Moral Problems in Behavioural Genetics – Should We Find 'Genes For'

MORAL PROBLEMS IN BEHAVIOURAL GENETICS – SHOULD WE FIND ‘GENES FOR’ INTELLIGENCE?

Ainsley Janelle Newson, B.Sc(Hons)

Submitted in total fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Centre for the Study of Health and Society The University of Melbourne

June 2002

ABSTRACT

In this thesis, I provide an analysis of the moral and practical problems associated with undertaking behavioural genetic research. Of the many projects in behavioural genetics, each with distinct issues, I have chosen to focus upon genetic research into intelligence.

The main question framing this thesis is whether there can be any ethical applications of this research. I argue that there can. The rationale of the thesis is therefore to describe the circumstances in which such applications might be acceptable.

Genetic research into influences on intelligence is both topical and controversial. To award this issue a comprehensive analysis, it has been necessary for me to address several different issues.

In order to ensure that an ethical analysis of this research is provided in an appropriate context, I begin by examining several important issues. The first is that the very definition of intelligence and the grounds for its genetic research are contentious. I review this debate in the first chapter. Additionally, there is concern that permitting genetic research into intelligence constitutes an undue promotion of the significance of genetic factors. I therefore also analyse the limitations in interpreting this information.

In the second chapter, I establish the ethical context in which debates over genetic research into intelligence have been undertaken. That is, I review and provide some initial analysis of arguments against the research. I utilise this analysis to identify important issues which I discuss in detail in later chapters.

One such issue is to what extent intelligence might contribute to the well-being of those who have it. To date, very little analysis has been performed (from a philosophical perspective) as to the value of any behavioural trait. I devote a chapter to discussing the value of intelligence, incorporating an analysis of both theoretical and empirical literature.

The majority of the thesis is dedicated to addressing the moral issues around two important clinical applications that might result from genetic research into intelligence. The first is whether it would be appropriate to ever develop genetic tests for intelligence (and to whom they should be administered). The second is whether it would ever be appropriate to augment intelligence.

In both cases, I offer a defence of such applications, subject to several important constraints. These constraints involve recognising the limitations of the predictive properties of behavioural genetic information, respecting the future interests of children in choosing their own life plan, ensuring that the interests of groups are protected and ensuring that choosing to utilise the various (potential) enhancement technologies does not harm parental interests.

This thesis marks one of the first attempts to fill a conspicuous gap in bioethics literature. My analysis is the first to assess ethical issues in behavioural genetics by utilising a framework where both ethical and empirical approaches are included. This represents progress towards practically-based, ethically-derived solutions for emerging problems in genetic research.

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STATEMENT OF ORIGINALITY

This is to certify that

(i) The thesis comprises only my original work towards the PhD except where indicated in the Preface;

(ii) Due acknowledgement has been made in the text to all other material used;

(iii) The thesis is less than 100,000 words in length, exclusive of tables, maps, bibliographies and appendices.

Signed:

Ainsley Janelle Newson

PREFACE

The work presented in this thesis represents my own research. No work has been submitted for any other qualification, or has been carried out prior to my PhD candidature.

Advice has been sought from experts to assist with various thesis chapters and I have listed these experts in the Acknowledgments. Where their contribution has been utilised in a chapter, it is recognized by a footnote.

Two sections of this thesis have been published:

Sections of Chapter Seven will appear in: Newson, A.J. ‘Is there a cost associated with Genetic Enhancements?’ in Almond, B. and Parker, M (Eds.) Ethical Issues and the New Genetics: Are Genes Us? Aldershot, Ashgate (Forthcoming, 2002).

Sections of Chapters One, Two, Four and Five appeared in: Newson A. & Williamson R. (1999). ‘Should we undertake genetic research on intelligence?’ Bioethics. 13(3-4):327-342.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Due to the multidisciplinary influences on this thesis, there are many people who have provided academic and personal support throughout its preparation.

I must first recognise the enormous contribution, support and patience of Professor Julian Savulescu. He has provided me with expert supervision, advice on resources, commentary on drafts and direction of the project as it developed. When I felt that I had exhausted all possibilities on a particular issue, Julian was instrumental in assisting me to find my way.

Professor Bob Williamson has provided me with many opportunities to access experts in the field and has provided me with much-needed advice about doctoral- student life in general. Bob also provided excellent feedback on writing technique and clarity, in addition to substantive comments on thesis content.

Dr David McCarthy supervised my project in its second year. Through attendance at his philosophy classes and by reading and discussing his work, I gained an enormous amount of knowledge about ethical theory. David also provided direction to several thesis chapters, particularly Chapters Four and Seven.

Staff members at The Centre for the Study of Health and Society at The University of Melbourne have also been a source of support, stimulation and advice. Dr Lynn Gillam in particular has provided outstanding independent guidance on the scope and direction of my thesis. I would like to recognise the support of fellow students, particularly Dr Edwina Vance and Jan Hodgson for their friendship and research support.

The multidisciplinary nature of this work necessitated seeking external expertise on numerous occasions. I thank the following people for their generous provision of time and resources:

• Professor Tony Hope, Dr Michael Parker, Dr John McMillan and Don Hill from Ethox, The Centre for Ethics and Communication in health at The University of Oxford. • Professor Con Stough from the Brain Sciences Institute at Swinburne University for his assistance in the preparation of Chapters One, Three and Five.

• Professor Robert Plomin from the Institute of Psychiatry at King’s College, London for his ongoing commitment to discussion about the implications of his work, the availability of his colleagues (particularly Dr Thalia Eley and Dr Brien Riley) and his assistance throughout the drafting process. • Professor Michael O’Boyle and Dr Mary Ainley from the Morgan Centre for the Study of the Development of High Intellectual Potential at the Department of Psychology, University of Melbourne for their assistance with the preparation of Chapter Three. • Professor John Geake, Professor of Education and Postgraduate Tutor at the Westminster Institute of Education at Oxford Brookes University, for his comments upon Chapter Three. • Dr Tom Shakespeare from the Centre for Life, Newcastle University (United Kingdom) and Ms Yvonne Melia, Nuffield Council on Bioethics, for valuable research assistance. • Associate Professor Vicki Anderson from the Department of Psychology at The University of Melbourne, for her assistance with Chapter Four.

I would also like to thank the staff and students of the Ethics Unit at The Murdoch Childrens Research Institute for their support and advice, including Dr Merle Spriggs, Melanie Hemsley and Rony Duncan.

Cate Azzopardi, Belinda Griffiths, Wonitta Hodge and Danielle Irvine have provided enormous personal encouragement. The Oxford ‘crew’ of Dr Emily Howman, Dr Alyssa Barry and those at # 43 were also enormously supportive.

My partner Evan Hollonds has been an unwavering support throughout my candidature. His patience, support, IT assistance and proofreading skills were much appreciated. I would also like to warmly thank Don, Lyverne and Kirrily Newson, Bruce and Rhonda Hollonds and James and Anne Bukovsan for their support.

Finally, I would like to thank my cat Alby for keeping me company during the long days of writing and for occasionally helping me with word processing.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT...... ii STATEMENT OF ORIGINALITY ...... iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS...... vi TABLE OF CONTENTS...... viii INDEX OF TABLES...... xiii THESIS OVERVIEW...... xv

SECTION I: Research Background and Overview of Ethical Issues

CHAPTER ONE: What is Intelligence? What Might Genetic Research Achieve? 1.1 INTRODUCTION ...... 2 1.2 WHAT IS INTELLIGENCE? ...... 3 Some beliefs about intelligence ...... 4 Philosophers’ views of intelligence...... 4 Lay theories and perceptions of intelligence...... 6 Three theories of intelligence ...... 7 General intelligence...... 8 Sternberg’s triarchic theory...... 10 Gardner’s multiple intelligences...... 12 How is intelligence measured? ...... 13 Uses of intelligence tests ...... 17 Controversies in the application of intelligence testing ...... 18 1.3 WHAT MIGHT GENETIC RESEARCH INTO INTELLIGENCE ACHIEVE? ...... 22 A brief history of genetic research into intelligence...... 22 Quantitative methods of research...... 24 Heritability...... 24 Family studies...... 25 Adoption studies...... 26 Twin studies ...... 27 A model for the inheritance of intelligence...... 28 Limitations of quantitative research into intelligence...... 28 Molecular methods of research into intelligence ...... 29

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1.4 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF GENETIC EXPLANATIONS...... 31 Determinism ...... 32 Limits upon the interpretation of genetic factors ...... 33 1.5 CONCLUSION...... 36

CHAPTER TWO: The Radical Critique against Genetic Research into Intelligence 2.1 INTRODUCTION ...... 37 2.2 POTENTIAL BENEFITS FROM THIS RESEARCH ...... 38 2.3 THE RADICAL CRITIQUE...... 41 Case Study: The Campaign for Real Intelligence ...... 42 Concerns with finding genetic influences on intelligence...... 44 The research itself is not valid science...... 45 The research will lead to deterministic interpretations of intelligence ...... 47 The research results will be misused ...... 51 Eugenic applications of research will be developed ...... 60 The research is a bad allocation of resources ...... 66 Potential limits to the critique ...... 70 2.4 ELUCIDATION OF KEY CONCERNS ...... 73 2.5 CONCLUSION...... 75

SECTION II: A Contextual Issue Surrounding this Research

CHAPTER THREE: Is it Good to be Intelligent? 3.1 INTRODUCTION ...... 77 3.2 EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF INTELLIGENCE ...... 78 3.3 THEORIES OF WELL-BEING ...... 79 3.4 HEDONISTIC THEORIES AND THE VALUE OF INTELLIGENCE ...... 80 Hedonistic theories of well-being ...... 80 Would a hedonist value intelligence?...... 81 Empirical evaluations of the hedonistic conception of intelligence ...... 86 3.5 THE VALUE OF INTELLIGENCE UPON DESIRE SATISFACTION THEORIES ....88 Desire Satisfaction theories of well-being...... 88 Would a desire theorist value intelligence?...... 89 The role of intelligence in forming desires...... 91

3.6 INTELLIGENCE AND SUBSTANTIVE GOODS THEORIES...... 95 Substantive goods theories ...... 95 Would a substantive goods theorist value intelligence? ...... 96 Empirical observations concerning substantive goods and intelligence...... 97 3.7 SUMMARY...... 104 3.8 INTELLIGENCE AND AUTONOMY ...... 110 3.9 CONCLUSION...... 115

SECTION III: Moral Issues in the Application of Research Results

CHAPTER FOUR: Should Genetic Tests for Intelligence be Developed? 4.1 INTRODUCTION ...... 118 4.2 GENETIC TESTING TECHNOLOGIES...... 119 What could be gained from a genetic test?...... 121 4.3 BENEFITS TO BE GAINED IN TESTING FOR INTELLIGENCE...... 123 Some benefits in testing children ...... 127 4.4 POTENTIAL HARMS FROM GENETIC TESTS FOR INTELLIGENCE ...... 129 General harms ...... 129 Discrimination ...... 130 Labelling...... 132 ‘Harm to sense of self’...... 134 Impact upon subsequent behaviour...... 140 Harms particular to testing children...... 144 Testing now removes the child’s ‘right to decide later’...... 145 Testing is a breach of the child’s confidentiality ...... 147 The information could deny opportunities...... 148 Should children be given their test results? When? ...... 149 4.5 GENETIC TESTS SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO SEVERAL CONSTRAINTS...... 153 Tests should only be requested by the individuals to whom the result will apply ...... 153 Genetic tests for intelligence should not merely provide an ‘IQ Score’...... 154 The need for appropriate counselling...... 155 Potential harms from testing need to be recognised...... 156 There need to be special constraints on testing children...... 156 4.6 CONCLUSION...... 157 x

CHAPTER FIVE: An Overview of Arguments Against Enhancing Intelligence 5.1 INTRODUCTION ...... 159 5.2 METHODS OF ENHANCING INTELLIGENCE ...... 160 Genetic Selection...... 161 Genetic Enhancement...... 163 Scientific experiments towards genetic enhancement of intelligence...... 164 Drug enhancement of intelligence ...... 165 5.3 ETHICAL ARGUMENTS IN GENETIC ENHANCEMENT...... 168 Justifications for Selection and Enhancement...... 169 Some general arguments against enhancement ...... 171 Four issues of significance ...... 179 Treatment is permissible; Enhancement is not ...... 180 Enhancement is an unacceptable means of increasing intelligence ...... 184 Enhancement and the ‘non-identity’ problem...... 189 Access to enhancements of intelligence will be unequal ...... 197 5.4 CONSTRAINTS UPON ENHANCEMENT...... 200 5.5 CONCLUSION...... 203

CHAPTER SIX: Two Ethical Problems in Enhancing Children's Intelligence 6.1 INTRODUCTION ...... 205 ‘Dr Bashir’s Genetic Enhancement’...... 205 6.2 ENHANCEMENT AND THE RIGHT TO AN OPEN FUTURE ...... 206 The ‘right to an open future’ ...... 206 Will enhancing intelligence limit a child’s right to an open future? ...... 210 Two reasons why enhancing intelligence will not limit a child’s open future...... 211 Is the right to an open future unduly restrictive?...... 212 If the right to an open future is acceptable, will it apply to intelligence?...... 213 Three counter-arguments ...... 215 Summary ...... 217 6.3 ENHANCEMENTS AND LEADING AN AUTHENTIC LIFE...... 218 What is meant by ‘authenticity’?...... 220 How could enhancing intelligence affect authenticity? ...... 221 Concerns over inauthenticity...... 222 xi

The value of ‘struggle’ ...... 223 Could enhancement lead children to become ‘someone that they are not’?...... 226 Will enhancement give people only superficial experiences of the good life, and mean that they are judged by others as undeserving? ...... 228 Summary ...... 228 6.4 CONCLUSION...... 229

CHAPTER SEVEN: Hard Choices - Is there a cost in enhancement decision-making? 7.1 INTRODUCTION ...... 230 7.2 WHAT IS THE VALUE OF HAVING CHOICES? ...... 231 An instrumental value of choice?...... 232 An intrinsic value of choice? ...... 233 7.3 POTENTIAL COSTS OF GENETIC SELECTION CHOICES...... 235 Decision-making costs ...... 237 Decision making costs in enhancement ...... 237 How well is complex genetic data understood by the public? ...... 239 Decision-making costs should not be over-interpreted...... 241 Responsibility costs ...... 242 Will others hold Paul and Jane as more responsible?...... 243 Will Paul and Jane feel more responsible? ...... 246 Raising children much smarter than their parents?...... 249 Coercive costs...... 250 Will Paul and Jane be coerced into making a selection decision?...... 251 Will Paul and Jane suffer harm from this influence?...... 252 7.4 FACILITATING GENETIC DECISION-MAKING...... 255 7.5 CONCLUSION...... 259

CHAPTER EIGHT: Final Conclusions ...... 260 BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 267 APPENDIX ONE: The intersection of theoretical and empirical research in bioethics... 289 APPENDIX TWO: Characteristics of genetic data about intelligence...... 292

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INDEX OF TABLES

Chapter One: What Is Intelligence? What Might Genetic Research Achieve?

Table 1-1: Some traits being investigated by behavioural geneticists...... 3 Table 1-2: Expert’s definitions of intelligence...... 8 Table 1-3: Gardner’s Multiple Intelligences...... 12 Table 1-4: Some examples of intelligence test items...... 16 Table 1-5: Common misinterpretations of IQ scores...... 17 Table 1-6: Correlations from Adoption data for intelligence ...... 27 Table 1-7: A framework for interpreting genetic data about intelligence ...... 36

Chapter Two: The Radical Critique Against Genetic Research Into Intelligence

Table 2-1 Overview of the Radical Critique ...... 45 Table 2-2: Wikler’s Five Candidate Wrongs of Eugenics...... 64 Table 2-3: Misconceptions about genetic research into intelligence ...... 72

Chapter Four: Should Genetic Tests for Intelligence be Developed?

Table 4-1: Qualifications on complex genetic information...... 122 Table 4-2: Some alternative ways of disclosing test results to Sarah...... 150 Table 4-3: Factors to be counselled in genetic tests of intelligence...... 156

Chapter Five: An Overview of Arguments Against Enhancing Intelligence

Table 5-1: Classes of interventions which enhance intelligence...... 161 Table 5-2: Compounds that reportedly enhance cognition ...... 167 Table 5-3: Some arguments against Genetic Enhancement ...... 179 Table 5-4: Constraints on the practice of enhancement ...... 202

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Chapter Seven: Hard Choices - Is there a Cost in Enhancement Decision-Making?

Table 7-1: The Values of Choice...... 235 Table 7-2: Potential costs of the choice of genetic selection...... 236 Table 7-3: Strategies to manage feelings of responsibility...... 257 Table 7-4: Lessons to draw from the costs of genetic enhancement choices... 257 Table 7-5: Factors affecting couples’ genetic decision-making ...... 258

Appendix One: The Intersection Of Theoretical And Empirical Research In Bioethics

Table A1: The contribution of empirical studies to bioethics 289

Appendix Two: Characteristics of Genetic Data About Intelligence

Table A2: How behavioural genetic information is different 300

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THESIS OVERVIEW

In light of the human genome project, identifying the genetic influences upon complex human diseases (such as cancer and diabetes) has become a research priority within Western medicine. However, in addition to the identification of disease genes, numerous research projects are now being undertaken to identify the genetic influences upon human behavioural traits, such as aggression, criminality, novelty- seeking and sexual orientation.

In this thesis, I undertake an analysis of the moral and practical problems arising from behavioural genetic research. From the many projects in behavioural genetics, I have chosen to focus upon genetic research into intelligence.

The issues raised by genetic research into intelligence are broad and complex. Suppose, for example, that you were faced with the following kinds of (hypothetical) situations:

1. A commercial genetic testing provider is promoting its new service: genetic testing for several behavioural and personality traits, including intelligence. Should such tests be permitted? Under what, if any, circumstances should this be allowed?

2. The same genetic testing provider indicates that testing of children is available upon request. Suppose you have a six year-old daughter, Sarah. Should you be allowed to have Sarah tested? What should you do with the results? Could this genetic information harm Sarah?

3. Genetic research into intelligence has enabled the development of several interventions for cognitive enhancement. These can be safely administered to children at relatively little cost. Should parents have access to such an enhancement for their child? What harms might result?

4. A couple is undergoing in-vitro fertilisation and pre-implantation genetic diagnosis, to avoid having a child with Cystic Fibrosis. Their doctor informs them their embryos can also be screened to select a child with the highest potential intelligence. Should they be offered such a decision? What costs might they face in doing this?

xv Thesis Overview

Even from these limited scenarios, it is clear that research into genetic influences on intelligence presents many ethical difficulties. Accordingly, this research attracts significant public and media interest. It is also influenced by varying scientific, cultural and ethical beliefs. To disentangle these issues is indeed a challenging task – a task yet to be embarked upon with any depth in bioethics.

In this thesis, my initial aim is to unpack the important issues generated by this genetic research. I also aim to develop some constraints upon how (if at all) the results of this research may be ethically used. As such, this thesis is framed around the following broad question: “How should results from genetic research into intelligence be used?”

My goal is not to come to a definitive moral judgement about every social, political or scientific controversy surrounding this research. Rather, I hope to develop the aspects of this debate that are particularly relevant for those who will come into contact with the applications of this research. Therefore, I analyse two potential clinical applications of this research: genetic testing for intelligence and the augmentation of intelligence.

To facilitate my discussion of these issues, it is also necessary for me to frame the genetic research in an appropriate context. To do this, I have developed several questions, the answers to which will help in answering the question I have posed above:

i) What research is being done? How might we interpret the results?

ii) Is intelligence something that should be valued?

iii) Is genetic testing acceptable? For whom?

iv) Is genetic selection or enhancement acceptable? For whom?

It is, of course, impossible to make generalisations about the acceptability (or otherwise) of using the results of this research. This is because the context in which the applications of genetic research into intelligence are used will also be important. Throughout this thesis, in order to recognise the importance of context, I develop

xvi Thesis Overview many necessary (but not sufficient) conditions to dictate what I see to be ethical uses of applications of the genetics of intelligence. As I suggest in the following chapters, these conditions will encompass factors such as the quality of counselling processes, the attitudes of parents or couples and the probability of harm that might result. These conditions are intended to assist both policy-makers and individuals to make decisions about if or when this information should ever be used.

In developing these conditions, I supplement my discussion with reference to the significant amount of empirical research that has been undertaken in parallel research areas. For example, in Chapter Three I discuss the relationship between being intelligent and a number of goods. In Chapter Four, I consider how explanations of psychometric intelligence can impact subsequent behaviour; and in Chapter Seven I discuss both how people interpret complex genetic information and how couples have adjusted to utilising new reproductive technologies. These studies give an indication of how genetic information about intelligence may be perceived, utilised and understood by society. In Appendix I, I further examine the significance that empirical research can have for theoretical bioethics.

Now, there are many who oppose genetic research into intelligence. In the United Kingdom for example, public campaigns have been staged to prevent this research from proceeding. At one point, opponents succeeded in stalling the Medical Research Council’s funding for the research.1 Although funding has now been reinstated, concern about behavioural genetic research is so considerable that the Nuffield Council on Bioethics, an independent policy organisation, is currently investigating ethical issues in behavioural genetics.2 Additionally, the Hastings Center for Bioethics and the American Association for the Advancement of Science are developing tools to encourage more informed public debate upon issues in behavioural genetics.3

1 I discuss this inquiry in more detail in Chapter Two. 2 The Council is due to report in mid-2002. For more information, see: http://www.nuffieldbioethics.org. 3 For more information, see: http://www.thehastingscenter.org. xvii Thesis Overview

As I have alluded to above, this research raises several issues. One of these is whether there is validity in researching ‘behaviours’ at all. Debates continue to rage over whether intelligence can ever be defined accurately and appropriately as an ‘endpoint’ (or, as a target for research). There is also debate over whether intelligence could ever be measured with any validity. A second concern is whether ‘the science’ is valid. Molecular genetic research to identify genes influencing intelligence has arisen from a century’s controversy over statistical research into the causes of differences in intelligence between people. Yet in their quest for genes ‘for’4 intelligence, researchers have taken these ideas and applied them within the discipline of recombinant DNA technology. A third (and perhaps most significant) group of concerns has regard to what might happen once the genetic research is completed. Some have argued that regardless of the significance or validity of the results, this research will cause a deterministic mindset to settle over science and society. There are also concerns that the genetic testing and enhancement of intelligence will become common, to the detriment of the recipients, ethnic and cultural groups, or humanity in general. I touch upon all of these debates in this thesis. The approach I take is as follows.

Summary of Section I – Research background and overview of ethical issues

In Section I (comprised of Chapters One and Two), I seek to review and analyse the research that is the subject of this thesis. I also analyse the overall ethical debate surrounding genetic research into human intelligence. In Chapter One, I consider issues relating to the definition and genetics of intelligence. Then in Chapter Two, I review and discuss the ethical issues arising from this research, to account for the questions I will discuss in following chapters.

Chapter One

There is little value in investigating the moral implications of this research if inaccurate assumptions are held about what intelligence is, or what researchers might be able to achieve. Therefore, I have dedicated the first chapter in Section I to reviewing these debates.

4 I say ‘for’ rather than for in recognition of the fact that genes will not provide the only explanatory constructs of intelligence. The phrase ‘genes for’ is in danger of being misinterpreted. xviii Thesis Overview

There are two important, yet often overlooked, findings from genetic research into intelligence. The first is that there is evidence for a heritable component. The second is that any differences in intelligence between people are due at least as much to differences in their environment. The goal of genetic research into intelligence is not merely to identify the genes involved. If successful, it will also provide a great deal of information about environmental contributions to intelligence.

I also discuss the impact that a genetic explanation of intelligence may have for our understanding of genetic determinism. I argue that an appropriate interpretation of genetic information about intelligence should involve appreciating many factors that will modify gene expression. Recognising these factors will limit the potential for genetic determinism.

Chapter Two

Having described the various definitions of intelligence and its genetic research, in Chapter Two I provide an overview and analysis of the ethical issues raised by the research. I identify five classes of objections that can be gleaned from what opponents to the research have argued. Collectively, I term these objections the ‘radical critique’ against this research.

I demonstrate that although powerful, the ‘radical critique’ against this research is subject to numerous problems. The issues raised by the radical critique alone do not provide reasons to prevent the research and its clinical applications. All the critique suggests is that there should be some constraints on the research and its applications if they are to take place. I then use this critique to define the approach that I take in subsequent chapters.

Summary of Section II –A Contextual issue surrounding this research

Chapter Three

Section II comprises Chapter Three, in which I discuss a significant issue that will arise from clinical applications of genetic research into intelligence. Just as there is a need to understand exactly what research is being undertaken, it is also important to

xix Thesis Overview discuss how intelligence contributes to a person’s well-being. In this chapter, I consider the value of intelligence for those who have it.

Many stereotypes exist about intelligence to suggest that it might not always be better for a person to be intelligent. For example, highly intelligent people are often considered as being prone to psychological disturbances, as lacking in physical agility or as being unable to engage in social relationships. If this is true, then it will be important not to inadvertently promote such undesirable ends when using genetic means to test for or enhance intelligence.

In this chapter, I present the triarchic theory of well-being (after Parfit5 et al) and suggest how supporters of each theory might evaluate intelligence. For each theory of well-being I discuss, I also elucidate several empirical outcome measures. These measures are those that supporters of each theory would expect to be related to intelligence, were they to consider intelligence as valuable.

I argue that supporters of each of the three theories of well-being would all value intelligence, though some would value it more highly than others. Interestingly, the empirical research I review indicates that (contrary to many social stereotypes of intelligence) being more intelligent does not promote a higher risk of psychological states such as anxiety or depression. In fact, longitudinal studies have shown that intelligence is a good predictor of a successful and happy life.

In addition to this discussion of the relationship between intelligence and well- being, I also present an argument that intelligence is related to an individual’s capacity to exercise autonomy.

Summary of Section III - Moral issues in the application of research results

With several practical issues dealt with, in Section III I turn my attention to the core of the problem that will arise from identifying genes influencing human intelligence. In the four chapters that comprise Section III, I determine how (if at all) the results from this research should be used.

5 Parfit, D., (1984) Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p493-502. xx Thesis Overview

In these chapters, I discuss moral issues in two potential applications of this research: genetic testing and genetic enhancement. The main premise for these four chapters is that if genes influencing intelligence are identified, it may become possible to test for the presence of particular genes in people, or embryos. As I also provide evidence for the burgeoning field of cognitive enhancement, it does not seem far- fetched to suggest that genetic research into intelligence might also be able to suggest some means by which intelligence could be increased.

I adopt, somewhat controversially, a permissive stance with respect to both genetic testing and the augmentation of intelligence. However if either testing or enhancement of intelligence ever become possible, they should only be undertaken with regard to particular constraints.

Chapter Four

Considering the generally controversial nature and history of intelligence testing and its applications, most people will view the development of genetic tests for intelligence with suspicion. The availability of such tests is sure to raise questions over when and how such testing should be permitted, if at all.

In this chapter, I discuss and evaluate several arguments for and against introducing genetic tests for intelligence, taking into account the current framework for psychometric testing.

I argue that it may be acceptable to offer genetic testing for intelligence in both competent and incompetent persons, subject to several constraints. These include that the test should be voluntary, should not become the ‘routine’ way of measuring intelligence (at the expense of psychometric intelligence tests), should not be required by institutions such as employers and should not be used to merely indicate an ‘IQ score’. Rather, a genetic test for intelligence should take on a more constructive role, helping persons (or their parents) to best develop their abilities.

Chapter Five

Of perhaps more concern to people than genetic tests for intelligence is the idea that genetic research into intelligence will lead to more ‘eugenic’ technologies – those

xxi Thesis Overview of selecting for, or enhancing, intelligence. My purpose in Chapter Five is to introduce the issue of enhancing intelligence and to discuss several preliminary but important issues relevant to the debate.

I begin by outlining the various technologies that could soon lead to intelligence being either selected or enhanced. I then consider two issues that are important to establishing the ‘moral landscape’ surrounding enhancement. These are whether there is a difference between treating a disease and enhancing a condition already in a ‘normal’ range; and whether there are significant differences in the various means available to enhance intelligence.

I also provide an account of the non-identity problem. This problem applies to creating people who are worse off than existing people in some way. Although these people are worse off than other people, they do not appear to be harmed by being created in this way, if their abnormality is necessary for their existence. There is no alternative better existence for them. In this chapter, I analyse how this aspect of the problem might generate a moral distinction between selection and enhancement.

This chapter also contains a brief summary of several other issues important to the moral landscape of genetic enhancement, such as issues of justice in the allocation of enhancement technology and how the ‘disability rights critique’ impacts upon the acceptability of enhancement.

Chapter Six

In Chapter Six, I examine two particularly significant ethical issues in enhancing intelligence. The first is that enhancing intelligence will deny a child the right to experience an open future. The second is that the enhancement will render a child’s subsequent intelligent actions inauthentic. I concentrate primarily on the enhancement of children, as this is arguably where an enhancement will be of most benefit. It is also the situation where enhancement is likely to be subject to the highest demand.

I argue that there are several constraints that would need to be adhered to should enhancement procedures ever go ahead including: valuing intelligence for more than its competitive advantage, not using enhancement to replace other inherently valuable xxii Thesis Overview means of enhancing intelligence, respecting a reasonably open future for the child and ensuring that the enhancement will not lead to conflicts with the recipient’s self- identity.

Chapter Seven

In the final chapter of Section III, I consider another important objection to the selection or enhancement of intelligence. Discussions of enhancements before birth (or in childhood) typically focus upon the effects that the enhancement could have upon the recipients of such an intervention. In this chapter, I instead examine potential harms to couples in choosing an enhancement for their child. If this poses a significant risk, then this could provide us with a reason not to offer genetic enhancements of intelligence.

In discussing this objection, I ask whether a person necessarily benefits by having increased choices. I identify three costs in making the enhancement decision: (1) the potential costs in having to deal with the decision process per se; (2) the potential for coercion in making such a choice; and (3) the increased responsibility that parents may harbour for their children if they make this choice. I weigh these costs against the value that making choices could have for parents.

I argue that although genetic selection choices may carry some costs, these are not significant enough to warrant overriding a presumption of parental autonomy.

Chapter Eight

At the conclusion of Chapter Seven, my analysis of issues arising from genetic research into intelligence comes to a close. In the final chapter of this thesis – Chapter Eight – I bring together the arguments and constraints that I have developed in the previous seven chapters. The core finding of my research is that there could be some legitimate applications of genetic research into intelligence. A secondary finding is that these could serve as an effective response to the radical critique against this research. I do not claim that there is a moral requirement for us to use the results of genetic research into intelligence to test for or enhance intelligence. Rather, my claim is that should any persons want to take up such applications of this research, then this is acceptable, provided that they do so within the conditions that I have described. xxiii Thesis Overview

To phrase them generally, some of the important constraints that will warrant due consideration include: the safeguarding of the interests of children in choosing their life plans; the safeguarding of parental interests in freely choosing to use these technologies; the protection of the interests of various social groups which could be adversely affected by the research; and a recognition of the limitations in the predictive properties of behavioural genetic information.

The advantages of this analysis

The Human Genome Project has identified approximately 40,000 genes.6 Functional genomics is now attempting to elucidate their function. Discussion of the ethics of the ‘new genetics’ has to date focussed upon genes influencing many human diseases, where questions raised for discussion have included: should we test children or embryos for adult-onset conditions for which no treatment is available? Should other family members, insurance companies and employers have access to genetic information? Should we screen populations for genes for diseases such as hemochromatosis?

But, the Human Genome Project will also allow for the identification of genes influencing characteristics which do not predispose or contribute to human diseases. Genes influencing height, hair colour and leg length will also be found.

Most controversially, the Human Genome Project will identify genes involved in our psychological and physical abilities, character and personality. That is, genes which contribute to who we are, rather than what diseases we shall suffer from. This is the field of behavioural genetics. Intelligence is just one example of the most controversial aspect of the Human Genome Project. The analysis of genetic research into IQ that I have undertaken in this thesis is applicable to the whole of this field of genetics, as there has been no sustained analysis of what is the most controversial area of the new genetics.

This thesis represents the first in-depth consideration of its kind. It is the first bioethical analysis of issues arising from one particular research project in genetics and

6 Venter, J.C., et al., (2001) 'The sequence of the human genome', Science, vol.291(5507): 1304-51. xxiv Thesis Overview its potential applications. I present new analyses regarding testing for and enhancing intelligence and discuss these in depth for the first time in connection with existing empirical research. I also offer substantive constraints and guidelines as to how results from this research should be used, based upon studies of both theoretical and empirical research. My work therefore represents progress towards a practically- based, ethically-derived solution towards an emerging problem in genetic research.

As I have suggested above, this approach may better inform ethical reasoning than a purely theoretical approach. This is because I examine actual practices and situations, such as: the lives of intelligent people, how people interpret complex genetic information and how genetic decisions are typically made.

However, genetic research into intelligence is obviously of great social and political importance. Since the issues here are wide-ranging and complex, I cannot hope to explore all of them in appropriate detail. Instead, my aim is to provide a moral framework that will be helpful to explore particular debates to a greater depth in future analyses on ethical and political platforms. Therefore, although my analysis is fairly broad in scope, there are a few important issues that I do not discuss at any length in subsequent chapters. I mention them here for completeness:

• The most appropriate methods of ensuring that the public is adequately informed about and involved in deliberations upon, this research;7 • Ensuring that the motivations for the research are not simply political; • Whether the results of the research (or the research itself) requires new codes of practice or other regulatory controls; • If the research is wrong, whether it is better for the research to be done in the public sector with strict controls and limitations, rather than in the private sector where control over the use of the research might not be so comprehensive; • The ethics of the research process itself – such as informed consent to participate in the research; and

7 There are dangers, for example, in assuming that the public does not know anything about this research; or that they are incapable of ever knowing anything. Additionally, members of several consumer groups and the general public have voiced concerns that such research is being undertaken without enough recourse to public debate about the consequences of this research. A significant number of responses to the Medical Research Council’s Inquiry: ‘Genes and the Mind’, for example, were particularly concerned with genetic research into intelligence occurring without full public approval. See: ‘Genes and the Mind: The People’s Response’ MRC News, Autumn 1997, p4. xxv Thesis Overview

• The degree to which knowing about the genetic influences on intelligence might affect our understanding of our ‘humanity’.

This thesis primarily offers a robust discussion of how people’s interests may be affected within a family framework. At this stage, this is perhaps the most relevant context in which this kind of genetic information will be used.

xxvi

Section I:

RESEARCH BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW OF ETHICAL ISSUES

Chapter One

1 WHAT IS INTELLIGENCE? WHAT MIGHT GENETIC RESEARCH ACHIEVE?

A discussion of the definition of intelligence and its genetic research

1.1 Introduction

Since the nineteenth century, there has been continually oscillating debate over the relative importance of biological or environmental explanations of human behaviour. Recently, advances in the knowledge of molecular genetics have led to resurgence in the popularity of biological explanations. In universities and institutes around the world, researchers are working to delineate the genetics of variation within the normal range of many human behavioural characteristics.

‘Behavioural genetics’ can broadly be defined as a complex combination of genetic and behavioural sciences, operating as an interdisciplinary field.1 Traits that behavioural geneticists are interested in vary widely and include normal and abnormal manifestations of human behaviour. Although genetic influences upon human behaviour are undoubtedly complex, researchers consider that they have the necessary tools and expertise to derive valid research results.

Research aimed at identifying genes influencing human intelligence is perhaps the best- known (and most controversial) example of behavioural genetic research. Literature in sociology, psychology and education contains hundreds, if not thousands, of references to the debates on intelligence. No other project in behavioural genetics has been subject to such wide-ranging debate, over such a broad range of issues. Indeed, the very attempt to discuss ethical issues in identifying genetic influences on intelligence has been subjected to claims that no one has yet accurately defined intelligence, or proven that researching the genetics of intelligence will be successful.

In this chapter, I review some of the most relevant issues surrounding both the definition of and research into intelligence. I suggest that whatever definition of

1 Plomin, R., DeFries, J.C., McClearn, G.E., and McGuffin, P., (2001) Behavioral Genetics, 4th Ed. New York: Worth Publishers, p xviii. 2 Chapter One – What is intelligence? intelligence might eventually prevail, similar ethical issues will arise when seeking to identify its genetic influences. I also suggest that it is likely that researchers will identify some genes contributing to the development of intelligence, or at the very least, specific intellectual abilities.

Table 1-1: Some traits being investigated by behavioural geneticists2

• Aggression • Addiction, including alcoholism and substance addiction • Anxiety • Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) • Autism • Bipolar disorder • Criminal behaviour • Dementia • General cognitive ability/intelligence/memory • Learning disability • Mood disorders • Neuroticism • Novelty-seeking • Obesity • Religious preference • Self-esteem • Schizophrenia • Sexual Orientation

1.2 What is intelligence?

A first hurdle facing investigators into the genetics of intelligence is the difficulty in defining ‘intelligence’. We all have some conception of what intelligence is. Generally, we tend to believe that there is such a thing as intelligence; as people tend to deal differently with problems presented to them in everyday life. We can also name those of our friends and family whom we believe to be ‘intelligent’, or perhaps we have wished for some more ‘intelligence’ at some time or another, whatever this might be.

However, no consensus has yet been reached as to what intelligence is; and the debate over this is certainly not new. Throughout history, definitions have been diverse and

2 I thank Melanie Hemsley for providing this information. 3 Chapter One – What is intelligence? varied, ranging from: ‘Intelligence is what the intelligence tests measure’,3 to intelligence as a concept involving a complex system of separate processes.4 During the twentieth century, ideas around the processes involved in intelligent behaviour altered as neurological research became more advanced. Presently, there are a significant number of definitions of intelligence, among both psychologists and non-specialists. I shall discuss a few such definitions in this chapter.

Some beliefs about intelligence

A great deal of literature (both within and outside of psychology) has been devoted to examining people’s beliefs about intelligence. Here, I discuss two different sources of such beliefs: those expressed by philosophers throughout history; and how laypeople perceive intelligence.

Philosophers’ views of intelligence

Although the psychological sense of ‘intelligence’ is relatively recent in origin, philosophers have discussed their views on intelligence throughout history.5 Prior to 1900, psychologists and philosophers did not distinguish intelligence from several other human characteristics, including consciousness, human nature or soul.

Plato had much to say about intelligence. He believed that one aspect of intelligence was the ability to learn. In the Republic book 5, Socrates asks Glaucon:

When you spoke of a nature gifted or not gifted in any respect, did you mean to say that one man will acquire a thing easily, another with difficulty; a little learning will lead the one to discover a great deal; whereas the other, after much study and application, no sooner learns than he forgets…?

In Theaetetus, Socrates introduced a metaphor. Socrates asks Theaetetus to imagine that every person’s mind contains a block of wax. Between people, this block of wax differs in

3 Boring, E.G., (1923) ‘Intelligence as the Tests Test it’, The New Republic, vol.35: 35-37. 4 For some examples of discussions of the definition of intelligence, see: Sternberg, R.J. and Detterman, D.K., (Eds.), (1984) What is Intelligence? Contemporary Viewpoints on its Nature and Definition, Norwood, NJ: Ablex Publishing Company; and Howard, R.L., (1997) ‘On What Intelligence Is’, British Journal of Psychology, vol.84(1): 27-37. 5 These views have been synthesised from: Sternberg, R.J., (1990) Metaphors of Mind: Conceptions of the Nature of Intelligence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Chapter Two. 4 Chapter One – What is intelligence? several qualities, such as size, hardness, moistness and purity. If the wax is pure and clear, the mind will easily retain information and distribute it to the proper place in the block of wax (due to its clearness). If however the wax is muddy, or too soft, or too hard, then there will be problems in learning or retaining information.

Hobbes believed that to acquire intellectual skills, people required ‘celerity of imagining’ (swiftness in moving from one thought to another) and ‘steady direction’ (the ability to move towards an approved end). He also believed that intelligence involved seeing similarities or differences in things that others cannot observe.

Kant believed that intelligence was a reference to the ‘higher faculties of cognition’. Intelligence had three equally important parts: understanding, judgement and reason. Kant also believed that there was a difference between creative intelligence (genius) and intelligence in learning, which he referred to as imitation:

Genius (1) is a talent for producing that for which no definite rule can be given, and not an aptitude in the way of cleverness for what can be learned according to some rule; and that consequently originality must be its primary property. (2)… Everyone is agreed on the point of the complete opposition between genius and the spirit of imitation. Now since learning is nothing but imitation, the greatest ability, or aptness as a pupil (capacity), is still, as such, not equivalent to genius.

In several of his texts, including Utilitarianism, Mill comments on aspects of higher and lower pleasures that indicate his attitude towards intelligence. I discuss his views in more detail in Chapter Three.

William James, who was both a philosopher and a psychologist, construed intelligence as the ability to associate ideas by similarity. He construed genius as the possession of this ability to an extreme degree. He also divided intelligence into two kinds: analytical and intuitive. Analytical thinkers, which included scientists and philosophers, had strengths in abstract reasoning. Intuitive thinkers included artists and critics. James valued analytical thinking more highly, as this involved not only classifying and characterising things, but noticing why such classifications were effective.

These views on intelligence are interesting, as they illustrate the great interest in intelligence throughout history. Additionally, several of the elements highlighted by the

5 Chapter One – What is intelligence? philosophers I have discussed are still represented in theories of intelligence today, including understanding, judgement and classification.

Lay theories and perceptions of intelligence

Laypeople are another group who have often been consulted for their ideas on intelligence. Studies have been undertaken spanning over 50 years to gauge people’s understanding of (and attitudes towards) intelligence.6 These opinions are important, as the impetus of laypersons can often elicit policy responses.

A main difference in the attitudes of laypersons and those of psychologists (which I will describe below) is that laypeople are more likely to utilise a broader conception of intelligence, one that includes knowledge and achievement. There are also many cultural and age-related differences in how people perceive intelligence.

Sternberg has undertaken several studies into lay conceptions of intelligence. In one, his research group interviewed people studying in a college library, entering a supermarket and waiting at a railway station.7 Results indicated that the ideally intelligent person possesses: (i) practical problem-solving skills, including being able to reason logically, identify connections between ideas and to see all aspects of a particular problem; (ii) verbal abilities, including speaking articulately and conversing well; and (iii) social competence, including admitting mistakes and displaying an interest in the world. Another study by Berg and Sternberg showed that as people get older, their opinions as to the importance of intelligence increase.8

Studies have also been undertaken to examine lay conceptions of intelligence within non-Western cultures. These have indicated that several factors about intelligence emphasised in Western culture are not shared throughout the world.9 Speed or efficiency in mental processing, for example, is not universally valued. In fact, work completed

6 For a detailed review, see: Furnham, A., (2001) ‘Self-Estimates of Intelligence: Culture and Gender Differences in Self and Other Estimates of Both General (g) and Multiple Intelligences’, Personality and Individual Differences, vol.31: 1381-405. 7 Sternberg, R.J., Conway, B.E., Ketron, J.L., and Bernstein, M., (1981) ‘People’s Conceptions of Intelligence’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, vol.41: 37-55. 8 Berg, C.A. and Sternberg, R.J., (1992) ‘Adults’ Conceptions of Intelligence Across the Adult Life Span’, Psychology and Aging, vol.7(2): 221-31. 9 Sternberg, Conway, Ketron and Bernstein. 6 Chapter One – What is intelligence? quickly may even arouse suspicion in some cultures. Yet, although many different cultures ascribe value to different traits, most cultures do recognise the importance of cognitive aspects of intelligence.

To give some examples from non-Western cultures; Malay students value practical skills, speech and creativity in addition to academic skills. In many African cultures, intelligence is viewed as a trait that facilities both intergroup and intragroup relations. In Zimbabwe, the word for intelligence, ngware, means to be ‘prudent and cautious’.10

Three psychological theories of intelligence

Historically, psychologists have only rarely reached agreement on a precise definition of intelligence, other than to agree that such a construct probably exists. It is, however, possible to put forward some general conceptions of what intelligence is. Linda Gottfredson, a prominent psychologist, has concurred with 51 other psychology academics to define intelligence as:

…a very general mental capability that, among other things, involves the ability to reason, plan, solve problems, think abstractly, comprehend complex ideas, learn quickly and learn from experience. It is not merely book learning, a narrow academic skill, or test-taking smarts. Rather, it reflects a broader and deeper capability for comprehending our surroundings – “catching on”, “making sense” of things, or “figuring out” what to do.11

In 1921, the editors of the Journal of Educational Psychology undertook what is perhaps the most well-known study of expert’s definitions of intelligence. I have reproduced some representations in Table 1-2.

10 Reviewed by: Sternberg, R.J., (2000) ‘The Concept of Intelligence’, in R.J. Sternberg, (Ed). The Handbook of Intelligence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp3-15, p5-7. 11 Gottfredson, L.S., (1997) ‘Mainstream Science on Intelligence: An Editorial with 52 Signatories, History and Bibliography’, Intelligence, vol.24(1): 13-23, p13. 7 Chapter One – What is intelligence?

Table 1-2: Expert’s definitions of intelligence12

• ‘The ability to carry on abstract thinking’ – L.M. Terman; • ‘Sensory capacity, capacity for perceptual recognition, quickness, range or flexibility of association, facility and imagination, span of attention, quickness or alertness in response’ – F.N. Freeman; • ‘Ability to learn or having learned to adjust oneself to the environment’ – S.S. Colvin; • ‘Ability to adapt oneself adequately to relatively new situations in life’ – R. Pinter; • ‘The capacity for knowledge and knowledge possessed’ – B.A.C. Henmon; • ‘The capacity to learn or profit by experience’ – W.F. Dearborn; and • ‘Sensation, perception, association, memory, imagination, discrimination, judgement and reasoning’ – N.E. Haggerty.

On these brief descriptions of what intelligence is, it appears to involve those mental abilities necessary for adaptation to different environmental contexts. If this is true, then intelligent behaviour will vary with different environments. Additionally, a person’s intelligence will not remain static throughout her life.

Within psychology however, there are many more theories as to ‘what intelligence is’.13 Here are three such theories.

General intelligence

Perhaps the most controversial theory of intelligence is that of general cognitive ability or g.14 Proponents of this theory believe that all discrete abilities are underpinned by a general, common factor. It is the relative amount of g a person has that predicts how well she performs on an IQ test.

The primary evidence offered in support of the theory of general intelligence is that there is a positive correlation between almost every reliable measure of mental ability, information retrieval, or the manipulation of information; and virtually any other measure

12 Adapted from: Sternberg, ‘The Concept of Intelligence’, p8. 13 For a review of many theories of intelligence, see: Davidson, J.E. and Downing, C.L., (2000) ‘Contemporary Models of Intelligence’, in R.J. Sternberg, (Ed). Handbook of Intelligence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp34-49. 14 Carroll, J.B., (1997) ‘Psychometrics, Intelligence, and Public Perception’, Intelligence, vol.24(1): 25-52. 8 Chapter One – What is intelligence? that involves cognitive activity. To put it another way, any person who does well on one mental test, such as reading comprehension, is likely to perform well on another, such as an analogy test or a digit substitution test.15 This suggests that people differ along some general continuum, which is labelled as ‘general intelligence’.

The g factor was first proposed by the psychologist Charles Spearman in 1904.16 He proposed that correlations between test scores are influenced by the amount of a general intelligence factor that a person has. However he also recognised that each test score would also be influenced by both error and any ability specific to that particular test.

According to those who support this theory, there is a model (termed the psychometric model) that explains cognitive abilities. Here, cognitive abilities are organised hierarchically, from specific tests, up to broad abilities (which show moderate correlation), up to general cognitive ability (Figure 1). g is one of several hierarchical theories of intelligence.

General cognitive ability (g)

Specific abilities

Tests

Figure 1: A hierarchical model of cognitive abilities.17

This theory is controversial, as some view it as a gross over-simplification of complex factors – termed ‘g-ocentrism’. Critics argue that if the g factor is relied upon too much,

15 Murphy, K.R. and Davidshofer, C.O., (1998) Psychological Testing: Principles and Applications, 4th Ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, p21. Murphy and Davidshofer cite papers by pioneers in this field, including those of psychologists Hans Eysenck and Arthur Jensen. 16 Spearman, C., (1904) ‘The Proof and Measurement of Association Between Two Things’, American Journal of Psychology, vol.15: 72-101. In the same paper, Spearman developed the statistical method of factor analysis. Factor analysis is used to analyse psychometric data in the field of abilities. Factor analysis constitutes a large (and controversial) part of the field of intelligence testing per se, but to discuss it at any length is beyond the scope of this chapter. For a review of factor analysis, see, for example: Mackintosh, N.J., (1998) IQ and Human Intelligence. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p201-30. 17 Adapted from Plomin et al, Behavioral Genetics, p157. 9 Chapter One – What is intelligence? this will lead to other key issues (such as why a person is intelligent) being overlooked.18 It is also contentious as it is this factor that researchers looking for ‘genes for intelligence’ are actually using in their studies. Detractors of the genetic research have claimed that this will provide a too-narrow description of intelligence to be useful.

A further problem in asking ourselves: ‘What is intelligence?’ is that even this question assumes that intelligence is a ‘thing’. Rather than viewing intelligence as a ‘thing’, supporters of the next two theories of intelligence argue that intelligence is better defined as a series of specific behaviours. In other words, it makes more sense to describe what an intelligent person does than to explain what intelligence is.

Sternberg’s triarchic theory

Rather than describing a general factor that constitutes intelligence, Robert Sternberg argues that intelligence is more than an academic construct; there is also a need to recognise practical skills.19

Under Sternberg’s triarchic theory, intelligence has at least three interacting sub- theories. The first is componential sub-theory, which relates intelligence to the internal mental mechanisms that underlie intelligent behaviour. The second is experiential sub-theory, which relates intelligence to how an individual mediates her internal and external worlds. The third aspect of the triarchic theory is contextual sub-theory, which relates intelligence to the ability to use our mental abilities in everyday life to attain an ‘intelligent fit’ with our environment.

The first aspect, the componential sub-theory, is the internal aspect of intelligence. This is the aspect of the theory that is best aligned with g. It describes the mental mechanisms, the

18 It is worth pointing out that since the g factor was first proposed, other theorists have developed further

theories of g: including gf and gc, which stand for fluid and crystallised intelligence respectively. For discussions of these other factors, see, for example: Kline, P., (1993) The Handbook of Psychological Testing. London: Routledge, p174-176. For a review of the argument that ‘one’ g is not enough, see: Brody, N., (2000) ‘g and the One-Many Problem: is One Enough?’ in G.R. Bock, J.A. Goode, and K. Webb, (Eds). The Nature of Intelligence (Novartis Foundation Symposium 233). Chichester: Wiley, pp122-35. 19 Sternberg, R.J., (1985) Beyond IQ: A Triarchic Theory of Human Intelligence. New York: Cambridge University Press; and Sternberg, R.J., (1997) ‘The Triarchic Theory of Intelligence’, in D.P. Flanagan, J.L. Genshaft, and P.L. Harrison, (Eds). Contemporary Intellectual Assessment: Theories, Tests, and Issues. New York: Guilford Press, pp92-104. 10 Chapter One – What is intelligence? information-processing skills, which are needed for intelligent behaviour. There are three components to the componential sub-theory:

(i) Metacomponents: the higher-order mental processes that individuals use to guide problem solving. These include being able to recognise problems and plan what one is going to do.

(ii) Performance components: to implement the instructions given by the metacomponents. These involve identifying potential solutions to a problem and weighing these against each other.

(iii) Knowledge-acquisition components: these allow an individual to learn how to acquire the knowledge necessary to solve a particular problem.

The second aspect of the triarchic theory of intelligence is the experiential sub-theory. This involves using past experiences to solve new problems and create precedents for solving similar problems in the future. Here, the ability to selectively combine and compare information is important.

The third aspect of the triarchic theory is the contextual, or external, sub-theory. This involves the practical application of the three internal aspects of intelligence that form the componential sub-theory. It is important to know when and how to try to change one’s environment or to strategically select a new one when one’s present environment is not yielding effective results. For example, learning how to allocate time and energy within a situation of studying for exams requires contextual aspects of intelligence.

These three aspects of intelligence all work together; however a person who is strong in one aspect of this intelligence might not be strong in all of them. Overall, the most important factors in intelligence are people’s abilities to capitalise on their personal strengths and compensate for their weaknesses.

11 Chapter One – What is intelligence?

Gardner’s multiple intelligences

Howard Gardner has also developed a theory of intelligence that rejects the idea that there is a broad factor underpinning success in a range of cognitive activities.20 This theory of ‘multiple intelligences’ is distinguishable from Sternberg’s triarchic theory in that multiple intelligences theory focuses more upon domains of intelligence and less upon mental processes.

Gardner argues that intelligence can be broken down into eight distinct types of cognitive ability, which correlate in only a limited way. These abilities are conserved throughout history and are respected across cultures.

Table 1-3: Gardner’s Multiple Intelligences

1. Linguistic Intelligence: Fluency in the production of language; includes people such as poets and lawyers; 2. Logical-mathematical Intelligence: Exhibited by logicians and mathematicians. 3. Musical Intelligence: Fluency in thinking in musical terms; akin to linguistic intelligence, includes composers and performers; 4. Spatial Intelligence: A capacity to operate on mental representations of large-scale space (pilots, for example); or small-scale space (chess-players or architects); 5. Bodily-Kinaesthetic Intelligence: The ability to solve problems using the whole body (an athlete, for example) or parts of the body (a surgeon or artist); 6. Interpersonal Intelligence: The ability to understand other individuals and to use this understanding to work effectively with them; includes salespeople, teachers and clinicians; 7. Intrapersonal Intelligence: The capacity to form an accurate working model of oneself and to make effective decisions based upon that model; and 8. Naturalist Intelligence: The ability to understand the patterns found in natural environments.

Each of Gardner’s ‘intelligences’ accounts for cognitive performance in a confined area. Mathematical intelligence is different to verbal intelligence, which is different to language skills. Interestingly, this model suggests that some types of intelligence conflict.

20 Chen, J.-Q., and Gardner, H., (1997) ‘Alternative Assessment from a Multiple Intelligences Theoretical Perspective’, in D.P. Flanagan, J.L. Genshaft and P.L. Harrison, (Eds). Contemporary Intellectual Assessment: Theories, Tests, and Issues. New York: Guilford Press, pp105-21; and Gardner, H., (1993) Frames of Mind: the theory of Multiple Intelligences, 2nd Ed. London: Fontana. 12 Chapter One – What is intelligence?

That is, some types of skills may interfere with others.21 If true, this could have repercussions for decisions to augment intelligence, as parents may be faced with a decision about what kinds of intelligent behaviours (such as linguistic intelligence, or spatial intelligence) they would like their child to have. These may be mutually exclusive.

Owing to factors such as genetic inheritance, training and life experience, people will develop only a selection of the eight intelligences over their lifetimes. Some of these abilities, such as spatial intelligence, may be similar to the ability measured by intelligence tests. Gardner stresses however that no test can measure all ‘intelligences’.

In this thesis, I do not actively endorse any one conception of intelligence.22 Rather, I recognise that each of these three theories (and the many others that I haven’t discussed) have their merits, but so too do they have their problems. In discussing whether it would be ethical to identify a genetic basis for ‘intelligence’, it is primarily to ‘g’ that I allude, but this is more a result of that theory being used in the research rather than that theory being clearly superior to any other. My argument applies equally no matter which theory of intelligence is adopted.

How is intelligence measured?

In addition to debates over the definition of intelligence, there is significant controversy over how intelligence is measured. It is important to discuss this debate, as similar measurement rhetoric may apply if genetic research leads to the development of genetic tests ‘for’ intelligence.

In the century or so of debate over what intelligence is, there has been only minimal agreement reached. It therefore might strike one as unusual that despite this discordance, tools to measure intelligence have been available for some time. Here, I consider one predominant measure of intelligence – IQ. It is important to recognise, however, that such a measure is largely derived from the somewhat narrow ‘g’ theory, neglecting the broader conceptions of intelligence represented by those such as Sternberg and Gardner.

21 Gardner, H., (1993) Frames of Mind, p96. 22 One reason for not explicitly endorsing one theory is that I have presented here only a fraction of what is a much larger and involved academic debate within psychology. A much more in-depth discussion would be required to answer such a question with any authority. 13 Chapter One – What is intelligence?

Although psychological tests of varying kinds have been used for over 3000 years, specific tests of intelligence were not developed until the turn of the last century.23 At this time, there were several key developments in the theory of intelligence (notably the posing of g), in addition to advances in statistical techniques.

Intelligence tests were developed in response to a practical need. In 1904, Binet and Simon developed tests of mental ability in response to a request from the French Ministry of Public Instruction.24 The Ministry required a tool to assess students who were suffering from cognitive disabilities, to determine who would benefit from remedial educational interventions. The government’s request for such tests was part of their changing attitudes to those with mental retardation, as they wished to improve how they were treated. Some tests of mental ability had been developed in Britain in the 1890s; however it is generally held that Binet and Simon’s test represented the first successful attempt at assessing intelligence.

Although Binet and Simon’s tests were successful, they were only applicable to children. So soon after Binet and Simon’s test, psychiatrist David Wechsler developed his own test for adults. The most common adult intelligence test today still bears his name – the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale. However, although undoubtedly an important and effective development, the Binet/Simon and Wechsler tests required a highly trained examiner. They were also administered on a one-on-one basis, which was not financially or practically feasible for large-scale testing.

The practical need for large-scale testing soon developed, as the onset of the First World War brought many new recruits into the United States army. In establishing new units, they needed a way to quickly identify officer candidates. This was done according to mental ability. The US army funded the development of the Army Alpha and Army Beta

23 Murphy and Davidshofer, Psychological Testing, p9-10, and Chapter Two. 24 For a comprehensive review of the history of intelligence testing, see: Matarazzo, J.D., (1972) Wechsler’s Measurement and Appraisal of Adult Intelligence, 5th Ed. Baltimore: Williams and Wilkins; Chapman, P.D., (1988) Schools as Sorters: Lewis M. Terman, Applied Psychology, and the Intelligence Testing Movement, 1890-1930. New York: New York University Press; Schneider, W.H., (1992) ‘After Binet: French Intelligence Testing, 1900-1950’, Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, vol.28(2): 111-32; Ittenbach, R.F., Esters, I.G., and Wainer, H., (1997) ‘The History of Test Development’, in D.P. Flanagan, J.L. Genshaft, and P.L. Harrison, (Eds). Contemporary Intellectual Assessment: Theories, Tests, and Issues. New York: Guilford Press, pp17-31; and Thorndike, R.M., (1997) ‘The Early History of Intelligence Testing’, in D.P. Flanagan, J.L. Genshaft, and P.L. Harrison, (Eds). Contemporary Intellectual Assessment: Theories, Tests, and Issues. New York: Guilford Press, pp3-16. 14 Chapter One – What is intelligence? tests, which were designed for literate and illiterate people respectively. These tests enabled the scrutiny of large groups of people at a time. Although these tests have been criticised,25 other kinds of group tests are still in use today.

Today, the most common outcome from an intelligence test is the intelligence quotient, or IQ. The IQ was developed by Lewis Terman at Stanford University in 1916. An intelligence quotient is designed to represent a person’s mental age, weighted against the performance of others in the same age group.

In modern testing, a ‘deviation IQ’ score is calculated. This is done by computing standard scores on a specific intelligence test and then converting these to a scale with a mean score of 100. So, a person scoring in the 50th percentile for her age group will have an IQ of 100, indicative of normal or average performance. A person scoring in the 98th percentile will obtain an IQ score of approximately 130. I represent the quantitative distribution that results from this in Figure 2.

34.13% 34.13%

13.59% 13.59%

2.14% 2.14% 0.13% 0.13%

55 70 85 100 115 130 145 (Wechsler) IQ Score

Figure 2 – The Distribution of IQ scores within the population.26 The percentiles indicate what percentage of the population could be expected to receive an IQ in that particular score range.

An IQ test is composed of numerous subtests, designed to assess various cognitive abilities. These include verbal ability, spatial ability, memory and speed of information-

25 See, for example: Gould, S.J., (1996) The Mismeasure of Man, 2nd Ed. New York: Norton. Gould argues that the test was neither simple nor standardised, and was altogether a harrowing and confusing experience for those who undertook it. 26 Diagram adapted from: Groth-Marnat, G., (1990) Handbook of Psychological Assessment, 2nd Ed. New York: John Wiley and Sons, p129. 15 Chapter One – What is intelligence? processing. The scores on each subtest are weighted for the test subject’s age and are then combined and compared with other results to provide an IQ score. Proponents of the g factor of intelligence claim that an IQ score is closely correlated to a measure of the amount of g that a person has. In Table 1-4, I provide some examples of test items.27

Table 1-4: Some examples of intelligence test items28

• Analogy Items – Finding an analogy involves looking for a relationship between the first and second part of a problem, eg: 25 is to 10 as 53 is to…. a. 2, b. 8, c. 31, d. 15, e.24. Analogies can be sought between words, numbers or letters, depending on the aspect of intelligence being examined. • Odd One Out Items – These problems involve being presented with sets of words, numbers or shapes and finding the one that doesn’t fit, eg: ‘concrete, abstract, furry, lovely, swiftly’. • Sequence Items – These problems involve completing a sequence by inserting a word, number or symbol into a sequence at its end, or in its middle, eg: ‘0.4, 2.4, 14.4, 86.4….?’

The three categories of questions in Table 1-4 are the building blocks of most intelligence tests. However they do vary in form and complexity, depending on the aspect of intelligence being tested for and the type of test being undertaken.

As there is considerable debate over what intelligence even is, it follows that intelligence tests will be unable to assess intelligence to everyone’s satisfaction. Indeed, it is important to note that testing of IQ (particularly in education) has now largely been phased out.

It is also important to note that there are several limiting factors about IQ test scores that should be communicated to test takers, to ensure that misinterpretation of a test score

27 For an in-depth analysis of test items, and comparisons between the different intelligence tests available (such as the Wechsler Scales and the Stanford-Binet tests), see, for example: Kline, The Handbook of Psychological Testing, Chapter 23. 28 Adapted from: Kline, p177-184. These items are not, however, obtained from actual intelligence tests, which are never published in order to protect the integrity of the testing process. The answers are: (d); swiftly; and 518.4. 16 Chapter One – What is intelligence? is limited. I represent these in Table 1-5. If this is not done, then the result may lead to poor decision-making or negative attitudes on the part of the recipient of test results. Similar limits about a measure of intelligence should also apply to those who undertake genetic tests of intelligence.

Table 1-5: Common misinterpretations of IQ scores

1. IQ is misinterpreted as fixed, innate and unchangeable. Actually, the opposite is true. IQ scores are subject to a range of environmental influences. 2. IQ is exact and precise. An IQ score is instead an estimate. It is expected that there will be fluctuation if the test is taken more than once. 3. IQ tests measure everything that intelligence is. IQ tests only measure a limited range of abilities. A large number of behaviours that are thought to be indicative of ‘intelligence’, such as many of Gardner’s ‘intelligences’, are beyond the scope of IQ tests. An IQ test cannot give a complete picture of intelligence; rather it assesses various areas of functioning.29

Uses of intelligence tests

Tests of mental abilities are used in a wide variety of situations.30 For example, although they are no longer used to place students in University, or to assess every student’s ‘potential’, intelligence tests are often used to select children for placement in special educational programs, or to identify specific learning abilities, or disabilities. It varies from country to country whether these tests are administered by educational institutions, or by a clinical psychologist.

Ability tests might also be used by employers in both the public and private sectors to aid personnel selection. Testing is still widely used in the armed forces of many countries, to ensure the optimal placement of individual soldiers according to their skills or abilities.

These days, perhaps the most common use for intelligence testing is within a clinical setting. Clinical psychologists often employ intelligence tests in assessing individual clients. Not all clinical psychologists are qualified to offer intelligence testing, but for those who are, it provides a valuable opportunity to not only assess ability, but to examine a subject’s response to a challenging situation. It is interesting to note that in individualised clinical

29 This table has been adapted from: Groth-Marnat, Handbook of Psychological Assessment, p127. 30 Murphy and Davidshofer, Psychological Testing, p10-11. I discuss the value that these could have for individuals in more detail in Chapter Four. 17 Chapter One – What is intelligence? testing, the clinician herself is an integral part of the experience. Indeed, the rapport that clinicians have with their clients is usually considered as part of the measurement instrument. Intelligence testing and the uses to which it is put have, however, been subject to a significant amount of criticism.

Controversies in the application of intelligence testing

Intelligence tests have been criticised ever since they were first introduced.31 For example, King has claimed that the IQ test is in fact ‘an artefact, an administrative convenience, useful for ranking individuals for the purpose of social administration, ’ and that:

IQ is middle class intelligence, the ability to solve the kinds of problems that middle class people need to be able to deal with… the supposedly “objective” measure of human abilities is heavily coloured by social ideas and interests.32

It is important to recognise this controversy, as in (potentially) introducing genetic tests for intelligence, similar issues will certainly arise.33 For example, there is sure to be concern that (as with psychometric tests for intelligence), genetic tests may come to be considered as the only valid predictor of intelligence. Current psychometric testing tends to produce a single score, which, for example, might not accurately represent those who think in ways that are alternative to the norm. It is therefore important to recognise the place of psychometric testing (and potentially genetic testing) within a broad definition of intelligence in varying contexts.34

Another important aspect of the controversy over intelligence testing is the question of classification in itself and it will also be important to bear this criticism in mind should genetic tests for intelligence become possible. Many people are concerned about the inherent ‘labelling’ that underpins intelligence testing and believe that people should have

31 See, for example: Strenio, A.J., (1981) The Testing Trap. New York: Rawson, Wade Publishers Inc. 32 King, D., ‘How to Control Science: A Case Study’ GenEthics News, August/September 1997, Available at: http://www.ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/genethicsnews/archive.htm (accessed 18 June 2001). 33 I discuss these issues at greater length in the subsequent chapter and in Chapter Four. 34 Groth-Marnat, Handbook of Psychological Assessment, p41, 121. 18 Chapter One – What is intelligence? an opportunity to ‘prove themselves’ before undertaking a test.35 For example, in the 1920’s, the intelligence testing movement was derided as ‘driven by ideological or extrascientific factors’ and ‘a value-laden idea with significant implications for the stratification of schooling practices and outcomes’.36 In an exchange in The New Republic between Terman, who was a central figure in the development of intelligence tests; and Lippman, who opposed them. Lippman wrote:

I hate the impudence of a claim that in fifty minutes you can judge and classify a human being’s predestined fitness in life. I hate the pretentiousness of that claim. I hate the abuse of scientific method which it involves. I hate the sense of superiority which it creates, and the sense of inferiority which it imposes.37

Perhaps the best-known controversy surrounding intelligence testing is its relevance to discussions of differences between ethnic groups.38 This controversy is sure to heighten once genetic research into intelligence is undertaken within different ethnic groups. When testing was first introduced, it was observed that some ethnic groups (such as those of Eastern European ethnicity) performed, on average, worse than others. At the height of the eugenics movement (which I describe in more detail in the subsequent chapter), intelligence testing was instrumental to denying immigrants access to the United States. It was also used to exclude Hispanic or other races from the US Army and to justify segregation within schools.

Regarding psychometric testing, one of the explanations for this difference in performance between groups is that the tests themselves were unfairly biased towards a particular group. That is, people from varying cultural backgrounds simply do not always approach problem-solving in the same way. Even I, as an Australian, would fare quite poorly on an American-based test, due to factors such as the primary differences in

35 See, for example: Howe, M.J.A., (1997) IQ in Question: The Truth about Intelligence. London: SAGE. 36 Valencia, R.R. and Suzuki, L.A., (2000) Intelligence Testing and Minority Students: Foundations, Performance Factors, and Assessment Issues. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, p7. 37 Lippman, W., (1923) ‘The Great Confusion: A Reply to Mr Terman’, The New Republic, vol.XXXIII(422):145-146, p146. 38 See, for example: Helms, J.E., (1997) ‘The Triple Quandary of Race, Culture and Social Class in Standardized Cognitive Ability Testing’, in D.P. Flanagan, J.L. Genshaft, and P.L. Harrison, (Eds). Contemporary Intellectual Assessment: Theories, Tests, and Issues. New York: Guilford Press, pp517-32. 19 Chapter One – What is intelligence? measurement between our two cultures. It is not difficult to imagine the further difficulties that test takers may face.

