compared tootherpotentialex help ustobetterunderstandth characterized bymassive changesin the‘rulesof thesis. Toextendtheobservationsbeyond regions isthemost obviouswaytostrengthentherobustnessoftherela date. (see Theorell houses’ ofthescholarship –theQualityofGovernment InstituteatUniversityofGothenburg research onorganizationalstructure ofpublicagenciesundertaken byoneofthe‘power agencies. However,asexpert-based evaluati of accesstoarchival andother‘hard’sour bureaucratic research,bringingpolicy-makers aboa As far asthisparticular project isconcerned,collecting data for alarger sample of et al 2008),itseems thattheyremain our tent ofde-politicizationshoul e contributionofade-politic y, itsotherelements –standa explored soastoappraise is focusedonlyonpersonnelpolicydimensionof 199 ces ontheorganizational structureofpublic ons havebeenemployed inthemost recent planatory factors.Thirdly,thehypothesized thegame’) isequallyimportantasitwould the initialpost-Sovietperiod(thatwas er social welfare as wellasbetween the rd may alsoassist insolvingtheproblem best availablemethodological toolto d befurtherco ized bureaucracytoeconomic rd operatingproceduresand the fullpotentialofsucha tions reportedinthis rroborated bycase CEU eTD Collection Please complete the questionnaire and return in the pre-paid envelope the pre-paid in and completereturn the Please questionnaire provided. onXXXXXXXXXXX. Ifyou have any survey queries about this totheResearch telephone do hesitate not Team partyeither. passedany be not to third will Yourdetails personal materialson based this research. and other articles the reports, arein keptCONFIDENTIAL STRICTLY shown be not and will collectiveexpertsthe portrait andcommunicationAll for of purposes. of the pool details needto compose a asks Thequestionnaire you we that details personal some for option. to say' Difficult / not to practice,know selectnot please do the hesitate personnel 'Do toregard elements some of the however,situation estimates.you If, with the don't know the absolutenumbers inor frequency).(proportions We doyou that understand may know not youSeveralofask questionsthis questionnaire related to factsevaluate personnel certain the thisfocussurvey. also is outside of advisers('posts of category 'advisers').Auxiliary (drivers, personnel typists and suchlike) themanagement top thedepartment of ('posts of category their 'managers'),in nor formerlyspecialists', andcategory 'supporting interested as known neither in We 'C'. are occupyBy postsofficialspublicthoseof mean who category 'specialists' we 'bureaucrat' promotedandfired. hired, regionaladministrations are in bureaucrats to tobetter how understand helpus bureaucracy public your insolicit anas Russia's expertregionaladministrations. We help AsRussian to researchis documentpractices in the aim personnel of youthis are aware, Thankyou the survey.taking for in part DearXXXXXX exact Draft Personnel Practices Russianin Regional Administrations answers to these questions. Please, do not hesitate to give do ushesitate Please, not to questions. these your answers best Expert Survey Appendix A. CEU eTD Collection Please select ONE option only option PleaseONE select majorprovisions?founding toregard and principles their with legislation pieces of two these best describes of the Infollowing ofyour1995. which FZ-119view, CurrentlyB1. policy governed the personnel byissues are FZ-79 replaced that of 2004 department/ministryof economicpolicy economicdevelopment / sufficiently well? atA5. personnelthe practices Do toregard you the with situation know department/ministryeconomic of policy/economic development is yourresponsible governanceof for expertise economicwhich development - the regional the personnelin practicesdepartmentare the particularly at within interested We with? familiar you Russia's regions are of and promoted - fired arebureaucrats what most hired, A4.ofthis studythe theme main Bearing mind in or how personnel - practices A3. What your is placeof work? A2.What you is surname? A1.What you is name?first parties. passedthird any be to not on strictlywill kept and be confidential personal will information forother notany purposes. All and study process informationto the the to used relating onlyyouaskwill likedetailsto be yourself. someYou about personal would questions First,we SECTION A : About yourself SECTION B : Legislation Draft Please write below the name of ONE region that you know the best. the you that nameONEknow theregion of below write Please No [please, contact to contact Nosituation] the discuss the researcher [please, go next the to section] Yes [please Don't know / Difficult say know to Don't Difficult / common in has nothing FZ-79 withFZ-119 are similar more and than FZ-79 different FZ-119 are moreand different FZ-79 than similar FZ-119 and FZ-119 FZ-79 are very similar much pretty are same the FZ-79 and FZ-119

