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IPRIS Maghreb Bulletin 10 10 IPRIS Maghreb Review APRIL 2011 Morocco: 2010 in perspective ERIC M. FISCHER 2010-2011 NSEP David L. Boren Fellow and Ph.D. student in International Economics, UC Santa Cruz, United States Despite the protests in Rabat and Casablanca on Febru- and in this way also acted to weaken the political party ary 20th, 2011, Morocco remains stable politically and eco- system in Morocco. nomically relative to its North African neighbors and con- tinues a process of reform and development under King The Justice and Development Party seeks attention Mohammed VI’s leadership. This review covers the key The Justice and Development Party (PJD) received the political, economic, and international issues in Morocco second highest number of seats in the 2007 parliamentary over the course of 2010 and early 2011. elections but is not a part of the ruling coalition. In May 2010, PJD leaders called for the cancellation of British singer Elton John’s concert in Rabat because of his Domestic political issues in Morocco homosexuality. Homosexuality is punishable by law in Morocco although, similar to the alcohol law, it is not The King re-organizes his cabinet strictly enforced. In the end, approximately 50.000 people At the beginning of 2010, Mohammed VI made several attended the state-sponsored concert in Rabat. Ultimately, changes to the composition of his cabinet. Most the King was able to strike a delicate balance between significantly, the King replaced his interior minister individual freedom and tolerance with his religious role as Chakib Benmoussa with Moulay Tayeb Cherkaoui, the amir al-muminin or commander of the faithful. who had previously served as president of Morocco’s At the end of June 2010, one of the PJD’s most outspoken Supreme Court. The King appointed two technocrats to leaders, Mustapha Ramid, made known that he would replace political party ministers: Mohammed Naciri in leave the parliament to protest the lack of parliamentary place of Abdelwahad Radi as Justice Minister and Yassir authority. Three days later, in a sudden change of events, Zenagui in place of Mohammed Boussaid as Tourism and Ramid announced that he would return to politics to lead Handicrafts Minister. These appointments show that King the PJD’s parliamentary bloc, saying that the party had not Mohammed VI was filling the Moroccan cabinet positions approved his resignation. Some political analysts believe with technocrats, instead of members of political parties, that Ramid orchestrated his own flip-flop from the start IPRIS Maghreb Review | 2 to highlight the frustration of parliamentary officials over February 2010, the Moroccan government has taken the King’s extensive powers in the political process. regulatory steps to liberalize the telecommunication sector. Maroc Telecom, for example, was a Moroccan Government fines the newspaper Le Journal Hebdomadaire state monopoly that is now partly owned by Vivendi. In February 2010, a Casablanca commercial appeals There is also now a new Moroccan telecom provider court declared the publishing group Media Trust and Wana that sells mobile telecommunications under the Trimedia, which owns the weekly magazine Le Journal brand Inwi. The Moroccan government argues that Hebdomadaire, bankrupt. At the end of 2006, the these privatization and liberalization measures will Ministry of Justice ordered Aboubakr Jamai, the former lead to lower consumer prices and increase the number managing director of Le Journal Hebdomadaire, and one of people with access to these telecommunications of his colleagues to pay US$340.000 for libel damages. services. The Moroccan government wants to increase Claude Moniquet, the head of the European Strategic the number of Internet subscribers from 1.2 million Intelligence and Security Center headquartered in in 2009 to 2 million by 2013. In September 2010, the Brussels, submitted the case arguing that Le Journal company France Telecom announced a deal to purchase Hebdomadaire inaccurately reported on his analysis of 40% of the second largest telecommunications company Morocco’s claim to Western in Morocco, Meditel. Meditel Sahara. To avoid paying the is expected to compete fine, Jamai left the country Despite the protests in directly with Maroc Telecom, only to face the same fine which was partly acquired by upon his reentry to Morocco in Rabat and Casablanca Vivendi. 