It would indeed be both unfortunate and damaging if genetic testing were to effectively ratify these putative group differences. Additionally, if ability tests were the only means of educational or personnel selection, this may eventually lead to a segregation effect in our society, where non-academic intellectual abilities are not appreciated.39

A fourth issue in psychometric tests of intelligence involves the use of test results in inappropriate contexts. Some critics of testing claim that there is a danger that a particular test will sometimes be used to determine who receives occupational advancement, or a place in a particular educational program, when that particular test was never designed for assessing such purposes. Or, a particular intelligence test could be used when advancement should depend upon more than merely this test outcome. Care will have to be taken with genetic tests for intelligence to ensure that such tests are not used to inappropriately deny individuals opportunities to which they might otherwise have had access.

Another problem with intelligence testing is that the testing process has been criticised as being arbitrary. Interestingly this is one problem which might be circumvented by genetic testing for intelligence. Under current testing procedures, if a person is nervous or anxious or in any other way threatened by her environment, then she will perform less well than if no such threat had existed. A particular way in which an arbitrary result can occur is if a person being tested is faced with a pre-existing stereotype, such as ‘poor people always do worse on intelligence tests’, or ‘Asians always do better’.40 If such hindering factors external to a person’s ability are not accounted for, then her test score may not be an accurate representation of her ability. As the outcome of a genetic test will not depend at all upon the psychological state of the test taker, this is one problem that will be avoided.

39 This issue is discussed further in the subsequent chapter. 40 Claude Steele is one who is concerned about such a factor interfering with ability testing. His research has centred around ‘stereotype threat’, where a person’s fear or anxiety about being stereotyped threatens their performance. See: Steele, C.M., (1997) ‘A Threat in the Air: How Stereotypes Shape Intellectual Identity and Performance’, American Psychologist, vol.52(6): 613-29 and Steele, C.M. and Aronson, J., (1995) ‘Stereotype Threat and the Intellectual Test Performance of African Americans’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, vol.69(5): 797-811. Croizet and Claire extend this theory to low socio-economic status: Croizet, J.-C. and Claire, T., (1998) ‘Extending the Concept of Stereotype Threat to Social Class: the Intellectual Underperformance of Students from Low Socio-Economic Backgrounds’, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, vol.24(6): 588-94. 20 Chapter One – What is intelligence?

Despite these criticisms however, it is also important to appreciate that just as psychometric tests of intelligence have their critics, there are some valid reasons why they exist. It is also important to recognise that it can be reasonably assumed that genetic tests will offer similar benefits. Often, ability testing is used to identify talent, such that a particular capacity can then be targeted for development. Ability tests are also used to identify intellectual ability in members of disadvantaged groups. This can lead to opportunities being offered to people who would not otherwise have had access to them. It is also interesting to consider what would happen if there were no tests. If this were to happen, then decisions for opportunities such as university entrance, jobs and other desirable opportunities may be made in the same way as they were prior to the advent of testing – often by arbitrary selection based on personal contacts or privilege. It does not seem desirable to return to a climate of such subjectivity.41

The lesson here is to not take intelligence out of context. An important point that I will make now (and will return to throughout this thesis) is that it is vital to never confuse a person’s intelligence, or a measure of their intelligence, with that person’s worth or value.

Summary

So far, I have discussed several plausible theories of intelligence and one way in which intelligence can be measured. Whilst it is not my intention to commit to any particular definition of intelligence, for the purposes of this thesis I have assumed that g, or general intelligence is an adequate description of what intelligence is. This is largely because this best reflects the attitude taken by the researchers; and it is not the purpose of this thesis to come to a determination about either the definitional or scientific value of this research. However, in making such a claim, I also recognize that there are other plausible theories of intelligence. It may be possible to commit to a range of definitions of intelligence, to serve different purposes in different contexts.

41 Murphy, K.R. and Davidshofer, C.O., (1991) Psychological Testing: Principles and Applications, 2nd Ed. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, p28-9. 21 Chapter One – What is intelligence?

1.3 What might genetic research into intelligence achieve?

Researchers have long been interested in the causes of differences in intelligence between people – and genetic causes are no exception. Genetic studies of intelligence are divisible into two broad classes. These classes reflect the researcher’s interest in either the genetic influence on variation in intelligence, or in identifying specific genes that influence intelligence.

The first class, quantitative genetic studies, involve the use of statistical tools (such as factor analysis) to apportion the amount of differences between individuals that are due to genetic differences. Molecular genetic studies, on the other hand, involve the utilisation of the various tools of the ‘new genetics’, to map genes involved in intelligence to various locations on human chromosomes.

I’ll summarise both approaches to the research here, as the results from quantitative genetic studies will impact upon the significance that the results of molecular genetic studies will have, once they are completed.

Intelligence is, of course, not regarded as determined by the inheritance of only a few genes. Rather, it is seen as a complex trait (or quantitative trait), influenced by many genes and the environment. Intelligence develops from a combination of potentially hundreds of genes, which will have effects of varying magnitude.

A brief history of genetic research into intelligence

Intelligence was the first trait to be subjected to behavioural genetic investigation. Although interest in the inheritance of human characteristics can be traced back to the ancient Greeks, ‘modern’ interest in behavioural genetics can be attributed to the work of Francis Galton in the late 1800’s. In his book Hereditary Genius,42 Galton developed a theory around the apparent grouping of ‘excellence’ within families. He believed that this was mainly due to biological heredity. In other publications around this time, Galton also developed some of the statistical tools necessary to undertake quantitative genetic research, such as correlation. He also started the eugenics movement, which aimed to increase the

42 Galton, F., (1869) Hereditary Genius. London: Macmillan and Company. 22 Chapter One – What is intelligence? amount of ‘excellence’ within the population, by influencing people who possessed ‘excellence’ to have more children.

Although Galton’s theories on the inheritance of intelligence have now been usurped by more sophisticated knowledge of inheritance, his work on statistical tools has not. For example, his work upon the systematic methods of measuring individual differences is still of importance to this day.

After Galton’s initial theories were published, one of the first behavioural genetic investigations was carried out by E.L Thorndike in 1905 (interestingly, at around the same time as the first intelligence test was developed).43 Thorndike examined the resemblance of older and younger sets of twins, to see to what degree the environment contributed to individual members of twin pairs becoming more dissimilar as they aged. The first adoption studies of intelligence were carried out in the 1920’s.

Since that time, the discipline of behavioural genetics has steadily grown. The most significant development in the discipline over the past 15 years has been the introduction of molecular genetic techniques to identify specific genes influencing behaviour, which I discuss below.

Currently, the majority of researchers perceive that both inheritance and environment facilitate the development of intelligence. Importantly, they also believe that there are significant interactions between these factors. They argue that rather than genes being strictly deterministic (which was what Galton believed), genes determine the likelihood of a particular behaviour.44 The various genes contributing to complex traits may not contribute equally to the phenotype. Additionally, different ‘versions’ of these genes (alleles) in individual people will interact uniquely with both other genes and environmental stimuli.

43 For a review, see: Rende, R.D., Plomin, R., and Vandenberg, S.F., (1990) ‘Who Discovered the Twin Method?’ Behavior Genetics, vol.20: 277-85. 44 Gottesman, I.I., (1997) ‘Twins: En route to QTLs for Cognition’, Science, vol.276: 1522-23. 23 Chapter One – What is intelligence?

Quantitative methods of research

The first class of genetic research into intelligence, quantitative genetics, involves the use of statistical tools to undertake comprehensive analyses of genetic contributions to complex traits. The tools are used to assess the extent to which individual differences within a particular population can be attributed to genetic effects (the heritability of the trait) or to environmental effects. Quantitative genetic studies of intelligence are concerned only with measuring its heritability, without regard to either the number or kind of genes involved.

Heritability

Heritability can be defined as the extent to which genes contribute to variation in intelligence within any given population.45 That is, heritability is not relevant to the intelligence of a particular individual – a heritability estimate of 50 percent does not indicate that half of my intelligence is due to my genes. Rather, heritability is a measure of the genetic contribution to individual differences (termed the variance) across a particular population. The question usually asked is: ‘how much of the difference between groups A and B is due to genetic influences?’

To think about heritability, consider the following analogy.46 Take the area of a rectangle. To understand its area, knowledge of both length and width is required. If information about either width or length is missing, the area simply disappears. Yet, if a population of rectangles is considered, then it is possible to ascertain to what extent the areas of a group of rectangles depend on differences in their width or length. If all of the rectangles have the same width, then any differences in their areas can be attributed to their lengths. For length and width, read environments and genes.

Heritability measures in quantitative analyses of intelligence have traditionally been drawn from three forms of study: family studies, twin studies and adoption studies, which I discuss further below. These three methods involve fixing either genetic or environmental variables (akin to fixing the length or width of the rectangle) to study the significance of the

45 For a review, see: Devlin, B., Daniels, M., and Roeder, K., (1997) ‘The Heritability of IQ’, Nature, vol.388(6641): 468-71. 46 Plomin et al, Behavioral Genetics, pp87-88. 24 Chapter One – What is intelligence? other component. To this end, heritability measures are given as a correlation of the genetic contribution compared to environmental factors, which is then expressed as a percentage. These studies have consistently demonstrated that intelligence is heritable, although there is inconsistency between specific studies as to what its heritability may be.

Now, heritability is a concept that is often misconstrued. It is important to emphasise that heritability measures cannot be applied to individuals. Instead, heritability measures the extent to which genetic factors contribute to differences between individuals. This has been summarised by Plomin and DeFries:

Heritability tells us what proportion of individual differences in a population – known as variance – can be ascribed to genes. If we say, for example, that a trait is 50 percent heritable, we are in effect saying that half of the variance in that trait is linked to heredity. Heritability, then, is a way of explaining what makes people different, not what constitutes a given individual’s intelligence. In general, however, if heritability for a trait is high, the influence of genes on a trait would be strong as well.47

As I mentioned above, three methods have traditionally been used to investigate the heritability of intelligence.

Family studies

When researchers became interested in whether intelligence was heritable, they first had to establish whether there was any similarity in intelligence between parents and children. This was achieved by examining the correlation of intelligence levels within families.

To examine this correlation, several large studies were undertaken. In such studies, a correlation of 1.0 would indicate a very strong case for the inheritance of intelligence; and a correlation of zero would indicate that the scores were no more similar than if the family members had been two randomly selected strangers. Because children share, on average, half of their genes with each parent, the highest correlation that could be expected on genetic grounds alone was 0.5. Results of these large family studies indicated that there was indeed a similarity between parents’ and children’s intelligence. Families were more similar

47 Plomin, R. and DeFries, J.C., (1998) ‘The Genetics Of Cognitive Abilities and Disabilities’, Scientific American, vol.278(5): 62-69, p63. 25 Chapter One – What is intelligence? for intelligence than unrelated individuals. The actual correlation observed between parents and children was 0.25; however this did not indicate whether the similarity between the scores of parents and children were due to genetic or environmental effects.

To separate out genetic and environmental effects, researchers then developed the tools of twin and adoption studies. Twinning and Adoption provide interesting ‘natural’ scenarios where the variables of either genetics or environment can be controlled.

Adoption studies

Adoption studies involve comparing adopted children to both their biological and adopted parents. Adoption is interesting, as it leads to two kinds of scientifically interesting social arrangements, both of which are relevant to behavioural genetics. The first is that adoption leads to individuals sharing an environment who are not genetically related. The second is that it leads to genetically related individuals who do not share an environment. Individuals who share an environment but not genes can tell us about the contribution of the environment to intelligence; and individuals sharing genes but not an environment can tell us something about the contribution of genetic factors to intelligence.

Adoption studies upon intelligence have largely been carried out within two long-term adoption studies: The Texas Adoption Project,48 (led by Horn et al) and the Colorado Adoption Project49 (established by Plomin et al).

From these studies, it appears that genetic factors are present in intelligence. There are similarities in intelligence for both genetically related parents and offspring and siblings who do not share an environment. Consider the following correlations, represented on the next page.

48 Reports from this project include: Horn, J.M., (1983) ‘The Texas Adoption Project: Adopted Children and their Intellectual Resemblance to Biological and Adoptive Parents’, Child Development, vol.54(2): 268- 75; and Horn, J.M., Loehlin, J.C., and Willerman, L., (1979) ‘Intellectual Resemblance Among Adoptive and Biological Relatives: the Texas Adoption Project’, Behavioral Genetics, vol.9: 177-207. 49 Reports from this project include: Plomin, R. and DeFries, J.C., (1983) ‘The Colorado Adoption Project’, Child Development, vol.54(2): 276-89; Plomin, R., Fulker, D.W., Corley, R., and DeFries, J.C., (1997) ‘Nature, Nurture, and Cognitive Development From 1 to 16 Years: A Parent-Offspring Adoption Study’, Psychological Science, vol.8(6): 442-47; Fulker, D.W., DeFries, J.C., and Plomin, R., (1988) ‘Genetic Influence on General Mental Ability Increases Between Infancy and Middle Childhood’, Nature, vol.336(6201): 767-69; and Wadsworth, S.J., DeFries, J.C., Fulker, D.W., and Plomin, R., (1995) ‘Cognitive Ability and Academic Achievement in the Colorado Adoption Project: A Multivariate Genetic Analysis of Parent-Offspring and Sibling Data’, Behavior Genetics, vol.25(1): 1-15. 26 Chapter One – What is intelligence?

Table 1-6: Correlations from Adoption data for intelligence50

Parent-Offspring Siblings Genetically Related AND 0.42 0.47 Same Environment Genetically Related Only 0.24 0.24 Same Environment Only 0.20 0.32

By comparing the figures for the correlations for intelligence between, for example ‘genetically related and same environment’ to ‘genetically related only’, one can observe that genetics accounts for approximately half of the resemblance for ‘genetically related and same environment’ parents and siblings. The other half of the variance is due to shared family environment, as indicated by the resemblance between adopted parents and adopted children, in addition to adopted siblings.

Twin studies

Twins are the most commonly studied group in behavioural genetics.51 Twin studies compare the resemblance of identical twins (who share the same genetic makeup) with fraternal twins. Fraternal twins share the same amount of genes as normal siblings, but as they grow up at the same time as each other, share more similar environmental influences. If intelligence is influenced by genetics, then identical twins should be more similar than fraternal twins are. Results from twin studies are then extrapolated to the general population, to suggest how much genetics influences the variance in intelligence. Longitudinal twin studies have generated a heritability estimate for intelligence of around 50 percent.

A particularly interesting twin study was published in Science in 1997.52 This study suggests that as we grow older, the contribution of genetics to differences between us remains at the same level as it did in adolescence. That is, the heritability of intelligence in a group of octogenarians is just as great as it is for younger groups. This is a somewhat surprising finding, as intuitively we might think that our experiences over our lifetime might

50 Adapted from: Plomin et al, Behavioral Genetics, p75. 51 For a general review of methods and theory, see: Roberts, D.F., Bouchard, T.J., and Propping, P., (1995) ‘Twins as a Tool of Behavioural Genetics’, Journal of Biosocial Science, vol.27(2): 245-46. 52 McClearn, G.E., Johansson, B., Berg, S., Pedersen, N.L., Ahern, F., Petrill, S.A., and Plomin, R., (1997) ‘Substantial Genetic Influence on Cognitive Abilities in Twins 80 or More Years Old’, Science, vol.276(5318): 1560-3. 27 Chapter One – What is intelligence? influence how we function as we age. This study suggests that although education and other influences do impact upon intelligence, that genetic differences still contribute a significant amount to differences between individuals. However, it is also important to note that the absolute contribution of genes to intelligence is still unknown.

A model for the inheritance of intelligence

Quantitative genetic studies have provided a general model for the inheritance of intelligence. This model was drawn from observations of a ‘normal’ distribution of IQ scores in the population and the evidence for heritability shown above. The model proposes that a person’s intelligence will develop from genetic and environmental influences. The genetic aetiology of intelligence will involve many genes of small effect, each with several alleles (or ‘versions’). Each gene will also interact with environmental stimuli. Some alleles of particular genes will aid intelligence, while others will decrease intelligence (‘mutations’) and may contribute to cognitive disability. Therefore, we would expect that people with average IQ scores would have different combinations of half of the increasing and half of the decreasing alleles. If an individual has a high IQ score, she would have IQ-increasing alleles for more of these genes.53

Limitations of quantitative research into intelligence

Whilst interesting, quantitative genetic studies of intelligence are also subject to several limitations. For example, as I mentioned above, one important limitation of these studies is that they cannot be used to determine the contribution of genes to the development of intelligence in individuals. The relative contributions of genetics and environment to individuals are very difficult to establish, as the two have been continually interacting since a person was born.

Additionally, quantitative studies are specific to the population and time at which the measure was obtained; and so they cannot detect fluctuations and variations not present at the time a particular population was measured.54 Different populations of people might

53 DeFries, J.C. and Fulker, D.W., (1985) ‘Multiple Regression Analysis of Twin Data’, Behavior Genetics, vol.15(5): 467-73; Chorney, M.J., Chorney, K., Seese, N., Owen, M.J. et al., (1998) ‘A Quantitative Trait Locus Associated with Cognitive Ability in Children’, Psychological Science, vol.9(3): 159-66. For a review, see; Thapar, A., (1994) ‘The Genetics of Mental Retardation’, British Journal of Psychiatry, vol.164: 747-58. 54 Gottesman, ‘Twins: En route to QTLs for Cognition’. 28 Chapter One – What is intelligence? have different environmental variables, or different genetic variation present. This means that a heritability measure obtained from one population cannot be applied generally.

Quantitative heritability studies are also incapable of detecting any genes involved in intelligence, or even specifying how many genes there might be. Further, quantitative studies have also been subjected to a large amount of criticism. This has included doubts that intelligence is even heritable,55 criticism that heritability studies ignore the interaction between genetics and environment,56 and questioning the assumptions (such as different environments) that are made in the studies. For these reasons, researchers were quick to embrace molecular genetic techniques when they became amenable to problems in behavioural genetics.

Despite these problems, the role of quantitative genetics is still very important. These tools have demonstrated a significant heritability of intelligence. Information gained from these studies can subsequently be used to empower a molecular genetic investigation, as heritability measures can inform researchers about the significance of any molecular data they might discover.

Molecular methods of research into intelligence

In an attempt to understand the biological mechanisms that contribute to cognition, a research team at the Institute of Psychiatry in London (led by Robert Plomin) is now undertaking a large project to identify genes influencing high intelligence, using an approach known as allelic association.57 The researchers believe that studying DNA directly may overcome the statistical limitations of quantitative techniques. They also

55 See, for example: Kamin, L.J., (1974) The Science and Politics of IQ. Potomac, MD: Earlbaum. 56 Wahlsten, D., (1994) ‘The Intelligence of Heritability’, Canadian Psychology, vol.35: 244-60. 57 For a review, see: Plomin, R., McClearn, G.E., Smith, D.L., Vignetti, S. et al., (1994) ‘DNA Markers Associated with High Versus Low IQ: The IQ Quantitative Trait Loci (QTL) Project’, Behavior Genetics, vol.24(2): 107-18; Daniels, J., McGuffin, P., and Owen, M., (1996) ‘Molecular Genetic Research on IQ: Can it be Done? Should it be Done?’ Journal of Biosocial Science, vol.28(4): 491-507; and Daniels, J., McGuffin, P., Owen, M.J., and Plomin, R., (1998) ‘Molecular Genetic Studies of Cognitive Ability’, Human Biology, vol.70(2): 281-96. The researchers are investigating high as opposed to average or low intelligence because they believe that this will be the most efficient strategy. They hypothesise that ‘high g’ will only develop if a person has many positive g alleles, and only a few negative ones. On the other hand, average or low intelligence can be caused by other genetic or environmental factors, which would make the hunt for ‘genes for g’ more difficult. Similar projects are also being undertaken around the world, however this is the largest. 29 Chapter One – What is intelligence? expect that these methods will eventually enable a substantial understanding of cognitive processes to be obtained.

The aim of the allelic association technique is to identify various genetic loci that contribute to intelligence, called QTLs, or Quantitative Trait Loci.58 DNA from children with high and low intelligence (measured using a variety of psychometric tests) is being studied by comparing many polymorphic markers (DNA sequences with known variations between people; which act as a ‘flag’ to indicate that a gene may be at this particular area of the genome) between the two samples.59 A finding that a particular DNA marker is present more often in a group with higher intelligence may indicate that a gene contributing to intelligence lies in the chromosomal region of that particular DNA marker. An advantage of this technique is that it is capable of detecting genes with a very low contribution to a trait. This is beneficial in the case of intelligence, as it is thought that there will be many genes involved, each contributing a small amount to the overall variation in intelligence. However, allelic association will never find all of the genes contributing to intelligence, as the contribution of some genes will be too small to be identified.

A disadvantage of the allelic association method is that it requires the testing of many markers throughout the genome, which can be expensive. It was also limiting until recently as not enough markers had been identified, yet with the completion of the human genome project this is now not such a problem. Further, there is some debate over how widely results using this technique may be applied, as to date putative QTLs for intelligence have been identified within one ethnic group only. Because of this, research results may not necessarily be able to be extrapolated to other populations.

One investigation using this approach examined markers on the long arm of chromosome six, considered to have a role in neurological functioning. In 1998, a significant association between a DNA marker on chromosome six and high intelligence was identified.60 A particular form of a DNA marker in the hormone receptor gene Igf2r was found to be present in a high number of children with high IQ, suggesting a QTL for

58 For a review of this technique, see: Lander, E.S. and Schork, N.J., (1994) ‘Genetic Dissection of Complex Traits’, Science, vol.265: 2037-48. 59 Plomin et al., ‘DNA Markers Associated with High Versus Low IQ: The IQ Quantitative Trait Loci (QTL) Project’. 60 Chorney et al., ‘A Quantitative Trait Locus Associated with Cognitive Ability in Children’. 30 Chapter One – What is intelligence? intelligence (or, consistent with Gardner’s theory above, a subset of intelligence such as logical reasoning). Since that first finding, several more putative QTLs have been identified on chromosome four.61 However, further research is necessary to delineate the significance of these findings and to search for other genes in proximity to this marker.

The endpoint of this research is by no means the identification of genes alone. Once genes influencing intelligence have been identified (and the studies replicated) further studies will then be necessary to understand the biochemical and physiological pathways that these genes are involved in. This subsequent research has already been given a name: ‘behavioural genomics’.62

It is important to also recognise that this is scientifically controversial research. Indeed, many are quick to point out the dangers in searching for genes for a single intelligence factor, which could rule out the importance of investigating discrete abilities, such as mathematical or musical abilities. There is clearly still a lot to be understood about how intelligence develops in individuals. Additionally, once the genetic aetiology of intelligence has been established, it will then become important to ensure that the information is not over-interpreted. I’ll now describe some of the limitations that will be necessary to bear in mind when interpreting this research data.

1.4 Putting the significance of genetic explanations in perspective

For as long as the relationship between intelligence and genetics has been discussed, there have been concerns that such discussions are of themselves promoting a determinist view of intelligence. And, as I will discuss further in the subsequent chapter, the ethical issues arising from genetic research into intelligence will depend upon how the significance of genetic data about intelligence is interpreted. I therefore conclude this chapter by highlighting some of the limitations that it will be important to recognise when interpreting genetic data about intelligence.

61 Fisher, P.J., Turic, D., Williams, N.M., McGuffin, P. et al., (1999) ‘DNA Pooling Identifies QTLs on Chromosome 4 for General Cognitive Ability in Children’, Human Molecular Genetics, vol.8(5): 915-22. 62 McGuffin, P., Riley, B., and Plomin, R., (2001) ‘Genomics and Behavior: Toward Behavioral Genomics’, Science, vol.291(5507): 1232-49. 31 Chapter One – What is intelligence?

Determinism

‘Genetic Determinism’ is a broad term used to describe the view that a person’s genes causally explain her traits such as intelligence, with her environment playing only a minimally modifying role. That is, our traits, diseases and capabilities can be solely attributed to the additive effects of genetics and environmental stimuli. Genetic information is thus seen as a ‘blueprint’ for the development of intelligence.

This view sits in virtual opposition to ‘environmentalism’, supporters of which claim that the various environments that a person is exposed to during her development are the major determinant of her intelligence, with genes playing only a secondary role.63

Contrary to what some critics might argue, the researchers involved in finding genes influencing intelligence are not believers in genetic determinism. According to Plomin:

Some of the fears [about the research] derive from misunderstandings about what genetics can and cannot do. The main misunderstanding is to think that genes determine outcomes in a hardwired, there’s-nothing-anyone-can-do-about-it way… [instead] behavioural dimensions (and their extremes and disorders) are complex traits influenced by many genes as well as by many environmental factors.64

In another general commentary (with Rutter), he has argued:

There is the assumption that genes are directly determinative such that if you have a particular gene, you will inevitably get the disorder with which it is associated… But the vast majority of medical conditions are not like that at all. Instead, they are multifactorially determined, meaning that they arise from the interplay among a mixture of genetic and environmental risk and protective factors… Accordingly, genetic effects are probabilistic rather than deterministic in their effects.65

Yet although they are not obviously determinists, these researchers are still enthusiastic about the potential significance of their research. They generally perceive that genes are an

63 Pigliucci, M., Genotype-Environment Interactions and Our Understanding of the Biological Bases of Human Cognitive Abilities [Draft Paper]; Available at: http://fp.bio.utk.edu/wisdom/Essays/nature-nurture.html (Accessed 8 November 2001). 64 Plomin, R. and Crabbe, J., (2000) ‘DNA’, Psychological Bulletin, vol.126(6): 806-28, p823. 65 Rutter, M. and Plomin, R., (1997) ‘Opportunities for Psychiatry from Genetic Findings’, British Journal of Psychiatry, vol.171: 209-19, p210. 32 Chapter One – What is intelligence? important primary causal factor in the development of intelligence. Consequently, they argue that genetic data can legitimately be used as a primary resource when seeking to understand the development of intelligence, compared to studying environmental influences on intelligence, or brain physiology.66 Researchers also believe that genetic data about a variety of behaviours will influence clinical psychology and will be valid enough to use in various diagnoses.

Limits upon the interpretation of genetic factors

Despite their enthusiasm for their research, the researchers undertaking genetic research into intelligence concur with their critics in recognising some limits upon the significance of their findings. For example, Plomin and Crabbe have claimed that the identification of genes influencing behaviour should not preclude other kinds of important research into intelligence:

These advances will need to be integrated with corresponding advances in understanding the multiple, interactive environmental influences as well. 67

Additionally, they recognise the undeniably complex nature of the information they are dealing with:

Identifying QTLs is one thing, but understanding their effects will take much more time… There are two built-in limitations to this DNA revolution. The first is that all behavior involves gene-environment interplay. The second is the unsolved question of the distribution of effect sizes of QTLs; some may involve effects so small or so complicated that they will never be detected.68

However, debates within Philosophy of Science have tended to arrive at a more conservative position upon the significance of genetic factors as causes of human traits (including intelligence).69 Scholars within this discipline are concerned that in the

66 For a more in-depth discussion of such views, see: Schouten, M.K.D., ‘Memory Genes Knocked Out: Gene Manipulation as a Reduction Tool in Cognitive Neurobiology’ (paper presented at the Society for Applied Philosophy Annual Conference, Manchester, United Kingdom, 2000). 67 Plomin and Crabbe, ‘DNA’, p806. 68 McGuffin, Riley, and Plomin, ‘Genomics and Behavior: Toward Behavioral Genomics’, p1249. 69 See generally: Kitcher, P., (2001) ‘Battling the Undead: How (and How Not) to Resist Genetic Determinism’, in R. Singh, et al., (Eds). Thinking about Evolution: Historical, Philosophical and Political Perspectives (Festchrifft for Richard Lewontin). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Schouten, ‘Memory 33 Chapter One – What is intelligence? enthusiasm over genetic explanations of human traits (and by privileging the seeking of genetic data over other kinds of research), complex developmental processes will be over- simplified.

One particular conservative view is interactionism. Supporters of interactionism believe that rather than emphasising either genetic or non-genetic factors in development, the interaction between the two should be emphasised instead.70 Thus from an interactionist’s perspective, intelligence would develop from successive interactions of a person’s genotype with her environment, such that the predictive value of genetic data is limited.

Interactionists also argue that it is important to recognise other, potentially random, factors which will influence human development. These factors should be borne in mind when considering genetic influences upon intelligence. Regarding genetic factors, it is important to first recognise that there will be many genes influencing intelligence. Additionally, many of the genes influencing intelligence are likely to influence other traits – a phenomenon known as pleiotropy.

Further, the genes influencing intelligence might not be limited to those that are identified by research projects of the kind that I have described above. For example, another theory of the genetics of intelligence is that the X chromosome might be of particular importance, due to the localisation of many genes for mental retardation to the X

Genes Knocked Out’; Schaffner, K.F., (1998) ‘Genes, Behavior and Developmental Emergentism. One Process, Indivisible?’ Philosophy of Science, vol.65:209-252; Griffiths, P.E. and Knight, R.D., (1998) ‘What is the Developmentalist Challenge?’ Philosophy of Science, vol.65: 253-58; Strohman, R.C., (1997) ‘The Coming Kuhnian Revolution in Biology’, Nature Biotechnology, vol.15: 194-200; Wolf, U., (1995) ‘The Genetic Contribution to the Phenotype’, Human Genetics, vol.95: 127-48; Griffiths, P.E. and Gray, R.D., (1994) ‘Developmental Systems Theory and Evolutionary Explanation’, Journal of Philosophy, vol.91: 277-304; Lewontin, R.C., (1993) The Doctrine of DNA: Biology as Ideology. London: Penguin. 70 Fogle, T., (1995) ‘Information Metaphors and the Human Genome Project’, Perspectives in Biology and Medicine, vol.38(4): 535-47; and Johnston, T., (1987) ‘The Persistence of Dichotomies in the Study of Behavioral Development’, Developmental Review, vol.7: 149-82.

34 Chapter One – What is intelligence? chromosome.71 Yet another hypothesis has posed that mitochondrial DNA might play a role.72

Another phenomenon to recognise is that non-genetic factors will intervene in the development of intelligence by modifying gene expression, perhaps in response to environmental stimuli. An example of a non-genetic factor influencing gene expression is the case of genomic imprinting. Genomic imprinting is an epigenetic process. In an epigenetic process, compounds such as methyl groups bind to DNA to prevent genes from being expressed. This differs from ‘typical’ regulation of gene expression, where the products of other genes influence gene expression. For some genes, either the maternal or paternal copy is always imprinted.

This kind of imprinting may have a role in intelligence. Keverne et al73 have established that the maternal genome in the mouse contributes to the development of the cortex and hippocampus, which have roles in learning and memory. Here, the genes inherited from the father (that would normally contribute to these structures) have been imprinted. The paternal genome, on the other hand, contributes to the development of the hypothalamus, considered to have a role in aggression.74 Here, maternally inherited genes have been silenced.

I have summarised the factors that it is necessary to appreciate when interpreting genetic data about intelligence in a table on the following page.

71 Turner, G., (1992) ‘Genes for Intelligence on the X Chromosome’, Journal of Medical Genetics, vol.29: 71- 72; Turner, G., (1996) ‘Intelligence and the X Chromosome’, The Lancet, vol.347(9018): 1814-5; Turner, G. and Partington, M., (1991) ‘Genes for Intelligence on the X Chromosome’, Journal of Medical Genetics, vol.28: 429; Gécz, J. and Mulley, J., (2000) ‘Genes for Cognitive Function: Developments on the X’, Genome Research, vol.10:157-163. 72 In one study, these researchers found an association between IQ and one allele from an ‘expressed sequence tag’ (a commercially available DNA library representing a particular area of the human genome) when they compared DNA samples from high and low IQ children: Skuder, P., Plomin, R., McClearn, G.E., Smith, D.L. et al., (1995) ‘A Polymorphism in Mitochondrial DNA Associated with IQ?’ Intelligence, vol.21: 1-11. 73 Keverne, E.B., Fundele, R., Narasimha, M., Barton, S.C. et al., (1996) ‘Genomic Imprinting and the Differential Roles of Parental Genomes in Brain Development’, Developmental Brain Research, vol.92: 91- 100. 74 Bear, M.F., Connors, B.W., and Paradiso, M.A., (1996) Neuroscience: Exploring the Brain. Baltimore, MD: Williams and Wilkins. 35 Chapter One – What is intelligence?

Table 1-7: A framework for interpreting genetic data about intelligence

It is important to recognise that: • Genes associated with intelligence must be interpreted within the context of other biological signals and the environment (cellular, extracellular and extraorganismic). There is a complex web of causes. Genes can be singled out for analysis, but this does not mean that they are all that should be considered as relevant. • There are factors which complicate DNA expression: o Spontaneous mutations; o Pleiotropy; o Variable penetrance: just because a gene is there does not mean that it will always be expressed o Variable expressivity; genetic makeup cannot tell us how mild or severe the expression of a trait will be. • A genetic component to a behavioural trait does not mean that the behaviour cannot be altered • There will only be rare circumstances where a single gene type is closely tied to a single type of behaviour • Behavioural phenotypes will not be entirely predictable from genetic information

1.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have provided a review of both the definition of intelligence and the mechanisms of its genetic research. I have discussed several plausible theories of intelligence and a way in which intelligence can be measured.

I have also reviewed genetic research into intelligence. Although molecular research is yet to produce conclusive, replicated results, it does not seem too far-fetched to claim that some genes influencing intelligence will be identified.

The significance of this chapter is that this framework can be used as a representation of a reasonable conception of genetic information about intelligence, to be utilised to undertake an analysis of the ethical implications of this research.

Chapter Two

2 THE RADICAL CRITIQUE AGAINST GENETIC RESEARCH INTO INTELLIGENCE

What are the ethical issues associated with identifying genetic influences on intelligence?

2.1 Introduction

Intelligence is such a highly valued human attribute that is so intimately linked with what makes us human that its genetic dissection will arouse very strong emotions in many people – including anger and fear.1

Anything to do with intelligence is deep water; combine it with genetics and it becomes positively shark-infested.2

Perhaps no issue in the history of science presents such a complex mixture of conceptual, methodological, biological, psychological, ethical, political and sociological questions as the controversy over whether intelligence has a substantial genetic component.3

Genetic research into intelligence is certainly one of the most controversial applications of genetic technology. Indeed, many have argued that we should question the wisdom of undertaking such research at all, given its potential implications. In this chapter, I provide an overview and analysis of the position of those opposed to genetic research into intelligence. My purposes are to elucidate what the likely benefits of the research will be, to clarify what opponents of the research have claimed and to outline the major issues which will become the subject of subsequent chapters.

1 Clarke, A., (1999) ‘The Genetic Dissection of Complex Traits’, in V. Launis, J. Pietarinen, and J. Räikkä, (Eds). Genes and Morality: New Essays. Amsterdam: Rodopi, pp103-19, p112. 2 Burne, J., ‘Gene Genetics’ The Sunday Times (UK), 1 February 1998, pBP3. 3 Block, N.J. and Dworkin, G., (1976) ‘IQ, Heritability and Inequality’, in N.J. Block and G. Dworkin, (Eds). The IQ Controversy: Critical Readings. New York: Pantheon Books, pp410-540, p410. 37 Chapter Two – The Radical Critique

After describing some putative benefits of this research, I identify five criticisms against it, which I collectively term the ‘radical critique’. They are: that the research itself is not valid science; that the research will lead to a genetically determined view of intelligence; that the research results will be misused; that ‘eugenic’ applications of the research will result; and that the research is a bad allocation of resources.

I argue that the proponents of the radical critique have, of course, identified several points for concern about this research and its potential applications. However, they have failed to present a valid case as to why their objections should preclude the research from taking place. The critique also harbours several misconceptions of the research. Yet what the radical critique does highlight is several important issues that scientists, policy-makers and the public should be wary of in dealing with the results of this research.

2.2 Potential benefits from this research

Whilst they have not been emphasised by either those undertaking this research or its critics, genetic research into intelligence does offer some potential benefits. There are at least five classes. First, knowledge of the genetics of intelligence may be valuable per se, regardless of any applications it may lead to.4 For example, the research could influence some of the long-running disputes about intelligence, such as the degree to which genes influence differences in intelligence between groups. Prominent intelligence researcher Hans Eysenck has argued that it would be better to obtain genetic data about our intelligence, rather than to defer to mere speculation for information.5 Other behavioural geneticists share Eysenck’s view. Krooth has argued that:

[I]f we take the position that people, generally, are too stupid or ignoble to deal sensibly with the truth, then how will they act in the absence of the truth? Truth

4 Goodman, R., (1992) ‘Locating the Genes for Intelligence: A Cause for Concern?’ Paper provided by author. 5 Eysenck, H.J., (1994) ‘The Intelligence Controversy: The Ethical Problem’, in E. Erwin, S. Gendin, and L. Kleinman, (Eds). Ethical Issues in Scientific Research: An Anthology. New York: Garland, pp371-75. 38 Chapter Two – The Radical Critique

discovered is a constraint, but truth imagined can be used to rationalize all kinds of appalling behaviour… In general, the more we know, the better we behave.6

It is also important to notice here that genetic research into intelligence will not merely shed light upon the genetic influences on intelligence. Rutter and Plomin have pointed out that one of the benefits of quantitative genetic research on behaviour is that it has shown that environmental influences are just as important as genetic influences. They have also argued that environmental influences tend to be person- specific.7 We can reasonably expect that molecular research will also shed light upon environmental influences on intelligence.

A second potential benefit of this research is that in addition to the researchers themselves gaining a greater understanding of the relationship between genetic and non-genetic contributions to intelligence, so too might the public come to have a greater understanding of genetics and intelligence. This would occur via the various debates, discussions and dissemination of research results.8 As Reiss claims:

Until recently the repeated publication in the non-specialist media of ‘gene for…’ stories may have simply reinforced a public equation of ‘genes’ with ‘inevitability’… It is possible that advances in genetics, including research on the genetics of intelligence, will lead people to have a better understanding of the limitations of ‘the gene for…’-type stories and that this will especially be the case when the genes in question are relevant for particular people.9

A third benefit of research is that it could also assist in understanding brain physiology, neural pathways to learning and memory, in addition to and the

6 Krooth, R.S., (1976) ‘Genes, Behavior and What Will Become of Us’, Man and Medicine: the Journal of Values and Ethics in Health Care, vol.1: 255-64, p262. Author’s Emphasis. 7 Rutter, M., and Plomin, R., (1997) ‘Opportunities for Psychiatry from Genetic Findings’, British Journal of Psychiatry, vol.171: 209-19. By ‘person-specific’, they mean that rather than being able to generally considered, environmental factors actually have quite specific effects in particular people. Even within families, the same environmental effects can make children different rather than similar. 8 In making such a claim, I do not wish to imply that society currently has a poor understanding of behavioural genetic research. As I discuss in subsequent chapters, studies on people’s conceptions of the causes of behavioural traits show that they have a sound understanding of their complexity. 9 Reiss, M.J., (2000) ‘The Ethics of Genetic Research on Intelligence’, Bioethics, vol.14(1): 1-15, p12- 13. 39 Chapter Two – The Radical Critique development of intelligence in general. Molecular genetic research, in particular, might lead to opportunities for researchers to increase their understanding of causal processes in the brain, as neurological research alone cannot fully explain intelligence. According to Plomin:

[B]asic science has much to gain from neurogenetic research on brain functions related to learning and memory… there is also much to celebrate here in terms of increased potential for understanding our species’ ability to think and learn.10

A fourth, related, benefit is that the research could also assist in understanding how the development of intelligence can go awry, leading to learning disabilities. Currently, many cases of mental retardation are considered as broadly ‘non-specific’. If genes contributing to normal variation in intelligence are found, then understanding how these function could assist in the understanding of what might sometimes go wrong.

A fifth reason why undertaking genetic research into intelligence might be beneficial is that genetic research might provide us with novel ways of providing interventions to optimise intellectual potential in individuals.11 For example, such interventions could help to alleviate mild mental retardation, perhaps in a similar way that a modified diet can prevent the onset of the symptoms of Phenylketonuria (a particular kind of mental retardation) in young children.

Psychologists argue that it is generally uncontroversial to desire improving intelligence per se. Additionally, I argue in Chapter Three that intelligence is valuable.12 In fact, in psychometrics, there are often colloquiums and symposia held to identify different ways in which intelligence can be ‘enhanced’. Moreover, many programs

10 Plomin, R., DeFries, J.C., McClearn, G.E., and McGuffin, P., (2001) Behavioral Genetics, 4th Ed. New York: Worth Publishers, p182. 11 To be sure, whether the means used for such interventions should be environmental (such as a behavioural change) or biological (such as a vitamin supplement to modify gene expression) is an important question. I address this in more detail in Chapter Five. 12 There does seem to be a fairly clear relationship between intelligence ‘levels’ and a person’s quality of life. A higher level of intelligence often correlates with higher earnings, a lower likelihood of criminal activity, and better health. See, for example: Gordon, R.A., (1997) ‘Everyday Life as an Intelligence Test: Effects of Intelligence and Intelligence Context’, Intelligence, vol.24(1): 203-320. I discuss this issue further in the subsequent chapter. 40 Chapter Two – The Radical Critique have been established over the past few decades to boost children’s intellectual potential.13 As the précis to a recent psychology conference states:

We think the time is right to consider intellectual enhancement, for several reasons…[A]lthough much of the scientific effort has been with the issue of what intelligence is, what most people seem to be interested in are the questions “Can intelligence be increased?” and “If so, how?”14

Despite these important (and not altogether unlikely) benefits of genetic research into intelligence, many objections have been made against it. These objections do not address many of these benefits, save for public understanding being improved (which is disputed anyway). Rather, those concerned with this research draw their objections from the broader implications that the research may have.

2.3 The radical critique against genetic research into intelligence

While “pure”, “disinterested”, scientific curiosity may motivate this research, there are strong grounds for concern about the pursuit of such research and for doubting the practical wisdom of embarking upon it.15

Throughout history, research into intelligence has been subjected to criticism. From the first suggestions that it had a heritable component, to the development of intelligence tests, to efforts to identify genes involved, there have been claims and counter-claims and equally passionate opinions on both sides. As research methods have developed, however, some agreements have been reached. For example, the debates over ‘nature vs. nurture’ are now settled to some extent, with both enthusiasts and detractors of this research recognising that both biology and environment play a significant role in the development of a person’s intelligence. But, there is still

13 These include programs such as Venezuela’s Project Intelligence and the Head Start program in the United States. For a review of such programs, see: Nickerson, R.S., (1986) ‘Project Intelligence: An Account and Some Reflections’, Special Services in the Schools, vol.3(1-2): 83-102; and Ellsworth, J., and Ames, L.J., (Eds.), (1998) Critical Perspectives on Project Head Start: Revisioning the Hope and Challenge, Albany: State University of New York Press. 14 Extracted from the précis of the Spearman Conference Website: http://www.psych.usyd.edu.au/spearman/precis.html (accessed August 23, 2001). 15 Clarke, ‘The Genetic Dissection of Complex Traits’, p111. 41 Chapter Two – The Radical Critique precious little agreement. In fact, the research is continually critiqued and researchers are asked to justify their intentions. There is very little agreement upon the scope, validity or expected outcomes of the research.

Although the literature is yet to see a significant analysis of the ethical framework around identifying genetic influences on intelligence, several issues have been raised in the media, academic journals and in public inquiries into this research.16

Case Study: The Campaign for Real Intelligence

A particularly strong objection against genetic research into intelligence has been provided by the Campaign for Real Intelligence. In 1996, the United Kingdom’s Medical Research Council faced criticism when it announced its intention to fund the Institute of Psychiatry £1.8 million to DNA type and establish cell lines from 5,000 pairs of British twins. This resource was to be used to look at molecular links between genes and intellectual development.

The Campaign, led by biotechnology critic Dr David King, provided a particularly strong voice in this debate. This group (now incorporated into Human Genetics Alert17) was formed in an attempt to stall Plomin’s research funding. Among the claims they made were that the research ‘can only lead to elitism’,18 that ‘money should be put into the education system, so everyone can fulfil their potential’ and that ‘there are some areas of human life where it is simply too dangerous for us to try and take control’.19

16 Clarke, A.J., (1997) ‘Limits to Genetic Research? Human Diversity, Intelligence and Race’, in P.S. Harper and A.J. Clarke, (Eds). Genetics, Society and Clinical Practice. Oxford: BIOS Scientific Publishers, pp207-18; Clarke, ‘The Genetic Dissection of Complex Traits’; Daniels, J., McGuffin, P., and Owen, M., (1996) 'Molecular Genetic Research on IQ: Can it be Done? Should it be Done?' Journal of Biosocial Science, vol.28(4): 491-507; Goodey, C., (1996) ‘Genetic Markers for Intelligence’, Bulletin of Medical Ethics, (126): 13-16; Harper, P.S., (1995) 'DNA Markers Associated with High Versus low IQ: Ethical Considerations', Behavior Genetics, vol.25(2): 197-8; Newson, A. and Williamson, R., (1999) ‘Should we Undertake Genetic Research on Intelligence?’ Bioethics, vol.13(3/4): 327-42; Reiss, ‘The Ethics of Genetic Research on Intelligence’. 17 See: http://www.hgalert.org (Accessed 5 October 2001). 18 Munro, J., ‘Campaigners Call for Debate on ‘Intelligence Gene’ Research’ Health Matters, Spring 1996, Available at: http://www.luna.co.uk/~health/issues/hm130.htm (Accessed 28 October 2001). 19 http://www.geocities.com/RainForest/Canopy/3770/journal.htm. (Accessed 25 September 2001). 42 Chapter Two – The Radical Critique

Such strong opposition to the research had an effect: the MRC decided to hold over the funding and established a public consultation process to determine the dominant concerns with genetic research into behavioural disorders.20 In their submission to this consultation, members of the Campaign gave the following reasons why funding for research into the genetics of intelligence should be blocked:

a) ‘It is based upon a false identification of intelligence with IQ’;

b) ‘It would encourage genetic determinism and associated harmful social consequences, such as selectiveness in education’;

c) ‘It opens up huge possibilities for eugenic abuse’; and

d) ‘It would divert funding from research with a genuine medical benefit’.21

In their response to the Campaign, the Medical Research Council attempted to account for this critique by stressing the potential benefits of the research. They also stipulated (in a public consultation document) that ‘measures to avoid unacceptable uses of research and to allay fears will be needed.’22 The Campaign responded that the negative consequences of this research are ‘inevitable and severe’ and that ‘the harmful impacts of identifying IQ genes, in a free market society, are neither preventable, nor difficult to forecast.’23

A parallel position also taken by Campaign members was that before being allocated any public funding, all research projects should be subjected to a social risk/benefit analysis. This would involve a wider range of expertise in the assessment of research proposals and some democratic (and potentially public) input. Even though the Campaigners conceded that precise prediction of the research results in

20 The project was also not funded in its first application cycle due to concerns about the ‘timeliness, design and cost-effectiveness’ of the proposal. See: Editorial, ‘MRC Rethinks Research’ The Times Higher Education Supplement, 1 November 1996, Accessed at: http://www.thesis.co.uk. 21 King, D. 'How to Control Science: A Case Study'. GenEthics News, August/September 1997, Available at: http://www.ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/genethicsnews/archive.htm (accessed 18 June 2001). Below, I use these reasons as a framework for discussing the radical critique against this research. 22 Dooley, T., Genes and the Mind... A Guided Tour of the Genetics of Mental Health. London: Medical Research Council, 1997. 23 King, ‘How to Control Science’. 43 Chapter Two – The Radical Critique the case under discussion would not be possible at the outset, they believed that due to the risks involved, no research should continue without a risk/benefit analysis.

The MRC’s inquiry received a relatively small response. These responses, however, did highlight several important concerns with research into behavioural disorders generally. Eventually, Plomin’s funding was reinstated and is still continuing.24 What the Campaign did achieve, however, was to bring a research project into the public domain, which forced the researchers to explicitly spell out both their scientific and political positions.

Whilst the Campaign certainly raised the collective consciousness about this research, there has yet to be a substantial analysis of the objections that were raised. In the next section, I take each of the Campaign’s objections in turn and consider how seriously each one should be taken.

Concerns with finding genetic influences on intelligence

From the four concerns raised by the Campaign, five classes of classes of concerns with finding genetic influences on intelligence can be generated. Collectively, these can be termed the ‘radical critique’ of genetic research into intelligence.

In the United Kingdom, both the Medical Research Council and the Nuffield Council on Bioethics have asked the public for their views on behavioural genetics.25 I have used their consultation documents and some of the responses that they have received here.26 Table 2-1 provides a summary of the radical critique against genetic research on intelligence.

24 Personal Communication, Ruth Carleton, Information Officer, Medical Research Council. This grant is known as the TEDS (Twins Early Development Study). 25 The Nuffield Council on Bioethics is due to report in June 2002. See: Nuffield Council on Bioethics, (2001) Genetics and Human Behaviour: The Ethical Context. Public Consultation Document. Available at: http://www.nuffieldbioethics.org (Accessed 16 March 2001); Dooley, Genes and the Mind...; and ‘Genes and the Mind: The People's Response’. MRC News, Autumn 1997, p4. 26 For the current Nuffield Council on Bioethics inquiry, only those submissions that have made freely available on the Internet have been used. The Nuffield Council will not make other submissions available until after they release their report. 44 Chapter Two – The Radical Critique

Table 2-1 Overview of the Radical Critique

The research itself is not valid science: • The methods for researching in behavioural genetics and for interpreting the results, are invalid; • The end-point of intelligence does not have a valid measure. The research will lead to deterministic interpretations of intelligence: • The research will lead to a genetically determined view of intelligence; • The research will mean that other domains for explaining intelligence are ignored. The research results will be misused: • Third parties will use this information to discriminate against people; • Genetic research into intelligence will reinforce perceptions of ethnic superiority, leading to discrimination. Eugenic applications of research will be developed: • Parents will use the results to choose to have a child with higher intelligence; • The State will encourage parents to select for higher intelligence. The research is a bad allocation of resources: • Funds for this research would be better spent elsewhere.

I’ll now discuss each aspect of the radical critique in more detail.

The research itself is not valid science

The first reason advanced by the Campaign for Real Intelligence for blocking research into the genetics of intelligence was that ‘the research is based upon a false identification of intelligence with IQ’. This kind of criticism has been advanced often throughout the history of genetic research into intelligence, together with criticisms of the methodology, which I discussed in more detail in the previous chapter.27 Often equally fervent, yet diametrically opposite, opinions are held by members of the same research disciplines.

These problems can be conceived of as both conceptual and methodological in nature. Conceptually, critics of genetic research into intelligence believe that the target of ‘intelligence’ itself is a false one. As there is no agreement upon either the

27 For several papers that criticise the idea that intelligence is largely heritable, see: Heng Leng, C. and Chee Khoon, C., (Eds.), (1984) Designer Genes: IQ, Ideology and Biology, Selangor, Malaysia: Institute for Social Analysis. 45 Chapter Two – The Radical Critique definition or measurement28 of intelligence, any genetic research into one particular definition of intelligence is sure to lead to misleading results, which don’t tell the whole story of biological influences on intelligence. This research may also not recognise that there are other skills and requirements that constitute intelligent behaviour in different contexts. Methodologically, there is also criticism that too much significance as to the role of genetic factors has been gleaned from heritability studies. Critics are at pains to argue that molecular studies will only ever explain a fraction of intelligence.

Although these conceptual and methodological concerns with the research are not strictly ethical criticisms, King (arguing in the context of science per se) claims it is necessary to debate the scientific merits of any particular research project at the same time as the broader ethical implications. This is because the social consequences of genetic research into intelligence are dependant upon its definition and dominant scientific theory, which are often socially or politically motivated:

It is necessary to take seriously the ways in which scientific ideas and the choice of scientific problem are influenced by social ideas and interests.29

King is thus suggesting that if the science involved is either spurious or politically motivated, then this can have ethical implications, such as whether it is appropriate to allocate resources to the project.

There have indeed been some interesting and challenging criticisms about current projects attempting to ‘find genes for’ intelligence. Yet given the repeated publication of studies investigating both quantitative and molecular aspects of intelligence in reputable journals, critics of the methodology have not succeeded in proving that no such relationship between genes and intelligence exists. Therefore, I undertake my analysis of the ethical implications of this research with the assumptions listed on the next page.

28 See, for example: Howe, M.J.A., (1997) IQ in Question: The Truth about Intelligence. London: SAGE. Howe argues that intelligence cannot be measured by IQ. 29 King, ‘How to Control Science’. 46 Chapter Two – The Radical Critique

• At the very least, there is likely to be a probabilistic relationship between genes and intelligence. That is, there are likely to be genetic tests made available which can provide probabilistic information about a person’s ability levels.

• Even if there is no reliable relationship between genetics and general intelligence (or ‘g’), there are likely to be more predictable relationships between particular abilities (such as mathematical abilities) and particular alleles. For example, there have been putative genes identified for perfect pitch.30 I am utilising intelligence as an example, but if other more discrete classes of genes are identified, many similar ethical issues will apply.31

Further, supporters of the Campaign for Real Intelligence, in trying to question scientific validity by smuggling in questions of social consequences, are perhaps confusing the issue. Surely if reputable research (carried out within a recognised methodological framework) implies that there are genetic influences upon intelligence, this should stand regardless of the social consequences of this research.

The implications of identifying genetic influences on intelligence are dependant on what society deems ethically acceptable, not upon the scientific facts about genetics and intelligence.

The research will lead to deterministic interpretations of intelligence

The second concern expressed by the Campaign for Real Intelligence was that (contrary to the putative benefit to public understanding of genetics and intelligence) genetic research into intelligence will ‘encourage genetic determinism and associated harmful social consequences, such as selectiveness in education’. To form two further aspects of the radical critique, I have split this concern into two and will discuss the ‘associated harmful consequences’ below. This leaves the second component of the radical critique: that genetic research into intelligence will promote deterministic

30 Baharloo, S., Johnston, P.A., Service, S.K., Gitschier, J. et al., (1998) ‘Absolute Pitch: an Approach for Identification of Genetic and Nongenetic Components’, American Journal of Human Genetics, vol.62(2): 224-31. 31 It is important to note, however, that to some extent it will be impossible to predict exactly what ethical issues will arise in response to this research. For example, if it eventually emerges that there are literally thousands of genes influencing intelligence (of a particular ability), with each making only a small contribution, then issues surrounding genetic testing and genetic enhancement may simply never arise because these technologies will be impossible. 47 Chapter Two – The Radical Critique interpretations of the causes of intelligence and that this will remove attention from other influences on intelligence.

Several commentators have expressed concerns about the potentially deterministic interpretations of genetic research into intelligence, whereby social problems will become technically defined as being due to individuals’ biology.32 They are worried that the role of genes in the development of intelligence is likely to be over-emphasised by the popularity of genetic explanations,33 and that this ‘profound significance’ accorded to genetic data will arise regardless of the conduct of the researchers in discussing their findings.34 Clarke has argued that the research will promote the message ‘that people’s genetic constitution determines their abilities and personal characteristics.’35 King has argued that the research ‘will make people believe that everything we are is determined by our genes’.36 Similarly, Lappé has claimed that:

As more attention is drawn to the molecular substratum of biological phenomena, we come to think of genes as the ultimate determinants.37

An over-emphasis upon genetic factors might also lead to research into other components of behaviour being stymied. The Nuffield Council on Bioethics, for example, is concerned about the impact of behavioural genetic research upon research into social or environmental factors influencing behaviour.38

32 Human Genetics Alert, Human Genetics Alert Response to Nuffield Council Consultation on Behavioural Genetics. 2001, Available at: http://www.hgalert.org/topics/behavGenetics/nuffieldResponse.htm (Accessed 28 May 2002). 33 See, for example: Rose, S., (1995) ‘The Rise of Neurogenetic Determinism’, Nature, vol.373(6513): 380-2. Rose raises this concern in the context of neuroscientific research. 34 Harper, ‘DNA Markers Associated with High Versus low IQ’. 35 Clarke, ‘The Genetic Dissection of Complex Traits’, p112-3. Author’s emphasis. 36 Arthur, C., ‘Gene Link Claimed with Intelligence’ The Independent (United Kingdom), 3 July 1997, p6. 37 Lappé, M., (1976) ‘Commentary: What's in the Genes Anyway?’ Man and Medicine: The Journal of Values and Ethics in Health Care, vol.1(4): 268-72’, p268. 38 Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Genetics and Human Behaviour: The Ethical Context. See also: Pelosi, A. and David, A., (1989) ‘Ethical Implications of the New Genetics for Psychiatry’, International Review of Psychiatry, vol.1: 315-20. These authors raise a similar concern in the context of psychiatric disorders. 48 Chapter Two – The Radical Critique

One submission to this inquiry claimed:

The danger with behavioural genetics is that it could tempt us to pursue the path of genetic reductionism…. a ‘geneticisation’ or medicalisation of human behaviour could mean that less attention was paid to educational and social influences on human behaviour.39

If this were to occur, then this could subsequently lead to the adoption of genetic models of intelligence and the ignorance of environmental or social influences. This could then cause further problems, such as badly formed social policy.40 For example, currently effective interventions in education might be hindered if there is consensus that genetic factors are the primary influence upon intelligence, or that nothing can be done to alter them. Lappé has argued that:

[A]n insidious effect of organizing the world according to genetic models can be the danger of ruling out environmental or social factors that might be changed to effect an improvement in the human condition in favour of policies that point towards genetic solutions… the emphasis given to the role played by one causal factor over the other can bias the outcome of policy decisions.41

The worry that this research will promote determinism has unfortunately not been alleviated by the media coverage it has attracted to date. It is understandably difficult for the media to achieve balance between encouraging debate about controversial research and ensuring that the public is not misled about the potential significance of the research findings. Additionally, as the relationship between genetic factors and intelligence is undoubtedly complex and remains uncertain, this adds to the difficulty of effectively reporting the research. Still, media coverage of this research has met this challenge rather poorly. Generally, very little space has been allocated to the research to ensure an adequate explanation. Further, sub-editor’s

39 Sutton, A., Response by the Centre for Bioethics and Public Policy to the Nuffield Council on Bioethics Public Consultation Document: Genetics and Human Behaviour: The Ethical Context. 2001, Available at: http://www.cbpp.ac.uk/index.html (Accessed 29 November 2001). 40 Lappé, M.A., (1976) ‘Reflections on the Cost of Doing Science’, Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, vol.265: 102-11. 41 Ibid, p103. 49 Chapter Two – The Radical Critique headlines such as ‘Scientists Close in on Genius Gene’42 or ‘Scientists discover gene that creates human intelligence’43 have probably only further misled readers.

And in the print media, even if misleading headlines are discounted, article content also often runs a risk of misleading the reader. An article in the United Kingdom’s Mirror, for example, when discussing the ‘thickest person in Britain’, suggested that ‘research suggests the 31-year-old Geordie is probably a bit short in the chromosome 6 department’.44 The same article also stated that ‘young clever-clogs have twice as many super-genes as average children’ – a gross over-generalisation of research results to date. Additionally, although satirical, a section in The Guardian about the Igf2r loci described it as ‘on the long arm of chromosome six – if you’re lucky’ and ‘the gene that influences our intelligence – or lack thereof’.45 Such discussion of the link between this preliminary research finding and intelligence (and using it to draw comparisons between people) is sure to be misleading, as it is highly likely that many (if not most) highly intelligent people will not have the particular loci identified by Plomin’s group.

Further, as was the case with the so-called ‘homosexuality gene’, whilst early research results are often widely reported in the media, further studies (which might fail to replicate the study’s results) tend to garner very little attention. This suggests that the public is often not provided with an accurate picture of the status of research projects in behavioural genetics.

This aspect of the radical critique provides an important constraint on the genetic research of intelligence. To limit the potentially detrimental effects of this research upon individuals, or upon social policy, it is vital that the nature and significance of the genetic data obtained is well understood. This research should not proceed unless it is supplemented by a discussion of how the information may bear upon our current understandings of intelligence. I have provided such an analysis in the previous

42 Urquart, C. ‘Scientists Close in on Genius Gene,’ The Times (London), 10 August 2000, p8. 43 Highfield, R., ‘Scientists Discover Gene that Creates Human Intelligence’ Daily Telegraph (London), 31 October 1998, p13. 44 Armstrong, J., ‘Pure Gene-ius’ The Mirror (UK), 18 September 1998, p6. 45 ‘Pass Notes No 1113 - Gene Igf2r’ The Guardian (London), 3 November 1997, pG2:3. 50 Chapter Two – The Radical Critique chapter, where I suggested some necessary constraints that we should impose upon considerations of the significance of genetic factors.

The research results will be misused

Another component of the radical critique against genetic research into intelligence is that the results of this research will be misused and that this will lead to ‘harmful social consequences, such as selectiveness in education’.46 A more florid description of this aspect of the critique can be phrased something like this:

Rather than providing means to help people with low intelligence, research into genetic influences on intelligence is likely to cause many problems. These include: (i) institutions misusing the research, which will lead to people being denied social resources such as education or welfare; and (ii) entire groups of people (such as particular ethnic groups, or those with low intelligence) being detrimentally labelled or stigmatised.

Perhaps the most likely means by which such harms might eventuate would be if genetic tests ‘for’ intelligence were administered in a similar way to how medical genetic tests are now (these often carry a duty of disclosure to insurance companies, for example), or were perhaps used for population-wide screening. I discuss the potential harms of such genetic tests for individuals in greater detail in Chapter Four. Here, I discuss some of the social repercussions that may arise.

According to this aspect of the radical critique as I have represented it above, the first problem in allowing research into the genetics of intelligence to proceed is that the research results are likely to be misused by institutions (such as educators or employers), which will lead to individuals being discriminated against.47 For the most of us who share such a concern, there is a fear that if institutions such as educators or employers were to request genetic tests for intelligence, this would lead to intelligence being considered as ‘unchangeable.’48 If this were to occur it could lead to people

46 King, ‘How to Control Science’. 47 In Chapter Four, my argument in favour of permitting genetic tests for intelligence relies upon institutional bodies not having access to test results. However, as many have expressed such a concern with regard to the use of research results, it is important that I recognise the issue here. 48 Some controversial academic papers in the past have made claims not unlike this one. See, for example: Jensen, A.R., (1969) ‘How Much Can we Boost IQ and Scholastic Achievement?’ Harvard Educational Review, vol.19: 1-123. 51 Chapter Two – The Radical Critique being denied important social resources such as education. At worst, the availability of such tests could be incorporated into new discriminatory social policies, to the exclusion of many, which could lead to a so-called ‘genetic underclass’.49 Lappé points out the (potentially dangerous) attractiveness of genetic information to policy- makers:

While we have only the most tentative clues about the role of genes in determining complex human phenomena like educability…, we are still sorely tempted to use even that limited knowledge base to affect social policy.50

As scholars such as Stephen Jay Gould have so often pointed out, the history of the intelligence testing movement does not provide us with great confidence that social policy in light of genetic tests for intelligence will be developed in a just way.51 For in the past (and as was discussed in the previous chapter), psychometric intelligence tests have unfortunately often been used to unfairly discriminate against individuals. Quantitative heritability estimates of intelligence (and other behaviours) too have been used to develop bad social policy on a number of occasions;52 indeed Castelman in 1976 argued that ‘our track record in constructively applying what we already do know leaves too much to be desired.’53

Additionally, Goodey has argued that genetic research into intelligence would also vastly increase the number of people who might be labelled as ‘abnormal’ and would therefore be discriminated against, encountering ‘prejudice where it did not exist before’. This redefining of the normal will mean that these people will ‘have to cope

49 See, for example: Christian Action Research and Education (CARE), Genetics and Human Behaviour: The Ethical Context. Response from CARE to the Nuffield Council on Bioethics. 2001, Available at: http://www.care.org.uk/resource/docs/medeth_nuffield.htm (Accessed 27 November 2001). 50 Lappé, ‘Commentary: What’s in the Genes Anyway?’, p268. 51 Gould, S.J., (1996) The Mismeasure of Man, 2nd Ed. New York: Norton. 52 See, for example: Headings, V.E., (1976) ‘Ethical Dimensions of Optimizing Human Intelligence’, Perspectives in Biology and Medicine, vol.20(1): 30-36; Rose, S., Kamin, L.J., and Lewontin, R.C., (1984) Not in Our Genes: Biology, Ideology, and Human Nature. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books; Billings, P.R., Beckwith, J., and Alper, J.S., (1992) 'The Genetic Analysis of Human Behavior: a New Era?' Social Science and Medicine, vol.35(3): 227-38; Lewontin, R.C., (1993) The Doctrine of DNA: Biology as Ideology. London: Penguin; Alper, J.S. and Beckwith, J., (1993) ‘Genetic Fatalism and Social Policy: The Implications of Behavior Genetics Research’, Yale Journal of Biology and Medicine, vol.66: 511- 24. 53 Castleman, N., (1976) ‘Commentary: On Planning What will Become of Us’, Man and Medicine: The Journal of Values and Ethics in Health Care, vol.1(4): 265-67, p266. Author’s Emphasis. 52 Chapter Two – The Radical Critique with a wave of research-induced prejudice cutting across increasing social and educational integration’.54

Further, some have argued that the research expresses an inherent disvalue of low intelligence, which might not be in accordance with how people of low intelligence view their status. According to Clarke:

The unwitting promotion of these views may have harmful effects on those with mental handicap and their families, quite apart from any strengthening of racism. By promoting the view that a person’s worth is determined by his/her IQ and that this is determined by the person’s genetic constitution, the discrimination experienced by children and adults with mental handicap may be exacerbated. Further, the limited willingness of society to support such individuals and their families may be compromised.55

The second part of this critique is that just as individuals might be labelled or discriminated against as a result of genetic research into intelligence, so too might entire groups (either ethnic, social or gender-based) be subject to genetic assessments of their potential.56 To put it another way, proponents of the radical critique are concerned that the research might legitimate ‘scientific racism’. Here, the genetic supremacy of one group might be asserted over another and other factors relevant to group differences might be ignored:57

54 Goodey, ‘Genetic Markers for Intelligence’, p16. 55 Clarke, ‘Limits to Genetic Research?’, p209-10. 56 This might occur even if genetic screening for intelligence were not implemented, as the very existence of research results showing a link between genes and intelligence might be interpreted to also indicate a genetic basis for group differences in intelligence. Now, whilst even the researchers involved in finding genes for intelligence themselves take pains to point out the fallacy of such an application (see below), detractors of the research claim that this is immaterial – the very existence of research data will encourage such misuse. 57 One example of group differences is in performance on IQ tests, where, on average, African Americans score less well than Anglo-Americans. The Academy of Learned Societies for the Social Sciences, for example, argues that: ‘the risk is not that the research itself causes discrimination, but the research agenda changes the way people make sense of social behaviour, and obscures important social and psychological processes’. See: Abrams, D., Genetics and Behaviour: The Ethical Context. Public Consultation Document from the Nuffield Council on Bioethics. Response from the Academy of Learned Societies for the Social Sciences. 2001, Available at: http://www.the- academy.org.uk (accessed 29 November, 2001). 53 Chapter Two – The Radical Critique

An almost inevitable consequence of finding an association between variation in IQ and genetic variation at one or more polymorphic sites will be the further finding that the allele frequencies at such sites (the frequencies of the different variants) will vary between different ethnic groups… It is most unlikely that any such variation identified would be associated in an important way – causally – with differences between populations in IQ or other personality or behavioural traits, but it is highly likely that such differences would be widely publicized and misinterpreted... even if the original researchers pay no attention to ethnicity.58

Ultimately, this could have an effect on social welfare policies, for example by reducing the State’s motivation to improve the environment and surroundings of disadvantaged people, instead seeking genetic ‘solutions’ to existing problems.59 At worst, the assertions of the supremacy of one group over another may be used to justify the provision or withdrawal of resources to one group (such as educational or welfare assistance), or to justify existing social inequality between groups. Krooth summarises this concern:

[T]he differences [between people] might be employed to justify depriving one group of people of access to educational resources, or to rationalize other kinds of social inequities.60

Again, history does not give great promise to the alleviation of concerns such as these. Much of the controversy surrounding this research relies not on current project activity, but the legacy of previous quantitative genetic research – its ‘murky history’, which often resulted in prejudice and discrimination against numerous minority groups.61

To give an example, a large amount of the 1994 book The Bell Curve was dedicated towards defending the thesis that group differences in intelligence are heritable. The authors also argued that intelligence creates a meritocracy, whereby those with the

58 Clarke, ‘Limits to Genetic Research?’, p208-9. 59 Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Genetics and Human Behaviour: The Ethical Context, p4. 60 Krooth, ‘Genes, Behavior and What Will Become of Us’, p262. 61 Hodges, L. 'Heir Conditioned,' The Times Higher Education Supplement (London), December 22 1995, Accessed at http://www.thesis.co.uk. For an in-depth review and critique of applications of intelligence testing throughout history, see: Block, N.J. and Dworkin, G., (Eds.), (1976) The IQ Controversy: Critical Readings, New York: Pantheon Books. 54 Chapter Two – The Radical Critique highest inborn abilities will ‘naturally’ rise to the top.62 Taken to their extreme, proponents of this kind of argument might argue that society is thus powerless to attempt to change the status-quo, or attempt to influence intelligence in any way. The repercussions of such claims for intervention programs in low-welfare environments, such as the USA’s HeadStart, might be disastrous. Parens echoes these concerns:

Given the sordid history of attempts to use pseudobiological explanations to justify the stratification of our society, perhaps most troubling of all is to imagine that our society will use such information to reinforce the view that current forms of stratification are ‘natural’.63

To be sure, it seems clear that most of us would share concerns such as those that I have outlined here – that there are fears about the potentially exclusionary applications of this research does not seem to be at issue. What is debatable, however, is whether (as organisations such as the Campaign for Real Intelligence have argued) such damaging consequences are indeed an ‘inevitable’ outcome of the research.

