The Last Battle of World War II

prof. dr. M. Gareev*

Introduction than 50 million human lives. The helped end the war together his article is devoted to the So- with Allied forces. viet Armed Forces’ role in de- Tfeating the Japanese Kwantung The Red Army defeated the million- Army in August-September 1945. In strong , the enemy’s my opinion, few people in the West largest Asia-Pacific military forma- know about the Manchurian military tion, which had 1,215 tanks, 6,640 operation that ended World War II. I artillery systems, 1,907 warplanes also took part in that operation; this is and 26 ships (The Times, 15.08. why I will combine historical facts 1984.). The Japanese had set up long- with my own recollections. term and multi-echelon reinforced concrete fortifications along the So- This article analyzes the balance of viet-Chinese border. Those fortifica- forces on the Far Eastern theater of tions were linked by underground the war in August 1945 and the effi- tunnels and had enough food and Soviet Command signing a formal ciency of the Red Army’s Manchurian water for several months of incessant document of Japan’s unconditional operation. The article features a dis- fighting. surrender aboard the battleship cussion with some Western historians USS Missouri on September 2, 1945 with regards to the need to involve the The Kwantung Army, which was (Photo RIA Novosti) U.S.S.R. in the war against Japan. commanded by General Otozo Ya- It also deals with hostilities on Chinese mada, comprised the First Front, the territory and Soviet-Allied coopera- Third Front and the Seventeenth The Manchurian tion. And, finally, the article offers Front, as well as the detached Fourth operation some brief conclusions stemming Field Army. The Kwantung Army had from the results of World War II. 42 regular infantry divisions and Soviet forces conducted the Manchu- seven cavalry divisions, as well as rian strategic offensive operation in On September 2, 1945, Japan signed a another 23 infantry brigades, two ca- the Far East from August 9 to Sep- full and unconditional surrender valry brigades and two tank brigades, tember 2, 1945. It is forever embla- aboard the battleship USS Missouri in one Kamikaze brigade, six detached zoned in the history of World War II as Bay. This marked the end of regiments, the Second and Fifth Air a brilliant example of military art and World War II, which had lasted almost Armies and the Sungari naval flotilla. as one of the war’s most outstanding exactly six years and claimed more episodes. That operation took place Moreover, General Yamada comman- ded the 250,000-strong of * ‘Army General’ M. Gareev is President of the Manchoukuo puppet state to- USS Missouri on board of which the Russian Academy of Military Sciences in gether with cavalry units of Prince a formal document of Japan’s Moscow. He has written over 200 publi- cations about military history and mililtary Teh Wang (Tonlop), the Japanese- surrender was signed science. appointed ruler of Inner . (Photo RIA Novosti)

268 MILITAIRE SPECTATOR JRG 175 6-2006 along a 5,000-km front and to a depth same area as Germany, Italy and Different visions of 200 to 800 km. Hostilities were Japan all together. conducted over rugged terrain that The Red Army killed about 84,000 True, some Western researchers, in- included deserts, plains, mountains, enemy officers and men and took cluding modern U.S. historians E. Ac- forests, marshes and the taiga. nearly 700,000 prisoner. Soviet losses tion, Paul Dull, Ronald Spector and totaled no more than 12,000 officers political commentator of Japan’s Ko- The Red Army had to cross such great and men, or less than 1 per cent of all kubo military magazine O.Toshima, rivers as the Amur, the Argun and the the troops involved. Neither the explained such outstanding successes Sungari. Its units also crossed the Wehrmacht, nor Great Britain and the by the complete demoralization of the Greater Khingan mountain range (al- United States had achieved similar Japanese Imperial Army after the titude, up to 1,500 meters above sea successes in any theater of operation bombings of and Nagasaki level). That theater of war had the of World War II. and by its end as a formidable milita-

