’s Oligarchy Consolidates Control over the Security Establishment

Joe Macaron March 22, 2017 After an impasse of nearly four years, on March move forward and succeed in thwarting suicide 8 the Lebanese government announced a attacks, forcing radical groups to retreat while sectarian quota deal to fill the security cutting their funding and logistical support. establishment's leadership positions. Amid Hariri had a choice to make—between coping tensions surrounding ’s regional with Hezbollah’s intervention in while activities, these appointments come at a critical returning to power, or defying it politically moment for the country’s stability and for the from the sidelines. Ultimately, he decided to future of US military aid to Lebanon. cope, but not without drawbacks. He had to What kept Lebanon immune from the spillover quell resistance from his own camp, most of the Syrian war is not necessarily the notably former Minister Ashraf Rifi, who dissociation policy of its consecutive accused him of being complacent with governments but, most importantly, the crucial Hezbollah. decision three years ago to resume coordination The latest appointments reaffirmed the three- among the country’s rival security and year-long security coordination as well as the intelligence agencies. parameters of last year's deal that selected That turning point came in 2014 when the General as president and Saad Saudi-backed Lebanese intelligence agencies Hariri as prime minister. Sectarian politics were shifted from lack of cooperation with in full display with a distribution of power Hezbollah, and not disrupting aid to groups among the representatives of the three major fighting the Syrian regime, to the resumption of confessional communities: President Aoun counter-terrorism efforts. The August 2014 joint (Maronite) consolidated his control over the attack by al-Qaeda and the Islamic State in (LAF) by selecting and the Levant (ISIL) on Arsal, a Lebanese General as commander; Prime village on the border with Syria, further Minister Hariri (Sunni) consolidated his control strengthened that line of cooperation. over the (ISF) by appointing Brigadier General Imad Othman as The Iranian-backed Hezbollah and the Saudi- general director; and Hezbollah/Parliament backed , which had bickered Speaker (Shiite) kept Abbas since 2011, found themselves facing a common Ibrahim as general director of General Security threat in 2014. The rise of radical elements in the for another six years (as a civilian after retiring Sunni areas had become a challenge for Hariri’s from the military). dwindling influence while Hezbollah had become vulnerable as it protected the Shiite Selection Criteria community from an array of suicide attacks without a functional state intelligence system. The "selection criteria" of these appointments Hence, scrutiny of the Lebanese security have framed the most contentious issue in the establishment since 2015 helped the country last four years. The term is loosely used by the

Lebanese oligarchy to mask the decade-long • Loyalty for respective sectarian leaders was battle of influence to control the security paramount in deciding the appointments. establishment since the Syrian regime’s grip over Lebanon began to fade in 2005. Here are • The principles of hierarchy and seniority the main selection criteria that informed these were not respected. Both Joseph Aoun and latest appointments: Imad Othman had to be promoted to take on their new roles, hence officers at ISF and • Each of three confessional representatives LAF are now compelled to salute younger selected a list of three options (by order of officers who have less years of service. At preference) for the vacancies allocated to least 50 brigadier generals were placed at the them while the other two only had the right disposal of the ISF commander to promote to veto. Othman, which means the career of these senior officers is over and all they can do • While the law says that the government is now is wait their turn to retire (AR). supposed to appoint only the army commander and the head of ISF, the ruling The Defense/Military Establishment oligarchy recently preapproved a string of senior-level appointments as part of the A few Lebanese military commanders shaped larger sectarian quota deal. the LAF legacy; the first commander, General , is perhaps a breed on his own. Yet, there are two influential trends that molded • All appointed commanders were new to the Lebanese army in the last three decades: the their positions; there were no extensions of anti-Syrian attitude of General Michel Aoun previous appointments, except for Abbas (who served as commander 1984-1990) and the Ibrahim. That was a win for President Aoun, pro-Syrian attitude of General Emile Lahoud who has been arguing for years against (who served as commander 1990-1998). extending the mandate of security The military cohorts, who served under Aoun commanders. during the final chapter of the Lebanese civil

war, suffered from the ramifications of his • No provocative names were put forth—all military defeat in 1990. When forced into exile appointees were officers known for their by the Syrian invasion, Aoun asked his troops moderate stances and inclinations to to declare allegiance for his successor Lahoud to coordinate unless instructed otherwise by save them from further bloodshed. The young their oligarchs. officers had the choice either to resign or

reluctantly integrate into the new army under

Syrian rule.