Whilst it would be a mistake to discount the potential for results from genetic research into intelligence to be manipulated to claim the superiority of particular individuals or groups over others, the reality is that such views do not reflect the opinion of most researchers in the field. In fact, most of them continually strive to point out the opposite, and I summarise some of the misconceptions of their research that they highlight below. As the Genetic Interest Group notes, most researchers are interested in individual variations in behaviour, not purported race or social group differences.64 Plomin has also made a similar claim. He argues that genetic research into intelligence describes what is, not what ought to be:

It should be emphasised that no public policies necessarily follow from finding genes associated with g because policy involves values. For example, finding genes for g does

62 Herrnstein, R.J., and Murray, C., (1994) The Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure in American Life. New York: Free Press. 63 Ibid, p13. 64 Genetic Interest Group (UK), Genetics and Human Behaviour: The Ethical Context. The Response of the Genetic Interest Group to the Nuffield Council on Bioethics Consultation. 2001. Available at: http://www.gig.org.uk/docs/gig_nuffieldbg.pdf (Accessed 27 November 2001). 55 Chapter Two – The Radical Critique

not mean that we ought to put all of our resources into educating the brightest children once we identify them genetically. Depending on our values, we might worry more about children falling off the low end of the bell curve in an increasingly technological society and decide to devote more public resources to those who are in danger of being left behind.65

However, detractors of the research, such as Goodey, criticise the claim that the research is effectively value-neutral:

To imply that the minutest health benefit must take priority over the most socially disruptive abuses is precisely not to take the ethical issue seriously.66

Additionally, Steve Jones, a Professor of genetics, states:

When you’re supping with people like Murray and Herrnstein [the authors of The Bell Curve] you have to be aware that your work can be taken in ways you might not like and used for their political agenda.67

But, perhaps Goodey et al are taking this issue to an unreasonable extreme. It is indeed impossible to guarantee that there will be a reasonable social response to genetic data about intelligence (one which is not over-interpreted to explain group differences, for example). Yet, neither can a negative response be guaranteed either. Parens, for example, supports claims such as Plomin’s above. Although science can indeed shape social, economic and political conditions, he has argued that there is an error in assuming that conceptions of equality will be inevitably undermined by facts emerging from behavioural genetic research:

In a word, while it is true and important that genetic information can be used to further disempower the already disempowered, it does not follow that it must be so used.68

That is, Goodey, in making his argument above, errs in assuming that there is necessarily a relationship between fact and policy; ‘to think, for example, that facts

65 Plomin et al, Behavioral Genetics, p182. 66 Goodey, ‘Genetic Markers for Intelligence’, p14. 67 Hodges, ‘Heir Conditioned’. 68 Parens, ‘Taking Behavioral Genetics Seriously’, p16. Author’s emphasis. 56 Chapter Two – The Radical Critique about the genetics of behaviour will inevitably be used to undermine valuable political ideas or to undergird hateful social programs.’69 It would be both unreasonable and ironic to assume that notions such as biological predisposition must be used in such a way, or that having this information will ‘dictate’ social policy.

What is vital to remember here is that any genetic component to intelligence will not mean that intelligence is immutable. Suppose that scientists discovered that heart disease had a genetic component and that people of Scottish descent were at a 20 percent greater risk of suffering from this condition, because they tend to possess several alleles predisposing the disease more often than did other populations. No- one would suggest that Scots should be withdrawn from health budgets, or that programs aimed at encouraging good nutrition and exercise could or should be discounted. No-one would claim that Scots were ‘destined’ to suffer from heart disease and that nothing could, or should, be done. Yet heart disease is a trait of similar complexity and malleability to intelligence.

There are other reasons why the past abuses of intelligence research will not inevitably happen again. Our society is now a different social and legal world to that of fifty years ago. The rights of individuals are now accorded greater respect. There are laws protecting equality and antidiscrimination. Within this framework of protecting individuals’ rights, genetic information is more likely to be used to ensure that people have access to the greatest possible amount of opportunity, not to exclude them from certain benefits.

Further, although the detractors’ claims may be firmly rooted in the ‘murky history’ of intelligence research, if they continually claim that the research results will inexorably lead to abuse, then ironically this could undermine their concern. This is because overstated claims are often dismissed.70 What is preferable (and is the approach taken in this thesis) is to flag issues such as the misuse of research results as potentially problematic and to use them as a framework to develop constraints and conditions which dictate when research is permissible. This involves both considering

69 Ibid, p13. 70 Ibid. 57 Chapter Two – The Radical Critique the majority opinion held presently and reflecting upon accounts of history to inform us about more appropriate ways to act in the future.

Separate to these issues of the validity of the premises and methodology of genetic research into intelligence are critiques of the conduct of the researchers themselves, who have been perceived on several occasions by the media as being completely unconcerned by the ethical implications of their research.71 As Gail Vines stated when reporting on Plomin’s research for The Guardian:

They want to pinpoint genes involved in intelligence as measured by IQ scores, and they plan to do the work while telling as few people about it as possible.72

In her investigation, Vines approached many of the researchers and other geneticists for their opinions on the research. Robert Plomin was quoted as saying:

I am not worried by the ethics of what I’m doing, and I don’t want to discuss it in a public forum… I want to get on with the science of it.73

In another interview, he stated:

It’s not the end of the world… If we can start coming to grips with it now, we will save ourselves a lot of concern later on.74

The editor of the journal Behavior Genetics Dr David Fulker also responded in a similar vein:

We’re finding genes for all sorts of things these days – why make a bogeyman out of IQ?75

What’s so special about genetics? The fear of the misuse of information has been with us since the beginning of time.76

71 See, for example: Editorial, ‘Genes Means Coming Clean’ The Times Higher Education Supplement, 26 July 1996, Accessed Online at: http://www.thesis.co.uk. 72 Vines, G., ‘The Search for the Clever Stuff’ The Guardian (London), 2 Feb 1996, p2-3 (OnLine Section), p2. 73 Ibid. 74 Hodges, ‘Heir Conditioned’. 75 Vines, ‘The Search for the Clever Stuff’, p2. 58 Chapter Two – The Radical Critique

In response to concerns that the research results will be used to exclude and disempower people before any real benefits emerge, Peter McGuffin, a co-investigator of Plomin’s, suggested that:

There are always people who will abuse scientific knowledge, but as scientists we can’t be held responsible.77

It would indeed be a mistake to assume that scientists can completely remove themselves from any of the ethical implications of their research. Yet, it is important to note that Plomin does discuss the implications of his research in his academic papers and books.78 Additionally, in more recent media reports about his research, he has participated in discussion about the ethical significance of his research, such as the potential problems of genetic testing. He has also expressed the view that it would be undesirable to introduce prenatal diagnosis for intelligence; and has willingly given evidence to the current Nuffield Council Inquiry.79

Further, the American Society for Human Genetics has recently published guidelines advising of appropriate researcher conduct in behavioural genetic research.80 Among the recommendations they make are that researchers should at the very least acknowledge both the issues their research gives rise to and their obligations to address these. Practically, they suggest that researchers should participate in education programs, whether through the media, classrooms or via personal presentations to public or private interest groups.

It is important, however, to recognise the somewhat limited potential for scientists to control the dissemination of their research results once they are in the public

76 Ibid, p3. 77 Ibid. 78 See, for example: Rutter and Plomin, ‘Opportunities for Psychiatry from Genetic Findings’; Plomin, R., (1999) ‘Genetics and General Cognitive Ability’, Nature, vol.402(6761 Suppl): C25-9; and Plomin et al, Behavioral Genetics, p182. 79 Dates and locations of where the evidence was given can be found at the Foundation’s web page at http://www.nuffieldbioethcis.org (Accessed 17 December 2001). A number of other behavrioual geneticists have also given evidence to this inquiry. 80 Sherman, S.L., DeFries, J.C., Gottesman, I.I., Loehlin, J.C., Meyer, J.M., Pelias, M.Z., Rice, J., and Waldman, I., (1997) ‘Recent Developments in Human Behavioral Genetics: Past Accomplishments and Future Directions’, American Journal of Human Genetics, vol.60: 1265-75. 59 Chapter Two – The Radical Critique domain. Even those concerned with the ethical implications of the research have recognised that ‘the way in which any such result reaches the general public will probably be beyond the control of the investigators.’81

Overall, an additional constraint upon genetic research into intelligence is required. This constraint dictates that researchers involved in this difficult and often controversial topic should not be permitted to undertake their research in a vacuum, sheltered from the concerns of the public and policy-makers. Statements such as those made by Plomin et al when the research first commenced should not be encouraged. Rather, researchers need to be transparent about the rationale for their research and how they see their research being applied. A policy statement on researcher conduct (such as that advanced by the American Society for Human Genetics) is laudable and should be embraced to ensure that researchers remain transparent and accountable. Yet, it is also important to point out that to a large extent, the researchers involved in the genetics of intelligence have now embraced this model of being accountable to others about their research.

Eugenic applications of research will be developed

A fourth component of the radical critique against genetic research into intelligence is that ‘it opens up huge possibilities for eugenic abuse.’82

This is a very broad critique. It could invoke numerous meanings of eugenics, from the denial of individuals’ rights, to the presence of coercion within reproductive decision-making, to the use of genetic information to assert the superiority of one group over another. Regarding intelligence, a particular concern is that of allowing either parents or the State to explicitly ‘choose’ to have an intelligent child, which might be considered a eugenic act. I provide a more comprehensive analysis of the issues arising from the enhancement of intelligence in Chapters Five and Six. Here, I will review the history of eugenics, to place current genetic research on intelligence into context. I suggest that genetic research into intelligence will not necessarily lead to any eugenic wrongs.

81 Harper, ‘DNA Markers Associated with High Versus low IQ’, p198. 82 King, ‘How to Control Science’. 60 Chapter Two – The Radical Critique

The nature and history of eugenics has been discussed at length on several occasions.83 The word ‘eugenics’ was first coined in 1883 by Francis Galton, who was also the first person to propose that intelligence was inherited. He utilised his cousin Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution to propose that it might be possible to breed out undesirable characteristics from society.

Galton adapted the word ‘eugenics’ itself from the Greek – meaning ‘good in birth’ or ‘noble in heredity’. His intended meaning for the term was to denote the science of improving human stock by giving the ‘more suitable races or strains of blood a better chance of prevailing speedily over the less suitable’.84

The eugenics movement did not become firmly established until the start of the twentieth century. Two distinct kinds of eugenics were promoted, which had positive and negative connotations. Positive eugenics was concerned with increasing the representation of people deemed to be socially valuable. Negative eugenics aimed to discourage the socially unworthy from reproducing.

The implementation of these theories varied with geography. In Britain and the United States, for example, the scientists at the forefront of the eugenics movement believed that human characteristics were virtually determined by germ plasm, which overwhelmed environmental influences. Consequently, the movement was supported by many prominent scientists of the day. Eugenics record offices and laboratories to study heredity in families were established, in addition to eugenics societies and university courses. Whilst some policies were enacted for positive eugenics, such as family allowance payments or the introduction at State fairs of ‘fitter family’ competitions in the USA, most policies were targeted at negative eugenic ends.

It is interesting to note however that there were a variety of viewpoints about eugenics. And where scientists held a weaker view of determinism, also recognising environmental factors, the eugenics movement had a very different effect. In France,

83 Kevles, D.J., (1985) In the Name of Eugenics: Genetics and the Uses of Human Heredity. New York: Knopf; Duster, T., (1990) Backdoor to Eugenics. New York: Routledge; Paul, D.B., (1995) Controlling Human Heredity: 1865 to Present. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press; Wikler, D., (1999) ‘Can We Learn From Eugenics?’ Journal of Medical Ethics, vol.25(2): 183-94. 84 Kevles, In the Name of Eugenics. 61 Chapter Two – The Radical Critique for example, the eugenics movement remarkably improved nutrition, health care and education for many.

Although eugenics was initially motivated by altruism, social prejudice soon crept in. Some of the more unpleasant activities that eugenicists engaged in included obtaining passage of the 1924 Immigration Act in the United States, which reduced the immigration of many races. Eugenics proponents also enacted sterilisation laws in various US States, which were validated under the US Constitution in the 1927 case Buck v Bell.85 In these eugenic acts, the contribution of social and environmental conditions to so-called ‘deviant’ behaviour was largely ignored. Additionally, eugenics became inextricable from ‘racial hygiene’, or other attempts to prove that certain races had esteemed characteristics that other races could not obtain.

By the 1930’s however, there was increasing criticism of eugenics, not least from the Roman Catholic Church, which denounced eugenics along with birth control. Throughout this decade, critics successfully wound down eugenic programs in most countries. The notable exception to this trend was Germany, where the Nazi regime was well entrenched and retained its power throughout the Second World War. During this period, hundreds of thousands of people were sterilised or killed for supposedly ‘negative’ eugenic reasons. Countless more were used in scientific experiments.

One of the foremost characteristics used to judge who was eugenically ‘fit’ was intelligence. People with good genes were deemed to be instantly recognisable by their intelligence and good character. Galton, for example, believed that to succeed in the professions, a person needed to possess a great natural, inherited talent. A person’s station in life could be used to indicate his or her capabilities. This could then be used as an indication of the genes that would be passed on to the next generation.

Although ‘eugenics’ is now largely condemned, programs with (usually positive) eugenic ideals are still being promoted by governments in several countries. An

85 (1927) 274 US 200. 62 Chapter Two – The Radical Critique interesting example of positive eugenics and intelligence involves Singapore.86 In a Singapore National Day speech in 1983, the Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew expressed his concern at the increasing number of university-educated women who were not having children. He was concerned that this would mean that ‘quality genes’ and ‘natural talents’ would be diluted out of the population. He discussed social policy reform for Singapore (based upon his convictions about intelligence and its heredity), which was aimed at encouraging more university-educated women to have children. Soon after, the government announced a package of reforms to encourage a re- proliferation of ‘good human qualities’ in Singapore. Included in this was a financial incentive scheme for university-educated women to have more children. Additionally, both computer-matched dating services and classes in approaching the opposite sex were suggested for Singapore National University.

Critics of this scheme denounced it as ‘Orwellian’, ‘elitist’, ‘technocratic’ and ‘short-sighted’.87 They pointed out that the scheme was reliant upon controversial data. The scheme also contained inherent assumptions that the education system in Singapore was equally accessible (an assumption refuted by critics) and that the educational level that one attained accurately reflected ‘intelligence’. Despite these criticisms however, Singaporean incentives for university-educated women to have children are still provided.

Eugenics teaches us several lessons. The main wrong of eugenics was its pseudoscientific belief in genetic determinism. Further, even the most altruistic of aims can lead to wrongs such as disregarding individuals’ rights. Outside of these main wrongs, we are left, as Wikler points out, with a central ideal of ‘improving the stock of humankind by application of the science of human heredity’.88 Wikler has developed five candidate wrongs associated with this central idea. I summarise these (followed by Wikler’s responses) in Table 2-2, on the following page.

86 Heng Leng, C. and Chee Khoon, C., (Eds.) (1984) Designer Genes: IQ, Ideology and Biology. Selangor, Malaysia: Institute for Social Analysis. 87 Chee Khoon, C. and Heng Leng, C., (1984) ‘Singapore 1984: Breeding for Big Brother’, in C. Heng Leng and C. Chee Khoon, (Eds). Designer Genes: IQ, Ideology and Biology. Selangor, Malaysia: Institute for Social Analysis, pp4-13. 88 Wikler, ‘Can We Learn From Eugenics?’, p187. 63 Chapter Two – The Radical Critique

Table 2-2: Wikler’s Five Candidate Wrongs of Eugenics

Replacement • Eugenics does not help actual people; it only betters those of the next generation. It values smart people over stupid people and does not hold hopes for our fellow human beings. It is not a benevolent doctrine. • However, many other lauded social policies have similar effects. If this criticism were taken to its extreme, people would not be permitted to choose their mate. The only concern would be the ‘quality’ of the next generation Value Pluralism • It is virtually impossible to set an ‘ideal’ for a person. Valuing only health and intelligence is too narrow. Instead, we should promote a plurality of ideals of a valuable human life. • Although we abhor many sentiments of the narrowness of eugenics, we have learned this lesson and it is unlikely to arise again. Further, traits such as health and intelligence are valued by a people with a variety of ideals and life plans. Statism • In the past, eugenics relied too heavily on the involvement of the State. Instead, individuals should be able to freely make their own reproductive decisions. • Although the State’s past actions were questionable, subtle coercion is still a charge against physicians and counsellors. Denying a role of the State could actually hasten the opening of the ‘backdoor to eugenics’, in which eugenic policies would gain momentum Collectivism • Eugenics is overly concerned with the well-being of the group, rather than the individual. Individuals are valued only in so far as they can contribute to the group. • Most decisions made by parents in the context of reproductive decision- making will not constitute this sense of eugenics. Fairness • Eugenics will ultimately lead to unfairness, particularly the unreasonable labelling and subsequent treatment of particular groups. Eugenics will ultimately result in specific groups being badly treated from the perspective of distributive justice. • Wikler argues that a concern with guaranteeing fairness is a persuasive problem with eugenics. At the very least, this is a concern from which we should learn an important lesson.

As can be observed from this summary of Wikler’s candidate wrongs of the central eugenic doctrine (that is, improving the stock of humankind by application of the science of human heredity), it is difficult to find an inherent wrong. However, Wikler argues that the ideal of guaranteeing fairness may be difficult to uphold under a eugenic regime.

64 Chapter Two – The Radical Critique

Regarding intelligence, in addition to fairness, the wrong of ‘Value Pluralism’ (outlined in the above table) is important. Although Wikler has responded to this concern, people are likely to be concerned that there will be pressure on couples to have intelligent children or that the State could withdraw support from parents who decide not to enhance their children. The lesson to be derived here is that variations in people’s intelligence should not be considered as a ‘disorder’ that should be treated. Rather, a broad spectrum of skills should be recognised as valuable by society. Allowing parents to choose their children’s intelligence should not be required by the State, but should instead be based upon well-informed, free choice. This issue is discussed further in Chapter Seven.

Wikler’s concern with guaranteeing fairness is also important for considerations of intelligence and eugenics. As intelligence is something worth valuing (a point discussed further in the next chapter), then the ability to influence intelligence may mean that certain groups (perhaps a particular ethnic group or anyone with ‘below- average’ intelligence) may be unfairly labelled or treated once genetic research has been completed. This ‘unfairness’ could cover a wide range of problems, from denying specific groups access to particular resources, to encouraging couples to only have intelligent children. These kinds of scenarios implicitly disfavour those they target.

Concern with eugenic applications of genetic research into intelligence therefore generates some constraints upon how genetic research into intelligence should be used. Primarily, it is important to reflect upon the significant place that intelligence has had in the history of eugenics, and how modern day reproductive-decision making, genetic testing and the allocation of social resources can be distinguished from past practice. Additionally, it is also important to reflect upon the central tenet of eugenics (as enunciated by Wikler) and to consider how this tenet applies to intelligence. I have suggested that for the genetics of intelligence, the candidate wrongs of failing to respect value pluralism and neglecting to guarantee fairness to particular groups provide a significant starting point to avoiding detrimental eugenic implications of this research. If these issues are utilised to generate appropriate policy and guidelines, then the potentially negative effects of a ‘new eugenics’ will be much reduced. 65 Chapter Two – The Radical Critique

The research is a bad allocation of resources

The final aspect of the radical critique against genetic research into intelligence is the claim that in a climate of limited resources, when many members of society are suffering from chronic diseases, research such as this without immediate therapeutic benefit should not be allocated public funds. Indeed, to do so would constitute an inappropriate allocation of resources. Reiss summarises this claim:

[A] very significant argument against a proposed piece of research is simply that, whatever its merits, given that research funds are limited, the money could be spent better elsewhere.89

As I have discussed above, when the Medical Research Council in the United Kingdom announced that it was considering funding Plomin’s project to the tune of £1.8 million, there was significant opposition to allocating resources to this work.90 The project was opposed because of the numerous ethical objections I have outlined above, but additional to these was concern over a perceived conflict of interest, as the head of the research centre at which the research was to take place was also the head of the Medical Research Council’s neurosciences and mental health board, which considered the application.91 Additionally, allocating such a large amount of money was seen to be frivolous and inconsistent with public opinion on priorities for research. According to Goodey, for example:

Professor Plomin’s application for public funds involves an amount almost twice the size of the annual NHS contribution to cancer research. The… public need for cancer research is cynically and correctly perceived to be such that fund- raising is done anyway, but on a charitable basis, a situation about which the voluntary organisations are understandably aggrieved. If the MRC turned down the [Plomin’s] application once and for all, it is hard to think who would feel a similar urgency about raising funds for Professor Plomin’s research. It is difficult to imagine MENSA members running car boot sales.92

89 Reiss, ‘The Ethics of Genetic Research on Intelligence’, p6. 90 Previously, the work had been funded by the National Institute of Health in the United States. 91 Vines, ‘The Search for the Clever Stuff’, p2. 92 Goodey, ‘Genetic Markers for Intelligence’, p16. 66 Chapter Two – The Radical Critique

Goodey’s emotive appeal is attractive, yet it is also misleading. The amount of funding that Plomin requested was significant, yet this sum was not going to be continuously allocated annually, as cancer research funding is. Plomin’s research group required these kinds of funds to set up their study in the United Kingdom, (which involved establishing thousands of cell lines) and so would have been expensive in the first instance. Once established, the funds required for maintaining this research would have been reduced from this initial amount.

Yet even if appeals such as Goodey’s are misleading, there still seems to be some substance to the argument, phrased as Reiss has done.93 Castleman, writing 25 years ago, voiced a similar concern:

For me, ‘the distant good’ that will result from more information on genetic/behavioural links may just be too far away to justify the continuance of such work, especially via government funding…. [I] wish that scientists could simply be ‘convinced’ to conduct research leading more directly toward the resolution of our pressing social problems…94

Several submissions to the Nuffield Council’s inquiry have also noted as an issue of concern the amount of resources that are being allocated to behavioural genetic research in general. Responding to the Council’s question on the priority that should be given to behavioural genetic research generally, the National Schizophrenia Foundation, for example replied that:

We believe that it should have the lowest possible priority.95

Additionally, the Christian Medical Fellowship has argued that research into serious disease should be prioritised. This suggests that they would be concerned about such a large amount of resources being allocated towards intelligence research:

Given limited resources and funds available for research, priority should be given to research into genetic predispositions for severe mental illness, rather than

93 See quote on page 3. 94 Castleman, ‘Commentary: On Planning What will Become of Us’, p266. 95 National Schizophrenia Fellowship, Submission: Genetics and Human Behaviour. 2001, Available at: http://www.nsf.org.uk (accessed 23 November 2001). 67 Chapter Two – The Radical Critique

mildly abnormal character traits. It also needs to be balanced against demand for funding for research into diseases causing serious morbidity and mortality in disciplines other than mental health; regionally, nationally and globally.96

This raises the question: what should be done about publicly funding research that might only have limited public benefit?

It is important to recognise that this issue does have significant force within any consideration of a framework of distributive justice. It is also important to recognise, however, that there are a few plausible responses that can be made to such concerns. Whilst these responses may not quash the concerns that have been expressed, I argue here that they provide some justification for genetic research into intelligence to proceed.97

Besides advocating the potential benefits of this research I have discussed above, one response to arguments against the allocation of resources to genetic research into intelligence is that unless the research is undertaken in the public domain, where the scientists remain accountable to a large research organisation, then there is a chance that less scrupulous scientists would attempt the research. If so, then it might be better that this research was undertaken with public funds, in a reputable research centre. In 1996, the editors of the Times Higher Education Supplement made exactly this argument about Plomin’s research. They stated that the Medical Research Council, once it had gauged sufficient public opinion, should fund this project:

One project it should then agree to fund is a £2 million study by Robert Plomin, of the Institute of Psychiatry. Plomin is working in its Social, Genetic and Developmental Psychiatry Research Centre, headed by Sir Michael Rutter. This was set up expressly to move research forward from the meaningless polarisation between nature and nurture. Instead it attempts the much more difficult task of

96 Christian Medical Fellowship, Submission from the CMF to the Nuffield Council on Bioethics Working Party on Genetics and Human Behaviour: The Ethical Context. 2001, Available at: http://www.cmf.org.uk (Accessed 29 November 2001). 97 Here, I don’t provide an in-depth analysis of the principles of resource allocation. Rather, my aim is to flag this as an aspect of the radical critique against genetic research into intelligence. This issue, could, of course be the subject of an entire analysis in itself. 68 Chapter Two – The Radical Critique

examining the interactions between the two…. A multidisciplinary environment is also the most reasonable way of ensuring it is done responsibly.98

Additionally, The Academy for the Learned Social Sciences points out that due to the potentially exploitative nature of this research in the future, that ‘it is important that much of the research remains in the public domain, funded through research councils and grant awarding bodies, and conducted within universities’.99

To be sure, genetic research will only be useful to generate interventions into intelligence (such as boosting performance) when the results are considered within a broader context of biological and environmental stimuli, which both researchers and their critics have already pointed out. So, if public funds are to be allocated to this research, then the most fruitful use of this research will be when the research results are appropriately located within wider psychological and social research on intelligence. That is, if public funding is to be allocated to genetic research into intelligence, it should be ensured that other kinds of research into intelligence are also allocated adequate funds.

A second response to the concern with resource allocation is that it is important to recognise the enormous financial cost that some conditions, such as learning disabilities, generate for society. In the United States alone, this figure tops more than US$5 billion annually. If genetic research into intelligence can supplement psychological and social research to generate some interventions to help alleviate this problem, then this could provide some means to justify the initial investment in the research.

For any research project, the argument may always prevail that the research funds may be better spent elsewhere. However, this is a general objection to using resources in a less-than-ideal way – it is not an argument against identifying genetic influences on intelligence per se. In this thesis, my greater concern is with finding and analysing objections to this particular kind of research – whether or not it is wise to identify the biological influences on human intelligence.

98 Editorial, ‘Genes Means Coming Clean’. 99 Abrams, Genetics and Behaviour: The Ethical Context. 69 Chapter Two – The Radical Critique

Potential limits to the critique

My discussion of resource allocation problems concludes my review of the radical critique against genetic research into intelligence. For each aspect of this critique that I have discussed, I have provided some response to the criticisms, to place them in what I see as the most appropriate context. To this end, I have argued that whilst this critique raises several serious concerns, an appropriate way to proceed is to use it to develop moral ‘warning flags’100 for the acceptable applications of research results.

Further, it is also important to recognise that despite the seriousness of the radical critique, it is difficult to utilise this to develop sound reasons for preventing this research from being undertaken. Here, I provide some more general reasons to explain why this is the case.

One general reason why the radical critique might be problematic is that it is going to be very difficult to grant critics of the research their wish to have genetic research into intelligence banned. There are both ethical and practical reasons for this. Ethically, we live in a liberal democracy, where there is a requirement for strong, sound arguments to be made against a technology before it is banned. Despite the difficult past of intelligence research, there is no indication that current researchers undertaking molecular analyses of intelligence are doing so with unreasonable or unsound applications in mind. Further, if it were always justifiable to ban a research project because there could be dangerous implications, then this would place an enormous amount of current valuable genetic research into jeopardy. Even discounting obviously risky research such as that into protecting people from genetic weapons, seemingly less controversial genetic research into diseases such as diabetes could still lead to people being discriminated against in the future. A liberal society demands that but for the most clear and present risk of significant harm to others (or to ensure the maintenance of justice), individual research projects should not be stymied. Rather, the approach should be for the State to ensure that the results of research are used in the most ethically appropriate way. Although this is not a

100 Buchanan, A., Brock, D.W., Daniels, N., and Wikler, D., (2000) From Chance to Choice: Genetics and Justice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 70 Chapter Two – The Radical Critique foolproof practice, governments in many countries are acting to ensure that people’s rights and interests are protected in the face of new genetic discoveries.101

Practically, it will also be difficult to ban genetic research into intelligence, as what exactly constitutes ‘genetic research into intelligence’ is difficult to define. Indeed, genetic information that could be relevant to explaining intelligence might arise from research projects investigating mental retardation, brain development or the imprinting of parental genomes, in addition to research that is directly attempting to identify genes influencing intelligence.

A further point is that even if public funding for this research were withdrawn, it might be likely to continue anyway. As I explained above, currently most intelligence research is funded by public organisations, such as the Medical Research Council (MRC) in the United Kingdom and the National Institutes of Mental Health (NIMH) in the United States. Yet even if this funding were removed and a moratorium declared, it is likely that researchers would be able to find other, privately funded, means by which to continue their research; a ban ‘may drive research off-shore into locations where responsible oversight is less available’.102 Such research would be very difficult to regulate. Subject to the claim that it is better for a responsible than an irresponsible agent to carry out the research, then perhaps it is better that this is undertaken within the public sphere.

Supporters of the radical critique against genetic research into intelligence are also (somewhat ironically) at risk of failing to recognise some of the common misconceptions of behavioural genetic research. That is, in claiming that research results will be misused, they may be failing to recognise the inherent limitations upon the meaningfulness of genetic information about intelligence.

The researchers themselves do not adopt a deterministic attitude to their research. In fact, rather than being overly zealous about the expected outcomes from the research, those undertaking it are usually at pains to point out its limits. In a recent

101 In Australia for example, the Australian Health Ethics Committee and the Australian Law Reform Commission are currently undertaking an inquiry into the protection of human genetic information. An issues paper is available at: http://www.alrc.gov.au. 102 Christian Medical Fellowship, Submission from the CMF to the Nuffield Council on Bioethics. 71 Chapter Two – The Radical Critique article in the British Journal of Psychiatry, Rutter and Plomin drew attention to some common misconceptions of their research.103 If each of these misconceptions is rectified, then this could greatly limit the significance of the radical critique. The misconceptions are summarised in Table 2-3:

Table 2-3: Misconceptions about genetic research into intelligence

1. Heritability is a stable value across all time frames and populations. Heritability estimates are actually population, environment and time specific. 2. Heritability estimates are applicable to individuals. Heritability estimates have ‘nothing to say about individuals’.104 Heritability measures do not suggest how much of an individual’s intelligence is genetic in origin and how much environmental. Rather, it indicates, on average, how much individual variation in intelligence is due to genetic influences. Further, a gene that functions to determine the range of intelligence for a group may have no significance for an individual within that group. 3. Heritability estimates show something that is fixed, innate or immutable. Heritability estimates say nothing about aspects of a trait that are immutable or not. The genetic disorder Phenylketonuria has a heritability of 1.0, yet is easily modifiable by a dietary intervention. Intelligence is not fixed or hard-wired, but reflects the ‘probabilistic propensities of many genes in multiple gene systems’105 4. If a particular population shows high heritability, then differences between this population and another population will also be genetic in origin. This is particularly important for debates over ethnic differences in intelligence. ‘The reasons why populations vary in the mean level of a characteristic may be the same as those causing variations within that population or they may be entirely different. It is quite invalid to generalise from the findings within one population to assumptions about reasons for differences between populations’.106 5. Molecular genetic research exists only to develop genetic tests for intelligence. Genetic testing would be liable for several ethical problems and is not the main aim of the research.

Although most of the above concerns are about quantitative and not molecular genetic research, these misconceptions are often still applied in the context of molecular genetic research into intelligence. For example, just as heritability estimates cannot be applied between groups of people, neither will molecular genetic information be able to be transferred. This fact suggests it is likely that any alleles that are identified as influencing intelligence are going to be population-specific.

103 Rutter and Plomin, ‘Opportunities for Psychiatry from Genetic Findings’. 104 Ibid, p209. 105 Plomin, R., (1988) ‘Genetic Influence and Cognitive Abilities’, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, vol.21(3): 420-21, p421. 106 Rutter and Plomin, ‘Opportunities for Psychiatry from Genetic Findings’, p210. 72 Chapter Two – The Radical Critique

2.4 Elucidation of key concerns

Flawed scientific theories can be refuted by more rigorous science. A more perplexing social problem involves the permissible societal response to legitimate discoveries in behavioural genetics.107

In this chapter, I have described some putative benefits from genetic research into intelligence. In then discussing the radical critique against this research, I have argued that it raises some important issues, but it is not strong enough to warrant the research not continuing. Rather, I advocate that appropriate constraints upon the interpretation of research results are required, in addition to constraints upon if and how the results of this research should ever be used. It is interesting to note that such an approach reflects the concerns expressed by the Campaign for Real Intelligence that controversial projects should be subjected to a risk benefit analysis.

This argument has lead me to identify several important core issues concerning the acceptability of the potential applications of this research. Additionally, there are issues about the nature of the data that may be obtained and the merits of intelligence per se.

The first group of concerns, reflecting the critique of ‘deterministic interpretation’ that I discussed above, is how we should be conceiving of genetic data about intelligence, particularly its relevance to the potential that intelligence might be genetically determined. I have already tackled this concern in the previous chapter, where I discussed the relevance for determinism that the genetic data from research into intelligence might have. Additionally, in Appendix II, I discuss the defining characteristics of genetic data about intelligence. This appendix is relevant, as it could be argued, virtually ‘opposite’ to the central objections against this research, that there is actually no need for an ethical analysis of the implications of genetic research into intelligence. Some may argue that this ethical analysis is unnecessary, given the existing means by which to measure intelligence, such as IQ testing. In Appendix II, I set out the ways in which genetic information about intelligence can be distinguished

107 Rothstein, M.A., (1999) ‘Behavioral Genetic Determinism: Its Effects on Culture and Law’, in R.A. Carson and M.A. Rothstein, (Eds). Behavioral Genetics: the Clash of Culture and Biology. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, pp89-115, p95. 73 Chapter Two – The Radical Critique from both medical genetic information and non-genetic information about intelligence. This appendix therefore serves as an important justification of why the issue under examination in this thesis is an original and important question.

A rarely discussed concern is whether intelligence is something that should be valued. This concern is relevant to my subsequent considerations of the misuse of research results, the labelling of those with low intelligence and the so-called ‘eugenic’ applications of this research. To answer this important issue, I undertake analysis of the value of intelligence in Chapter Three.

In Chapter Four, I suggest several constraints upon genetic tests for intelligence that are derived from concerns about the potential misuse of such tests, including concerns that the research will be exploited by third parties such as educators. By adopting the constraint that such tests should only be permitted by individual request, I explore how such tests might benefit or harm competent individuals, or children.

In Chapters Five, Six and Seven, I address many ethical problems related to the eugenic applications of genetic research into intelligence, including several of those raised by the Nuffield Council’s consultation document, such as whether there are significant differences in the various means that could be used for the end of enhancement. I discuss how selecting for or enhancing intelligence could affect both children and parents. I also reflect upon the empirical literature detailing people’s experiences with reproductive technology to date.

Prior to concluding this chapter, it is worth also considering what factors would have to be present in order to warrant this research not continuing. Guidance on research ethics, such as the Australian National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Research Involving Humans,108 is useful here. In its directions for genetic research, the Statement urges investigators to consider the social and cultural context of their research.109 Scientists investigating the genetics of intelligence have clearly met this requirement, as discussed above. Investigators are also asked to consider the balance between the

108 National Health and Medical Research Council (Australia), (1999) National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Research in Human Beings. 109 At [16.1]. 74 Chapter Two – The Radical Critique contribution to knowledge and the potential for individual or collective harm.110 Again, both those undertaking the research and independent commentators are actively engaging in discourse about the potential outcomes of this research. Other requirements include ensuring the privacy and confidentiality of research samples and information, obtaining appropriate consent from participants or their guardians and the provision of appropriate counselling. There is no evidence that these requirements have been abridged in the conduct of this research to date. Therefore, perhaps the only factors which would preclude this research from taking place were if it were to inevitably lead to irrecoverable harm to individuals or groups. As I have suggested in this chapter (and will continue to do in the remainder of this thesis), such an outcome is by no means obvious.

2.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, using the ‘Campaign for Real Intelligence’ as a case study, I have reviewed and analysed various arguments that form the radical critique against genetic research into intelligence: that the scientific method and the definitions employed are invalid; that the research will lead to a genetically determined view of intelligence; that the research results will be used inappropriately; that ‘eugenic’ applications of the research will result; and that the research yields difficult resource allocation problems.

I have argued that the radical critique highlights many important (perhaps limiting) problems with this research. However, I have also argued that the critique does not provide valid reasons to prevent this research from continuing. I did, however, use the radical critique to develop a framework of key concerns, which I analyse in subsequent chapters.

I continue my aim of developing constraints upon the acceptable uses of this research in subsequent chapters, in an attempt to ensure that research results from genetic research into intelligence are used in an appropriate way.

110 At [16.2]. 75

Section II:

A CONTEXTUAL ISSUE SURROUNDING THIS RESEARCH

Chapter Three

3 IS IT GOOD TO BE INTELLIGENT?

The need to address questions of value in the debate over genetic research into intelligence

3.1 Introduction

No one would worry about who has intelligence, or why, if it did not matter.1

A serious concern with research into genetic influences on intelligence is that in working towards various means to either test for or increase intelligence we are neglecting to question the value of intelligence per se. In thinking, for example, about whether we ought to allow people to have their ‘intelligence profiles’ genetically analysed, or whether parents ought to be able to enhance their children’s intelligence; we should first ask whether being intelligent actually promotes a person’s well-being.

To date, the scientific and ethical debates over genetic research into intelligence have largely ignored such a question. In the vast literature on intelligence, only few academic and social commentators have directly addressed the question of whether intelligence is of value. Highly intelligent people are often considered by the lay public to be weighed down by their complex deliberations, while those of lower intelligence are considered to be not so troubled, living simple but contented lives. Do these images bear any relationship to the reality of living with intellectual ability?

In this chapter, I examine the relationship between higher intelligence and well- being. I compare three different philosophical accounts of well-being and consider whether intelligence would contribute to well-being on each account. Additionally, for each theory of well-being I discuss, I elucidate various empirical outcome measures and (via an inspection of the empirical literature) use these to examine the empirical relationship between intelligence and the particular goods promoted by each theory. In Section 3.8, I discuss the relationship between intelligence and autonomy.

1 Hunt, E., (1995) ‘The Role of Intelligence in Modern Society’, American Scientist, vol.83: 356-68, p362. 77 Chapter Three – Is it good to be intelligent?

My purpose in this chapter is not to provide a detailed critique of well-being, nor is it to delineate the best theory of individual well-being. Rather my aim is to illustrate, by combining theoretical and empirical research, how philosophical theories of well- being can shed some light on the question of the value of intelligence.

I argue that on each theory of well-being, if all else is equal, it would be better for a person to be more intelligent. However there might be some limits to how intelligent a person can be and still achieve well-being. I also argue that higher intelligence contributes to enhanced personal autonomy, which in turn instrumentally contributes to enhanced well-being. I conclude that the value of higher intelligence is most appropriately represented as instrumental to the achievement of well-being.

3.2 Empirical studies of intelligence

Empirical analyses of intelligence are an important tool for analysing theoretical claims. Typically, empirical analyses progress by identifying various groups (such as the highly intelligent and those of average intelligence) and then designing or applying various instruments – psychological tests – to measure the correlations between the groups for several different character attributes or lifestyle factors.

Studies of the relationship between intelligence and various outcome measures of well-being are divisible into two broad categories. First, there are studies that correlate high or low intelligence with a particular personality trait, or a battery of traits. These studies are interesting, but are quite impersonal with respect to individual experiences. Second, there are studies that examine in-depth the qualitative experiences of people with high intelligence. These studies are florid and interesting, yet their general applicability is questionable due to a small sample size. Therefore, I consider a mix of these studies here.

Although empirical work on the relationship between intelligence and the various goods that I discuss here is illuminating, I present the data whilst recognising its limitations. It is important to remember that these are psychological studies with psychological assumptions. For example, these studies assume that measures of both intelligence and the other trait under investigation are valid and stable. Additionally, empirical data is difficult to synthesise and compare, as often researchers have used

78 Chapter Three – Is it good to be intelligent? different scales for measuring intelligence, and research subjects (apart from a few studies) have been limited to children and adolescents, which is not really helpful to considering intelligence over a life-span perspective.

However, the purpose of this chapter is not to provide a detailed critique of these studies. Rather, it is important to be aware of the assumptions of empirical studies, in addition to their limitations.

3.3 Theories of well-being

Theories of well-being are theories about what kinds of things contribute to a person’s life going well. Scanlon describes the intuitive notion of well-being as:

[A]n idea of the quality of life for the person who lives it broader than material and social conditions, at least potentially broader than experiential quality, different from worthiness or value… all things considered.2

What constitutes well-being is often addressed by asking: ‘what makes someone’s life go best?’3 What is best for a person will influence the decisions she makes, will indicate what a concerned benefactor would want to promote for her (especially in the Utilitarian tradition) and will provide the basis for accounting for her interests in moral judgements.

There are three primary theories of well-being. The first two, hedonistic theories and desire-satisfaction theories, are associated with Utilitarian moral theory. Hedonists claim that a person’s life goes best when pleasurable experiences are maximised. Supporters of desire-satisfaction theory instead claim that a person’s life goes best when she gets what she wants. The third theory of well-being varies from the first two in that individual experiences and wants are not the main concern of its supporters. Instead, the central claim advanced is that there are certain things that are necessarily good for us, whether or not we realise it or even want these things. This

2 Scanlon, T., (1998) What We Owe to Each Other. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, p112-113. 3 Parfit, D. (1984) Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p493-502. 79 Chapter Three – Is it good to be intelligent? theory had been termed ‘Objective List Theory’, but the name ‘Substantive Goods Theory’ is now generally preferred.4

I will now analyse these three theories of well-being and consider what supporters of each theory might say about the value of intelligence.

3.4 Hedonistic theories and the value of intelligence

Hedonistic theories of well-being

Supporters of hedonistic theories claim that all that contributes to a person’s well- being are her experiences and whether or not these are pleasurable. Hedonism thus carries an ‘experience requirement’: people cannot achieve well-being unless they experience the relevant good themselves. There are two classes of hedonistic theories, narrow hedonism and preference hedonism, which differ in how experiences are evaluated.

Narrow hedonists adopt a narrow conception of the good. They claim that any experience should only be assessed by the amount (not the quality) of pleasure or happiness that it produces. That is, there are only one or two good experiential states, such as pleasure or happiness; and also only one or two bad experiential states, such as pain or unhappiness.

J.S. Mill, whilst supporting narrow hedonism, qualified his support by stating that the quality of pleasure and happiness is also important. He argued that higher pleasures should be sought to maximise total happiness.5 I’ll describe Mill’s view in more detail below.

Preference hedonists, whilst recognising the quantity and quality of pleasures, adopt a broader conception of pleasure. Instead of calculating well-being only in terms of the amount of pleasure or happiness one experiences, they recognise that there can be a broader range of desirable mental states – there is more than one kind of pleasure. So even if a particular experience is not ‘happiness-generating’ in the

4 Scanlon, T., (1993) ‘Value, Desire and Quality of Life’, in M.C. Nussbaum and A. Sen, (Eds). The Quality of Life. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp185-200, p188. 5 Mill, J.S., (1998) Utilitarianism, Ed. R. Crisp. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p55-58. 80 Chapter Three – Is it good to be intelligent? traditional sense, if a person prefers this experience, then it can contribute to her well- being. Parfit illustrates the difference between narrow and preference hedonism:

Suppose that I could go to a party to enjoy the various pleasures of eating, drinking, laughing, dancing, and talking to my friends. I could instead stay at home and read King Lear. Knowing what both alternatives would be like, I prefer to read King Lear.6

Although reading King Lear is not happiness or pleasure-generating in the traditional sense, this is still a valuable mental state for a person to want to experience. I discuss Preference hedonism in more detail below.

Would a hedonist value intelligence?

Narrow hedonists would be unlikely to value intelligence highly, as they would only be interested in how much being intelligent contributes to one having happy or pleasurable experiences. Now, if it was true (and it probably is) that a pleasurable experience could be achieved regardless of intellectual exertion, then intelligence may be seen as a means only to some pleasurable ends. It would not be privileged over any other traits or experiences that are equally pleasure-generating. According to Bentham:

If the game of push-pin7 furnish more pleasure, it is more valuable than either [the arts and sciences of music and poetry]. Everybody can play at push-pin: poetry and music are relished only by a few.8

Perhaps the only way intelligence would be valued on a narrow hedonist’s view would be if being more intelligent made experiences of pleasure or happiness easier to attain, or intensified one’s experiences of happiness. This is a fairly narrow conception of the value of intelligence, but it is robust and defensible. In today’s society, we constantly exercise our intelligence to ensure that we can achieve the pleasures we value, for example by managing our time effectively to allow for relaxation.

6 Parfit, Reasons and Persons, p493. 7 A children’s game in which pins are pushed one across another. 8 Bentham, J., (1962) ‘The Rationale of Reward’, in J. Bowring, (Ed). The works of Jeremy Bentham. Edinburgh: William Tait, pp253-4 (vol. ii), p253. 81 Chapter Three – Is it good to be intelligent?

However, J.S. Mill would have held a more positive view of the value of intelligence. Recognising that the quality of experiences also matters in addition to their amount, he might have held that being more intelligent could enable a higher quality of pleasure to be achieved. Indeed, Mill’s support for intelligence is illustrated in his comments upon higher and lower pleasures:

[T]here is no known Epicurean theory of life which does not assign to the pleasures of the intellect, of the feelings and imagination, and of the moral sentiments, a much higher value as pleasures than to those of mere sensation… [I]t is an unquestionable fact that those who are equally acquainted with, and equally capable of appreciating and enjoying, both [types of pleasure], do give a most marked preference to the manner of existence which employs their higher faculties.9

[N]o intelligent human being would consent to be a fool, no instructed person would be an ignoramus… A being of higher faculties requires more to make him happy, is capable probably of more acute suffering,… than one of an inferior type; but in spite of these liberties, he can never really wish to sink into what he feels to be a lower grade of existence... It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be a Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied.10

In supporting the Millian view, it is also possible to argue that although an intelligent person may not consistently have her pleasurable experiences maximised, other qualities that come from being intelligent should also be valued. Imagine a choice between two lives. In the first, you would experience nothing but pleasure and happiness, but would not experience things such as self-discovery or a sense of personal achievement. In the second, you may suffer through periods of adversity or other displeasure, yet you would also experience other periods of contentment, ultimately achieving self-understanding. Most people would choose the second life. This is because people value pleasure and happiness (and often aim to experience them), but these are not the only ends in their lives.

Such an attitude is also found in the writings of Plato, who argues that people need wisdom to be able to order and remember pleasures. In the dialectic between

9 Mill, Utilitarianism, p56. 10 Ibid, p57. 82 Chapter Three – Is it good to be intelligent?

Protrachus and Socrates, Socrates suggests that a good life could involve neither pure pleasure, nor pure wisdom:

[I]f you had not memory, it obviously follows that you would never so much as remember that you had known enjoyment before, and that the present moment’s visitation of pleasure would leave no trace of itself behind it. Again without true judgement you could not judge at the moment of enjoyment that you are experiencing it, while without the power of calculation you could not even calculate that you will get enjoyment in the future.11

Plato then argues that the good life must consist of an appropriate mix of pleasure and wisdom:

We are indeed, as it were, cup-bearers with two fountains at our disposal, that of pleasure which we may liken to a stream of honey, and that of thought, a sobering wine-free spring of health-giving hard water; our task is to mingle them in the fairest way.12

Therefore although narrow hedonists present a robust conception of well-being, they might not be right if they were to advocate that intelligence has only a limited role in leading a good life. Such a claim is also reflected in the fact that people are unlikely to ‘trade-in’ their intellect, even if this were to mean that they would have pleasurable experiences all the time. People usually like being intelligent, even if they don’t use their faculties all the time. Mill elegantly summarises this intuition about the value of intelligence:

Of two pleasures,… [i]f one of the two is, by those who are completely acquainted with both, placed so far above the other that they prefer it, even though knowing it to be attended with a greater amount of discontent, and would not resign it for any quantity of the other pleasure which their nature is capable of, we are justified in ascribing to the preferred enjoyment a superiority in quality, so far outweighing quantity as to render it, in comparison, of small account…13

11 Plato, (1972) Philebus, trans. A.E. Taylor. Folkstone: Dawsons of Pall Mall, at 21 C 1-12. 12 Ibid, at 61 C 5-10. 13 Mill, Utilitarianism, p56. 83 Chapter Three – Is it good to be intelligent?

How might a preference hedonist value intelligence? Recall that preference hedonists claim that there is more than one kind of pleasure. That is, there are experiences which we would sometimes prefer to have, but which do not make us happy in the ‘traditional’ sense. My life therefore goes better if it goes as I prefer.14 Parfit points out the limitations of a narrow description of pleasure:

Compare the pleasures of satisfying an intense thirst or lust, listening to music, solving an intellectual problem, reading a tragedy, and knowing that one’s child is happy. These various experiences do not contain any distinctive common quality.15

Pleasure is thus that state which one would prefer to have (and which may not necessarily be pleasurable in the ordinary sense). Pain is that state which one would prefer not to have. This may mean that things that we would not normally consider ‘pleasurable’ in everyday discourse may in fact be so, such as Parfit’s King Lear example that I cited above. In sum, the preference hedonist’s position can be summarised as:

An experience A is better for someone than experience B if, and only if, she would prefer having A to having B.

A preference hedonist would be likely to value intelligence. Intelligence may better enable people to comprehend themselves and their surroundings, to formulate their preferences. An intelligent person would more easily be able to comprehend information and would more easily be able to set about achieving solutions to complex problems. She may also find the process of problem solving a desirable or preferable experience in itself.

Now, an objection to these claims arises if we recognise that a person of less intelligence may merely have different preferred mental states, or derives happiness from different things. She can still achieve well-being by preferring experiences that do not involve intellectual abilities. As Thomas Scanlon states:

There is no reason why a person may not assign an unusually high value to what would normally be considered a trivial concern.16

14 Parfit, Reasons and Persons, p494. 15 Ibid, p493. 84 Chapter Three – Is it good to be intelligent?

On the preference account, this person is simply expressing their preferred mental states. She achieves a good life if she achieves these states, regardless of their complexity.

Recognising this objection appears to diminish the value that preference hedonists may place upon intelligence. A preference hedonist may indeed value intelligence. Yet as is the case with the narrow hedonist’s view, they may not privilege experiences that are had as a result of being intelligent over other experiences that one can have that do not require intellectual input.

But even if preference hedonists might not privilege intelligence over other attributes required to experience different pleasures, intelligence may help people to achieve their preferences, whatever they are. This seems to reflect Sternberg’s triarchic theory of intelligence (which I discussed in Chapter One), where intelligence is expressed not only as the ability to exercise traditional intelligence, but being able to undertake problem solving in a practical context; be it planning the weekly shopping or tackling a difficult essay.

To be sure, a problem with these claims about the value of intelligence is that it is difficult for a person of high intelligence to understand the life of a person of lower intelligence, and to accurately claim that she prefers higher intelligence. A person with intellectual delay can still live an independent life, have a job, and raise a family. In fact, it is often considered in psychological discourse that ‘intelligence only matters to the intelligent.’ However, the happiness we derive from undertaking more complex tasks is different – a mental kind of happiness. This is something that should be accorded a higher value.

A further problem is to the extent to which these claims are supported by the empirical literature.

16 Scanlon, T.M., (1975) ‘Preference and Urgency’, The Journal of Philosophy, vol.72(19): 655-69, p666. 85 Chapter Three – Is it good to be intelligent?

Empirical evaluations of the hedonistic conception of intelligence

Empirical analyses of intelligence are an important tool for examining theoretical claims. Typically, empirical analyses proceed by identifying various groups (such as the highly intelligent and those of average intelligence) and then designing or applying various instruments – psychological tests – to measure correlations between them for different character attributes. I’ll explain a few such instruments in more detail below, but at the outset it is interesting to consider whether such instruments offer a broad enough conception of traits such as happiness to render them meaningful for discussion within a philosophical context.

It is difficult to derive empirical outcome measures from the preference hedonist’s account of well-being, as on this account, the value of intelligence lies mainly in its contribution towards achieving preferred mental states. These will differ between individuals. Empirical outcome measures might include the ability to balance alternatives and problem-solving abilities. However, these measures better reflect desire-based accounts of well-being, so I discuss these in the section on desire theory below.

However, several interesting empirical outcome measures can be derived from a narrow hedonistic account of well-being and intelligence. Below, I examine the relationship between higher intelligence and happiness; and also the relationship between intelligence and the bad experiential states of anxiety, stress, depression and suicidal feelings. What emerges is that there is a virtually neutral relationship between higher intelligence and these outcome measures.

Indeed, studies investigating the relationship between intelligence and happiness have shown that overall, intelligence levels play virtually no part in how happy a person is. In his recent book, David Lykken, a prominent American psychologist, claimed that intelligence levels are only weakly correlated with happiness.17 Hartog also presents a longitudinal study, which shows that intelligence has little to do with

17 Lykken, D., (1999) Happiness: What Studies on Twins Show us About Nature, Nurture and the Happiness Set Point. New York: Golden Books, p1, 46 & 104. Lykken compared MPQ (happiness) scores and IQ test scores, and got a correlation of 0.06 – ‘close enough to 0 not to be worth mentioning’. 86 Chapter Three – Is it good to be intelligent? happiness, health and wealth in later life.18 However, it is also important to note from these studies that intelligent people do not seem to be more likely to be unhappy than those of average or low intelligence.

In contrast to the neutral association between intelligence and happiness, several studies have reported a negative correlation between anxiety and intelligence.19 Reynolds and Bradley, for example, found that ‘on multiple measures of chronic, manifest anxiety, the intellectually gifted consistently displayed lower levels of anxiety than their non-gifted peers’.20 Other studies with gifted children have also claimed that IQ has little to do with stress or burnout,21 and that intelligence may actually be an excellent tool to cope with either stress or anxiety.22

Another negative experience that would be disvalued by hedonists is suicidal ideation. Empirical studies examining the relationship between intelligence and suicide vary. Several papers have suggested the presence of a higher risk for suicide in highly intelligent people,23 yet there are also several studies denying such a relationship.24 However, even if rates of suicide are equal to those of the rest of the population, intelligent people are susceptible to particular stressors, which may lead to

18 Hartog, J. and Oosterbeek, H., (1998) ‘Health, Wealth and Happiness: Why Pursue a Higher Education?’ Economics of Education Review, vol.17(3): 245-56. 19 See, for example: Scholwinski, E. and Reynolds, C.R., (1985) ‘Dimensions of Anxiety Among High IQ Children’, Gifted Child Quarterly, vol.29(3): 125-30; and Milgram, R.M. and Milgram, N.A., (1977) ‘The Effect of Test Content and Context on the Anxiety-Intelligence Relationship’, Journal of Genetic Psychology, vol.130(1): 121-27. 20 Reynolds, C.R. and Bradley, M., (1983) ‘Emotional Stability of Intellectually Superior Children Versus Nongifted Peers as estimated by Chronic Anxiety Levels’, School Psychology Review, vol.12(2): 190-94, p190. 21 Zeidner, M., (1995) ‘Personality Trait Correlates of Intelligence’, in D.H. Saklofske and M. Zeidner, (Eds). International Handbook of Personality and Intelligence. New York: Plenum Press, pp299- 319, p304-5. 22 Lazarus, R.S. and Folkman, S., (1984) Stress, Appraisal and Coping. New York: Springer. 23 Hayes, M.L. and Sloat, R.S., (1989) ‘Gifted Students at Risk for Suicide’, Roeper Review, vol.12(2): 102-07; and Milling, L., Giddan, J.J., Campbell, N.B., Bush, E. et al., (1997) ‘Preadolescent Suicidal Behaviour: The Role of Cognitive Functioning’, Child Psychiatry and Human Development, vol.28(2): 103-15. 24 Lester, D., (1995) ‘Intelligence and Suicide in Ireland and the United Kingdom’, Psychological Reports, vol.77(1): 122; Lester, D., (1993) ‘Intelligence and Suicide in France: An Ecological Study’, Psychological Reports, vol.73(3): 1226; and Petzel, S.V. and Riddle, M., (1981) ‘Adolescent Suicide: Psychosocial and Cognitive Aspects’, Adolescent Psychiatry, vol.9: 343-98. 87 Chapter Three – Is it good to be intelligent? suicidal behaviour.25 Such stressors can include sensitivity, high expectations (or perfectionism, which I discuss below), and isolationism.

Another study is worth mentioning, as it has directly asked the question echoed by many social proverbs: “Is Ignorance Bliss?” That is, are people better-off living a life with lower intelligence? Sigelman measured intelligence and correlated it with psychometric measures of well-being.26 Contrary to what he terms ‘folk wisdom’, his findings suggested that intelligent people tend to be happier and more satisfied than less intelligent people. There is also no indication that less intelligent people are better-off psychologically. However, he also found that intelligence was not a statistically significant predictor of happiness or life satisfaction, when considered in the context of other variables. That is, it was largely neutral in effect.

In sum, empirical studies have countered some stereotypical claims about unhappiness, anxiety and a propensity for suicide among intelligent people. It appears, for example, that being intelligent is not likely to cause unhappiness. However empirical research indicates that intelligence has a largely neutral effect on well-being from a narrow hedonistic perspective.

3.5 The value of intelligence upon desire satisfaction theories

Desire Satisfaction theories of well-being

Supporters of Desire Satisfaction theories view well-being as the satisfaction of an individual’s desires or preferences. A person’s well-being is therefore determined by the extent to which her desires are fulfilled.

There are three main versions of desire satisfaction theories, which differ in the types of desires considered relevant to individual well-being. Supporters of the first two favour desires that are determined subjectively, whereas informed desire theorists emphasise what a person would value if she was rational and had a reasonable amount

25 Gust-Brey, K. and Cross, T., (1999) ‘An Examination of the Literature Base on the Suicidal Behaviors of Gifted Students’, Roeper Review, vol.22(1): 28-35. 26 Sigelman, L., (1981) ‘Is Ignorance Bliss? A Reconsideration of the Folk Wisdom’, Human Relations, vol.34(11): 965-74. 88 Chapter Three – Is it good to be intelligent? of information. I shall discuss only the first two versions here. I discuss Informed Desire Theory in section 3.7 below.

The first (and simplest) desire satisfaction theory is ‘Unrestricted Desire Theory’. Supporters of this theory place no restrictions upon the types of desires that can contribute to a person’s quality of life. However, it would be a mistake to accept this construction, as it is too broad. Parfit gives the example of meeting a terminally ill stranger who desires a cure. You have sympathy for him and desire for him to be cured. Years later, without you knowing, he is cured. It seems implausible that this later event (fulfilled without you knowing or experiencing its satisfaction) can actually make your life go better.27 As this theory is implausible, I will not consider how its proponents might value intelligence.

Proponents of the second theory of desire satisfaction, ‘Success Theory’28 again value subjectively chosen desires, but only those that are relevant to one’s life ‘count’. Those desires which don’t affect a person in her present circumstances do not apply. This avoids the problems raised by Unrestricted Desire Theory.

Would a desire theorist value intelligence?

To supporters of desire satisfaction, intelligence would probably have two roles. First, it would be relevant for people when deciding what they want, as intelligence is a tool which people could use to influence how they generate their desires. As intelligent people know more of the world, their desires might be more realistic. Second, intelligence may also be involved in helping people get what they want. How well our desires have been formed (relative to our external environment and resources) will determine whether they are satisfied. I address both roles here.

Consider the second role of intelligence in desire satisfaction. Here, it is important to notice that as having one’s desires satisfied is often a case of what resources are available (and of competing interests). Intelligence may enable a person

27 Parfit, Reasons and Persons, p494. 28 Griffin, J., (1988) Well-being: its Meaning, Measurement, and Moral Importance. Oxford: Clarendon Press, p13. 89 Chapter Three – Is it good to be intelligent? to form desires which are more likely to be satisfied as they may be more efficient. According to William James:

Those ideals must be written highest which prevail at the least cost, or by whose realisation the least possible number of other ideals would be destroyed.29

This echoes the contextual aspect of Sternberg’s triarchic theory of intelligence, which I discussed in Chapter One. An intelligent person may be better off as she possesses self-understanding, strong reasoning abilities, mental efficiency and problem solving abilities.30 As satisfying a desire will often depend upon the extent to which a person can attain an ‘intelligent fit’ with her environment; how she decides between alternatives and envisions their possible outcomes is important.

Again reflecting Sternberg’s triarchic theory, it is also important to appreciate that an intelligent person may be more likely to effectively review past desires and the impact of their satisfaction, to determine her future preferences. Intelligence does not merely allow a person to adapt to her present environment if this is not ideal; it allows for shaping of the present environment and selection of a new one. That is, intelligence contributes to instrumental rationality, as it allows for people to choose a means that is appropriate for their particular ends.

Consider again the first role of intelligence in forming desires. One potential problem with this role for intelligence is that a person of higher intelligence may undermine the efficiency of her desires by forming desires that are too complex. Goal-choice literature suggests that the choice of a goal is related to ability. The higher a person’s ability, the more difficult the goal selected will be.31

There is a problem here. Even if intelligent people might increase their chances of well-being by creating efficient desires with a higher chance of satisfaction, there is no reason why other people will not simply create desires which are less complex and

29 James, W., (1899) The Will to Believe and other Essays in Popular Philosophy. New York: Longmans Green and Company, p205. Author’s emphasis. 30 Gottfredson, L.S., (1997) ‘Why g Matters: The Complexity of Everyday Life’, Intelligence, vol.24:79- 132. 31 See, for example: Locke, E.A. and Latham, G.P., (1990) A Theory of Goal-Setting and Task Performance. Engelwood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. 90 Chapter Three – Is it good to be intelligent? easier to satisfy. But, even if intelligent people will not have their desires satisfied, this may not matter. They might not want the kind of desire satisfaction that a person of lower intelligence would, instead preferring to work towards higher desires, even if they might not be as achievable in the first instance. This response highlights a general problem with Success Theory, in that often people will desire things which it might not be in their best interests to have. I discuss further in Section 3.7 below.

The role of intelligence in forming desires

To reflect upon the empirical relationship between intelligence and Desire Satisfaction (Success) Theory, various outcome measures need to be discussed. Here, I discuss the relationship between intelligence and decision-making, rational thinking and perfectionism. I have chosen these traits because they are potentially relevant to desire satisfaction.

Any general relationship between intelligence and general desire formation is not recognised in empirical literature. This is because the ability to form desires is often incorporated into definitions of intelligence. That is to say, intelligence is considered to involve abilities to reason, solve problems, think abstractly and acquire knowledge, 32 all of which may facilitate the selection and subsequent satisfaction of desires. According to Jessup for example, high achievers are generally considered to possess:

Advanced comprehension… a longer attention span, retentive memory, intellectual curiosity… persistent, goal-directed work, multiple interests, intuitiveness, the ability to generate original ideas, and the ability to evaluate self and others.33

Intelligence therefore provides a means by which we can successfully process and comprehend information thrown at us in ordinary life.34

The few empirical studies undertaken do give support to these claims. For example, studies have shown that intelligent people are more likely to use more than

32 Snyderman, M. and Rothman, C., (1988) The IQ Controversy, the Media and Public Policy. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, p56; and Sternberg, R.J., (Ed). (2000) The Handbook of Intelligence, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p225-307. 33 Jessup, S., (1992) ‘Gifted and Talented Students’, in C.J. Jones, (Ed). Social and Emotional Development of Exceptional Students. Springfield, IL: Charles C Thomas, pp151-64, p153. 34 Gottfredson, ‘Why g Matters’. 91 Chapter Three – Is it good to be intelligent? one approach to a given task, which will make them more flexible,35 and they also possess good abilities to monitor their performance.36 Flexibility is important to satisfying desires, as if people are able to invoke more than one approach to a problem, it may increase the chances that they may solve it. Additionally, monitoring one’s performance towards the achievement of a desire is important, as if people are able to critically evaluate the relative ‘quality’ of their desire, or their progress in achieving a desire, then again their chances of satisfying that desire may increase.

In addition to these general ideas about the role of intelligence in everyday life, some specific studies have also been carried out. The ability to make a decision between alternatives is obviously very important to desire formation. Comparisons of gifted and ‘normal’ students have found that there is a positive relationship between intelligence and decision-making. One study, for example, found that intelligent students knew significantly more about decision-making, were able to make decisions faster and more efficiently, were better at predicting possible outcomes and had a ‘more competent decision style.’37

There are, of course, traits that one might wish to avoid in forming desires. The first of these is (severe) perfectionism.38 Goal-choice literature suggests that being ‘overly-perfectionistic’ may cause a person to set impossibly complex desires. She might then despair if she does not achieve them. Perfectionism is often studied in people of high intelligence and several reviews of highly intelligent children assert that such children are at risk of being overly perfectionistic.39 In the words of one gifted child:

35 Shore, B. and Dover, A., (1987) ‘Metacognition, Intelligence and Giftedness’, Gifted Child Quarterly, vol.31: 37-39. 36 Whitmore, J.R., (1980) Giftedness, Conflict and Underachievement. Boston: Allyn and Bacon. 37 Ball, C., Mann, L., and Stamm, C., (1994) ‘Decision-Making Abilities of Intellectually Gifted and Non-Gifted Children’, Australian Journal of Psychology, vol.46(1): 13-20. 38 Distinct from the Philosophical theory of Perfectionism, discussed below. 39 Adderholdt-Elliott, M., (1991) ‘Perfectionism and the Gifted Adolescent’, in M. Bireley and J. Genshaft, (Eds). Understanding the Gifted Adolescent: Educational, Developmental, and Multicultural Issues. New York: Teachers College Press, pp65-75; and Roedell, W.C., (1984) ‘Vulnerabilities of Highly Gifted Children’, Roeper Review, vol.6(3): 127-30. 92 Chapter Three – Is it good to be intelligent?