JRG 175 6-2006 MILITAIRE SPECTATOR 269 ry force. U.S. President Harry Truman Japanese territory against invading incur the losses incident to such a said the same in 1947 (Bulletin of U.S. forces. war and we shall have to leave the History, 1949. No. 143. p. 30). Japanese islands. In that case, the war would have las- (J. Ehrman, Grand Strategy. Moreover, they claim that the Soviet ted for at least another year or two, October 1944-August 1945. Union’s participation in the final sta- rather than only one month. Conse- Moscow 1985. pp. 271-272) ges of World War II was not necessary quently, U.S. casualties would have ex- because the U.S. Armed Forces and ceeded one million. (For more details, It is a fact of history that President those of their Allies could have coped see Ronald Spector’s book Eagle Truman first did not think that it with imperialist Japan on their own. Against the Sun pp. 552-553; W. would be expedient to involve the So, how can one reply to these state- Churchill The Second World War U.S.S.R. in the war. Nevertheless, U.S. ments? Vol. 6. p. 333) generals convinced him to change his mind. General Douglas MacArthur, One could portray those statements as Pentagon leaders believed that the Ja- who commanded Allied forces in the relics of the bipolar Cold War con- panese Emperor and the General Staff south-west Pacific, wrote to the Presi- frontation between the capitalist sys- could leave for and resist dent that U.S. forces should not land in tem and the socialist system. At that U.S. forces there with the help of Japan, until the Russian Army laun- time, each side did its best to distort bacteriological weapons. This, too, ched combat operations in Man- any achievements and to portray them would have inflicted tremendous los- churia. (Vyacheslav Zimonin. Final in the worst manner in historical ses on the U.S. Truman’s generals told Victory of World War Two. Moscow science and the mass media. We must him bluntly about this possibility. In 2005. p. 24) now discard old-time ideological his memorandum to President Tru- stereotypes and rely on authentic his- man, U.S. Secretary of War Henry torical facts instead. This is the only Stimson wrote: The Russian view possible method. Once started in an actual invasion, It should also be mentioned here that As is known, U.S. President Franklin we shall, in my opinion, have to go the Kremlin was also interested in de- Delano Roosevelt and British Prime through with an even more bitter feating the Kwantung Army, libera- Minister Sir Winston Spencer Chur- finish than in Germany. We shall ting China’s northeastern regions chill repeatedly asked Supreme Com- mander-in-Chief Joseph Stalin (during the 1943 Tehran conference and at the Yalta conference in 1945) to provide military help against Japan. The new U.S. President Harry Truman also asked Stalin about this at the 1945 Potsdam conference. The Soviet leader confirmed that the Red Army would attack the Kwantung Army exactly three months after the surren- der of Nazi Germany. Indeed, Soviet forces crossed the line of contact with the Japanese Army in the early hours of August 9.

Military historians know why Washing- ton insisted that the U.S.S.R. had to enter the war against Japan. In August 1945, the Japanese Armed Forces had almost 7,000,000 troops, 10,000 planes and 500 warships in Asia and the Pacific. The Allies had only 1,800,000 officers and men and 5,000 planes. If the had not joined the war, then the most combat- ready Kwantung Army would have concentrated its main elements on

