No state can do it alone - Private sector involvement in the civil security provision in 1

Vera-Karin Brazova Charles University in Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences [email protected]

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1 The paper was supported by the Specific Research Grant of the Charles University in Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences Nr. 260 232 1

ABSTRACT

Protecting society from devastating disasters is a fundamental function of the modern state. In this respect, the concept of resilience to disasters (and the application thereof) has enjoyed a steep rise in popularity in the civil security policymaking and crisis management over the last years. Most importantly, it stresses the need for a broad involvement of stakeholders in the prevention, mitigation and response efforts. In this respect, however, the European countries differ significantly. While in some countries (such as e.g. the ), the civil security provision is highly privatized, in other countries the opposite is the case and most of the civil security-related activities rest upon the state. Similarly, the importance of civic organizations' involvement differs significantly. It is the aim of this paper to shed more light on these differences, framing the findings within the security governance approach (Krahmann 2003). Building on the governance framework, the paper identifies and analyzes different dimensions of civil security governance in the European countries. Firstly, the role of the societal engagement, non-profit organizations and profit-oriented organizations in the civil security provision is examined, followed by other dimensions as identified in the literature on resilience and security and disaster management. These concern decentralization of civil security provision, international engagement and the use of the military in civil security operations. Particular attention is paid to the post-communist new member states of the EU. It is examined whether these represent a distinctive group with specific patterns of (rather low) private involvement in the civil security provision or whether more universal patterns apply. To achieve this, a hierarchical cluster analysis is conducted, based on the data gathered within a large-scale collaborative research project (European Commission's FP7 project ANVIL). The paper seeks to answer the following research questions: How does the civil security governance vary in the European countries? And are there any patterns identifiable among these variations?

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1. INTRODUCTION

In the field of security, there has been a clear trend in most societies of citizens expecting good governance, yet with less government. With an increasing pressure on effectiveness, public service functions, including some fields of security, have been increasingly placed in private hands and outsourced through contracting. While public expectations of government performance in ensuring civil security remain high even in the face of a widening spectrum of threats, the resources available to the public authorities are limited (Hamilton et al. 2005). At the operative level, the consequences thereof can be seen in the changing structures of the national civil security systems, such as e.g. the deployment of the military to deal with internal security issues like natural disasters. Concurrently, the geographical scope has broadened to include not only the nation state but also whole regions in the case of transboundary threats or even the world as a whole, as the term "global security" suggests (Daase, 2010: 30-32). Institutional plurality and mixed deliveries of public goods have generally started to gain on importance and to be viewed as an effective strategy enhancing governance capacities (Hefetz et al. 2014, Huitema et al. 2009).

While there is a growing acceptance of "governance" based on the "belief that the focus of administrative practice is shifting from hierarchical government toward greater reliance on horizontal, hybridized, and associational forms of governance" (Hill, Lynn 2005: 1), implying a larger inclusion of different atakeholders, the empirical evidence thereof - as it is argued by Hill and Lynn (ibid.) - is limited. So far, the analyses of (civil) security governance have concentrated at the international (EU) level (Krahmann 2003; Kirchner 2006) or - on the contrary - at very narrow and specific topics, such as citizen's involvement in flood risk management through information and communication technologies (Wehn et al. 2015). A comprehensive comparative is lacking so far in the civil security realm. The goal of this article is thus to attempt an empirical explorative analysis regarding governance in the field of civil security.

The term civil security refers especially to extraordinary events, including vulnerability reduction, response and recovery measures (Dory 2003). Despite a considerable degree of convergence among the European countries in this area (Hamilton et al. 2005) - especially due to EU Directives, such as the so-called Floods Directive 2 or the Directive on Critical Infrastructures 3, significant differences exist (Lethbridge 2007). Apart from differences in the nature of the prevalent crises and in geographical conditions, cultural underpinnings of disaster preparedness and response are reported to be of a significant importance as well (Gopalakrishnan, Okada 2007). While many comparative studies conducted in this field have typically focused on two countries or regions only (see e.g. Lai 2012; Saban 2013), the aim here is to involve more states into the analysis and thus to discuss patterns of similarities and differences in their civil security governance systems.

In particular, the research questions are: How does the civil security governance vary in the European countries? And are there any patterns identifiable among these variations? To

2 2007/60/EC 3 2008/114/EC 3 answer these questions, the paper builds on the data collected within the EU 7th framework project ANVIL ("Analysis of Civil Security Systems in Europe") within which data on civil protection and disaster management systems in 22 European countries were collected. In the first part, general features of civil security governance are outlined. Followingly, based on the literature review, key dimensions of civil security governance are identified and discussed for the European states, based on qualitative analysis of the ANVIL country reports. In the next section, cluster analysis is conducted, based on the previously identified dimensions, using the ANVIL coded datasheets. Finally, results are discussed in the concluding part.

