Zionist Terrorism and Imperial Response British Policies towards Jewish Resistance in Palestine 1944-1948
Diplomarbeit
zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades eines Magisters der Philosophie
an der Karl-Franzens-Universität Graz
vorgelegt von
Robert LACKNER
am Institut für Geschichte Begutachter: Ao.Univ.-Prof. Mag. Dr.phil. Siegfried Beer
Graz, 2009
Ich möchte meinem Betreuer Prof. Siegfried Beer danken, der mich bei der Ent- stehung dieser Diplomarbeit tatkräftig unterstützt und mir geholfen hat, meinen Forschungsaufenthalt an den britischen National Archives in London zu reali- sieren. Weiters bedanke ich mich bei Prof. Grete Walter-Klingenstein für die zahlreichen anregenden Gespräche und die wertvollen Ratschläge. Besonderer Dank gilt abschließend meinen Eltern Anna und Peter, die mir stets zur Seite gestanden und meine Studien in Graz und im Ausland ermöglicht haben.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1 PROLOGUE ...... 1 1.1 INTRODUCTION ...... 1 1.2 COMMENTS ON SOURCES...... 3
2 THE EMPIRE AND PALESTINE ...... 5 2.1 THE ARAB-JEWISH CONFLICT ...... 6 2.2 PALESTINE IN BRITISH IMPERIAL STRATEGY ...... 11 2.3 BRITISH POLICY-MAKING FOR PALESTINE...... 14
3 THE EMERGENCE OF THE JEWISH UNDERGROUND...... 18 3.1 THE HAGANA ...... 19 3.2 THE IRGUN...... 23 3.3 THE STERN GANG...... 27
4 THE DAWN OF JEWISH INSURGENCY ...... 31 4.1 THE ATTEMPT ON HAROLD MACMICHAEL...... 33 4.2 THE ASSASSINATION OF LORD MOYNE...... 36 4.3 HUNTING SEASON ...... 43
5 THE REVIVAL OF TERRORISM ...... 48 5.1 THE INTERNAL SECURITY SITUATION...... 49 5.2 THE UNITED RESISTANCE MOVEMENT...... 52 5.3 THE BEGINNING OF IMPERIAL COUNTER-TERRORISM ...... 57 5.4 THE KING DAVID HOTEL BOMBING...... 63
6 THE CLIMAX OF OUTRAGE ...... 68 6.1 INTERNATIONAL JEWISH TERRORISM...... 69 6.2 BRITISH MILITARY AND POLITICAL REACTIONS ...... 74 6.3 THE END OF THE MANDATE ...... 80
7 CONCLUSION ...... 91
8 BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 96 8.1 PRIMARY SOURCES...... 96 8.2 SECONDARY SOURCES ...... 99
1 PROLOGUE
1.1 INTRODUCTION
As a result of the First World War, Great Britain became the mandatory power for Palestine and governed the territory de facto as a part of her Empire. However, she did not only enjoy the country’s amenities but was also confronted with the internal conflicts of the population. Due to the emergence of Zionism and National Socialism, Jewish immigration to the Holy Land increased exponentially. Whereas the Jews longed for their own state, the Arabs feared becoming the minority in Palestine. Therefore, Arabs as well as Jews tried to vie for the support of both the British as well as that of the international community. The Empire, on the other hand, chose to act as a mediator and engaged in the finding of a peaceful solution acceptable for both sides. Apart from the political aspect, Jewish and Arab extremists used violent methods and rebelled against the mandatory power with differing outcomes. Whereas the Great Arab Revolt was resolutely quelled by the Empire in the 1930’s, the Jewish efforts were more successful and not as easily put down. From 1944 onwards, several Jewish underground organisations launched a terrorist campaign which in fact lasted until the British announcement to withdraw from Palestine in 1948. Until its very last days in Palestine, the Empire found no appropriate policy either to break up the underground or at least to stop the attacks on military and civilian targets. My thesis concentrates on these violent events during the last years of British rule in the Holy Land. In this context, there are various fundamental questions: Why did parts of the Jewish community engage in an underground movement? Why did Jewish settlers become terrorists? How did the terrorist organisations attack the Empire? However, these issues are only the basis for the further analysis since the focus of this paper is on the British perspective. I therefore sought to uncover the British reaction to the Jewish challenge for autonomy: What was Britain’s policy with regards to the restoration of law and order? Did she use rhetorical, political, military, or economic measures? Did terrorism play a role in terms of the British decision to withdraw from Palestine?
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Finally, the main question of the thesis refers to the obvious inefficiency of British postwar counter-terrorism in Palestine: While Great Britain was able to rather easily subdue the Arabs, why did she eventually succumb to the Jewish insurgency? As a starting point, the first two sections give a historic overview of the Mandate from the very beginning until the Second World War. The first chapter concentrates on informing the reader about the structures of the Arab and Jewish communities and the roots of the Arab-Jewish conflict. Further, the country’s strategic importance is examined in order to show the Empire’s desire to maintain the Mandate. Finally, it is explained how Palestine was actually ruled and which departments were the decisive factors within the British administrative system. The second chapter deals with the emergence of the Jewish underground. It focuses on the development of the three underground organisations Hagana, Irgun and Lehi, and highlights the differences in terms of their structures, goals and ideology. After the introduction, the main part of the thesis follows, dealing with the Jewish terrorist struggle against the Empire. In fact, these activities can be divided into three phases. The first offensive started when the Irgun declared war on the Empire in early 1944, and ended with the Hagana’s attempt to stop terrorism in cooperation with the British authorities in the fall of the same year. After a short break, a program of terrorism was again reinitiated by the Jewish underground in the summer of 1945, this time with the support of the Hagana. The second phase lasted until the King David Hotel bombing in July 1946. After that incident, the Hagana ceased its attacks on the British, and the Irgun and the Lehi continued the fight on their own until the Empire decided to leave the country. The fourth, fifth and sixth chapters thus describe these three phases which can be considered as the dawn, the revival, and the climax of Jewish terrorism. Moreover, the sections actually analyse the course and the development of British policies. They try to interpret the various approaches made by the Foreign Office, the Colonial Office and the War Office, and reflect the disagreement between the different departments. In the very last chapter, I conclude my work ultimately with the British withdrawal and the subsequent creation of the state of Israel.
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1.2 COMMENTS ON SOURCES
To a large extent, my research is based on documents obtained from the British National Archives in London. Especially the Cabinet Papers on Palestine (CAB) were a rich source of information. They do not only contain the minutes of the meetings which enables an analysis of the discussions but also various military and intelligence reports by the General Staff, the Joint Planning Staff or the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC). Another valuable series were the correspondences of the Prime Minister (PREM) and the Colonial Office (CO). Especially the telegrams between the High Commissioner for Palestine and the Secretary of State for the Colonies were of particular significance. In addition, the correspondence of the Foreign Office (FO) and especially its Middle East section offers interesting insights concerning the department’s attitude. The files of the War Office (WO) and the Special Operations Executive (HS), on the other hand, were useful for the analysis of the large military operations and contained several intelligence papers which give a detailed estimation of the respective security situation in the Holy Land. Since they originated from the 1930’s and 1940’s, the vast majority of these documents have been available since the 1970’s due to the normal period of closure of 30 years. For that reason, many of them have already been analysed in literature. In this context, I wanted to highlight the files of the Security Service or MI 5 (KV) which had only been made available since 2003 and 2006 respectively. Since they have not been used before, they give a hint as to exactly how much the British actually knew about the structure, the manpower, and the activity of the three terrorist organisations. In addition to the official files, I used a range of articles originating from The Times. For several reasons, I consider them as an important contribution to my research. On the one hand, the newspaper gives reliable information about the terrorist attacks that occurred in Palestine during the Mandate. Furthermore, it comments on the public opinion concerning the deteriorating situation during the last years of the Mandate. And finally, it contains various minutes of meetings in the House of Commons which normally can be found in the Hansard, reflecting the discussions going on in the British Parliament.
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Concerning secondary literature, the British reaction towards Jewish terrorism is a subtopic rather than an independent issue. Most of the articles and books are on general British policies in Palestine or the Empire’s role in the Middle East. These authors often deal with terrorism only marginally. Other researchers, on the other hand, have precisely worked on the Hagana, the Lehi or the Stern Gang. In contrast to my paper, they observe the whole matter from the Jewish perspective yet, nearly ignoring the British reaction. However, all of them offer a crucial framework for the understanding of the British position in the Holy Land and the Jewish motives behind their activities. In particular, I want to mention Michael J. Cohen and Nicholas Bethell. Whereas the former has published a range of comprehensive works on the British decision-making during the last days of the Mandate, the latter has written a detailed illustration on the Jewish struggle for independence. Among those who actually concentrate on the terrorist aspect from the Empire’s angle, Bruce Hoffman and David A. Charters have carried out elaborate surveys of the British military strategy in Palestine. In general, the military aspect dominates in literature; intelligence activities as well as political and economic measures of British counter-terrorism are hardly mentioned. Finally regarding the dates of publication, the archival situation again becomes visible. A considerable part of the key literature has been published in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s when the first documents became available for the general public. Out of the more recent works, I especially want to refer to the books of John Bowyer Bell and Saul Zadka, both issued in the mid-1990’s. Bell, similar to Bethell, offers a close description of the Jewish insurgency. But in addition, he focuses on the internal security situation, dealing above all with the state of the British Palestine police. Zadka, on his part, deals with the Irgun and its role during the fight for independence. His doctoral thesis also contains a chapter on the British response to the terrorists’ activities, including civil and military reaction as well as British public opinion. In terms of my own research, it served as a most valuable aid of orientation.
