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An Israeli Attack on Iran Volume 16 | No. 3 | October 2013 If Attacked, How Would Iran Respond? | Amos Yadlin and Avner Golov An Israeli Attack on Iran: The International Legitimacy Factor | Yoel Guzansky and Ron Tira The Plutonium Option: Iran’s Parallel Route to a Military Nuclear Capability | Ephraim Asculai A Nuclear-Armed Iran and US Extended Deterrence in the Gulf | Mark Doyle Alone at the Top: Bashar al-Assad and the Struggle for Syria | Eyal Zisser The Hamas Predicament: Organizational Challenges in a Volatile Environment | Benedetta Berti and Anat Kurz Chinese Involvement in the Middle East: The Libyan and Syrian Crises | Yoram Evron Strategic ASSESSMENT Volume 16 | No. 3 | October 2013 CONTENTS Abstracts | 3 If Attacked, How Would Iran Respond? | 7 Amos Yadlin and Avner Golov An Israeli Attack on Iran: The International Legitimacy Factor | 23 Yoel Guzansky and Ron Tira The Plutonium Option: Iran’s Parallel Route to a Military Nuclear Capability | 35 Ephraim Asculai A Nuclear-Armed Iran and US Extended Deterrence in the Gulf | 47 Mark Doyle Alone at the Top: Bashar al-Assad and the Struggle for Syria | 57 Eyal Zisser The Hamas Predicament: Organizational Challenges in a Volatile Environment | 67 Benedetta Berti and Anat Kurz Chinese Involvement in the Middle East: The Libyan and Syrian Crises | 79 Yoram Evron The purpose of Strategic Assessment is to stimulate and Strategic enrich the public debate on issues that are, or should be, ASSESSMENT on Israel’s national security agenda. Strategic Assessment is a quarterly publication comprising policy-oriented articles written by INSS researchers and guest contributors. The views presented here are those of the authors alone. The Institute for National Security Studies is a public benefit company. Editor in Chief Amos Yadlin Editor Mark A. Heller Associate Editor Judith Rosen Managing Editor Moshe Grundman Editorial Board Shlomo Brom, Moshe Grundman, Yoel Guzansky, Mark A. Heller, Ephraim Kam, Anat Kurz, Gallia Lindenstrauss, Judith Rosen, Amos Yadlin Editorial Advisory Board Dan Ben-David, Azar Gat, Efraim Halevy, Tamar Hermann, Itamar Rabinovich, Shimon Shamir, Gabi Sheffer, Emmanual Sivan, Shimon Stein, Asher Susser, Eyal Zisser Graphic Design: Michal Semo-Kovetz, Yael Bieber Tel Aviv University Graphic Design Studio Printing: Elinir The Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) 40 Haim Levanon • POB 6997556 • Tel Aviv 61398 • Israel Tel: +972-3-640-0400 • Fax: +972-3-744-7590 • E-mail: [email protected] Strategic Assessment is published in English and Hebrew. The full text is available on the Institute’s website: www.inss.org.il © All rights reserved. ISSN 0793-8942 Abstracts If Attacked, How Would Iran Respond? / Amos Yadlin and Avner Golov Many in the West and in Israel have warned of a tough Iranian response and escalation into regional war in the event of a military strike against the Iranian nuclear program. Close scrutiny, however, suggests that these assessments are exaggerated, with the likely Iranian response far more limited. Moreover, such overestimation serves the Iranians, providing an excellent tool for deterrence, and dilutes the goal of a credible military threat prompting the regime to agree to a diplomatic solution. This article analyzes Iran’s capabilities and the range of possible Iranian responses toward Israel, including the response capabilities of Iran’s allies in the region, particularly Syria and Hizbollah. The article challenges the scenario of a regional war in the wake of a military strike against Iran’s nuclear program, and offers recommendations for a response to the anticipated Iranian retaliation that would reduce the likelihood of extensive regional escalation. An Israeli Attack on Iran: The International Legitimacy Factor / Yoel Guzansky and Ron Tira In contemplating a possible military attack on Iran, the Israeli decision maker must weigh the element of international legitimacy. Though only one consideration among many and not necessarily the most crucial, legitimacy is nonetheless a major factor in the web of considerations accompanying any decision. There is currently diminished legitimacy for an Israeli attack on Iran, and therefore Israel must understand that building and maintaining a cloak of legitimacy is an integral part of the military effort. This article will analyze what a legitimacy-promoting campaign can and must achieve, namely, understanding among others – as opposed to approval – regarding the attack. It sketches a framework for campaigns before, during, and after an attack to cultivate and strengthen the perception of legitimacy for an attack among select key audiences. Strategic Assessment | Volume 16 | No. 3 | October 2013 3 ABSTRACTS 4 The Plutonium Option: Iran’s Parallel Route to a Military Nuclear Capability / Ephraim Asculai