2. CIVIL SECURITY GOVERNANCE

The use of the term "governance" varies with respect to the issues covered and levels of analysis applied. In the field of security studies, the concept of "security governance" (Krahmann 2003) has emerged, stressing the shift from centralized security structures towards more fragmented and complex ones. The core of the concept of security governance refers to the fragmentation of authority and resources in security policymaking and implementation among different governmental and non-governmental stakeholders, while the transnational and international relations are increasingly regulated in particular areas (Krahmann 2003b).

Security governance is seen as a helpful framework for studying the interactions between a diverse number of actors (Kirchner 2006), yet governance in civil security has not been fully conceptualized as yet. A very emerging - and somewhat similar - concept is here the one of disaster governance (Tierney 2012), however it is still remaining quite fuzzy to grasp and more research on this topic is needed (ibid.). Thus, a "collateral" aim of this paper is to provide such conceptualization - identifying dimensions alongside which the civil security governance could be studied and compared among different countries. From an analytical perspective, based on the review of the literature on security governance, the following aspects are of utmost importance: Firstly, the incentive to cooperate and to engage the private sector in security matters often stems from the growing demands on the provision of security on the one hand; and from the limited resources available for the security provision on the other hand (ibid.). Secondly, according to Krahmann (ibid.), security governance is fragmented among governmental and non-governmental actors. At the same time, some endeavors are marked by a "disjuncture between the enthusiasm (...) and the lack of interest" concerning bureaucratic elites on the one hand and the wider communities on the other hand (Breslin, Higgott, 2000: 345). According to some scholars, "citizens in the former communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe (...) participate less in voluntary organizations than their Western counterparts" (Uslaner 2004: 81; see also Petrova, Tarrow 2007; Cottey et al. 2002). This feature, when identified, is often linked with the issue of trust, in line with Putnam's (1993) concept of civic community (ibid.: 82). Yet, as this is commonly ascribed to the developing social capital of these societies (ibid.: 83), the differences might not be as large now as in 2000s. A working hypothesis could thus stand that the civic sector involvement is larger in "western" European countries with longer democratic tradition.

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Although concerns about privatization have been risen especially in the field of military security with respect to the private military companies (Scahill, 2007) and civilian and military missions within CSDP (Giumelli, Cusumano,2014), the field of civil security and disaster management cannot go completely disregarded. In this particular area, some academic attention has started to be paid to the public-private cooperation concerning the protection of critical infrastructure (Boin, Smith, 2006). Yet, similar trends in more traditional areas of disaster management, such as e.g. firefighting or search and rescue works have not received virtually any attention so far. In this respect, a special attention should be paid to the post-communist Central and South-Eastern European countries which were often at some point of their transition, resorting to massive and abrupt deregulation, outsourcing and privatization in their public policies (Kouzmin 2008). This support a hypothesis of for-profit sector being more important in the post-communist countries.

To test the hypotheses in a more systematic way, a cluster analysis is conducted in the latter part of the paper. This is done in two steps. First, characteristics of the crisis management systems are discussed with the aim to identify key variables entering the analysis and to provide a descriptive overview of the similarities and differences among different European countries, based on qualitative data obtained from the ANVIL country reports. Second, a cluster analysis is conducted aiming at identifying groups of EU states with similar approaches to crisis management. This is carried out using coded data from the ANVIL data annexes, related to the dimensions identified in the previous section.

3. DIMENSIONS OF CIVIL SECURITY GOVERNANCE

Responsibility for civil security rests ultimately with the local and national governments, yet the tasks should be shouldered and shared also by other stakeholders, such as private agencies or even individuals (Gopalakrishnan, Okada, 2007: 367). The role of other actors is then often seen as complementary or supplementary: „where the government assistance leaves off, multilateral and nongovernmental organizations pick up“ (Coppola 2006: 377). This has been witnessed e.g. in Ireland where there has been a decrease in state activity due to the economic crisis (Fanoulis et al. 2013b) or in , where volunteering was a reaction to state insufficiency after the l'Aquila earthquake (Di Camillo et al. 2013).

Based on the literature, the following section seeks to identify key dimensions and stakeholders in civil security governance and to look into how these are covered in the European countries which are here under study. All the sections below first focus on general observations on the particular dimension as identified in the literature and, consequently, cover the issue based on the data from the ANVIL analytical reports.

3.1. CIVIL SOCIETY INVOLVEMENT - CITIZENS

The involvement of civil society is widely regarded as growing in the field of security (Dembinski, Joachim, 2014). It is expected to enhance transparency and accountability, providing a remedy for the democratic deficit often associated with (intergovernmental)

5 decision-making in the field of security (ibid.). At the same time, the shift from "government" towards "governance" does not have to be seen as limited to the organized forms of civil society only. Instead, broader networks of actors, including the citizens need to be considered as well (Perry, Lindell 2003; Fung 2006; Wehn et al. 2015).