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2 THE EMPIRE AND PALESTINE
When the Ottoman Empire was dismantled in the years following World War I, the great European powers did not hesitate to take charge of the strategically important areas in the Middle East. Whereas France got hold of Syria including Lebanon, Great Britain gained the former Ottoman provinces of Mesopotamia and Palestine including Transjordan, as both countries had already decided in the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916. In 1920, the three areas were handed over as so-called A-mandates (denoting the indigenous population’s high level of self-determination) by the League of Nations. The main task of the mandatory powers therefore was to assist the native peoples in terms of administration until they were able to run the countries on their own 1. In this respect, the Middle East was not intended to be governed as a colony by either the French or the British. On the contrary, their role was to facilitate the establishment of independent nation states. Nevertheless, this was not the case, as the mandatory powers had complete administrative and economic control over their territories 2, and the French as well as the British were very keen on making the most of the situation for their own imperial advantage. Concerning the British zones of influence, Mesopotamia became the kingdom of Iraq in 1921 and achieved full independence in 1932 (but still maintained close relations with Great Britain). Transjordan, which had been initially a part of Palestine, was separated in 1923, and from then on governed as a relatively autonomous region until its sovereignty in 1946. Palestine, however, proved to be the hot spot in the eyes of British statesmen with a political solution rather impossible, due to the religious and ethnic division of the country’s population.
1 Cf. Scott Atran, The Surrogate Colonization of Palestine, 1917-1939. In: American Ethnologist 16/4 (1989) 720. 2 Cf. James L. Gelvin, The Israel-Palestine Conflict. One Hundred Years of War (Cambridge et al. 2007) 88.
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2.1 THE ARAB-JEWISH CONFLICT
Since the very beginning of the Mandate, there had been tensions between the Arabs, who were the majority, and the Jewish community, which was steadily growing as a result of a boom in immigration from European Zionists. The British and the promises they had given to both groups during the First World War were essentially responsible for this development: the McMahon-Hussein Correspondence from 1915 to 1916 concerning an independent Arab state on the one hand, and the Balfour Declaration of 1917, which spoke of a Jewish National Home in Palestine on the other. From the outset, both agreements offered enough space for both interpretation and criticism, as a British intelligence brief clearly points out. 3 In the eyes of the Arabs, the pledge of Arthur Henry McMahon (1862-1949), the High Commissioner of Egypt, meant self-determination for all Arabs, including those living in Palestine. In fact, however, McMahon announced the creation of an Arab state including Syria and Iraq but did not mention Palestine at all. Later, he even stated that he had deliberately omitted it from the negotiations. On the other hand, there were discussions concerning the exact wording of the Balfour Declaration. In terms of their religious understanding, the Zionists aimed at creating a state which correlated to the biblical description, Eretz Israel. But according to the British, the declaration only spoke of a Jewish national home inside Palestine, not referring to the whole mandate area. Further, the term ”national home” did not necessarily indicate an independent state but rather an area under British auspices. In addition, it also urged that “nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish Communities” 4. A Jewish state consisting of the whole Mandate and Transjordan, ruled by a Zionist leadership hardly fit the bill put forth in the Balfour declaration. Nevertheless, the flow of Jewish settlers coming to the Holy Land continued, with the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate, providing the legal basis for immigration. In the first five years of the Mandate, nearly 100,000 immigrants reached the shores of Palestine, doubling the size of the Yishuv, as
3 Cf. PIC Paper No. 58, 23 July 1944, WO 201/188. 4 Ibid.
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the Jewish community was called. 5 According to article 4 of the Mandate, the Yishuv had the legal right to set up an administrative body to provide for political representation: An appropriate Jewish Agency shall be recognized as a public body for the purpose of advising and co-operating with the Administration of Palestine in such economic, social and other matters as may affect the establishment of the Jewish National Home and the interests of the Administration, to assist and take part in the development of the country. […] It shall take steps in consultation with His Britannic Majesty’s Government to secure the co-operation of all Jews who are willing to assist in the establishment of the Jewish National Home. 6 Such a body, called the Jewish Agency, had already been created by the World Zionist Organisation in 1921. However, its purpose was not only to act as the political link between the British and the Jews. It was also responsible for the colonisation of the territory via the purchasing of land and recruitment of settlers, through its stewardship of the Jewish National and Palestine Foundation Funds respectively.7 In addition to the Agency, there was a national council (Vaad Leumi) and a national trade union (Histadrut) which governed communal, economic, educational and medicinal affairs. In this respect, the immigrants from Europe and the United States did not only bring the will to create a new state with them but also their familiar political concepts. Right from the beginning, the Zionists presented themselves as a well organised, homogeneous body, although factions still existed within the community. The Arabs, for their part, did not have a similar political representation system but several religious institutions such as the Supreme Muslim Council, which concerned itself with the interpretation of Islamic law 8. In fact, the Arabs were a loose community consisting of different factions ruled by a range of competing noblemen. In this respect, they were perfectly susceptible to the common British principle of indirect rule, i.e. the usage of inherent governing structures by backing a leading family. A scion of one of these families, the Hajj Amin al-Husayni (1893-1974), who had already served as the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, was appointed the new president of the Supreme Muslim Council in
5 Cf. Gelvin, Conflict 72. 6 PIC Paper No. 58, 23 July 1944, WO 201/188. 7 Cf. Gelvin, Conflict 90. 8 Cf. Taysir Nashif, Palestinian Arab and Jewish Leadership in the Mandate Period. In: Journal of Palestine Studies 6/4 (1977) 120.
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order to appease his clan in face of the immense Jewish immigration. 9 By supporting only one faction and concentrating power in the hands of the Mufti, the British inadvertently radicalized the Arab community. In general, the Arabs began to feel threatened, regarding both the Sykes- Picot Agreement as well as the Balfour Declaration as harsh betrayals in terms of the creation of an independent Arab state in Palestine. The Jews were still the minority, but many Arabs believed that the British fostered Jewish immigration until they would be strong enough to establish their own state. For this reason, a slew of violent clashes erupted between members of both communities leading to casualties on both sides. Additionally, social conflicts fuelled the tense situation concerning the purchasing of land by the Jewish Agency. Article 6 of the Mandate granted land owned by the state or waste territories for Jewish settlements. 10 As more Jews came to Palestine, the Agency also started to buy the estates of noble Arab families who, although they lived in the cities, possessed the majority of the fertile land. Consequently, the peasants who lived there were suddenly without land, leading to the expulsion of 20,000 families alone in 1931 11 . As a result, the bulk of those living on the fringes of society was radicalized. The straw which broke the camel’s back in terms of an open escalation of conflict took place in the fall of 1935, when police discovered a huge Jewish arsenal in the port of Jaffa 12 . For many Arabs, this was a proof-positive for the future plans of the Jewish community which had been exponentially growing since 1933 due to the rise of Nazi power and the mass emigration of German Jews. Rumours spread about a forthcoming Jewish rebellion which suspected the Jews to establish their state by force, leading to an increase in distrust between both groups. Arab bands suddenly saw the need to take up arms, resulting in the killing of several Jews during riots in Jaffa in April 1936 and the declaration of a state of emergency by the British administration 13 .
9 Cf. Gabriel Sheffer, British Colonial Policy-Making towards Palestine (1929-1939). In: Middle Eastern Studies 14/3 (1978) 313. 10 Cf. PIC Paper No. 58, 23 July 1944, WO 201/188. 11 Cf. Gelvin, Conflict 106. 12 Cf. Wasif F. Abboushi, The Road to Rebellion. Arab Palestine in the 1930’s. In: Journal of Palestine Studies 6/3 (1977) 33. 13 Cf. Michael J. Cohen, Palestine: Retreat from the Mandate. The making of British policy, 1936-45 (London 1978) 10.