270 MILITAIRE SPECTATOR JRG 175 6-2006 (Manchuria) and North Korea. It also Obviously, the Russian defeat was At that time, I was a major and senior wanted to deprive Tokyo of its milita- ‘helped’ a good deal by the revolu- assistant to the Fifth Army’s intelli- ry and economic bases in Asia – a tion of 1905, which undermined the gence officer. The Fifth Army, which bridgehead for attacking the U.S.S.R. country’s relatively small economic helped seize Konigsberg in April and Mongolia – and to help Chinese potential and prevented it from con- 1945, was subsequently transferred to patriots eliminate the Japanese inva- tinuing to defend its national interests the First . I also took ders from their homeland. in the Far East. Still we must face the part in preparing the Manchurian ope- These goals were fueled by the Krem- facts: Soviet leaders had every reason ration and trained advanced rifle bat- lin’s desire to take revenge for Rus- to declare war on imperial Japan. The talions that were ordered to seize sia’s ignominious defeat in the 1904- people always remembered the heroic long-term Japanese fortifications in 1905 war against Japan and to retrieve feat of the Varyag cruiser, which went August 1945. the lost South Sakhalin and the Kurile to the bottom in Chemulpo Bay rather archipelago. than surrender to the Japanese, and the Seventeen powerful fortified districts wonderful waltzes ‘The Hills of Man- had been built near Soviet and Mong- At the turn of the 20th century, Japan churia’ and ‘The Amur Waves’, which olian borders by that time, including received all-out U.S., British and French were composed during that time and eight fortified districts on the Soviet support and attacked Russian forces served as reminders of the event, and Primorye (Maritime) Territory’s bor- in Manchuria, on China’s Kwantung many other emotion-filled develop- der. They measured 800 km in length Peninsula and Korea. It sank its ships ments of the Russo-Japanese war. and 50-100 km in depth. I was orde- off Chemulpo seaport, seized Port Ar- red to supervise combat operations in thur, and defeated our troops at Sha- the Mudanjiang sector. After that, I ho, Mukden and Liao-Yang. It demo- My own experience took part in assisting the Eighty- lished a Russian naval squadron in the Fourth Cavalry that was sur- Tsushima Strait, practically depriving In August 1945, I served with the rounded northeast of Ninang. And I Russia of its Navy and forced upon attacking Fifth Army of the First Far commanded a task force responsible the country a humiliating peace under Eastern Front; and I recall vividly that for controlling Japanese POW camps which Russia lost not only its influen- almost every officer and soldier was later on. ce on China and Korea, but also some bent on eradicating the disgrace of of its traditional territories. 1905. I have never doubted the fact that the Kwantung Army had to be defeated, no matter what, and that the Soviet Far East must no longer face any mi- litary threats. World War II had to end as soon as possible; and the U.S.S.R. was supposed to get former Russian territories back.

It turns out that my personal opinions fully coincided with the Soviet politi- cal and military leadership’s tasks and goals because the Kremlin tried hard to ensure the safety of Far Eastern borders. As all of us know, the Soviet Union fought a terrible Great Patriotic War against Nazi Germany from June 22, 1941 and until May 9, 1945. As Japanese intentions were not abso- lutely clear, Moscow had to deploy up to forty full-strength army divisions and 29 air force divisions, as well as

Russo-Japanese war (1904-1905); Cruiser ‘Varyag’ and gunboat ‘Koreets’ during the Battle of Chemulpo (Photo RIA Novosti)

JRG 175 6-2006 MILITAIRE SPECTATOR 271 A coastal defense ship of the Amur Flotilla launching an assault group (Photo RIA Novosti) six air-defense divisions, that were our soldiers, violated Soviet land and tung Army, to ‘concentrate the main sorely needed on the Soviet-German maritime borders. effort against the Soviet Union and to Front, against the Kwantung Army. rout the enemy’ (Tokushiro Hattori. These units would have tipped the Japanese planes violated Soviet air The Japanese Army in Action in the scales during the battles of Moscow, space on over 1,000 occasions be- Pacific. Translated from English. Stalingrad and Kursk. Unfortunately, tween 1941and 1945. Japan stopped Moscow. 1964. p. 80.) the U.S.S.R. was forced to keep about our merchant ships 178 times, sinking 15 to 30 per cent of its military for- 18 of them. The Soviet merchant Neither the Japanese Army, nor the mations in the Far East because it marine’s losses totaled 637 million people of Japan knew back then that a feared a possible Japanese attack. rubles between 1941 and 1944. terrible force had been unleashed against them. Nor did they have any Some foreign researchers, including The Atomic bombs idea of a nuclear blast’s casualty- Ronald Spector (Eagle Against the What effect did the bombing of Hi- producing factors, such as residual Sun. N. Y. 1985) and Paul Dull (A Bat- roshima and Nagasaki produce on the radiation and radioactive contamina- tle History of the Imperial Japanese Kwantung Army? The atomic bombs tion of adjacent areas. Navy. Annapolis. 1979), claim that the were dropped on August 6 and 9, Japanese had behaved rather quietly respectively. Prominent Japanese his- Most Japanese learned about the de- along the Chinese-Soviet border, and torian Tokushiro Hattori, who also struction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki that they had no intention of attacking fought in that war, wrote that on only after the war ended. Field Mar- the U.S.S.R. But this is not so. The August 10 the Emperor’s General shal Shunroku Hata, Commander of Kwantung Army’s elements staged Headquarters ordered General Otozo the Second General Army, wrote, that numerous armed provocations against Yamada, Commander of the Kwan- although Hiroshima had suffered