Doing anything well, that’s important.… I can do anything I want to do, but I’m not always doing it perfectly, and this bothers me…. I set high standards for myself.40

However, it is questionable whether a generalisation can be made from these studies, as empirical literature has given rise to conflicting conclusions. Some studies have failed to find a relationship between intelligence and perfectionism. Herman and Welch, for example, observed no correlation between intelligence and perfectionism, dysfunctional thinking or ‘low frustration tolerance.’41 Another comparative study also failed to find a difference between mean scores on a perfectionism inventory.42 Other studies, however, have found that gifted students generally demonstrated high ‘scores’ on tests which purport to measure perfectionism.43

The relationship between intelligence and perfectionism also requires further research, but if being intelligent is associated with being overly perfectionistic, then being intelligent is less valuable, at least on a success version of desire fulfilment accounts of well-being. However, it is important to recognise that some have suggested the persistence of ‘perfectionism stereotypes’ amongst highly intelligent people may actually be due to differential labelling. That is, as society has come to expect perfectionism in highly intelligent people, they are thus labelled as perfectionists, even if their desires may be similar to people of more average intelligence.44 Additionally, it is also important to point out that just because a person pays attention to detail, or is persistent in their dedication to their tasks, they are not always a ‘perfectionist’ in a negative sense. Generally, perfectionism is viewed as a positive trait. Often, a smattering of perfectionism can lead to a very successful outcome. Only being ‘overly-perfectionistic’ is negative.

40 Leroux, J.A., (1988) ‘Voices From the Classroom: Academic and Social Self-Concepts of Gifted Adolescents’, Journal for the Education of the Gifted, vol.XI(3): 3-18, p13. 41 Herman, S.M. and Welch, R.L., (1998) ‘The Relationship Between Absolutistic Thinking and Intelligence: A Correlation of the Revised Questionnaire of Absolutistic Thinking and the Shipley Institute of Living Scale’, Psychotherapy in Private Practice, vol.17(3): 45-53. 42 Parker, W.D. and Mills, C.J., (1996) ‘The Incidence of Perfectionism in Gifted Students’, Gifted Child Quarterly, vol.40(4): 194-99. 43 See, for example: Orange, C., (1997) ‘Gifted Students and Perfectionism’, Roeper Review, vol.20(1): 39-41. 44 Parker and Mills, ‘The Incidence of Perfectionism in Gifted Students’. 93 Chapter Three – Is it good to be intelligent?

A second concern with being intelligent is that this may lead to a person having too many options to choose from - she may ‘flounder in a sea of possibilities.’45 Being smart may mean that people have so many options open that they don’t know which one to choose. If this were to occur, intelligent people may fear ‘making the wrong choice’, which could result in an almost haphazard decision-making pathway. This is a fairly common perception about intelligent people and even has a name – ‘multipotentiality’.

Whilst we should be concerned about highly intelligent people suffering with multipotentiality (indeed, it would be a mistake to ignore it), researchers in gifted education claim that this actually does not occur.46 Highly intelligent people do not generally appear to be ‘overwhelmed’ by their options. Rather, their options and choices appear to be of a similar size to those of average intelligence.

To summarise, intelligence equips people with the necessary tools to deal with complexity when making desires. However, empirical studies have not given unqualified support for desire-based accounts of the value of intelligence. There are good theoretical reasons to suggest that there is a relationship between intelligence and desire formation, yet it remains unclear how detrimental traits such as ‘over- perfectionism’ might affect this. Obviously, intelligence will not provide a person with a guarantee that she will always be able to formulate desires that will be more easily satisfied than those who are less intelligent. However, as I discuss below, this may be due to a problem with desire theories and not intelligence per se.

45 Achter, J.A., Lubinski, D., and Benbow, C.P., (1996) ‘Multipotentiality Among the Intellectually Gifted: It Was Never There and Already It’s Vanishing’, Journal of Counseling Psychology, vol.43(1): 65-76. 46 Achter, J.A., Benbow, C.P., and Lubinski, D., (1997) ‘Rethinking Multipotentiality Among the Intellectually Gifted: A Critical Review and Recommendations’, Gifted Child Quarterly, vol.41(1): 5- 15. 94 Chapter Three – Is it good to be intelligent?

3.6 Intelligence and substantive goods theories

Substantive goods theories

Individually determined conceptions of well-being are important, for two reasons. First, they place a high value on the sovereignty of individual tastes, as the notion of ‘asking people what they think’ is always popular. Second, they are important as they are result-oriented. They can accommodate variations in the needs of different people.

However, Scanlon argues that in reality, when well-being is under consideration, an objective criterion of well-being is more appropriate, as this approach better explains our intuitions. It is more important that we value the object of actual desires or experiences, rather than valuing the experience of a preferred mental state, or desire satisfaction.47 Parfit summarises this position as:

Certain things are good or bad for people, whether or not these people would want to have the good things, or to avoid the bad things.48

Under substantive goods theory, individuals do not determine the value of any particular object. Rather, substantive theorists argue that there can be impersonal descriptions of what a person would desire if she had full information. The achievement of these goods then contributes to a good life.

Few theorists have proposed a specific list of substantive goods theories. The various goods suggested tend to be general in scope, although the intention is that they will be expanded upon when considering any person’s particular circumstances. Parfit is one who has devised a list of substantive goods:

The good things might include moral goodness, rational activity, the development of one’s abilities, having children and being a good parent, knowledge, and the awareness of true beauty. The bad things might include being betrayed, manipulated, slandered,

47 Scanlon, ‘Value, Desire and Quality of Life’, p190; and Scanlon, ‘Preference and Urgency’, p658; This is also recognised by Griffin, Well-being, p17 as a weakness of desire theory. 48 Parfit, Reasons and Persons, p499. 95 Chapter Three – Is it good to be intelligent?

deceived, being deprived of liberty or dignity, and enjoying either sadistic pleasure, or aesthetic pleasure in what is in fact ugly.49

Another account of substantive goods is from the Perfectionist perspective (a philosophical theory, distinct from the above discussions of the trait of perfectionism). Supporters of this theory claim that a good life is one that involves the development of the distinctively human.50 A Perfectionist’s account of the good holds that a good life involves the exercise of theoretical and practical rationality; and an ability to choose between and act upon complex ends and intentions. Theoretical rationality includes the development of personal beliefs and the acquisition of knowledge. Practical rationality includes being able to focus on pursuing particular ends.

Would a substantive goods theorist value intelligence?

It is important to note that no theory of substantive goods has yet been universally accepted. This makes it difficult to consider exactly how a substantive goods theorist would value intelligence. If an account like Parfit’s is right, then intelligence would certainly be valued as a tool to obtain goods such as knowledge. The question is whether intelligence per se should be included on a list of substantive goods. Here, I discuss two options. The first is that intelligence be included in a list of substantive goods. The second is that intelligence be considered as instrumentally valuable to the achievement of goods on a list.

If intelligence is to be included on a list of substantive goods, it would have to be intrinsically valuable. That is, its value must be inherent to it, independent of a relationship to other goods. People would need to pursue intelligence for its own sake (as we value friendship), not for its consequences (as we value money).

There does seem to be intrinsic value in ‘knowledge’ and the ‘development of one’s abilities’, both of which appear on Parfit’s list. Perfectionists, too value the acquisition of knowledge. Yet although these ends may well have intrinsic value, as we saw in Chapter One, they are not what we mean when we use the term

49 Ibid. 50 See, for example: Hurka, T., (1993) Perfectionism. New York: Oxford University Press. 96 Chapter Three – Is it good to be intelligent?

‘intelligence’. There does seem to be a difference between these goods per se and the talents or abilities that may be used to provide them.51

It is therefore more appropriate to adopt the second option. That is, it is more appropriate to conceive of intelligence as a means by which to expedite the achievement of substantive ends, such as knowledge. However, it should be valued as one of several means, such as determinedness, by which people can obtain various substantive goods.

Empirical observations concerning substantive goods and intelligence

I have argued above that intelligence is instrumental to obtaining substantive goods. I’ll now consider some potential substantive goods (or goods necessary to obtain substantive goods) and how they might correlate with intelligence.

As I have demonstrated in the above sections, empirical studies into intelligence often tend to conflict with each other; and studies of intelligence and putative substantive goods are no exception. Much of the empirical literature examining the relationship between intelligence and putative substantive goods has given rise to inconsistent results. For this reason, I will concentrate here upon the relationship between intelligence and only a few putative substantive goods, for which a reasonable consensus has been reached in the literature.52

In reflecting Parfit’s recognition of the development of abilities as a potential substantive good, I examine how intelligence correlates with occupational type and performance. Additionally, I then examine how intelligence correlates with psychological adjustment. Whilst I won’t consider them in any detail, intelligence has

51 We can’t say for certain whether or not intelligence will always be the only means with which we gain knowledge or pursue certain ends. There is, for example much research being undertaken into the broad field of artificial intelligence, and an aspect of this research has involved investigating whether people may one day benefit from ‘memory chips’ inserted into their brains. See: Maguire, G.Q. and McGee, E.M., (1999) ‘Implantable Brain Chips? Time for Debate’, The Hastings Center Report, vol.29(1): 7-13. 52 These goods are not an exhaustive representation of possible empirical outcomes that could arise from a list of substantive goods. 97 Chapter Three – Is it good to be intelligent? been shown to correlate with an absence of criminal behaviour,53 the presence of good health54 and marital success.55

Without devaluing any particular occupation, it does seem reasonable (in line with the value that lies in developing one’s abilities) that substantive goods theorists would place some value on attaining a relatively complex occupation. Empirical literature has indicated that there is a positive correlation between intelligence and both occupational type and performance.56

Intelligence is associated with job type. Intelligent people are represented more in professional occupations than in those that require fewer skills.57 Some studies suggest this is due to a ‘gravitation process’ – people drift towards the job that best matches their abilities.58 It is still important to recognise, however, that intelligence does not correlate exactly with the kind of profession a person will pursue.

53 See, for example; Kandel, E., Mednick, S.A., Kirkegaard-Sorensen, L., Hutchings, B., et al., (1988) ‘IQ as a Protective Factor for Subjects at High Risk for Antisocial Behavior’, Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, vol.56(2): 224-26. 54 A recent study has suggested a relationship between childhood intelligence and longevity. Subjects who died before 1 January 1997 had a significantly lower mean IQ at age 11 years than subjects who were alive: Whalley, L.J. and Deary, I.J., (2001) ‘Longitudinal Cohort Study of Childhood IQ and Survival up to Age 76’, BMJ, vol.322: 1-5. Another study arising from the same data set has suggested that there is a link between childhood mental abilities and a lower risk of late-onset dementia. See: Whalley, L.J., Starr, J.M., Athawes, R., Hunter, D. et al., (2000) ‘Childhood Mental Ability and Dementia’, Neurology, vol.55(10): 1455-9. 55 For example, the subjects of the Terman study (discussed below) married more often and more successfully than the control group. See also: Kim, A., Paul, D., and Paul, M., (1989) ‘Effects of Personality on Marital Satisfaction: Identification of Source Traits and their Role in Marital Stability’, Family Therapy, vol.16(3): 243-48 – the results of this study indicated that maritally satisfied couples scored significantly higher on intelligence tests. However, there are other factors besides intelligence which are important to marital success. These include the cultural context within which the marriage takes place, the age at marriage, and whether a couple cohabitates prior to marriage. 56 For a substantial review of the literature, see: v29(3) (1986) Journal of Vocational Behaviour - special issue: ‘The g Factor in Employment’, especially: Gottfredson, L.S., (1986) ‘Societal Consequences of the g Factor in Employment’, Journal of Vocational Behavior, vol.29(3): 379-410. 57 See, for example: Blackburn, M.L. and Neumart, D., (1993) ‘Omitted-Ability Bias and the Increase in the Return to Schooling’, Journal of Labour Economics, vol.11: 521-44. 58 Wilk, S.L., Desmarais, L.B., and Sackett, P.R., (1995) ‘Gravitation to Jobs Commensurate with Ability: Longitudinal and Cross-Sectional Tests’, Journal of Applied Psychology, vol.80: 79-85. 98 Chapter Three – Is it good to be intelligent?

The performance of a person in her occupation is also related to her intelligence.59 Ghiselli showed that that on average, workers with higher intelligence scores were better workers, on both supervisors’ evaluations and individual self-report.60 However, although intelligence is important to predicting job performance, it is not the only variable that matters.61 If a person was intelligent but showed no application to her work, then she would not be considered a valuable employee. Overall, empirical investigations point to an instrumental value for intelligence in assigning people to achieve satisfaction in their employment.

Another important substantive good, in line with Parfit’s putative good of avoiding being deprived of one’s dignity, is that of psychological adjustment.62 Is being intelligent more likely to mean that a person suffers from ‘social maladjustment’, or low self-esteem? The literature offers two contrasting views about psychological adjustment in intelligent people. The first is that:

[G]ifted children are generally better adjusted than their nongifted peers; that giftedness protects… from maladjustment…. [T]he gifted are capable of greater understanding of self and others due to their cognitive capacities and therefore cope better with stress, conflicts and developmental dysynchrony than their peers.63

The contrary view is the claim that:

[G]ifted children are more at-risk for adjustment problems than their nongifted peers, that giftedness increases a child’s vulnerability to adjustment difficulties…. Gifted children are at greater risk for emotional and social problems, particularly during adolescence and adulthood… The gifted are more sensitive to interpersonal conflicts

59 Stewart, N., (1947) ‘Relationship between Military Occupational Specialty and Army General Classification Test standard score’, Educational and Psychological Measurement, vol.7: 677-93. For a review, see: Hunter, J.E., (1986) ‘Cognitive Ability, Cognitive Aptitudes, Job Knowledge and Job Performance’, Journal of Vocational Behavior, vol.29: 340-62. 60 Ghiselli, E.E., (1973) ‘The Validity of Aptitude Tests in Personnel Selection’, Personnel Psychology, vol.26(4): 461-77. 61 For review, see Gottfredson, L.S., Sternberg, R.J., and Wagner, R.K., (1993) ‘Is IQ the Best Predictor of Job Performance?’ CQ Researcher, vol.3(28): 665. 62 Within psychology, ‘adjustment’ describes an individual’s pattern of responding to environmental demands. Those with positive adjustment cope effectively with the life’s demands. Those with negative adjustment display maladaptive coping skills and cannot deal with stress. 63 Neihart, M., (1999) ‘The Impact of Giftedness on Psychological Well-Being: What Does the Empirical Literature Say?’ Roeper Review, vol.22(1): 10-17, p10. 99 Chapter Three – Is it good to be intelligent?

and experience greater degrees of alienation and stress than do their peers as a result of their cognitive capacities.64

So which view best describes the typical reality of being intelligent? A most effective mechanism by which to examine the validity or otherwise of the common conceptions of intelligent people has been to undertake large longitudinal studies. Several of these have now been carried out, the largest being the somewhat misleadingly titled ‘Genetic Studies of Genius’, which was initiated by Lewis Terman at Stanford University in 1921.65

This study examined over 1,500 subjects with an IQ of 135 or above. Long-term follow-up is still being carried out. The aims of the Terman study were to provide empirical data about highly intelligent children; specifically the relationship between childhood intellectual acuity and adult productivity, health and life satisfaction.66 Data obtained from the Terman study, although subject to some qualifications,67 have shown that advanced intellectual development in childhood, when provided with adequate family and social support, does not lead inevitably to any psychological problems later in life.68 In fact on average, the children of the Terman study were taller, healthier, more athletic and much more scholastically advanced than an age- matched control group.

Replications of Terman’s work generally lend support to his findings.69 Studies have reported either a positive70 or neutral71 relationship between intelligence and

64 Ibid. 65 For a commentary, see Laycock, F., (1979) Gifted Children. Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman. 66 Terman, L.M., (1925) Genetic Studies of Genius. Stanford: Stanford University Press; Terman, L.M. and Oden, M.H., (1947) The Gifted Child Grows Up: Twenty-Five Years’ Follow-Up of a Superior Group. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 67 These studies have been criticised as not being relevant to current-day experiences. See: Cravens, H., (1992) ‘A Scientific Project Locked in Time: the Terman Genetic Studies of Genius, 1920s - 1950s’, American Psychologist, vol.47(2): 183-89. 68 Holahan, C.K. and Sears, R.R., (1995) The Gifted Group in Later Maturity. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 69 See, for example: Subtonik, R.F., Karp, D.E., and Morgan, E.R., (1989) ‘High IQ Children at Midlife: An Investigation into the Generalizability of Terman’s Genetic Studies of Genius’, Roeper Review, vol.11(3): 139-44. 70Sayler, M.F. and Brookshire, W.K., (1993) ‘Social, Emotional and Behavioural Adjustment of Accelerated Students, Students in Gifted Classes, and Regular Students in 8th Grade’, Gifted Child 100 Chapter Three – Is it good to be intelligent? adjustment, although there have been suggestions that girls cope better with high intelligence than boys.72 In a recent review Robinson and Noble claim that in general, intelligent children are generally more mature and well-adjusted than comparison groups of lower intelligence.73

Researchers have also used case studies to illuminate some of the more narrative aspects of leading a life with high intelligence, which has led to several specific potential problems being identified.74 When gifted children were asked how they felt about being intelligent, the best things were reported as: greater opportunities, increased self-esteem, academic success and being held in high regard by others. The worst things about being intelligent were reported as: being called a ‘nerd’ or a ‘snob’, being resented by others and being subjected to excessive expectations.75 As the words of two highly intelligent people illustrate:

“Being one of the smarties isn’t easy. Actually, it is on the same wave length to some people as a man with one leg”76

“I had it ingrained in me by everyone around me that I was different.”77

Quarterly, vol.37(4): 150-54; and Luthar, S.S., Zigler, E., and Goldstein, D., (1992) ‘Psychosocial Adjustment Among Intellectually Gifted Adolescents: the Role of Cognitive-Developmental and Experiential Factors’, Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, and Allied Disciplines, vol.33(2): 361-73. 71 See, for example: Oram, G.D., Cornell, D.G., and Rutemiller, L.A., (1995) ‘Relations Between Academic Aptitude and Psychosocial Adjustment in Gifted Program Students’, Gifted Child Quarterly, vol.39(4): 236-44; and Rost, D.H. and Czeschlik, T., (1994) ‘The Psycho-Social Adjustment of Gifted Children in Middle-Childhood’, European Journal of Psychology of Education, vol.9(1): 15-25. 72 See, for example: Tomlinson-Keasey, C. and Smith-Winberry, C., (1983) ‘Educational Strategies and Personality Outcomes of Gifted and Nongifted College Students’, Gifted Child Quarterly, vol.27(1): 35-41. 73 Robinson, N.M. and Noble, K.D., (1991) ‘Social-Emotional Development and Adjustment of Gifted Children’, in M.C. Wang, M.C. Reynolds, and H.J. Walberg, (Eds). Handbook of Special Education: Research and Practice. Oxford: Pergamon Press, pp57-76. 74 These include: academic under-achievement caused by a denial of intellectual talent, perceiving a lack of challenge, feelings of competitiveness and rivalry, poor self-concept, and a lag between intellectual and social development. See, for example: Sowa, C., McIntyre, J., May, K.M., and Bland, L., (1994) ‘Social and Emotional Adjustment Themes Across Gifted Children’, Roeper Review, vol.17(2): 95-98; Hillyer, K., (1988) ‘Problems of Gifted Children’, Journal of the Association for the Study of Perception, vol.11(3): 134-39; and Galbraith, J., (1985) ‘The Eight Great Gripes of Gifted Kids: Responding to Special Needs’, Roeper Review, vol.8(1): 15-18. 75 Manaster, G.J., Chan, J.C., Watt, C., and Wiehe, J., (1994) ‘Gifted Adolescents’ Attitudes Towards their Giftedness: A Partial Replication’, Gifted Child Quarterly, vol.38(4): 176-78. 76 A gifted child’s viewpoint, reproduced in: Coleman, L.J. and Cross, T.L., (1988) ‘Is Being Gifted a Social Handicap?’ Journal for the Education of the Gifted, vol.11(4): 41-56, p41. 101 Chapter Three – Is it good to be intelligent?

However, there are numerous strategies available to alleviate these problems,78 and overall people who are highly intelligent have expressed that they would rather be intelligent than not intelligent.79

Empirical studies have also suggested that although intelligent people are likely to be as emotionally balanced as other age-matched children, they may be at risk of psychological disturbances if they are continually told that they are different. They may also suffer from inappropriately targeted educational interventions.80 According to Bracken:

If giftedness is not viewed by the child’s family and friends as an asset, then it is likely that these negative appraisals would be reflected in the gifted child’s developing self- concept.81

Therefore, problems faced by some intelligent people may be due to social attitudes towards persons of high intelligence (including contradictory treatment and labelling by society), rather than being inherently related to intelligence itself.82 What that State must provide is adequate family and social support, guidance and acceptance of persons of high intelligence from an early age, just as has been advocated for people of lower intelligence.

One group of intelligent people may still be susceptible to adjustment problems - those of extremely high intelligence. The Terman Studies concluded that those who were extremely intelligent were actually less well-adjusted than those of slightly lower intelligence.83 Likewise did Hollingworth, who in another longitudinal study claimed

77 Crutis, M., ‘The Lonely World of the Little Genius’ The Sunday Herald-Sun Magazine (Melbourne), 16 January 2000, p8-13, p10. 78 See, for example: Freeman, J., (1997) ‘The Emotional Development of the Highly Able’, European Journal of Psychology of Education, vol.12(4): 479-93. 79 See, for example: Colangelo, N. and Kelly, N., (1983) ‘A Study of Student, Parent and Teacher Attitudes Towards Gifted Programs and Gifted Students’, Gifted Child Quarterly, vol.31(2): 75-78. 80 Freeman, J., (1985) ‘Emotional Aspects of Giftedness’, in J. Freeman, (Ed). The Psychology of Gifted Children. Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, pp247-64. 81 Bracken, B.A., (1980) ‘Comparison of Self-Attitudes of Gifted Children and Children in a Nongifted Normative Group’, Psychological Reports, vol.47: 715-18 p715. 82Personal Communication: O’Mullane, A. Gifted child unit, Department of Learning and Educational Development, University of Melbourne: Feb 15 2000. 83 Terman and Oden, The Gifted Child Grows Up: Twenty-Five Years’ Follow-Up of a Superior Group. 102 Chapter Three – Is it good to be intelligent? that: ‘The really difficult problems of adjustment to life and to people come to those who test above 170 IQ.’84 As a result of her research, Hollingworth coined the concept of ‘optimum intelligence’ for a child’s happiness and adjustment: an IQ ranging from 125 to 155.85 Her hypothesis for this concept was that moderately intelligent children would have more in common with their peers and so could better relate to them. In the 1990s, a number of studies suggested that the rate of maladjustment within the extremely intelligent is roughly double that of a ‘normal’ population,86 although there were more studies that denied such a connection.87

It is therefore important to recognise that intelligent people are a heterogeneous group. Whilst ‘no inherent quality of giftedness automatically dooms these individuals to social maladjustment or unhappiness’,88 there is evidence that the experience of high intelligence may lead to vulnerability at some life stages, such as adolescence,89 and that it is experienced in different ways by males and females.90

To summarise the relationship between intelligence and psychological adjustment; empirical studies have indicated that the reality of being intelligent is not that of common stereotypes. Being intelligent does not prevent a person from forming social relationships, nor will she suffer from psychological problems any more than other groups of people do.91 The current status quo within empirical studies can be summarised as:

84 Hollingworth, L.S., (1977) Children Above 180 IQ: Stanford-Binet Origin and Development. New York: Octagon Books, p253, 267-283. 85 I discuss this further in Chapter Six. 86 For reviews, see Robinson and Noble, ‘Social-Emotional Development and Adjustment of Gifted Children’; and Norman, A.D., Ramsay, S.G., Martray, C.R., and Roberts, J.L., (1999) ‘Relationship Between Levels of Giftedness and Psychosocial Adjustment’, Roeper Review, vol.22(1): 5-9. 87 For a synopsis, see: Garland, A.F. and Zigler, E., (1999) ‘Emotional and Behavioral Problems Among Highly Intellectually Gifted Youth’, Roeper Review, vol.22(1): 41-44. 88 Roedell, ‘Vulnerabilities of Highly Gifted Children’. 89 Robinson and Noble, ‘Social-Emotional Development and Adjustment of Gifted Children’. 90 Loeb, R.C. and Jay, G., (1987) ‘Self-Concept in Gifted Children: Differential Impact in Boys and Girls’, Gifted Child Quarterly, vol.31(1): 9-14. This study indicates that being gifted is more of an advantage for girls than it is for boys, as they had a higher self-concept than their non-gifted peers. No such difference was observed with gifted boys. 91 This excludes the very highly intelligent, who may be at greater risk of psychological disturbance. 103 Chapter Three – Is it good to be intelligent?

[T]here is no reliable evidence that giftedness is of itself directly related to emotional adjustment; the causes of adverse emotional effects on the gifted are usually the same life circumstances which can bring about poor adjustment in most children. In fact, it is generally accepted that the gifted are psychologically sturdier than other children. However, there are secondary aspects of being gifted which can cause emotional problems for some, bringing them conflict and anxiety, and producing consequent unwelcome behaviour. Typical problems may ensue, for example, from the interaction between other people’s responses to exceptionally high ability and many gifted children’s hypersensitivity and perfectionism.92

Empirical studies have provided some interesting insights into the value of intelligence on a substantive goods perspective. Importantly, these studies have shown that several common stereotypes about highly intelligent people are not supported by empirical literature - intelligent people are not all ‘semi-autistic sickly bookworms or frail nerds who can barely bench-press a pencil.’93 Additionally, several goods important to a successful life, such as health status, vocation and social adjustment, do seem to have a positive correlation with intelligence levels.

3.7 Summary

So far, I have discussed the value of intelligence upon three theories of individual well-being. For each, I have supplemented my theoretical discussion about how being intelligent may promote a better life, with examples from empirical literature. I have argued that overall, the best way of conceiving of the value of intelligence is as being instrumentally of value and that it may be desirable (but not sufficient) for achieving well-being.

Now, the arguments I have advanced here are subject to an important critique. Interestingly, the following statement comes from perhaps the most controversial book on intelligence published recently, The Bell Curve. The book’s authors, Charles Murray and the late Richard Herrnstein, have the following to say about the value of intelligence:

92 Freeman, ‘Emotional Aspects of Giftedness’, p260-261. 93 Sternberg, R.J., (Ed). (1994) Encyclopedia of Human Intelligence, New York: Macmillan p521, c.f. Doidge, N., ‘Why Geek Geniuses Lack Social Graces’ Washington Post Online 1999, Available at: http://www.nationalpost.com/artslife.asp?f=990908/74176.html (Accessed 5 June 2000). 104 Chapter Three – Is it good to be intelligent?

[T]he concept of intelligence has taken on a much higher place in the pantheon of human virtues than it deserves.… The identification of IQ with attractive human qualities in general is unfortunate and wrong. Statistically, there is often a modest correlation with such qualities. But modest correlations are of little use in sizing up other individuals one by one. For example, a person can have a terrific sense of humour without giving you a clue about where he is within 30 points on the IQ scale. Or a plumber with a measured IQ of 100 – only an average IQ – can know a great deal about the functioning of plumbing systems. He may be able to diagnose problems, discuss them articulately, make shrewd decisions about how to fix them, and, while he is working, make some pithy comments about the president’s recent speech.94

Geneticists, too, warn about the disproportionate value that society places on intelligence. They are worried that concentrating overly on one good might lead to the value of others being discounted, such as the value of forming interpersonal relationships. For example, clinical geneticist Angus Clarke argues that:

…society already overvalues “intelligence” as against other characteristics and qualities of persons, and… this research is likely to accentuate this still further.95

It would, of course, be a mistake to place excessive value upon intelligence, such that other traits are devalued. However, my argument in this chapter does not exclude other traits from being valued. In discussing the value of intelligence, I have not argued that people with lower intelligence are not able to lead a good life, or should be barred from accessing resources. Rather, as so many people are concerned about genetic research into intelligence, I think that it is important that we have a discussion about the value of intelligence.

Consider again the various conceptions of well-being I discussed above and how supporters of each theory would value intelligence. On a hedonistic conception of well-being, I suggested that intelligence may equip a person with a good capacity to imagine alternative pleasures and to remember salient features of past experiences.

94 Herrnstein, R.J., and Murray, C., (1994) The Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure in American Life. New York: Free Press, p20-21. 95 Clarke, A., (1999) ‘The Genetic Dissection of Complex Traits’, in V. Launis, J. Pietarinen and J. Räikkä, (Eds). Genes and Morality: New Essays. Amsterdam: Rodopi, pp103-19, p113. 105 Chapter Three – Is it good to be intelligent?

An examination of the empirical literature showed that intelligence does not produce displeasure. Yet, hedonists probably would not privilege intelligence over any other trait that could improve the quality of one’s experiences to the same extent.

According to both desire satisfaction and substantive goods theorists, intelligence would be valued. A desire theorist would consider intelligence as important to choosing effective means to satisfy one’s ends. Intelligence enables a person to formulate desires that may be more easily satisfied, as she could best fit them with her current environment and the information available to her. Thus the desires of an intelligent person may carry a lower ‘fulfilment cost’. A substantive goods theorist would value intelligence as instrumentally important to gaining knowledge of the world and for obtaining various other goods.

Empirical evidence lent some support to the value of intelligence on both the desire-based and substantive goods accounts of well-being. However factors such as the conflicting measures of the various traits I discussed and differences in sample sizes used make it difficult to advance categorical claims about the empirical outcome of being intelligent on these views of well-being.96 Yet, what empirical evidence has indicated is that intelligent people are not destined to live a life of psychological disturbance and social isolation. Intelligence is valuable for the development of personal coping styles for everyday life97 and communication strategies. It is also valuable for processing and reasoning about the information in the cognitive complexities presented to us every day.98

Overall, the general view of psychologists is that intelligence is:

…strongly related, probably more so than any other single measurable human trait, to many important educational, occupational, economic and social outcomes…. Of course, a high IQ no more guarantees success than a low IQ guarantees failure in life.

96 For a review of problems in the empirical literature, see: Robinson and Noble, ‘Social-Emotional Development and Adjustment of Gifted Children’. 97 Watten, R.G., Syversen, J.L., and Myhrer, T., (1995) ‘Quality of Life, Intelligence and Mood’, Social Indicators Research, vol.36(3): 287-99. 98 Gottfredson, ‘Why g Matters’. 106 Chapter Three – Is it good to be intelligent?

There are many exceptions, but the odds for success in our society greatly favour individuals with higher IQs.99

There is another issue, which to this point remains unresolved. Above, I have discussed the value of intelligence according to three theories of well-being. I have suggested that supporters of each theory would value intelligence in different ways and to different extents. What I have not done, however, is indicate a more precise value of intelligence, which would necessitate a resolution of these conflicting theories of well-being. Whilst it is not my objective to resolve the debate over well-being (which is a significant topic in itself), it is worthwhile to comment briefly upon the shortcomings of each theory.100 Parfit has offered a solution to these shortcomings, which might assist in deciding where the value of intelligence might lie.

Consider again hedonistic conceptions of well-being. These are initially quite plausible. People like things that make them happy; and to say that something makes people happy is often reason enough to promote that thing. Additionally, Hedonism is a conceptually clear theory, as its sometimes-pluralistic approach allows flexibility in assessing pleasurable experiences. However, a problem with this theory is that it values experiences alone. In reality, our quality of life depends on more than the quality of the experiences we have.101 This has been famously illustrated by Robert Nozick’s example of the ‘experience machine’.102 Nozick concocted an imaginary machine, into which competent persons could input their own desires and wishes for their life. That person could then enter this machine and lead a life in which all his aspirations and desires are satisfied. However, Nozick is sceptical that we would plug into such a machine, as in addition to having nice experiences, people want to do things and be a certain sort of person. It is therefore necessary to bring in some non- experiential considerations to a conception of well-being.

99 Gottfredson, L.S., (1997) 'Mainstream Science on Intelligence: An Editorial with 52 Signatories, History and Bibliography', Intelligence, vol.24(1): 13-23, p14. 100 My discussion here is by no means a comprehensive critique. There are bound to be many objections besides the ones I discuss. 101 Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, p113. 102 Nozick, R., (1974) Anarchy, State and Utopia. New York: Basic Books, p42-5. 107 Chapter Three – Is it good to be intelligent?

Despite meeting the challenges raised by Nozick’s experience machine and their other advantages, Desire Satisfaction theories (specifically Success Theory) are still problematic. Merely satisfying a desire does not guarantee that this will be good for a person. For some, the satisfaction of a desire might not make their life go better, or might make it go worse. For example, if a person has adapted to sub-optimal circumstances, then it is difficult to say that satisfying her desires has made her life go better. In fact, if a person is both poor and adapted to being poor, she is suffering a ‘double injustice’, as she may no longer desire better circumstances.

Informed Desire Theory has addressed the problem with actual desires not correlating with what makes for a good life.103 Informed desire theorists place less value on actual desires. Instead, they use an objective standard to evaluate the types of desires that are relevant for considerations of personal well-being. Desires need to be fully informed, made with sound reasoning and not made under coercion or duress to provide reasons for action. Moreover, they cannot result from adapting to undesirable circumstances. Scanlon, however, has criticised informed desire theorists as being too hypothetical. That is, their formulation of ideal desires is not readily applied to actual concerns people may have about their well-being.104 Also, having an informed desire seems to detract significance from the importance of having desires in the first place, as the true value of the desire lies not with the desire itself, but with the end which it will promote.105

Substantive goods also are subject to several difficulties. Two particular criticisms are that this theory is inflexible and that it lacks social relativity. Consider the first criticism. Because substantive goods theory is about a ‘list’, it is liable to the charge that it is excessively rigid or inflexible, which could then undermine individuals’ autonomy.106 Instead, individuals’ circumstances and preferences should be

103 See, for example: Griffin, Well-being, p14. 104 Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, p114-115. 105 Scanlon, ‘Value, Desire and Quality of Life’, p188. Griffin would challenge this claim, and state that it is the inherent flexibility of informed desire theories which do make them, desire theories. See: Griffin, Well-being, p33. 106 Raised by: Scanlon, ‘Value, Desire and Quality of Life’, p189. 108 Chapter Three – Is it good to be intelligent? considered.107 Substantive goods theorists respond to this objection by claiming that individual interests are respected by this theory.108 Even though goods are specified substantively, a person would still have the freedom to determine her own detailed ‘goods’ from the general list of things desirable for achieving well-being.109 The second problem of substantive good theories lies in the allegation that the theory is elitist or arbitrary, prescribing what society should value, rather than deferring to what people actually value. Substantive theorists respond that substantive goods will still be socially relative. They claim that the theory will be able to deliver different types of goods to people in different circumstances.110

So in short, being intelligent makes one’s life go better on each account of well- being, but not all of the accounts stand up. The various problems with these theories may mean that we should adopt one theory of the value of intelligence over another.

Although hedonists are not likely to place a high value on intelligence, the failure of this theory to recognise things other than experiences means that we can legitimately look elsewhere to examine the value of intelligence. Likewise, as desire satisfaction only offers a subjectivist approach to well-being (and because people can desire things that are not good for them), then even if empirical data indicates some problems with how intelligent people form desires (such as perfectionism), then this might not matter so much. As it is unclear whether informed desire theory is subjective or substantive, I will not discuss it further here. Substantive goods theory, although accounting for a value of intelligence independent of desires and experiences, is also subject to several problems.

Parfit has offered a solution to this problem, in which he combines what is most plausible in these three theories of well-being. He argues:

We might then claim that what is best for people is a composite. It is not just their being in the conscious states that they want to be in. Nor is it just their

107 Raised by: Griffin, Well-being, p33, 54-55. 108 Scanlon, ‘Value, Desire and Quality of Life’, p189-90. 109 Scanlon, ‘Preference and Urgency’, p658. 110 Ibid. 109 Chapter Three – Is it good to be intelligent?

having knowledge, engaging in rational activity, being aware of true beauty, and the like. What is good for someone is neither just what hedonists claim, not just what is claimed by Objective List Theories… We might claim, for example, that what is good or bad for someone is to have knowledge, to be engaged in rational activity, to experience mutual love, and to be aware of beauty, while strongly wanting just these things… What is of value, or is good for someone, is to… be engaged in these activities, and to be strongly wanting to be so engaged.111

The value of intelligence therefore best lies in its value as a means to achieve ends such as acquiring knowledge and the development of our abilities. It will also be important to desire ends of this kind, and to derive pleasure from doing them. The empirical literature that I have examined here demonstrates that intelligence can assist with the development of many important abilities. It has also demonstrated that it is not displeasurable to undertake activities that involve intelligence.

3.8 Intelligence and autonomy

Before concluding my discussion of well-being and the value of intelligence, it is important that I discuss another potential value that intelligence may have. There might be a correlation between intelligence and another concept very much valued in moral theory, that of autonomy.

But what is the relevance of autonomy to well-being? There are two views on this. The first is that being autonomous is intrinsic to well-being. Upon this view, determining whether intelligence contributes to autonomy is important, as intelligence could have a direct impact upon well-being. The second view is that being autonomous is not a component of well-being, but that it is still good that an agent is autonomous. Either way, intelligence may be important as it may influence our capacity to be autonomous.

Now, autonomy is obviously a complex concept and I do not intend to discuss it at length here. Rather, I will briefly synthesise one popular conception of autonomy and discuss how intelligence might relate to this.

111 Parfit, Reasons and Persons, p502. 110 Chapter Three – Is it good to be intelligent?

Defining a core notion of ‘autonomy’ is a difficult task. As Feinberg points out, there are several different accounts: the capacity to be autonomous, the actual condition of it, autonomy as a character ideal or the sovereign right to self-govern.112 He doubts that there can be a core notion of autonomy. Instead, he argues that these disparate concepts are the best possible way of construing it. However, Christman disagrees. He argues that ‘the actual condition of autonomy defined as a psychological ability to be self-governing’ is the core of autonomy.113 Christman describes this as ‘PC- autonomy’, which is the psychological condition of autonomy, as opposed to ‘R- autonomy’, which is autonomy as a right. PC-autonomy is therefore an actual psychological characteristic of people.

Whether we take Feinberg’s disparate theory or Christman’s core concept, it seems apparent that it will be impossible to exercise the right to be autonomous, or to aspire to the ideal of autonomy, unless one has the capacity to be so. So, here I will discuss how intelligence might contribute to the capacity to be autonomous.

A general understanding of the capacity to be autonomous, as I understand it, is as an individual’s ability to form, revise and pursue her conception of the good, such that she can design and go after particular projects or goals.

Gerald Dworkin has offered a characterisation of autonomy that relies on the importance of the capacity to be autonomous.114 He emphasises the importance of having both first-order desires (where the object is an action); and second-order desires (where the object is a desire to perform a particular action). It is important that an agent both identifies with and endorses her desires as being legitimate goals, consistent with her values. Within this recognition and evaluation of both first and second-order desires, Dworkin argues that the ‘capacity to raise the question of

112 Feinberg, J., (1989) ‘Autonomy’, in J. Christman, (Ed). The Inner Citadel: Essays on Individual Autonomy. New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp27-53, p28. 113 Christman, J., (1989) ‘Introduction’, in J. Christman, (Ed). The Inner Citadel: Essays on Individual Autonomy. New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp3-23, p5. Emphasis Added. 114 Dworkin, G., (1988) The Theory and Practice of Autonomy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, especially Chapter 1. 111 Chapter Three – Is it good to be intelligent? whether I will identify with or reject the reasons for which I now act’115 is one of the most important features of autonomy. He then offers his definition of autonomy:

[A]utonomy is conceived of as a second-order capacity of persons to reflect critically upon their first-order preferences, desires, wishes, and so forth and the capacity to accept or attempt to change these in light of higher-order preferences and values.116

Within this definition, autonomy should be assessed globally, over time, rather than over shorter periods. To be autonomous, a person also needs to be able to alter and adapt her preferences to make them effective within her life and the relative other constraints she may have:

The idea of autonomy is not merely an evaluative or reflective notion, but includes as well some ability both to alter one’s preferences and to make them effective in one’s actions and, indeed, to make them effective because one has reflected upon them and adopted them as one’s own.117

Another important aspect of the capacity to be autonomous is the capacity for rationality, which is emphasised by both John Rawls118 and Richard Lindley,119 among others. These theorists argue that in evaluating desires, it is important that such an evaluation is consistent with the principles of rational choice. By rational, I mean that a person needs to be able to decide between a reasonable range of possible alternatives. Additionally, in having relevant knowledge of each alternative, she must be able to accurately evaluate the information and be able to vividly imagine how each alternative might be like.120 To be autonomous, a person needs to be able to formulate and evaluate rational desires about how she would like her life to go (and she needs to be able to act upon these desires to realise them).

115 Ibid, p15. 116 Ibid, p20. 117 Ibid, p17. 118 Rawls, J., (1971) A Theory of Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p408 119 Lindley, R., (1986) Autonomy. London: Macmillan. 120 This is akin to Aristotle’s conception of voluntary action, from Book III of the Nichomachean Ethics. People must not be ill-informed, or ignorant of relevant facts when making a decision. 112 Chapter Three – Is it good to be intelligent?

How might intelligence contribute to a person’s capacity to be autonomous? Being intelligent will favourably influence people’s capacities to act autonomously. Considering Dworkin’s view of autonomy as the second-order capacity to evaluate first-order desires, being intelligent may enable a person to more easily reflect upon her desires and to balance them with those constraints that already exist in her life. Just as it is helpful to achieving well-being from a desire satisfaction theorist’s viewpoint, being intelligent will enable a person to gain and evaluate the necessary knowledge to make a rational decision about an autonomous action.121

But as long as people have a threshold level of intelligence, will the ‘level’ of intelligence make any difference to how autonomous a person can be? According to Feinberg, there probably is a relationship between a person’s intellectual abilities and how autonomous he or she may be able to be.122 He discusses, but ultimately rejects, Wikler’s ‘threshold’ of natural competence view, which discusses a more natural conception of competence than how it is legally defined.123 Wikler suggests that above a certain minimum, competence is possessed to an equal degree by all those who have it. He claims that:

Though a person may have more intelligence than another, he will be no more competent at performing certain tasks; his added power is simply an unused surplus. Those lacking enough intelligence for the task will be incompetent to perform it; while those having sufficient intelligence will be equally competent however great the difference in their intelligence levels.124

According to Wikler, the threshold conception of natural competence (which requires only a minimally relevant capability to perform a task), can be used to generate necessary and sufficient conditions for the right of self-governance in individuals. Of those who are competent, obviously, some will be more richly endowed with intelligence than others, but ‘above the appropriate threshold they are

121 Note that I discounted the empirical studies presented in the section on desire theory, as the conception of ‘rationality’ they adopted was different to how the term is understood in philosophical literature. 122 Feinberg, ‘Autonomy’, pp29-30. 123 Wikler, D., (1979) ‘Paternalism and the Mildly Retarded’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol.8: 377- 92. 124 Ibid, p384; cited by Feinberg, ‘Autonomy’, p29. Feinberg’s emphasis. 113 Chapter Three – Is it good to be intelligent? deemed no more competent (qualified) than the others at the “task” of living their own lives according to their own values as they choose’.125 Feinberg suggests that regarding his fourth sense of autonomy (the right to self-govern) a threshold level of competence (or, autonomy) is all that is required to secure that right.

As Feinberg points out however, this threshold of competence view should not be applied when we are discussing the ‘capacity’ or ‘actual condition’ sense of autonomy. A person may very well be able to form and evaluate desires for herself, but this does not mean that she will rule herself wisely. Although one’s right to autonomy is not in question, a person’s capacity to actually exercise autonomy may be limited. It seems reasonable to suggest that intelligence will play a significant role in one’s capacity to be autonomous. As Feinberg argues:

In summary, capacities relevant to self-government do differ in the degree to which they are possessed by various competent persons. Therefore, above a minimum threshold, the autonomy that is defined in terms of those capacities is also a property admitting of “more” and “less”…. Some people are “more in control of themselves” than others, have more prudence… The explanation of these differences may be in some cases be that the better governed (or more self-governed) people have more of the capacities that define autonomy in the first sense.126

It is important to recognise that in making such assertions about the relationship between intelligence and the ability to exercise autonomy, it is not suggested that it is only possible for those of elite intelligence to truly exercise autonomy. Indeed, such an assertion might have dire practical applications, such as denying the important right to autonomy to many – if Feinberg’s distinction between the capacity to be autonomous and the right to be autonomous is not kept in mind. Feinberg rightly points out that abilities will not be the only factors that contribute to a capacity to be autonomous. Also relevant will be a person’s character, feeling, sensibility and circumstances.127 Dworkin concludes his discussion of a theory of autonomy by saying:

125 Feinberg, ‘Autonomy’, p29. 126 Ibid, p30. 127 Ibid. 114 Chapter Three – Is it good to be intelligent?

It is important both to guard against certain intellectualist conceptions of autonomy as well as to be candid about the ways in which people may differ in their actual exercise of autonomy. The first error would be to suppose that my views imply that only certain types or classes of people can be autonomous. If we think of the process of reflection and identification as being a conscious, fully articulated, and explicit process, then it will appear that it is mainly professors of philosophy who exercise autonomy and that those who are less educated, or who are by nature or upbringing less reflective, are not, or are not as fully, autonomous individuals. But a farmer living in an isolated rural community, with a minimal education, may without being aware of it be conducting his life in ways which indicate that he has shaped and moulded his life according to reflective procedures…. It may be true, however, that there is empirical and theoretical evidence that certain personality types, or certain social classes, or certain cultures are more (or less) likely to exercise their capacity to be autonomous… To the extent that this is borne out by the evidence, we must be on guard against the tendency to attribute greater value to characteristics which are more likely to be found in twentieth-century intellectuals than in other groups or cultures.128

In summary, being intelligent arguably does have a significant relationship with the capacity (not the right) to act autonomously. The psychological ability to self- govern, or the ability to embrace second-order desires, would usually be enhanced if an agent is able to effectively obtain and evaluate significant information prior to making a decision as to how to act in any given situation.

3.9 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have discussed the important but rarely examined issue of the relationship between intelligence and individual well-being. Through an analysis of three theories of well-being and an examination of the empirical literature, I have identified several important analytical and empirical reasons for valuing intelligence.

I have argued that intelligence would be valued on any of the three theories of well-being I have discussed, albeit to different degrees. Further, where intelligence is not valued highly, such as with hedonistic theories, a brief critique of the theory has illustrated why such a view might be mistaken.

128 Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy, p17. 115 Chapter Three – Is it good to be intelligent?

I have argued that it is justifiable to claim that intelligence has a high instrumental value for people, as it equips them, for example, with an ability to handle the large amounts of complex information that they face in their everyday lives. Additionally, intelligence (particularly on a substantive goods perspective) equips people with a tool that can lead to the provision of many other personal and social goods. I have also suggested that being intelligent makes an important contribution to a person’s capacity to act autonomously. So, if individuals or parents wanted to measure or augment their own or their child’s intelligence, then upon this analysis, the experience of being intelligent does not provide any serious reasons as to why this should not take place.

Now, in advocating that indeed it may good to be intelligent, it is important that I point out a few caveats to my claim. The first and most important is that intelligence, though instrumentally valuable, is not a ticket to life success. The achievement of well-being by no means has a direct linear relationship with increasing intelligence. As with all of us, intelligent people will not function without adequate family and social supports. We also need to recognise that, as with most groups of people in society, intelligent people are a very heterogeneous group. Indicators based upon collective studies should not be used for individual predications. Further, as there are still some inconsistencies in the empirical literature regarding persons of very high intelligence, we need to be wary about promoting extreme intelligence.

Additionally, there are sure to be some who will criticise the rather quantitative measures that I have employed in this analysis. It seems obvious, as Reiss points out, that there is more to life than ‘having a well-paid job, staying out of prison and being healthy’.129 However, what he also points out is that very few parents expend any effort in trying to reduce (or minimise) their own or their child’s intelligence, whilst many dedicate much time and money to optimise intelligence, even if this is not their specific intention.

So, if we appreciate these caveats, we are left with what I would argue to be some clear reasons for arguing that indeed, it is good to be intelligent.

129 Reiss, M.J., (2000) ‘The Ethics of Genetic Research on Intelligence’, Bioethics, vol.14(1): 1-15, p14. 116

Section III:

MORAL ISSUES IN THE APPLICATION OF RESEARCH RESULTS

117

Chapter Four

4 SHOULD GENETIC TESTS FOR INTELLIGENCE BE DEVELOPED?

If they are permitted, should they be used to test children, or should only those competent to consent to such a test be allowed to undertake them?

4.1 Introduction

As with most genetic research, genetic testing is likely to be the first clinical application to arise once genes influencing intelligence are identified. Armed with results from genetic research into intelligence, together with the existing technologies of genetic testing, it may soon be possible to predict people’s ‘intelligence profiles’, either before or after birth. In this chapter, I discuss the issues that testing existing people for ‘intelligence genes’ might raise. Consider the following:

Suppose you are given a brochure advertising a commercial clinical genetics service, Genes!Life.1 Genes!Life is informing clients of its new service, which provides people with genetic information about several behavioural traits, among them intelligence. Clients can choose which traits they would like to receive information about. Should people be permitted to have access to this information?

Consider also a further issue in this scenario:

In its brochure, the service also indicates that testing of children is available by request. Suppose you have a six-year-old daughter, Sarah. Should you be able to have Sarah tested?

I will argue that there may be some permissible uses of genetic testing for intelligence in both competent and incompetent persons. Whilst I acknowledge existing controversies over both psychometric tests of ability and genetic testing per se, testing may be ethical if it is undertaken subject to several conditions. These include that the genetic test result is not

1 I say ‘commercial’ service, because it is unlikely that any publicly-funded genetics service will offer such tests. However, for the purposes of the arguments I will make in this chapter, I will assume that any costs involved in such tests are negligible. 118 Chapter Four – Should genetic tests be developed? taken purely as indicative of an ‘IQ Score’ and that access to both testing and test results is adequately facilitated.

To make this argument, after reviewing the technologies that could be used in genetic testing, I first present some reasons as to why people might want to seek genetic information about their own or their children’s abilities. I also account for some standard objections that will be raised against this. Regarding the more problematic case of testing younger children, I argue that just as parents have access to information that is broadly environmental about their children (and given the interaction between environmental and genetic factors), then parents should also be able to gain access to genetic data to facilitate their child’s development. This also requires an appreciation of the distinguishing properties of genetic information, which I discuss in Appendix II. Additionally, testing for children’s ‘intelligence profiles’ should only be undertaken if parents have their children’s best interests in mind, such as when there is an intervention available that will directly benefit the child.

4.2 Genetic testing technologies

Genetic tests utilise technologies such as Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR), Southern blotting or sequencing of small regions of the genome, to look for changes in DNA at one locus (place) on a chromosome. However, a limiting factor facing those who might want to use such techniques to test for intelligence is that this kind of testing will undoubtedly require analysis of alleles from several (perhaps hundreds) of genes. With these current technologies, this would be very costly and time-consuming.

To combat these difficulties (which also arise in testing for complex genetic diseases), faster and cheaper technologies for DNA analysis are now being developed. One of the best-known is the ‘DNA chip’ – a silicon chip covered by a ‘microarray’ of defined short sequences of synthetic DNA.2 All of the sequences on the one chip can then be simultaneously compared with a person’s genome, via hybridising her DNA to the chip and analysing the results using a computer. This allows for a huge amount of information to be obtained from a single sample.

2 For reviews, see: Hacia, J.G., Brody, L.C., and Collins, F.S., (1998) ‘Applications of DNA Chips for Genomic Analysis’, Molecular Psychiatry, vol.3(6): 483-92; and Aitman, T.J., (2001) ‘DNA Microarrays in Medical Practice’, BMJ, vol.323: 611–5. 119 Chapter Four – Should genetic tests be developed?

DNA chips are likely to be very useful, as sequences from many different alleles of one gene can be included, making exact mutation identification much cheaper. To gain a person’s ‘intelligence profile’, a chip could be created which contains thousands of small sequences of DNA, representing some of the genes associated with intelligence. Chip analysis could then provide a probabilistic indicator of a particular intelligence level, or particular kinds of abilities. The following vignette describes the possible framework in which testing might be offered:

In a paper published in Nature in December 2005, researchers from the Institute of Psychiatry in London announced that they had mapped 125 genes involved with the attainment of high scores on cognitive ability tests. Within these 125 genes, they identified at least 30 alleles that they considered to be particularly important. However, a person did not need all 30 of these alleles to be ‘intelligent’, a selection of 12 – 17 of them was considered to be enough to contribute to an above-average intelligence score. The authors also claimed that there might be other significant genes that had not been mapped yet.

In the paper, the authors provided a table of probability, which correlated the presence of different numbers and types of ‘intelligence’ genes with an ability test score range. For example, the presence of genes Int-3, -6, -8,-10,-13, -18, -20, -21, -22, -27, -28 and Int-30 indicated a 70 percent probability that a person would achieve a score above 110 on a standard IQ test, assuming a reasonably standard upbringing and childhood. However, they were also very careful to say that this result was specific to the population from which it was obtained. The researchers could not guarantee the predicted scores when they were applied to people from different genetic backgrounds.

The researchers announced that although they did not intend to introduce genetic testing services for intelligence in the foreseeable future, they expected that some commercial genetics providers would be interested in their research findings.

Despite its detail, this vignette is probably still only a simplistic representation of the complex kinds of information that researchers are likely to obtain. Indeed, it is important to note that genetic tests would be unlikely to give more than a probabilistic indication of a person’s abilities. However, what is illustrated is the kind of information that people taking a genetic test may obtain.

120 Chapter Four – Should genetic tests be developed?

What could be gained from a genetic test?

Before I address the ethical issues that will arise if genetic tests for intelligence are made available, it is important that I first address what, from a scientific perspective, people may be able to gain from genetic tests for intelligence.

Now, the predictive validity of genetic tests for intelligence is still unknown. Indeed, it is uncertain (and also scientifically controversial) as to whether intelligence will ever be measurable ‘genetically’, how many quantitative trait loci will be needed to give a valid test result, or indeed even what a ‘valid result’ might be.3 There are also likely to be many genes that influence intelligence to such a small extent that they are never detected by researchers.

In addition to the scientific uncertainty that surrounds potential genetic tests for intelligence, controversy may also arise over the fact that we already have a predictor of intelligence – an IQ test. Even the researchers into the genetics of intelligence point out that a genetic test will not be able to be as informative as an IQ test, as an IQ test measures both genetic and environmental contributions to intelligence (and accounts for the interaction between these factors), whilst genetic tests will only be able to measure the genetic component.

There are a few ways to see this problem. The first is to argue that although genetic tests will not be able to account for the number of influences on intelligence that IQ tests can, they will still be useful. For example, genetic tests could be used in a more predictive way than IQ tests are, as a genetic test could be used to test potential in a very young person, where an IQ test may not be accurate. Additionally, genetic tests will eliminate a number of variables from the testing process, such as the rapport between the tester and testee; and the potential negative influence of stereotype threat, which I mentioned in Chapter One.

Further, genetic tests could be used to see if a person’s potential had been realised. Parents could request testing for a young child and later measure their IQ using standard testing to see if their ‘genetic potential’ had been realised, or perhaps whether their environment had intervened in a negative way to limit this potential being reached. Genetic

3 In reality, genetic tests for discrete cognitive abilities, such as reading or mathematical ability may be more likely, as there are many ‘intelligences’ for which genetic information may become available. Ethically however, much the same arguments will apply within this example as they will for other discrete abilities. 121 Chapter Four – Should genetic tests be developed? tests might better be able to predict people’s potential, and their subsequent amenability to environmental manipulation.

However, at this early stage of the research, it is very important that extreme care is exercised in using terminology such as ‘genetic potential’. Recall King’s concerns about the deterministic mindset that this research may promote discussed in Chapter Two4 and the debates over the limits on the interpretation of genetic information discussed in Chapter One:5

Table 4-1: Qualifications on complex genetic information

• Genes associated with intelligence should be interpreted within the context of other biological signals and the environment; • Genes can be singled out for analysis, but this does not mean that they are all that is relevant; • There are factors that will interfere with DNA expression, including spontaneous mutations, pleiotropy, variable penetrance and variable expressivity; • Knowledge of a genetic component to a behavioural trait does not affect how alterable a behaviour is; • There will only be rare circumstances where a single gene type is closely tied to a single type of behaviour; • Behavioural phenotypes will not be entirely predictable from genetic information.

Those who hold interactionist views about the interplay of genes and environment claim that genetic information per se will be meaningless as a predictor of eventual outcome. They would refute the idea that a genetic test could show a person’s innate limits, with the environment simply modifying the expression of genes. Given the significant effect of the environment in interacting with genes and modifying their expression, we must be very careful not to over-generalise the potentially unpredictable effects of factors other than genes in influencing the development of people’s intelligence.

Whichever view of genetic testing and the predictability of genetic information turns out to be correct, what is certain is that people are going to be interested in this information.

4 Refer to page 3. 5 Refer to page 3. 122 Chapter Four – Should genetic tests be developed?

Intelligence is important to most of us.6 Even if only a few alleles are ever demonstrated to be associated with intelligence, people may still be interested in obtaining this information. And, they may still be interested even if there is no adequate scientific basis for testing. The powerful impact of identifying specific genes involved in the normal variation of intelligence even if their individual effect is small, as opposed to a more general involvement of unidentified genes, should not be underestimated.7 Experts have already suggested that genetic testing for intelligence will occur. For example, when the first quantitative trait locus influencing general cognitive ability was announced in 1998, several psychologists claimed that testing was the next logical step. Among these was Dr John Kihlstrom, the editor of the journal where the research was published; he ‘confidently’ predicted that genetic centres would be set up to test for the gene ‘within two months’ of publication, adding, however, that this would be a ‘crummy idea’.8 Additionally, Professor Angus Clarke, a clinical geneticist, has suggested that the fact that genetic tests might be less efficient than IQ testing will ‘not hinder such DNA testing, because of the sense of legitimacy lent to the DNA testing by its origins in the precision world of genetics.’9

These tests will, of course, be contentious if they are ever to be offered on a commercial scale. However, testing may also offer some putative benefits.

4.3 Benefits to be gained in testing for intelligence

At first instance, it may seem unusual for anyone beyond school-age to want to find out about her intelligence. After all, by the time we have finished our education, we usually have a clear idea of our intellectual strengths and weaknesses. We have also usually developed vocational interests. Moreover, most of us have an intuitive, negative attitude to intelligence testing, expressing that “I just don’t want to know”. When asked why, most of us tend to say that we are worried that it could indicate that our IQ is actually lower than we would like to believe. Additionally, providing a genetic test for intelligence does not seem to promote

6 For example, the ‘National IQ test’, a television program recently screened in Australia, was among the highest-rating television shows for the year 2002. 7 Harper, P.S., (1995) ’DNA Markers Associated with High Versus low IQ: Ethical Considerations’, Behavior Genetics, vol.25(2): 197-8, p197. 8 Quoted by: Wade, N., (1998) ‘First Gene to be Linked with High Intelligence is Reported Found’, The New York Times, vol.147(May 14): A16. 9 Clarke, A., (1999) ‘The Genetic Dissection of Complex Traits’, in V. Launis, J. Pietarinen and J. Räikkä, (Eds). Genes and Morality: New Essays. Amsterdam: Rodopi, pp103-19, p112. 123 Chapter Four – Should genetic tests be developed? the more ‘typical’ benefits that medical genetic tests may provide. A genetic test for intelligence may not become a primary influence our reproductive decisions, nor will it convey a sense of relief at having avoided a genetic disease. Still, genetic testing of intelligence could have some important benefits.

Before outlining these benefits, however, it is important that I again reinforce the ‘qualification’ I made earlier in this thesis. That is, whilst recognising that genetic information about intelligence may offer the benefits to be outlined below, it is equally important to bear in mind that in no way should this information be solely regarded as predictive of intelligence. Nor should it be regarded as indicative of the immutable capacities of individuals. In making any kind of predictive genetic test for intelligence available to people and their children, it is imperative to make it clear that this information will not be powerful enough to inform them about, for example, whether or not it is worth pursuing a career requiring high intelligence. This kind of interpretation would be hugely deterministic and potentially false, as the predictive value of this information will vary with each individual case. If predictive genetic testing for intelligence is ever to be offered, it should only be done so within a context of recognising that environmental and educational factors also make a significant contribution to one’s intelligence. Genetic information should at all times be regarded as but one kind of information, to be construed in the context of several other sources of information.

That said, there is no reason why genetic information will not offer benefits that are similar (or perhaps supplementary) to information that people currently derive when undergoing psychometric testing for intelligence. The prevailing benefit in undertaking a genetic test for intelligence is that this information could generate self-knowledge, which will aid in our self-understanding. In addition to the value of being intelligent, which I outlined in the previous chapter, there is value in knowing about our intelligence.

Consider why people are usually interested in finding out information about themselves. Philosophically, there is value in reaching self-understanding – coming to terms with the sort of person that one is and how you became that way.10 This type of introspection is vital to

10 Fritz Cates, D., (1994) ‘Commentary on Genetic Knowledge and Self-Understanding’, in R.F. Weir, S.C. Lawrence, and E. Fales, (Eds). Genes and Human Self-Knowledge: Historical and Philosophical Reflections on Modern Genetics. Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, pp59-62. 124 Chapter Four – Should genetic tests be developed? human flourishing. Also part of self-understanding is a person’s knowledge about how she might shape herself in the future. Information about our character can inform us about the types of possibilities that we may have available. The freedom that we have to actualise our preferences is also vital to these possibilities. Such freedoms will be informed by a person’s knowledge of her personal traits.

One of the many useful ways for people to reach self-understanding is to gain an appreciation of their own psychology, including their intelligence. Once tested (either via a psychometric test or a genetic test supplemented with environmental information), a person might then consider how to best use her intellectual strengths and weaknesses abilities in her daily life or in the planning of future projects. She could use knowledge of her different skills for different ends. Therefore, finding out about our intellectual abilities could help us decide how we might shape our futures. I provide some specific examples of this below.

The potentially negative impact of such knowledge on a person’s self-understanding is, however, not hard to imagine. If a genetic test for intelligence was able to predict a person’s intelligence, then if a person received a ‘sub-optimal’ result, this may damage her self-esteem or upset her plans for future projects. Indeed, due to the ‘specialness’ and apparent ‘concreteness’ of DNA test results, the relevance of this information to people’s self- understanding may be profound. I consider such potential harms in more detail below, so will set them aside for now.

Genetic information about intelligence, when considered in its appropriate context, could deliver several benefits to a person’s self-understanding. Although such benefits will vary with an individual’s own values and preferences for a good life, arguably this information will help with making informed decisions about significant life-choices.

To give some examples, there are at least three practical situations where intelligence testing (and, by implication, predictive genetic testing) could benefit one’s self- understanding.11 These are that testing can aid decision-making for educational planning, career planning, or to target a particular area of intelligence for problem solving. Whilst intelligence test data should not be considered as the only information worth obtaining, it is

11 See, for example: Murphy, K.R., and Davidshofer, C.O., (1991) Psychological Testing: Principles and Applications, 2nd Ed. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, p292-95. 125 Chapter Four – Should genetic tests be developed? still helpful. If genetic testing is ever able to offer a significantly meaningful interpretation of intelligence, then these aids to self-understanding could also arise. Each of these practical situations will now be considered.

Knowledge about intelligence (either psychometrically or genetically derived) will have obvious applications in educational decision-making. This could be relevant to deciding a particular course of study to undertake, or to determine whether a particular course of study is worth staying in. Say I was studying maths, but doing badly. I could seek to undergo intelligence testing to determine what particular aspect of this subject I may be having trouble with, such as numerical reasoning. This may then allow me to concentrate on this problem to improve performance, or to undertake a different course of study that better matched my abilities.12

Ability testing also has applications for career planning. This might be by way of identifying new opportunities, reinforcing current choices, or providing alternative choices, should current plans go awry. Individuals may also undergo intelligence testing to determine which type of vocation they may have the appropriate skills for. For example, a teenager might undertake an ability test to assist them with choosing various high-school subjects, depending on whether they wish to pursue higher education. Additionally, employees may undertake an intelligence test to see if there are any areas that they can improve upon, such as verbal reasoning, to perform better and more satisfyingly at their work.

Intelligence testing is also offered within a clinical environment, for individuals who wish to learn why and how they may be experiencing a particular problem, such as not doing well in a particular subject at school or university, or merely feeling that they can never ‘get’ a particular type of problem. Intelligence tests of this kind are fast becoming the most common application of testing. They involve the provision of a large amount of detailed feedback about a person’s abilities and styles of thinking, rather than merely an IQ score. The information gained is not infallible, but it provides a unique tool by which to obtain systematic information quickly and accurately.

12 This is, of course, a relatively simple example – where probabilistic information would be relatively useful in decision-making. It should also be recognised that situations are sure to arise where the predictive value of this information is not so obvious. Yet, to preclude individuals who are interested in this information from accessing it indicates an overly cautious approach. 126 Chapter Four – Should genetic tests be developed?

To summarise, allowing individuals to utilise the services offered by Genes!Life to access genetic information about their intelligence could have important general benefits for self-understanding. These benefits are similar in nature to those a person could obtain via psychometric testing, but there is no reason why individuals should not also have access to their genetic profile should they desire to do so. Such information could also be of particular benefit in areas such as formation of desires for future educational or career projects. Again, however, it is important to stress that genetic information ought not be considered alone, ignorant of the significant need that it be appropriately contextualised.

Some benefits in testing children

Just as competent persons might benefit from genetic tests for intelligence, such tests might also be within children’s interests, again provided that genetic information is construed within appropriate limitations. Consider the following scenario of providing a psychometric intelligence test. A genetic test may be able to offer a similar benefit:

A neuropsychologist reports that she recently consulted with a family with a six-year-old daughter, Sarah. Sarah’s parents wished for her to undergo intelligence testing, as she was experiencing some problems with learning how to read. The psychologist administered the Wechsler intelligence scale for children13 to Sarah and discussed the results at a follow-up session. Sarah had an above-average IQ, but showed weaknesses in reading comprehension, which could explain her problems at school.

This scenario illustrates one benefit to children in having their intelligence tested. Providing Sarah and her parents with her IQ score, in the context of appropriate discussion and general information was therapeutic for Sarah and her family. The information helped Sarah to both understand her difficulties and to ask for help when she needed it. For Sarah, the test resulted in a better performance overall and increased self-esteem.14 If genetic tests become possible, then this kind of data might be utilised in the context of other information to arrive at an individually tailored and appropriate strategy for Sarah, to help her as her cognitive skills develop.

13 See, eg: Cooper, S., (1995) The Clinical Use and Interpretation of the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children-Revised, 3rd Ed. Springfield: C.C. Thomas. 14 This is based on an actual case, discussed in: Anderson, V., Northam, E., Hendy, E., and Wrennall, J., (2001) Developmental Neuropsychology: A Clinical Approach. Philadelphia: Psychology Press, Chapter 10. 127 Chapter Four – Should genetic tests be developed?

Sarah’s developing autonomy might also benefit as a result of testing. Sarah will be able to incorporate this information into her developing personal identity15 as her test results are gradually disclosed to her.16 This might contribute to Sarah experiencing greater self- understanding in making life choices than if she had not had access to such information. For example, as she gets older, Sarah could use her genetic profile in concert with other information to more accurately contextualise her career options, or perhaps to better understand her strengths and weaknesses.