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The Arab reaction was composed of two different parts; a political and a violent one. On the one hand, the elite formed a coalition under the leadership of the Mufti, called the Arab Higher Committee which declared a general strike, demanding the immediate cessation of Jewish immigration and land purchases as well the establishment of an Arab national government 14 . On the other hand, the violent outbreaks continued, forcing the civil administration to call in the army and to repress the riots. In an attempt to counteract the situation on the political level, a commission under the British politician Lord Peel (1867-1937) was formed in order to find a well-balanced solution, especially in face of the deteriorating political situation in Europe which would soon attract the Empire’s full attention. In the end, the Commission recommended the partition of Palestine and the establishment of two separate states, with a British controlled zone around Jerusalem. Whereas the Jews reacted with restrain and calm, the announcement of a possible partition fuelled rioting again, leading the Arabs to an open rebellion against the British in 1937. The Empire reacted by force, adopting a wide range of measures including the “collective punishment of villages, targeted assassinations, mass arrests, deportations, and the dynamiting of homes of suspected guerrillas and sympathizers” 15 . Approximately 2,000 Arab houses were destroyed. Moreover, the army and the police started to torture resistance fighters during interrogations. They were mistreated, beaten up and humiliated. Another popular practice was the “water can” method, similar to the technique of “waterboarding”. 16 In contrast to physical violence, it left no traces on the victim’s body. In face of the British counter-insurgency, the Arabs finally surrendered in 1939. Despite the successful crushing of the Arab revolt, Great Britain was well aware of the necessity of making certain concessions to the Arab community. In the meantime, the 500,000 Jews represented already one third of the country’s whole population and the Arabs had justified fears of becoming the minority. For that reason, the White Paper on Palestine was issued in May 1939 which announced the establishment of an independent state jointly governed by Arabs
14 Cf. Cohen, Retreat 10. 15 Gelvin, Conflict 113. 16 Cf. Tom Segev, One Palestine, Complete. Jews and Arabs under the British Mandate (New York et al. 2000) 417.
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and Jews after a transition period of ten years 17 . Further, and this was the most striking component of the new British policy, the admission of Jews was capped at 75,000 immigrants within the next five years and should be completely suspended after that period. In face of the persecution and the mass emigration of European Jews, the figure was much too small, leading to a public outcry of the world Jewry. The outbreak of the Second World War only served to postpone any major violent reactions. The Arabs had to recover from the consequences of the revolt because the majority of the Arab Higher Committee had been detained and sent to the Seychelles while the Mufti had escaped to Lebanon.18 In addition, the Arabs were more and more pleased with the new British immigration policy. The Jews, on the other hand, were willing to support the Empire in its fight against the Axis powers, as David Ben-Gurion (1886-1973), the chairman of the Jewish Agency, stressed: “We shall fight the war against Hitler as if there were no White Paper, and we shall fight the White Paper as if there were no war.“ 19 Immigration therefore should be continued covertly and by illegal means. Moshe Shertok (1894-1965), the head of the Agency’s political department, was of the same opinion. Although he expressed his consternation about the British decision, he maintained the necessity of cooperation with the British and the continuation of the Mandate.20 Whitehall did not respond to the Yishuv’s willingness to actively assist the Empire in its war effort. Palestinian Jews could enlist in the British forces as regular soldiers of the Empire. But an offer by Chaim Weizmann (1874-1952), the president of the World Jewish Organisation, to set up a Jewish Legion as had been the case in World War I when Jewish battalions had fought alongside their British comrades against the Ottoman Empire in Palestine 21 was refused for the time being because of suspicion towards the reliability of the Jewish troops. There were most likely suspicions that at the end of hostilities the Jewish soldiers would turn their training and weapons on the British with the aim
17 Cf. PIC Paper No. 58, 23 July 1944, WO 201/188. 18 Cf. Abboushi, Rebellion 40. 19 Quoted in Gelvin, Conflict 119. 20 Cf. Segev, Palestine 434. 21 Cf. Lenni Brenner, Zionist-Revisionism. The Years of Fascism and Terror. In: Journal of Palestine Studies 13/1 (1983) 66.
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of establishing an independent state. Furthermore, any effort by the British to establish a heavily-armed Zionist army would have provoked negative feelings among the Arab community, potentially resulting in a new outbreak of violence. Supposing violence would break out, the British would be unable to spare any troops to deal with it, and a rebellious Palestine was certainly not in imperial interests.
2.2 PALESTINE IN BRITISH IMPERIAL STRATEGY
From the birth of the Mandate on, Palestine had played a crucial role in the minds of British decision makers. However, it was not the country’s recourses which were of significance but rather its unique geographic position connecting Egypt to the oil fields of the Middle East. The former, which had been a British protectorate since 1882, was transformed into a sovereign kingdom in order to appease mounting anti-British, Egyptian nationalism in 1922. In fact, Egypt remained a dependent territory, with all defence, imperial communication and Sudanese (then an Anglo-Egyptian possession) affairs being handled by a British resident minister 22 . In addition, the British still controlled the Suez Canal, the single largest military base in the world at that time, consisting of 38 military bases and ten airfields 23 . The canal, often referred to as an imperial lifeline, was the gate to British possessions in the East and therefore vital for British geostrategic considerations. However, its importance was not only clear to military experts. Already in 1915, Chaim Weizmann had championed the idea of a Jewish State in Palestine in the form of a British protectorate which would act as a reliable safe-guard for Britain’s interest in the Suez Canal.24 By emphasising this advantage, he had hoped to persuade the British to take sides with the Zionist cause. The situation in the former Mesopotamian territories was similar. Intending to administrate the area as a mandate and exploit the oil resources, Britain was
22 Cf. Glen Balfour-Paul, Britain’s Informal Empire in the Middle East. In: The Twentieth Century, eds. Judith M. Brown / Wm. Roger Louis (= The Oxford History of the British Empire 4, Oxford 1999) 499. 23 Cf. Michael J. Cohen, The Strategic Role of the Middle East after the War. In: Demise of the British Empire in the Middle East. Britain’s Responses to Nationalist Movements, 1943-55, ed. Michael J. Cohen / Martin Kolinsky (London 1998) 23. 24 Cf. Atran, Colonization, 721.
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confronted with a massive Arab uprising fuelled by Arab nationalist sentiments which was immediately put down by the army in 1920. Yet the British had to install an Arab noble named Faisal, who was expelled from Syria by the French, as the new king in order to relieve the tensions.25 Even when the autonomous Kingdom of Iraq was established in 1932, the Empire continued to maintain its military bases there as well as to dominate the production of oil. Considering Egypt and Iraq, there existed five essential strategic aspects which help clarify British interest in these countries, and highlight the necessity of maintaining an imperial hegemony and presence there: (a) Control of the eastern exit of the Mediterranean. (b) Security of the sources of oil, their supply lines and their terminal points including, in particular, Haifa. (c) Security of Empire air routes to South Africa, India and the Far East. (d) Security of sea communications. (e) A base for Imperial strategic reserves. 26 In general, Palestine served as the land linkage between the canal and the Iraqi oil fields. On the one hand, the main British pipeline went from Kirkuk via Transjordan to the shore of the Mediterranean, reaching the sea at the crucial port of Haifa, from where the oil was transferred to England and the military bases in the Canal Zone. Additionally, Palestine was perfectly suited for the stationing of a Middle East reserve force which could act as police in peacetime 27 but intervene militarily in Egypt as well as in Transjordan and Iraq in case of emergency. Such a case occurred in 1935, when Italy invaded Abyssinia and gained naval influence in the Red Sea in addition to its power in the Eastern Mediterranean. In the event of war, Palestine would not only be a crucial supply centre, but also a critical marshalling area. The troops stationed there would be responsible for defending the Canal Zone which could be attacked from two directions by Italian forces as well as ensuring that in the event of an Italian canal blockade, troops coming from India or other overseas territories would be able to reach Egypt from Iraq via an overland route – namely by crossing Palestine. 28 However, an operation which required the full attention of all troops stationed there could only be successful if there were neither local riots nor external threats by the neighbouring Arab countries.
25 Cf. Balfour-Paul, Empire 498. 26 Report by the Joint Planning Staff, 21 January 1944, CAB 119/147. 27 Cf. Cohen, Retreat 3. 28 Cf. ibid. 4.
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Fortunately for the British, the internal situation in Palestine did not escalate when the Second World War broke out. The Palestinian Arabs, though passive supporters of the Axis Powers, were gradually appeased by the White Paper and moreover too weak after the failed uprising to do much of anything, whereas the Jews supported the Empire despite the restriction of immigration. This was the case, at least in the “dark years” of Germany’s military victories. The threat came from outside of Palestine, when a military coup in Iraq brought the anti-British Rashid Ali (1892-1965) to power in April 1941. Ali was supported and advised by the Mufti of Jerusalem who was living in Baghdad after his flight from Palestine and Lebanon, and who maintained good relations with Hitler 29 . Encouraged by the German offensive in North Africa and the British withdrawal from Cyrenaica, the new Iraqi Government decided to attack the British military bases on its territory. In the event of concrete German support, the Empire might have suffered a heavy defeat which would have entailed the loss of key oilfields and a retreat to Palestine. However, Hitler was concentrating mainly of his invasion of the Soviet Union, seeing no need to spare troops for operations in the Middle East. The British, upon regrouping, forced the Iraqi troops to withdraw. At the end of May the British seized Baghdad and reinstalled the old puppet regime. Any threat to the Middle East posed via a German thrust through the Caucasus was finally averted following the failure of Operation Barbarossa. However, all three events – the Italian conquest of Abyssinia, the pro-Axis coup in Iraq and the German operations in North Africa – showed how vulnerable the British actually were. Above all Rashid Ali’s attempt to push the British out was more than just an isolated event, and signalled things to come. When the danger of similar pro-German sentiments arose in Egypt in 1942, the British Ambassador scotched it by surrounding the royal palace with armoured cars, forcing King Farouk (1920-1965) to appoint a new, more reliable government 30 . The harsh measure prolonged Egypt’s relationship with Britain but also highlighted how illusory the idea of Egyptian sovereignty actually was, leaving a bitter aftertaste in the mouth of Egyptian nationalists.