A certain change can be seen in the expansion of the role of the citizens: Under normal circumstances, the obligations of citizenship are quite modest. When a disaster occurs, however, "the obligations of citizenship are enhanced and the focus of activity is clarified" (Dynes 2006: 5).The importance of citizens' participation in civil security governance has been officially recognized also e.g. in the Aarhus Convention of 1999 on environmental issues or, more recently, in the EU Flood Directive of 2007. The actual implementation, however, is reportedly rather limited in many cases as the extent to which the authorities expect civil security outcomes from the citizens varies from one country to another (Wehn et al. 2015). The same holds for the citizens themselves as their expectations of the state also vary significantly. Such expectations range from the belief that the state "will do it", such as the case e.g. in , Hungary, Poland, Romania, Serbia or the United Kingdom (Coste et al. 2013; Takacs, Matczak 2013; Matczak, Abgarowicz 2013; Fagarasan 2013; Kešetovi ć 2013; Fanoulis et al. 2013) to the alienation of society and self-reliance as reported in Latvia (Hellenberg, Vissuri 2013b).

Looking at the current legislation, in some cases, there are clearly formulated expectations of the state towards its citizens. On the one hand, these concern subsidiarity - as it is reflected in the cases where responsibility of citizens for their individual protection during disasters is stipulated. It might be argued that a legally stated obligation to undergo trainings could also be understood as augmenting citizens’ capacities to protect themselves. While such measure can be found in several countries (see Table 1 below), not everywhere is this obligation observed in reality (see Matczak, Abgarovicz 2013).

On the other hand, legislation in the European countries also sometimes covers obligations making the citizens an integral part of the crisis response and recovery. These are especially the obligation for citizens to participate upon request in civil security activities during a crises stated by the legislation in some countries; or the obligation to provide necessary resources. Table 1 below shows countries, where such legal provisions exist.

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Table 1: Responsibilities and Obligations of Citizens in the 22 European countries

Responsibilities and Obligations Examples of Countries Clearly stated responsibility of citizens for Austria, Croatia, , Italy, Lithuania, individual protection Romania, Slovakia, Sweden, Switzerland Training of citizens in civil security Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Serbia Obligation for citizens to participate (upon Austria, Czech Republic, France, Hungary, request) in civil security Lithuania, Norway, Slovakia, Sweden, Switzerland Resource provision Romania, Serbia, Austria, Czech Republic, Germany, Switzerland, Slovakia Source: author's compilation based on ANVIL country studies

3.2. CIVIL SOCIETY INVOLVEMENT - CSOs

The inclusion of CSOs in crisis management is often seen as a precondition for both effectiveness (Brudney, Gazley, 2009) and efficacy (Waugh, Streib, 2006). While strengthening the state’s capacity (in terms of an almost exclusive reliance on public authorities and agencies) in civil security policy planning and implementation might lead to an increase in policy effectiveness, when a disaster occurs, collaboration with CSOs is seen as a means to achieve a high level of trust and augment local competency (Saban 2013).

At the European level, the CSOs became increasingly active in shaping the security policies and started to exert influence over some national security issues as well (Joachim, Dembinski, 2011). In many countries, the role of these organizations in disaster management has shifted from a supplemental to a central one with their inclusion in the national disaster management structures, concerning not only preparedness but also response and recovery operations. The voluntary provision of fire-fighting services can be given as one example of such activities (Lethbridge, 2009). Recently, however, especially the influence assumed by the International Federation of the Red Crossand Red Crescent Societies is noted as an indicative one of the whole civic sector in the field of civil security (Coppola 2006: 407).

With some exception of Finland and Austria where individual approach to volunteering seems to be somewhat more popular (Hellenberg, Vissuri 2013a; Bossong, Hegemann 2013a), most of the countries prefer organized way of civic participation in the form of CSOs. In the sample of 22 countries, the only cases where volunteering is not considered too important in the civil security provision are Estonia and Romania and to some extent also France (Hellenberg, Vissuri 2013; Fagarasan et al. 2013; Coste et al. 2013). Hence, it can be inferred that volunteering and civic participation in CSOs constitutes important part of civil security provision in most of the European countries.

The most common area of civic engagement in the civil security realm in Europe is firefighting. In most of the countries at least some (typically less accessible and rural) areas are covered by voluntary units. The scope of the voluntary firefighters' engagement is typically relatively high with some countries (such as Austria) relying on this mode almost

7 exclusively. On the other side of the spectrum then can be found e.g. Latvia with a small role of the voluntary firefighters (Hellenberg, Vissuri 2013b).

Another large and relatively diverse area where the CSOs are active can be subsumed under the umbrella term of support. This comprises especially search and rescue activities, quite often including the dog rescue; amateur radio organizations, water rescue, etc. Less frequently, also new areas of security are covered, such as cyber defence in Estonia (Hellenberg, Vissuri 2013).