If Sarah’s genetic profile indicates intellectual promise, then this information might allow her parents the time to set up the necessary supports and perhaps search for an appropriate school for her. For example, children who are highly intelligent often do not function well (and may even be labelled as learning impaired) if they are placed in regular schooling and their giftedness is not detected.17 Often they are so far ahead of a class that a teacher might think that the student is actually having trouble keeping up. A related point is that ability tests are also sometimes used to identify intellectual ability in members of disadvantaged groups. This may subsequently lead to opportunities being offered to people who would not have otherwise had access to them.

Sarah’s parents, too, might benefit if Sarah undergoes a genetic test to predict her intelligence profile.18 Besides the strong legal and cultural norms in Western Society (which permit parents to have wide latitude in making decisions for their children), testing Sarah may allay anxieties her parents may have. They might be concerned, for example, about not promoting Sarah’s chances of becoming the best she could be. Testing may allow them to better act in her interests. Having more information to maximise Sarah’s development can actually be justified, as intelligence is clearly a result of a complex interaction between genetic and environmental factors. Such a benefit doesn’t necessarily ignore Sarah’s interests –

15 Robertson, S. and Savulescu, J., (2000) ‘Is there a Case in Favour of Predictive Genetic Testing in Children?’ Bioethics, vol.15(1): 26-49. 16 See below for a discussion as to when children should be told their results. 17 Cook, M., ‘Assessing Potential’ The Age (Melbourne), 23 May 2001, p4. This article describes problems that can occur if a child is gifted, and is not identified as being so. 18 Interestingly, when IQ testing was still fairly standard procedure within schools (particularly in the United States), parents were not typically allowed to have access to their children’s test result information. However, one parent did successfully litigate in New York State in order to gain access to his child’s file. See: Sharp, E., (1972) The IQ Cult. New York: Coward, McCann and Geoghegan. 128 Chapter Four – Should genetic tests be developed? rather, her interests are recognised within the context of this important parental right.19 Overall, it seems sensible to say that her parents are the ones who know her best. In deciding whether or not to have Sarah tested, they will have the best of what will be in her best interests.

4.4 Potential harms from genetic tests for intelligence

So far, I have claimed that genetic tests for intelligence could be potentially beneficial to individuals (either competent persons, or children). Yet despite these benefits, there are several harms that could result from undergoing the Genes!Life genetic test for intelligence. Indeed, virtually all who have discussed genetic tests for intelligence to date (including the researchers themselves) have condemned the idea, or at least claimed that it should not be the primary outcome of the research.

Here, I discuss some putative harms that might follow from genetic testing for intelligence. I will first discuss general harms that may arise. Then, I will examine some of the harms particular to testing children.

General harms

There are four broad classes of putative harms that may arise from genetic tests for intelligence. The first two harms, discrimination and stigmatisation, are actual harms that people may suffer as a result of being tested. The second two, harm to self and impact upon subsequent behaviour, are psychological harms.

Before I discuss these particular harms, it is important that I recognise that existing ethical issues in medical genetics also apply to this discussion. That is, it is implicit in the argument that I make here that any pursuit of genetic testing for intelligence should also have due regard for issues such as nondirective counselling,20 the privacy of genetic

19 Cohen argues that parental rights are often neglected in debates over genetic testing in children. See: Cohen, C.B., (1998) ‘Wrestling With the Future: Should We Test Children for Adult-Onset Genetic Conditions?’ Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal, vol.8(2): 111-30. 20 See, for example: Grandstrand Gervais, K., (1993) ‘Objectivity, Value Neutrality and Nondirectiveness in Genetic Counseling’, in D.M. Bartels, B.S. LeRoy, and A.L. Caplan, (Eds). Prescribing our Future: Ethical Challenges in Genetic Counselling. New York: Aldine De Gruyter, pp119-30; and Kessler, S., (1997) ‘Psychological Aspects of Genetic Counseling. XI. Nondirectiveness Revisited’, American Journal of Medical Genetics, vol.72: 164-71. 129 Chapter Four – Should genetic tests be developed? information,21 informed consent22 and debates over the right to know and not to know about one’s personal genetic information.23

Discrimination

One of the most insidious applications to result from genetic tests for intelligence would be the utilisation of test results to discriminate against particular individuals. For example, people could find that their test results deny them opportunities in either education or employment.24 At one extreme, we can conceive of an employer requiring a genetic test result for various ‘intelligence alleles’, which may be perceived to be the best tool for predicting success in a particular vocation.

Institutions such as employers will usually prefer people who have can learn faster and solve problems better, as they will not have to invest as many resources in training them. If employers perceive the genetics of intelligence can predict this, they may wish to introduce such tests.25 Further, to claim that such tests could be banned might be a naïve perspective, as there will always be people who would be willing to volunteer genetic information to secure a position. Such a scenario is also not helped by the fact that throughout the history of intelligence testing, IQ test results have often been over-interpreted and used in inappropriate contexts (which I briefly discussed in Chapters One and Two). Genetic test results too have on occasion been used to make unfair comparisons between people, such as

21 See, for example: Office of the Privacy Commissioner, The Privacy Implications of Genetic Testing. Sydney: Commonwealth of Australia, 1996; and Macklin, R., (1992) ‘Privacy and Control of Genetic Information’, in G.J. Annas and S. Elias, (Eds). Gene Mapping: Using Law and Ethics as Guides. New York: Oxford University Press, pp157-72. 22 See, for example: Quaid, K.A., (2000) ‘Genetic Information, Ethics, Informed Consent to Testing and Screening’, in T.H. Murray and M.J. Mehlman, (Eds). Encyclopedia of Ethical, Legal and Policy Issues in Biotechnology. New York: John Wiley and Sons, pp397-405; and American Medical Association Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, (1998) ‘Multiplex Genetic Testing’, Hastings Center Report, vol.28(4): 15-21. 23 See, for example: Räikkä, J., (1998) ‘Freedom and a Right (Not) to Know’, Bioethics, vol.12(1): 49-63; Chadwick, R.F., (1997) ‘The Philosophy of the Right to Know and the Right not to Know’, in R.F. Chadwick, M. Levitt, and D. Shickle, (Eds). The Right to Know and the Right not to Know. Aldershot: Avebury, pp13-22; Husted, J., (1997) ‘Autonomy and a Right Not to Know’, in R.F. Chadwick, M. Levitt, and D. Shickle, (Eds). The Right to Know and the Right Not to Know. Aldershot: Avebury, pp55-68; and Takala, T., (1999) ‘The Right to Genetic Ignorance Confirmed’, Bioethics, vol.13(3/4): 288 -93. 24 For a general discussion, see: Müller-Hill, B., (1993) ‘The Shadow of Genetic Injustice’, Nature, vol.362: 491-2; and Wolf, S.M., (1995) ‘Beyond "Genetic Discrimination": Toward the Broader Harm of Geneticism’, Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics, vol.23(4): 345-53. 25 Kavka, G.S., (1994) ‘Upside Risks: Social Consequences of Beneficial Biotechnology’, in C.F. Cranor, (Ed). Are Genes Us? The Social Consequences of the New Genetics. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, pp155-79, p174. 130 Chapter Four – Should genetic tests be developed? denying insurance to healthy carriers of Sickle Cell Anaemia in the United States in the 1970s.

Seeing as we already have a predictive instrument for intelligence (an IQ test), it is unlikely that a genetic test is going to be able to predict performance any better, particularly in adults where genetic and environmental components have already interacted to facilitate the development of intelligence.26 Whilst hiring more productive people will ensure better company productivity and larger profits, it is doubtful that obtaining and analysing the genetic information of individuals is going to be a better predictor. In speaking about behavioural genetics generally, Rutter and Plomin agree:

In some respects the situation with respect to susceptibility genes for multifactorial disorders is more straightforward in that the predictions at an individual level are so much weaker that, if dealt with rationally, they should be less open to abuse.27

However, they also recognise that the potential for educators or employers to succumb to mass ‘genetic hysteria’ over the genetics of behaviour should not be underestimated:

Nevertheless, in practice, the problems may be greater simply because of the lack of appreciation that this is so.28

So, if it emerges that individuals are indeed being discriminated against by employers by being subjected to potentially unfair interpretations of genetic tests (particularly if there are other more appropriate measures of assessing a potential employee’s potential, such as behavioural scenarios), then this could provide an important reason as to why such tests should be withdrawn. At the very least, efforts must be made to create or impose laws to prevent this from occurring.

26 It is interesting here to question who would be better off: a person with a higher measured IQ, but a ‘lower’ genetic potential, or a person with a lower measured IQ but a ‘higher’ genetic potential. A person who holds an additive view of inheritance would claim that the latter person would be better off. However, an interactionist would claim that as everyone has a different environment and as we cannot derive significant predictions from genetic information alone, these two people are in exactly the same position. Such a debate is beyond the scope of this discussion. 27 Rutter, M., and Plomin, R., (1997) ‘Opportunities for Psychiatry from Genetic Findings’, British Journal of Psychiatry, vol.171: 209-19, p212. 28 Ibid. 131 Chapter Four – Should genetic tests be developed?

However, this does not mean that genetic tests for intelligence should not ever be developed in the first place. To take this kind of approach would be to ignore the various benefits of such tests discussed above. Rather, a better approach involves recognising that ‘genetic hysteria’ is perhaps the most dangerous outcome of making genetic tests for intelligence available. To counter this prospect, it should be the responsibility of researchers, policy-makers and the media to exhaustively promote an ‘anti-determinist’ stance – to place these tests in a more realistic context. Yet if, despite the best efforts of all concerned, ‘genetic hysteria’ does seem to be leading to discrimination, then genetic tests for intelligence may not be such a good idea after all.

Labelling

A second, related issue, which has also been briefly discussed in Chapter Two, is that the recipients of genetic tests for intelligence could be subjected to social stigmatisation, or labelling. Even if they are not denied opportunities as a result of genetic testing, persons might experience derogatory labelling by others as a result of their test. Those who are identified as being of below-average intelligence, for example, may be considered to be less morally important as persons if they are found to have mutations in particular ‘intelligence genes’. Or, if teachers were able to access their student’s genetic test results, then if a student were to subsequently under perform, a teacher might turn to the students’ parents and say something like: “Well that’s because he doesn’t have the necessary genes to succeed at this task”.

Low intelligence is, unfortunately, stigmatised by modern society. Another example, from popular culture, can be gleaned from the movie Alien 3. In this movie, there is a character who is an assistant caretaker on an ex-penal settlement. The ex-inmates of this settlement find out about his IQ score, which is below-average. After this discovery, they no longer refer to him by name, but simply call him ‘85’ – his score. Whilst of course it seems unlikely that this would ever happen outside Hollywood, the potential problem is still well- illustrated. Indeed, Clarke has argued that the very offering of genetic tests for intelligence will indicate that knowledge of a person’s IQ tells us something of central importance to that person’s worth or value.29 If genetic information is perceived by anyone as a way of

29 Clarke, ‘The Genetic Dissection of Complex Traits’, p113. 132 Chapter Four – Should genetic tests be developed? legitimating labels such as ‘stupid’, then there is obviously a potential for people to suffer a greater kind of harm.

Consider another situation. When I first met my partner and was discussing my research with him, he casually mentioned to me that he had had his IQ measured. He said that his intelligence quotient had been assessed as 90 (slightly below average). I made no verbal response, but I still reacted. My partner noticed that I had automatically, unwittingly, changed my opinion of him, as I had perceived him to be intelligent. As it turns out, he was joking and had never had his IQ tested, but his behaviour illustrated something very powerful. Unfortunately, most of us will usually make a value judgement about a person once we have some kind of evaluative information about them. This could even subtly change our opinion of that person. Most of us would like to avoid making such a value judgement, but it is often difficult to achieve psychologically.

There is also a risk that specific groups could also be devalued by the availability of genetic testing for intelligence within the community. Again, the history of intelligence testing does not bode well for how some groups might be treated in light of genetic information. Stigmatisation and labelling has undeniably already occurred as a result of psychometric intelligence testing – African Americans, for example, are claimed by some scholars to be less intelligent as a group.30

At worst, if genetic information were seen to legitimise this stigmatisation, this could lead to public pressure to direct funds away from programs that aid people to overcome their genetic limitations and ‘social difficulties’,31 as there may be a belief that these will be unhelpful. This would, of course, be a mistaken view. Genetic information does not necessarily indicate an immutable phenotype and people’s limitations are often set by environmental factors alone32. Further, testing to define particular groups (such as those with low intelligence) often leads to benefits, such as the HeadStart program in the United States33, or even the sweeping reforms in the French education system at the turn of the

30 For a general discussion, see: Yongue, G., ‘The Gene Genies’ The Guardian (London), 1 May 1996, p2. 31 Clarke, A., (1998) ‘Introduction’, in A. Clarke, (Ed). The Genetic Testing of Children. Oxford: Bios Scientific Publishers, pp1-16, p2. 32 Müller-Hill, ‘The Shadow of Genetic Injustice’. 33 This is an intervention program to enrich intelligence in children who live in a low-welfare social environment. 133 Chapter Four – Should genetic tests be developed? century. Still, social responses have been made in the past where scientific evidence remained dubious.

Whilst these potentially stigmatising effects of genetic information about intelligence should not be underestimated, they can be overcome. It is important to bear in mind that often, if not most of the time, information about intelligence is used in a positive way. It can assist in diagnosing particular problems in learning and can suggest strategies to help us understand how we learn best. Whether information is obtained via a psychometric test, or whether it is obtained via a genetic test supplemented by appropriate environmental information, it would be extremely rare that a person will derive some value from an appropriate clinical assessment of her intelligence.

Additionally, the political protections now accorded to people (in Western countries at least, where genetic testing is likely to be offered first) are a vast improvement when compared to those that existed when intelligence testing was last such a great controversy. A particular manifestation of this greater protection is the anti-discrimination legislation that exists in most jurisdictions. Under such legislation, people are prohibited from detrimentally labelling others, with harsh penalties usually imposed if they do.

Moreover, general societal attitudes to labelling are vastly different than they were even fifty years ago. It is justifiably no longer acceptable to refer to a person merely by her class, ethnicity or gender. Labelling a person with their intelligence would also not be tolerated, particularly as lower intelligence is now viewed very differently to fifty years ago.

‘Harm to sense of self’

Consider whether internally imposed psychological harms might occur as a result of genetic tests for intelligence. There are two main harms of this kind. The first of these is that a person could suffer harm to her ‘sense of self’. The second, to be discussed in the next section, is that a test result could negatively impact subsequent behaviour.

A significant concern over genetic tests for intelligence is that they could negatively impact upon a person’s self-understanding. According to Butchvarov:

The belief that one has reliable and specific knowledge about one’s intellectual capacities is bound to affect one’s choice of a career. But, more important, it could affect profoundly

134 Chapter Four – Should genetic tests be developed?

one’s self-esteem. We already know that persons’ learning their IQ… scores sometimes does have such an effect on them. But a belief that one has knowledge of one’s own genetic makeup would have an effect enormously wider in scope and much more specific.34

For most of us, our sense of personal identity is linked to our self-concept and self- esteem. And, our conceptions of our abilities are significant to how we view these. If we were to receive genetic information about our intelligence, there is a risk that we may suffer psychological harm as a result – we may come to have a ‘spoilt identity’, or experience alienation from our life-plans and ourselves.

Indeed, such concerns have already been raised within the context of medical genetics. Jolly et al, for example, point out that often when a person finds out that he has a medical disorder, he is likely to experience a ‘disruption of his psychological equilibrium’35. When the information is about genes, this could be even more profound, as ‘genes are seen as part of the self and thus genetic disorders cannot be externalised’.36 We would be receiving a kind of information that we see as ‘part of ourselves’, about an aspect of ourselves that is vital to our self-understanding. This information might very well harm us by our interpreting it as some inherent limit in what we might ever be able to achieve.

So, what should be done about the potential for psychological harm as a result of genetic tests for intelligence? My argument here is that whilst due care and attention must be given to the potential for psychological mal-adjustment after genetic testing, this risk alone cannot be used as a reason to prevent such tests from being made available. My reasons for this, which I elaborate further below, are threefold. First, it is important to question whether people can truly be said to be ‘harmed’ if the harm has occurred as the result of an irrational misconception of the information they are given. Second, even if a person has an accurate perception of the information she has been given (but is still harmed) it would be an unreasonable standard to require that these tests be available only on the condition that no-

34 Butchvarov, P., (1994) ‘Some Concerns about Self-Knowledge and the Human Genome Project’, in R.F. Weir, S.C. Lawrence, and E. Fales, (Eds). Genes and Human Self-Knowledge: Historical and Philosophical Reflections on Modern Genetics. Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, pp46-48, p47. 35 Jolly, A., Parsons, E., and Clarke, A., (1998) ‘Identifying Carriers of Balanced Chromosomal Translocations: Interviews with Family Members’, in A. Clarke, (Ed). The Genetic Testing of Children. Oxford: Bios Scientific Publishers, pp61-90, p67. 36 Kessler, S., (1979) ‘The Psychological Foundations of Genetic Counseling’, in S. Kessler, (Ed). Genetic Counseling: Psychological Dimensions. New York: Academic Press, pp17-33, cited by Jolly, Parsons, and Clarke, p67. 135 Chapter Four – Should genetic tests be developed? one is ever harmed. Third, predictions of harm can be addressed to some extent by examining the outcomes of psychometric intelligence testing to date.

To consider the first response, think about the factors vital to the interpretation of genetic data about intelligence that I presented in Table 4-1 above and the potential for harm from genetic testing I’ve discussed here. It is not difficult to foresee that there could be a dichotomy between how individuals construe the significance of their test result and what the test actually predicts. Say you have your intelligence tested by Genes!Life and perceive genetic factors to be more significant for explaining intelligence than they actually are. Say you then suffer harm to your self-understanding or self-esteem as a result. Do rights not to be harmed exist when those harmed harbour inaccurate beliefs about the significance of the data they receive?

Tooley might answer this question in the negative. In discussing human cloning, he claims that if people themselves are responsible for irrationally misinterpreting information presented to them, they are then responsible for the harms that may befall them from that mistaken presumption and cannot legitimately claim that rights arise from these beliefs37. He argues:

It seems to me that if the knowledge that a clone of oneself exists were disturbing to one, this would probably be because of the presence of some relevant, false belief, such as a belief in genetic determinism. But if this is so, then the question arises as to whether rights exist when the interests that they protect are ones that will be harmed only if the potential subjects of the harm have certain false, and presumably irrational, beliefs. My own feeling is that the responsibility for such harm is properly assigned to the individual who has acquired the irrational beliefs whose presence is necessary if there is to be any harm. Consequently, it seems to me that the actions of others should not be constrained in order to prevent harm from occurring, and thus that there is no right that is violated in such a case. 38

37 This kind of irrational belief needs to be distinguished from a mere false belief. We may often hold false beliefs that are not irrational. It is less certain whether we should be responsible for the harm that may befall us from a false belief; as often a false belief can be imposed upon us by a third party. 38 Tooley, M., (1998) ‘The Moral Status of the Cloning of Humans’, in J.M. Humber and R.F. Almeder, (Eds). Human Cloning. New Jersey: Humana Press, pp65-101, p80. 136 Chapter Four – Should genetic tests be developed?

Tooley would argue that the reason for this is that although a person may have subjectively experienced harm, objectively she is no worse-off. Therefore, no-one else is bound to act upon her interests in light of her irrational beliefs.

Davis would be concerned about Tooley’s claims.39 In also discussing human cloning and harm, she dismisses the dichotomy between subjective and objective harm. She claims that it is irrelevant whether harm arises from irrational beliefs about the significance of genetic factors. Rather, what is important is the belief that harm has occurred and that some subsequent action has taken place because of this. In support of her argument, she quotes Jonas:

It is all a matter much more of supposed than real knowledge, or opinion than truth… [I]t does not matter one jot whether the genotype is really… a person’s fate: it is made his fate by the very assumptions in cloning him, which by their imposition on all concerned become a force themselves. It does not matter whether replication of genotype really entails repetition of life performance: the donor has been chosen with some such idea, and that idea is tyrannical in effect.40

There are therefore two competing positions. Tooley argues that harm from irrational beliefs about genetic determinism does not give rise to rights, such as the right not to be cloned. Davis and Jonas argue that the fact that harm occurs per se is what is important. Therefore, the issue is about whether, if a person is harmed by irrational beliefs about genetic testing for intelligence, this constitutes a reason not to introduce genetic tests for intelligence. Tooley would argue that it does not. Davis and Jonas would argue that it does.

Consider these positions. Say a person who harboured an irrational perception of her test result (and suffered harm as a result) wanted to obtain some form of compensation for her loss. A court, in assessing this claim, would examine the reasonable position to take on the perception of the information, in addition to the reasonable standard for explanation of the information required of the genetics service provider. If the court were to find that the

39 Davis, D.S., (2001) Genetic Dilemmas: Reproductive Technology, Parental Choices, and Children’s Futures. New York: Routledge, p121. Davis critiques an argument made by Brock, which is similar to Tooley’s. See: Brock, D.W., (1998) ‘Cloning Human Beings: an Assessment of the Ethical Issues Pro and Con’, in M.C. Nussbaum and C.R. Sunstein, (Eds). Clones and Clones: Facts and Fantasies About Human Cloning. New York: W.W. Norton and Company, pp141-64, p154. 40 Jonas, H., (1980) Philosophical Essays: from Ancient Creed to Technological Man. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, p161-2; quoted by Davis, Genetic Dilemmas, p118. 137 Chapter Four – Should genetic tests be developed? service provider had exercised due care in explaining the test and its significance, then it is unlikely that they would award compensation for a mistaken belief. It seems reasonable to extrapolate this hypothetical hearing to determine that Tooley’s position is the one that carries the most common sense. Yet, this also illustrates that there will be a significant responsibility for Genes!Life to adequately educate and counsel test recipients.

What this argument illustrates is that it is imperative to first gauge public attitudes towards complex behavioural genetic information, something that I discuss further in Chapters Six and Seven. Secondly, it is imperative that appropriate resources be allocated towards educating the public about the nature of this information, as soon as the researchers themselves know what it is.

This leads me to my second response to the potential for harm to self from genetic tests for intelligence. So far, in analysing Tooley’s and Davis’ arguments, I have sidestepped an important issue: what if a person has rational beliefs about the information, yet is still harmed as a result from taking the test?

Although all reasonable steps should be taken to try to ensure that this does not occur, a response can be made to this concern. Currently, medical genetic tests do sometimes cause harm to people, yet these instances of people suffering harm have not been used to suggest that genetic tests should be stopped, provided that people have adequate opportunity to give full and informed consent to the test. Many genetic tests carry the risk of ‘survivor guilt’ and anxiety or depression, yet often even if people are warned about these factors, they still wish to obtain this information. Further, even if one receives a bad piece of information, often this contributes to our lives going better in the long term. For example, a contribution of this information to our self-understanding might outweigh any initial harm we may endure.41 Indeed, requiring that no-one be harmed if a test is ever to be offered represents an unreasonable standard for testing per se, a standard that no current genetic test would meet. It would, however, be important to counsel test recipients to warn them that, as with any genetic test, they might receive information that could cause psychological harm. Yet this is standard in all genetic counselling.

4141 I thank Dr David McCarthy for drawing my attention to this line of reasoning. 138 Chapter Four – Should genetic tests be developed?

A third response can be made to this concern with genetic tests for intelligence: predictions of harm can be addressed by examining the outcomes of psychometric intelligence testing. If there is evidence that people (including children) are often harmed as a result of finding out about their intelligence, then this could provide a reason not to introduce genetic tests for intelligence.

Somewhat surprisingly however, very little evidence has been obtained to indicate whether psychological harm ever occurs in intelligence testing.42 Yet, some interesting qualitative evidence about the psychological impact of intelligence testing can be obtained by reading journalists’ reports of taking intelligence tests. Every year when the worldwide ‘high IQ’ organisation Mensa holds its tests for entry, journalists are invited to participate. Several who have done so have written about the experience.43 Interestingly, in reflecting upon the test and their results, most discussed where the test placed them along the overall distribution for intelligence. What they didn’t discuss was how the test result affected them personally. However, one who was disappointed claimed, somewhat satirically:

Being an adult with a fairly steady history of supporting myself, I thought it could do no real harm. What I failed to realize is that such a test mucks with both your past and your future, clarifying a lifetime of bad choices and setting you up for the inevitability of future failure.44

The experiences of journalists tend to reflect the lack of consensus over the outcome of intelligence testing. Two experts in the field, for example, provided me with different answers. One stated:

No one is ever happy in learning their IQ - no matter how high the IQ, people are disappointed that it’s not higher.45

42 Various keyword searches were performed in the databases PsychInfo and Medline. Additionally, advice was sought from the Australian Psychological Society, the Australian Council for Educational Research and from clinical and research psychologists. All reported that only the privileged case notes of psychologists administering ability tests would give any indication of the effect that these tests have on people. Participants in research studies, those who are applying for jobs or (particularly in America) school students would only rarely be given their results. 43 Barbian, J., (2001) ‘Just Call Me Leonard Zelig’, Training, vol.38(6): 78; Boxer, S., ‘What’s the Opposite of a Tree? Ask Mensa’s Testers’ The New York Times (New York), November 13 1995, pB13 & B15; Deveney, C., ‘Intelligence: It’s All in the Mind’ The Age (Melbourne), January 11 2000, pB1; and Sedaris, D., (1999) ‘(I Used to Be) A Smart Guy’, Esquire Magazine, vol.132(5): 154. 44 Sedaris, ‘(I Used to Be) A Smart Guy’. 45 Personal Communication, Professor Robert Plomin, 22 November, 2001. 139 Chapter Four – Should genetic tests be developed?

The second pointed out, however, that most people are interested in their intelligence levels – they are generally interested in talking about what they are good at and bad at. They are also interested in relating this to psychological instruments.46

What seems important to recognise is that we often receive feedback related to our intellectual abilities, as a part of everyday life. Children are routinely reported upon whilst at school. Many of us receive performance feedback in the course of our education or employment. People don’t usually go out of their way to avoid such information. Therefore, whilst there is always a potential for disappointment, the genuine interest that people express regarding learning about their abilities and the positive impact that this can have upon one’s life mean that the potential for ‘harm to self’ from genetic tests for intelligence might be less than we initially imagine.

Therefore, the argument that genetic tests for intelligence will be harmful in their effect on people’s self-conception can be weakened in three ways, which have been discussed above. Whilst it is very important to recognise that psychological mal-adjustment might occur after undergoing a genetic test for intelligence, this risk is not significant enough to warrant genetic tests for intelligence being ‘banned’. Not only are people not necessarily harmed when they harbour irrational beliefs about the information they are given, but to establish a standard whereby no-one is harmed from genetic tests for intelligence is to set the bar unreasonably high, higher than it is set for medical genetic testing. Further, the lack of evidence about significant harms being suffered from psychometric tests for intelligence means that people may be too quick to jump to conclusions of psychological damage when the reality may be significantly more benign.

What is important, as for all harms arising from genetic tests for intelligence, is that test recipients (or their parents) are appropriately counselled about the impact of test results on one’s self-perception. Strategies for minimising harm are examined in further detail below.

Impact upon subsequent behaviour

Despite my setting aside arguments about psychological harm to individuals, there remains another issue about how genetic information about intelligence may affect people. If there is a significant chance that the information were to detrimentally affect people’s

46 Personal communication, Associate Professor Vicki Anderson, 20 September 2001. 140 Chapter Four – Should genetic tests be developed? future behaviour (such as causing them to withdraw from a university course), could this provide a reason not to allow genetic testing in the first place?

Within psychology, a person’s beliefs about the cause of a particular behaviour are considered to affect how she subsequently manifests that behaviour. To give an example, those who hold entity trait beliefs consider that traits are fixed, whilst those who hold incremental trait beliefs believe that traits are malleable. Psychological research has shown that entity trait beliefs are common in both adults and children. People who hold such beliefs are likely to demonstrate a more fatalistic (or deterministic) attitude to their own work and abilities if faced with even a small challenge. For example, say I held entity beliefs and was told that I had average intelligence. I might then think that every time I try to excel, I will be ultimately limited by my abilities. Very young children in particular may attribute more significance to internal than external causes of behaviour.47 It is not difficult to imagine the detrimental effects that the blaming of innate limitations could have upon a child’s (or anyone’s) future development.48

This research provides an important constraint to bear in mind when considering providing genetic information about intelligence. If a person who holds entity trait beliefs about intelligence is then provided with genetic evidence to suggest a biological basis for her abilities, then this could have a more detrimental effect upon future behaviour than it would if the information were provided to a person with incremental trait beliefs. Practically, preventing such a problem will involve discussing people’s beliefs about the malleability of intelligence before testing.

Another way in which behaviour could be influenced subsequent to testing (particularly that of children) is if the genetic information was to act as a catalyst for a ‘self-fulfilling prophecy’. Broadly defined, a self-fulfilling prophecy occurs when the expectations that others (or, yourself) have of you for a particular behaviour actually affect your behaviour. If I receive consistent feedback that I am quite intelligent, for example, then I may be more

47 Miller, P.H., (1985) ‘Children’s Reasoning About the Causes of Human Behaviour’, Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, vol.39: 343-62; and Heyman, G.D. and Dweck, C.S., (1998) ‘Children’s Thinking about Traits: Implications for Judgements of the Self and Others’, Child Development, vol.64(2): 391-403. If a child fails at a particular task, those who hold incremental beliefs will be more likely to exercise more effort in the future. 48 See, for example: Heyman and Dweck, ‘Children’s Thinking about Traits’. 141 Chapter Four – Should genetic tests be developed? likely to become more intelligent. Yet, a self-fulfilling prophecy might also work to detrimentally affect intelligence. Indeed, Clarke has argued that the ‘scope for destructive, self-fulfilling prophecies would be immense’:49

To what extent the knowledge of the IQ test result would itself become an important influence upon the environment – and hence upon the final IQ – will remain a matter of speculation for some time, but there clearly is a possibility of some such interaction.50

A study by Rosenthal and Jacobson51 was among the first to suggest that having knowledge of another person’s IQ score could cause one to influence that person’s subsequent intelligence level. In what has become a classic study in sociology of education, these researchers gave an intelligence test to students at a primary school at the beginning of the school year. They then selected 20 percent of the students at random, and by giving teachers inflated student IQ scores, led them to believe that these students could be expected to vastly improve in their academic abilities during that year. At the end of the school year, the researchers returned and re-tested all of the students (who were not told their results). Those who were (randomly) labelled as improvers gained an average of 12 IQ points, compared to a gain of 8 points for those were not labelled as likely to improve.52

Many further studies have been carried out since these initial findings. Whilst some studies have refuted this so-called ‘expectation effect’,53 many others have supported it,54 and it is generally now considered to be a valid phenomenon. The effect has also been shown to be present in higher education and in students’ expectations of themselves. Importantly, it is considered to be valid for negative expectations as well as positive:

49 Clarke, ‘The Genetic Dissection of Complex Traits’, p112. 50 Ibid, p106. 51 Rosenthal, R. and Jacobson, L., (1972) Pygmalion in the Classroom. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. 52 Although this difference is only 4 quotient points, it was considered to be a very significant finding. 53 See, for example: Fleming, E.S. and Anttonen, R.G., (1971) ‘Teacher Expectancy or My Fair Lady’, American Educational Research Journal, vol.8(2): 241-52. 54 Several studies are cited in: Madon, S., Smith, A., Jussim, L., Russell, D.W. et al., (2001) ‘Am I as You See Me or do You See Me as I am? Self-Fulfilling Prophecies and Self-Verification’, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, vol.27(9): 1214-24. 142 Chapter Four – Should genetic tests be developed?

When teachers expect students to do well and show intellectual growth, they do; when teachers do not have such expectations, performance and growth are not so encouraged and may in fact be discouraged in a variety of ways.55

These studies raise an interesting question. If teachers can elicit such responses from their students, then will parents, or individuals, also be able to influence such an outcome? Parents are just as vital as educators are to their children’s development. If parents perceive that their children have good capabilities and give such a message to their children, then the children themselves may have a better chance of developing these. Or, if parents perceive that their children have poor capabilities, they could relay this kind of message to their children. It would be most unfortunate if parents were to remind their children each time they fail to succeed: “Oh, that’s because you don’t have any good intelligence genes”.

It seems clear that genetic information about intelligence has a significant potential to influence the expectations that people have about themselves and others. It is also clear that this can influence subsequent behaviour. This could have either a positive or negative outcome. Although it is important to recognise that parents are likely to place genetic information within a context of their pre-existing intricate relationships with and knowledge of their children, the potential for the information to be used to elicit a self-fulfilling prophecy should be recognised. Recognition of this potential provides another constraint upon the provision of genetic tests for intelligence: the importance of counselling around self-fulfilling prophecies. Particularly if a sub-optimal result is obtained, test recipients (or their parents) need to be counselled about the malleable nature of intelligence, and the interventions that can be used to optimise intelligence.

Therefore, both entity trait beliefs and the potential for a ‘self-fulfilling prophecy’ provide an important constraint upon how genetic tests for intelligence should be offered. The potential for entity trait beliefs to cause blameworthy conduct, or for a self-fulfilling prophecy to arise, are certainly bad outcomes. However these concerns are capable only of providing a constraint upon (not an objection to) offering genetic tests for intelligence, as they are also subject to the arguments given above. That is, if a person holds irrational beliefs about the information they are given, then this does not give rise to rights. And even if harm is suffered from accurate information, care needs to be taken in holding genetic tests

55 Rhem, J., (1999) ‘Pygmalion in the Classroom’, The National Teaching and Education Forum, vol.8(2): 1-4, p1. 143 Chapter Four – Should genetic tests be developed? for intelligence to a standard that will be impossible ever to practically attain. To prevent a new intervention from being offered (particularly one which could be beneficial) because there is a potential for a negative impact on subsequent behaviour, is actually to neglect these positive impacts upon future behaviour. Therefore, rather than using the potential for a negative self-fulfilling prophecy as an objection to overcome offering genetic tests for intelligence, it is more appropriate that appropriate counselling strategies to minimise this outcome are put in place. This can be done whilst maximising the potential for positive outcomes from the information.

Harms particular to testing children

Further questions about genetic testing for intelligence will inevitably arise if it is not the recipient of the test who gives consent for it to be carried out. Consider again the scenario I presented in the introduction to this chapter. What objections might there be if you, as Sarah’s parent, were able to access genetic testing technology to assess Sarah’s ‘intelligence profile?

If parents are ever to access genetic testing for intelligence for their children, ethical concerns additional to those I have discussed above will certainly be raised. Indeed, the majority of academic writing56 and professional guidelines57 on genetic testing in children condemns this practice, save for some limited situations. These are: when there is a clear

56 See, for example: Harper, P.S. and Clarke, A., (1990) ‘Should we Test Children for "Adult" Genetic Diseases?’ The Lancet, vol.335: 1205-6; Clarke, A., (1999) ‘The Genetic Testing of Children’, in R.F. Chadwick, et al., (Eds). The Ethics of Genetic Screening. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp231-47; Wertz, D.C., Fanos, J.H., and Reilly, P.R., (1994) ‘Genetic Testing for Children and Adolescents: Who Decides?’ JAMA, vol.272(11): 875-81; and Clarke, A. and Flinter, F., (1996) ‘The Genetic Testing of Children: a Clinical Perspective’, in T. Marteau and M. Richards, (Eds). The Troubled Helix: Social and Psychological Implications of the New Human Genetics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp164-76. 57 See, for example: World Health Organisation, Proposed International Guidelines on Ethical Issues in Medical Genetics: Report of a WHO Meeting on Ethical Issues in Medical Genetics; Available at: http://www.who.int/ncd/hgn/hgnethic.htm (Accessed 27 September 2001); Human Genetics Society of Australasia, (1999) Predictive Testing in Children and Adolescents, Available at: http://www.hgsa.com.au/; Gillott, J., (1998) ‘Childhood Testing for Carrier Status: the Perspective of the Genetic Interest Group’, in A. Clarke, (Ed). The Genetic Testing of Children. Oxford: Bios Scientific Publishers, pp97-102; Wilfond, B.S., (1995) ‘ASHG/ACMG Report: Points to Consider: Ethical, Legal, and Psychosocial Implications of Genetic Testing in Children and Adolescents’, American Journal of Human Genetics, vol.57: 1233-41; Clinical Genetics Society, (1994) ‘Report of the Working Party on the Genetic Testing of Children’, Journal of Medical Genetics, vol.31: 788-97. A genetic test for intelligence is not easily classifiable as a diagnostic, carrier or predictive test. This will have implications as to how existing ethical guidelines and policy about testing will be able to be applied to behavioural traits. 144 Chapter Four – Should genetic tests be developed? benefit to the child in being tested, where the trait being predicted has an onset in childhood, or when a competent child is requesting the test (which must be in their best interests).58

It seems unlikely that genetic tests for intelligence will fall into any of these three categories. Considering the present research climate, it remains unclear whether genetic testing for intelligence will definitely offer a ‘clear benefit’ for the child being tested. However, genetic testing may be able to offer at least some information similar to that currently gained from psychometric tests for intelligence. These tests are currently used to identify and intervene in a wide range of learning problems in children. To be sure though, it would be too optimistic to rely upon such a putative benefit as a justification in favour of offering genetic testing for children. Similarly, offering genetic testing to children because intelligence has its ‘onset’ in childhood also seems to extend the scope of this criterion beyond that which those who developed it would have envisaged. Additionally, as the scenario I will be discussing involves a six year-old child, we can safely assume that Sarah would not be competent to consent to the test. Therefore, it is necessary to consider some of the harms that may result if children are tested.

In the many papers in which predictive genetic testing in children has been discussed, three main potential harms have been raised. These are that genetic testing will remove the child’s ‘right to decide’ to be tested when competent; that it will constitute a breach of the child’s confidentiality; and that it will cause the child to be denied various opportunities as they grow up.

I will argue here that although these putative harms will generate constraints upon how genetic testing may be utilised in children, they do not present problems that are grave enough to warrant the prevention of testing completely.

Testing now removes the child’s ‘right to decide later’

Undeniably, giving Sarah a genetic test for intelligence at age six is removing her option later in life to choose whether or not she would like to have such a test. If removing this future option from Sarah were unreasonable, then this would provide a strong reason to prevent her parents from having her tested.

58 See, for example: Clarke, ‘Introduction’, p6. 145 Chapter Four – Should genetic tests be developed?

Robertson and Savulescu suggest (but do not support) three related ways in which removing a child’s option to choose to be tested might be unreasonable.59 They are: that testing is a failure to respect the child’s future autonomy (or, ‘right to decide later’); that it constitutes a breach of confidentiality; and that it could harm the child.

Take the first argument; that testing Sarah now will constitute a breach of her ‘right to decide later’.60 Now, this right is generally considered to be quite important, given its proximity to the right ‘to know’ or ‘not to know’ about one’s genetic information. Indeed, this right is closely connected with individual values and attitudes towards genetic information.

Jonas has defended the right to remain ignorant of one’s genetic constitution. In discussing cloning, he is concerned that a child’s knowledge of her genetic makeup might remove her ‘unprejudiced selfhood’,61 and that it is important to ‘respect the right of each human life to find its own way and be a surprise to itself.’62

Concern with the removal of this ‘right to decide later’ is also connected to Sarah’s future autonomy. Joel Feinberg has developed the doctrine of the ‘right to an open future’ to explain this.63 According to Feinberg, a child should retain her future adult rights to choose or not to choose to make a variety of significant decisions. This would probably preclude Sarah’s parents from testing her intelligence genes, as this will limit Sarah’s future autonomy.64

It is undeniable that Sarah’s right to remain in ignorance has been removed if she is told her test results. However, Sarah’s loss of this right must be weighed against the benefit to Sarah from testing now. In allowing her to grow up with genetic information being gradually imparted to her by her parents, Sarah’s best interests might better be looked after,

59 Robertson and Savulescu, ‘Is there a Case in Favour of Predictive Genetic Testing in Children?’, pp38-43. 60 See, for example: Harper and Clarke, ‘Should we Test Children for "Adult" Genetic Diseases?’ 61 Jonas, Philosophical Essays, p159. 62 Ibid, p161-2. 63 Feinberg, J., (1980) ‘The Child’s Right to an Open Future’, in W. Aiken and H. LaFollette, (Eds). Whose Child? Children’s Rights, Parental Authority, and state Power. Totowa, NJ: Littlefield, Adams and Company, pp124-53. I discuss this in doctrine in Chapter Six. 64 Clarke and Flinter, ‘The Genetic Testing of Children’. 146 Chapter Four – Should genetic tests be developed? as the diversity of activities that she will be able to engage in (such as choosing her university course) has not been limited by this information. Overall, the choice that is being denied to Sarah does not seem to be more significant than the ones that could open up for her.

Additionally, if Sarah’s parents do protect her right to decide, this may still not guarantee her future autonomy. As Michie points out, by not testing children, parents are effectively removing their child’s option of growing up with this information (and the benefits that this may have).65 As long as her parents strive not to use the information to limit Sarah’s options for her future, then her future autonomy should remain intact. I discuss this further below.

Despite what I have said above, Sarah may still express regret at her parents’ decision to have her tested. However, Robertson and Savulescu point out that just because a child may express regret at having been tested, this does not indicate that her rights have been infringed. Sarah’s parents have not acted wrongly, provided that their request for her to be tested was made in good faith, with Sarah’s best interests in mind.

Testing is a breach of the child’s confidentiality

A second criticism often made about genetic testing in children is that testing constitutes a breach of the child’s right to confidentiality. According to Clarke and Flinter, among others:

Testing in childhood removes the confidentiality that would be expected and provided for any adult undergoing the same test, both for the fact of having the test performed and for the test result.66

Whilst breaching a person’s confidentiality is indeed usually legally and ethically wrong, this concern does not carry as much weight in children vis a vis parents. For normal family functioning, it is vital that parents be intimately involved with their children’s lives. To do this, they need to access and control a great deal of information about them. Indeed, Michie

65 Michie, S., (1996) ‘Predictive Genetic Testing in Children: Paternalism or Empiricism?’ in T. Marteau and M. Richards, (Eds). The Troubled Helix: Social and Psychological Implications of the New Human Genetics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp177-83. 66 Clarke and Flinter, ‘The Genetic Testing of Children’, p166. 147 Chapter Four – Should genetic tests be developed? pointes out that a presumption of an absolute right to confidentiality within family units is a fairly contentious issue.67

Robertson and Savulescu have argued (in the context of medical genetics) that so long as parents are not merely undertaking genetic testing gratuitously to satisfy their own ends, then we do not need to attribute weight to the breach of a child’s confidentiality to them.68 It seems reasonable to suggest that as IQ scores are regarded as confidential, but that parents can commonly obtain them for their children in their best interests, then this would also apply to genetic testing.

Further, in a climate where avoidance of professional paternalism is important (consider the emphasis upon non-directive counselling, for example), it seems nonsensical to suggest that it is the role of professionals to dictate when parents can and cannot have access to information about their children. Particularly if the information will have a practical benefit for the child (perhaps by intervening to promote their intellectual development), then as long as parents are made duly aware of the sensitivity of this information, then the argument from confidentiality should not apply.

The information could deny opportunities

What is more important than whether parents obtain access to genetic information about their children is what they do with it once they obtain it. This issue raises a third potential objection to genetic testing of intelligence in children: that Sarah could be directly harmed as a result of her parents’ decision to have her tested. There is a concern that upon obtaining this information, Sarah’s parents may act to make detrimental changes to her future as a result of the information they receive.

Say, for example, that Sarah’s genetic profile indicated a risk that she might experience learning difficulties as she grew up. Rather than utilising this information to help Sarah by beneficially intervening in her development, her parents used this information as a label to indicate that she was ‘learning disabled’, claiming: “try as we might, there’s nothing we can do to help her”. As a result, they abandoned all of their earlier decisions about Sarah’s education and her learning environment at home and decided to be only minimally involved

67 Michie, ‘Predictive Genetic Testing in Children’ 68 Robertson and Savulescu, ‘Is there a Case in Favour of Predictive Genetic Testing in Children?’ 148 Chapter Four – Should genetic tests be developed? in her education and development. If this were to occur, then Sarah would obviously suffer as a result of these altered parental expectations.

Or, Sarah’s parents could also over-estimate the significance of her risk for learning problems. As a result of her genetic test, her childhood might be punctuated by many unnecessary interventions to optimise her intellectual functioning, which might interfere with her normal development and socialization.

Such scenarios are indeed worrying. They are problematic, however, as they are just that – scenarios. There is little empirical evidence to suggest that this would represent a typical parental reaction to genetic information, nor is there evidence that all parents would think differently to this. For example, Michie cites studies where parental attitudes towards genetic information were ‘stable’, yet a qualitative study has indicated that parents may sometimes adopt a fatalistic attitude towards genetic information.69 Surely, such inappropriate parenting occurs already, in the absence of genetic testing.

In reality, the likelihood of such a scenario will necessarily depend upon many family- specific circumstances. These include the parent-child relationship, the general parental support for their children and the value that is placed upon intelligence. A sensible approach would be to analyse each request for genetic testing of intelligence in children on a case-by- case basis, exploring with parents their reasons for wanting this information. These specific parental motivations could then be linked with broader family goals, relationships and values.70 The lesson here is that usually, parents feel that they would benefit from some kinds of guidance or training when raising their children. It is not unfeasible that dealing with genetic testing could be seen as one part of this wider context of guidance.

Should children be given their test results? When?

In arguing that there are circumstances in which children may be given genetic tests for intelligence (and that the putative harms associated with these tests can be minimised), I have yet to address an important question. The validity of some of the arguments I have

69 Senior, V., Marteau, T.M., and Peters, T.J., (1999) ‘Will Genetic Testing for Predisposition for Disease Result in Fatalism? A Qualitative Study of Parents' Responses to Neonatal Screening for Familial Hypercholesterolaemia’, Social Science and Medicine, vol.48(12): 1857-60. I discuss this study further in Chapter Seven, at page 3. 70 Cohen, ‘Wrestling With the Future’. 149 Chapter Four – Should genetic tests be developed? advanced above may vary depending whether (and how) children are given their test results. I believe that it is in children’s interests to receive their test results. However, communication of results should be consistent with the child’s stage of development and should have regard to their particular family context, such as the quality of the relationship between parents and children.

Consider again your decision to have your daughter Sarah tested. Sarah has had a sample of blood taken and you return two days later to receive her ‘intelligence profile’. The counsellor discusses Sarah’s results with you and explains the significance of the genetic information. What should you do now that you have discussed the implications of the test? There are various alternative ways to proceed once the test has been completed. I have represented these in table on the following page.

Table 4-2: Some alternative ways of disclosing test results to Sarah

First Alternative: • Sarah could be tested and the result could be stored without communicating it to anyone. At a later time, Sarah would be told that she was tested. She could then request the results once she becomes competent, should she desire to do so. Second Alternative: • Sarah could be tested; and her parents could obtain the result, but never tell Sarah that she was tested. Sarah’s parents may perceive that it would be harmful for her to ever know the results of the test and so choose to never tell her that they had access to this information. Third Alternative: • Sarah could be tested; and her parents could obtain the result. They could then immediately tell Sarah what this held for her. Her parents do not want to keep any secrets from Sarah. They feel that it is important that she adjust to this information about herself as soon as possible. Fourth Alternative: • Sarah could be tested and her parents could obtain the result. They could then communicate the results to Sarah at a later, more appropriate stage (preferably before the onset of adolescence, where a threat to personal identity might be more pronounced). This might involve returning to Genes!Life in order to discuss the results with a trained geneticist and counsellor.

Regarding the first alternative, one reason for taking this approach is that the disclosure of the results is entirely in Sarah’s control. Additionally, perhaps her parents were worried

150 Chapter Four – Should genetic tests be developed? that genetic testing might not always be equitably available. By testing her now, they have effectively provided a means for her to have fair access to such information in the future. However, this does seem to defeat the purpose of testing and would merely be a decision based upon convenience.

The second and third alternatives seem equally unreasonable. Whilst not giving Sarah information about her abilities would indeed mean that several of the putative harms in being given this information could be avoided (and the benefits to Sarah would stay intact), the result in the long-term may be more damaging. There is a risk that Sarah will find out that she was tested at a later stage (perhaps during an argument with her parents as an adolescent). Indeed, guidelines from organisations such as the Human Genetics Society of Australasia expressly discourage such a practice.71 Additionally, studies in families where donor gametes were used in procreation have indicated that children are overall less well adjusted if information is deliberately concealed from them.72 If a similar phenomenon applies to all information kept between parents and children, this renders the second alternative as implausible.

Similarly, telling Sarah her results straightaway might not be the wisest course of action. Whilst this alternative would not involve any secrecy or non-disclosure and would respect the fact that young children such as Sarah do have a rudimentary understanding of inheritance,73 Sarah should not be expected to incorporate such complex information at a young age. It is most important to consider how this information might interact with Sarah’s hopes for her future and her developing self-esteem. Even if her parents do periodically refer back to the information to ensure understanding, genetic information

71 Human Genetics Society of Australasia, Predictive Testing in Children and Adolescents: ‘Where the parents request non-disclosure of results or a test to be performed without the child’s knowledge, there is conflict between parents request and child’s right to autonomy and predictive testing should not be performed’ 72 See, for example: Brewaeys, A., (1996) ‘Donor Insemination: the Impact on Family and Child Development’, Journal of Psychosomatic Obstetrics and Gynaecology, vol.17: 1-13; Kovacs, G.T., Mushin, D., Kane, H., and Baker, H.W., (1993) ‘A Controlled Study of the Pscyho-Social Development of Children Conceived Following Insemination with Donor Semen’, Human Reproduction, vol.8: 788-90; and Nachtigall, R.D., Becker, G., Quiroga, S.S., and Tschann, J.M., (1998) ‘The Disclosure Decision: Concerns and Issues of Parents of Children Conceived Through Donor Insemination’, American Journal of Obstetrics and Gynecology, vol.178(6): 1165-68. 73 See, for example: Springer, K. and Keil, F.C., (1989) ‘On the Development of Biologically Specific Beliefs: The Case of Inheritance’, Child Development, vol.60: 637-48. These beliefs tend more strongly towards biological rather than social concepts. 151 Chapter Four – Should genetic tests be developed? about intelligence is never going to be anything but complex in nature. To suggest that it will be easily understandable, even by adults, is unwise. The most likely scenario here is that Sarah would retain only small amounts of the information. Consequently, this information could then negatively impact upon her future behaviour and self-concept. Some might also argue that the sacrosanct nature of childhood should prevent parents from divulging this kind of information.

The final alternative is that as Sarah grows up, her parents (with intimate knowledge of her emotional and cognitive development) gradually disclose this information to her, such as the fact that she was tested when she was younger and their purpose for obtaining the information. They could then ask her if she would like to know the results of her test. Her parents can talk through their knowledge of the test results with her, but as people tend to have a poor recall of information presented in counselling sessions, it would be most appropriate for Sarah and her parents to return to Genes!Life for more in-depth discussions and follow-up. By adopting this alternative, Sarah’s parents have been able to utilise the information to maximise her development. Then, Sarah herself can benefit from the information later if she chooses to. There is a risk that Sarah could feel dissatisfied that her parents have information about her genetic nature that she herself may not want to have, yet this is still a relatively small cost for the best option overall.

Indeed, studies of the impact of medical genetic information in children suggest that children might benefit if they ‘grow up’ with their test results, rather than having them disclosed to them when they reach a more mature age:

From a person who was not told about their carrier status until aged 17: “I think I would have rather got it over and done with when I was a young age… er I could understand what it was all about then, than have it done now, because it’s too much pressure on me now. I’d rather have had it over and done with at an earlier stage.”

From a person who grew up knowing their carrier status: “I think that it was probably best knowing then, before, because it has helped me become aware of certain things. Because if for instance I found out about at the age of sixteen, it would have come as a huge shock. It probably would have affected me more than it already had”.

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As to why it would have been a shock: “I think by that age you probably have certain ideas and certain plans and then you realize this and it stops those plans”.74

If handled appropriately, the fourth alternative would lead to the best possible adjustment outcome for Sarah.

Now, if Sarah is tested when she is a bit older, this will understandably impact upon the option chosen. If Sarah is tested at age ten, for example, then Alternative Three may be more appropriate, as she will be aware of the testing process and will probably ask questions. Alternative Three also reflects current practice regarding psychometric tests of intelligence, where results are disseminated on a family level and are targeted to the child’s level of understanding. Such a long tradition of established (and continually reviewed) clinical practice provides a powerful reason in favour of adopting this particular option.

An appropriate constraint on testing is that it could be restricted to those circumstances where Sarah’s parents do want to disclose this information to her once she will be able to understand it and where appropriate counselling can be given.

4.5 Genetic tests for intelligence should be subject to several constraints

I have argued in this chapter that genetic testing for intelligence may be permissible for both competent and incompetent persons. However it is obvious that genetic testing for intelligence will still be subject to several difficulties. Therefore, if genetic tests for intelligence are to be offered, it is important that this is done with regard to several important constraints.

Tests should only be requested by the individuals to whom the result will apply, or her parents

At least at the outset, undertaking a genetic test for intelligence should be a matter only for individual or parental decision-making, not by a third party request. The main reason for this is that it remains uncertain how good these tests will be. Additionally, for contexts such as employment and education, a battery of psychological and behavioural tests already exist which are entirely satisfactory. There is something insidious about introducing a genetic test

74 Jolly, Parsons, and Clarke, ‘Identifying Carriers of Balanced Chromosomal Translocations’, p82. 153 Chapter Four – Should genetic tests be developed? into a situation where there are already a variety of means to gain the information.75 Even if genetic information could enhance the reliability of these current means of assessing people, there is currently no way to guarantee that this information will always be handled by organisations in the most appropriate way, such as not being over-interpreted. This information will thus be best left to an individual’s own interpretation and control, where the potential for unfair labelling will be minimised.

Genetic tests for intelligence should not merely provide an ‘IQ Score’

Another concern with genetic tests for intelligence is that they will lead to a person (or her parents) perceiving her intelligence to be determined by a genetically-imprinted ‘IQ score’. Genetic tests for intelligence should therefore only be made available within a context that mirrors current best practice in clinical psychology. This means that testing should be done to identify problems and improve individual performance with appropriate counselling and support, not merely to identify an IQ score (although a probable IQ score can certainly be given if it is possible to deduce). Most clinical intelligence testing has very little to do with obtaining an IQ score.

The purpose of an intelligence test is to identify varying parts of a person’s performance and to determine the strengths and weaknesses therein. They are designed to bring various aspects about how we learn from our sub-conscious to our conscious mind, to assist us to further refine our skills and talents, no matter the task we are performing. A clinically administered intelligence test provides much more information than simply a number – and as such the report tends to be several pages long. Indeed, it is considered inappropriate to provide a score without also this broader context, as the score itself is considered to be meaningless without this additional information.

This approach should also be adopted as much as possible when obtaining genetic information. Only being interested in obtaining a ‘label’ (whether genetic or otherwise) for oneself or one’s children seems a great deal less justifiable than seeking to explain some aspect of how our abilities affect our performance.

It is also important, however, to examine why psychologists hold this particular view, and whether this is defensible. Broadly, psychological practice is a highly regulated field that has

75 Discounting the potential that genetic information may give a ‘purer’ estimate of potential. 154 Chapter Four – Should genetic tests be developed? been in existence for a significant period of time. The standards of psychological testing are often subjected to scrutiny and are regulated by professional guidelines. Further, psychological testing is dogged by the debates and problems that genetic testing is. Therefore, there are good reasons to follow psychological standards for intelligence testing.

Additionally, in the first instance at least, genetic testing for intelligence should not become the routine way by which intelligence is measured. Psychometric tests for intelligence will be likely to reflect more factors, such as the genotype/environment interaction. It would be unfortunate to become solely concerned with genetic information, at the expense of other relevant information.

The need for appropriate counselling

Ideally, genetic testing for intelligence should only be carried out in an environment where appropriate, non-directive counselling is provided (subject to a libertarian argument discussed briefly below). The counselling process should involve in-depth counselling before, during and after testing; and could be facilitated by both a psychologist and a geneticist.

Also important here is that test results must be communicated effectively. Any data from an intelligence test, be it a psychometric or genetic test, will be meaningless unless it is communicated in such a way that the recipient can understand and effectively utilise the information. Such clear communication will involve the factors indicated in the table overleaf.

155 Chapter Four – Should genetic tests be developed?

Table 4-3: Factors to be counselled in genetic tests of intelligence

Issues that should be included in such discussions include: • a clear, thorough exploration of the rationale for testing; • an explanation of what the test results would mean for the individual; • an explanation of the accuracy or error margins of the test and the possible conclusions that the test may reach; • information about any other traits that the information might be relevant to; • an explanation of the impact of the test result upon other family members, or future family members; • an explanation about any implications for employment or insurance; • the potential misconceptions based upon genetic information (for example, that it is immutable, or deterministic); and • giving feedback that is appropriate to the characteristics of the person, such as their educational background, their knowledge about the testing process and possible emotional response to the information.

Potential harms from testing need to be recognised

It is important not to dismiss the potential harms that may arise in genetic testing for intelligence. For example, it will be important to flag (in order to try to avoid) potential discrimination, stigmatisation or labelling of individuals based upon their test results.

Additionally, test recipients or their parents need to be adequately counselled about the potential for psychological harms, such as a self-fulfilling prophecy that could occur as a result of their test. This would be particularly important if a ‘negative’ result was obtained.

There should be special constraints on testing children

Given the particular difficulties in administering genetic tests to children, it is important that genetic testing of children be made subject to several important constraints.

Ideally, genetic tests for intelligence would only be offered to children if there was an effective intervention available to optimise intelligence in light of test results.76 If the test is

76 The Human Genetics Society of Australasia, The Clinical Genetics Society (UK) and the American Society of Human Genetics have published guidelines stipulating that this should be discouraged when there is no effective intervention in childhood. See: Human Genetics Society of Australasia, Predictive Testing in Children and Adolescents; Clinical Genetics Society, ‘Report of the Working Party on the Genetic Testing of Children’; and Wilfond, ‘ASHG/ACMG Report’. 156 Chapter Four – Should genetic tests be developed? being undertaken merely for the sake of life planning, parents should be encouraged not to utilise the information to limit their children’s opportunities.

Counsellors or providers of tests should also gauge parental motivations for having their child tested, on a case-by-case basis and ensure that they provide clear and sufficient information. If parents are not motivated to promote their child’s best interests, then their justification for commissioning the test would be diminished. Further, children should be involved in the test decision where possible, even if they are unable to consent. Even young children can have views on these kinds of issues.77 Once they are tested, children should be told about the test at an appropriate stage in their development, with a counsellor present.

However, it is also important to note that libertarians, such as Locke, would be opposed to an insistence on the provision of counselling in the provision of a genetic profile for intelligence. That is, provided that both the nature and meaning of the test are explained with sufficient clarity and detail in order to obtain informed consent, then an insistence on counselling over and above this requirement arguably constitutes an unreasonable further restriction on the liberty of choice of the individual.78 Although counselling will obviously be desirable, particularly if genetic information about intelligence turns out to be as complex as people expect, it will also be important to ensure that in developing ‘request pathways’ for genetic testing, an appropriate balance is developed between the powers of veto or discretion that may lie with counsellors or testing services and people’s desires to commission a test. Ideally, if what I have argued is correct and there is an entitlement to testing, the value of this testing should not be undermined by making it contingent upon the impressions of counsellors or test providers. A more cooperative relationship between counsellors and test recipients should be aimed for.

4.6 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have examined the difficult questions of whether and when genetic tests for intelligence should be administered. Through analysing the most pressing arguments for and against the development of such tests for both adults and children, I have argued that such testing may be permissible, particularly if it offers an opportunity for

77 Dickenson, D., (1999) ‘Can Children and Young People Consent to be Tested for Adult Onset Genetic Disorders?’ BMJ, vol.318: 1063-6. 78 I thank Professor John Harris for brining this issue to my attention. 157 Chapter Four – Should genetic tests be developed? subsequent effective interventions in a person’s best interests. It is important that these interventions not be constituted merely in medical terms. More effective life planning and educational modification are important benefits from knowledge of one’s abilities, including intellectual abilities.

There are, of course, many concerns with the development of such tests. Therefore, my endorsement of genetic tests for intelligence is subject to several constraints, which include testing only being offered to the individuals to whom the results will apply (or their parents), that tests should be provided only with appropriate encouragement to undergo counselling and follow-up and that the potential harms from such tests need to be recognised.

It also remains an open question as to whether these constraints upon genetic testing for intelligence will be able to be upheld by the genetics community and those organisations with which it interacts.

158

Chapter Five

5 AN OVERVIEW OF ARGUMENTS AGAINST ENHANCING INTELLIGENCE

5.1 Introduction

Since Adam and Eve’s apple... the most controversial means of cognitive enhancement have always been the enhancers we take rather than the ones we invent or earn… [those that work] without requiring us to exert ourselves unduly in the process.1

Besides genetic testing, another commonly discussed application of research into genetic influences upon intelligence is genetic enhancement – using this research to develop technologies to improve the abilities of people beyond ‘normal’ levels. It is not inconceivable that results from genetic research into intelligence might bring about the development of technologies to augment cognition in either existing persons, or those yet to be born.

Although some enhancements of intelligence will be able to be administered to adults, the group most likely to be targeted for enhancements of intelligence will be children. It is not hard to imagine that parents will want to enhance their children as early as possible in their life, or perhaps before they are born, to derive maximum benefit from the enhancement.

Such notions of genetic enhancements of intelligence are unpalatable to most. Researchers in bioethics usually reject enhancements of intelligence,2 and suggestions that it is acceptable are often met with a response that this will lead inevitably to disastrous scenarios in which children become commodities for the ends of their parents.

1 Whitehouse, P.J., Juengst, E., Mehlman, M., and Murray, T.H., (1997) ‘Enhancing Cognition in the Intellectually Intact’, The Hastings Center Report, vol.27(3): 14-22, p14. 2 For a review, see: Holtug, N., (1997) ‘Altering Humans: The Case For and Against Human Gene Therapy’, Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, vol.6: 157-74. 159 Chapter Five – An overview of enhancement

In this chapter, I synthesise and evaluate the major moral issues that will arise if enhancements of intelligence become possible. First, I review the technologies of enhancement that might allow intelligence to be augmented. I point out that enhancing intelligence might not be far away. Taking enhancement in children in particular, I then address some of the general arguments that will be important to the debate over genetic enhancement and discuss how these will apply to intelligence. I also discuss four arguments that warrant a more detailed discussion: the treatment/enhancement distinction, whether means can provide a moral boundary to enhancement, the role of the non-identity problem and how distributive justice might affect the acceptability of enhancements of intelligence.

I argue that although there are several serious concerns that would need to be addressed if enhancing procedures were ever to go ahead, currently no arguments have been presented that absolutely reject enhancement. I also argue that although a limited defence of the treatment/enhancement distinction is plausible and that the means employed to bring about an enhancement are significant, these distinctions cannot be used as a moral boundary to indicate what is permissible or impermissible. I also argue that a consideration of the non-identity problem means that genetic selection may be preferable to genetic enhancement. Finally, I suggest that equality in access to genetic enhancements of intelligence is likely to present some difficult problems. Consistent with my aim of providing constraints upon the acceptable uses of genetic research into intelligence, I then illustrate the conditions which, if satisfied, might render the enhancement of intelligence as permissible.

Having reviewed the general objections against enhancement, in the next chapter I turn my attention to two strong objections against the enhancement of intelligence. These are that enhancing people’s intelligence will deny them the right to an open future and that it will render people’s actions as inauthentic.

5.2 Methods of enhancing intelligence

There are several putative means by which intelligence might be augmented. These can be divided into three discrete classes – genetic selection, genetic

160 Chapter Five – An overview of enhancement enhancement and enhancements that do not alter DNA.3 I have summarised these various classes of enhancement genetic interventions in Table 5-1 and describe them in more detail below.

Table 5-1: Classes of interventions which enhance intelligence

Genetic Selection: 1. Pre-implantation Genetic Diagnosis 2. Prenatal testing and termination of pregnancy4 Genetic Enhancement: 3. Somatic DNA enhancement 4. Germ-line DNA enhancement Those that do not alter DNA: 5. Drug enhancement

It is important to recognise that the majority of these technologies do not yet exist. So throughout this chapter and the next, I assume that several genes for intelligence have been identified and that we understand enough about how these interact to develop techniques for enhancing intelligence. I also assume that these enhancements do not carry significant medical side-effects.

Yet even with these caveats, it is interesting to note that some enhancing technologies may not be as far-fetched as previously thought. What is startling from the examples I discuss below is that the tools with which we might enhance intelligence may not be as complicated as originally perceived. In fact, people are already utilising some of these interventions to enhance intelligence.

Genetic Selection

There are two techniques of genetic selection that may be used to bear a child with higher intelligence. Both are already used in medical genetics. The first is prenatal screening or testing, involving DNA or chromosomal testing within an established pregnancy, for example using Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) to detect the

3 I have distinguished these three kinds of enhancement because there are various ways in which intelligence might be enhanced. However, throughout this chapter and the next, I refer to enhancements generally, unless explicitly discussing a particular kind of enhancement. 4 Semantically, it could be argued that pre-implantation genetic diagnosis and prenatal testing followed by termination are not strictly enhancements of intelligence, as they generally do not constitute the enhancement of a particular individual. However, I have construed ‘enhancement’ to include enhancements of intelligence at the level of the population. 161 Chapter Five – An overview of enhancement presence of a particular mutation. Currently, couples may choose such selection to determine whether a foetus has a particular genetic condition, such as Down’s syndrome or Cystic Fibrosis. Depending upon the results of the test, a couple might choose to terminate a pregnancy. Some commentators have suggested that couples would be interested in terminating a pregnancy if they deem that the foetus’ intelligence level is not high enough, even though it would be considered to be within the ‘normal range’.5

The second technology of genetic selection involves pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) to determine which embryos will be implanted during in-vitro fertilisation.6 In broad terms, the process of pre-implantation genetic diagnosis involves creating embryos in vitro and allowing them to develop to the 8-cell stage. Then, one or two cells are removed (to no apparent detriment to the embryo) and are subjected to similar DNA or chromosome analyses as above.7 Only embryos that do not carry the conditions couples want to avoid are implanted. Currently, PGD is used to avoid single-gene genetic disorders such as Cystic Fibrosis, Huntington’s Disease, Fragile-X Syndrome and several cancers.

For many couples, PGD is a morally superior option to prenatal screening or testing, as it avoids traumatic decisions about the termination of an established pregnancy. However, PGD does involve IVF. As such, couples who wish to utilise PGD will be subjected to invasive procedures and potentially a long wait for a successful pregnancy. Additionally, PGD analysis is still technically difficult and may not always be accurate.8

5 See, eg: Gillis, J.S., (1996) Everyone an Einstein? The Quest for High Intelligence Genes. Dorking, Surrey: Press Ahead. 6 For a review, see: Delhanty, J.D. and Harper, J.C., (2000) ‘Pre-Implantation Genetic Diagnosis’, Best Practice and Research in Clinical Obstetrics and Gynaecology, vol.14(4): 691-708; and Harper, J.C. and Delhanty, J.D., (2000) ‘Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis’, Current Opinion in Obstetrics and Gynaecology, vol.12(2): 67-72. 7 If screening embryos for more complex diseases or traits becomes possible, embryo DNA may be analysed using DNA chip technology, described in the previous chapter. 8 Not all cells removed from the embryo at the 8-cell stage are necessarily representative of the DNA or chromosomes in the rest of the embryo. Wells, D. and Delhanty, J.D., (2000) ‘Comprehensive Chromosomal Analysis of Human Preimplantation Embryos Using Whole Genome Amplification and Single Cell Comparative Genomic Hybridization’, Molecular Human Reproduction, vol.6(11): 1055-62. 162 Chapter Five – An overview of enhancement

It is theoretically possible that one day, couples could use this technology to screen embryos for more complex traits such as intelligence. Yet an inherent limitation in this is the sheer complexity of gene combinations that couples will have to choose between. If, for example, a couple desires a particular combination of intelligence genes, they may have to produce hundreds of embryos to find the combination they want. A further layer of complexity would arise if a couple also wanted to select for other traits in addition to intelligence. As a woman can produce only approximately eight embryos per cycle, this would create an ‘IVF bottleneck’, with potential parents having to wait a long time for an embryo that would have the exact gene combinations they prefer. One way around this would be for parents to simply choose the ‘best’ embryo from those they have. Another option would be to utilise genetic enhancement.