29 Cf. Nicholas Bethell, Das Palästina-Dreieck. Juden und Araber im Kampf um das britische Mandat 1935-1948 (Frankfurt/Main et al. 1979) 108. 30 Cf. Balfour-Paul, Empire 503.
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In this respect, Palestine once again became the centrepiece of British strategic considerations. On the one hand, a decision in favour of the Jews would most likely have upset the whole Arab world, posing a grave threat to British interests. On the other hand, the incidents in Egypt and Iraq showed that despite all treaties and agreements, the Empire was still dependent on local rulers, at least to a certain extent. In this respect, Palestine remained the only country in the Middle East where the British had full administrative power. Particularly for the military, this was an advantage which should not be given away too carelessly.
2.3 BRITISH POLICY-MAKING FOR PALESTINE
From the administrative point of view, the mandate area was run by the British Government for Palestine. This consisted of an executive committee, an advisory council and a secretariat with governmental departments and civil servants 31 , subordinated to the Colonial Office. Its head, the High Commissioner was therefore appointed by the Secretary of State for the Colonies. However, the Colonial Office was never the only decisive policy- maker for Palestine. On the contrary, there was a sort of inner-departmental competition including the Foreign Office, the War Office as well as the Prime Minister and the Cabinet. Although all officials involved were well aware of the strategic importance of the area, the discussion concerning who had the most efficient program and represented imperial interests the best never ceased. In addition, another question had a critical effect on the process of policy-making: Who was in favour of the Arab cause, and who preferred a pro-Jewish solution? In fact, the biggest opponent of the Colonial Office was the Foreign Office which dealt usually with diplomatic relations between Britain and the rest of the world. Although Palestine belonged to the Empire, British policy there had an immense impact on the entire Arab world, which entitled the Foreign Office to a say, especially since the outbreak of the Arab revolt. It was the opinion of those who worked in the Foreign Office that Britain would have to pacify the situation rather quickly in order to secure the necessary resources for the upcoming war.
31 Cf. David A. Charters, The British Army and Jewish Insurgency in Palestine, 1945-47 (Basingstoke et al. 1989) 85.
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In contrast, the Colonial Office did not think that the Empire was capable of solving the problem; from its point of view, Arabs and Jews had to engage in mutual conciliation.32 In this respect, the Foreign Office wanted to intervene actively by making concessions in order to appease the Arabs whereas the Colonial Office preferred to sit on the sidelines and act as a neutral mediator. The main discussion, however, came from the new Colonial Secretary, the pro-Zionist William Ormsby-Gore (1885-1964), who supported the partition of Palestine into Arab and Jewish areas. This stance was not only rejected by the Arabs but also by the Foreign Office. The dissent came primarily from differing perceptions of the Arab community. Whereas the Foreign Office considered a future Arab state as being susceptible for pan-Arab sentiments which would harm the overall British position in the Middle East, Ormsby-Gore argued that such a state would only increase the disunity in the Arab world and therefore serve British interests. 33 The implementation of the White Paper and the rejection of the Peel Commission’s recommendations of partition finally showed that the Colonial Office had lost the inner struggle for power and that the Foreign Office had become the decisive department in terms of the Palestine question. With respect to the concessions made, it was regarded as being more pro-Arab than pro-Zionist, at least from the Jewish point of view. The Government’s decision to ignore the report of the Peel Commission corresponded to the War Office’s appreciation of the Palestine situation. From the army’s point of view, bi-nationalism under British control was the most suitable way to maintain the imperial status-quo whereas partition into two independent states would make the Empire susceptible to treaty rights.34 In addition, it was assumed that the ensuing Arab outrage in the Middle East and the possibility of sympathisers and opportunists in India could not be adequately dealt with due to the lack of reserves, and was therefore, understandably, opposed by the Imperial General Staff. Apart from the question of partition, the Colonial Office and the War Office were in agreement on another issue: the local army forces. Their commander,
32 Cf. Gabriel Sheffer, Appeasement and the Problem of Palestine. In: International Journal of Middle East Studies 11/3 (1980) 380. 33 Cf. Sheffer, Policy-Making 318. 34 Cf. Appreciation of the Military Implications of the Palestine Problem on Imperial Strategy by the C-in-C, Middle East, 2 May 1944, CO 732/88/22.
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the General Officer Commanding (GOC) British Troops in Palestine and Transjordan, answered to the War Office in London, but additionally was in charge of all civil security forces, i.e. the Palestine police 35 . In this respect, the GOC had to cooperate with the local civil authorities represented by the High Commissioner. This enabled close coordination between all armed forces in the event of large-scale security operations. On the other hand, it was also a breeding ground for “power games” between the Colonial Office and the military. In terms of public opinion in Great Britain, imperial policy in Palestine was not of great importance and therefore not of interest to the Parliament either. During the 1930’s, only 25 Members of Parliament were active pro-Zionists whereas 10 were involved openly with the Arabs. 36 In addition, these supporters did not belong to a distinctive party because neither the Conservatives nor the Labour Party were homogenous with regards to this question. In this respect both the Jews as well as the Arabs tried to get as much support as possible, meeting British politicians of all factions. The Jewish Agency, which was a representative of Labour Zionism and therefore actually in closer contact with the British leftists, tried especially hard to engage Conservatives such as Austen Chamberlain (1863-1937), Winston Churchill (1874-1965) and Lloyd George (1863-1945) 37 . Especially Churchill became a keen supporter of the Jewish case. Since he had been appointed to the War Cabinet by Arthur Neville Chamberlain (1869-1940) in 1939, he had opposed the White Paper policy, without any success. Upon becoming Prime Minister in 1940, he eventually expressed his opinion: I cannot agree that the White Paper is the ‘firmly established policy’ of the present Government. I have always regarded it as a gross breach of faith committed by the Chamberlain Government in respect of obligations to which I personally was a party…it runs until it is superseded. 38 However, to voice his objection and dislike was obviously the only thing Churchill was capable of doing. In face of the fact that the focus was on the general war effort, he could not institute any pro-Zionist measures to ease the
35 Cf. Charters, Insurgency 86. 36 Cf. Sheffer, Appeasement 378. 37 Cf. ibid. 381. 38 Quoted in Cohen, Retreat 162.
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severe restrictions of immigration but rather followed the policies of the influential sections, especially the Foreign Office. The White Paper was not the only point of contention for the Prime Minister with regards to policy in Palestine. Churchill supported Weizmann’s offer to set up a Jewish Brigade since he argued such forces would release the British troops in Palestine to more vital theatres. The Foreign Office and the Colonial Office, for their part, rejected the Jewish ambitions. George Lloyd (1879-1941), Secretary of State for the Colonies, strongly opposed such an army because he feared an imbalance between the Jews and the Arabs.39 After four years of negotiations and lobbying, a Jewish Brigade (complete Star of David insignia) was eventually formed via consent of the Cabinet. However, even though Churchill had managed to get his way in this case, the Brigade had little effect on the war itself. As Tom Segev remarks, the “brigade’s 5,000 men heard only the final shots” 40 of the war. Undoubtedly, it was a moral success for the Jewish community. On the other hand, the fact that consent between all involved governmental factions was only reached after four years may illustrate the paralysing character British imperial administration sometimes displayed.
39 Cf. Note on Jewish Offer of Military Assistance, 22 May 1940, PREM 4/51/9. 40 Segev, Palestine 451.
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3 THE EMERGENCE OF THE JEWISH UNDERGROUND
To settle in British Palestine did not mean a safe and pleasant life for Jews at all. In fact, they faced two major threats to their security during the period of the Mandate. In the long run, Arab animosity towards the increasing Jewish immigration led to violent outbreaks, some greater in magnitude than others. For example, in 1929, 67 Jews were killed and dozens injured by a marauding Arab crowd in the city of Hebron during two days of riots. 41 However, attacks on cities or towns with larger Jewish communities occurred seldom. Small settlements in the countryside had to deal with the permanent danger of raiding Arab gangs. Since the British police and military forces were often unable to guarantee their security due to their remoteness, the settlements, called kibbutzim, decided to take their defence into their own hands. This step did not only require the availability of weapons but also basic military training for the defenders. With regards to such a training, the British offered help in face of the political circumstances in the mid-1930’s. During the Arab revolt, the Jewish Settlement Police, trained and commanded by British officers, were officially in charge of the defence of Jewish settlements 42 , while the British forces were subduing the Arabs. The second danger for Jews in Palestine arose of course with the German advance in North Africa during World War II. Although the creation of a Jewish army was rejected, the Empire began to take emergency actions in the event of a British defeat in Egypt and a German occupation of Palestine by training Jews in sabotage and intelligence skills for operations behind the enemy lines. When the Nazi threat was eventually neutralized with Montgomery’s decisive victory at El Alamein in 1942, the British had already formed a small force consisting of special units who assisted in the conquest of Vichy-controlled Syria and Lebanon. Later in the war, some of these operatives were even sent on guerrilla missions to the Balkans. 43
41 Cf. Segev, Palestine 324. 42 Cf. Yehuda Bauer, From Cooperation to Resistance: The Haganah 1938-1946. In: Middle Eastern Studies 2/3 (1966) 186. 43 Cf. Bethell, Dreieck 105.