Table: Areas of civil security where CSOs are active

Areas of engagement Examples of Countries Firefighting Austria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Latvia (small share), Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Serbia, Slovakia Relief Austria, France, Hungary, Latvia, Serbia, Slovakia, United Kingdom Policing Estonia, the Netherlands (small share) Medical and/or ambulance services Austria, Germany, Ireland, Malta, Slovakia, United Kingdom Other support Austria, Croatia, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Serbia, Slovakia, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom Source: author's compilation based on ANVIL country studies

The field of relief and of medical services is often dominated by different charities, with the Red Cross playing a dominant role in this area in most of the countries. Despite the relatively large number of countries where voluntary firefighting units can be found, the most important organization is typically considered to be the Red Cross. Indeed, the Red Cross societies enjoy a considerable degree of privileges compared to other CSOs. This includes the official agreements signed with the national Red Cross associations with the governments, such as e.g. in Slovakia or in Hungary (Brazova, Matczak 2013b; Takacs, Matczak 2013); or being legally privileged as it is the case in Germany (Hegemann, Bossong 2013a). Table below provides the overview of the relative importance of the Red Cross among the 22 countries under study.

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Table: The most important CSO in civil security

Organization Countries Red Cross Austria, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Sweden, Switzerland Red Cross + other CSO Estonia, France, Malta, United Kingdom Other than Red Cross Croatia, Czech Republic, Finland, Poland (Voluntary Firefighters in all cases) Source: author based on ANVIL country studies

As it can be seen from the table above, only in a few countries (Croatia, Czech Republic, Finland and Poland) the Red Cross does not play a crucial role in the civil security provision. Despite being present and actively engaged especially in the relief efforts, the voluntary firefighters are considered the most important and are usually the most counted-on CSO by the national governments in the field of civil security in these countries. Another group of countries represents a mixed approach with the Red Cross being important, yet sharing its position with other CSOs. In Estonia, the Red Cross, voluntary firefighters and rescue organizations seem to be relatively equally important (Hellenberg, Vissuri 2013). In France, voluntary firefighters are also important besides the Red Cross (Coste et al. 2013). In the United Kingdom, the Red Cross shares its position with other CSO from the same area of civil security, namely with the St. John Ambulance (Fanoulis et al. 2013). The case of Malta then lies somewhere between the categories as the Red Cross operates alongside other CSOs, yet assumes an informal lead (Fanoulis et al. 2013c).

3.3. PRIVATE (FOR PROFIT) SECTOR INVOLVEMENT

In addition to public agencies and civic organizations, an important role in civil security can be played by private organizations. While these are exploited somewhere, there is still a considerable space for their greater involvement in disaster management (Gopalakrishnan, Okada, 2007: 359). The role of businesses in disaster management belongs to a rather newly realized one. On the one hand, private companies usually have to “assume preventive and mitigative responsibility” (Coppola 2006: 404-406). On the other hand, their involvement goes quite often beyond these responsibilities and private firms get engaged directly in crisis management, be it due to privatization of formerly exclusively public spheres of security or due to outsourcing and contracting.

Ambulance and firefighting services typically represent public services in emergency response operations. Although private sector provision of these services has been so far quite limited in the European countries, recently, the involvement of the private sector has started to be increasingly visible in both fire-fighting and ambulance services provision (Lethbridge, 2009). In the context of civil security, the ambulance services have to be seen as important

9 providers of pre-hospital care and of emergency medical services. The active engagement of private companies in delivering ambulance services should be seen as indicative of companies’ wider strategies to increase their participation in the public sector (Lethbridge, 2009).

As it is shown in Table below, the field of activities taken up by the business sector in civil security seems to be more varied than it was the case with CSOs. The largest number of countries refer to private companies in connection with critical infrastructure. As a relatively recently recognized field of civil security, critical infrastructure protection has been made the subject to EU legislation in 2008. The transposition of the respective Directive into the national frameworks can be thus expected in all EU countries.

One of the areas where private companies are engaged in several European countries is the provision of special machinery, as it is done e.g. by salvage companies for shipwrecks recovery in the Netherlands (Kuipers, Boin 2013). The involvement of private companies is also quite common in the provision of transportation and logistics, such as rail and airports in Hungary; logistic services in Poland; or shipping and trucking services in Switzerland (Takacs, Matczak 2013; Matczak, Abgarowicz 2013; Hegemann, Bossong 2013b). In Poland, Switzerland and Norway, too, the stockpiling of emergency food (Norway) or sanitary equipment (Poland) is contracted out to private companies (Hollis, Ekengren 2013; Matczak, Abgarowicz 2013).

Ambulance and health rescue are also quite frequent activities undertaken by private firms. These play a major role in Finland, Poland, Slovakia and the Netherlands. One of the largest players in this field is the Danish Falck company which operates emergency ambulance services in Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Finland, Poland, Slovakia and Spain (Lethbridge 2009). In other countries, private companies can also be found in this field, yet playing a rather small and complementary role only to other modes of provision of this service, such as in Germany or in the Czech Republic, where typically smaller for-profit health rescue services assist at various cultural and sporting events at the expenses of the organizer (Brazova, Matczak 2013).