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(formerlycategoryspecialist' and 'supporting 'specialist' of categoryposts that 'C') was D1. below. box the in yourestimate filed by the regionalgovernment?already for worked who bureaucrats were years, two the last economicpolicy within vacancy for about applications all Thinking C3. contests received by the of department only. thiscompared number to has thechanged year How C2. 2000? 11-12. e.g. estimate rangevalues, a of as your write can you that jobvacancy?per of applications years, two about the last Thinking what, C1. economicpolicy/economic development. department/ministry the the to of Pleasequestions rememberrelate the section this in all that SECTION D : Appointment economicpolicy/economic development. department/ministry the the to of Pleasequestions rememberrelate the section this in all that SECTION C : Admission Approximately Draft Even if Even the formal vacancy department,outcomesat contests their take this are place Compared to Compared the year 2000 Considerably more Considerably moreDramatically Don't know / Difficult say know to Don't Difficult / Considerably less Slightly less No change moreSlightly what is the officialsproportion is of public of the currently what working Slightly moreSlightly more Considerably moreDramatically PER CENT of all job applications has been filed byfiled been bureaucrats has applications job all of CENT PER Please write below.box the in yourPlease in estimate Don't know / Difficult say know to Don't Difficult / Please write in your estimate in the box below. Please note Please below. estimate box the in your in Please write approximately approximately approximately Compared toComparedthe year 2004 Don't know / Difficult say know to Don't Difficult / Considerably less Slightly less No change moreSlightly more Considerably moreDramatically Considerably Considerably less Slightly less No change how many how applications of those Please select ONE option in eachoptionPleaseONE in select PER CENT PER has beenthe average has number Please select ONE select option Please Please write Please CEU eTD Collection option only.option formalvacancy candidates?both openinternal and external to contest, viafilled departmenthighest grades) at were poststwo that importancethis (the of higher years,about the last E1.two Thinking only beentemporarily topost higher a importance ? appointed of years, thelast two about approximatelyThinking frequently E3. how have bureaucrats years? the last two within department higherotherposts importance havemethods filling usedat What of this of E2. been economicpolicy/economic development. department/ministry the remember sectionthe this in to questionsof Please all the relate that SECTION E: Promotion and Demotion E4. Why E4. youdo temporarily think used? promotionswere Don't know / Difficult tosay know Difficult Don't / inbox specify the [please below] Other needs office the relatedto not official, senior other or department the the of head of favour personal It a is by experienceposts posts relevanttosenior senior their advancing more for contests into succeed vacancy employedcurrently the bureaucrats theenhance of chances It to doneis post cope with in the capacity to a duties ne a bureaucrat's of test a probationin post, of kind It a is department the of needs urgent andother bycaused someunplanneddevelopments personnel-related measure, It emergency an is Draft 3-4 times 3-4 times 1-2 come Never case a such across About 50% About About two-thirds 90% About 100% Don't know / Difficult say know to Don't Difficult / the space in specify below] Other [please, above the of None Vacancy employedonly for contests currently bureaucrats department the of head the of Atdiscretion reserve Appointmentcadre from the approximately Pleasemany as asselect options apply what is the proportion of bureaucratic the proportion is what Don't know / Difficult to to say knowDon't Difficult / None than Less one-third About one-third 5 times 5 Don't know / Difficult say know to Don't Difficult / times 5 Morethan Pleasemany as select apply as Please select ONE option PleaseONE select Please select ONE select Please w CEU eTD Collection department? departmentthebecause change thestructure organizational of in theof dismissed years,about this the last at F1.bureaucrats two approximatelyoftenThinking were how beendemoted? years,about the last E5.two approximatelyfrequentlyThinking how have bureaucrats economicpolicy/economic development. department/ministry the remember sectionthe this in to questionsof Please all the relate that SECTION F: Dismissal Draft 3-4 times3-4 times1-2 Never come case a such across 3-4 times 3-4 times 1-2 come Never case a such across