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In any case, the permanent threats and the necessity of Jewish self- defence had led early on to the creation of a slew of secret paramilitary organisations. Most of the men trained by the British in order to protect Jewish settlements against Arab attacks or to fight against Rommel’s Afrikakorps joined these units. They had both professional military training as well as experience in guerrilla warfare. However, in terms of moderates and extremists, the Jewish underground was as divided as the Yishuv. The three major organisations, Hagana (The Defence), Irgun Zvai Leumi (National Military Organisation), and Lohamei Herut Israel or Lehi (Fighters for the Freedom of Israel) did not only differ in size and structure but also in political views and strategy. In the coming period of uncertainty, it was not even clear if they were always standing on the same side.
3.1 THE HAGANA
Although loosely organized, armed self-defence groups had already existed during Ottoman rule, a structured organisation which was able to operate throughout Palestine was not formed until 1921, when the Jewish trade union Histadrut formally set up the Hagana in order to protect agricultural settlements.44 In the first years, however, its members did not limit themselves to the mere defence of remote rural colonies. They also launched pre-emptive strikes and committed atrocities among the Arab community, sometimes in reaction to Arab violence. However, in 1927, the Hagana adopted an attitude of self-restraint or Havlaga, limiting its activity to preparations for a future general attack by the Arabs.45 This development can most likely be best explained as being linked to the fact that the organisation had come under the aegis of the Jewish Agency which was very keen on keeping an organised Jewish militia a secret in order to maintain good relations with the Empire. As the future GOC in Palestine, General Evelyn Barker (1894-1983) remarked, the establishment of such a private army, regardless of ethnicity, was high treason. 46 Nevertheless, when the Hagana’s existence became a fait accompli, the Agency changed its
44 Cf. PIC Paper No. 2 (revised), 8 November 1944, FO 141/957. 45 Cf. ibid. 46 Cf. Note of Conversation with General Barker, 1 November 1939, HS 3/209.
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stance and demanded full recognition as an official Jewish defence force. Although the British authorities rejected the demand outright, they did not react in any repressive way such as crackdowns or arms-searches. On the contrary, they established the Jewish Settlement Police, knowing that the majority of the staff was probably from the ranks of the Hagana. In this respect, the Hagana continued to exist as a semi-official branch of the Jewish Agency, transforming itself into a well-developed organisation with different departments and a strict hierarchy. In the late 1930’s, the inner core was represented by a permanent staff of some hundred men who were responsible for military training, transport, and the control of the village groups.47 Most of them had either served in the British Palestine Police or were former soldiers, with a majority coming from Germany, Austria and especially Poland. As veterans, they therefore had knowledge of guerrilla and asymmetric warfare and infantry tactics. With regards to the total number of Hagana members throughout the country, around 40,000 men and women served in the organisation with 20,000 having received some sort of military training. Jewish informers even spoke of 100,000 members which was regarded as an exaggeration by the British intelligence services. 48 . In any case, the Hagana possessed enough manpower to represent a serious threat to British authority, also due to its logistic system involving the smuggle of arms. The bulk of the weapons such as those which had been found in Jaffa during the prelude of the Arab revolt had come from the CSSR, Germany or Belgium to Palestinian ports.49 . Ironically, these uprisings, initially a sign of outrage against the illegal import of weapons, actually helped the Jews smuggle even more arms due to the ensuing confusion and chaos. The fact that the British acquiesced to the Jewish request to build a harbour in Tel Aviv in face of a general strike transformed the city into the main commercial hub in Palestine, with a vast majority of Jewish longshoremen. The Hagana managed to evade British custom’s controls by recruiting a network of sympathisers. Regarding the huge number of Hagana members, the British were well aware of
47 Cf. PIC Paper No. 2 (revised), 8 November 1944, FO 141/957. 48 Cf. MI 2 to War Office, 25 August 1943, KV 5/33. 49 Cf. ibid.
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the challenge they faced in terms of finding reliable workers. Due to the Arab revolt, however, they were dependent on the Jewish working force. Further, the Hagana set up an intelligence service which closely cooperated with the Jewish Agency. 50 It did not only focus on Arab affairs including the whereabouts of important leaders and the location of hidden arsenals but also on Anglo-Arab contacts and on any British discussion concerning the Arab-Jewish question. As the British services tried to hire Jewish informers, a special Hagana branch concentrated on infiltrating both the British establishment as well as intelligence and military facilities in order to gain valuable information, carry out counter-espionage and create confusion. These operations were not limited to Palestine. On the contrary, the organisation’s offices were spread all over the Middle East. Due to its oversight by the Jewish Agency with its leaders David Ben- Gurion and Moshe Shertok, and the close relation to the labour movement, the Hagana was particularly strong amongst the agricultural settlements. Apart from its left-wing members, there was a bourgeois centre within the organisation which had a more nationalist stance. During the 1930’s, factions coming from that centre repeatedly criticized the organisation’s policy of self-restraint. Above all during the critical moments of the Arab revolt, the nationalists demanded a change and recommended that the Hagana take “an eye for an eye” 51 in order to restrain the enemy. However, due to the declared willingness of the Agency to cooperate with British authorities, it needed to practice self-restraint and prevent any attempts of self-justice by militant Hagana fighters. The moderates were able to hold sway over the militants until the announcement of the White Paper. By 1939, self-restraint was more or less abandoned 52 , and isolated incidents began to occur against the Arab community. In light of the Second World War, however, the Hagana did not engage in any violent measures against the British caused by anger or frustration. On the contrary, the organisation stuck to the Jewish Agency’s official position of cooperation with the British authorities and quickly expressed its pro-British attitude, emphasising its willingness to support the British war
50 Cf. PIC Paper No. 2 (revised), 8 November 1944, FO 141/957. 51 Cf. MI 5 Report on Hagana, 4 June 1937, KV 5/33. 52 Cf. PIC Paper No. 2 (revised), 8 November 1944, FO 141/957.
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effort. For Hagana officers, three different types of military action presented themselves in order to fight the Axis powers: the service of Hagana members as regular British troops, the establishment of a Jewish army, and cooperation with the British in terms of a special unit. Concerning the latter, there had already been a test case. When the Arab revolt had reached its climax and the British administration had had to face a shortage of reinforcements, intelligence officer Orde Wingate (1903-1944) had established the Special Nights Squad, consisting of British soldiers and Hagana members. This paramilitary unit primarily had served to secure strategic facilities such as vital pipelines but had been scrapped in face of the British decision to favour Arab interests. 53 When the Axis opened another front in North Africa, the idea of such a Jewish strike force was revitalised. According to Nicholas Bethell, agents of the Military Intelligence, Section 4 (MI 4) and the Special Operations Executive (SOE) were sent to Palestine by the end of 1940 in order to train Hagana fighters without informing the local administration. 54 Such a procedure shows the internal disagreements of British policy makers concerning the Palestine question which understandably led to a serious conflict of interests. Whereas the Palestinian Government had to concentrate on the legal state and was therefore anxious to keep the internal situation quiet, banning the private carrying of arms, the intelligence services focussed on the war effort, supporting the circulation of arms to back the resistance in case of a German invasion despite all existing concerns.55 In the eyes of the Hagana, on the other hand, the British effort to train and equip their men with new weapons was an enormous benefit. Ironically, the majority of these weapons were to be used against those who had given them to the Jews, as prominent Hagana members such as Yigal Allon (1918-1980), future Israeli minister, would admit years later 56 . However, the Hagana leadership was not only thinking of special missions against single targets but also of large-scale military operations in the event of
53 Cf. Bauer, Hagana 187. 54 Cf. Bethell, Dreieck 104. 55 According to a high ranking officer involved, the arming and training of the Hagana was a serious threat to the internal security in Palestine. Cf. SOE Memorandum on Events in Palestine and Syria, 28 September 1942, HS 3/207. 56 Cf. ibid. 107.