Contrary to the civic sector involvement, private companies do not seem to get too much engaged in firefighting. Where they do (e.g. in Finland or in Slovakia), their role is small and often limited to the fire protection in large enterprises. Similarly as in the ambulance provision, also here is the Falck company the largest provider. Although this situation contrast with the very original development of firefighting services which in many countries started out as a private enterprise - e.g. by private insurance companies in the United Kingdom in the 18th century (Lethbridge 2009), voluntary provision of firefighting services is nowadays more common than the private one (see section above).

So far, it does not seem much common to engage private companies in direct response to disasters. Somewhat exceptional case here is Croatia, where there are over 30 public-private partnerships in place in the field of flood protection and response to environmental accidents (Samardzija et al. 2013). It is also in Croatia that public authorities contract expertise from

10 private companies in civil security matters - in Croatia this concerns threat assessment and development of protection and rescue plans for different public agencies (ibid.).

Table: Areas of civil security where private companies are active

Areas of engagement Examples of Countries Critical infrastructure Austria, Czech Republic, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland Special machinery provision France, Hungary, the Netherlands, Norway, Romania Ambulance and health rescue Major role: Finland, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia Minor role: Czech Republic, Germany Transport and logistics Hungary, Poland, Romania, Switzerland Emergency stockpiles Norway, Poland, Switzerland Firefighting Finland, Slovakia (complementary role only in all cases) Expertise Croatia Flood protection; environ. accidents response Croatia Source: author's compilation based on ANVIL country studies

In several European countries, any (larger) outsourcing or privatization of tasks related to the civil security provision is considered to be out of question. This is the case especially in Austria, Czech Republic, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and the Netherlands. Although private companies can be asked for an additional assistance during a disaster and they have certain obligations and responsibilities with respect to their activity (e.g. chemical plants), the national civil security governance systems do not ascribe any special role to them. In other countries, some activities are outsourced, yet are rather insignificant in scope and/or not directly related to emergencies. In this way, e.g. in Ireland, private services are purchased by the authorities upon request and cover such issues as drainage of lands (Fanoulis et al. 2013b). In Italy, the option for the authorities to outsource parts of civil security to private companies is theoretically open (as the respective legislation is in place), but in reality it remains unexploited (Di Camillo et al. 2013).

Public-private partnerships are, on the other hand, more commonly used in civil security in France, Romania and Croatia (Coste et al. 2013; Fagarasan et al. 2013; Samardzija et al. 2013). One of the most advanced countries concerning the engagement of the private sector in the civil security provision is Estonia. Here, private sector is involved in multiple areas, including preparedness and planning (Hellenberg, Vissuri 2013). Crisis preparedness activities are also outsourced in Finland with the prospect of an increase in the future (Hellenberg, Vissuri 2013a). Similarly in Norway, preparedness and response tasks are outsourced to profit-oriented companies (Hollis, Ekengren 2013).

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3.4. INTERNATIONAL ENGAGEMENT

As it is argued in the literature on security governance (Krahmann 2003), all levels have to be taken into account, including the international one. Civil security thus "has to be conceived of as a multi-national concern" (Hamilton et al. 2005: 15). There is a reported convergence in disaster management and civil security provision among the countries world-wide due to globalization and - as in the case of the EU - also due to agreements and common mechanisms, such as the EU Emergency Response Coordination Centre. At the same time, however, national civil security governance systems still do retain their specific characteristics (see sections above) which play a significant role also when addressing crises together with the rest of the international community (Ha 2015).

On the one hand, many national civil security systems have successfully adapted to the need for an enhanced, international cooperation, mostly realized on the basis of treaties and other similar documents (ibid.). On the other hand, though, the deficiencies in resources available to the national public authorities to meet civil security threats have not yet been fully compensated by an enhanced international cooperation and the structures for dealing with civil security threats are still national in focus (Hamilton et al. 2005). This holds true also for the EU, despite growing efforts in this area.

An example in this regard can be seen the actual exploitation of the Commission’s Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC) which has been used only by some countries so far (see Table below). The countries seem to be considerably more active in contributing to the MIC themselves with all EU countries making at least some active contribution to the MIC in 2007-2011. The range of the number of these contributions varies significantly, from less than ten times (Croatia, Estonia, Finland, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland and Romania) to more than twenty times (Austria, France and Italy). The median number of active contributions to the MIC in the countries which are here under study then lies at ten contributions per country.

Table: MIC and Solidarity Fund activation by European countries in 2007-2011 MIC activation in the period 2007-2011 Countries (Nr. of activations) Yes France (5x), Hungary (2x), Ireland (1x), Italy (4x), the Netherlands (1x), Romania (2x), Slovakia (1x), United Kingdom (1x) No Austria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Norway, Poland, Serbia, Sweden Source: author based on ANVIL country data sheets

Somewhat more telling (also due to the time-span covered) is the usage of the EU Solidarity Fund in case of natural disasters. In the period between 2002 and 2012 most of the European countries did make an active use of this financial support. In our sample, the only EU countries not receiving any support from the Solidarity Fund were Finland and the

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Netherlands. Most commonly (median value), the countries asked for such support once in the given period. The maximum number of times when financial support was requested to deal with natural disasters was six (France and Italy).