Now, after nearly 27 years, these military A third and last point of presidential leverage is officers are again in a position of power: the expected synergy between the current General Joseph Aoun, Brigadier General Samir Defense Minister Yaacoub al-Sarraf (close to al-Hajj (Inspector General), and Brigadier Emile Lahoud) and General Joseph Aoun. The General George Shreim (General Officer). All last defense minister, Samir Moqbel, was three serve on the six seats of the military outmaneuvered many times by former Army council, the highest decision-making body of Commander General , including the armed forces. The council is entrusted with when Kahwaji enforced the decision to appoint naming commanders across the military and his cohort Brigadier General Edmund Fadel as hence can shape the balance of power inside the head of . Once Fadel retires army for decades to come. According to the in a few months, President Aoun will have yet National Defense Law, the military council is another opportunity to appoint a loyalist in one chaired by the army commander along with five of the most crucial intelligence agencies in the other members (as shown in table 1 of the security establishment. appendix). The vote is by simple majority and in case of a tie, the army commander’s vote is The Internal Security Forces decisive, which gives President Aoun significant control over the council. The assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri in 2005 and the subsequent Indeed, presidential leverage extends to civilian withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon oversight over the military. While the 1989 Taif altered the balance of power in the Lebanese Agreement shifted civilian command of the security establishment. The three ISF directors military from the president to the Council of since then have been loyalists of the Future Ministers, the Lebanese president is the chair of Movement: Ashraf Rifi, Ibrahim Basbous, and the Supreme Defense Council along with the now Imad Othman. The emergence of the prime minister as his vice chair. The remaining Information Branch as a potent and five members are the ministers of defense, independent Sunni-led intelligence force foreign affairs, interior, treasury, and economy. reflects that new dynamic. The daily operations of the secretary general are run by a military officer who reports directly to Since then, the Information Branch even earned the prime minister. Only the president is the trust of Hezbollah by playing a key role in authorized to convene the Supreme Council; unraveling Israeli networks and agents otherwise, the prime minister needs one-third operating in Lebanon. Othman, who served as of the vote to do so, which Hariri lacks in the head of the Branch since October 2012 (after the current formation. assassination of his predecessor, Wissam The Supreme Defense Council met once last Hassan), now leads the ISF. A new January since Aoun became president. memorandum (AR) last year stated that the Information Branch now directly reports to the

ISF director, which likely means that the clout occasionally tasked by Hezbollah to play of the branch will return to normalcy compared political roles. Most recently he mediated the to its oversized role under Wissam Hassan. rapprochement between President Aoun and Speaker Berri. The second expected breakthrough is the resumption of the ISF leadership council While technically the State Security directorate meetings after a period of dysfunction and serves as an arm of the Supreme Defense inactivity since 2007, due to infighting among Council, its role has been controversial in recent the oligarchy to replace more than half of the years. The last director, Brigadier General eleven members whose terms had expired. Now George Balaa, sought to expand the authority of the council is fully staffed (see table 2 of the his directorate under the banner of restoring appendix). Christian influence. The reaction was swift— cutting the funding and marginalizing State *All commanders report to the ISF Director Security—and this led to sectarian tensions. The except the inspector general, who reports to the recent appointment of Brigadier General Tony Interior Minister. Saliba (close to President Aoun) as the new The powers concentrated by law in the hands of director helped to mitigate the bureaucratic Othman will provide enough leverage for infighting, but the issue might need further Hariri to have a dominant role in the ISF. The clarification. While reports are suggesting that challenge for Othman is to revitalize a fragile the role of State Security will be neutral moving institution and counter the remaining influence forward, with a focus on protecting state of Ashraf Rifi, who is quietly challenging the institutions and preventing public corruption, détente between the Future Movement and the first statement by Saliba after taking office Hezbollah. Hariri's team hopes to amend the offered an ambitious agenda of countering both ISF leadership council's internal procedures and and radical terrorism. cut its size to make it the centralized core of internal security; however, there is no Final Thoughts and Future of US Military Aid indication yet if that scenario will materialize in Politics have molded the security establishment the foreseeable future. for decades. In the early 1970s, the late President It is worth noting that Othman’s significant Suleiman Franjieh purged the military officers influence on internal security agencies does not affiliated with his predecessor, Fouad Chehab. extend to the Shiite-led General Security and Michel Aoun, as head of the interim Christian-led State Security. The General government and army commander in the mid- Security’s role expanded since 2005, when it 1980s, distrusted the senior officers and asked became part of the Shiite quota of security younger officers to report to him directly. The positions, and it reports directly to the interior Syrian regime subdued the security minister. Abbas Ibrahim’s role is widely establishment for nearly a decade by giving recognized among the oligarchs and he is preference to those loyal to while the