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an open Arab-Jewish war. The availability of some 700 improvised tanks in 1942 shows the fact that such a conflict was definitely taken in consideration 57 . Despite its manpower and military training, the organisation lacked experienced commanders for larger campaigns. For that reason, Weizmann’s failed attempt to create a Jewish national army would have offered the perfect opportunity for Hagana officers to be given experience in field commands and tactics. The regular British Army, on the other hand, was not as attractive as a Hebrew Legion. Obviously, the Jewish leaders did not want to loose too many men on battlefields outside of Palestine and leave the mandate area undefended. In this respect, only one of five Hagana members was serving with imperial forces in 1942. 58 Together with the special units, most of these veterans joined the organisation’s recently established, permanent striking forces Hish and Palmach, which numbered approximately 10,000 men (out of 50,000 members) 59 , and represented the military wing of the Jewish Agency and the leftist Jewish underground.
3.2 THE IRGUN
The Hagana’s antipode on the right side of the political spectrum arose from its own ranks. As mentioned above, the more extremist elements could not stomach the official policy of self-restraint. For that reason, some extremists chose to leave the Hagana during the early 1930’s, forming a loose gathering of militants called the Hagana B. It did not become a structured organisation until another division took place in 1935, this time not on the military but on the political level. The nationalist party, also known as the Revisionists, split from the Zionist movement. From their point of view, a Jewish state with a Jewish majority should be established in the whole mandate area which consisted of Palestine and Transjordan. They cited the Balfour Declaration and referred to the biblical conception of Israel, giving credence to this idea.60 In this respect, they did not agree with the Labour Zionists headed by the Jewish Agency which
57 Cf. MI 5 Report on Hagana, 16 May 1942, KV 5/33. 58 Cf. SIS Report on the Stern Group, 18 March 1942, KV 5/33. 59 Cf. Charters, Insurgency 44. 60 Cf. Brenner, Zionist-Revisionism 67.
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engaged in negotiations with the British and Arabs concerning a partitioned country. The extremist former Hagana members, who were in favour of revisionist political ideas, officially founded the new organisation in 1937 and became the military branch of the Revisionist party rather soon thereafter, inspired by the relationship of the Jewish Agency and the Hagana. The obvious difference between both organisations was already indicated by the names: whereas the term Hagana emphasised the focus on self-defence, the Irgun Zvai Leumi stressed a more offensive character, and a willingness to suppress Arab resistance by force. The Irgun gained world attention at the end of the Arab revolt and the announcement of the White Paper, when it claimed responsibility for a number of murders and atrocities amongst Arab civilians. The group additionally attacked some British facilities. However, it remained a politically unstable organisation and many of those who had left years before decided to go back to the better structured Hagana. 61 Due to their violent methods and actions, not only the fighters but also many of the political officials came under the suspicion of the British authorities and, as a result, the Irgun’s leader Vladimir Jabotinsky (1880-1940), who was also heading the Revisionists, again separated the underground movement from the party. With the beginning of the war, the Irgun acquiesced to the Palestine Government by ceasing all military action, in return for the release of detained Revisionist activists.62 This truce also led to a short period of cooperation with the British in order to carry out covert operations in neighbouring countries, similar to the Hagana but to a smaller extent.63 Still, the organisation’s activities in Palestine remained in the spotlight of British observation, as the sheer number of intelligence reports concerning the organisation shows. Concerning the Irgun’s structure, it was apparent that the Hagana was used as a model, however slightly modified. Initially, the inner core consisted of some 40 men who were in charge of training, logistical matters, and the
61 Cf. Charters, Insurgency 46. 62 Cf. PIC Paper No. 2 (revised), 8 November 1944, FO 141/957. 63 The head of the Irgun’s military section, David Raziel, was even killed in Iraq in May 1941 while participating in a joint Anglo-Jewish commando mission. Cf. Y. S. Brenner, The ‘Stern Gang’ 1940-48. In: Middle Eastern Studies 2/1 (1965) 3.
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communication between the single cells. 64 In this respect, the Irgun cannot be considered a cohesive underground army but rather a network of operating units spread throughout the country. Understandably, it was much smaller in terms of manpower than the Hagana. Its members came mostly from Poland, where they had joined the Betar or Brith Trumpeldor, Jewish youth organisations operating in Europe as well as in Palestine. It offered paramilitary training, glossed over officially as sporting and scouting, and helped facilitate immigration to the Holy Land. 65 In order to recruit new members, the Irgun even tried to get hold of young Hagana sympathisers by establishing a bogus youth branch as well as faked newsletters and broadcasts announcing cooperation between the left and the right.66 The Hagana immediately rejected these reports. In fact, the recruitment of new members and the right-wing political position were only two of many reasons for conflicts between the Hagana and the Irgun. Opposition between both movements constantly increased, due to the Irgun’s riotous appearance and strong-arm behaviour in collecting funds to maintain the organisation. British intelligence sources even considered it as a fusion of Zionist ideology with political totalitarianism.67 However, such behaviour definitely impressed those who had to flee the Nazi humiliation and persecution in Europe, and most immigrants usually tended to join the right- wing faction.68 This development had a tremendous impact on the Yishuv as a whole, not only because the Hagana and the Irgun were equal opponents and people had difficulty deciding which party they would support. Most of the Jews still favoured the moderate Jewish Agency and therefore the Hagana. However, a conflict inside the Jewish community would waste energy and resources and in the end harm the Zionist cause while giving strength to its enemies. Rumours about the establishment of an Arab army of 40,000 to 50,000 men under German command continued to fuel inner Jewish tensions. In a letter to the British Embassy in Washington, a lobby called the American Friends of a Jewish Palestine asked the British Government to formally
64 Cf. MI 5 Report No. CX/9956, 15 August 1934, KV 5/33. 65 Cf. PIC Paper No. 2 (revised), 8 November 1944, FO 141/957. 66 Cf. Colonial Office to MI 5, 24 January 1944, KV 5/34. 67 Cf. PIC Paper No. 2 (revised), 8 November 1944, FO 141/957. 68 Cf. SIS Report on Policy of Jewish Terrorists in Palestine, 2 January 1947, KV 5/31.
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recognise the Irgun as an official army in order to defend Jewish livelihood and property. 69 The British rejection of the plea was obvious, and even supported by the Zionists. Apart from the fact that the Irgun was not an army, it challenged the Jewish Agency’s attempts to transform the Hagana into a national Jewish defence force. Therefore, it also challenged the Agency’s claim to be the single representative of the entire Yishuv. The Irgun’s growth as a result of an increase in illegal immigrants and the deterioration of the situation in Europe steadily radicalised the organisation during the first years of the war. In 1941, it neglected the agreement of 1939 and accused the British Government of being anti-Semitic. It denounced any cooperation as “a political error, a moral crime, and a national treachery” 70 by circulating pamphlets and advocating terror acts. Thereafter, it became relatively clear that the Irgun was not willing to participate in any political negotiations to solve the Palestine problem. This was in stark contrast to the Hagana, which would use its strength only to underline its political goals, thereby adopting a new strategy for defeating the British, either in the political or on the military arena, with the ultimate aim of forcing the Empire to withdraw from the Mandate. The British eyed the faction’s development suspiciously and were well aware of the menace. Already in 1939, High Commissioner Harold MacMichael (1882-1969) had remarked the danger of the situation: [T]here can be no doubt that its suppression as a dangerous terrorist organisation by all measures as may be required is called for, but action can only be taken as and when opportunity offers. […] The Irgun can be suppressed only by the exercise of strong measures over a long period. 71 But as mentioned above, the Yishuv was rather unable to intervene because the majority of the Jews favoured the Hagana but demonstrated, at the very least, a small degree of sympathy for the Irgun’s ideas. In addition, critics had to always reckon with severe retaliation which limited the number of overt opponents to a small number. For that reason, the British authorities had to deal with the Irgun on their own, waiting for any terrorist action directed against the Empire which would justify severe police intervention.
69 Cf. British Embassy Washington to Lord Halifax, 29 September 1939, KV 5/34. 70 Security Summary Middle East No. 9, 29. December 1941, KV 5/34. 71 Letter from the High Commissioner for Palestine, 16 October 1939, KV 5/34.
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In the meantime, the Irgun was able to increase its combat strength because of generous financial support from abroad and the new leadership of the Polish ex-soldier Menachem Begin (1913-1992), future Israeli Prime Minister. The wealthy Jewish families, the Rothschild’s and Kirchner’s granted money in order to build a training ship for naval combat, whereas the opening of a flying school was intended in Tel Aviv. 72 The latter, in fact, was never realised. However, it demonstrated Begin’s intention to transform the Irgun into an army limited not only to guerrilla operations. Ultimately, however, guerrilla operations would remain the organisation’s preferred method of warfare during the coming years. In any case, the total strength of the Irgun was approximately 4,000 to 5,000 with 1,000 men mobilised permanently and the rest serving as a reserve in the event of an emergency. 73 The fact that the Irgun did not possess as sophisticated supply lines as the Hagana and did not cooperate with the British intelligence services are largely why the organisation suffered from a shortage of weapons. From Begin’s point of view, terrorism was a more profitable way of opposing the British than a large-scale uprising like the Arab revolt from 1936 to 1939. He was not the only one who thought this way.