Based on the above, it can be inferred that France and Italy represent countries which make an active use of the international dimension in their civil security governance. Both countries are actively "giving and taking", i.e. contributing above average to the MIC and, at the same time, frequently requesting support from the EU mechanisms. On the other side of the spectrum then lie the North-Eastern European countries (Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland) which (together with Malta) engage in the international dimension rather moderately. They belong to smaller contributors to the MIC while not activating the mechanism themselves and receiving financial support from the Solidarity Fund only once in all the cases.

3.5. DECENTRALIZATION

(De)centralisation belongs to one of the key dimensions in security governance (Krahmann 2003). While the majority of risks associated with disasters is coordinated and managed centrally at the national level (Field 2012: 360), lower levels of administration cannot be disregarded. Over the last several decades, the role and importance of local governments in managing the demands associated with disaster preparedness and response has been growing (Wolensky, Wolensky 1990; Field 2012).

While this is an undisputed shift in governance of civil security matters, no consensus exists about the effectiveness of this feature. Based on an extensive literature review the Wolensky and Wolensky (1990) point to a questionable effectiveness of decentralization: "local governments continue to face problems that (...) have greatly limited effective performance" (ibid.:706).Effectiveness in this field depends rather on good planning and leaderships of those in charge than on the particular type of governance structure (i.e. centralized versus decentralized). In fact, decentralization was noted as an obstacle to effective dealing with emergencies by Stallings and Schepart (1987). Contrastingly, however, decentralized decision-making mechanisms were suggested to increase the effectiveness in disaster management and risk reduction by Ahrens and Rudolph (2006) and Field (2012).

In the countries under study, both centralized and decentralized civil security systems can be found with decentralization tending to be prevalent especially in the countries in Central and Northern Europe (Bossong, Hegemann 2013).Although differing from some other policy domains, the governance of civil security tends to reflect the general administrative setup in most of the countries. In this way, federal Central European countries adhere to a large degree of decentralization also in their civil security policies. By the same token, small and unitary states, such as Latvia, Lithuania or Slovakia have adopted centralised approaches (ibid.). Table below summarizes the case.

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Table: Decentralisation in Civil Security Governance

Level of (de)centralisation Countries Decentralised Austria, Germany and Switzerland Rather decentralised Czech Republic, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom Rather centralised Croatia, Estonia, France, Poland and Romania Centralised Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Serbia and Slovakia Source: Bossong, Hegemann 2013

3.6. MILITARY INVOLVEMENT

Besides the private involvement as discussed above, the literature on disaster governance (Tierney 2012) recognizes also the role of the military as a particular governance aspect in the civil security provision. Although the involvement of the military would typically be subsumed under the state provision of security, several authors point out the need to treate the military as a distinct actor in civil security and disaster mangement - paralelly to e.g. public health organizations, safety organizations or voluntary associations and religious institutions (Tierney 2012; Wentz 2006). This is even more understandable in the time when the civil– military tasks are getting increasingly blurred while the strict departmental division prevails (see e.g. Daase, Friesendorf 2010). For this reason, also here the military engagement is treated as yet another dimension to the civil security governance.

Despite large variations, it is becoming growingly common for governments to engage their military resources (including troops, equipment or information) in response and recovery activities during disasters (Coppola 2006). The military assistance to civil security operations typically includes especially transportation logistics or search and rescue. As a general example can be given the U.S. military which is “frequently involved in natural and technological disaster and (…) relief efforts“ (Coppola 2006: 374).

Although the crisis management approach is based on civilian operations (as opposed to military ones), military forces do regularly contribute to the civil security efforts (under the civilian leadership) in all the countries under study, at least during exceptional crises adding considerable manpower and logistical capacities (Bossong, Hegemann 2013). However, as it is shown in Table below, large variations in the extent and frequency of military deployment in dealing with disasters exist. An exemplifying example is the difference between the Czech Republic and Slovakia. In the latter case, military is commonly engaged in disaster response (especially through the provision of machinery, equipment and forces e.g. during heavy snowfalls), especially at the local level (Brazova, Matczak 2013b). In the former case, military plays only a marginal role in the civil security provision as most of the activities are

14 during disasters undertaken by both professional and voluntary firefighters (Brazova, Matczak 2013).

