The Pentagon Labyrinth Aims to Help Both Newcomers and Seasoned Observers Learn How to Grapple with the Problems of National Defense
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The Pentagon Labyrinth aims to help both newcomers and seasoned observers learn how to grapple with the problems of national defense. In tended for readers who are frustrated with the supercial nature of the debate on national securit y, this handbook takes advantage of the insights of ten unique prof essionals, each with decades of experience in the armed services, the Pe ntagon bureaucrac y, C ongress, the intelligence community, military history, journalism and other disciplines . The short but provocative essays will help you to : • identify the decay— moral, mental and physical—in America ’s defenses, • understand the various “tribes ” that run bureaucratic life in the Pe ntagon, • appreciate what too many def ense journalists are not doing , but should, • conduct rst rate national security oversight instead of second rate theate r, • separate careerists from ethical prof essionals in senior militar y and civilian ranks , • learn to critique strategies , distinguishing the useful from the agenda-driven, • recognize the per vasive inuence of money in defense decision-mak ing , • unravel the budget games the Pe ntagon and Congress love to pla y, • understand how to sort good weapons from bad—and avoid high cost failures , and • re fo rm the failed def ense procurement system without changing a single law. The handbook ends with lists of contac ts , readings and Web sites carefully selected to facilitate fur ther understanding of the above, and more. The World Security Institute’s Center for Defense Information (CDI) provides expert analysis on U.S. national security, and defense policy, the Pentagon’s budget and its weapon systems. CDI promotes wide -ranging discussion and debate on these and related issues. CDI is an independent monitor of the Pentagon, conducting research and analysis not normally available from other think tanks and defense -minded organizations. It is comprised of retired senior government officials and former military officers, a s well as experienced defense analysts. Funded exclusively by public donations and foundation grants, CDI does not seek or accept Department of Defense funding or military industry money. CDI makes its military analyses available to Congress, the media and the public through a variety of services and publications. The views expressed in CDI publications are those of the authors. World Security Institute’s Center for Defense Information 1779 Massachusetts Avenue, NW Washington, D.C. 20036 -2109 © 2 011 Center for Defense Information ISBN - 978 -0-615 -44624 -0 The Pentagon Labyrinth 10 Short Essays to Help You Through It From 10 Pentagon Insiders, Retired Military Officers and Specialists With Over 400 Years of Defense Experience Edited by Winslow T. Wheeler Center for Defense Information World Security Institute February 2011 About the Authors Thomas Christie began his career in the Department of Defense and related positions in 1955. He retired from the Pentagon in February 2005 after four years as Director of Operational Test & Evaluation. There he was responsible for policy and procedures for testing weapon systems and for providing independent evaluations of the test results to both the defense secretary and Congress. He earlier served as director of the Operational Evaluation Division at the Institute for Defense Analyses, where he was also involved in DOD weapons testing. Between 1985 and 1989, he was director of program integration in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, responsible for developing procedures for managing the defense acquisition system. Prior to that, he had served in two separate positions under the assistant secretary of defense (Program Analysis and Evaluation): director of tactical air division and deputy assistant secretary of defense for General Purpose Programs. Andrew Cockburn is a writer and documentary filmmaker resident in Washington, D.C. He has covered defense and national security issues for over 30 years. He has authored several books, including The Threat: Inside the Soviet Military Machine (1982), Out of the Ashes, The Resurrection of Saddam Hussein (1999) and Rumsfeld: His Rise, Fall and Catastrophic Legacy (2007). Bruce I. Gudmundsson served in the Marine Corps Reserve for 20 years, joining as a private in 1977 and retiring as a major in 1997. The author of seven books and several hundred articles, he is a historian who specializes in the internal workings of military forces (their structure, training, doctrine and culture), as well as the way that these things influence their ability to adapt to changing circumstances. Col. Chet Richards (U.S. Air Force, ret.) is a consultant and writer with J. Addams & Partners in Atlanta. He is the author of If We Can Keep It: A National Security Manifesto for the Next Administration (2007), Certain to Win: The Strategy of John Boyd Applied to Business (2004) and other publications on Third