2009. Although the Moroccan th Interestingly, despite these press has become freer in the on February 20 , 2011, liberalization measures, the last few years journalists are Morocco remains Moroccan government still still expected to remain within maintains substantial price unspoken boundaries on topics stable politically and controls on the telecom- related to Western Sahara and munications industry. In an- the activities of the King. economically relative ticipation of the February to its North African 20th, 2011 demonstrations in New seatbelt law passed to cut Rabat and Casablanca, for down traffic fatalities neighbors and continues example, the government The Moroccan parliament lowered the prices of mobile passed a new traffic law in Jan- a process of reform telephone calls and monthly uary 2010 intended to reduce and development under Internet subscriptions by the numbers of accidents and 50%. These price changes driving fatalities. This new law King Mohammed VI’s implemented the week be- raises the amount of the fine fore February 20th served to for many driving offences, al- leadership. satisfy the Moroccan youth lows police to perform random and to create disincentives tests to see whether drivers are under the influence of for youth to join the protests in opposition to the King. alcohol, reduces the speed limits in certain locations, and These measures in Morocco are in sharp contrast to requires additional training and social security coverage Tunisia and Egypt where the state used heavy-hand- for individuals working as drivers. While traffic fatalities ed measures such as mobile censorship and Internet remain a problem in Morocco, there are also concerns cuts to prevent further protests. that these additional traffic laws could have unintended consequences and lead to new ways for police and ad- New Oxford Poverty Indicator causes controversy in ministrative officials to extract bribes. Morocco In August 2010, the Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative (OPHI) at the University of Oxford Domestic and regional economic liberalization in with funding from the United Nations Development Morocco Programme (UNDP) launched the Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) in which Morocco was ranked 48th The Moroccan telecoms are liberalized but still heavily out of a total of 104 countries. According to the MPI, controlled 28.5% of the Moroccan population is poor compared Morocco has instituted several economic reforms and to 3% according to the Moroccan government survey. the economy has experienced growth but the country The Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs criticized the has yet to reach its full economic potential. Starting in new MPI ranking measurement because it does not IPRIS Maghreb Review | 3 accurately reflect the poverty reduction that has occurred International issues faced by Morocco in Morocco. Nonetheless, unemployment and low living standards remain a reality especially among the urban Morocco and the Western Sahara issue reignites poor and the young. The issue of Western Sahara continues to be a significant area of disagreement and concern between Morocco, Morocco hosts World Economic Forum on MENA in Algeria, Spain and the international community. Various Marrakesh events within Morocco and North Africa have made Western In November 2010, Morocco served as the host to the Sahara reignite as an important foreign policy issue. World Economic Forum on the Middle East and North From the Moroccan point of view, the Western Sahara Africa (MENA) in Marrakesh. King Mohammed VI did issue unites Moroccans and has led to strong support not attend the meeting but nonetheless welcomed its for the monarchy. Ever since he became King in 1999, attendees by challenging them to find ways to better Mohammed VI maintains that Morocco must maintain integrate North Africa into the world economy. Over control over Western Sahara. Morocco has diverted 1.000 representatives from 62 countries attended resources towards Western Sahara and in 2007 presented the forum, which serves as a place where leaders in an autonomy plan for the region under Moroccan business and government can discuss opportunities sovereignty for negotiation with the UN Secretary- to improve economic cooperation and collaboration. General. Despite expending financial resources to lay Various participants attending the World Economic claim to this region there are long term economic benefits Forum stated that additional investments in physical should Western Sahara remain a part of Morocco. infrastructure and improvements of the educational From the Algerian point of view, Western Sahara is seen system must be made to make Morocco a more desirable as one of the last areas of decolonization. Should the destination of foreign direct investment. Polisario gain control over the region then Algeria will have greater access to the Atlantic Ocean. If, however, the Wikileaks highlights the real estate corruption of the issue of Western Sahara’s future status continues to be Royal Palace unresolved then this outcome hurts Morocco more than In November 2010, Wikileaks released US diplomatic it does Algeria. The African Union (AU) has recognized cables describing
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