Table: Extent to which military is used in the civil security provision

Use of the military in civil security provision Country In exceptional situations only Austria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Switzerland, United Kingdom Regularly Italy, Norway, Slovakia, Sweden Source: Source: author based on ANVIL country data sheets

4. IN SEARCH OF CLASSIFICATION - PATTERNS IN CIVIL SECURITY GOVERNANCE

The article employs a hierarchical cluster analysis to empirically assess if the civil security governance systems of the European countries fall into geographically and culturally similar clusters. In particular, the position of the Central European post-communist countries is followed. Such empirical assessment can be regarded a helpful tool in indentifying different patterns in the civil security governance in Europe. Hierarchical cluster analysis can be regarded the most appropriate method to allow grouping of countries which exhibit similar characteristics across a set of variables (Fenger 2007). In this section, firstly, the variables entering into the analysis are presented. Secondly, the cluster analysis to identify similarity patterns among the countries is conducted.

4.1. VARIABLES

A crucial step in the performance of the cluster analysis is the selection of variables. Variables selected here represent the different dimensions of civil security governance as identified in the previous part. These are 1) the obligations placed upon the citizens; 2) the engagement of the CSOs and 3) of the for-profit organizations; 4) the importance of the international and 5) of the local (decentralization) levels; and, finally, 6) the involvement of the military. 4

1. Citizens' obligations distinguishing between countries where regular responsibilities in civil security are codified and countries largely without any special (codified) responsibilities. 2. A) Large role of CSOs in regular civil security provision distinguishing between countries with the official role of non-profit actors in regular situations in almost all aspects of civil security and countries where the CSOs play a minor role, or are active in a few areas only.

4 Note: the data at hand allow for the construction of binary variables only. 15

B) Official role of non-profit actors in exceptional situations distinguishing between countries with CSOs active in almost all aspects of civil security during exceptional situations and no or a few areas only. 3. A) Official role of for-profit actors in regular situations making difference between the countries with regular engagement of for-profit actors in many fields of civil security and without such engagement of for-profit actors. B) Official role of for-profit actors in exceptional situations making difference between countries where for-profit organizations play some official role during exceptional situations and those where they do not. 4. The activation of the MIC making difference between countries having used the mechanism and not. 5. Decentralization distinguishes between the countries where civil security provision is rather decentralized and others (with rather centralized civil security provision). 6. The use of the military for support during crisis management operations distinguishing between countries where military is regularly used and where it is not.

4.2. CLUSTER ANALYSIS

When conducting the cluster analysis, the following technical decisions were made: Considering the nature of the data (binary variables), the common Jaccard measure has been used (see e.g. Finch 2005) with the Complete Linkage method 5. Because the SPSS does not include in the hierarchical cluster analysis those countries for which the data on one or more variables are missing, the final sample entering the analysis here is reduced to 20 countries 6. The dendogram representing the outcomes of the cluster analysis is shown in Figure 1 with the vertical proximity of the linked countries suggesting their similarity in terms of civil security governance patterns.

5 Other methods were yielding very similar results (with the exception of Austria which seems to be "volatile" and matched sometimes with Sweden and Italy as above or with Germany, Croatia and Malta). 6 Latvia and Lithuania containing missing variables. 16

Figure 1: Clusters of European countries based on civil security governance dimensions

Rescaled Distance Cluster Combine

C A S E 0 5 10 15 20 25 Label Num +------+------+------+------+------+

Ireland 9 -+------+ United Kingdom 22 -+ +------+ Czech Republic 3 ------+ +------+ Poland 16 ------+ +---+ Italy 10 ------+------+ | | Sweden 20 ------+ +------+ | Austria 1 ------+ | Hungary 8 ------+------+ | Romania 17 ------+ +------+ | France 6 ------+------+ | | Slovakia 19 ------+ +------+ | Estonia 4 -+------+ | | | Serbia 18 -+ +------+ | | Netherlands 14 ------+ +------+ Finland 5 -+------+ | Switzerland 21 -+ +------+ | Norway 15 ------+ +-+ Croatia 2 ------+------+ | Germany 7 ------+ +------+ Malta 13 ------+

Source of data: ANVIL data annexes recoded into binary variables

The cluster analysis reveals substantial heterogeneity in civil security governance among the European countries. Nevertheless, a relative similarity can be observed between Ireland and the United Kingdom; between Estonia and Serbia; and between Finland and Switzerland. Further, out of the tree diagram in Figure 1 above, several groups of countries stand out with somewhat similar civil security governance.

One of these groups is formed by the abovementioned Ireland and the United Kingdom, joined by the Czech Republic and - more distantly - also by Poland. In all these countries, according to the coded data, no large obligations for citizens in civil security exist. In Poland, training of citizens officially belongs to such obligations, yet is not observed in reality (Matczak, Abgarowicz 2013). Similarly, the role of the state provision of civil security is crucial in these countries. CSOs are engaged during emergencies, however, their role is rather supportive only. Also the engagement of the for-profit sector is rather small and civil security tasks are not outsourced 7. Neither the military, nor the international dimension play a large role here. While the civil security provision is rather decentralized in the former three countries, Polish civil security is more centralized what also explains the distance at which Poland joins this group.