dominant role of Hezbollah, as an armed group, US diplomats and military and intelligence has undermined these institutions’ core mission officials have working relations with LAF, ISF, of monopolizing the use of force. and General Security. The appointments are not expected to have impact on US security aid and Since 2005, the repetitive disregard of hierarchy relations with Lebanon; the White House’s cuts and seniority in making appointments has in foreign aid, however, can be more damaging demoralized these institutions and their high- in that regard. In the past weeks, congressional ranking officers. The army commanders in the and military delegations visited , though last 15 years have imposed that same policy by no US officials from the White House or State making staff transfers that ensure their loyalists Department are expected anytime soon. are de facto heads of certain departments. At present, the synergy between the president, However, these security appointments defense minister, and army commander should reaffirmed the fact that Washington has limited reflect positively on the armed forces instead of space to maneuver the increasingly complex continuing the same trend where respecting Lebanese politics. Furthermore, halting US hierarchy and seniority is the rule and not the military aid will not only undermine Lebanon’s exception. A small and mobile ground force, stability and its ability to fight radical terrorism, like the army in Lebanon, cannot afford to have but will also weaken the remnants of US a large base of idle senior officers; hence altering influence in the country. The Lebanese security the seniority and hierarchy or extending the age establishment is leading one of the most of retirement are not the right path moving successful regional campaigns against radical forward. terrorists, but the greatest danger it faces is the sectarian tendency that is undermining loyalty On the ISF side, purging high ranking officers is for national institutions. What the Pentagon can a recurring policy that existed under Syrian rule do is to encourage LAF commanders to further and will likely continue. Furthermore, professionalize the military. sectarianizing the internal security agencies is disconcerting and could gradually turn them In the largest context, President Aoun’s into paramilitary forces. The relatively young comments last month that Hezbollah age of the security leaders means that they will “complement” the Lebanese army raised stay in their positions for at least six years. There concerns in Washington. However, that is an urgent need to streamline these military statement should come as no surprise. LAF, ISF, and security agencies to make them more and the Information Branch all coordinate with effective and relevant to today’s challenges Hezbollah, whether at the borders with Syria without overlap and lack of coordination. and Israel or in areas held by Hezbollah. No Having a body that synchronizes both military senior military or security officer in Lebanon and security agencies could serve that purpose can function or sustain his job without having a while ensuring information exchange. minimum working relationship with

Hezbollah. Forcing the Lebanese military and it should not expect the Lebanese security security agencies to block Hezbollah or not to establishment to play that role while the cooperate with the group is a recipe for political country is struggling to cope with the spillover instability in the current political environment. of the Syrian war.

While the United States did not provide basic In the absence of a clear US regional policy support for Lebanese allies attempting to deter beyond defeating ISIL, withdrawing US Hezbollah between 2005 and 2008, military aid will most likely push Lebanese security agencies into the arms of Iran.

Appendix

Table 1.

Military Council of the Name Confession Political Connection Armed Forces

Chair: Army Commander General Joseph Aoun Maronite President Aoun

Chief of Staff Brig. Gen. Hatem Mallak Druze Walid Joumblatt

General Director of Brig. Gen. Mohsen Fneich Shiite Hezbollah-Nabih Berri Management

Inspector General Brig. Gen. Samir al-Hajj Orthodox President Aoun

Secretary General of the Brig. Gen. Saadallah Sunni PM Hariri Supreme Defense Council Mohyeldin

General Officer (picked by the Brig. Gen. George Shreim defense minister in consultation with the (previously served as military attaché Catholic President Aoun government and army commander) in Washington, DC)

Table 2.

ISF Leadership Council Name Confession Political Connection

Chair: ISF Director Brig. Gen. Imad Othman Sunni PM Hariri

Chief of Staff Brig. Gen. Naim Chammas Orthodox No strong affiliation

Head of Central Administration Brig. Gen. Saeed Fawwaz Shiite Speaker Berri

Commander of Social Services Brig. Gen. Fares Hanna Maronite No strong affiliation Department

Commander of the Security of Embassies and Public Brig. Gen. Walid Jawhar Shiite Hezbollah Administration

Mobile Units Commander Brig. Gen. Fouad al-Khoury Maronite

No strong affiliation, Inspector General* Brig. Gen. Joseph Kallas Catholic close to Interior Minister Nuhad al-Mashnouk

Commander of Regional Police Brig. Gen. Joseph el-Helou Maronite No strong affiliation

Brig. Gen. Mohammad al- Commander of Beirut Police Sunni PM Hariri Ayoubi