3.3 THE STERN GANG
Within the Irgun there existed an extreme militant faction which had advocated terrorism since its split from the Hagana. During the riots of 1939, five members of this group were arrested by the British because of their alleged involvement in the murder of two inspectors of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID). Led by the Polish Avraham Stern (1907-1942), the men gathered another 50 radical Jewish detainees in prison. After their release, due to a lack of evidence in 1941, they came in conflict with Begin because of their fanaticism. 74 As a result, Stern and his group refused to recognise the Irgun leadership and set up their own organisation: the Lohamei Herut Israel (Lehi) or Stern Gang. Its first action was not directed against the British or the Arabs but the Yishuv. In search for arms and money, they raided Hagana arms’ caches
72 Cf. Report on the New Zionist (Revisionist) National Army, 17 January 1939, KV 5/34. 73 Cf. PIC Paper No. 2 (revised), 8 November 1944, FO 141/957. 74 Cf. ibid.
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and robbed Jewish banks and businessmen. In this respect, the Lehi was not regarded as a secret army like the Hagana or the Irgun but as a criminal band of thugs. During the first years of its existence, the organisation was ruled exclusively by Avraham Stern himself. His ideology, composed of two main tenants, became the Lehi’s main doctrine. On the one hand, Stern had been strongly influenced by the concepts of fascism which he had come across in Italy as a student. According to some analysts, he envisioned a “vast fascist Hebrew Empire from the Euphrates to the Nile” 75 . Whether this is true or not, the Stern Gang tried to collaborate with Mussolini and contacted the Italian consul for Palestine, offering their services to the fascists. The outcome after several months of negotiations was the Jerusalem Agreement of September 1941 76 , which would make Italy the protector of the future Jewish state. The Jews, for their part, would declare themselves allies of the Italians, recognise the whole Mediterranean as a sole Italian property (including the handover of Haifa) and grant the Italians the right to intervene in foreign affairs. In addition, the Old City of Jerusalem and other Christian holy sites would be handed over to the Vatican. Finally, the Italians take over the task of appeasing the Arab world, while the Jews would assist their Arab neighbours in terms of economic development. The draft never actually reached the Italians. The go-between who directed the negotiations between Stern and the Consul was an Irgun agent 77 , and the leadership of the Irgun deemed such an agreement to be too risky for the greater cause of Jewish independence. The reasons for this were two-fold. First of all, the Irgun wanted to prevent a fascist Italian-Jewish agreement which would damage Jewish prestige worldwide. Secondly, such an agreement between the Lehi and Hitler’s allies was completely out of sync politically and morally, and could be used to discredit the fanatics in the Yishuv. Despite the fact that the agreement was never signed due to some unexplained reasons, it remains a rather interesting document, especially in
75 Cf. Charters, Insurgency 50. 76 Cf. Report by the Area Security Officer, Southern Palestine District, on Activities of the Stern Group, 11 November 1941, KV 5/31. 77 Cf. Area Security Officer, Southern Palestine District to Defence Security Officer, Middle East Forces, 11 November 1941, KV 5/31.
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terms of the concessions made by the Lehi. The handover of Jerusalem as well as the announced cooperation with the neighbouring Arab countries did not correlate with the beliefs of religious radicals. In this respect, the Stern Gang was a band of fanatics by all means, but not in the strict sense of Zionism. In order to reach their political aims, they were willing to make the necessary compromises. The Jerusalem Agreement leads us onto Stern’s second ideological pillar: his radical anti-British attitude which was even worse than that of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) 78 . In his mind, the British, not the Arabs, were the main obstacle for the Zionist cause. In order to protect their imperialistic interests, they were keen to continue the occupation of Palestine and would not leave the country on their own free will. Stern was not entirely wrong, especially when his views are taken hand in hand with those of the Imperial High Command. Therefore, collaboration with Italy was a necessary evil, which would bring about the demise of the Empire in the Middle East and the elimination of the British Mandate in Palestine, catalyzing the creation of a Jewish state. To further along his cause, an appropriate tool was of course terrorism; directed chiefly against prominent British officials so as to harm the political system. Whatever the case, it was the British who first succeeded in beheading the enemy. Unlike the other two underground movements, the Lehi had never ceased its violent activity since its creation. On the contrary, it was the first to carry out a range of bloody attacks on British targets, culminating in the killing of three police officers and the wounding of four others in 1942. As a consequence, the authorities intensified their search for the terrorists and Stern was killed in a shoot-out with the police. Shortly thereafter, the majority of the Lehi members were arrested.79 However, after its decapitation, the remaining members regrouped and reorganized. They copied the Irgun, utilising vertical communication lines and a rigid recruitment system, and setting up a network of
78 Cf. Report on Situation in Palestine, 21 June 1944, KV 5/29. 79 There was suspicion that the CID executed Stern during the operation in revenge for the murder of several police officers. Additionally, the police was accused of having killed two unarmed Lehi members and planting revolvers after the massacre. Although this theory had never been proven, it led to a radicalization and strengthening of the anti-police attitude of the reorganised Lehi. Cf. Brenner, Stern Gang 5.
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small cells, each consisting of only a handful of men so as to evade the police. 80 In this respect, the Stern Gang was different from both the Irgun as well as the Hagana. The latter were a relatively easy target for intelligence services due to the fact that they were linked to the Jewish Agency and the Revisionists respectively. Even if an infiltration into the organisation itself did not work out, information could be retrieved by an investigation of the political party. In the case of the Lehi, such a procedure was not possible; it acted completely independent from any other organisation within the Yishuv. Additionally, the reorganized Lehi created an intelligence service and began to utilise a propaganda department which included a radio station.81 Both were used for reconnaissance, counterintelligence and confusion via false reports. However, its efficacy was severely limited on account of its size. In total, the whole organisation only numbered around 200 to 400 men.82 In this respect, the escape of twenty detained Stern members in October 1943 was of crucial importance. The group regained valuable manpower, and a wave of terrorism was to be unleashed the following year, precipitating Palestine into four years of chaos and violence. However, it was not only on account of the actions of the Lehi that Britain found herself in a new war; the Stern boys just were to play a leading role.
80 Charters, Insurgency 49. 81 Cf. ibid. 82 Cf. PIC Paper No. 2 (revised), 8 November 1944, FO 141/957.
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4 THE DAWN OF JEWISH INSURGENCY
Apart from a range of smaller incidents such as the regular clashes between the Palestine police and Lehi gunmen (until the death of Avraham Stern), the internal situation in Palestine had been relatively calm from the end of the Arab revolt in 1939 on. The Hagana and the Irgun, numbering altogether approximately 55,000 members, did not challenge the Palestine Government with any violent behaviour. Although they were eyed with suspicion by the local authorities, they actually could not be persecuted as terrorists without any evidence proving their intention to carry out terrorist attacks against the Empire. However, the question arises as to why the British authorities never undertook any legal measures to combat the Irgun’s call for terrorism at the end of 1941. The reasons for the lack of an appropriate response were most likely rooted in the shortage of troops and police forces in Palestine due to the need for troops elsewhere, above all in the North African theatre. The only tense moments were the occasional round-ups of Hagana members during training sessions who were brought to trial because of carrying illegal arms. However, their initial jail sentences of ten years or more by Palestinian courts were either reduced or even stayed by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS). This was completely in contrast to the draconic treatment of the Arabs who sometimes faced the death penalty for similar trespasses.83 The logic behind such a decision lay in the fact that the Hagana’s whole purpose for armament was as a means of self-defence whereas the Arabs used their weapons to attack Jewish and British targets. In addition, SOE agents who armed and trained the Hagana frequently used their status and connection to get their protégés out of prison.84 In face of such external interventions, it became rather difficult for local authorities to maintain law and order and to appear above all ambivalent and unbiased in the eyes of the Arab community. Due to the strict adherence to the White Paper policy and the continuing efforts of Jews to enter the Mandate illegally, a conflict between the Zionists and
83 Cf. Segev, Palestine 450. 84 Cf. Bethell, Dreieck 106.
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the British was inevitable. From the British point of view, there were only two ways to deal with the illegal immigration and fulfil the White Paper requirements. they could either force the ships to turn around and go somewhere else or detain the immigrants in camps outside of Palestine. Both responses were met with harsh Jewish opposition. Concerning the former, the fate of the Struma became a national myth for the Yishuv. The small ship with 769 refugees from Eastern Europe was on its way to the shores of Palestine but was detained by the Turks while trying to cross the Bosporus. Because of the British refusal to let the immigrants in, the ship was dragged back to the Black Sea where it sank after an unexplained explosion, taking the lives of all but two passengers 85 . The incident did not only lead to an outcry amongst the Jewish community, it also attracted the attention of the world press, offering rhetorical material for Zionist propaganda. In the eyes of many, the British were directly responsible for the tragedy, and some even compared it to the inhuman crimes committed by Hitler in Nazi Germany. In terms of deportation, there was a similar level of critique by American newspapers and US lobbyists for the Jewish cause, which labelled the British camps as being de-facto jails with poor medical conditions and sadistic guards 86 . Such reports by both the local and international press and the Jewish intelligence services raised the question if it was still necessary to cooperate with the British authorities, especially in face of the course of the war. Since it had become rather clear that Germany was losing and the Allies were winning, the moral obligation to assist the Empire’s war effort was clearly no longer of importance. In addition, many Jews had hoped that the White Paper would be repealed when the war appeared to come to an end, at least as a gesture of gratitude for Jewish loyalty. Yet there were no signs indicating a change of policy by early 1944. On the contrary, Jewish immigration was to be completely suspended in March after the official number of 75,000 had been reached within five years. Whereas the Jewish Agency and the Hagana were looking for a political settlement and continued to cooperate with the authorities, the right- wing of the Jewish underground was not willing to accept this development and declared war on the Empire.