7 In this respect, Poland stands somewhat out with the ambulance services being privatized. Overall, however, the reliance of the state on the for-profit sector is very small in Poland (Matczak, Abgarowicz 2013). 17

The countries with the most distinct civil security governance patterns are then Italy, Sweden and Austria. It seems hard to match them with any of the previous groups, as well as to form a completely homogeneous group composed of them. They do distantly resemble the previous grouping in that the reliance on CSOs is larger compared to the for-profit sector. The role of the CSOs is, then, also larger than in the group above. While Sweden and Italy do make use of the military during a crisis, in Austria this is not the case. The countries also vary in terms of international assistance - while help from neighbors was received in Sweden and Italy, Italy also activated the MIC, while Austria did not request any international help in the followed period.

Another group which stands out is composed of Hungary, Romania, France and Slovakia. All these countries have rather centralized system of civil security provision. In all cases also the international dimension played a role as the countries activated the MIC in the past and also received help from a neighbor or other partner based on a bilateral cooperation. Unlike the civic sector which is here not so much engaged in regular civil security provision, the countries do engage the for-profit sector in both regular and exceptional situations. Moreover, both Hungary and Romania do have stipulated specific obligations for their citizens. Slovakia, then - unlike the rest of the countries in this group - also employs its military relatively often in disaster response.

This group (Hungary, Romania, France and Slovakia) is somewhat similar to the grouping formed by Estonia, Serbia and the Netherlands. Basically, the civil security governance reveals the same patterns as in the group above. The difference, however, lies in the reliance on international help which is rather small in these three countries. Overall, the scope of the for-profit involvement is larger than the one of CSOs, at least in regular civil security activities.

Yet another group of countries is Croatia, Germany and Malta. Except for decentralization, Croatia and Germany resemble each other in their civil security governance. In both cases, relatively high level of governance is reached with the reliance on both CSOs and for-profit organizations regularly as well as during exceptional situations. At the same time, obligations of the citizens are not large and the countries do not rely too much on the international help, neither on the assistance of the military during a crisis. Malta, then, shows similar features with the exception of regular engagement of the for-profit sector which is absent in this case.

This group can be distantly associated with Finland, Switzerland and Norway. In these three countries - unlike in the previous group - the obligations of citizens are quite high. On the other hand - similarities concern the for-profit sector involvement in both regular and exceptional situations, decentralization of the civil security provision and refraining from asking for international assistance. The role of the CSOs under regular circumstances is (with the exception of Norway) somewhat smaller than in the previous group.

Thus, one could conclude that geographical proximity (and the geographical conditions behind it) is by far not the most important factor explaining the similarity of civil security governance patterns in Europe. Although the vicinity and cultural similarity does play some role (such as between Ireland and the UK or Hungary and Romania), it cannot explain the

18 adherence to similar patterns in civil security governance. From the cluster analysis it also becomes clear that the so-called Eastern Europe does not constitute any even remotely homogeneous group. Instead, mixes of "old" and "post-communist" countries are frequent, displaying similar patterns in the features of their civil security governance.

5. CONCLUSIONS

No state can provide the public good of civil security for its citizens alone. The engagement of other actors is necessary in all European countries. However, significant differences in the scope and form exist. The article attempted to identify different dimensions alongside which the civil security governance could be conceptualized. These do not have to be limited to the involvement of the civic and/or for-profit sector. Instead, such aspects as decentralization, international engagement and the role of different bodies (such as the army) should be considered as well.

While volunteering via CSOs is typically seen as an important element in the national systems of civil security governance in the literature, as well as in most of the countries, exceptions do exist. The most remarkable ones are the cases of Estonia and Romania where the CSOs also participate in the civil security provision in one way or another, yet they play only a relatively small role compared to the state and/or private actors. Contrastingly, a large role is ascribed to the CSOs in civil security especially in Western Continental and Northern Europe. In the rest of the countries, the official role of the CSOs in civil security can be best described as mixed with the countries relying on the CSOs, yet often parallelly with services provided by the for- profit sector or the state at the national or regional level.

Despite the fact that regional and/or cultural differences exist in some dimensions, such as decentralization of the civil security provision systems or the reliance on CSOs - both of which tend to be somewhat more prevalent in the "old" European countries; this distinction does not hold when more dimensions of civil security (such as the inclusion of for-profit organizations, the role of international assistance, etc.) are combined. As the cluster analysis shows, clusters typically tend to be mixed with "old" and "new" EU member states, such as Germany and Croatia, showing similar patterns especially in civic and for-profit actors engagement.

The data does not suggest a greater for-profit involvement and public-private partnerships in the post-communist countries. Consequently, the above stated hypothesis on the greater role of private sector in civil security of the post-communist European countries by far does not seem to be universally valid.

Finally, the heterogeneity of civil security governance in many neighboring countries might have potential implications for interoperability which is being increasingly stressed as desirable (see e.g. Hamilton et al. 2005). Hence, further research is suggested in the area of cross-border and international cooperation in civil security, taking into account the interactions of different civil security governance systems.

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