Genetic Enhancement

The term ‘genetic enhancement’ includes several different technologies that could be used to augment human traits and abilities. Commonly understood, genetic enhancement refers to the utilisation of the emerging tools of gene therapy, such as cell mediated gene transfer or the use of human artificial chromosomes, to introduce or replace genetic material in cells to increase intelligence beyond ‘the norm’.

There are several classes of enhancements. The first, somatic enhancements, involve the modification of genes in cells that have already become differentiated. This could involve, for example, the administering of a de-activated virus carrying a genetic change. Were it to become possible, this technology could be utilised in adults. A significant characteristic of somatic enhancements is that they will (usually) only last for the lifetime of the individual to whom they were given. If it were being used to treat a disease, a somatic intervention would be considered no more controversial than other similarly risky medical interventions.

Germ-line enhancements involve alterations to DNA in unspecialised germ cells. That is, the genetic change will be present in every cell of the enhanced individual. It will also be inherited by her children. For reasons of safety, germ-line enhancements are currently considered as more controversial.

163 Chapter Five – An overview of enhancement

Scientific experiments towards genetic enhancement of intelligence

These methods to enhance intelligence are presently clinically unfeasible. However, recent research suggests that using genetic means to enhance intelligence might be possible.

Consider, for example, a recent experiment in mice. In 1999, scientists at Princeton University investigating pathways in memory formation in the mouse brain created what has come to be known as the ‘smart mouse’.9 Using standard tests, these mice are able to learn more quickly and retain knowledge for a longer period of time. They also adapt to change in their environment more flexibly than do normal mice.10

The mice were created by inserting extra copies of a gene, NR2B, which contributes to a chemical receptor for NMDA.11 Prior experiments had indicated that mice lacking these receptors suffered from learning disabilities. The Princeton researchers showed that an increased amount of the NR2B gene product could improve the processes that rely on the NMDA receptor – that is, learning and memory.

However, such ‘smart mice’ are at risk for several side-effects. In ageing mammals the number of NMDA receptors decreases naturally, which may protect from stroke. These receptors may not decrease to the same extent in the engineered mice, rendering them more susceptible to stroke. Additionally, NMDA has a role in making the brain sensitised to drugs such as cocaine and may have a role in triggering pain. The ‘smart mice’ are more sensitive to chronic pain caused by tissue damage and inflammation, as they have more NMDA receptors.12 It may therefore be difficult to enhance particular brain functions without simultaneously detrimentally affecting others. Enhancement decisions like these may involve difficult trade-offs.

9 Tang, Y.P., Shimizu, E., Dube, G.R., Rampon, C. et al., (1999) ‘Genetic Enhancement of Learning and Memory in Mice’, Nature, vol.401(6748): 63-9. 10 One test for this involved the mice having to find a pontoon in a pool of opaque liquid. The ‘smart mice’ were able to find this pontoon much faster a second time than the non-enhanced mice. 11 NMDA stands for N-methyl-d-aspartate. 12 Tang, Y., Shimuzu, E., and Tsien, J.Z., (2001) ‘Do ‘Smart’ Mice Feel More Pain, or Are They Just Better Learners?’ Nature Neuroscience, vol.4(5): 453. The Nuffield Council on Bioethics has suggested that this is an example of pleiotropy (which I discussed in Chapter One). 164 Chapter Five – An overview of enhancement

Currently any experiments involving the manipulation of a person’s genetic material would be considered as medically unsafe. Yet, the elegant experiments of Tang et al suggest that the processes to alter human cognition may be feasible.

Drug enhancement of intelligence

Genetic research into intelligence is also likely to lead to the development of new intelligence-enhancing drugs. In actuality, however, many drugs to boost cognition already exist.13

To provide some examples, some of the drugs designed to treat Alzheimer’s could have cognitive-enhancing effects in ‘normal’ people. The drug donepezil, marketed as Aricept, blocks an enzyme that destroys acetylcholine, a neurotransmitter important for memory. The US National Institute on Aging is currently undertaking a study to determine whether Aricept may help those with mild cognitive impairment.

Among children with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), the drug methylphenidate hydrochloride, marketed as Ritalin, is already heavily used to control hyperactivity and improve concentration.14 These stimulants may improve performance in normal children as well as those with ADHD,15 and there are indications that children not suffering from ADHD may already be receiving it.16

Additionally, researchers have identified drugs that can improve cognitive function in children with mental retardation,17 although there are also studies that denounce their usefulness.18

13 These are not genetic enhancements. However, whatever the means of enhancement employed, similar ethical issues are sure to arise. 14 This drug is classed in the same family of pharmacological agents as amphetamines. However, in people with ADHD it does not cause hyperactive activity. Rather, it has the paradoxical effect of reducing active behaviour. In Australia, authorisation is required from the health department to prescribe Ritalin. 15 Personal Communication, Professor Peter J. Whitehouse. 16 Diller, L.H., (1996) ‘The Run on Ritalin: Attention Deficit Disorder and Stimulant Treatment in the 1990s’, Hastings Center Report, vol.26(2): 12-18. 17 See, for example: Goldstein, R., Joja, O., Psatta, D.M., Petrescu, M. et al., (1989) ‘Vasotocin Improves Intelligence and Attention in Mentally Retarded Children’, Physiology and Behavior, vol.46(6): 967-70. 165 Chapter Five – An overview of enhancement

The most popular cognitive enhancer is Ginkgo Biloba, a herb derived from the bark of a Chinese tree. Sales of this herb grossed US$240 million in 1997 alone,19 and alternative therapy companies heavily market this herb, often under the ‘memory and concentration improvement’ banner. Ginkgo, which was originally marketed as an aid for circulation problems, is thought to increase the blood flow to tiny blood vessels in the brain.

Placebo-controlled studies published in reputable journals suggest that Ginkgo Biloba does have cognitive enhancing effects.20 For example, in a study at Swinburne University in Australia, participants taking either Ginkgo Biloba or a placebo were tested for improvements in memory, concentration and information processing speed. There were significant improvements in those who took the herb – with increases in memory of as much as 15 percent reported.

Another study undertaken by researchers in the United Kingdom showed that taking a combination of Ginkgo Biloba and Ginseng brought about improvements in attention and memory in less than an hour, which, as the media took no time in predicting, could have far-reaching implications for people giving important presentations or undertaking exams.21

Taking any type of cognitive enhancer is not without risk, however. Several studies have provided warnings about mixing either herbs or pharmaceuticals with other drugs (even aspirin in the case of Ginkgo Biloba), as this may cause unpleasant side-effects, such as organ damage. The following table summarises the main cognitive enhancers.

18 See, for example: Lobaugh, N.J., Karaskov, V., Rombough, V., Rovet, J. et al., (2001) ‘Piracetam Therapy Does Not Enhance Cognitive Functioning in Children with Down Syndrome’, Archives of Pediatric and Adolescent Medicine, vol.155: 442-48. 19 Drummond, T., ‘Elixirs for Your Memory’ Time, September 27 1999, p64-65, p64. 20 See, eg: Le Bars, P.L., Katz, M.M., Berman, N., Itil, T.M. et al., (1997) ‘A Placebo-Controlled, Double-Blind, Randomized Trial of an Extract of Ginkgo Biloba for Dementia’, JAMA, vol.278(16): 1327-32; and Stough, C., Clarke, J., Lloyd, J., and Nathan, P.J., (2001) ‘Neuropsychological Changes After 30-Day Ginkgo Biloba Administration in Healthy Participants’, International Journal of Neuropsychopharmacology, vol.4(2): 131-34. 21 Reported in: Norton, C., ‘Herbal Cocktail Gives an Instant Boost’ The Independent (London), April 15 2000, p13. 166 Chapter Five – An overview of enhancement

Table 5-2: Compounds that reportedly enhance cognition22

• Aricept • Ritalin • Ginkgo Biloba (all discussed above) • Vitamins E and C (or other large doses of antioxidants) may also combat memory loss due to their ability to eliminate free radicals. • Nicotine, which mimics the effects of acetylcholine • Co-enzyme Q-10, commonly used to improve ‘heart health’, is considered to protect nerve cells from damage by free radicals. It is found naturally in human mitochondria and is vital for energy production. • Phosphatidylserine, a fat derived from lecithin, is considered to improve attention, concentration, mood and short-term memory. It is found in cell membranes and can stimulate the release of neurotransmitters. • DHA, a fatty acid derived from fish and algae, also boosts memory. It is marketed in Australia as a key ingredient in a bread marketed to boost IQ.

Anecdotal evidence is continually emerging regarding use of many of these cognitive enhancers. For example, there are several Internet sites that offer advice on which drug cocktails will provide the most effective cognitive enhancement in individuals.23 An Australian chess player who already had a high skill level recently won a state chess title after having taken Ginkgo Biloba for a few months.24 American doctors treat stressed out businessmen claiming to have ‘diminished cognition’ with a battery of enhancing substances.25 Ritalin is reportedly being sold in Australian schoolyards for $1.00 per tablet.26 ‘Brain Gum’, chewing gum containing phosphatidylserine is sold in the United States, with a turnover of US$15 million

22 This table was compiled from a variety of sources, but primarily via undertaking a search of the Reuters database of international media coverage. For a review of these and other putative cognitive enhancers, see: Greider, K., (1996) ‘Making our Minds Last a Lifetime’, Psychology Today, vol.29(6): 42-46. 23 See, for example: http://www.braingum.com; http://www.ceri.com/index.shtml (accessed September 15, 2001). 24 ‘A Performance Enhancer?’ The Canberra Times (Canberra), 19 December 1999, p6 25 See, eg: http://www.brain-longevity.com (accessed September 20, 2001). 26 Papps, N. and Jamieson, T., ‘Exam Drug: Pep Pill Floods Schools’ The Herald Sun (Melbourne) 1999, p1-2. Students who were prescribed Ritalin often did not take the drug, choosing instead to sell it to their friends. 167 Chapter Five – An overview of enhancement annually.27 ‘Intellect’ chocolate bars containing phosphatidylserine and Ginkgo Biloba have been marketed in the United Kingdom.28 Psychology students swotting for exams at a prominent Melbourne university wear nicotine patches to boost brain function.29

To summarise, there are numerous putative ways in which intelligence could be enhanced. It is interesting to note that although the debate over enhancements is often confused by claims that such technology will never be possible, it seems clear that it is possible to improve cognitive performance. Indeed, several of these methods are closer to being available than we might have previously thought. The important question now, however, is what moral issues such enhancements will raise.

5.3 Ethical arguments in genetic enhancement

Before turning to a discussion of two important arguments against enhancement in the next chapter, it is important to address several important preliminary ethical issues. These issues, which include both justifications for and problems with enhancement, will form the background, the ‘moral landscape’, upon which the discussion in the next chapter can be based. There are a significant number of these issues, and each is discussed below.

In addition to a brief synthesis of some of these issues, I discuss four issues in more detail. These are the treatment/enhancement distinction, the question of means involved in an enhancement, the significance of the non-identity problem and what can be done about problems in equality of access to this technology. Establishing a position on all of these issues forms an important ‘moral landscape’, which I then build upon when making my arguments in the subsequent chapter.

27 Jones, L., ‘You Must Have Bubbles for Brains’ The Independent on Sunday (London), April 14 1999, p3. The telephone number to order this product is: 1-800-IQ-BOOST. 28 McQuillan, D., ‘A Clever Way to Eat? Deirdre McQuillan Felt Stupid after Paying £2 for a Small Chocolate Bar’ Daily Telegraph (London), August 8 1998, p8. 29 Personal Communication, Professor Con Stough. 168 Chapter Five – An overview of enhancement

Justifications for Selection and Enhancement

Before turning to consider some of the ethical problems in genetically enhancing intelligence, it is also important to consider that there are some justifications for intelligence being enhanced. These justifications will be described utilising a scenario of parents choosing an enhancement for their child.

The first justification for selecting for or enhancing intelligence is that most parents want to provide their child with the best attributes to lead a successful life that they can. Most parents would be interested in the variety of ways in which this can be brought about.

Intelligence is a leading contender as an ‘all-purpose capability’, an important attribute for forging a successful life, whatever a person may decide to do. As was argued in Chapter Three, intelligence is a capability that can contribute to a person achieving well-being and autonomy. Indeed, several authors have already pointed this out.30 Most parents would desire for their child to have the potential to become as self-aware as possible and to experience a broad range of goods. According to Hudson:

[M]any of the episodes and activities of greatest importance to us, [are] those that involve our awareness of our own rational thinking and acting, as well as our arranging thoughts or sensory elements into complex wholes or our apprehending pre-existing complexes of such elements. These complex experiences… all involve intelligence.31

A second justification for enhancing intelligence, related to the first, is that parents usually have a wide array of rights or freedoms in reproductive decision- making. Therefore, it arguably will fall within any parents’ scope of procreative autonomy to influence a child’s intelligence. To give an example, Buchanan et al argue for a strong general presumption of procreative autonomy:

30 Hudson, J., (2000) ‘What Kinds of People Should we Create?’ Journal of Applied Philosophy, vol.17(2): 131-43; and Savulescu, J., (2001) ‘Procreative Beneficence: Why we Should Select the Best Children’, Bioethics, vol.15(5/6): 413-26. I have also discussed this issue in Chapter Three. 31 Hudson, ‘What Kinds of People Should we Create?’, p135. 169 Chapter Five – An overview of enhancement

Neglect and abuse aside,… parents remain free to pursue producing the best offspring they can. Interference with this would be seen by most as interference with the most fundamental elements of the parents’ conception of a good life.32

The question is, however, whether the principles of procreative autonomy would also encompass parents choosing attributes such as intelligence. Savulescu, for example, has recently argued that not only do parents have the right to procreative autonomy to choose traits, but that they also have a duty of procreative beneficence; to have the best children they can who will experience the maximum amount of well- being.33

Yet Robertson would not take the argument to procreative autonomy to such an extent. He has argued that only genetic selection, not genetic enhancement, can be considered to fall within the scope of procreative autonomy.34 Presumably, therefore, Robertson would not share Savulescu’s views on procreative beneficence. If Robertson is right, then using procreative autonomy to justify genetic enhancement might not be valid.

A third reason for justifying enhancement of intelligence concerns justice. For example, Buchanan et al have recently suggested that providing enhancements to allow equality of opportunity might be included within a theory of justice.35 Additionally, Holtug has suggested that our commitment to justice gives us pro tanto reasons to undertake enhancements of traits such as intelligence.36

According to Daniels, if cognitive enhancement were easily affordable, then there would not only be morally justifiable, but compelling reasons to use it, even if these are

32 Buchanan, A., Brock, D.W., Daniels, N., and Wikler, D., (2000) From Chance to Choice: Genetics and Justice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p159. 33 Savulescu, ‘Procreative Beneficence: Why we Should Select the Best Children’. 34 Robertson, J.A., (1994) Children of Choice: Freedom and the New Reproductive Technologies. Princeton: Princeton University Press, Chapter 7, esp. p166-67. 35 Buchanan, Brock, Daniels, and Wikler, From Chance to Choice: Genetics and Justice, Chapter 3. 36 Holtug, N., (1999) ‘Does Justice Require Genetic Enhancements?’ Journal of Medical Ethics, vol.25(2): 137-43. A pro tanto reason is one that is morally justifiable, but which may not take precedence over other, more important reasons. 170 Chapter Five – An overview of enhancement not strictly related to the goal of medicine as promoting equality of opportunity.37 He claims that enhancements will: (i) enhance the results of education; (ii) close the gap between ‘poor’ and ‘normal’ students; and (iii) contribute to social productivity. As all of these reasons have value attached to them, there might well be some compelling reasons to justify enhancement in this way, even if it did depart from the standard justification for the importance of health care. However in such a delicate reproductive and parenting decision, no moral requirement of this kind should translate to state-imposed restrictions on parents’ freedoms.

If a strict benefit/harm calculation were made, then (as will be seen below) potential problems with enhancing intelligence would probably make for a longer list than its benefits. However it is still important to keep these benefits in mind when considering the potential problems of enhancement. A rationalization of enhancement based upon claims of justice seems to be particularly important, as if a means of enhancing intelligence can be found that is practically and economically accessible to a large number of people, then this might provide compelling reasons to utilise this technology.

Some general arguments against enhancement

Pursuing optimal intellectual development using genetic means raises several problems. The first concern I’ll consider, applying the ‘disability rights critique,’38 is that as society is over-concerned with ‘normality’, persons who are below any socially defined norm are being devalued. So, any genetic interventions (particularly those for enhancement) become exclusionary and will lead to a society where anyone not of ‘normal’ intelligence will be denied fair access to social resources, or will be ignored as a person of moral status deserving of respect.39 Indeed, Vehmas has already suggested that infants or children of low intellectual capacity are systematically

37 See, eg: Daniels, N., (1994) ‘The Genome Project, Individual Differences, and Just Health Care’, in T.F. Murphy and M.A. Lappé, (Eds). Justice and The Human Genome Project. Berkeley: University of California Press, pp110-32. 38 See, for example: Parens, E. and Asch, A., (1999) ‘The Disability Rights Critique of Prenatal Genetic Testing: Reflections and Recommendations’, Hastings Center Report, vol.29(5): S1-S22. 39 Goodey, C., (1996) ‘Genetic Markers for Intelligence’, Bulletin of Medical Ethics, (126): 13-16. 171 Chapter Five – An overview of enhancement discriminated against and devalued by bioethicists.40 He claims that this reflects a general ‘intelligist’ notion, whereby persons of relatively normal intelligence are considered as morally better than persons with low intellectual capacity.

Whilst it would be a mistake (and a grave injustice) to exclude people on the basis of their intelligence, or claim that they do not deserve respect as persons, it is also important to question whether this will necessarily result from the utilisation of enhancement technologies to increase intelligence. Although enhancement has not been conceived merely to end suffering, any claim that enhancement will devalue persons would require empirical support. While the history of genetics is peppered with discriminatory interventions, there is now (due to the disability rights movement) a much greater appreciation of the respect that must be accorded to all persons, no matter their attributes.

It would be a further mistake to argue that increasing intelligence necessarily discounts the personhood of those with lower intelligence.41 What is being devalued here in our enthusiasm for enhancement, if anything, is low intelligence per se, not people with low intelligence.

Another argument against enhancement is that many supporters of disability rights also claim that rather than preventing or curing disability, we should alter social structures to better accommodate persons with a disability. However, as Buchanan et al point out, it will be difficult to see how we could introduce such a social infrastructure to meet all ability levels equally.42 They consider the example of a card game, where the goal is for persons from a wide range of age groups to be able to participate. The rules of the game here represent the social infrastructure that we would need to meet so that all ‘can play’. If a game such as contract bridge is chosen, then some will obviously be left out. Another option is to choose a different game, with a less demanding infrastructure. Everyone would be able to effectively

40 Vehmas, S., (1999) ‘Discriminative Assumptions of Utilitarian Bioethics Regarding Individuals with Intellectual Disabilities’, Disability and Society, vol.14(1): 37-52. 41 See, for example: Harris, J., (1998) ‘Should we Attempt to Eradicate Disability?’ in E. Morscher, O. Neumaier, and P. Simons, (Eds). Applied Ethics in a Troubled World. Boston, MA: Kluwer Academic, pp105-14. 42 Buchanan, Brock, Daniels, and Wikler, From Chance to Choice: Genetics and Justice, p288-89. 172 Chapter Five – An overview of enhancement participate if ‘go fish’ were played. However, this would require the loss of the value of a more complex social infrastructure, as in Western society, we have a social framework which is contingent upon complex legal and political rights and obligations for individuals. Within this framework, people thrive when they are able to develop complex skills. Yet, we do need to be aware that such a framework is also a powerful instrument for exclusion.

A second important class of concerns with the enhancement of intelligence is that it could cause harm to the child as a result of labelling. Supporters of this argument claim that in enhancing their children, parents would effectively ‘reject’ their child’s potential to become an un-enhanced person. Perring, for example, in discussing Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, has summarised this concern as follows:

[T]here is a general worry that labelling a child as having a mental illness, and letting the child know this diagnosis, will itself have a damaging effect upon the child, so he or she starts to think of him or herself as having a problem or being ill, and so he or she will continue to think and behave such a way in the future.43

It is not difficult to imagine that an enhanced person (whether a child or an adult) might fall victim to this kind of labelling. People might presume, if they did not choose to be enhanced, that they were rejected as the person they ‘originally’ were. This could lead to feelings of self-doubt, or a continual need to ‘prove oneself’.

The risk of labelling is, of course, something worthy of concern. However, it is also important that its significance does not become disproportionate to the current experiences of children. All children are subjected to labelling throughout their development. This labelling can be in respect of their interests, talents or health. Sometimes it can be valuable, as it contributes to our sense of uniqueness and individuality as persons. As a child, I was taken to a specialist in height, as my parents were interested in giving me growth hormone due to my short stature. Although these visits effectively contributed to my being labelled as a ‘short’ person, I didn’t experience this negatively. Rather, I enjoyed being separated from the ‘norm’; this contributed to my identity as a person who would not have to feel uncomfortable

43 Perring, C., (1997) ‘Medicating Children: The Case of Ritalin’, Bioethics, vol.11(3/4): 228-40, p233. 173 Chapter Five – An overview of enhancement asking strangers to reach items on the top shelf at the supermarket. Concerns with labelling suggest that we do need to be careful how we label children, but this does not suggest that labelling in general should be avoided, particularly if labelling is something that could ultimately benefit the child.

A third issue with enhancements of intelligence is that this will be self-defeating, as they will only be desirable as long as they can confer a competitive advantage. Proponents of this argument claim that ultimately, if everyone were able to have his or her intelligence enhanced, then this will become self-defeating. They argue that the same amount of resources (such as higher education, or skilled jobs) will remain available, whilst more and more people will have to compete for them.

To appreciate this, imagine a world in which parents are able to genetically enhance their child’s intelligence. Most of these parents would have chosen to enhance their child to gain a competitive advantage for them. They would have desired for their children to be relatively better, rather than choosing intelligence because they value it inherently. Higher intelligence may help their child to obtain social resources such as education, income, housing and consumer goods, which could contribute to a better quality of life. According to Kavka:

[A]s a competitive good, greater intelligence is valued partly for its own sake as a positional good (i.e., for moving up on the intelligence ladder compared to one’s fellows) and as an instrument for competing for other goods such as wealth and career opportunities. But if very many parents were to exercise to option of increasing their offspring’s intelligence genetically, it would not have this effect for most. For these children will be competing for intelligence rankings, and for the jobs and wealth made possible by high intelligence, against many others who have been given similar “intelligence boosts.”44

Kavka notes that this could even create a cost to society, as any net social advantages would be lost due to increased competitiveness. Further, enhancing intelligence could actually create new problems, such as increased anxiety.

44 Kavka, G.S., (1994) ‘Upside Risks: Social Consequences of Beneficial Biotechnology’, in C.F. Cranor, (Ed). Are Genes Us? The Social Consequences of the New Genetics. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, pp155-79, at p164-5. 174 Chapter Five – An overview of enhancement

This objection is not a persuasive one. To be sure, if the only reason to choose intelligence were for its competitive value, then this would naturally decrease the validity of parents’ reasons for choosing to enhance their children. However, as I explained in Chapter Three, intelligence is valuable for reasons other than its competitive advantages. That is, on several different views on what makes a good life, intelligence can contribute to maximising the amount of good that a person can experience. Further, enriching intelligence may well allow for greater benefits to society, or flourishing in human skills and talents in general.45 Intelligence is not a positional good, akin to competitive sport, where a win for one necessarily implies a loss for others. There are many more satisfying jobs for people of high intelligence than there are Olympic gold medals for talented athletes. Additionally, it is not obvious how higher intelligence could lead to resources costs (where a beneficial increase in a trait on an individual level causes a deficit in other resources on a social level) such as an increase in a trait like height would.46 It is fairly unlikely that enhancement technologies will allow for uniformity in mental abilities across a diverse population.

A fourth concern is that the availability of this technology will lead to parents being coerced into utilising enhancements. That is, their ability to decide rationally about enhancement will be impaired by dominant social forces influencing them to choose enhancement. Regarding enhancement of cognition, it is important to note that, especially in the United States, there are reports of some schools threatening parents to medicate their children with Ritalin, or be faced with the child’s expulsion.47 If parents are subject to similar coercive practices to encourage them to enhance their children’s intelligence, then this would provide a strong reason not to develop enhancement technology.

45 See, eg: Glover, J., (1984) What Sort of People Should There Be? Harmondsworth: Penguin, p179-81. Glover argues increased intelligence will increase our understanding of the universe. 46For a discussion of potential social costs, see: Kavka, ‘Upside Risks: Social Consequences of Beneficial Biotechnology’. 47 See, eg: Diller, L., Just Say Yes to Ritalin! Available at: http://www.docdiller.com (Accessed 10 September 2001). I discuss coercion in more detail in the next chapter. 175 Chapter Five – An overview of enhancement

Thomas Murray canvasses this issue in his account of the use of drugs in sport.48 In providing an ethical critique of drugs in sport, he argues that the only sound reason for rejecting drug use (besides the risk to individuals) is that its use is coercive – that it offers ‘free choice under pressure.’49 Whenever people are in a competitive situation and there is a means available by which people can gain an advantage, then there is a risk of coercion. Murray claims that:

There is, then, an inherent coerciveness present in these situations: when some choose to do what gives them a competitive edge, others will be pressed to do likewise, or resign themselves to either accepting a competitive disadvantage, or leaving the endeavour entirely.50

This potential threat to the freedom to choose enhancement is very important. However, again we need to think carefully about what we already accept in society – what concern is there, for example, over giving children access to computers to gain a competitive advantage?51 This potential disparity in values may mean that it is arbitrary to draw the line at coercion for genetic enhancement of intelligence, ‘just because it helps children in a different way,’52 although as I discussed in the previous chapter, the means involved may be of relevance.

A fifth concern with enhancing intelligence is to what degree we should allow intelligence to be enhanced. As yet, a maximal ‘level’ of intelligence has not been determined. And, as Whitehouse et al point out, there may not even be such a level.53 Yet, it might be a mistake to assume that intelligence should continually be enhanced and enhanced to continually higher extremes. To appreciate this, imagine that intelligence (or memory) is a little like hearing. If our hearing is enhanced to levels

48 Murray, T.H., (1983) ‘The Coercive Power of Drugs in Sports’, Hastings Center Report, vol.13(4): 24- 30; and Murray, T.H., (1984) ‘Drugs, Sports, and Ethics’, in T.H. Murray, W. Gaylin, and R. Macklin, (Eds). Feeling Good and Doing Better: Ethics and Non-Therapeutic Drug Use. Clifton, NJ: Humana Press, pp107-26. 49 Murray, ‘Drugs, Sports, and Ethics’, quoted by Kramer, R., (1993) Listening to Prozac. New York: Viking Penguin, p273. 50 Murray, ‘Drugs, Sports, and Ethics’, p116. 51 Still, it is important that the potential for coercion is recognised and mitigated. 52 Perring, ‘Medicating Children: The Case of Ritalin’, p239. 53 Whitehouse, P.J., Juengst, E., Mehlman, M., and Murray, T.H., (1997) 'Enhancing Cognition in the Intellectually Intact', The Hastings Center Report, vol.27(3): 14-22. 176 Chapter Five – An overview of enhancement beyond that currently present in society, problems may emerge. First, we may never be able to ‘switch off’ or ‘tune out’ our hearing, subjecting us to insistent, unwanted intrusions. Enhancing memory also has the potential to become like this. Most of us, I’m sure, would have memories or experiences that we would rather forget. We are able to do this most of the time. But what if it became impossible for us to block out memories, our minds filling with ‘noise’ created by a litany of memories (even about the most mundane things) we are unable to let go? Here, enhanced memory may literally be like having ‘tinnitus of the mind’. It would be much preferable in this situation to merely be able to enhance memory to a certain degree, so that it can effectively interact with our other capacities.54

A second reason why enhancing intelligence beyond particular levels may not be wise is that unless society could radically change to meet the needs of the highly intelligent, then they will have been endowed with a capability that is incompatible with regular social life. We have already seen in Chapter Three that such a problem might exist with those who are highly gifted – contrary to those who are moderately intelligent, the highly intelligent may be at higher risk of social disturbances and are less likely to achieve what most of us would see as a good life.55 One of the main reasons suggested for this occurrence is that society simply does not have the means or resources to appropriately respond to and support the needs of this group of people. Unless this was to change, we may find that in enhancing intelligence to very high levels in our children, we are actually compounding this already delicate problem.

Another argument against genetic enhancement is that people’s genetic makeup should be ‘left to chance’ or the ‘genetic lottery’, rather than being interfered with by their parents. According to Ronald Dworkin:

[The]crucial boundary between chance and choice is the spine of our ethics and our morality, and any serious shift in that boundary is seriously dislocating.56

54 Brock has also made a similar point. Brock, D.W., (1998) ‘Enhancements of Human Function: Some Distinctions for Policymakers’, in E. Parens, (Ed). Enhancing Human Traits: Ethical and Social Implications. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, pp48-69, p59. 55 Leta Hollingworth coined the concept of ‘optimal intelligence’ to describe this problem. 56 Dworkin, R., ‘Justice and Fate: An Introductory Paper to Genetics, Identity and Justice’ 1999, Available at: http://www.21stcenturytrust.org/genetics.doc (Accessed 10 August, 2001). 177 Chapter Five – An overview of enhancement

Here, Dworkin is warning society not to proceed with unnecessary genetic interventions, as he is concerned that morality could be threatened if we deliberately allow things to become matters of choice, when they were previously left to chance alone. Thomas Schelling supports Dworkin’s concern:

There are some things… that it is a great relief to be unable to control. The lottery distributes arbitrary justice indiscriminately, but it may beat having to discriminate.57

Whilst their concerns are certainly not trivial, our current ‘lack of control’ in parental choice about intelligence is actually fairly questionable. There are several examples that suggest that a person’s genetic makeup is not determined entirely by chance. To give an example, parents have been shown to ‘assortatively’ partner each other; that is, intelligent people tend to partner other intelligent people.58 Additionally, parents seeking donor gametes for reproduction will often request information about the health and characteristics of the gamete donor.59

Therefore, although Dworkin and Schelling would advocate that it is valuable to maintain the ‘genetic lottery’, the actual behaviour of parents currently seems to imply the opposite. This suggests that the value of chance alone cannot be a reason not to offer extra choices to parents.

This discussion highlights that there are several general concerns with enhancement, all of which are relevant to enhancements of intelligence. These concerns will be drawn upon again to generate some constraints upon the enhancement of intelligence in section 5.4 below. I have also summarised these concerns in Table 5-3 on the following page.

Dworkin discusses the intrinsic value of chance, and warns of the danger of removing the genetic lottery. 57 Schelling, T., (1978) 'Choosing our Children's Genes', (in his) Micromotives and Macrobehaviour. New York: Norton, pp193-210, p203. 58 ‘Assortative mating’ refers to the tendency for people to select a partner according to particular characteristics they have. The correlation between partners for IQ is approximately 0.33 – 0.40. See, for example: Jensen, A., (1978) ‘Genetic and Behavioral Effects of Nonrandom Mating’, in R.T.O. Osborne, C.E. Noble, and N. Weyl, (Eds). Human Variation: The Biopsychology of Age, Race, and Sex. New York: Academic Press, pp51-105; Bouchard, T.J. and McGue, M., (1981) ‘Familial Studies of Intelligence: a Review’, Science, vol.212: 1055-59. 59 See, for example: Scheib, J., (1994) ‘Sperm Donor Selection and the Psychology of Female Mate Choice’, Ethology and Sociobiology, vol.15: 113-29. 178 Chapter Five – An overview of enhancement

Table 5-3: Some arguments against Genetic Enhancement

Enhancements of intelligence: • Are recognising an insidious trend towards maximisation in our society; • Show an overconcern with being ‘normal’, which will lead to discrimination; • Will cause psychological harm to the enhanced child by labelling them as ‘defective’; • Will be competitively sought and so will become self-defeating; • Will cause problems for parents, such as coercion and increased responsibility; • Will harm children by making them ‘too smart’; • Would be better ‘left to chance’; • Are unnatural or artificial; are an example of ‘Playing God’; and are a eugenic practice.60

Four issues of significance

Having examined some of the general concerns with enhancement, I will now consider four issues in particular. The reason for selecting these four issues for a more detailed analysis is that they all suggest some kind of moral ‘dividing line’, whereby a distinction between a permissible and an impermissible use of enhancement technology may be made out. As mentioned above, these four issues are the treatment/enhancement distinction, the significance of means to enhancement, the role of the non-identity problem and the significance of considerations of justice.

I argue that these four putative distinctions all have some moral significance, yet that none is capable of providing a moral boundary between the permissible and impermissible. These four issues do, however, contribute to the constraints upon enhancement that I draw together in section 5.4.

60 I do not consider the arguments that enhancements are artificial or are ‘Playing God’. For a critique of these and other general statements against genetic technology, see: Boone, C.K., (1998) ‘Bad Axioms in Genetic Engineering’, in G.E. Pence, (Ed). Classic Works in Medical Ethics. Boston: McGraw Hill, pp315-23. I have already discussed the objection that enhancements will be eugenic in Chapter Two. 179 Chapter Five – An overview of enhancement

Treatment is permissible; Enhancement is not

Traditionally, the boundary between acceptable and unacceptable uses of genetic interventions has been between those that are therapeutic and non-therapeutic, or between ‘treatments’ and ‘enhancements’. On this view, an intervention that is a treatment is acceptable, whilst any enhancement is not.61 Enhancement interventions are said to be problematic because they are aimed at the improvement of something already within the normal range.

As genetic research proceeds from investigating typically catastrophic medical conditions to diseases or behavioural traits which have a wider distribution and which lack discrete manifestations of behaviour, it is questionable whether this distinction will stand up. Indeed, some argue that the treatment/enhancement distinction is no longer a reliable tool for determining what is permissible and impermissible in genetic interventions. Reasons for rejecting the distinction include claims that it is difficult to use and is subject to many exceptions (therapeutic abortion, for example, which is not a ‘treatment’ in the traditional sense). The distinction also presents hard cases, such as determining whether short stature due to inheritance is different to short stature due to a growth hormone deficiency.62 Another reason for rejecting the distinction is that its supporters would logically have to reject all types of preventative medicine, as this involves providing health care to someone who is not ‘ill’ in the typical sense.63

Several alternatives that sidestep the treatment/enhancement distinction have been suggested. Singer and Wells, for example, suggest that the distinction should be avoided altogether. Instead, they claim we should recognise that:

The acceptability of genetic engineering depends not on whether it falls under the label ‘therapeutic’ rather than ‘eugenic’, but on the ends towards which the engineering is directed. When the goal is something that would indisputably

61 See, for example: Anderson, W.F., (1989) ‘Human Gene Therapy: Why Draw a Line?’ Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, vol.14: 681-90. 62 See, for example: Holtug, N., (1993) ‘Human Gene Therapy: Down the Slippery Slope?’ Bioethics, vol.7: 402-19 and Daniels, N., (2000) ‘Normal Functioning and the Treatment-Enhancement Distinction’, Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, vol.9(3): 309-22, p309. Note however that Daniels ultimately supports the distinction. 63 See, eg: Walters, L.R. and Palmer, J.G., (1997) The Ethics of Human Gene Therapy. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 180 Chapter Five – An overview of enhancement

improve the human condition, safe and successful genetic engineering would be a good thing.64

Alternatively, Holtug, in discussing gene therapy and slippery slope arguments,65 suggests that we could decide on a ‘line’ between treatments and enhancements purely for pragmatic reasons.66 However, in doing this, he admits that there is a good chance that we could be wrong. His other suggestion is that we could form a more tolerant conception of what disease is, which could encompass preventative strategies. However, he again admits that this would be difficult.

Despite these criticisms of the distinction between treatments and enhancements and the offers of different alternative approaches, several theorists claim that there can be at least a ‘limited’ defence of the distinction, which can be used as a moral ‘warning flag’ but for the hardest cases, which should be analysed contextually. This limited distinction is not as harsh as the traditional view of the distinction; there is scope for ‘exceptions’ and blurring of lines.

For example, Daniels has recently offered such a limited defence of the distinction between treatments and enhancements.67 He proposes a limited distinction between treatments and enhancements, which would offer a more flexible approach to hard cases than the ‘harder’, more traditional distinction. Daniels argues that although in most circumstances, the distinction between treatments and enhancements should stand, at times interventions that would ordinarily be termed ‘enhancements’ may be morally justified, provided that the goal of health care remains that of enabling

64 Singer, P. and Wells, D., (1984) The Reproduction Revolution: New Ways of Making Babies. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p184. 65 A slippery slope argument is invoked with the following kind of claim: If we do A now, which could foreseeably lead to B in the future, and B is not morally acceptable, then we should refrain from A now. For a review, see: McGleenan, T., (1995) ‘Human Gene Therapy and Slippery Slope Arguments’, Journal of Medical Ethics, vol.21: 350-55. 66 Holtug, ‘Human Gene Therapy: Down the Slippery Slope?’ 67 Daniels, N., (1994) ‘The Genome Project, Individual Differences, and Just Health Care’, in T.F. Murphy and M.A. Lappé, (Eds). Justice and The Human Genome Project. Berkeley: University of California Press, pp110-32; and Daniels, ‘Normal Functioning and the Treatment-Enhancement Distinction’. 181 Chapter Five – An overview of enhancement everyone to function at some objectively ‘normal’ level.68 ‘Disease’ would remain the main reason to justify treatment. That is, an individual’s need for treatment should be based upon the impact of her impairment on normal function and the impact of this upon her opportunities. This means that an intervention may be permissible even if it isn’t alleviating what may be typically understood as a disease condition, such as vaccination. However, he also notes that the distinction will not always show what is permissible and impermissible, or what is obligatory or non-obligatory.

Daniels recognises that his theory of a limited distinction does not provide ‘clean lines’ as to when and how the distinction between treatment and enhancement should be applied. Additionally, there is still considerable controversy on how ‘normal’ should be defined in society – John Harris has pointed out how much normality can change over time and between cultures,69 and Glenn McGee has criticized attempts to specify norms when discussing enhancements.70 Moreover, Whitehouse et al have claimed that this approach will not be helpful when applied to issues of cognitive enhancement, as there is no consensus on what species typical functioning is for cognition.71 In response to such claims, Daniels states that it is better to have a ‘fuzzy baseline’ than no baseline at all.

Consider these treatment/enhancement arguments in the context of this thesis. Whilst they are all interesting and important, none seems likely to assist in answering the question of whether enhancements of intelligence are ethically justifiable. The traditional ‘hard’ distinction is overly dogmatic,72 yet Daniels’ limited distinction would probably not be helpful to determine whether an enhancement of intelligence is justifiable unless it was to help a person into the ‘normal range’ of intelligence.

68 The reasons he gives for this are that we live in a climate of limited resources, where we will not ever be able to treat all disease, and that society already demands interventions that are not treatments, such as access to abortion for the sake of equality. 69 Harris, J., (1993) ‘Is Gene Therapy a Form of Eugenics?’ Bioethics, vol.7(2/3): 178-87. 70 McGee, G., (1997) The Perfect Baby: A Pragmatic Approach to Genetics. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, Chapter 7. 71 Whitehouse, Juengst, Mehlman, and Murray, ‘Enhancing Cognition in the Intellectually Intact’. 72 Whilst usual conceptions of the augmentation of intelligence will fall fairly cleanly into the ‘enhancement’ category, there are bound to be circumstances where augmenting it can be considered a ‘treatment’, such as using the methods of ‘enhancement’ I have described above to assist children whose intelligence is below-average. 182 Chapter Five – An overview of enhancement

However, there are dangers in abandoning the distinction altogether (perhaps by adopting a stance akin to Holtug’s suggestions), as this could easily lead to arbitrary decision-making as to the acceptability or otherwise of a particular enhancement. The distinction between treatments and enhancements seems to have some value as a benchmark, even as a way of using moral intuition to indicate that some further discussion and debate is required before moving forward with enhancements of intelligence.

Therefore, a formulation of the treatment/enhancement distinction such as that offered by Daniels does have some value. This distinction should be a valid consideration when evaluating issues such as resource allocation to enhancements (assuming they are not merely offered on the free market, which is discussed in more detail below). That is, the distinction could offer a ‘moral warning flag’ upon enhancements of intelligence.73 This would involve recognition that this kind of technology is outside the usual gamut of health care practice and may not attract the usual priorities that other kinds of health care do. However, this should not be the only consideration by which to determine the acceptability or otherwise of enhancing intelligence.

What is important is that recognition of each situation’s context (alluded to by Daniels) is a very important aspect of making these very difficult decisions. The distinction between treatments and enhancements, to be practically useful, must be able to move from the objective to the subjective, as subjective elements will usually have an important impact upon whether a particular enhancement will be acceptable or not.

Yet this fact that enhancing intelligence seems to be a legitimate goal within some spheres (such as education) and not others (such as health care), raises an interesting question. An alternative way to investigating a benchmark for acceptability of a particular enhancement may better lie in a consideration of the means, where the

73 This is akin to ideas of moral repugnance. A ‘moral warning flag’, like moral repugnance, does not provide an indication that something is wrong and should not be done. Rather, a warning flag indicates that further critical analysis of a negative intuition is necessary, to examine the facts of a specific case and come to a position. 183 Chapter Five – An overview of enhancement different focus of each way of enhancing intelligence may inform about its ethical acceptability.

Enhancement is an unacceptable means of increasing intelligence

It seems as if to many, ‘means do matter’ when considering enhancements. That is, genetic interventions to enhance intelligence constitute a new means (when compared to something like education) and so can be considered separately, thus providing a moral dividing line between the permissible and impermissible. Can such a distinction be upheld?

There are three broad classes of means to increase intelligence: environmental interventions, which include education and psychometric interventions; genetic interventions, which will involve introducing alterations to DNA; and psychopharmacological interventions, which will involve the use of drugs to change brain chemistry. These interventions could introduce either permanent or temporary changes in a person’s range of cognitive abilities.

In the first instance, it seems as if these three classes, particularly those that are based on a technological intervention, are easily distinguishable from each other. Yet several theorists have claimed (reflecting differences in ethical beliefs) that the significance of these means does not matter, so long as they are aimed at the same end. Parens, although not supporting this argument, has phrased it as follows:

We’ve always used means A to achieve end A; means B also aims to achieve end A; therefore means B is morally unproblematic.74

John Harris, for example, has alluded to such a claim. In Clones, Genes and Immortality, he describes a school where an enriched learning program has been developed to ensure improved mental capacity in all students. He suggests that it would be rational and logical for all of us to want to send our children there. Then, supposing that ‘biotechnological processes’ could provide the same type of change, he suggests that it might still be reasonable to want this:

74 Parens, E., (1998) ‘Is Better Always Good? The Enhancement Project’, The Hastings Center Report, vol.28(1): S1-S17, p12. 184 Chapter Five – An overview of enhancement

Our question is this: if the goal of enhanced intelligence… is something that we might strive to produce through education…, why should we not produce these goals through genetic engineering? If we could engineer enhanced intelligence… into the embryo, should we not do so? If these are legitimate aims of education could they be illegitimate as the aims of medical, as opposed to educational, science?75

Later, he also argues:

And if, as we have asked before, it is not wrong to attempt to improve something like intelligence by education, why should it be wrong to attempt to improve it by genetic manipulation?76

The four authors of From Chance to Choice also question the apparent over- emphasis on means when they ask why pursuing the best should not also lend itself to genetic means.77 Recognising the intersecting roles of genetics and environment in human development, they claim that although a genetic intervention may be perceived as changing a child fundamentally (such that she will develop differently to how she would otherwise have been); a contrast between means is actually hard to make out. Bringing out a child’s best will always involve modifying and actually shaping her phenotype, which is what virtually every parental intervention will do. They argue that:

75 Harris, J., (1998) Clones, Genes and Immortality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p173. 76 Ibid, p203. 77 It is interesting to note that one of the authors, Dan Brock, has made a slightly stronger claim about the significance of means in a different paper. See: Brock, D.W., (1998) ‘Enhancements of Human Function: Some Distinctions for Policymakers’, in E. Parens, (Ed). Enhancing Human Traits: Ethical and Social Implications. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, pp48-69. Here, he argues that: In many valued human activities, the means of acquiring the capacities required for the activity are as much valued and admired as the performance of the activity. They are a part of the very definition of the activity, and transforming them transforms, and can devalue, the activity itself - p58. 185 Chapter Five – An overview of enhancement

There is no pre-existing (“essential”) “best” in the child that is brought out by parental manipulation of environmental causes; such manipulation has enormous effects in shaping phenotype.78

Buchanan et al are rejecting the notion that a person’s potential should be seen as something to unfold from inherent biological architecture. So a genetic intervention is not creating something new (as opposed to the ‘natural’ default), it is steering a child down a different path than another alternative intervention would have. So if one is allowing for the ‘best’ phenotype, then why not ‘add to their arsenal of methods whatever genetic interventions may make it easier to accomplish some of those goals?’79

Despite the intuitive strength of these defences of the idea that ‘means don’t matter’, several theorists have claimed that they do. Parens summarises why he thinks means are significant:

[M]eans make an obvious moral difference when a given socially valued activity is predicated upon their use… Even when two different means are “in themselves” morally unproblematic, one means might not be a part of the definition of the activity, and thus using it would undermine the activity.80

That is, if any activity that is valued by society is valued because of a particular means involved in achieving a particular end, then to use a different means to that end (which could bypass an important part of that activity) could decrease the value of the activity itself or the achievement gained from it. He gives the example of a person winning a competitive chess tournament because he enhanced his memory with a drug prior to the game (which bypasses an important aspect of the game of chess), as opposed to someone taking a cognitive enhancer to assist her to remember (and thus better enjoy) poetry.

Whitehouse et al agree. They claim that distinguishing between acceptable and unacceptable means should involve a consideration of ‘the game’ and how drastically

78 Buchanan, A., Brock, D.W., Daniels, N., and Wikler, D., (2000) From Chance to Choice: Genetics and Justice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p160. 79 Ibid. 80 Parens, ‘Is Better Always Good? The Enhancement Project’, p12. 186 Chapter Five – An overview of enhancement the new means would affect it.81 It is necessary to see how the new means will affect the significance of the endeavour. Completing the Boston marathon on rollerblades, for example, would be an unacceptable enhancement.

In also defending the distinction between various means to a similar end, Cole- Turner offers a similar argument.82 He claims that means can be an important part of human interactions, such as parental affection. Providing a good education and diet for one’s child is not simply a ‘means to an end’ – it is part of the richness of the parental and family experience, part of a parent’s love of and fostering respect for their child.

Another important reason why means may be significant is that the person subjected to the various means could have a radically different experience depending upon the means used. Diller, although not supporting this idea, discusses the concern that resorting to a technologically derived means could lead to an inadequacy in feelings in the child who is given it. Achievement subsequent to taking the drug, as opposed to relying on our ‘inherent resources’, could affect our feelings of competence and ‘biologic integrity’.83 I discuss this issue further in my discussion of enhancement and authenticity in the next chapter.

Consider how these concerns would apply to somatic enhancements of intelligence (such as a cognitive-enhancing drug), as opposed to a smaller class size at school, both of which could have the effect of improving children’s achievement. Parens is concerned that an enhancement may be outside the ‘rules of the game’ – that means make an obvious difference when a particular socially valued activity is predicated upon their use. However this is problematic, as where intelligence is concerned, ‘the game’ itself is hard to define. According to Whitehouse et al:

Much of life is not so clearly a competitive game played with specific, explicitly identified skills at stake. In the absence of clear rules of engagement, it is not as

81 Whitehouse, Juengst, Mehlman, and Murray, ‘Enhancing Cognition in the Intellectually Intact’, p18. 82 Cole-Turner, R., (1999) ‘Do Means Matter?’ in E. Parens, (Ed). Enhancing Human Traits: Ethical and Social Implications. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, pp151-61, p153-156. 83 Diller, ‘The Run on Ritalin: Attention Deficit Disorder and Stimulant Treatment in the 1990s’, p16. 187 Chapter Five – An overview of enhancement

easy to explain why, in the context of career-building, love or politics, the advantages provided by cognitive enhancement would be unfair or immoral to enjoy.84

Cognitive skill is something that can be valued over such a wide range of human endeavours that we can’t possibly say that all endeavours can only be achieved by one means. Especially if an enhancing intervention has been given very early in life (and is permanent), then the charge that one is using an inappropriate means for a particular activity, when they are merely using all their faculties in their learning and experience, seems a little far-fetched. Therefore Parens’ argument may serve as an effective warning flag, but it may not be able to be used to voice concerns about a wide-ranging enhancement such as cognition. The ‘rules of the game’ argument may only be able to be applied where there is a defined game to be played. However, this is not to argue that the process and experience of being placed in a smaller class at school is not different to taking a cognitive-enhancing drug – these may well lead to different experiences.

Cole-Turner’s concerns about the value of particular means to human interactions and the richness of people’s experiences are also valid and appropriate. We do need to ensure that if any new means of optimising intelligence are introduced, that this does not render existing means of optimising intelligence, such as small class sizes, or parents reading to their children, as obsolete. The values that these means have, such as their contribution to parent-child relationships, should not be lost. Neither should complex social problems be ignored by providing all children with enhancers, a charge that is currently being made against the use of Ritalin, particularly in the United States. Yet although this is an important concern, it also seems to expect too much of enhancements of intelligence. A genetic intervention or a drug developed from genetic research is highly unlikely to render children so independent that they are able to function without such important parental and educational interventions. Rather, they are likely to assist the child in their normal course of learning and development.

Therefore, whilst the means of enhancement for some traits are easily distinguishable (as might be the case with drug assisted sporting achievement); the

84 Whitehouse et al, ‘Enhancing Cognition in the Intellectually Intact’, p19. 188 Chapter Five – An overview of enhancement case is not so clear-cut for a broad trait such as intelligence. Intelligence is a skill that applies in a much broader context, which affects so many more of life’s activities, than does sporting ability.

These claims tend towards a similar position as that which was argued for the distinction between treatments and enhancements above. The fact that a putative distinction between means to augment intelligence can be made out does not indicate that this should also be the distinction between permissible and impermissible enhancements of intelligence.85

Enhancement and the ‘non-identity’ problem

A third issue relevant to the debate over genetic enhancement concerns how this debate might be affected by the ‘non-identity’ problem, which takes the following form. Derek Parfit has famously discussed the example of attempting to persuade a 14-year-old girl (presumably without adequate emotional or financial resources) to delay having a child. Someone might say to her:

You should think not only of yourself, but also of your child. It will be worse for him [sic] if you have him now.86

If the girl decides to have her child now, people would probably be critical of her decision, as she has deliberately bought about a life in which someone may be harmed.87 However, as Parfit points out, it will not be ‘worse for’ that child if the 14- year-old girl chooses to have a child now, as if she waited, that child will not exist. Even if a different child in the future would have a greater probability of having a

85 An unresolved issue about the significance of any means to enhance intelligence is the potential effect that an ‘artificial’ means could have for the recipient. This is particularly because of the focus on children here, whom will carry their enhancements with them through the identity- forming period of adolescence. It is incredibly important that any new means of optimising intelligence do not cause children to form self-conceptions based on the idea that their achievements are due to whatever biological enhancements they were given. I discuss this issue further in the next chapter. 86 Parfit, D., (1984) Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p358-9. Further philosophical discussions of this problem can be found in: Hanser, M., (1990) ‘Harming Future People’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol.19: 47-70; and Woodward, J., (1986) ‘The Non-Identity Problem’, Ethics, vol.96: 804-31. 87 Traditional notions of harm look at the individual before and after the putative harm has occurred. An individual is harmed only if they are worse-off in the latter condition. 189 Chapter Five – An overview of enhancement good life, this does not mean that the child born now has been directly harmed as a result of his mother’s choice, so long as his life is worth living, as his very existence is dependant on his mother’s decision to conceive now.

This scenario leads to an apparent stalemate. The non-identity problem seems to suggest that to compellingly argue the 14-year-old girl has caused harm to her child, the circumstances of that child’s life must be horrible indeed, because the alternative for that child (of his mother delaying pregnancy) is non-existence.88 In fact, any child born from the 14-year-old’s decision should be glad that her mother had made such a decision – for she would not exist otherwise.

This problem will have repercussions for the relative acceptability of some of the means of enhancement I discussed above, namely genetic selection compared to pre- birth genetic enhancements. Consider these two methods of intervention again:

The Genetic Selection Case: A couple decide to undergo IVF. In this process, six embryos are created. As this couple values intelligence, they choose an embryo that has a high potential intelligence, but which, because of the combination of genes they have selected, also has a predisposition to anxiety. They implant this embryo, which results in a son, whom they call Josh.

The Genetic Enhancement Case: The same couple now wish to have another child. This time, they opt instead for germ-line enhancement of an embryo that they previously have had frozen, in order to have a child with a high probability of being intelligent. They have certain genes predisposing the embryo to high intelligence spliced in. This embryo also gives them a son, whom they call Ben.

However, the couple didn’t realise that some of the genes influencing intelligence are pleiotropic, predisposing anxiety.

88 This point has been made by, among others: Steinbock, B., and McClamrock, R., (1994) ‘When is Birth Unfair to the Child?’ Hastings Center Report, vol.24(6): 15-21. 190 Chapter Five – An overview of enhancement

Unfortunately, despite the couple’s best intentions to optimise their children’s future options by enhancing their intelligence, both Ben and Josh develop anxiety.89

At first instance, it seems fair to say that both Josh and Ben have suffered a similar harm. However, there are some reasons why they might not have suffered equal harm, as there is an important difference between them. Namely, in the genetic enhancement (Ben’s) case, the enhanced child and the non-enhanced child would be the same person, but leading two different possible lives. In the genetic selection (Josh’s) case, the selected child and a child without anxiety would have to be different children, as it is extremely unlikely that the same sperm and egg would have met in a natural conception event.

Consider Ben’s enhancement case. Here, the same person (Ben) will exist no matter whether his parents decide to proceed with the enhancement. If Ben is enhanced and then develops anxiety, then Ben has been harmed by his parent’s decision. Now consider Josh. Has Josh been harmed by selection? In Josh’s selection case, he would not have existed but for his parent’s decision to select the embryo that he developed from. If his parents had not undergone genetic selection, then it is very unlikely that the same sperm and egg would have met during ‘natural’ procreation; and this embryo would have given rise to a different person. Hence, Josh has not been harmed by his parent’s choice. Josh is not worse-off than ‘he would otherwise have been, as he wouldn’t otherwise have been.’90 The only exception to this scenario would be were Josh’s life not worth living, which does not seem to be the case here. Josh’s life, although he does suffer from anxiety, is still worth living.

This problem arises because harm is usually viewed from the perspective of the person who suffers it. That is, we adopt a person-affecting view of harm, as opposed to an impersonal view, where harm occurring per se is important. In Ben and Josh’s cases here, we likely to be more concerned about the harm that the anxiety causes to Ben and Josh, rather than being concerned that there is more anxiety in the world.

89 I am assuming here that the decrease in well-being brought about in suffering from anxiety outweighs any of the benefits of being more intelligent. I have also assumed that Ben and Josh’s parents know of the risk of anxiety. 90 Parfit, D., (1976) ‘Rights, Interests, and Possible People’, in S. Gorovitz, (Ed). Moral problems in medicine. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, pp369-75, p374. 191 Chapter Five – An overview of enhancement

However, in Josh’s case, the genes predisposing him to anxiety are inextricably linked to his existence.

We have thus arrived at a situation where a child may be born into sub-optimal circumstances, but that we cannot say he has been harmed. The problem is that an act of harming may not always be wrong if this act is inextricable from an act of bringing a child into existence who will live a worthwhile life.

Now, this may have implications for the relative acceptability of selection and enhancement. If this problem is correct, Ben may plausibly say to his parents “I wish you hadn’t enhanced me”, but Josh cannot make such a statement, as this would require that he had not been born. His life does seem to be worth living. As Josh cannot make such a claim, genetic selection could be immune from critiques that it generates harm. Consequently, genetic selection may be morally preferable to genetic enhancement because of the non-identity problem.91

What needs to be established here is how morally important the non-identity problem is. Should we instead view impersonal harm, which is the kind of harm that Josh is experiencing92, as just as important as person-affecting harm, which is the kind of harm that is affecting Ben?93 Could Josh be said to have less of a claim for harm, as his selection was worse for no one, than Ben, whose enhancement was worse for him? To answer these questions, I’ll now turn to the ways in which various theorists have attempted to solve the non-identity problem.

Parfit has undertaken an extensive analysis of this problem. He has arrived at a view – termed the No Difference View – that supports the commonsense attitude that Ben and Josh have suffered equal harm, or at least that an equal wrong has occurred. One justification for this view is that knowing about the non-identity problem doesn’t really change our attitudes to the wrongness of any parent’s action in causing him to

91 Savulescu, J., Hemsley, M., and Newson, A., (in preparation) ‘Is eugenic selection superior to eugenic enhancement? The Example of a Criminal Kindred’. 92 With impersonal harm, a person cannot say that they have truly been harmed by the act that caused their suffering. In Josh’s case, this is because he would not exist were it not for his harmed state. 93 Ben’s harm, on the other hand, can be said to be person-affecting, as it affects Ben in a personal way. Ben would still ‘be’ Ben, he would still exist, even if he had not suffered the harm that he has. 192 Chapter Five – An overview of enhancement exist (such as Josh suffering from anxiety). Consequently, this should not be practically important. That is to say, there is no significant moral difference between a harming act that doesn’t affect who is born (Ben’s case) and a harming act that does (Josh’s case), provided that in each instance the same number of people exist. In defending the No Difference View, Parfit invokes the ‘Same Number Quality Claim’, or Q:

Q: If in either of two possible outcomes the same number of people would ever live, it would be worse if those who live are worse-off, or have a lower quality of life, than those who would have lived.94

This claim rests not on individual interests, but is a new, impersonal theory. According to Q, it would have been better overall if Josh’s parents had acted differently. Parfit’s No Difference View suggests that the parents in these two cases acted equally wrongly. Therefore, selection would not be immune from criticism.

To summarise Parfit’s view, in same person choices (such as genetic enhancement) where the same person will exist no matter which choice is made, impersonal theories such as Q and person-affecting moral judgements coincide. In same number choices (such as genetic selection), we can only appeal to impersonal claims such as Q, as person-affecting judgements cannot apply. But, if Parfit’s No Difference View is accepted instead, Q can be used in both same number and same person choices. Parfit might argue that the alternative to the No Difference View, a person-affecting view, forces a distinction (between degrees of harm) to be drawn where we don’t really think that one should exist. Most of us would rather argue that Ben and Josh’s parents are blameworthy to the same degree for their selection decision and their enhancement decision – not that the selection decision was a ‘better’ one.

Dan Brock, in discussing why it might be wrong to deliberately give birth to a person with a genetic condition, takes a similar position to Parfit.95 He argues that although harm principles are necessarily person-affecting, there can also be an

94 Parfit, Reasons and Persons, p360. 95 Brock, D.W., (1995) ‘The Non-Identity Problem and Genetic Harms: The Case of Wrongful Handicaps’, Bioethics, vol.9(3/4): 269-75. 193 Chapter Five – An overview of enhancement impersonal moral principle which requires that no harm be done. Brock argues that even though people like Josh would not have a claim against their parents for harm, the parents have still acted wrongly; there is just no ‘particular’ victim.

Some have criticised this enthusiasm for non-person-regarding reasons, claiming that person-regarding value judgements are still going to be more important. Schelling, for example, may not support Parfit’s ‘solution’ to the non-identity problem:

The skinny boy whose mother insists on violin lessons may wonder whether “he” might not have been big like the other boys if his mother hadn’t traded size for musical talent before he was old enough to be asked what he preferred. And he may not be satisfied with the answer that “he” comes in only one size: the alternative was some other little boy or girl from among those sixty trillion.96

Whilst sympathetic to Parfit’s (and by implication, Brock’s) view of the non- identity problem, McMahan also draws attention to numerous problems that will necessarily result. He argues, in contrast to the No Difference View, that there can be ‘some difference’ between cases like Ben’s and cases like Josh’s. This is because an effect can be bad even if it is not worse for anyone, ‘but not as bad as it would be if it were worse for someone.’97 Impersonal considerations do matter, but person-affecting considerations matter more.

On this view, there would be a morally significant difference between selection and enhancement, such that selection would be morally preferable to enhancement, at least in terms of harm reduction. Both actions have caused someone to suffer from anxiety. Genetic Selection is bad for Josh, but it is worse impersonally. This suggests that selection for Josh it is not as bad as enhancement is for Ben.

McMahan extends his ‘some difference’ view to an Encompassing Account, which he believes is stronger. According to this account, person-affecting and impersonal considerations may not make a great practical difference:

96 Schelling, T., (1978) ‘Choosing our Children’s Genes’, (in his) Micromotives and Macrobehaviour. New York: Norton, pp193-210, p210. 97 McMahan, J., (2001) ‘Wrongful Life: Paradoxes in the Morality of Causing People to Exist’, in J. Harris, (Ed). Bioethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp445-75, p473. 194 Chapter Five – An overview of enhancement

[P]erson-affecting considerations and impersonal considerations are distinct and nonadditive. Neither type is reducible to the other. Both matter, both provide reasons for action. But it is not always worse if a bad effect is worse for someone; sometimes it is, sometimes it is not.98

However, even if an effect is worse only impersonally, then this fact still provides a reason to prevent this particular action from occurring:

The Encompassing Account holds that, when this effect is worse for the child as in the prenatal case [akin to the enhancement case] that fact provides whatever reasons there are to prevent it. That the effect is also worse impersonally is irrelevant. Yet, when the effect is worse only impersonally, as in the Preconception case [akin to the selection case], that fact provides a reason to prevent it.99

McMahan is suggesting that practically, there is scope for these two cases to be treated in a similar way, as ‘it is hard to believe that the moral difference between the two cases could be more than very slight.’100 The enhancement case, where the harm is worse for the child, is at least as bad as it would be if it were worse only impersonally, as the world would have been better if one less person suffered from anxiety. Therefore the Selection case, where it is worse to choose intelligence only impersonally, is at most as bad as it would be if it were bad for someone. So, it is possible that the objections to the two cases can be equally strong, although the selection argument will never be stronger than the enhancement argument.

Compare McMahan’s account with Parfit’s. According to McMahan, the genetic enhancement intervention has indeed violated Ben’s rights. Josh’s genetic selection would make for a worse outcome overall (a world with more anxious people), but this would merely be a general statement and could not be applied to Josh. Effectively, his parents choosing an embryo with a predisposition to anxiety cannot matter to Josh. As person-affecting viewpoints have priority, avoiding genetic enhancements would

98 Ibid, p474. 99 Ibid. 100 Ibid, p475. 195 Chapter Five – An overview of enhancement be more important than avoiding genetic selection. Selection may indeed be preferable to genetic enhancement.

Parfit, on the other hand, would claim that there is no significant moral difference between selection and enhancement. Even though Josh cannot claim that he was harmed, his parents can still be accused of acting wrongly, via an impersonal moral judgement. Moreover, Buchanan et al argue that the increasing importance of these judgements in genetics means that Josh’s (and in fact all) parents should avoid scenarios where there is a risk of harm, if possible. So Josh’s parents could be deemed to act wrongly in both the selection of Josh and the enhancement of Ben.

So where is the correct position? Does this mean that if harm is to result, that genetic selection and enhancement are both equally bad, such that we attempt neither? Overall, I believe that the correct position to take reflects that of McMahan’s critique – that selection may indeed be preferable to enhancement. My reason is the falsity of Parfit’s claim that modifying people is as wrong as selecting people. Such an assertion would not be true in reality, as at least experientially: when children found out about their modification, they would foreseeably suffer greater harm if they realised that their anxiety could have been prevented and they still could have lived. In sum, causing anxiety for both Josh and Ben has been bad, but that Ben’s enhancement may be said to be more wrong than Josh’s selection, in practice because of the greater psychological distress associated with modification. Yet despite modification being worse than selection, selection which foreseeably results in more harm than benefit would still be still wrong. This should be discouraged from an impersonal point of view.

How does this issue impact upon the debate over the augmentation of intelligence? At least where interventions before birth are concerned, from a moral point of view, the technology of genetic selection may lead to a morally preferable outcome to genetic enhancement, subject to the caveat that knowledge of risk in advance should lead to measures to avoid such a risk if possible. As such, regarding the permissibility (or otherwise) of parents selecting for or enhancing intelligence, it is not acceptable for parents to use selection instead of enhancement as a ‘way out’ of

196 Chapter Five – An overview of enhancement avoiding ‘harming’ their children.101 This is because although not wrong as enhancement, it is (on McMahan’s view) still wrong if there were foreseeable and unreasonable harms. Yet, if selection becomes practically feasible (recall the problems outlined above), then it may be the case that couples exercising selection may be less accountable for the harm their children may suffer than parents who utilise enhancement.

Access to enhancements of intelligence will be unequal

Every parent is going to want this. But who will have access to it?102

When enhancements of intelligence are first introduced, they are likely to confer a significant competitive advantage upon those who receive them. As Buchanan et al (among others) have recognised, there are numerous distributive justice questions related to genetic enhancements, including whether it is acceptable to give enhancement interventions only to those who can afford them, or whether the right to health care would include a right to genetic enhancement.103 Another argument against enhancement is that in the current climate of scarce resources in health care, enhancements of intelligence will not be available to everyone and will only increase inequality if made available in the free market.

Now this is, of course, a serious and significant objection against enhancements of intelligence, as it raises very important questions about social justice. However, such an important question needs to be dealt with separately in its own right, as an in-depth analysis of this issue is beyond the scope of this analysis.104 In this section, assuming

101 Supposing, of course, that there will be such harm. 102 Gibbs, N., ‘If we Have it, Should we Use it?’ Time, September 27 1999, p63-4, p63, quoting Jeremy Rifkin. 103 Buchanan, Brock, Daniels, and Wikler, From Chance to Choice: Genetics and Justice, p61. 104 Indeed, such analyses have already been embarked upon elsewhere. See, eg: Daniels, ‘The Genome Project, Individual Differences, and Just Health Care’; Holm, S., (1994) ‘Genetic Engineering and the North-South Divide’, in A. Dyson and J. Harris, (Eds). Ethics and Biotechnology. London: Routledge, pp47-63; Kavka, G.S., (1994) ‘Upside Risks: Social Consequences of Beneficial Biotechnology’, in C.F. Cranor, (Ed). Are Genes Us? The Social Consequences of the New Genetics. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, pp155-79, at p168-171; Buchanan, A., (1995) ‘Equal Opportunity and Genetic Intervention’, Social Philosophy and Policy, vol.12: 105-35; Mehlman, M.J. and Botkin, J.R., (1998) Access to the Genome: the Challenge to Equality. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press; and Buchanan, Brock, Daniels, and Wikler, From Chance to Choice: Genetics and Justice, Chapter 3. 197 Chapter Five – An overview of enhancement that enhancements will not only be made commercially available, I very briefly summarise some of the issues and approaches to dealing with this problem.

There are many ways in which the allocation of enhancements of intelligence can be approached. One is the already mentioned approach: to not utilise any formal resource allocation, instead allowing enhancements to be distributed according to the free market. Yet this will probably generate greater inequality; because it will allow for increases in the ‘divide’ between classes in society. Additionally, even though much health care is currently provided in this way, it does not mean that we should validate unfair processes in order to justify a new technology.

