Talking to the other side Humanitarian engagement with the Taliban in Afghanistan Ashley Jackson and Antonio Giustozzi HPG Working Paper December 2012 About the authors Ashley Jackson is a Research Fellow with the Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG). Antonio Giustozzi is Visiting Professor in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. Acknowledgements Sara Pantuliano, Eva Svoboda, Alex Strick van Linschoten and Matthew Foley provided helpful inputs and guidance. Due to the sensitive nature of this research, the authors would like to thank many other individuals who assisted in this endeavour but who prefer to remain nameless. Finally, the authors would like to thank the men and women who gave their time to be interviewed and share their experiences. Humanitarian Policy Group Overseas Development Institute 203 Blackfriars Road London SE1 8NJ United Kingdom Tel. +44 (0) 20 7922 0300 Fax. +44 (0) 20 7922 0399 E-mail: [email protected] Website: http://www.odi.org.uk/hpg ISBN: 978 1 909464 01 8 © Overseas Development Institute, 2012 Readers are encouraged to quote or reproduce materials from this publication but, as copyright holders, ODI requests due acknowledgement and a copy of the publication. This and other HPG Reports are available from www.odi.org.uk/hpg. Contents Executve summary iii Chapter 1 Introducton 1 1.1 Overview of the project 1 1.2 Methodology 1 1.3 Terminology and definitions 2 Chapter 2 Ad agency access n Afghanstan 3 Chapter 3 Ad agency perspectves on engagement wth the Talban 5 3.1 Community acceptance approaches 5 3.2 Structured negotiations 6 3.3 Cooperation, collaboration and collective approaches 7 Chapter 4 Talban perspectves on engagement wth ad agences 9 4.1 Taliban structure and organisation 9 4.2 Taliban leadership policy and perspectives on engagement with aid agencies 10 Chapter 5 Case study: Faryab provnce 13 5.1 Overview of Faryab 13 5.2 Taliban structure, organisation and influence 13 5.3 Other armed groups 13 5.4 Taliban policies on aid agency access 14 5.5 Influencing factors 15 5.6 Taliban perceptions of aid agencies 16 5.7 Taliban perceptions of humanitarian and development approaches 17 5.8 Perceptions of elders and aid agencies 18 Chapter 6 Case study: Kandahar provnce 21 6.1 Overview of Kandahar 21 6.2 Taliban structure, organisation and influence 21 6.3 Other armed groups 22 6.4 Taliban policies on aid agency access 22 6.5 Influencing factors 24 6.6 Taliban perceptions of aid agencies 26 6.7 Taliban perceptions of humanitarian and development approaches 27 6.8 Perceptions of elders and aid agencies 27 Chapter 7 Concluson and recommendatons 31 7.1 Recommendations 31 References 33 HPG Working HPG Working Paper Map of Afghan Uzbekistan Tajikistan Turkmenistan stan Jawzjan Balkh Kunduz Badakhshan Takhar Samangan Iran Faryab Baghlan Sar Pul Panjsher nurstan Badghs Kapsa HPG Bamyan Parwan Kunar KabUl Laghman wo Herat wardak Kabul nangarhar RKI Logar India Ghor n Day Kund Paktya G paper Ghazn Khost Uruzgan Farah Zabul Paktka nmroz Pakistan Kandahar Helmand Provinces where fieldwork was conducted The Taliban in afghanistan HPG woRKInG paper Executve summary In afghanistan, approaches to negotiating humanitarian access, and a general difficulty in distinguishing between different assistance and protection with the Taliban have been largely actors (NGOs, UN agencies, the UN assistance Mission inconsistent and ad hoc. after 2001, aid agencies enjoyed access in afghanistan (UNaMa), for-profit contractors, Provincial to the majority of the country, but access rapidly declined as Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and so on). The Taliban who security began to deteriorate. as Taliban influence expanded and criticise aid organisations are not just accusing them of violence increased, aid workers were caught up in hostilities or being ‘spies’ or siding with the government, but are also explicitly targeted. Few agencies publicly acknowledge engaging critical of their perceived lack of a principled approach and with the Taliban to secure access to areas under Taliban influence effectiveness. Elders, while generally not as hostile towards or control. Even those that are able to access Taliban areas aid agencies, often shared many of the Taliban’s criticisms: acknowledge the difficulty associated with engagement and the uneven distribution of aid in favour of more peaceful areas, precarious nature of negotiated access. corruption and a lack of respect for afghan culture. Where Taliban – and indeed elders – were more positive about aid Taliban attitudes towards and perceptions of aid agencies, their agencies, this often reflected personal experience, suggesting activities and the principles and frameworks that guide their that views of one aid agency are likely to influence