272 MILITAIRE SPECTATOR JRG 175 6-2006 substantial damage, its scale did not Kwantung Army simply disintegrated well as the outstanding military skills exceed that in other cities after mas- into isolated pockets. On August 17, of its commanders. Suffice it to men- sive air raids. (S. Woodburn Kirby Marshal Alexander Vasilevsky sent a tion the rapid transfer of 400,000 War Against Japan. Vol. 1-5. L. 1957- tough-worded telegram to General troops, over 7,000 artillery pieces and 1970. Vol. 5. pp. 207-208,434.) Yamada, ordering him to stop resi- 1,100 planes from the West to the Incidentally, British Prime Minister stance. Yamada accepted this ulti- East in 136,000 railroad carriages. Winston Churchill had a similar opi- matum because of the Red Army’s in- nion. He wrote that it would be wrong exorable onslaught. On August 19, The Japanese intelligence service, to believe that the atomic bomb had 1945, the Kwantung Army’s high which had many secret agents in the sealed the fate of Japan. (W. Chur- command ordered an unconditional Far East, simply did not notice this chill. The Second World War. Vol. 6. surrender. transfer. Its blunder is quite explain- p. 552.) able because many units that had I myself saw that some fortified dis- fought Nazi Germany in 1941-1945 On August 14, Tokyo decided to tricts near Grodekovo and the Ver- were ordered to return to their per- accept the July 26, 1945 Potsdam blyud Mountain continued stubborn manent bases. Their officers and men Declaration and to sign an act of un- resistance even when they were fully traveled openly through Siberia and conditional surrender. The Japanese encircled after September 2. It is the Soviet Far East. They sang songs side notified the governments of the common knowledge that some armed and mixed with local residents during United States, the Soviet Union and Japanese soldiers continued to hide in meetings at major railroad stations. Great Britain about this. However, the the South East Asian jungles even But nobody saw other troop trains Kwantung Army was not ordered to thirty and fifty years after Japan’s de- move quietly along sidetracks at night stop resisting. But Emperor Hirohi- feat. Some of them committed sep- because their occupants were forbid- to’s officers and men were forced to puku. However, Japanese POWs told den to go out. lay down their weapons and to raise us that their military personnel did not To be frank, the number of such trains the white flag only after August 20 commit mass suicide. exceeded that of ‘home-bound’ trains. because of the ’s rapid In short, the Soviet High Command advance that was supported by the Air deployed large forces capable of de- Force and the Navy. In Retrospective feating the Kwantung Army.

Add to this all-out artillery bombard- It should be emphasized that the Man- The Manchurian strategic offensive ment and the landing of paratrooper churian strategic offensive operation was conducted by elements of the units in the Japanese rear. The Japa- highlighted the Red Army’s enhanced Trans-Baikal Front, the First and nese had no alternative because the potential by the end of the war, as Second Far Eastern Fronts. The Mongolian Popular Revolutionary Army (Marshal Choibalsan com- manding) also took part in the Soviet offensive, which was supported by the Soviet Navy’s Pacific Fleet and the Amur flotilla. Marshal of the Soviet Union Alexan- der Vasilevsky supervised the entire operation. Soviet and Mongolian forces had over 1,500,000 officers and men, more than 26,000 artillery systems and mortars, about 5,300 tanks and self-propelled guns, 5,200 planes and 93 cruisers, destroyers and submarines.