An alternative approach is to use a theory of justice to mediate allocation of this technology.105 This will involve adopting a particular method of assessing the relative amounts of good that people have in their lives as a result of their intelligence and establishing how to determine who should have precedence in receiving enhancements. A ‘bank’ of enhancements will have to be made available, which may or may not rule out the enhancement also being available on the free market.

Sen has suggested a method of assessing the relative amounts of good that people have could involve the ‘capability set’ approach.106 A capability set is a tool by which we can measure people’s abilities to use the resources that they have. Relevant to capability sets are functionings, which are things that we do or achieve. Our capability sets refer to functionings that we are capable of achieving. If one person has a larger capability set, then she is better-off, from a moral point of view, than one whose capability set is not so large. Suppose there are two people who are failing a particular class at school. One is working hard, but lacks the capacity to understand the work. The other is more than able to handle the subject’s content, but prefers to act as the class clown. These two people have similar functionings, but the class clown has a larger capability set than the hard worker.

105 I thank Dr David McCarthy for his ideas about this section. 106 Sen, A., (1993) ‘Capability and Well-Being’, in M.C. Nussbaum and A. Sen, (Eds). The Quality of Life. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp30-53. 198 Chapter Five – An overview of enhancement

So how is this relevant to enhancements of intelligence? One way to tackle the problem could be to use a capability set approach to determine how well-off people are. This would involve assessing people’s actual and possible functionings and examining how enhancing their intelligence will affect their chances of expanding their capability set. It might also be important here to assess people’s functionings with respect to intelligence in conjunction with other functionings they might have. For example, if two people are of a similar level of intelligence, but one has access to greater socio-economic resources, then this might mean that we consider that person as having a larger capability set. Once each person’s capability set has been established, it would then be necessary to make interpersonal comparisons between people, to determine who should receive the enhancement.

Here, it is possible to make out several distinct arguments. For example, one could argue that a person of below-average intelligence would benefit much more from an improvement in her intelligence than a person who already has average intelligence. Then again, one could argue that true excellence might result if more people were to have higher intelligence, as more people could work upon complex problems that we now face. Should we maximise total intelligence, or instead emphasise equality in intelligence? These difficulties would be compounded if there were many who appear to be potential recipients of enhancements.

One fairly recent theory that could be used in answering this question is Parfit’s priority view. 107 This could be used to compare capability sets, to decide who should receive a particular benefit. According to supporters of this view, benefiting people matters more the worse-off that people are. Rather than merely examining the expected outcome that may occur if someone were to receive an enhancement (and allocating the enhancement to the person who will do the most well), it is necessary to take account of how badly-off a person is currently (such as the intellectual capabilities a person currently has). On this account, priority should be given to those who are of below average intelligence, but those who clearly would not benefit from the enhancement may not be given priority.

107 Parfit, D., (1997) ‘Equality and Priority’, Ratio, vol.10: 202-21. As this is a brief discussion of the allocation of enhancements, I do not discuss alternative ways to answer this question, such as a utilitarian approach, or an egalitarian approach. 199 Chapter Five – An overview of enhancement

One problem with this account however is the time scale upon which capability sets should be calculated. Particularly as enhancements of intelligence are likely to be given to children (in order for them to gain maximum benefit), there might not be a lot of information upon which to form a capability set judgment.108

There is, of course, much more to be said here. The problem of who should receive enhancements is not unique to intelligence. It applies to all benefits when they cannot be distributed to everyone. However, what seems clear is that it would be unjust for the enhancement of intelligence to be made available merely so that one individual can gain an unfair advantage over another. What would be preferable would be for the State, with a view to the potential social benefits of such a technology, to make this technology available to as many as possible, perhaps using some moral assessment of individual capabilities, provided this would not usurp access to more fundamental health care. The enhancement of intelligence may be permissible within a theory of just access to health care, albeit with a low priority.

5.4 Constraints upon enhancement

A consideration of some of the general arguments against enhancement, in addition to some putative distinctions that may be made out with respect to enhancement technology, have lead me to generate some important constraints upon the use of enhancement technology to augment intelligence.

Regarding the discussion of some of the general arguments against enhancement, I claimed that none of the objections to enhancement I discussed are capable of providing a categorical rejection of enhancement.

In discussing the treatment/enhancement distinction, I suggested that such a distinction is not powerful enough to warrant a moral boundary between the permissible and the impermissible. The distinction could, however, indicate where health care priorities may lie. It could also be used as a ‘moral warning flag’ to suggest where we should take care in permitting a particular intervention.

108 It remains to be determined whether capability sets should be assessed using one point in time, or on a ‘life-span’ perspective. See, for example: McKearly, D., (1992) ‘Equality Between Age- Groups’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol.21: 275-95. 200 Chapter Five – An overview of enhancement

Regarding the significance of the various means employed to bring about an enhancement of intelligence, I argued that although it is important to bear in mind the value that certain ways of developing one’s intelligence have (and the potential problem of ignoring more complex social problems by enhancing everyone), intelligence is a broad trait. Any enhancement of intelligence would be unlikely, either theoretically or practically, to have such damaging effects.

I then discussed the non-identity problem and its potential impact upon the acceptability of genetic selection for intelligence, when compared with genetic enhancements. By rejecting the ‘no difference’ principle, it seems apparent that theoretically at least, genetic enhancement could sometimes be worse for the recipient than genetic selection. However, it would be undesirable for parents to use this conclusion to avoid responsibility for selection choices. As McMahan has argued, when thinking about cases akin to the selection case, impersonal harm per se can be a significant enough reason to avoid causing harm to another individual.

Finally, I discussed problems in allocating enhancement technologies. Whilst I undertook only a limited discussion of this issue, I suggested that it would be important to avoid only having this technology available in a free market. Further, policy-makers should employ a plausible theory of distributive justice when deciding who should have access to enhancements of intelligence.

Enhancements of intelligence therefore seem to be acceptable in principle. These arguments provide an important foundation for further debate, which I undertake in the subsequent chapter. Yet, in claiming that enhancement may sometimes be acceptable, it is also important to appreciate that this is not unequivocal. My discussion of objections to enhancement, and the four putative moral boundaries for enhancement provide some important constraints upon the practice of enhancement, which I have summarised in Table 5-4.

201 Chapter Five – An overview of enhancement

Table 5-4: Constraints on the practice of enhancement

Enhancements of intelligence will only be acceptable under the following conditions: • The importance of values other than the competitive value of intelligence should be promoted; • Society should be wary about inherent, negative value assumptions about low intelligence. Everyone should be treated with equal concern and respect, regardless of their intelligence; • Society should promote the need for a variety of skills in society, where the value of different types of ‘intelligent’ behaviours in different contexts is respected; • Society should ensure that enhancing intelligence does not take place at the expense of recognising the value of complex social relationships; • Care needs to be exercised in how enhancements are administered to children – we need to be sure that children do not feel labelled as a result of the enhancement. Children should be monitored for such harms subsequent to the enhancement intervention; • Caution should be exercised when considering how high we want to enhance intelligence; • Parents should not interpret genetic information deterministically, if this meant that it would become the dominant label with which they perceive their child; • Enhancements should not be privileged over other important health care interventions; and • Initially, enhancement of intelligence should be used to benefit those with lower actual or potential intelligence • Existing means of optimising intelligence must be recognised and emphasised, and we must ensure that the genetic enhancement of intelligence does not become the primary or the only means available to optimise intelligence • Genetic selection is morally preferable to genetic enhancement in terms of minimising harm; • Genetic enhancements should only be made available within an environment of fair allocation of resources, with principles of distributive justice being employed to allocate enhancements

It will therefore be important, if enhancement of intelligence is ever to be offered, that instead of making general assumptions about the permissibility of enhancements for all families, each of the constraints in the above table should be applied on a case-

202 Chapter Five – An overview of enhancement by-case basis.109 Other more general constraints that should also be taken into account include the age of the child, parental support and the concerns, values and objectives of all concerned.

To be sure, the citing of limitations on genetic enhancement technology such as these and actually ensuring that they are met in practice are very different. An analysis of how these technologies should be practically managed or regulated is outside the scope of this thesis. However, it would be desirable for health professionals (or other service providers) to have some capacity to act as gatekeepers to the technology in dialogue with parents, if coupled with substantial guidelines.

All of these constraints form a significant aspect of the ‘moral landscape’ upon which enhancements of intelligence may take place.

5.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have described the relevant technologies that might give way to enhancements of intelligence. What is surprising about these technologies is that although the genetic architecture of intelligence will undoubtedly be complex, researchers have already obtained results of cognitive enhancement in animals, by undertaking much simpler research strategies. It is also interesting to note that although people are opposed to cognitive enhancement per se, that there are numerous drugs available now that are have already been shown to have such an effect.

In addition to discussing some of the general concerns with enhancement, I discussed four preliminary distinctions relevant to the ethical acceptability of enhancing intelligence: the treatment/enhancement distinction, the significance of means employed to bring about an enhancement, the difference between genetic selection and enhancement and the fair allocation of enhancements. These four issues, in addition to the general problems I discussed, generate some important constraints upon the use of enhancements.

109 This has been advocated by Cohen in the context of genetic testing in children: Cohen, C.B., (1998) ‘Wrestling With the Future: Should We Test Children for Adult-Onset Genetic Conditions?’ Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal, vol.8(2): 111-30. 203 Chapter Five – An overview of enhancement

This chapter has therefore formed the moral landscape for a discussion of enhancement – the issues that form the backdrop against which a more robust discussion of enhancement must be held. In the next chapter, I build upon this moral landscape to discuss two substantive objections against enhancements of intelligence: that enhancing intelligence will deny a person the right to an open future and that it will render a person as inauthentic.

204

Chapter Six

6 TWO ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN ENHANCING CHILDREN’S INTELLIGENCE

Will enhancement of intelligence impair a child’s right to an open future or her ability to lead an authentic life?

6.1 Introduction

In modern Western society, it is certainly acceptable, if not required, that parents will act to pursue ‘the best’ for their children. Most parents inform their children about the importance of their education, health, personal safety and social responsibilities. Parents usually wish for their children to be the best that they can be, and often make personal or financial sacrifices to ensure that this occurs. Moreover, they are encouraged by the State to do so. Within this framework, most parents are also concerned to ensure that their child’s intellectual development is among those attributes maximised. This raises the question: in removing children’s abilities to decide whether they would like to have their intellect enhanced, could they be harmed?

In this chapter, I address two strong objections to enhancing children’s intelligence: that enhancing intelligence will deny a child an open future; and that it will lead to enhanced children leading an inauthentic life, or being labelled as inauthentic. I have identified these two arguments as I believe that they are among the strongest and most persuasive arguments against enhancing intelligence in children.

I argue that neither the argument against narrowing a child’s open future, nor the argument against inauthenticity is capable absolutely rejecting enhancement. Yet, enhancement should not proceed unless certain constraints are recognised, in addition to those presented in the previous chapter.

‘Dr Bashir’s Genetic Enhancement’

The various kinds of genetic enhancements that I described in the previous chapter will, of course, lead to many different ethical scenarios, reflecting the wide array of issues that those considering enhancements of intelligence will undoubtedly 205 Chapter Six –Two objections to enhancement face. Throughout this chapter, I’ll utilise a scenario I have adapted from Star Trek – which involves a character from Deep Space Nine, Dr Julian Bashir:1

Julian Bashir is 6 years old and in his second year of school. He enjoys this very much, has many friends. He has average reading and numeracy skills. He does, however dream of becoming a doctor; and he often practices his skills with his teddy bear. Julian’s parents love their son and want him to succeed. Concerned about his mental abilities (and wanting to provide their son with the best possible future) they give him a somatic genetic enhancement. They wish to boost his academic achievement and potential future education and employment opportunities. They are very concerned not to try and push their son into a particular career, yet they feel that giving him the drug will promote his future options.

Should Julian’s parents have enhanced his intelligence?

I argue here that although there are several serious concerns that would need to be addressed if enhancement of intelligence were to be ethically permissible in children, it is very difficult to rationally reject enhancements of intelligence in toto. I then present some constraints to illustrate the circumstances in which enhancement would be permissible.

6.2 Enhancements of intelligence and the right to an open future

Will enhancing Julian Bashir’s intelligence harm him by constraining his ‘right to an open future’? That is, by enhancing his intelligence, would Julian’s parents violate his right to choose a life plan of his own, once he is able to decide for himself, from an appropriately broad range of alternatives?

The ‘right to an open future’

Despite parents’ current freedom to pursue varied conceptions of what they think is best for their children, parents do not operate without moral limits on their authority to influence their children’s capacities. Brock cites the example of a child’s parents wishing to place their 9-year-old into a tennis skills enrichment program, to

1 I thank Dr Lynn Gillam for this example. 206 Chapter Six –Two objections to enhancement assist her to become a professional tennis player. Even though this parental decision effectively requires the child to share her parent’s life goals, this is usually regarded as acceptable. However if parents desired to cease their child’s education to spend more time at tennis training, this would be a case of ‘severely limiting or neglecting many other capacities and opportunities she would otherwise have,’2 and public policy would dictate this as unacceptable. This illustrates the essence of the ‘right to an open future’.

Legal philosopher Joel Feinberg provided the first general account of a child’s right to an open future.3 He distinguished three classes of rights:

1. A-C Rights,4 such as the right not to be robbed, which belong to both adults and children;

2. A-rights, such as the right to vote, which belong only to adults (many A-rights are based upon autonomy and so cannot be held by children);

3. C-rights, such as the right to be cared for, which usually belong to children.

Within C-rights, Feinberg distinguishes two sub-classes – dependency rights, which derive from a child’s dependence upon others for basic goods; and rights in trust. Rights in trust are C-rights that have several properties in common with A- rights. However, the child cannot exercise this type of right until ‘later when he is more fully informed and capable.’5 Thus, rights in trust are rights that a third party has the responsibility to protect ‘now for then’. Collectively (but generally), ‘rights-in- trust can be summed up as the single ‘right to an open future’, which Davis has described as including ‘virtually all the important rights we believe adults have, but which must be protected now to be exercised later’.6

2 Brock, ‘Enhancements of Human Function: Some Distinctions for Policymakers’, p54. 3 Feinberg, J., (1980) 'The Child's Right to an Open Future', in W. Aiken and H. LaFollette, (Eds). Whose Child? Children's Rights, Parental Authority, and state Power. Totowa, NJ: Littlefield, Adams and Company, pp124-53. 4 Here A stands for adult, and C for child. 5 Feinberg, ‘The Child’s Right to an Open Future’, p125. 6 Davis, D.S., (1997) ‘Genetic Dilemmas and the Child’s Right to an Open Future’, The Hastings Center Report, vol.27(2): 7-15, p9. 207 Chapter Six –Two objections to enhancement

Such a right is obviously important. It not only preserves future autonomy, but hedges against erroneous parental conceptions of what is best for their child. If they respect this right, then parents will have to be careful not to let their current values interfere with respecting what their child may want for her future self.7

Feinberg states that this right can be violated in advance. If this happens, then ‘when the child is an autonomous adult, certain options will already be closed to him.’8 He claims that:

His right while he is still a child is to have these future options kept open until he is a fully formed, self-determining adult capable of deciding among them.9

He also claims that it is not the child now who will be able to express appropriate interests or desires, but that:

It is the adult he is to become who must exercise the choice, more exactly, the adult he will become if his basic options are kept open and his growth kept ‘natural’ or unforced…. The child is potentially that adult, and it is that adult who is the person whose autonomy must be protected now (in advance).10

In making these claims, it seems that Feinberg is arguing for some ‘reasonable standard’ of options for every future adult. Moreover, he does not believe that asking children now what they would want as adults will not ensure that their future is kept objectively open. Instead, it is the role of parents to foster a range of talents and skills in their children, so that they can reasonably evaluate and choose between a broad range of alternatives.11 Unlike adults whose autonomy we have to respect in making future-limiting decisions, children’s future autonomy should be maximized until they

7 Buchanan, Brock, Daniels, and Wikler, From Chance to Choice: Genetics and Justice. p172. 8 Feinberg, ‘The Child’s Right to an Open Future’, p125. 9 Ibid, p126. 10 Ibid, p127. 11 Buchanan, Brock, Daniels, and Wikler, From Chance to Choice: Genetics and Justice, p175. 208 Chapter Six –Two objections to enhancement are able to make decisions for themselves. This may even involve preventing children’s free choices now.12

Obviously, Julian’s C-right to an open future will often conflict with the A-rights of his parents to control his upbringing. Feinberg maintains that any parental decision which irrevocably forecloses the future options that Julian would be expected to decide upon for himself should not be permitted. To avoid such conflicts in ideals, Feinberg suggests that the benchmark for parents should be to:

[E]quip the child with the knowledge and skills that will help him choose whichever sort of life best fits his native endowment and matured disposition. It should send him out into the adult world with as many open opportunities as possible, thus maximizing his chances for self-fulfilment.13

Davis has applied Feinberg’s account of a child’s right to an open future in the context of parent’s decisions about genetic and reproductive technology. Although in her accounts she respects the value of procreative autonomy (referring to reproductive decisions as ‘of the greatest magnitude and of the greatest intimacy’14), she claims that service providers in genetics should not facilitate parental decisions that will violate a child’s right to an open future. She argues that currently there is scope for this to occur, as the policy framework for parental autonomy in genetic and reproductive decision-making leaves ‘no “space” in which to give proper attention to the moral claims of the future child who is the endpoint of many counselling interactions.’15 That is, she is concerned that the child’s future autonomy is subordinate to its parents existing autonomy.

12 It is interesting to note that this requires quite a paternalistic attitude towards raising children, which is virtually opposite to some theories on children’s rights. See, for example: Holt, J., (1980) ‘Liberate Children’, in W. Aiken and H. LaFollette, (Eds). Whose Child? Children’s Rights, Parental Authority and State Power. Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, pp84-86. Some of these theorists (the “Children’s rights movement”) reject all forms of paternalism, and claim that we should make available to children all rights, duties and responsibilities that adults currently have. Feinberg concedes his thesis involves Paternalism, but offers some ways to mitigate the problem. See: Feinberg, ‘The Child’s Right to an Open Future’, p140-142. 13 Feinberg, ‘The Child’s Right to an Open Future’, p134-5, emphasis added. 14 Davis, ‘Genetic Dilemmas and the Child’s Right to an Open Future’, p8. 15 Ibid, p7. 209 Chapter Six –Two objections to enhancement

Davis has not applied her critique of the right to an open future in the context of genetic enhancements. She has, however discussed how it would apply in the contexts of cloning and sex selection, where she argues that being born from these parental choices would deny a child an open future. In her argument, she focuses her attention on the parental motivations that would underlie these decisions. She claims that the cloning or sex selection decision would be unduly focussed on the significance of genetic information or gender.16 That is, as parents will have spent time and money to have a child with a particular trait or sex, then there is a very real possibility that they will endeavour to influence their child to use their particular ability.17 Moreover, in the case of cloning, she claims that the parents’ very decision to utilise this technology indicates an inherent belief in biological or genetic determinism. Parents who go to such lengths to select children in this way are not going to be able to sit back and merely observe how their significant investment manifests.

Several other scholars have given accounts similar to that of the right to an open future. Agar, for example, illustrates a concept that is lacking from the analyses of Feinberg and Davis.18 He has developed a distinction between permissible and impermissible enhancements that requires an examination of whether an intervention will affect capacities or the life-plan of the enhanced individual where capacities help determine a person’s success in various life plans. He claims that capacities could be (and are) within the realm of parental interference, whilst life-plans never should be. Parents need to have respect for a range of life plans in their children and should constrain the choices they make accordingly.

Will enhancing intelligence limit a child’s right to an open future?

So far, I have described some different accounts of the right to an open future. Collectively, these accounts dictate that parents ought not to unreasonably constrain the potential life plans of their children. But the more pressing question here is

16 Davis, D.S., (2001) Genetic Dilemmas: Reproductive Technology, Parental Choices, and Children’s Futures. New York: Routledge, p118. 17 Davis concedes that this may not apply in instances where parents have utilised cloning or genetic selection only incidentally to their primary motivation of circumventing infertility. 18 Agar, N., (1995) ‘Designing Babies: Morally Permissible Ways to Modify the Human Genome’, Bioethics, vol.9(1): 1-15; and Agar, N., (1998) ‘Liberal Eugenics’, Public Affairs Quarterly, vol.12(2): 137-55. 210 Chapter Six –Two objections to enhancement whether enhancing intelligence (whether by a genetic or psychopharmacological intervention) will limit a child’s right to an open future. Will enhancing intelligence, to paraphrase Feinberg, render Julian ‘fit for only one way of life’? Or, will enhancing intelligence ‘send him out into the adult world with as many open opportunities as possible, thus maximising his chances for self-fulfilment’?

Consider Julian Bashir and his parents in greater detail. As I mentioned above, Julian had his intelligence ‘enhanced’ at age 6. What effect could this have upon his right to an open future? On one perspective, Julian’s options may have been limited, as in choosing to enhance his intelligence, his parents may have subsequently encouraged him to undertake a particular life plan which would utilise his enhanced intellect, in order to maximise their investment in him.

Both Davis and Feinberg might offer such a criticism. They would claim that by their giving him the enhancement, no matter what their subsequent conduct was, that they have sent Julian a ‘message’ that they want him to pursue a particular kind of life. To give an example, he would not be free to undertake a non-specialised profession.

Agar too, might have similar concerns about the conduct of Mr and Mrs Bashir, although his may not be about the enhancement per se. Unlike Davis and Feinberg, he might argue that Julian’s parents’ influencing his capacities was acceptable, but then he might argue that if this intervention was inextricably linked to altering Julian’s life plan for him, then this would render it unacceptable. Obviously, a lot will turn on Julian’s parents conduct after the enhancement, such as whether or not they were able to provide alternative options for Julian to reach self-fulfilment after he was enhanced.

Two reasons why enhancing intelligence will not limit a child’s open future

Whilst sympathetic with the right to an open future, I don’t believe that such an argument establishes that enhancing intelligence in children will be unethical. As I see it, there are two responses that can be made to this problem. The first is to claim that the generic open future argument itself is invalid. The second is to claim that the argument of a child’s right to an open future is defensible, particularly on a permissive

211 Chapter Six –Two objections to enhancement reading of Feinberg’s formulation,19 but that enhancing intelligence does not infringe this right to an open future. I argue here for the second response, although it is still interesting to consider the first response.

Is the right to an open future unduly restrictive?

Now, although laudable, respecting a child’s right to an open future could actually place quite severe restrictions upon parenting. If the right to an open future were accepted and adopted into public policy, it would be virtually impossible for parents to offer their children (even if they act reasonably, which most parents would) an open future. Moreover, this right is not reflective of current, quite reasonable, parenting practices – most parents routinely limit some of their children’s options, such as influencing their career options.

Yet even if it did become both practical and reasonable for parents to reach Feinberg’s prescription for a child’s open future, it may still be problematic. Even if the enhancement of his intelligence may have removed a particular option (such as the option to choose a profession other than being a doctor) from Julian’s life, this may not necessarily be harmful for him. That is, taking the extreme form of Feinberg’s argument, we could deny that Julian’s future should have to include such a broad array of options. Parents may be able to offer their children a limited range of options, yet still allow them full opportunity to achieve self-fulfilment. Robertson and Savulescu allude to this option in a recent paper, which I discussed in Chapter Four. They argue that there can be many types of an appropriately open future. Parents, in removing a particular option, are not necessarily reducing the ‘openness’ of their child’s future, provided that they do not limit capacities necessary for autonomous action. They state:

Being a parent necessarily involves making choices between mutually exclusive futures for one’s child. Foreclosing some options is not necessarily a significant violation of the child’s future autonomy.20

19 A formulation of Feinberg’s argument based on such a reading would de-emphasise the unrestricted nature of a child’s right to an open future. 20 Robertson, S., and Savulescu, J., (2000) 'Is there a Case in Favour of Predictive Genetic Testing in Children?' Bioethics, vol.15(1): 26-49, p39. 212 Chapter Six –Two objections to enhancement

Therefore, rather than prescribing an infinitely open future for Julian, it should be formulated in terms of a reasonable standard of options that should be made available to him. Provided that all of his significant future life choices remain in place (such as choices about reproduction, survival and major decisions about their life’s direction) then if one option is removed so that it can be replaced it with another, the State would not interfere. These approaches seem to reflect commonsense morality, where foreclosing on some options does not of itself deny an open future, especially when it opens up other futures. In fact, this may actually enhance one’s capacity to make later decisions. As long as children have a reasonable set of circumstances or life-plans to choose between, with factors influencing these provided by their parents, this is acceptable.

If the right to an open future is acceptable, will it apply to enhancements of intelligence?

Consider the second (and to me, more appropriate) response to the argument that the right to an open future will not permit the genetic enhancement of intelligence. Even if Feinberg’s account of the right to an appropriately open future is acceptable, this does not mean that enhancing intelligence will necessarily limit the openness of Julian’s future. Instead, it could actually amplify it.

To make this argument, it is first important to consider how enhancing intelligence could limit the openness of Julian’s future. Primarily, this could occur if, after having him enhanced, Julian’s parents were to develop ‘intellect-specific’ expectations for him, surreptitiously directing him towards a particular life plan. Yet rather than being the kind of overbearing and deterministic parents that Davis and McGee warn us about, the ‘typical’ conduct of parents in choosing genetic enhancements of intelligence for their children might be quite different. It would be quite unlikely that Mr and Mrs Bashir would unavoidably limit Julian’s development. Indeed, this claim is reflected in empirical studies of both parental attitudes to genetic information and their attitudes to offspring conceived by donor conception, which I discuss below.

Additionally, Davis’ claims as to why parents should not create clones or choose the sex of their child (and, by inference, not enhance their intelligence) relies upon an assumption of genetic determinism. She claims:

213 Chapter Six –Two objections to enhancement

[P]arents who take expensive, cumbersome steps to provide their child with a specific DNA in order to maximise the chances of success in a particular field will, I suspect, find it almost impossible to accept if the child hates ballet or basketball and chooses the life of an accountant or timpani player…. Parents will be focussed, from the child’s first days, on such a narrow range of possibilities that the child’s right to an open future, her chance to explore her own options and interests, will be radically compromised.21

The problem with this argument is that Davis has made her claim based upon a florid example, with no indication that it will occur in the reality of reproductive decision-making. Generally, people do reject the genetic determinism of complex human traits.22 Additionally, in contrast to Davis, I would suggest that most parents would inevitably delight in the child that they have. They would realise that their child is not something that can be predicted and moulded via a genetic intervention. At the very least, one cannot rely upon theoretical vignettes and claims of genetic determinism which are unsubstantiated by empirical inquiry.

So far I have attempted to show how enhancing intelligence will not automatically render Julian’s future as no longer open. However, it is also important to recognise that enhancing intelligence could actually add to the openness of Julian’s future, by providing him with an ability which will aid his autonomous decision-making skills.

As I discussed in Chapter Three, intelligence is commonly understood as an extremely broad human trait, valuable in a variety of endeavours, no matter a person’s vocation.23 Whilst selecting for something like deafness or sex may express particular prejudices or allow a life only within a limited culture, there does not seem to be any such analogue for intelligence. Selecting for intelligence will not automatically narrow a child’s future options for marriage, financial security, or involvement in numerous

21 Davis, Genetic Dilemmas: Reproductive Technology, Parental Choices, and Children’s Futures, p120. 22 See, eg: Richards, M. and Ponder, M., (1996) ‘Lay Understanding of Genetics: A Test of a Hypothesis’, Journal of Medical Genetics, vol.33(12): 1032-36; Richards, M., (1996) ‘Lay and Professional Knowledge of Genetics and Inheritance’, Public Understanding of Science, vol.5: 217-30. 23 However some, such as Agar (‘Liberal Eugenics’) have raised concerns that if Gardner’s theory of multiple intelligences (discussed in Chapter One) turns out to be right, then this will allow parents a means by which to effectively limit some intellect-related abilities of their children when enhancing others. 214 Chapter Six –Two objections to enhancement cultures. Rather, enhanced intelligence could provide Julian with more options to effectively increase the range of life plans that he could choose for himself.

Three counter-arguments

My second response to the right to an open future suggests that this right will not necessarily preclude parents from choosing the putative intelligence of their children. However, before concluding my account of this argument, it is important that I address three interesting counter-arguments.

A failure to recognise ‘unwanted’ options?

A first potential problem in enhancing intelligence is that in permitting the enhancement of intelligence, we may be failing to recognise that there could be some options that it is better not to have. Say that a there was a couple that valued a basic and simple life, without unnecessary technology or complexity (not unlike the Amish culture). If a child within this context was enhanced, then this may remove their ability to experience and enjoy the value that is this simplified existence.24 Due to constant wonderment or questioning, they may be tempted away from this type of life. Proponents of this counter-argument would claim that rather than having an optimal number of futures, it is instead important to assess the value of the current future that this child has, then questioning whether this value would be preserved if the enhancement took place.

This is an interesting counter-argument. If, in enhancing children, parents inadvertently pave the way for their children to ultimately leave their own culture, then arguably a loss has occurred. These children will no longer have the ability to partake of the particular value of their own culture. However, is it really better to constrain children’s access to other options for their lives? In not allowing them to make an informed choice, their parents may even be deceiving them. Removing options on a child’s behalf to ensure that they grow up experiencing a particular environment is not always appropriate. An alternative approach would be to make a variety of options

24 This was the argument raised by the Amish community in the case of Wisconsin v Yoder. See Feinberg, ‘The Child’s Right to an Open Future’, for a full discussion. 215 Chapter Six –Two objections to enhancement known to children (which could include the enhancement of intelligence), to eventually allow them to make an informed choice.

Additionally, the analogy upon which the objection is based fails. To argue that an enhanced child living within a simple culture would lose the ability to enjoy the value of this simplified existence is to ignore a significant problem. As John Harris has argued:

[W]hereas a person exposed to and using technology in everyday life is denied the opportunity to live without such things, a person with the intelligence to appreciate sophisticated choices is not thereby obliged to exercise these choices… [I]ndeed intelligence will enable the individual to choose between sophisticated and simple pathways by having an adequate appreciation of the consequences of both [the simple and complex life].25

Would Julian limit his own future instead? Could his options actually be reduced?

A second potential problem with my argument is that in arguing that Julian’s future would be open because his parents would not become overbearing or act deterministically to limit his future options, I have discounted the potential for Julian himself to subjectively limit his future as a result of his parents’ intervention in his intelligence. That is, regardless of the conduct of Mr and Mrs Bashir, Julian himself could perceive his parents conduct as directive towards a particular life plan. Although he wanted to become a doctor from a young age, Julian may have discounted any other interests that could have emerged as he grew older, as he may have felt ‘driven’ to best exploit the enhanced intelligence that his parents had given him.

A third potential problem is that enhancing his intelligence may not actually enhance the openness of Julian’s future.26 Rather than increasing his options, enhancing intelligence could actually serve to reduce them; as by being more intelligent, Julian could actually desire or recognise less options.27 To appreciate this

25 Personal Communication, Professor John Harris, 16 September 2002. 26 I thank Dr Rob Sparrow for bringing this objection to my attention. 27 In another paper, Feinberg discusses a person on a train travelling non-stop to one destination, unable to divert to any branch tracks. Although the branch lines are technically available, they are 216 Chapter Six –Two objections to enhancement concern, imagine a chess game.28 A player of exemplary standard really only ‘sees’ a few good moves whilst playing a game. An average player, on the other hand, may see hundreds. The great player may have originally seen these too, but would have immediately discounted these options as being of inferior quality. So even though technically a more intelligent person may have more choices, they may feel that many of them lead nowhere. Will Julian’s future really be open if he merely has options that he is never going to exercise?

Again, these second and third concerns are worth noting. It is important not to merely assume that increasing intelligence will provide a person with more options, or that if parents were not overbearing then an open future for Julian would result. However, having options open to us does not of itself equate with the openness of our futures, as we also need to take into account the quality of the options. An average chess player may indeed see many moves, but the fact is that most of these are bad ones. The third objection in particular may therefore actually imply that if we desire lots of bad options, then this may be acceptable. What we should be considering therefore is: if we were to expand options, what sort of quality would the new options have?

Summary

In this section, the argument that enhancing intelligence will limit a child’s open future has been considered. Proponents of this argument state that parents should act to preserve future options of a child – they should not in any way restrict a child’s ‘future autonomy’. Enhancing intelligence imputes a particular value judgement about the type of life that parents will desire for their child to lead.

However, I have argued that even if one were to concur with Feinberg and Davis’ concerns about the need for an open future, this does not give any strong reasons to limit the enhancement of intelligence. Making this kind of assertion ignores the fact that typically, parents do not display overbearing conduct towards their children even

not available to this person. If a person is compelled towards a particular end, then they do not have true liberty. See: Feinberg, J., (1980) ‘The Interest in Liberty on the Scales’, (in his) Rights, Justice and the Bounds of Liberty: Essays in Social Philosophy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp30-44. I thank Dr Darren Shickle for drawing my attention to this reference. 28 I thank Professor Julian Savulescu and Dr Rob Sparrow for this example. 217 Chapter Six –Two objections to enhancement though most parental interventions will limit a child’s future in some way. Additionally, given appropriate education and counselling, parents are unlikely to be genetic determinists. Indeed, enhancing intelligence could even increase the openness of a child’s future. Moreover, there are also reasons to doubt the right to an open future itself.

Overall, in respect of the right to intimacy and privacy that belonging to a family has, it is important not to interfere unless it is justifiable to do so. This may necessitate an acceptance that parents can limit the range of lives that their children can lead, provided that this is not unreasonable. Nonetheless, it is important to flag the potential problem of parental overconcern with the genetic origins of their enhanced child. This should be kept in mind when counselling couples about using genetic enhancement.

6.3 Enhancements of intelligence and leading an authentic life

Another important objection to the enhancement of intelligence is that using a genetic or pharmacological intervention to boost a child’s intelligence could prevent him from ever becoming his ‘authentic self’. That is, intervening to boost intelligence in this way may prevent the child from becoming ‘who they were meant to be’. Consider again Julian Bashir, our character from Star Trek. The following is a further synopsis of what happened to him in future episodes:

Over twenty years on from his enhancement, Julian Bashir has become a brilliant medical doctor, serving with Deep Space Nine. He excels in response to the various challenges that practising and researching in intergalactic medicine provides. He is well-liked and respected by his colleagues.29 Indeed, he finds great satisfaction in being able to so successfully achieve goals that he has had as long as he can remember.

However, a seeming disaster strikes Dr Bashir. Due to his achievements and excellent demeanour, he is chosen as the model doctor for the long-term Medical Holographic Program, where a holographic doctor in his image and likeness will serve numerous subspace communication stations. As a part of developing the

29 See: http://mario.lapam.org/ds9/bashir.htm (accessed October 8, 2001). 218 Chapter Six –Two objections to enhancement

hologram’s psychological profile, his parents are invited to Deep Space Nine.30 Whilst there, they inadvertently revealed their secret to the Deep Space Nine crew: they had chosen to have Julian’s mental skills illegally genetically enhanced when he was 6 years old.

Their revelation rekindled many of Dr Bashir’s past reactions to his parents’ decision. Whilst he was an obviously gifted physician, Dr Bashir had always been ‘psychologically crippled’, plagued by self-doubt and bitterness about his parents’ actions. He could ‘never shake off the disturbing feeling that his parents had rejected the original Julian’.31

Further, after the initially stunning news, other crewmembers began to wonder just how much of the doctor’s brilliance was actually his, thus mirroring the undermining thoughts that Dr Bashir had held about himself all his life. The crew thought that the reason Julian became a successful medical doctor was because of his enhancement, not because of any acts that were really his.

That is, all of Dr Bashir’s achievements smacked of ‘inauthenticity’.

This scenario raises numerous questions. Are the reactions of the crew rational - Is Dr Bashir really an inauthentic doctor? What about Julian’s personal feelings that his original self was somehow thwarted from development, which has meant that his ‘new self’ was plagued by questions of his genuineness? To be sure, an intuitive reaction to such questions could be that yes, Julian is inauthentic, as were it not for his enhancement, he may not have become a doctor and developed that particular identity. Here, however, I will argue that although we do need to be wary of concerns with inauthenticity, this problem does not provide us with good reasons not to enhance intelligence.

30 For further information, see: http://mario.lapam.org/ds9/bashir.htm and http://www.geocities.com/Area51/Nebula/4156/profile/biography/biography.html 31 http://www.geocities.com/Area51/Nebula/4156/profile/biography/biography.htm (Accessed October 8, 2001). Emphasis added. 219 Chapter Six –Two objections to enhancement

What is meant by ‘authenticity’?

Prior to proceeding, it is important that I first establish what I mean by ‘authenticity’.32 Lionel Trilling and Charles Taylor were among the first to describe an ‘ethic of authenticity.’33 According to Taylor, authenticity is the moral ideal of ‘being true to oneself,’34 to really ‘lead a life of one’s own’. It is thus the moral force behind our self-fulfilment, where we respond to our ‘inner calling’, our inner source of the good, to then pursue a particular project:35

There is a certain way of being human that is my way. I am called upon to live my life in this way, and not in imitation of anyone else’s.36

If we do not do this, we are inauthentic and miss what life is truly about. We become unoriginal and conformist, foregoing finding out about our life from within. Taylor is concerned that if I were inauthentic, I may not be able to realise ‘a potentiality that is properly my own.’37 In acting inauthentically, we are not truly acting as ourselves, but as someone else, as someone who had these different values would act.

But, why would we want to be authentic? How might enhancing intelligence affect it? According to Vadas, if we are not authentic, then this will lead to feelings of disorientation and disturbance, displacement and alienation.38 Further, the benefits from acting inauthentically may be shallow, as if one acts in this way, she could feel that ‘the goods which have accrued to this [inauthentic] self are not hers, but someone

32 It is important to point out that the concept of ‘authenticity’ has been widely discussed, particularly with regard to theories of autonomy. Here, my aim is not to summarise all of these theories. Rather, it is to highlight how this interesting concept may invoke an important objection to the enhancement of intelligence. 33 Trilling, L., (1972) Sincerity and Authenticity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; Taylor, C., (1991) The Ethics of Authenticity (originally published as The Malaise of Modernity). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 34 Taylor, The Ethics of Authenticity (originally published as The Malaise of Modernity), p15. 35 Ibid, p17. 36 Ibid, p28. 37 Ibid, p29. 38 Vadas, M., (1989) ‘Why be Authentic?’ Idealistic Studies, vol.19: 16-27, p17, 18. 220 Chapter Six –Two objections to enhancement else’s’,39 regardless of whether we actually receive some good end or not. She illustrates this idea:

We act inauthentically, hoping to gain some end, but the rewards of such inauthentic action are ashes in our mouths. It seems to us that these rewards are not ours.40

To gain happiness from achieving some end (and perhaps to gain the respect of others for that act), we do need to feel that it is our act that has caused this good to come about. If we are inauthentic and ignore our inner self (perhaps having regard to other more objective goods), then we may feel as if someone else deserves the goods that our actions have led to. If this process of receiving goods with dissatisfaction continues, it will ultimately lead to alienation from the self.41

How could enhancing intelligence affect authenticity?

In enhancing intelligence, parents such as Mr and Mrs Bashir could inadvertently pave the way for inauthenticity in their children. Julian, who grows into the adult Dr Bashir, is able to achieve great goods from his skills, yet feels that these are not truly his, that his life was not really his own as a result of the enhancement.

It does seem as if Julian is indeed alienated from his achievements. Julian has been unable to discover himself, as his true self may have been lost as a result of the enhancement. However, contrary to what someone like Taylor might be worried about, it was not Julian himself who removed his inner self, replacing it with a new self; rather it was the result of his parents’ actions in enhancing him. Does it matter that Julian was looking into an enhanced (as opposed to a natural) self in acting out his desire to become a doctor? Meyerson thinks it does.

Meyerson, drawing from Mill, believes that we can thwart the development of authenticity in others, as authentic behaviour is only that which truly pictures one’s natural inclinations:

39 Ibid, p24. 40 Ibid, p24. 41 Ibid, p25. 221 Chapter Six –Two objections to enhancement

[O]ur desires and impulses are our own when they are the expression of our own nature, as developed and modified by culture. [A person can be likened] to a tree which needs to grow and develop “according to the tendency of the inward forces which make it a living thing.”42

Meyerson claims that each of us has a normal or proper range of lines of growth, which reflect our natural temperament and talents. Thus Myerson would be concerned that enhancing intelligence could lead to a person possessing intelligence out of step with their true nature, as it could push someone in a direction not suited to their natural endowment:

Ideally, our natural endowment is cultivated and built on as we come to maturity. Our parents and educators start the process off, enabling us gradually to play an ever increasing role in the maturing and perfecting of our basic dispositions. But the environmental influences to which we are subjected can also fail to respect our natural bent, forcing us in alien directions and providing a poor foundation for our own future efforts at developing our potentialities.43

If this is true, then any influences on the development of Dr Bashir’s character may provide an obstacle to him becoming authentic. Reflecting Taylor’s concerns above, we must be wary of locking people into particular roles or stereotypes. If Julian is indeed an inauthentic agent who had been exposed to these influences, then any ideas or desires he creates may not truly be his own.44

Concerns over inauthenticity

Concern over the enhanced Julian leading a life which is not truly ‘his’ requires some further discussion. No one would desire a world where people are not living authentic lives, where they may be living in the equivalent of Nozick’s experience machine.45 There are at least three concerns with enhancing Julian’s intelligence that arise from this ‘ethic of authenticity’.

42 Meyerson, D., (1998) ‘On Being One’s Own Person’, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, vol.1: 447- 66, p460, citing Mill’s On Liberty in the final sentence. 43 Ibid, p461. 44 Ibid, p455. 45 Nozick, R., (1974) Anarchy, State and Utopia. New York: Basic Books, p42-5. 222 Chapter Six –Two objections to enhancement

First, there is concern that the enhancement has not allowed Julian to ‘be true to himself’. He has not been allowed to lead a life that was based on his own potentiality, as his true self was augmented at age six by the enhancement. So Julian may be living the existence of ‘someone that he is not.’

The drug Prozac has recently been raised as a model of how enhancement might interfere with authenticity. Prozac is known to enhance sociability, concentration and creativity and reduce depression. However, there are concerns about how using Prozac could disturb authenticity. Carl Elliott states:

It would be worrying if Prozac altered my personality, even if it gave me a better personality, simply because it isn’t my personality. This kind of personality change seems to defy an ethic of authenticity.46

Second, there is a concern that the goods that Julian has gained from his achievements as a result of the enhancement will always feel shallow or superficial to him. This concerns the relationship between authenticity and the meaningfulness of his life. Using the drug may have removed Julian’s sensation that his life is really his, such that his achievements seem only to be attributable to his enhancement.

The third concern is that others may judge him as undeserving of his intelligence; that his intelligence does not belong to him. Other members of Deep Space Nine seem to think that artificially enhancing intelligence is not an appropriate means to leading the life of an authentic doctor on board the ship.

The value of ‘struggle’

A related concern, which I will consider before evaluating the above concerns, is that truly authentic actions also require some struggle or striving on behalf of the agent performing the action. Some theorists, proceeding from this kind of idea, have claimed that failure or suffering is constitutive of an authentic action. Some reasons for this are that:

46 Elliott, C., (1998) ‘The Tyranny of Happiness: Ethics and Cosmetic Psychopharmacology’, in E. Parens, (Ed). Enhancing Human Traits: Ethical and Social Implications. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, pp177-88, p182. 223 Chapter Six –Two objections to enhancement

• Vulnerability or struggle can be important for our self-awareness, self- formation, or our character development. Suffering can lead us to ‘appreciate what we have’, to find greater meaning in our lives.

• If we suffer or fail, then when we do succeed, this success will have a much greater value than if we had not experienced suffering. This will give us a greater sense of achievement.

• Effort itself contributes value to our projects, as we feel that we really achieve a goal when we contribute effort and labour. If we were merely able to wish for a particular end, would this decrease its value?47

If enhancement of intelligence were to become widespread, is there a chance that such values could be lost? The enhancement of his intelligence may make many activities easier for Julian. This does seem to promote the idea of a ‘quick fix’, rather than valuing the ‘struggle’ with which we often attain our great achievements in life. Consequently, this may prompt society to turn away from vulnerability and imperfection.

To be sure, if enhancing intelligence were to effectively remove all struggle and striving, or to protect people from vulnerability in their everyday projects, then we could say that we had lost something of value.48 Yet if we imagine how enhancements of intelligence would work in practice, it seems clear that such an outcome would be quite unlikely. Often it is good for persons to overcome difficulties via struggling and striving, rather than being handed a solution. But, it is not clear how the enhancement of intelligence will preclude these kinds of struggles. Consider this from Dr Bashir’s perspective. Has the enhancement removed struggle from his life? Of course not. Although genetically enhanced, Dr Bashir has still had

47 Adapted from Savulescu, J. (1994) Good Reasons to Die. PhD Dissertation: Centre for Human Bioethics, Monash University, Australia, p185-189; McKenny, G.P., (1998) ‘Enhancements and the Ethical Significance of Vulnerability’, in E. Parens, (Ed). Enhancing Human Traits: Ethical and Social Implications. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, pp222-37; and Parens, E., (1995) ‘The Goodness of Fragility: On the Prospect of Genetic Technologies Aimed at the Enhancement of Human Capabilities’, Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal, vol.5(2): 141-53. 48 It is important to be careful about lauding experiences of suffering as a desired state. Experiencing vulnerability or struggle will not always lead to emotional growth, and it is also possible for persons to experience emotional growth though success. 224 Chapter Six –Two objections to enhancement to do the same amount of learning, interacting, growing up and self-realisation that all of us have had to. He had to work hard to get into medical school. He has worked hard since graduation to ensure that he assimilated himself both professionally and personally into the Deep Space Nine crew. The enhancement may have given him skills that he would not have otherwise had, but it was Julian who then utilised these to pursue the life plan he had chosen for himself. Even if we are all smarter, we all will still be faced with unintended events and challenges. Enhanced cognition may actually assist us to deal with such problems.

Increasing intelligence might even increase the struggle that a person may experience. Returning to the example of the chess game, it doesn’t become easier for even a grand master of chess. If anything, the game becomes more of a struggle, as each move needs to be considered and planned and turned over in the player’s mind more so than for a player who has less understanding of the consequences of their move.

It is not obvious therefore that enhancing intelligence will prevent experiences of striving or struggle in people’s lives. It would however be problematic if our lives consisted only of enhancement-assisted achievements and values. Yet the use of enhancement to allow us to focus on a few of our main projects may be acceptable, as this will not of itself destroy experiences of striving and struggle. Still, it will be important to remember that if achieving a goal is linked with a particular kind of difficulty, then this goal will only ever truly be achieved if that specific difficulty is overcome. If my goal is to obtain the answer to a complex problem in philosophy, then I have really only truly achieved that goal if I solve the problem myself, as the goal is linked to the difficulty of the problem, rather than if someone else were to give me the answer.

Having claimed that enhancing intelligence will not necessarily remove the experience of struggle from our lives, I’ll now return to the three other concerns with the enhancement of intelligence and potential authenticity problems that I outlined above.

225 Chapter Six –Two objections to enhancement

Could enhancement lead children to become ‘someone that they are not’?

The first concern was that Julian would in effect not be living his own life; that he has become ‘someone that he is not’, as he was not allowed to progress naturally from his own potentiality.

I am not convinced that enhancing Julian’s intelligence could have spoiled his chances of achieving an authentic life by damaging his chances of ‘finding’ his true self. DeGrazia argues that it is possible to lead an authentic life, even if one had deliberately undertaken a process of self-transformation.49 He claims that descriptions of the authentic life seem to presuppose that our ‘self’ is something static deep inside us, waiting to be discovered and be true to, something he disagrees with. We need instead to have a view of the self as amorphous and malleable, so that we are entirely self-creating people. Additionally, rather than focussing on the means of the intervention, he argues that we should see all interventions instead as part of the broader process of self-creation. He claims:

One can be true to oneself even as one deliberately transforms and to some extent creates oneself.50

What is also important is how self-creation relates to issues of identity. DeGrazia adopts a conception of identity where what one identifies with is definitive, where it is possible to self-create to a reasonable extent. He then claims that it is possible to be an authentic person, who still values altering himself or herself to be what they identify with. Therefore, he argues that one can authentically be enhanced as part of a project of self-creation, as the recipient needs to examine what is authentic for them. It should not be society’s role to determine what is in another’s best interests. I am inclined to support DeGrazia’s position.

Yet, there is an obvious problem DeGrazia’s response as it applies to Julian Bashir. So far, it seems as if (according to DeGrazia) authenticity is not incompatible with self-creation, provided that you are acting in agreement with what you value

49 DeGrazia, D., (2000) ‘Prozac, Enhancement and Self-Creation’, The Hastings Center Report, vol.30(2): 34-40. 50 Ibid, p35. 226 Chapter Six –Two objections to enhancement about your identity. This argument assumes that a competent person is making the decision. Obviously, deciding for children is a different, special issue. In our society we have extensive legal and ethical instruments to ensure that decisions that parents make for their children are in their best interests. If parental consent is ever in conflict with the best interests of the child, then the State is likely to intervene. Regarding Julian, the ideal self that would be taken into account in the enhancement decision would be those of his parents, projected onto him. They would be the people best placed to understand his developing identity and values. But is this acceptable?

Here, I reach a similar point to that which I reached above regarding the right to an open future above. That is, as long as his parents do not project their values and expectations onto him in a limiting way (and enhancing his intelligence does not overtly alter Julian’s identity or personality), then it is within his parents’ role (and within the intimacy and privacy of the family unit) to decide about the intervention based upon their values. Julian should also be given the right to be involved in the decision if he appears able to.

In so far as Julian has struggled and strived, then his achievements are his, not his parents. It should not make any difference whether the intelligence with which he obtained these achievements was given to him by luck or by his parents.

Additionally, it seems fairly arbitrary to single out ‘unnatural’ interventions such as enhancements as the sole basis for inauthenticity. Dr Bashir has become the person he is due to a variety of interrelating factors, including his biological disposition, environmental influences, chance effects and his genetic enhancement. Why should his enhancement be singled out – this alone was not enough to change his ‘self’ away from his natural potentiality, or to expose him to influences to move his development away from what his natural potentiality dictated. Other events in Julian’s life (from learning to ride a bike… to his first day of high school) could have had similarly drastic effects on his continually evolving self-concept, yet we do not make the same charge of inauthenticity towards events that were due to chance.

Also, it is problematic to suggest, as Meyerson has, that it is always important to let the ‘natural unfold’. For if we broadly embraced this principle, disastrous and unjust consequences may unfold – should we not intervene to correct a congenital 227 Chapter Six –Two objections to enhancement heart defect, for example? Overall, therefore, the charge that Julian’s life is inauthentic cannot be substantiated. Julian is still leading his existence, adapting to his own continually evolving self-conception, eking out his own life.

Will enhancement give people only superficial experiences of the good life, and mean that they are judged by others as undeserving?

I’ll now briefly consider the second and third concerns over Julian’s enhancement and his authenticity. These were that due to his enhancement Julian would only have a shallow (as opposed to an authentic) experience of the goods he was able to create after being enhanced. Additionally, other crewmembers on Deep Space Nine viewed his achievements as inauthentic, as they were not truly ‘his’. As we have seen in my response to the first concern, however, these would not be a rational response, as the enhancement of intelligence can be incorporated into an evolving self-identity. Further, Julian has subsequently used his enhancement to work hard for the ends he has achieved. The challenge is thus to counsel Julian and his colleagues into accepting this response to their views, or to change the way in which society views enhancement.

Summary

In sum, it seems that being genetically enhanced can be consistent with leading an authentic life. Moreover, it can actually increase Julian’s chances of doing what he really wanted to do, reflecting his self-identity of wanting to be a doctor. Enhanced intelligence will have value for the enhanced individual, yet it will not provide a quick and easy route to achieve any imaginable life project. What it will do is help people to achieve specific projects more efficiently.

It is however important to ensure that if we allow for development of the self via an enhancement intervention, that this does not come to be considered as the wisest (or the only) path available51 – it should still be important to address issues of ‘emotions, family relationships, or school environment’.52 With respect to enhancing

51 Ibid, p39. 52 Diller, L.H., (1996) ‘The Run on Ritalin: Attention Deficit Disorder and Stimulant Treatment in the 1990s’, Hastings Center Report, vol.26(2): 12-18, p14. 228 Chapter Six –Two objections to enhancement intelligence in children, these constraints translate to adequate class sizes, appropriate parental involvement, adequate access to professionals where necessary and an appreciation of the diversity and value of childhood. If these factors are removed by enhancements, this could lead to the recipient leading an inauthentic life.

6.4 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have built upon the ‘moral landscape’ I developed in the previous chapter, by discussing two important objections to enhancing intelligence. I outlined both a child’s right to an open future and the important interest a person has in leading an authentic life. I have suggested that neither of these concerns can render enhancement as impermissible.

Now, such a claim is obviously controversial. However, my analysis is subject to two important constraints. The first is that if they choose to enhance their child’s intelligence, parents must ensure that they then keep a reasonable range of futures open for their child, between which she will be able to exercise autonomous choice. Additionally, parents must take all the steps they can to ensure that enhancing intelligence will not lead to conflicts in their child’s self-identity as they grow up.

When these are coupled with the constraints I developed in the previous chapter, it is apparent that this constitutes a fairly restricted defence of enhancing intelligence. Some of these constraints would even conflict with how enhancement will develop, if current trends continue.

There is also yet another issue which requires recognition. Although children’s interests are not at high risk of being undermined, provided that the constraints I have articulated here and in the previous chapter are respected, what about those of parents who will be exercising choice about the enhancement? It is to this question that I now turn.

229

Chapter Seven

7 HARD CHOICES: IS THERE A COST IN ENHANCEMENT DECISION-MAKING?

Costs to couples of the choice to enhance intelligence

7.1 Introduction

Thus far, I have examined the applications of genetic research into intelligence from the perspective of the person who will be subjected to them. That is, I have considered putative benefits and harms to the recipients of both genetic tests for, or enhancements of, intelligence. Now, I turn to a different issue – whether the decision to choose genetic selection (or enhancement) of intelligence is one that could cause harm to the people that undertake such choosing.

Choice is undoubtedly something we all value, most strikingly given its importance to our ability to lead truly autonomous lives. Gerald Dworkin, however, has suggested that increasing the choices that people can make is not always a costless process. This raises the question of whether increasing couple’s choices in reproduction by allowing them to make new ‘genetic selection choices’ will carry significant costs.

In this chapter, I examine the potential harms that couples may face when making selection choices. It is well-understood that practitioners of clinical genetics place substantial value upon individual choices and decision-making; yet to date very little discussion has taken place as to whether exercising an expanded amount of procreative autonomy could ever carry a cost for couples. Consider the following:

Paul and Jane are carriers of a genetic disease. To avoid undergoing pre-natal diagnosis and potentially facing a decision to terminate the pregnancy, they opt to undergo pre-implantation genetic diagnosis and IVF.

Of six embryos, two are affected and four are not. Their doctor then asks if they would also like to know the potential intelligence of the four unaffected embryos.

Should Paul and Jane have been offered this choice?

230 Chapter Seven – Hard Choices?

For Paul and Jane, being offered and then making the choice to select for intelligence may carry a number of unique costs, which form the subject of this chapter. To evaluate these, I first discuss the value of being able to make choices in procreation. I then consider several costs that could detrimentally affect couples’ choices to use genetic selection.

I argue that for couples to have choices in procreation is generally something to be valued. However, I also recognise that giving couples genetic selection choices will only be good if it increases the total range of desirable options that they have. In determining whether genetic selection presents a desirable option, I argue that genetic selection choices may carry some costs, but that these are not significant enough to warrant overriding procreative autonomy. I conclude by suggesting some risk minimisation strategies that could facilitate couples’ genetic selection decisions.

Although I argue that they do not warrant the prevention of genetic selection choices, it is important that these potential costs have been identified. This is because it will become imperative to convey these potential problems to couples during the process of obtaining informed consent for genetic selection (or enhancement).

7.2 What is the value of having choices?

To determine whether it is in couples’ interests to have genetic selection choices, it is first necessary to discuss some of the existing reasons that have been given for the value of having choices per se. This is something that is generally considered to be a part of the good life. According to Mills, for example:

We want to believe that the central facts of our lives… contain in them some fundamental element of our own selection and decision… it seems to have something to do with the value we place on autonomy, self-governance, self-authorship.1

It is, however, difficult to articulate exactly what the value of choice is. Support has been given in the literature for both an instrumental and an intrinsic value of choice. As such, I will briefly discuss both here.

1 Mills, C., (1998) ‘Choice and Circumstance’, Ethics, vol.109: 154-65, p154. 231 Chapter Seven – Hard Choices?

An instrumental value of choice?

There are several reasons why having choices could be instrumentally valuable.2 First, having more than one option to choose from can increase potential well-being, as it may increase the probability that a person can obtain what they want. For example, say that the London Met decides to change its ticketing system. Rather than having different kinds to tickets available for different lengths and distances of journeys, all people, no matter where they were travelling to, would now be required to buy a daily, zone 1-6 ticket. This would not suit everyone. Although everyone would technically be able to utilise such a ticket, for some it would be superfluous to their needs, whilst for others (say who usually purchased a weekly ticket), it would require an unnecessary disruption to their daily commute. Having different ticketing options available increases the chances that people are going to be able to find a kind of ticket that best suits their journey, which will therefore increase people’s potential satisfaction.

A second instrumental value of choice is that giving people choices may serve to validate the choice of an existing option. Say that Paul and Jane, the couple discussed above, are also having difficulty conceiving a child due to Jane’s history of endometriosis. They explore alternative options for having children, such as In Vitro Fertilisation, gamete donation and adoption. After evaluating each alternative, they decide that they will not utilise any of these options and will let ‘nature take its course’. However, they express to their practitioner: “We are glad that we at least now know that we will be childless by choice”. Paul and Jane are still in the same situation that they would have been in had they not been offered these options, but they feel that their existing option has been validated by their active decision not to utilise any of the alternatives.3

A third instrumental value of choice is that the act of making a choice can allow scope for individuals to develop their character and gain self-knowledge. Suppose

2 Dworkin, G., (1988) ‘Is More Choice Better than Less?’ (in his) The Theory and Practice of Autonomy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Mills, ‘Choice and Circumstance’; and Scanlon, T., (1988) ‘The Significance of Choice: Lecture 2, The Value of Choice’, The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, vol.8: 177-85. 3 Mills, ‘Choice and Circumstance’. 232 Chapter Seven – Hard Choices? that all people were allocated by an independent administrative body into various relationships, vocations and lifestyles. Although a particular person could indeed be satisfied with her situation, she would have missed out on the self-reflection and contribution to self-understanding that typically results from making these types of choices.

A final instrumental value of choice is that the act of making choices contributes to a person’s role in society. Being allowed to make choices indicates social acceptance or belonging. If a parent is judged by society to be unable to provide basic goods for their children, the State will usually intervene and remove his or her right to care for the child (or children) affected. Here, the State has made a judgement that this parent is unable to fulfil a particular social role.

Although all obviously important, several have argued that these instrumental values do not seem to capture what it is about choice that people fundamentally value.4 This suggests that the value of having choices may not be merely instrumental in nature.

An intrinsic value of choice?

Several explanations of the factor ‘missing’ from the above description s of choices’ instrumental values have been offered. For example, Mills suggests that above all else, the value of choice may be explained in the way that having a choice relates to living an authentic life.5 That is, people want their lives to be something that they actively participate in, not merely something that happens to them. Choice can also be considered as intrinsically vital to a person’s ‘intentional agency’, whereby a person is expressing their moral agency in the choices she makes.6

However, the kind of choices a person has is also relevant. If a person had a wide range of choices, but none were meaningful or all were awful, then this would not contribute to her agency. Consider Raz’s examples of the ‘man in the pit’ and the

4 Ibid. 5 Ibid, p164. I discussed authenticity in greater detail in the previous chapter. 6 Hurka, T., (1987) ‘Why Value Autonomy?’ Social Theory and Practice, vol.13: 361-82, p362/4, cited by Mills, ‘Choice and Circumstance’, p158. 233 Chapter Seven – Hard Choices?

‘hounded woman’. A man is confined to a pit. His choices are very limited: whether to eat now and sleep later, or sleep now and eat later and so on. The hounded woman is trapped on a desert island, with all her energies dedicated to trying to escape from a fierce carnivorous beast. Both of these people have choices, but neither has an adequate range of options. Their choices are either trivial, or equally horrendous.7 Most of us would not value having choices, if it meant that we had to be in such a situation of extreme deprivation.

According to Dworkin however, choices do not have intrinsic value. He argues:

Suppose someone ranks three goods A, B, and C in that order. Then… there will be A, B and C such that the person prefers a choice between B and C to receiving A. This will occur whenever the utility of having a choice between B and C plus the utility of B is greater than the utility of A. This seems to me irrational… why should I prefer to receive my second-ranked alternative to my first?8

However, Dworkin seems to overstate the significance of ‘intrinsic value’. For even if choice does have intrinsic value, this does not imply that it has overriding value and should never be displaced. Anything of value always needs to be considered within the context of other things of value. Therefore, contrary to Dworkin’s claim above, it is indeed possible that I could value being given A more than I value choosing between B and C (the choice itself). Having the ability to choose between options is generally better than simply having certain outcomes determined by another, as long as a meaningful range of choices is presented.

Therefore, the value of choice seems to involve a mixture of instrumental and intrinsic values. I have summarised these values of choice in Table 7-1.

7 Raz, J., (1986) The Morality of Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press, cited by Mills, ‘Choice and Circumstance’, p161. 8 Dworkin, ‘Is More Choice Better than Less?’, p80. 234 Chapter Seven – Hard Choices?

Table 7-1: The Values of Choice

Instrumental 1. Choice can increase potential well-being, as it may increase the probability that people can obtain what they want; 2. Giving people choice may serve to validate the existing options that they may have; 3. Making a choice can be a source of personal satisfaction, as it allows scope for individuals to develop their character; and 4. Making choices contributes to the role of people in society by indicating social acceptance or belonging.

Intrinsic 1. Having choices relates to living an authentic life, as it allows for deliberation; and

2. Choice is vital to a person’s ‘intentional agency’; people expresses agency better when they have choices.

7.3 Potential costs of genetic selection choices

So far, I have suggested that choice is valuable as it contributes to our intentional agency and the authenticity of our actions, among other reasons. However, in examining this value of choice, I have given only minimal consideration to the optimum amount of choice that people should be presented with.

Several modern theorists have discussed the value of various ‘amounts’ of choice. For example, Rawls included ‘rights and liberties’ in his list of primary goods.9 He claimed that it is rational for any individual to be offered as much of any primary good as possible, as they ‘are not compelled to accept more if they do not wish to,’ and that a person does not ‘suffer from a greater liberty.’10 Hurka also stipulates that choices have a direct relationship with autonomy, as the ability to exercise more choice contributes to a freer life. Hurka also claims that by making more choices (such as to

9 Rawls, J., (1971) A Theory of Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p92. 10 Ibid, p142-143. 235 Chapter Seven – Hard Choices? choose, A, but also to choose not-B and so on) an agent has a greater causal impact upon the world.11

However, extra choices are not costless. Contrary to the normative assumption that ‘for the rational individual more choices are always preferable to fewer,’12 Gerald Dworkin has argued that it will not always be rational to increase choice. He presents several costs to indicate that having extra choices is not necessarily always desirable. Here, I consider three of his costs that are relevant to genetic selection, which I have summarised in Table 7-2:

Table 7-2: Potential costs of the choice of genetic selection

1. Decision-making Costs; personal resources (such as time and money) can be lost in making the decision; 2. Responsibility Costs; one’s moral responsibility for choosing a particular option increases when there are more options to choose from; and 3. Coercive Costs; social pressures or legal sanctions could sway individuals to make a particular choice which they would not have made otherwise.

These costs can be utilised to examine how couples’ interests may be harmed by adding genetic selection choices to the suite of choices they can make. Schelling, for example, is doubtful of the value of increasing couple’s reproductive choices. He asks:

Will people be glad to have this choice available? Or will it just add one more decision to make, one more source of conflict, one more opportunity for remorse, when life is already full enough of decisions?13

Consider Paul and Jane again. In evaluating the option of embryo selection, what processes would they have to undergo to consider the option? How responsible will they be for their decision to have a child utilising genetic selection? What if they feel

11 Hurka, ‘Why Value Autonomy?’ 12 Dworkin, ‘Is More Choice Better than Less?’ p63. 13 Schelling, ‘Choosing our Children’s Genes’, p200. This comment is made in the context of sex selection. 236 Chapter Seven – Hard Choices? responsible? Would their choice truly be their own, or is there a potential for coercion? How harmful would this be?

Decision-making costs

Dworkin draws our attention to the costs that people often incur in acquiring the necessary information to make well-informed and reasonable choices. These ‘decision-making’ or ‘transaction’ costs can include the time involved in obtaining information about different options and the effort that will be involved in making a decision between alternative options. He claims that:

The proliferation of products, services, and so-forth, hailed with much enthusiasm as the chief virtue of competitive markets, brings with it the need to know more and more to make intelligent choices.14

This problem is also recognised by Harry Frankfurt, who in criticising Rawls’ above position states:

[P]ossessing more of a primary good may well require of a responsible individual that he spend more time and effort in managing it and in making decisions concerning its use. These activities are for many people intrinsically unappealing.15

Additionally, as some of the studies discussed below illustrate, there are other costs in decision making, additional to those of expending time and effort. In making decisions, people can face costs such as misunderstanding of information, and feeling anxiety as a result of that misunderstanding.

Decision making costs in enhancement

Consider how transaction costs might affect Paul and Jane’s choice to undergo genetic selection. What decisions would they have to make and how complex would they be?

Given that we attach importance to both intelligence and reproductive decision- making, Paul and Jane’s choice to select an optimal intelligence profile is not one that

14 Dworkin, ‘Is More Choice Better than Less?’ p66. 15 Frankfurt, H., (1988) ‘Equality as a Moral Ideal’, (in his) The Importance of What We Care About: Philosophical Essays. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, pp134-58, p157. 237 Chapter Seven – Hard Choices? they would take lightly. To make an informed decision, they would be likely to devote a significant amount of time and effort to examining the available options. They would also want to understand the technology involved, including any risks. Further, in selecting for intelligence, Paul and Jane would want to understand the personality, health and quality of life characteristics that would correlate with intelligence.

Unlike the majority of current choices in reproduction, such as whether to test a foetus for the presence of trisomy-21 (Down Syndrome), genetic selection decisions will almost certainly lead to only a probabilistic outcome. Whilst deciding to undergo selection for intelligence may reduce uncertainty about the intelligence level of Paul and Jane’s future child, they will not be able to predict this with any certainty.

Indeed, using genetic information to make reproductive decisions about complex genetic diseases and traits will not be straightforward. As I discussed in Chapter One, complex traits are characterised by the involvement of numerous genes, with each gene not necessarily contributing equally to the phenotype. Additionally, for all complex traits, there is also a significant modifying role of the environment. Paul and Jane will therefore be faced with probabilistic ‘risky’ information. Consider again the scenario that I presented in Chapter Four:

Researchers have recently announced that they had mapped over 125 of the genes involved with high intelligence. Within these 125 genes, they identified 30 alleles that they considered to be particularly important. However, a selection of 12 – 17 of these was considered to be enough to contribute to an above-average intelligence score. The researchers have developed a table of probability, which indicates a ‘range’ of intelligence test scores predicted by different combinations of genes. For example, one particular combination indicated a 70 percent probability that a person would achieve a score above 110 on a standard IQ test, assuming a reasonably standard upbringing and childhood.