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14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 1 Ryazan Ryazan Tver Kostroma Moskow Belgorod Ivanovo Vladimir obl obl obl Voronez obl Bryansk Region obl Tula obl Smolensk obl Orel obl Lipetsk obl Kaluga obl obl obl obl obl 2 per vacancy per vacancy applications number of Average 3 5,67 4,33 4,33 3,33 3,67 3,33 6,83 4,5 6,5 6,7 4,5 4 4 2 CEU eTD Collection job seekers number of the total candidates in internal job Proportion of 4 31,25 Appendix B.Indicators ofPersonnelPolicyPractice (RealMerit) 20,8 32,5 53,3 28,3 21,9 32,5 43,3 28,3 37,5 35,8 22,2 25 30 index recruitment Meritocratic 5 40,08 31,6 31,25 18,83 23,25 12,5 8,9 9,75 40,5 2 11 29 50 740230 1310 3 2221 contest vacancy Promotion by 6 5,3 4,7 4,3 3,7 3, 1,3 4,7 205 2 2 5 31130 3 4

discretion political Promotion at 7 1 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 1 0 reserves reserves cadre Promotion by 8 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 promotions Temporary 9 2,67 2,33 3,33 2,5 3,5 2,5 3,5 3 3 3 3 3 demotion Temporary 10 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 reorganisation by Dismissal 11 3,75 2,7 2,7 2,3 2,7 3,7 3,3 2,7 3 2 3 3 3

29 28 27 26 25 24 23 22 21 20 19 18 17 16 15 1 2 3 456789 10 11 Yaroslavs Tatarstan NN Leningrad Volgograd Stavropol Novgorod Samara obl obl obl Pskov obl Murmansk obl Vologda Region obl Penza R Chuvashia obl Rostov obl Astrakhansk obl

obl kray kray obl

per vacancy per vacancy applications number of Average 4,83 4,33 3,67 3,67 4,33 3,83 4,33 3,83 3,88 3,83 4,17 4,17 7,5 4,5 4 CEU eTD Collection job seekers number of the total candidates in internal job Proportion of 18,83 21,33 25,8 38,3 34,5 32,5 24,2 22,5 25,8 28,3 22,5 25 35 30 20 index recruitment Meritocratic 46,8 29,67 26,25 16,17 20,25 48,46 14,58 21,67 29,17 30,83 27,5 25, 21 24 12 84112 340130 550030 3 contest vacancy Promotion by 2, 3,7 3, 3,4 4,7 4, 2,7 4, 2,5 206 71220 4 30121 4 31130 3 5 30130 3

discretion political Promotion at 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 reserves reserves cadre Promotion by 0 1 2 0 1 0 2 0 promotions Temporary 2,67 2,75 2,75 2,67 2,5 , 3 3 3 50 3 demotion Temporary 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 reorganisation by Dismissal 2,75 2,7 2,5 2,7 3,3 3,3 2,7 2,7 3 3 3

40 39 38 37 36 35 34 33 32 31 30 1 2 3 456789 10 11 Tomsk Irkutsk Ulyanovsk kray kray Altaj Cheliabinsk obl Tumen obl Saratov Region obl Amur obl Omsk obl Novosibirsk obl Kemero obl obl obl obl

per vacancy per vacancy applications number of Average 1,83 4,67 4,33 5,83 3,67 4,17 3,33 4,13 3,83 3 3 CEU eTD Collection job seekers number of the total candidates in internal job Proportion of 58,3 24,2 33,3 23,3 56,7 31,7 38,3 32,5 55 45 55 index recruitment Meritocratic 40,3 24,75 42,8 18,75 27,5 21,17 3,08 8,58 9,42 1 12 8410 350030 3502 84012 contest vacancy Promotion by 3,3 3,7 1,7 4,7 2, 207 3 31130 2 3

discretion political Promotion at 1 0 1 0 1 0 reserves reserves cadre Promotion by 1 2 0 0 1 2 promotions Temporary 3,33 2,33 2,67 2,25 2,33 , 2 3 2 50 demotion Temporary 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 reorganisation by Dismissal 3,3 3,3 2,3 2,7 2,3 2,5 3 3 2 3

Note: *Significant at p *Significant Note:

8 4 2 1 7 6 5 3 Demotion at Promotion by reorganization by Dismissal discretion political Promotion at discretion political per vacancy of applications Average number recruitment index Meritocratic promotions Temporary vacancy contest vacancy Promotion by cadre reserves

CEU eTD Collection < 0.1,at **

Appendix C.RealMeritIndicators: BivariateCorrelation p < 0.05. .686 -.186 .258 .795 .489 -.672 .850 1 1

*** *** *** ** ***

-.149 .220 .720 .561

2 -.427

.504 1

*** *** ** **

-.176 .224 1 .654

-.716 3

.486

*** ** ***

208

.128 -.333

-.563 4 1

-.348 *** ** **

-.147

5

.059

.068 1 -.254

6

.533

1 ***

1

7

-.381

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8

1

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