and Fourth Generation Warfare. He holds a doctorate in mathematics and is adjunct professor of strategy and quantitative analysis at Kennesaw State University. Franklin C. Spinney retired from the Defense Department in 2003 after a military-civilian career spanning 33 years. The latter 26 of those years were as a staff analyst in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. During this period, he appeared as a witness in numerous congressional hearings before the Budget, Armed Services, and Government Affairs or Reform and Oversight committees of the U.S. House and Senate. He is author of Defense Facts of Life: The Plans/Reality Mismatch (1985). His op-eds and essays have appeared in the The Wall Street Journal, The Washington Post, Los Angeles Times, Challenge, CounterPunch, Proceedings Magazine of the U.S Naval Institute and the Marine Corps Gazette, among other places. His sharply critical analysis of the Reagan defense program landed him on the cover of Time Magazine (March 7, 1983), based on a hearing at which the senior Pentagon management witness promised all Pentagon budgeting and programming problems were being effectively dealt with. In 2003, he held an hour long "exit interview" with Bill Moyers on Moyers' PBS show NOW; the basic message was that 20 years later, none of the problems had been addressed, let alone solved. Pierre Sprey consulted for Grumman Aircraft's research department from 1958 to 1965, then joined Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara's "Whiz Kids" in the Pentagon. There, in 1967, he met the Air Force's brilliant and original tactician, Col. John Boyd and quickly became a disciple and collaborator of Boyd's. Together with another innovative fighter pilot, Col. Everest Riccioni (U.S. Air Force), they started and carried out the concept design of the F-16 air- to-air fighter, then brought the program to fruition through five years of continuous bureaucratic guerilla warfare. More or less simultaneously, Sprey also headed up the technical side of the Air Force's concept design team for the A-10 close support fighter. Then, against even steeper opposition than the F-16 faced, he helped implement the A-10's innovative live-fire, prototype fly-off competition and subsequent production. Sprey left the Pentagon in 1971 but continued to consult actively on the F-16, the A-10, tanks and anti-tank weapons, and realistic operational/live-fire testing of major weapons. At the same time, he became a principal in two consulting firms; the first doing environmental research and analysis, the second consulting on international defense planning and weapons analysis. During this period, Sprey continued the seminal work of Col. Richard Hallock (U.S. Army/Airborne) in founding the field of combat history/combat data-based cost effectiveness analysis for air and ground weapons. During the late 1970s, Colonel Boyd and Sprey, together with a small, dedicated group of Pentagon and congressional insiders, started the military reform movement. Attracting considerable attention from young officers, journalists and congressmen, the movement led to establishment of the Congressional Military Reform Caucus and to passage of several military reform bills in the early ’80s. Sprey continues to work with reform-minded foundations and journalists. Numerous articles, books and theses have described the work of Colonel Boyd and Sprey on the F-16, A-10 and military reform. These include Robert Coram's “Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War” (2002) and James Fallows' “National Defense” (1981). Winslow T. Wheeler is the director of the Straus Military Reform Project at the Center for Defense Information in Washington, D.C. He has authored two books: The Wastrels of Defense (2004) about Congress and national security, and Military Reform (2007). He is the editor of America’s Defense Meltdown (2008) and of this handbook. From 1971 to 2002, Wheeler worked on national security issues for members of the U.S. Senate from both political parties and for the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO). In 2002, he was forced to resign his position with the Republican staff of the Senate Budget Committee because of senators’ objections to an essay he wrote, “Mr. Smith Is Dead: No One Stands in the Way as Congress Lards Post-September 11 Defense Bills with Pork.” George C. Wilson has had an upfront seat from which to study the military- industrial-political-intelligence complex for a half century. After five years with Aviation Week & Space Technology magazine, which gave him an insight into the inner workings of the complex, he became the chief military correspondent for The Washington Post. He did combat reporting for The Post in South Vietnam, the Middle East and Panama. He is the author of six books, including the best seller Supercarrier, based on his seven-and-a- half month deployment on the aircraft carrier John F. Kennedy, during which time he flew in every plane on her deck. Wilson is a Navy veteran, graduate of Bucknell University and winner of several journalism awards.