Since the first announcement in August 2002 that Iran was constructing a heavy water production facility at Arak, there has been little doubt in the minds of many people that Iran has embarked on a plutonium route for the production of fissile materials for military use. With the approaching completion of the IR-40 heavy water natural uranium reactor at Arak, this scenario has commanded more public attention. The potential for using plutonium in the core of a nuclear explosive device is serious, | Volume 16 | No. 3 | October 2013 16 | No. Volume | and indeed, this project has proceeded in blatant disregard of Security Council resolutions. Although the estimated date of completion of this route is not imminent, the project is nevertheless nearing a so-called critical point. This paper describes the general processes involved in the production of plutonium, and then considers the potential of the Iranian Strategic Assessment Strategic plutonium program, an estimated timeline and other aspects of the program, and prospects for the future. A Nuclear-Armed Iran and US Extended Deterrence in the Gulf / Mark Doyle This paper considers some of the complexities of US extended nuclear deterrence to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf allies in the face of a nuclear- armed Iran. In the past, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf monarchies appeared prepared to remain without independent nuclear arms, perhaps feeling sufficiently protected by US extended nuclear deterrence. This is unlikely to remain the case with a nuclear Iran. The article considers the alternatives available to the Saudi kingdom and the Gulf monarchies: independent nuclear weapons, an extended deterrence arrangement with Pakistan, or perhaps a much reinforced and extended US nuclear umbrella, codified more formally in some new treaty arrangement. Alone at the Top: Bashar al-Assad and the Struggle for Syria / Eyal Zisser Bashar al-Assad emerges from the quagmire of Syria’s civil war as the man who carries the entire weight of the Syrian regime on his back, who stands starkly alone at the top, and who makes fateful decisions affecting him and Syria by himself. It seems that never before has the identification of the Syrian regime with its leader been as pronounced as it is today. The Syrian regime’s success in surviving the revolution is ABSTRACTS 5 also – and especially – the personal success of Bashar al-Assad. Bashar has shown resilience and personal fortitude as well as lasting power not many believed he possessed. When he assumed the presidency the assertion often made was that he lacked the killer instinct, a necessity for anyone trying to rule Syria. But Bashar has emerged as an icy dictator willing to sacrifice an entire nation for the sake of his own survival. The Hamas Predicament: Organizational Challenges in a Volatile Environment / Benedetta Berti and Anat Kurz Hamas seemed to emerge from the November 2012 confrontation with 3 | October 2013 16 | No. Volume | Israel in a position of relative strength. The terms of the ceasefire and the limited steps Israel undertook in the aftermath of the war to lift some of the restrictions on the Gaza Strip substantiated Hamas’s sense of victory and control. The Gaza-based Palestinian movement also benefitted from regional backing, particularly from Qatar and Egypt, which confirmed Assessment Strategic the overall perception that Hamas had been able to take advantage of the upheaval generated by the Arab Awakening to improve its regional status. Yet in the following months this trend reversed quickly, propelling Hamas from a position of strength to one of clear fragility. Hamas now finds itself at a crossroads, forced to choose between isolation and integration and between political and military tracks to advance its organizational interests. Chinese Involvement in the Middle East: The Libyan and Syrian Crises / Yoram Evron China’s involvement in the Middle East has increased in recent years, and notwithstanding the assumption that Beijing has no interest in intervening in regional processes, a shift toward political involvement is evident. At the same time, the nature of Chinese involvement in the region is as yet unclear, particularly in view of the gradual and at times obscure nature of the change in its behavior. This article assesses the pattern of Chinese involvement in the Middle East in recent years through two test cases: the Libyan and Syrian crises. It appears that China’s near-exclusive reliance on economic motives, its conformity to Russian policy in all matters pertaining to the Middle East, the centralized management of its foreign policy, and its avoidance of taking a stand in regional disputes are assumptions not fully supported by the events. The article thus proposes several alternative explanations
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