And here is one more aspect. The So- viet High Command planned to attack Japanese positions in the early hours of August 9. The Japanese Fifth Ar- my’s head of intelligence reported this to General Yamada. The latter Manchurian Operation (August 9 - September 2, 1945) wrote on his report that ‘only a mad- Surrender of the Kwantung Army (Photo Y. Khaldei, RIA Novosti) man can dare start an offensive in the

JRG 175 6-2006 MILITAIRE SPECTATOR 273 Manchurian Operation (August 9 - September 2, 1945) City folk in (North-Eastern China) welcoming Soviet soldiers, August 1945 (Photo Y. Khaldei, RIA Novosti)

other hand, Moscow did not allow the Pentagon to deploy its military bases on the Kurile Islands. It was obvious that if the Americans had occupied those islands, it would have been ex- tremely difficult to make them leave.

A study of the outcome of World War II and the events of its last few days suggests the following main conclu- sion. Leading countries can defeat a common evil only by concerted ef- fort. German Nazism and Japanese Maritime Territory in August, when vance and occupation zones before- militarism were a common evil in the the rain never ends, and all roads hand. The Big Three (Joseph Stalin, middle of the twentieth century. Inter- become unfit for the movement of Clement Attlee and Harry Truman) national terrorism has now become troops’. (As this quote was taken from agreed to this in advance at Potsdam. our common enemy. a classified Soviet strategic intelligen- Soviet and U.S. headquarters officers ce report, I cannot offer an official took over later on. We must support each other and help source – Gareev). our partners in every possible way. Not all missions were accomplished Without solidarity and all-round But the Soviet Union launched an without a hitch. For example, bat- mutual assistance, we are doomed to offensive and won, albeit with tre- talions of Colonel-General Ivan failure. There is no place for time- mendous effort. Tanks and artillery Chistyakov’s Twenty-Fifth Army serving considerations and petty sel- guns bogged down in mud. Cavalry reached the outskirts of Seoul and fish politics here. But we are invin- units could barely move. Kilograms waited there for two days before the cible when we act hand of mud stuck to soldiers’ boots and Americans came and occupied their in hand. horses’ legs. However, we advanced designated area. When elements of faster than the Army did on the So- our Thirty-Ninth Army approached viet-German Front even in dry sum- Port Arthur, two groups of Americans mer weather. on fast boats attempted to land and Bibliography seize a strategic bridgehead. Soviet Bulletin of History, 1949. No. 143. p. 30. Churchill, W., ‘The Second World War’, Vol. 6. The Chinese peasants also helped us soldiers fired their submachine guns p. 333. greatly. Nobody asked them to help into the air and drove off the ‘uninvi- Churchill, W., ‘The Second World War’, Vol. 6. but they did so of their own free will. ted guests’. p. 552. The Japanese had driven them to such Dull, P., ‘A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy’, Annapolis. 1979. a state that they literally carried our Nor did the Americans honor their Ehrman. J., ‘Grand Strategy. October 1944 - armored vehicles, so that we could commitment to jointly occupy the August 1945’, Moscow. 1985. pp. 271-272. oust their sworn enemies as soon as Island of Hokkaido, as the Big Three Hattori, Tokushiro, ‘The Japanese Army in possible. leaders had agreed. General Douglas Action in the Pacific’. Translated from Eng- MacArthur, whose word carried much lish. Moscow 1964. p. 80. Kirby, S., ‘War Against Japan’, Vol. 1-5. L. weight with President Truman, reso- 1957-1970. Vol. 5. p. 207-208, 434. Final Observations lutely opposed the idea of a Soviet MacArthur, D., ‘Reminiscences’. N. Y. 1965. presence in Japan. (D. MacArthur p. 260-261. I would like to say a few words about wrote about this in Reminiscences. Spector, R., ‘Eagle Against the Sun’. pp. 552- 553. our cooperation with the Allies. N. Y. 1965. pp. 260-261). The Japan Times, 15.08.1984. Those in charge of operations had Consequently, Soviet troops never set Zimonin, Vyacheslav, ‘Final Victory of World agreed on combat areas, routes of ad- foot on Japanese territory. On the War II’, Moscow 2005. p. 24.

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