views of work are poorly understood. Through almost 150 interviews aid agencies in general. It also indicates that consistency and with the Taliban, aid agencies and ordinary afghans, this high-quality work can improve access, and that poor-quality Working Paper aims to provide greater understanding of Taliban programmes can have a negative impact on acceptance. attitudes and policies. It focuses on two provincial case studies, Faryab and Kandahar, to examine these issues in depth. at the Even among those Taliban who claim to follow official policy, leadership level, the Taliban have a clear policy on aid agency local differences within and tensions among the Taliban access. agencies are required to register with the Taliban resulted in challenges to access. In areas where the insurgency at senior leadership level and adhere to various conditions, was fractured, with different groups competing for power, or including neutrality, respect for Taliban notions of ‘afghan where there was a proliferation of different armed groups culture’ and, occasionally, payment of tax. This policy was (such as local militias aligned with strongmen or criminal fairly well understood by provincial Taliban leaders in the gangs), even structured negotiations and engagement with the two provinces examined. The Taliban at the local levels also Taliban resulted in precarious access. Tensions between the appeared to be capable of monitoring adherence to these political and military leadership and the growing militarisation conditions and enforcing them. However, research in Faryab of the Taliban have led to uneven implementation and varying and Kandahar indicated that there is significant discretion and interpretations of access policies. While the military leadership flexibility accorded to local commanders, which means that the appears not to explicitly violate official policy on humanitarian rules are fluid and vary depending on who is in charge. Increased access, such concerns are clearly subordinate to military military pressure, widespread distrust of aid agencies and a objectives. There are also substantial differences between lack of adequate command and control have also undermined local Taliban, who have pragmatic reasons for being part of the adherence to established policy. insurgency, and Taliban from other parts of afghanistan or from Pakistan and Uzbekistan, who are ideologically motivated. There were other subtle deviations from official policy evident at the local level. Senior and provincial Taliban leaders Obtaining sustained access to afghans in need of assistance asserted that where an aid agency obtains its funding does not under these conditions is exceedingly difficult. However, influence access. In practice, however, many local commanders structured engagement in specific circumstances, with multiple exhibited negative attitudes towards and suspicion of funding levels of the Taliban and with the community, appeared to from International Security assistance Force (ISaF) troop- provide the greatest guarantee of security for aid workers contributing countries. While senior leaders asserted that and those they aim to help. However, many aid agencies most activities were acceptable, they were reluctant to allow interviewed followed ‘community acceptance’ approaches works perceived to interfere with military objectives, such as that avoided direct engagement with the Taliban and focused road construction, and were hostile towards Western notions on security guarantees provided by communities. While of women’s rights. at the local level these trends were more structured, rigorous approaches to gaining and maintaining pronounced. Suspicion of aid workers as ‘spies’ results in acceptance without directly negotiating with the Taliban can attacks on them or restrictions on access. be effective in some areas, many agencies appeared to be effectively operating a ‘don’t ask, don’t tell’ policy – even In general, but particularly pronounced at local level, there internally – with regard to access. Such practices place an is deep and prevalent hostility towards aid organisations undue burden on local afghan staff and community members, HPG Working Paper HPG woRKInG paper who assume the bulk of responsibility for securing access to the role and mandate of aid agencies. The afghan NGO Taliban areas. Safety Office (aNSO) has also played a critical role in providing independent analysis and recommendations for Interviews with elders and Taliban highlight the often- NGOs, and should continue to provide this support. instrumentalist Taliban attitude towards civilians and the risks that elders face in mediating on behalf of aid agencies. This To the UN: calls into question the viability, both operationally and ethically, of such apparently ad hoc approaches.