This scenario is only a simplistic representation of the kind of information genetic research into intelligence could provide. However, it illustrates the complexity that beginning to utilise this information in reproductive decision-making could lead to. The choice that Paul and Jane would be offered may not be one that will only offer benefits – making choices in embryo selection could also involve having to ‘trade-off’

238 Chapter Seven – Hard Choices? between various probabilities for particular traits. Making this sort of decision could create a significant cost for Paul and Jane.

To consider the gravity of this potential cost, it is important to consider how Paul and Jane are likely to comprehend complex behavioural genetic information about intelligence and how they will respond to the probability scenario that I have just outlined. To predict how Paul and Jane might react, empirical literature on the knowledge of and attitudes towards genetic information per se can be examined.

How well is complex genetic data understood by the public?

To some extent, how couples like Paul and Jane might experience transaction costs can be considered via an examination of how the public understands this kind of complex genetic data. If there is generally a poor understanding of concepts such as heritability, or the inheritance of complex traits, then this may create a risk that couples such as Paul and Jane may face a serious decision-making cost. They may have to dedicate more time and resources to coming to terms with selection technology and its expected outcomes if they have less understanding of complex genetic information.

Several studies have assessed knowledge of and attitudes towards the heritability of behavioural traits. With respect to intelligence, people generally have a ‘middle of the road’ perspective on the roles of genes and environment.16 Zeidner and Beit Hallahmi found that 47 percent of participants thought that the environment was the primary factor determining intelligence, 32 percent said heredity and 20 percent were undecided. Nilsson and Ekehammar suggest that these attitudes are also informed by political beliefs.17

Studies have also been undertaken to examine public knowledge of (and attitudes towards) complex genetic diseases. Evidence from these studies suggests that due recognition is given to both genetic and environmental contributions to multifactorial

16 Zeidner, M. and Beit Hallahmi, B., (1988) ‘Israeli Students’ Perspectives Concerning Determinants of Intelligence’, Journal of Social Psychology, vol.128(4): 517-23. Students participating in this study were not directly asked if they held an interactionist view of the causes of intelligence. 17 Nilsson, I. and Ekehammar, B., (1989) ‘Social Attitudes and Beliefs in Heredity: A Replication and Extension’, Personality and Individual Differences, vol.10(3): 363-65. 239 Chapter Seven – Hard Choices? traits.18 For example, diseases such as breast cancer are not considered to be a straight progression from a ‘faulty gene’ to the onset of cancer. Yet, complex genetic information may also often be understood in terms of immutability and inevitability (that is, a person’s genes ultimately lead to a pre-determined outcome that cannot be influenced),19 though this varies with a person’s age, gender and social class.

One study in particular indicates a warning about public interpretations of genetic information. Senior et al undertook a study that involved giving subjects vignettes of information about the risk of a disease.20 This information was given either in genetic terms, or was unspecified. They found that if the information given to individuals was about their genetic makeup, then they viewed their risk with a more fatalistic attitude.

Another pilot study by the same research group examined parent’s perceptions of health information about their infant children, in the context of familial hypercholesterolemia.21 This disease can have a genetic predisposition, but is controllable by diet and drug therapy. Here, the researchers provided the information about hypercholesterolemia to parents phrased as either diagnostic information, or as the results of a genetic test. They found that:

When the test was seen as detecting a genetic problem, the condition was perceived as uncontrollable and, hence, more threatening.22

As two mothers in this study stated:

It’s the word hereditary that sets the alarm bells ringing… it sort of suggests that there is nothing you can do about it.23

18 Richards, M., (1997) ‘It Runs in the Family: Lay Knowledge about Genetic Inheritance’, in A. Clarke and E. Parsons, (Eds). Culture, Kinship and Genes: Towards Cross-Cultural Genetics. Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, pp175-94 p188. 19 Marteau, T., (1999) ‘Communicating Genetic Risk Information’, British Medical Bulletin, vol.55(2): 414-28, p416. 20Senior, V., Marteau, T.M., and Weinman, J., (2000) ‘Impact of Genetic Testing on Causal Models of Heart Disease and Arthritis: An Analogue Study’, Psychology and Health, vol.14: 1077-88. 21Senior, V., Marteau, T.M., and Peters, T.J., (1999) ‘Will Genetic Testing for Predisposition for Disease Result in Fatalism? A Qualitative Study of Parents’ Responses to Neonatal Screening for Familial Hypercholesterolaemia’, Social Science and Medicine, vol.48(12): 1857-60. This qualitative study involved a relatively small sample size and did not include people from different cultural backgrounds. 22 Ibid, p1857. 240 Chapter Seven – Hard Choices?

Hereditary levels, as I understand it, cannot be affected by diet. So you know, I feel as though this death sentence has been put on my little boy.24

This finding is interesting, as it indicates that although there may be good ‘population-based’ knowledge about the causes of complex genetic disease,25 once that information is applied on an individual level, this can then lead to a greater emphasis upon the genetic information, whilst discounting other relevant factors. This can generate further costs to individuals when making decisions about genetic information, as a misunderstanding can vastly affect one’s levels of well-being. This could also have implications for the children of these parents who were provided with genetic information, as this could affect parents’ subsequent behaviour to minimise the potential for disease.

This choice of genetic selection for intelligence is at risk of creating a serious decision-making cost. If the trend discussed by Senior et al does extend to behavioural traits, then there is a potential that providing genetic selection could create genetic determinists. If these attitudes of individuals and couples towards genetic information remain consistent across the spectrum of genetic traits, then couples such as Paul and Jane may indeed attribute greater significance to genetic information when considering the development of intelligence. Their choice could mean that they are constantly ‘watching and waiting’ for their child’s intelligence to develop. This could also have implications for the development of a relationship with their child.

Decision-making costs should not be over-interpreted

This is, of course, a bad outcome. However, we also need to recognise that this potential for over-emphasising genetic information will not necessarily by typical of all couples who are considering genetic selection. Just as there will be couples who may over-interpret the significance of genes in the development of their child’s intelligence, not all couples will be fatalistic. Couples’ attitudes to genetic information about

23 Ibid, p1859. 24 Ibid. Full Medline and Web of Science searches have failed to find any other studies that assess parental attitudes to genetic information. 25 Richards, ‘It Runs in the Family’; and Richards, M., (1996) 'Lay and Professional Knowledge of Genetics and Inheritance', Public Understanding of Science, vol.5: 217-30. 241 Chapter Seven – Hard Choices? intelligence will be context-sensitive, dependent upon their attitudes towards both intelligence generally and their knowledge of genetics. Their attitudes will also be informed by their personal goals and the other options they have available. They will also have regard to the potential consequences of their choice.26 Further, Scarr has shown that once people become aware of their own talents or shortcomings, they take an active role to try to shape their environment accordingly.27 It is reasonable to assume that couples would adopt a similar role with their selected children.

The significance of decision-making costs can therefore be limited by an appeal to the contextual nature of decision-making. Yet, this claim obviously also creates a responsibility on the part of selection service providers, to go to reasonable lengths to ensure that they communicate to couples that their service will not provide a guarantee of high intelligence.28

Responsibility costs

Another kind of cost in increasing choices identified by Dworkin is that of greater responsibility. Say that Paul and Jane decide to proceed with embryo selection, to maximise the potential intelligence of their child. There are two ways in which their decision could generate a ‘responsibility cost’: the first is that making the decision to select renders them more responsible than they would have been if they had left things to chance. This might be something they wish to avoid. The second is that regardless of whether they are actually more responsible, Paul and Jane are harmed because they feel more responsible.

26 Adapted from Lappé, M., (1993) ‘Risk and the Ethics of Genetic Choice’, in D.M. Bartels, B.S. LeRoy, and A.L. Caplan, (Eds). Prescribing our Future: Ethical Challenges in Genetic Counselling. New York: Aldine De Gruyter, pp57-63, p58. Also see Hoedemarkers, R., (1998) ‘Predictive Genetic Screening and the Concept of Risk’, in A. Clarke, (Ed). The Genetic Testing of Children. Oxford: Bios Scientific Publishers, pp245-64, p257. 27 Quoted by Terwogt, M.M., Hoeksma, J.B., and Koops, W., (1993) ‘Common Beliefs About the Heredity of Human Characteristics’, British Journal of Psychology, vol.84(4): 499-503, p499. 28 They will have to ensure that if parents’ pre-existing conceptions are incorrect, that these are altered. See, eg: Marteau, T.M. and Lerman, C., (2001) ‘Genetic Risk and Behavioural Change’, BMJ, vol.322: 1056-59. 242 Chapter Seven – Hard Choices?

Will others hold Paul and Jane as more responsible?

Dworkin pointed out that responsibility arises when a person acts to bring about changes, as opposed to letting either fate, chance or the decisions of others determine an outcome. As more choices become available, the moral responsibility of the person making the decision might also accrue. Couples such as Paul and Jane may not want this increased responsibility when making selection choices.

Once genetic selection is available, will couples’ responsibility increase to include decisions such as these? According to Strong, it would. He argues that giving couples more choices in reproduction will mean that they will face increased responsibility for the choices they make:

When offspring characteristics are under parental control… there would be a greater tendency to blame parents for their children’s imperfections. The question, “Can’t you control your children?” might take on a darker meaning.29

Consider whether parents should be held more accountable for the outcome of a pregnancy when it was established via genetic selection. Guidelines for genetic counsellors suggest that a presumption of differing responsibility between deliberate and chance events if often helpful in assisting parents to deal with guilt and shame if a child is born with a genetic condition.30 Parents are usually reassured in the event of their child being born with a genetic condition that they had no control over such an outcome. They are also reassured that they are responsible people, but just not responsible for the transmission of their genes.

To be sure, this approach may not be as successful when parents have taken quite a deliberate, specific approach to conceive. Indeed, it is not difficult to perceive that when couples make deliberate choices, then perhaps they should be responsible for the outcome. Consider Paul and Jane again:

29 Strong, C., (2001) ‘Can’t you Control your Children?’ American Journal of Bioethics, vol.1(1): 12-13, p13. 30 See, eg: Kessler, S., Kessler, H., and Ward, P., (1984) ‘Psychological Aspects of Genetic Counseling. III. Management of Guilt and Shame’, American Journal of Medical Genetics, vol.17: 673- 97. 243 Chapter Seven – Hard Choices?

Paul and Jane are currently undergoing genetic selection to avoid a genetic disease. Suppose that they have now also opted to select for intelligence.

Paul and Jane are friends with Rebecca and Mark, who are also trying to have a child, but do not consult a genetics service provider and so are not offered selection. They establish a pregnancy naturally at around the same time as Jane becomes pregnant with an embryo they selected. Rebecca and Mark have therefore not selected their child’s intelligence.

Jane and Rebecca’s children, Lucy and Jack, were born healthy around the same time. Both lead very full lives with a high degree of parental and peer interaction. However, by age 10, both children had developed anxiety disorders.

Should Paul and Jane be held as more responsible for Lucy’s anxiety than Rebecca and Mark?

Jane’s responsibility here may be contingent upon the information that they had at the time of embryo selection. If there were no known association between anxiety and intelligence, or anxiety and the use of reproductive technologies such as pre- implantation genetic diagnosis, is uncertain at the time of selection, Paul and Jane are not responsible for Lucy’s anxiety. Neither should Paul and Jane feel responsible. Counselling should be able to correct any irrational feelings of responsibility.

Suppose however that anxiety did correlate with higher intelligence. If Paul and Jane did know of this correlation when choosing between embryos, then they could to some degree be held responsible for Lucy’s anxiety. However Rebecca and Mark, because they didn’t select their embryo, may be less responsible for Jack’s anxiety than Paul and Jane are for Lucy’s.31 Therefore, Paul and Jane may be more responsible for Lucy’s anxiety (because they chose to select her), than are Rebecca and Mark, who did not select.32

31 Yet if Paul and Jane or Rebecca and Mark did not know of the risk between intelligence and anxiety, or the risk was very low, then Paul and Jane should not be held to be more responsible than Rebecca and Mark. 32 Discounting here the non-identity problem, which I discussed in the previous chapter. 244 Chapter Seven – Hard Choices?

This issue is reminiscent of the debate over the distinction between acts and omissions.33 Here, the act in question is embryo selection. Paul and Jane acted to determine which of their possible children they would have, whilst Rebecca and Mark did not make such a choice. Even if it were assumed that Lucy developing an anxiety disorder might be linked to Paul and Jane’s use of embryo selection, some will undoubtedly argue that there is no moral difference between the actions of the two couples, as the outcome was the same. Others, however, would argue that even if the outcome was equally foreseeable and avoidable, there is a morally relevant difference between Paul and Jane’s act and Mark and Rebecca’s omission.

Although in ordinary morality we often do care about how particular consequences come about, in the case under discussion here it is difficult to conceptualise the difference between Paul and Jane’s act and Rebecca and Mark’s omission. The responsibility of our two couples for their children’s illness may well be related to the choices they made in conceiving, bearing and rearing their children. However, there is something insidious about targeting one direct choice (genetic selection) amongst many others, when Rebecca and Mark’s actions, which just happened not to occur at conception, may have had a similar effect. For example, Rebecca and Mark may have held Jack up to extremely high standards, which caused him to become anxious about his achievements. Even if Paul and Jane did have information about anxiety at the time of choosing their embryo, this should not automatically render them as responsible. If Paul and Jane in good faith believed that in choosing an embryo with higher potential intelligence that this would give the resulting child the best possible life, then it is not clear that they are morally responsible for a sub-optimal outcome.

Therefore, so far as responsibility arising from selection is concerned, the two couples under discussion here should both be held as not responsible for their children’s anxiety, as the means of reproduction have little influence upon this.

33 See, for example: D’Arcy, A., (1963) Human Acts. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Rachels, J., (1975) ‘Active and Passive Euthanasia’, The New England Journal of Medicine, vol.292: 78-80; and Rachels, J., (1986) The End of Life. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 245 Chapter Seven – Hard Choices?

Will Paul and Jane feel more responsible?

If what I have argued above is correct, then Paul and Jane should not be held to be more responsible for the outcomes of selection than couples not using genetic selection are. However, another problem remains: what if Paul and Jane still feel responsible for their decision? For example, Jane might say to Rebecca: “I feel so responsible for Lucy’s disorder. At least you didn’t choose your embryo – you cannot be blamed for Jack’s anxiety.”

Dworkin termed this kind of responsibility cost a ‘psychic cost’; that is, after making a particular decision, Paul and Jane might worry over whether they had might the ‘right’ decisions. They might also wonder how such a decision reflects upon them.

This can also be discussed in a more general sense. Suppose that from the battery of embryos that were created for Paul and Jane, they chose embryo C, which had the highest potential intelligence. After their child’s birth, they found themselves overly concerned with how their child was developing. If Paul and Jane had instead selected at random (and embryo D was implanted) they would have no such responsibility that exists with embryo C. Provided that the child from embryo D still has reasonable intelligence, then isn’t this preferable?

The likelihood of this scenario arising can be evaluated by referring to empirical studies. Literature searches I have undertaken failed to find any substantial discussion of how parents perceive their responsibility for the choices they make for their children during pregnancy. However, an excellent example of a deliberate choice in procreation is that of existing couples who have chosen to utilise assisted reproductive technologies. Of this, the case that best mirrors the problem under examination here is that of couples who undergo in-vitro fertilisation with their own gametes.34 Are parents of IVF children more harmed by the responsibility they have for their procreative decisions than parents who have not utilised IVF?

34A sub-section of this group is parents who also utilise the technology of preimplantation genetic diagnosis, but this group is relatively new, and no studies have yet been published of their experiences. 246 Chapter Seven – Hard Choices?

Many empirical studies have been undertaken in following up over 20 years of parental decisions to utilise IVF technology. Although these studies have not directly assessed whether parents feel harmed by their responsibility, they have examined factors that are reflective of responsibility, including emotional involvement, separation anxiety, perceptions of vulnerability and parental expectations of children.

The majority of these longitudinal studies have indicated that parents who have conceived children utilising IVF technology are not worse-off (and may be better-off) than those who have conceived children using other means.35 They generally found no differences between IVF parents and parents who had conceived naturally with respect to adjustment to parenthood, or the burden they feel in being parents. These studies have also indicated that parents of IVF children do not place excessive expectations for achievement upon their children. They were also more emotionally involved with their child, but were not over-protective or worried about them.

A study by van Balen is interesting as it mirrors the findings of these studies, but found a similar outcome in other initially infertile mothers, who then conceived without the use of IVF.36 This could indicate that if couples have a particular desire (such as optimising intellectual ability) which compels them to make a particular choice (such as genetic selection) then this desire could influence how they perceive and raise their children. Additionally, it may mean that people who make deliberate choices get more out of parenting.

35 See, eg: van Balen, F., (1996) ‘Child-Rearing Following In Vitro Fertilisation’, Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, and Allied Disciplines, vol.37(6): 687-93; Greenfield, D.A., Ort, S.I., Greenfield, D.G., Jones, E.E. et al., (1996) ‘Attitudes of IVF Parents Regarding the IVF Experience and their Children’, Journal of Assisted Reproduction and Genetics, vol.13(3): 266-74; Golombok, S., MacCallum, F., and Goodman, E., (2001) ‘The "Test-Tube" Generation: Parent- Child Relationships and the Psychological Well-Being of In Vitro Fertilization Children at Adolescence’, Child Development, vol.72(2): 599-608; Braverman, A.M., Boxer, A.S., Corson, S.L., Coutifaris, C. et al., (1998) ‘Characteristics and Attitudes of Parents of Children Born with the use of Assisted Reproductive Technology’, Fertility and Sterility, vol.70(5): 860-65; McMahon, C.A., Ungerer, J.A., Tennant, C., and Saunders, D., (1997) ‘Psychological Adjustment and the Quality of the Mother-Child Relationship at Four Months Postpartum after conception by In Vitro Fertilization’, Fertility and Sterility, vol.68(3): 492-500; Golombok, S., Cook, R., Bish, A., and Murray, C., (1995) ‘Families Created by the New Reproductive Technologies: Quality of Parenting and Social and Emotional Development of Children’, Child Development, vol.66: 285-98. 36 van Balen, ‘Child-Rearing Following In Vitro Fertilisation’. 247 Chapter Seven – Hard Choices?

However, some of these studies have also indicated that IVF mothers saw their children as more vulnerable and were more likely to experience separation anxiety when compared to non-IVF mothers.37 As the mother of a 9 year-old child conceived with IVF stated:

I was very concerned about his personal safety and found it difficult to trust caregivers when he was an infant, but he’s turned out to be a very active kid who won’t allow me to be overprotective.38

This could indicate that IVF parents may by harmed by an increased sense of responsibility for their children. However, authors have also suggested that appropriate counselling could mitigate this potential problem. Importantly, these differences have all but disappeared in parents of teenaged IVF children.39

Studies of parents of IVF children have indicated that overall, there are strong suggestions that they have not been harmed from making a deliberate choice in procreation. Therefore, even if there is an increase in responsibility arising from deliberate choices, empirical studies to date do not indicate that this is something that will be harmful.

Empirical studies have also indicated what may occur when couples utilise a reproductive intervention, yet a bad outcome occurs. These studies are relevant to the potential for Jane’s feelings of guilt over Lucy’s anxiety disorder. A recent study by Hall et al examined the outcome for parents if they received a false negative result in Down’s syndrome screening.40 Although there were some negative outcomes when

37 Colpin, H., Demyttenaere, K., and Vandemeulebroecke, L., (1995) ‘New Reproductive Technology and the Family: The Parent-Child Relationship Following In Vitro Fertilization’, Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, and Allied Disciplines, vol.36(8): 1429-41; Hahn, C.-S. and DiPietro, J.A., (2001) ‘In Vitro Fertilisation and the Family: Quality of Parenting, Family Functioning, and Child Psychosocial Adjustment’, Developmental Psychology, vol.37(1): 37-48. The study by Hahn and DiPietro is interesting as it indicated that IVF mothers showed higher separation anxiety when measured by self-report, but that this was not shown when the mothers were independently assessed. 38 Greenfield et al., ‘Attitudes of IVF Parents’, p273-4. 39 Golombok, MacCallum, and Goodman, ‘The "Test-Tube" Generation’. 40 Hall, S., Bobrow, M., and Marteau, T.M., (2000) ‘Psychological Consequences for Parents of False Negative Results on Prenatal Screening for Down’s Syndrome: Retrospective Interview Study’, BMJ, vol.320(7232): 407-12. 248 Chapter Seven – Hard Choices? compared to parents who had declined screening or who chose to continue with the pregnancy:

Overall, the parents in our sample, regardless of screening history, adjusted well to having a child with Down’s syndrome: levels of anxiety, depression and parenting stress and attitudes towards their disabled child were similar to those in parents of unaffected children.41

This study indicates that in making deliberate decisions in reproduction, parents may still take responsibility for that decision and love any child that they have.

Raising children much smarter than their parents?

Another aspect of potential responsibility costs arising from genetic selection is that parents might find that they have chosen to have a child who is actually more intelligent than they are. If there is a significant difference between the intelligence of children and parents, it might be quite difficult to raise such children and establish meaningful relationships with them.

Whilst this potential problem is important to recognise, again it does not seem to provide a significant responsibility cost. There are many situations around the world where parents of average intelligence bear children who are extremely bright. In these kinds of families, parents often turn to support groups to determine how best to raise and support their children. If a similar situation were to arise from selection choices, there is no reason why parents who have utilised genetic selection also could not turn to such groups, if they wished to. These kinds of groups provide support, counselling and advice over a wide range of issues, including family relationships and appropriate ways of working with children to maximise not just their academic potential, but a rounded and well-balanced life. They are viewed as an extremely positive influence upon families with bright children.

In summary, here I have explored the potential cost of increased responsibility from making genetic selection choices. I have claimed that genetic selection should not bring about an increase in parental responsibility, but that even if it does, this will

41 Ibid, p410. 249 Chapter Seven – Hard Choices? not necessarily harm parents. Further, any costs in having children brighter than parents should be able to be overcome. However, if parents were ever to make use of this technology, it will be in everyone’s interests for their selection choice to be closely monitored. It would also be important to allow parents plenty of time for reflection and counselling if they desired.

Now, there is one aspect of responsibility that I have not yet discussed in depth. It is not inconceivable that once genetic selection becomes available, couples might be pressured to make ‘the responsible’ choice. Dworkin discusses this under the heading of ‘coercion’, which I will now discuss.

Coercive costs

Another cost raised by Dworkin in increasing choices is that of coercion. Even if there is more choice, the benefit of this could evaporate if there were social or legal sanctions to encourage individuals to make a particular choice.

Considering the history of eugenics and the denials of freedom this imposed, such a cost is perhaps the most serious that might arise from genetic selection choices. If couples, when faced with the availability of genetic selection, feel compelled to use this technology regardless of their personal attitudes or values, then they may suffer harm as a result. Consider Paul and Jane again:

Paul and Jane have decided to proceed with pre-implantation genetic diagnosis to avoid a genetic disease. They consult their clinician and Jane begins the hormone regime necessary to commence. At one of their consultations, the doctor advises them that it is also possible to select for intelligence. He offers them counselling so that they can discuss this option and off-handedly remarks that more and more couples are now choosing this additional procedure. In the car on the way home, Paul remarks to Jane: “Well, if everyone else is doing it, we better do it too. After all, intelligence is good, isn’t it?”.

I will analyse the pressures that Paul and Jane could face by first establishing whether they are being coerced, or if they are not being coerced, what the factor influencing them might be. I then evaluate whether they could be harmed by

250 Chapter Seven – Hard Choices? influences upon their choices. This will help in deciding how ‘real’ the choice to choose (or not to choose) genetic selection actually might be.

Will Paul and Jane be coerced into making a selection decision?

Take the first question above. Will Paul and Jane be coerced into making a decision about selection? Coercion can be defined broadly as the presence of unreasonable external pressures or constraints one faces when making a decision.42 According to Beauchamp and Childress:

Coercion… occurs if and only if one person intentionally uses a credible and severe threat of harm or force to control another.43

Thus coercion exists when there is effectively no choice but to perform a particular act, even if theoretically a person has more than one choice. A coercive threat is made intentionally and involves threatening harm to those who do not bow to the coercer’s will. Coercion does not necessarily involve reducing the options that one has, but it increases the cost of pursuing the alternative they favour such that the person is worse-off no matter what is chosen.44

As Schelling point out, it is not difficult to imagine such influences upon couples’ decisions to utilise genetic selection for intelligence:

[I]f it became widely believed in social classes that nearly everybody was taking advantage of this opportunity; parents might feel coerced into practising selection not out of any dissatisfaction with the prospective intelligence of their children, but to keep up with the new generation.45

On the above definition of coercion however, it is not obvious that Paul and Jane are facing a coercive threat. What they are experiencing is more an awareness that there are social trends; they might look to the decisions that other couples are making

42 For discussion, see: Nozick, R., (1997) ‘Coercion’, (in his) Socratic Puzzles. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, pp15-44; and Wertheimer, A., (1987) Coercion. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 43 Beauchamp, T.L. and Childress, J.F., (1994) Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 4th Ed. New York: Oxford University Press, p164. 44 Feinberg, J., (1986) Harm to Self. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p192. 45 Schelling, ‘Choosing our Children’s Genes’, p208. 251 Chapter Seven – Hard Choices? and utilise those in making their own decision. There has not been an unreasonable threat made directly towards them. It is also not clear that they will suffer harm if they do not choose genetic selection. This offer may have pressure to confirm, but it is not harmful to Paul and Jane in the way that most coercive offers are.46

Will Paul and Jane suffer harm from this influence?

Although the factor that could influence Paul and Jane’s decision is not strictly coercive in nature, some may argue that there may still be elements of this ‘atmosphere of selection’ that may be harmful to their interests in procreative autonomy. Numerous ethicists have already commented on these. According to Agar:

[P]opular suggestions such as the avoidance of disease or the securing of quality of life threaten to smuggle into individual choices substantive views about human worth… citizens will end up being engineered in accordance with a dominant set of values.47

To be sure, informed consent is clearly a requirement of genetic screening and testing procedures during pregnancy. It would, of course, also be required for genetic selection choices. However this is sure to be influenced by social opinion. Although the influence of what Agar terms ‘popular suggestions’ will be less sinister than coercion, it may hold a significant potential for adversely impacting upon the choices that couples like Paul and Jane make. For example, a recent study has indicated that whilst still small, public support for selecting desirable traits in children is increasing.48

Tom Shakespeare also points out that it is important to examine both the broader social context in which a decision is made and the knowledge that people are given access to when making this decision.49 He argues that there is a need to ‘highlight the collective and social effects of the many individual decisions.’ Shakespeare is also

46 It is not an offer of the ‘your money or your life’ kind. 47 Agar, N., (1998) 'Liberal Eugenics', Public Affairs Quarterly, vol.12(2): 137-55, p137. 48 Marteau, T., Michie, S., Drake, H., and Bobrow, M., (1995) ‘Public Attitudes Towards the Selection of Desirable Characteristics in Children’, Journal of Medical Genetics, vol.32: 796-98 49 Shakespeare, T., (1998) ‘Choices and Rights: Eugenics, Genetics and Disability Equality’, Disability and Society, vol.13(5): 665-81, p665. 252 Chapter Seven – Hard Choices? concerned that the current individual model of decision-making adopted by clinical genetics services obscures the wider social context in which decisions are made:

It is important not to see choice in a vacuum: individual choices are structured and influenced by wider social judgements and pressures.50

Michie and Marteau make a similar point – they claim that couples evaluate their options based on social meanings and social consequences rather than biomedical risk information or abstract ethical principles.51 Shakespeare suggests that the ways to alleviate this problem are to ensure that full information is provided and that the practice of health professionals must be transparent.

Unfortunately, empirical studies have not mitigated Shakespeare’s concerns over the social influences on couple’s decision-making. Many have indicated that even the offer of a specific technology can provide a subliminal expectation that couples should utilise it.52 This could effectively coax a woman along a path to a termination decision that she would not otherwise have chosen. Further, studies have indicated that screening is often presented as obligatory (via the provision of directive advice) and without adequate information.53 Surprisingly, 20 percent of geneticists in English-

50 Ibid, p672. 51 Michie, S. and Marteau, T., (1996) ‘Genetic Counselling: Some Issues of Theory and Practice’, in T. Marteau and M. Richards, (Eds). The Troubled Helix: Social and Psychological Implications of the New Human Genetics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp104-22, p110. 52 Tymstra, T., (1989) ‘The Imperative Character of Medical Technology and the Meaning of "Anticipated Decision Regret"’, International Journal of Technology Assessment in Health Care, vol.5: 207-13; and Marteau, T.M. and Drake, H., (1995) ‘Attributions for Disability: the Influence of Genetic Screening’, Social Science and Medicine, vol.40(8): 1127-32. This study found that women who had declined screening and had a Down’s child were more likely to be blamed for their choice. 53 Gekas, J., Gondry, J., Mazur, S., Cesbron, S. et al., (1999) ‘Informed Consent to Serum Screening for Down Syndrome: Are Women Given Adequate Information?’ Prenatal Diagnosis, vol.19: 1-7; Smith, D.K., Shaw, R.W., and Marteau, T.M., (1994) ‘Informed Consent to Undergo Serum Screening for Down’s Syndrome: The Gap Between Policy and Practice’, BMJ, vol.309: 776; and Marteau, T., (1994) ‘Counselling Following Diagnosis of a Fetal Abnormality: The Differing Approaches of Obstetricians, Clinical Geneticists, and Genetic Nurses’, Journal of Medical Genetics, vol.31(11): 864-67. The study by Gekas et al indicated that Maternal Serum Screening was often imposed by doctors. 253 Chapter Seven – Hard Choices? speaking countries believe that it wrongs society to knowingly give birth to a child with a serious genetic disorder.54

These studies suggest that there are factors that may influence the genetic selection decisions that couples like Paul and Jane may make and that these could cause them to make a decision inconsistent with their values. This factor is hard to define, but involves institutional influences upon reproduction. It is morally important, as studies indicate that this factor may mean that couples are not being allowed sufficient freedom to make truly informed choices.

However, in critiquing the influences upon couple’s opportunities to make truly informed decisions, are we attempting to overcome something that is simply impossible to avoid? After all, we live in a society where many of the decisions we make are influenced by factors from our environment, advertising being a good example. In fact, it is sometimes possible to justify social practices that influence or limit individual freedoms. For example, vaccination and the wearing of seatbelts are compulsory in our society, as this is judged to be in everyone’s best interests.

Indeed, when we argue against social influences on our individual decisions, we may be failing to recognise that sometimes, a technology may simply be unavailable without some element of influence over those who access it. As Dworkin has argued, when cars became available, this unavoidably compelled people to abandon other forms of transportation, such as horse and cart. Yet, the advent of the motor vehicle remains an important contribution to the development of industrialised society. Influences such as these are often intricately and inextricably intertwined with the availability of a new technology.

Regarding genetic selection, this kind of influence must also be contrasted with the fact that it is difficult to determine the distinction between when reproductive technologies are used for the purpose of providing a treatment and when for enhancement. If we were to prevent genetic technologies that influenced people from

54 Wertz, D., (1997) ‘Society and the Not-So-New Genetics: What are We Afraid Of? Some Predictions from a Social Scientist’, Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy, vol.13: 299-346. 254 Chapter Seven – Hard Choices? being available, then this may mean that some treatments would also have to be made unavailable, which would not be desirable.

So, even if couples are influenced by social factors in the decision they make, it does not seem obvious that they will be harmed by this decision. The challenge, however, is to ensure that any external influences on Paul and Jane’s choices are legitimate. According to Mills:

[W]e will always be making our choices against the background of others’ predicted or actual reactions to those choices, so we cannot expect to make our choices in a moral vacuum, influenced by nothing. Others can legitimately seek to influence us in our choices; we distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate influence according to the means used…55

In this section, I have examined the potential for couples such as Paul and Jane to be harmed by being subjected to undue influences when making genetic selection decisions. This potential for influences on couples’ decisions is not insignificant. In fact, there is already evidence to suggest that this is what currently occurs in clinical scenarios. However, to expect an environment of complete procreative freedom may be unrealistic given the ‘technologization’ of today’s society and the allure of new reproductive technologies. Yet couples will benefit if they are able to make decisions with as little influence as possible. What is important is whether the social force on couples is legitimate. In considering genetic selection choices, there is no reason to believe that illegitimate forces upon decision-making will be brought to bear on couples.

7.4 Facilitating genetic decision-making

So far, several problems that couples could face when making genetic selection choices have been identified and discussed. Even though I have argued how the significance of any harm can be diminished for each of the costs I have discussed, it is still important that some lessons or constraints are developed from these costs. It is also important to consider how genetic decision-making might best be facilitated.

55 Mills, ‘Choice and Circumstance’, p161. 255 Chapter Seven – Hard Choices?

Taking these kinds of steps will ensure that couples’ control over their reproductive choices is maximised.

Firstly, there are several lessons that can be drawn from the potential costs of having genetic selection choices available. Regarding decision-making costs in genetic selection, the example I provided in Section 7.3 above illustrates how complex the information used for selection may be. This information will also have to be weighed against other data about risks of the procedure, financial costs and the potential well- being of their child. The lessons here are first that it is important to make policy- makers and service providers aware that couples will be confronted by a vast amount of information of varying kinds. Second, counselling processes should be targeted towards facilitating couples to come to terms with this information.56

Responsibility costs, too, require that we be aware that couples may perceive a significant sense of responsibility for the genetic selection choices that they make. Above, I suggested that parents of selected children should not be held morally responsible, provided that they had good reason to believe that they were giving their future child the best life.57 The lesson here however is that if parents do feel overly responsible for the genetic selection decision that they have made, then known strategies for managing these feelings should be followed. I indicate some such strategies in Table 7-3.

56 Shaw and Dear suggest that it is preferable to present risk information to parents quantitatively (expressed as a percentage risk, for example) if that information is to be used for decision-making. This is preferred to qualitative information, which often leads to differences in interpretation between parents and doctors. See: Shaw, N.J. and Dear, P.R.F., (1990) ‘How do Parents of Babies Interpret Qualitative Expressions of Probability?’ Archives of Disease in Childhood, vol.65: 520-52. 57 However, as I argued in the previous chapter, there may be a difference between the responsibility that couples engaging in selection might face, when compared to the responsibility that ‘enhancing’ couples might face. Yet, as I have argued in this chapter, that difference in responsibility disappears when the choices are considered in a practical context, compared to the myriad of influences that parents have upon their children after they are born. 256 Chapter Seven – Hard Choices?

Table 7-3: Strategies to manage feelings of responsibility

• Normalisation - emphasise to parents that it is normal to feel responsible when choosing to have a child with higher intelligence; • Reframe the responsibility - positively reinforce that as parents, they are responsible people and that they have these feelings because of this. • Limit parents’ liability - for example say that they are responsible for raising their child after birth, but they are not responsible for small risks associated with the genetic selection procedure.58

The potential too for Paul and Jane to be influenced in making their genetic selection decision should not be ignored, particularly given that empirical studies have indicated that influence is already relatively widespread within medical genetic decision-making. The lesson here is that prior to couples utilising genetic selection, service providers should specifically identify this potential problem and take care to avoid covertly conveying unjustified values in counselling sessions. I have summarised these three important lessons in Table 7-4.

Table 7-4: Lessons to draw from the potential costs of genetic enhancement choices

1. Recognise factors that couples are likely to consider relevant when making their decision and counsel around these; 2. Recognise couples’ feelings of responsibility and utilise strategies to limit this; and 3. Ensure as much as possible that couples’ choices are not being illegitimately influenced by social pressures or trends.

In addition to the lessons we need to take from the potential costs of selection choices, we also need to consider how to best facilitate genetic decision-making. There are two things in particular that should be recognised. First, if couples are ever to be offered genetic selection choices, those who are to offer the choice need to be aware of the various factors that couples are likely to be interested in when making their decision.59 There is likely to be great diversity in how and what couples decide.

58 Kessler et al, ‘Psychological Aspects of Genetic Counseling. III. Management of Guilt and Shame’, p682. 59 Adapted from Shiloh, S., (1996) ‘Decision-Making in the Context of Genetic Risk’, in T. Marteau and M. Richards, (Eds). The Troubled Helix: Social and Psychological Implications of the New Human Genetics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp82-103. 257 Chapter Seven – Hard Choices?

Their choice is also likely to reflect their own experiences. These factors are depicted in Table 7-5.

Table 7-5: Factors affecting couples’ genetic decision-making

• Characteristics of the trait; • Reversibility /permanence of the decision; • Relationship of the trait to couples’ values; • Certainty with which the trait can be predicted; • Interpretation of the information given in counselling;60 • Desire to have children; • Experiences with existing children; and • Social norms about an acceptable choice.

Additionally, despite the enormous emphasis upon choice in the provision of clinical genetics services, there is little understood about how couples may best make these decisions. One suggestion by Huys et al could help to limit problems associated with decision-making costs.61 Couples such as Paul and Jane could be counselled to imagine a few possible outcomes that could arise from their choice; and think about how they would handle each outcome, using their current knowledge and attitudes. Additionally, Pancer et al suggest that complex expectations of parenthood should actually be encouraged, as these can be beneficial for reducing anxiety after birth.62

60 See, eg: Frets, P.G., Duivenvoorden, H.J., Verhage, F., Ketzer, E. et al., (1990) ‘Model Identifying the Reproductive Decision After Genetic Counseling’, American Journal of Medical Genetics, vol.35(4): 503-9. 61 Huys, J., Evers-Kiebooms, G., and d’Ydewalle, G., (1992) ‘Decision Making in the Context of Genetic Risk: The Use of Scenarios’, in G. Evers-Kiebooms, et al., (Eds). Psychosocial Aspects of Genetic Counseling. New York: Wiley Liss, pp17-20. 62 Pancer, S.M., Pratt, M., Hunsberger, B., and Gallant, B., (2000) ‘Thinking Ahead: Complexity of Expectations and the Transition to Parenthood’, Journal of Personality, vol.68(2): 253-80. 258 Chapter Seven – Hard Choices?

7.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have addressed the question of whether the choice to genetically select the intelligence of future children an option that will harm couples. Through an analysis of the value of having choices and the potential costs that increasing choices can lead to, I have identified some ways in which couples may be harmed as a result of the choice of genetic selection.

I have argued that the choices of genetic selection (and by implication, genetic enhancement63) may carry some costs, but it is unlikely that these will overwhelmingly harm couples. However, this does not mean that genetic selection will always be in couples’ best interests. Therefore, the most sensible action will be to proceed slowly and to take advantage of the many risk minimisation strategies advanced above.

Additionally, we need to recognise that there will be great diversity in couples’ attitudes towards this technology and that individual values and experiences will be important. Universal predictions about psychological responses to information cannot be made. Instead, individual attitudes to this information should be emphasised.

A particularly important aspect of this analysis is that it is vital that couples are made fully aware of the potential harms of genetic selection choices to give full informed consent. As such, all the potential harms I have discussed above should be incorporated into counselling couples who are considering genetic selection (or enhancement) of intelligence.

Upon this analysis, it is therefore acceptable to include genetic selection choices within the scope of procreative autonomy, although such a claim needs to be qualified by recognition that this is not a choice that all couples will want to make. There should also be effective checks in place to ensure that couples do not feel overly or inappropriately influenced to utilise this technology.

63 Subject to a potentially significant difference regarding responsibility, as discussed above and in the previous chapter. 259

Chapter Eight

8 FINAL CONCLUSIONS

What are the considerations that dictate acceptable uses of genetic data about intelligence?

The aim of this thesis has been to critically assess the issues arising from molecular genetic research into intelligence. This has involved assessing both the research itself and its potential applications. It has also involved the development of some relevant considerations as to how research results should be used. In undertaking this analysis, I have begun to fill a conspicuous gap in bioethics literature, as this is the first analysis to assess ethical issues in behavioural genetics utilising a framework combining ethical and empirical approaches. This represents progress towards a practically-based, ethically-derived solution towards an emerging problem in genetic research.

Now, the issues surrounding the debate over genetics and intelligence are large in number and diverse in content. Indeed, existing controversy over this research spans several disciplines, involving concepts as challenging as eugenics and justice. Whilst I have recognised the controversial context of this research, it has been impossible for me to cover all these components in significant depth.

Bearing this limitation in mind, I have attempted to find a way in which these broader issues could all be respected, yet where detailed ethical discussion about the use of research results could still take place. To do this, I proposed a central research question, namely: ‘Should the results from this research be used for clinical genetic tests, selecting intelligence or modifying intelligence?’ Through asking and answering several important questions derived from this central question, my answer to this question is now: ‘yes, subject to several important constraints’.

The main theme within my argument is that once we develop realistic expectations about the value of intelligence, the research being undertaken and its applications, there may be some valid reasons for undertaking this research. There may also be some valid reasons for utilising research results in applications such as

260 Final Conclusions genetic tests for intelligence, or genetic enhancement. When the research is understood in its appropriate context, there is less reason to fear the technology. Indeed, many of the fears seem to be based on an irrational genetic determinism. Yet, another important aspect of this work has been the presentation of several constraints upon each application of this research. Unless such constraints are recognized as valid limiters of this research, its applications may be unethical.

One of the main contributions of this work is a definition of the factors that parents and individuals will need to be counselled about if they are to make an informed decision to use any of these technologies.

These constraints constitute a most important contribution to the debate over this research (and indeed to debates about genetic technology generally) as they represent one of the first attempts to look beyond merely accepting or rejecting arguments for or against a particular project, to instead consider what would be necessary if a particular technology were ever to be accepted.

I began my study by identifying some preliminary, yet important, issues that would need to be addressed prior to discussing the interests of individuals. These included: what was intelligence? What were the controversies associated with measuring it? What limitations does this provide us with? What research is being done? What do researchers expect to find? Here, I suggested that there are several plausible theories of intelligence, some of which focus on a central intelligence ‘factor’, some which emphasise more discrete abilities. Whatever theory of intelligence might eventually be adopted, similar ethical issues will arise once researchers begin to undertake genetic investigations. I also reviewed the main way in which intelligence is measured and suggested that those who might consider introducing genetic tests for intelligence should not forget the controversies over its measurement.

Regarding genetic research, several things need to be recognised. The first is that there is evidence for a heritable component of human intelligence. The second, equally important message is that any differences in intelligence between people are due at least as much to differences in the environment they have been exposed to. The goal of genetic research into intelligence is not to merely identify genes involved; if successful it will actually provide a great deal of information about the environment. 261 Final Conclusions

An important product of this chapter was the development of constraints on the use of molecular genetic data about intelligence, which includes the recognition that:

• Other genetic and non-genetic factors will influence gene expression, such as pleiotropy and variable expressivity;

• That knowledge of a genetic component to intelligence does not affect how alterable it is; and

• That intelligence will not be entirely predictable from genetic data.

It was also important that I analysed the reasons why people are opposed to this research, to ensure that my research questions were legitimate and relevant. I first identified several classes of reasons why people were opposed to this research: that the scientific method and the definitions employed are invalid; that the research will lead to a genetically determined view of intelligence; that the research results will be used inappropriately; that ‘eugenic’ applications of the research will result; and that the research yields difficult resource allocation problems. Collectively, I termed this the ‘radical critique’ of the research. I then analysed each of the aspects of this critique and argued that whilst the critique was well-founded, it was also subject to several limitations and counter-arguments. Yet, the critique was still important, as it provided a framework of key concerns that required further analysis or clarification in subsequent chapters.

The very issue of genetic research into intelligence is presumed on the assumption that intelligence is of value. But is it? Another issue also lacking from debates over behavioural genetics has been the question of the value of intelligence, from both a philosophical and empirical perspective. I argued that intelligence would be valued, at least to some extent, on any of three accounts of well-being. I also identified a significant amount of empirical literature to support this claim. It would, of course, be a mistake to value intelligence to excess, or to neglect to recognise that the intelligent are a heterogenous group. However, intelligence is very valuable to individuals, as it equips them with the relevant abilities to handle complexity in their everyday lives and facilitates access to other personal and social goods. I also suggested that being intelligent contributes to a person’s capacity to act autonomously. 262 Final Conclusions

Having discussed several issues relevant to the debate over genetic research into intelligence, I then turned my attention towards analysing ethical issues that will arise in the application of research results. One such application was genetic testing.

Regarding the ethical acceptability of genetic tests to predict intelligence, I argued that such tests were permissible for both competent and incompetent persons, subject to several important constraints. These would include: offering tests only by individual request; providing high-quality behavioural genetic counselling to explain the results and mitigate fatalistic beliefs; not simply providing a ‘score’; and avoiding unfair labelling of both individuals and groups. Genetic testing should also not become the routine way of measuring intelligence. Children should only be tested if their parents can demonstrate a legitimate reason for wanting such information, or better still, if there was an effective intervention available in light of test results. Additionally, it is important to recognise the very real potential for harm that still exists in psychometric intelligence testing. If there are any indications that genetic testing will have similar results, then it should not be pursued.

Another, more difficult potential application of research results from genetic research into intelligence is the potential for genetic enhancement of intelligence, not least because traditionally, this invokes claims of ‘eugenics’, ‘designer babies’ and a ‘brave new world’. I negotiated these and many other objections to the enhancement of intelligence, yet argued that such objections do not provide a categorical rejection of enhancement.

The position I took was that either genetic selection or enhancement might be acceptable, provided that several conditions are adhered to. Among the conditions that I emphasised were the recognition of the value of some traditional means of learning (such as the contribution of learning interactions to the parent-child relationship) and that allowing enhancement should not preclude viewing intelligence in an overly mechanistic (or, biological) way. It would also be important to recognise an intrinsic value for intelligence (as opposed to its instrumental value for things such as making us more competitive with our peers), yet to still recognise that intelligence is not the only attribute of persons that should be valued.

263 Final Conclusions

I also provided a detailed analysis of two objections to enhancements of intelligence – that they will deny an enhanced child both her open future and an opportunity to lead an authentic life. Whilst I argued that these two objections were not significant enough to warrant preventing enhancement, they added two constraints to how enhancements should be used. These were that if parents are to enhance their children’s intelligence, then they should ensure that they keep open a reasonable range of options for their child and that it should be ensured that this will not lead to future conflicts with the recipient’s self-identity.

The final issue I addressed also concerned genetic selection and genetic enhancement, yet examined the potential for harm to those who choose enhancement for another, not the recipients themselves. I gauged this harm in terms of the costs that people might face when exposed to the new choice of genetic selection, compared to the general value of being able to make choices. I argued that whilst genetic selection choices may carry some costs and do provide important procedural lessons on how this technology should be offered, these are not significant enough to warrant that we override the presumption of parental autonomy.

However, it is vital that parents receive adequate individual counselling around these issues, so that they can give full informed consent. Counselling should canvass the complexity of the genetic factors involved and feelings of parental responsibility. Additionally, it should explore parents’ motivations and influences for requesting selection in first place.

This thesis offers a number of important outcomes and achievements. First, I have provided a significant analysis of many important issues surrounding genetic research into intelligence, incorporating theoretical and empirical scholarship from philosophy, genetics and psychology. This constitutes an important attempt to reconcile opinion from different disciplines and to make this varying scholarship relevant in an ethical context. Second, I have offered new treatments of many arguments within bioethics as they apply to intelligence. Along the way, I have challenged several popularly accepted principles, such as that there should be a presumption against genetic testing in children, or that the right to an open future provides a strong argument against enhancement. Finally, I have suggested a number

264 Final Conclusions of ways in which the results from this research might be able to be utilised, subject to some important constraints.

To summarise, some of the important constraints that should be regarded if technologies such as genetic testing or enhancement are ever to become a reality include: the safeguarding of the interests of children in choosing their life plans; the safeguarding of parental interests in freely choosing to use the technology; the protection of the interests of various social groups which could be targeted by the research; and a recognition of the limitations in the predictive properties of behavioural genetic information.

Considering that genetic research is quickly advancing, this research also has wider implications for research into traits other than intelligence. Indeed, genes more closely related to our everyday lives are being announced all the time; the ‘fat’1 gene and the ‘obsessive grooming’2 gene being two fairly recent examples. The problems that I have discussed here, including interpreting genetic data, questioning the value of a trait and considering what sort of applications of the research should be allowed – are also likely to arise in investigations of many other traits.

Several opportunities for future research arise from this work. Whilst I have discussed questions such as the definition of intelligence and the potential for the success of the research, it is important that such questions continue to be monitored. Equally important is that the effect of this research upon group differences be observed to ensure that no group is being unfairly disadvantaged. It is worth noting that organisations such as The Hastings Center in the United States have already begun to address the need for research into such issues. Additionally, there is significant scope for further analysis of the value of intelligence and how theories of its value should inform theories of social and distributive justice. It is particularly interesting to question whether the State should have a role in distributing intelligence (via enhancement), given its apparent value. Finally, in this thesis, I have offered many varied constraints upon utilising the results of intelligence research. It seems

1 http://www.eurekalert.org/pub_releases/2001-12/cshl-fgd121701.php (Accessed 3 January, 2002) 2 http://www.cnn.com/2002/HEALTH/conditions/01/02/grooming.gene.reut/index.html (Accessed 3 January 2002). 265 Final Conclusions obvious that the citing of such constraints leaves open the question as to how it can be ensured that they are met in practice, or what further policy considerations may be required. There is certainly a need to investigate how these technologies should be practically managed. As a brief aside, I would argue that it would be desirable for health professionals (or other service providers) to have some capacity to act as gatekeepers to the technology in dialogue with parents, if coupled with substantial guidelines. Policy-makers alone should not have the ultimate controls. It is additionally important that policy-makers do not discount the voices of those who will most be affected by this technology – the families themselves.

As I indicated at the outset, my argument about genetic research into intelligence is that of a qualified acceptance. I have identified several ways in which we can think about this research. It would be desirable for policy-makers to take such considerations into account when deciding what an appropriate response to this research may be. As such, I hope to have moved the debate beyond its usual sticking points of definitions and scientific validity, to address some of the most important questions that we may soon be facing in reality.

266

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288

Appendix One

THE INTERSECTION OF THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL RESEARCH IN BIOETHICS

Issues generated by genetic research are sure to mount as more advances are made. Whilst using moral theory to derive broad principles will be valuable to analyse issues in new technologies, theoretical analysis alone may often be unable to determine the best course of action.

A reason for this is shortcoming is that genetic technologies have already begun to affect people’s lives. For example, people are already utilising reproductive technologies to avoid passing on a genetic disease. Once genetic information about traits also becomes available, then these complexities are sure to manifest. Therefore, when developing arguments about new research, it is important to also look towards empirical information about issues such as genetic and reproductive decision-making and the quality of life for people who live with particular traits. This kind of data will be helpful to determine how people are likely to cope with particular kinds of information and how it will affect decision-making. Empirical research can inform debates in bioethics in numerous ways, as I show in Table A1.

Table A1: The contribution of empirical studies to bioethics

Empirical studies can: • Identify certain previously unappreciated ethical issues; • Show how ethical concepts may be misunderstood or which can lead to bad consequences in practice; • Undermine existing ethical concepts by showing how they may be inconsistent when applied in real situations; and • Show how recognised ethical concepts fare when placed in a practical context.1

1 Braddock, C.H., (1994) ‘The Role of Empirical Research in Medical Ethics: Asking Questions or Answering Them?’ Journal of Clinical Ethics, vol.5(2): 144-47; Pearlman, R.A., Miles, S.H., and Arnold, R.M., (1993) ‘Contributions of Empirical Research to Medical Ethics’, Theoretical Medicine, vol.14: 197-210. 289 Appendix One

If bioethical research is undertaken without regard to empirical factors, there is a risk that the outcome of any such research will be inapplicable to the practicalities of everyday uses of genetic technologies. Indeed, the genre of empirical research in bioethics is now increasing in popularity.

However, it is important to appreciate the shortcomings of empirical approaches. One commentator recently pointed out that empirical study in bioethics might pose questions more fundamental than the validity of the statistics, methodologies and conclusions that can be used to answer them.2 Additionally, data that describes current practices or beliefs should not be used in a normative way to recommend future action or policy. Empirical questions alone cannot tell us whether something is ever morally justifiable and if so, under what conditions.

Still with exercise of due caution, empirical data can have utility to provide a connection with reality when considering complex theoretical questions. According to Pellegrino:

Properly used, such data can help to explain and to understand the sources, attitudes, reasoning and motivations that impel human beings… To that end, empirical data are indispensable, and empirical studies should be encouraged. 3

Therefore, as the questions I pose in this thesis are complex and necessitate a multi-disciplinary approach, virtually every chapter of this thesis gives due regard to empirical outcomes. These are quite varied. In Chapter Three, for example, I have used empirical studies of the lives of highly intelligent people to inform my theoretical analysis of the value of intelligence. In Chapter Four, I refer to studies about the impact of psychometric tests for intelligence, to help determine whether genetic tests for intelligence should be permitted. In Chapter Seven, I examined the outcome of couples choosing to undergo IVF to consider some of the ‘costs’ of genetic enhancement. In this chapter I also analyse studies about how people perceive the significance of genetic information, to gauge how significantly parents might perceive

2 Pellegrino, E.D., (1995) ‘The Limitation of Empirical Research in Ethics’, Journal of Clinical Ethics, vol.6(2): 161-2. 3 Pellegrino, p162. 290 Appendix One behavioural genetic information if they were given the opportunity of genetically influencing their child’s intelligence.

291

Appendix Two

CHARACTERISTICS OF GENETIC DATA ABOUT INTELLIGENCE

How we think about ethical issues arising from genetic research into intelligence will depend upon whether we think that the kind of information that genetic research will provide us with is significantly different from other kinds of genetic information, such as that provided to patients within medical genetics. The kinds of issues that arise from this research may only be comparable in a limited way to those that we currently face.

In this Appendix, I discuss the characteristics of genetic data about intelligence and the significance that knowledge of genes influencing intelligence might have for our understanding of genetic determinism. I argue that genetic factors about intelligence are distinguishable from both medical genetic information and any information about intelligence that people may obtain from other sources, such as the results of a psychometric test.

Is genetic information about intelligence different?

I’ll first consider the characteristics of genetic data about intelligence. Within bioethics, there is currently dissent over whether genetic information can be considered as significantly different from other kinds of information that we have about ourselves. Indeed, some have suggested that the lack of differences between these kinds of information means that genetic information cannot be singled out for ethical analysis or lawmaking. Instead, it should be treated as other kinds of information are. Contrary to this position, I argue here that genetic information about intelligence is distinctive and does warrant a separate analysis.

According to Murray, if special treatment of genetic information were to be warranted, it would ‘have to be distinctive and especially sensitive’.1 He argues that in

1 Murray, T.H., (1997) ‘Genetic Exceptionalism and "Future Diaries": Is Genetic Information Different from Other Medical Information?’ in M.A. Rothstein, (Ed). Genetic Secrets: Protecting Privacy and Confidentiality in the Genetic Era. Yale University Press, pp60-73, p64, emphasis added. 292 Appendix Two a medical context at least, genetic information does not meet such a requirement. What happens when this test is applied to genetic data about intelligence?

It seems obvious that genetic information about intelligence will be sensitive – the considerable media coverage and public discourse about this research is testimony to this, as are the campaigns by individuals and organisations to have the research banned.

To determine whether behavioural genetic information is distinctive, however, I need to make two comparisons. First, I will ask whether genetic information about intelligence is distinguishable from non-genetic information, a question that also draws upon the more general question of whether genetic information per se is distinctive. Second, I question whether genetic information about intelligence is significantly distinctive when compared with medical genetic information. I argue that the answer is a ‘yes’ on both counts.

Is genetic information about intelligence distinctive when compared to non-genetic information?

In principle there seems to me little difference between information about a person’s genes, and how it is treated, and information about his or her intellectual abilities, psychological qualities, appearance, and past medical history, and how these are treated.2

I will argue here that a distinction can be made between ‘genetic’ and ‘non-genetic’ information about intelligence. ‘Genetic’ information seems to suggest something like lots of DNA bases in a row, or bands on an electrophoresis gel, somehow signifying the potential intelligence of an individual. On the other hand, ‘non-genetic’ information about intelligence incorporates information such as the results of a psychometric test. The results of an IQ test are a typical kind of ‘non-genetic’ information, however a description of factors in a person’s environment could also provide ‘non-genetic’ information about her intelligence.

2 Benjamin, J., (1998) ‘Genes for Human Personality Traits’, Science in Context, vol.11(3-4): 357-72, p366. 293 Appendix Two

Consider why genetic information per se is often claimed to be distinctive.3 Common features about (medical) genetic information that may render it distinct from non-genetic information include claims that it:

• Uniquely identifies particular people;4 • Can be obtained from a small amount of material (perhaps even without the person being present); • Has predictive properties - the results of a genetic test can give people information about their future health before symptoms develop; • Can be obtained before a person is born; • May indicate a risk for other genetically related family members or future offspring; • May be of relevance to third parties, such as insurers and employers; • Can be shared by members of larger communities beyond the individual or family, such as Tay Sachs disease in populations of Ashkenazi Jewish descent.5

Applying these to genetic information about intelligence illustrates why genetic data about intelligence will be distinctive. Indeed, it is difficult to think of any kind of non-genetic information about intelligence that would possess all of these properties.

Contrary to something like an IQ test, genetic data about intelligence will provide a unique profile of the individual – it is likely to provide a greater degree of ‘personal’ information. Considering the number of alleles that are supposedly involved in intelligence, it would be less likely for two individuals to share the same genetic profile, whereas in considering the way in which IQ tests are constructed, it is more likely that they could have the same intelligence profile.

3 See, eg: Annas, G.J., (1993) ‘Privacy Rules For DNA Databanks: Protecting Coded Future Diaries’, JAMA, vol.270(19): 2346-50. 4 This of course does not include monozygotic (identical) twins. 5 Annas, ‘Privacy Rules For DNA Databanks’; Annas, G.J., Glantz, L.H., and Roche, P.A., (1995) ‘Drafting the Genetic Privacy Act: Science, Policy and Practical Considerations’, Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics, vol.23: 360,65; Bayertz, K., (1998) ‘What’s Special about Molecular Genetic Diagnostics?’ Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, vol.23: 247-54; Green, R.M. and Thomas, A.M., (1998) ‘DNA: Five Distinguishing Features for Policy Analysis’, Harvard Journal of Law and Technology, vol.11: 571-91; Holm, S., (1999) ‘There is Nothing Special About Genetic Information’, in A.K. Thompson and R.F. Chadwick, (Eds). Genetic Information: Acquisition, Access and Control. New York: Kluwer Academic, pp97-103; Murray, ‘Genetic Exceptionalism’; and Human Genetics Commission, (2000) Whose Hands on Your Genes? A Discussion Document on the Storage Protection and Use of Personal Genetic Information. Available at: http://www.hgc.gov.uk. 294 Appendix Two

Additionally, rather than having to take some kind of psychometric test, genetic information about intelligence could be obtained from a small tissue sample, which could include material collected without the person being present, such as hair.

A further important factor is that predictive genetic information about intelligence may be able to be obtained from a person before she is born, long before she would be able to take an IQ test, or be exposed to toxic levels of lead in her environment. Genetic tests can be predictive in a way that IQ tests are not. IQ tests may be capable to a degree of predicting adult IQ scores, but they are limited in that they are really only accurate once a child reaches age 5 or so.

Genetic tests for intelligence may also provide information that could be relevant for other family members, such as siblings, parents or future children. To be sure, IQ tests may have implications for their relatives, however, the potential for genetic information about intelligence to be much more specific should be recognised.

Where genetic and non-genetic information about intelligence may coincide is with educators and employers, as schools already do have a seemingly legitimate use for many kinds of ability test, such as identifying areas of potential success or failure that individual teachers had not detected. Some employers, too already seek a fair amount of psychometric data about potential employees. The interests of third parties do not add to the distinction between genetic and non-genetic information about intelligence.

But even if genetic information about intelligence meets a significant number of the above criteria, this still does not give us unequivocal reasons to proclaim its significance. Returning again to the uniqueness of genetic information per se, many think that it is not at all distinctive.6 If they are right, then we may have to rethink whether or not genetic information about intelligence is really distinguishable from non-genetic information.

6 Interestingly, this includes both proponents and detractors of genetic research. See, for example: Beckwith, J. and Alper, J.S., (1998) ‘Reconsidering Genetic Antidiscrimination Legislation’, Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics, vol.26: 205-10; Alper, J.S. and Beckwith, J., (1998) ‘Distinguishing Genetic from Nongenetic Medical Tests: Some Implications for Antidiscrimination Legislation’, Science and Engineering Ethics, vol.4: 141-50; Holm, ‘There is Nothing Special About Genetic Information’; and Murray, ‘Genetic Exceptionalism’. 295 Appendix Two

One reason for such a claim is that the ‘predictiveness’ of genetic information is not a compelling reason to render it as special, as many other types of information can also give us glimpses of the future, such as measurements of cholesterol levels in blood. Another is that other types of information that affects people’s lives, such as social class, are transmissible between generations. A third is that other types of information are also shared within families, as is the case with communicable diseases such as tuberculosis.

So, does this mean that genetic data is actually not significant? Murray thinks so. He explains that the common attitude of genetic information being distinctive or special is because it has a peculiar ‘technologization’ or ‘mystery’, which has developed since the advent of recombinant DNA techniques. He argues however that this mystery is baseless, and provides no sound reasons to explain any substantive differences from any other kind of information.7

However, examining an important quality it has that has been overlooked provides a better explanation of why genetic information is distinctive. Of course, none of the properties of genetic information discussed above are unique to genetic information when considered individually. However, the distinctiveness of genetic information – the quality that allows it to be set apart from other types of information – lies in the fact that for most genetic information, all of the above properties are present together. That is, it is very difficult to think about another type of health information that has all of the above properties.8

Therefore, genetic information (and by inference, behavioural genetic information) can be considered as distinct from non-genetic information about intelligence, as it has a unique number of properties that are not found in the same combination in non-genetic information.

There is a further feature of genetic information about intelligence that renders it as distinctive. As more complex genetic traits are investigated, an important feature of

7 Murray, ‘Genetic Exceptionalism’ 8 HIV status is one example of information that may have all of these properties, however this too is treated as distinctive information by policy-makers. 296 Appendix Two this information has emerged. This is that a large amount of complex genetic information will be pleiotropic – genes identified for one developmental pathway may also be involved with the others.9 Pleiotropy has already been observed for several complex genetic diseases, such as the relationship between coronary heart disease and Alzheimer’s disease, where the APOE gene can provide risk information for both conditions. How should society respond if genes involved with intelligence were also found to be associated with something like anxiety or an antisocial personality?

The phenomenon of Pleiotropy will complicate the ethical analysis of finding genes involved with intelligence. Suppose that a couple wanted to select a particular embryo for implantation due to its higher potential intelligence, but that the genes involved would also predispose the child to anxiety. Should they be told about the potential for anxiety? Would they be responsible if they went ahead and their child did develop anxiety? Or suppose that parents wanted to obtain their child’s genetic profile for intelligence. What other information divulged by a particular allelic combination should parents (or any third parties, for that matter) be given? Should people even be told about the existence of other predictions from genetic tests for intelligence? Do people have the right to all information, or just some? The issues are obviously complex. In consenting to a genetic test, a person may be consenting to a much greater amount of information than she had initially anticipated. It is hard to imagine that IQ testing could have such wide-reaching implications.

To summarise, genetic information is distinct from non-genetic information as it has a unique combination of properties, including the fact that it is unique for individuals, that it can be obtained far in advance of traits developing (perhaps before a person is born) and that one genetic test could provide information about several unrelated conditions.

9 Wachbroit, R., (1998) ‘The Question Not Asked: The Challenge of Pleiotropic Genetic Tests’, Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal, vol.8(2): 131-44. 297 Appendix Two

Is genetic information about intelligence distinct from medical genetic information?

Although in many ways behavior presents geneticists with the same challenges as other complex psychological and medical traits, behavior is unique in that it is the product of our most complicated organ, the brain.10

So far, I have said nothing about whether genetic information about intelligence (or behaviour generally) can be distinguished from typically medical genetic information. Considering the somewhat fuzzy boundaries between what is commonly considered as ‘health’ and what may be described as ‘behavioural’ in Western society, is such a distinction possible?

Behavioural and medical genetic information are distinguishable. One reason to support such a distinction is that contrary to medical genetic information, genetic information about intelligence and behaviour has a much greater potential to affect how we think about ourselves – our personality, our behaviour and our abilities. Genetic information about behaviours such as intelligence will therefore impact significantly upon people’s self-perception or self-image. Aspects of our selves (such as our abilities) do seem to be a much greater component of our personal identity than our medical history is.

The second way in which genetic information about intelligence can be distinguished from medical genetic information is that it could be relevant to everyone. To be sure, in a world of genetic knowledge, almost all of us will be considered at risk for at least one genetic disease. The difference with behavioural traits is that everyone would be able to obtain a ‘diagnosis’ of one particular trait. We are all going to have some kind of genetic profile that will have predictive or explanatory value for our intelligence. It is hard to think of one example of medical genetic information that could potentially affect such a broad range of people in such a way – a genetic risk for heart disease will be relevant for many people, as will cancer susceptibility information, yet information about behaviour is conceptually distinct

10 McGuffin, P., Riley, B., and Plomin, R., (2001) ‘Genomics and Behavior: Toward Behavioral Genomics’, Science, vol.291(5507): 1232-49. 298 Appendix Two from this. It may be harder to ‘escape from’. It may also be more confrontational to people than medical genetic information is.

Third, it seems clear that behavioural genetic information is much more sensitive than medical genetic information, especially when groups of people are being discussed. Debates over works such as The Bell Curve, a recent example of a long line of debates over the relationship between inherited ability, class and race, are testament to this. Overall therefore, behavioural genetic information, such as genetic information about intelligence, can be said to have a much greater ‘overall pervasiveness’ than medical genetic information.

These are several reasons why behavioural genetic information, such as genetic information about intelligence, can be distinguished from medical genetic information. However, an objection to making this distinction arises if one were to ask: ‘But what exactly is defined as medical and what as behavioural?’ As behavioural traits such as intelligence have a continuous ‘normal’ distribution within the population and some extremes of this distribution may have a pathological component, it is usually not possible to draw a line between what is medical and what is not. Mental retardation, for example, is usually considered as more relevant to medicine than behaviour. How can lines be drawn upon such a continuum?

Rather than seeing problems with drawing lines as an impediment to developing classes of information however, I would instead claim that such classes can exist, to perhaps indicate that to which we should direct our immediate resources. Buchanan et al suggest such an approach, where they claim that health care should encompass all of that which the community would be compelled to treat.11 As Jonathan Glover claimed, even though the distinction between night and day is problematic (night is obviously different to day, but it is difficult to pinpoint exactly where one ends and the other starts), this does not give us a reason for abandoning the distinction altogether.12

11 Buchanan, A., Brock, D.W., Daniels, N., and Wikler, D., (2000) From Chance to Choice: Genetics and Justice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 12 Buchanan et al, p110. 299 Appendix Two

I have argued here that genetic information about intelligence is different; distinguishable from both non-genetic and medical genetic information. This information therefore meets Murray’s ‘distinctiveness test’. The following table summarises this discussion:

Table A2: How behavioural genetic information is different

Compared to non-genetic information Compared to medical genetic Information • The Information is unique for • It will provide information about a very particular people broad range of traits • It may be obtained prior to the trait • One trait will be of relevance to developing everyone • It may be obtained from those yet to • It is especially sensitive information be born • Complex relationship between genes • It could provide information about and traits. other traits • Genetic information will cover the • It has a unique combination of whole spectrum of behaviour. properties • Traits that we all share to varying degrees, rather than abnormal traits

This Appendix has been concerned with both the nature and significance of genetic factors for intelligence, to ensure that my ethical analysis provides an accurate portrayal of the information being discussed. Through comparing and genetic information about intelligence information with other medical genetic, or non-genetic information, I have argued that genetic information about intelligence is distinctive.

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