85 Cf. Bethell, Dreieck 121. 86 Cf. ibid. 113f.
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4.1 THE ATTEMPT ON HAROLD MACMICHAEL
In February 1944, the Irgun stated officially that the armistice between itself and the Palestine Government was at an end and launched a range of terrorist attacks on British targets. Simultaneously, the revitalised Stern Gang became active again, immediately participating in the Irgun’s drive for violence. An intelligence dossier points out the difference between the methods of both organisations: The aim of the Irgun […] is the destruction of property without assassination, although their members are prepared to use fire arms to resist arrest. […] The Stern Group, on the other hand, is composed of ultra-extremists who will stop at nothing, even assassination. 87 Whereas the former concentrated on the wrecking of anti-Jewish facilities such as the offices of the Department of Immigration in Haifa, Jerusalem and Tel Aviv which could inadvertently lead to casualties, the latter openly sought to cause human damage, concentrating on killing policemen and soldiers in ambushes. But the Lehi did not limit itself to the assassination of policemen and soldiers. In order to damage the British imperial system, a high-ranking British official would be their next target. In addition to upsetting the imperial power structure, the murder of a prominent figure would have a bigger impact on public opinion than the shooting of an anonymous soldier or policeman in order to take revenge for Britain’s anti-Zionist attitude. Since the creators of the White Paper were not within reach, the local administration came in the line of fire. After the Struma incident in 1942, a dummy bomb had been fixed to the fence of the Government house and pamphlets and leaflets had been distributed including the picture of the current High Commissioner Harold MacMichael alongside the title “Wanted for Murder”.88 In general, MacMichael was an object of hate for the Jews. Ben-Gurion described him as a “snob, pro-Arab, inefficient, and corrupt”89 . He was not considered as one who was interested in solving the problem. On August 8 th 1944, the High Commissioner and his wife were on their way from Jerusalem to Jaffa, when his car convoy was ambushed and attacked with several bombs and heavy small-arms fire. The security men accompanying
87 MI 5 Report on Jewish Terrorism, 23 February 1944, KV 5/34. 88 Cf. Bethell, Dreieck 122. 89 Quoted in Segev, Palestine 416.
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MacMichael returned fire and eventually the assailants fled. The High Commissioner sustained slight wounds in his hand and thigh whereas his wife was completely untouched. The only casualties were the driver and MacMichael’s adjutant who were seriously wounded. Since no further attacks took place, MacMichael managed to return to Jerusalem safely. The first reaction of the British after the attack was the cordoning off and subsequent searching of the nearby settlement of Givat Shaul where the assailants had fled according to Arab witnesses 90 . The searches and interrogations, enforced by a curfew of nearly two days, continued but did not yield any useful outcome. The British complained about the behaviour of the inhabitants; and although there was no physical opposition directed against the investigation of the security forces, the Jews were not willing to volunteer any useful information. On the next day, however, the Government stated that the attack could not have been carried out by a small band of criminals but rather by a widespread terrorist organisation due to the weapons and equipment found at the crime scene as well as the performance and tactics of the assailants 91 . In addition, the necessity of cooperation from the public was stressed; due to the fact that the British were well aware that even if the majority of the population condemned such violent outrages – which was certainly the case – it was essential for the police to receive information from the Jewish settlers. Actually, the attempt hit the British unprepared. It had been the first major assault on a high-ranking official in Palestine since the Arab revolt. On the next day, a conference was held in order to figure out the best ways to protect the life of the High Commissioner and to reorganise all security matters. In this respect, a tight cooperation of police and army forces was proposed, including a clear division of responsibilities. The personal escort service was now carried out by an army unit 92 . The fact that the GOC commanded both military and police helped facilitate the new structure. The official investigation yielded little and left the British at an impasse. Whereas the Lehi issued pamphlets claiming responsibility for the attack, the
90 Cf. High Commissioner MacMichael to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 9 August 1944, CO 733/457/3. 91 Cf. Government Communique, 9 August 1944, WO 201/189. 92 Cf. Report on the Attempt to Assassinate the High Commissioner of Palestine, 9 August 1944, WO 201/189.
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police arrested 37 men who were known or suspected Irgun members. Although stating that there was no evidence of their participation, MacMichael claimed that the connection between both organisations was not clear for the time being. 93 However, the statement appears rather as an excuse and the detention of the suspects as an attempt to signal some progress in the fight against the terrorists when in reality there had been none. Without the actual culprits in custody, the British used a well-tried measure which had already been deployed during the Arab revolt in order to remind the people of their duties of assisting the Empire. The settlement where the assailants had fled was condemned by the Acting District Commissioner to pay a collective fine of GBP 500 because its population “was found guilty of failure to render all assistance in their power to help authorities find the persons who committed the crime in question” 94 . In reality, the measure was nothing more than a signal of the desperation of the authorities. The British intelligence services were well aware of the compact size of the Stern Gang and that it primarily operated in the cities. For that reason, it was rather unlikely that the rural settlement of Givat Shaul was a secret Lehi base. In the eyes of some British officials, the collective fine was not satisfying anyway. Above all the Minister Resident in Egypt, Lord Moyne (1880-1944), expressed his resentment towards the feeble response in the wake of an assassination attempt on MacMichael. In a letter to Oliver Stanley (1896-1950), the Colonial Secretary, he warned that a too mild reaction would not only cause problems within Palestine in terms of discipline but also encourage neighbouring countries to challenge the British hegemony. 95 From Moyne’s point of view, the Palestine Government did not only fail to deal with the criminal aspect of the attack but additionally ignored the political component. In a subsequent letter, he referred to a speech given by David Ben-Gurion on August 21 st , only two weeks after the incident. Ben-Gurion had talked about the Jewish legitimacy of using violence to become the country’s majority and
93 Cf. High Commissioner MacMichael to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 2 September 1944, CO 733/457/3. 94 High Commissioner MacMichael to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 21 August 1944, CO 733/457/3. 95 Cf. Personal Telegram from Lord Moyne to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 18 August 1944, CO 733/457/4.
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expand its boundaries. 96 Such a statement was more likely to ignite anti-British attitudes than to help spur the Prime Minister’s demand of the Jewish leadership to call for cooperation with the British among the Yishuv. In general, Moyne toyed with using stronger measures such as the breaking up of the illegal Jewish underground and the arrest of its leaders in order to demonstrate the Empire’s strength as had happened during the Arab revolt. Then, the murder of L.A. Andrews, the District Commissioner of Galilee, had led to the imprisonment of the Arab Higher Committee thereby decapitating the rioting Arab masses 97 . This time, however, the Government did not resort to distinct action, probably again due to the shortage of troops linked to the war effort in Europe. Its policy was limited to statements urging the Jewish community to assist the authorities, which would be to its own advantage; as the Colonial Secretary admitted in public, the terrorist activity of a small group may harm the entire Jewish cause 98 . Nevertheless, the assailants of August 8 th were never captured, and the Stern Gang continued its terror campaign, even crossing borders and attacking the Empire abroad.
4.2 THE ASSASSINATION OF LORD MOYNE
In October 1944, the British announced closer cooperation between the military and the civil authorities and once more stressed their willingness to root out terrorism in Palestine. For that reason, a new warning system was implemented which would include those of the Yishuv who were willing to offer information to the British. 99 In the meantime, the Irgun and Lehi continued their terrorist activities. Whereas the former launched a series of bomb attacks on police stations, the latter stuck to their tried and true method of targeted assassinations and killed a CID officer during an ambush in Jerusalem. However, following the failed assassination attempt on MacMichael, whose term in Palestine had in the meantime come to an end, the Stern Gang had sought to find another worthwhile target. Ironically, their choice fell on the
96 Cf. Personal Telegram from Lord Moyne to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 27 August 1944, CO 733/457/4. 97 Cf. Cohen, Retreat 53. 98 Cf. The Times, Palestine Terrorism. Warning and Appeal To The Jews (12 October 1944) 4. 99 Cf. The Times, Terrorist Acts in Palestine. New Warning System (17 October 1944) 3.
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harshest critic of the mild British reaction following the attacks from August 8 th , the Minister Resident in Egypt, and was based on two reasons. First of all, Moyne was one of the highest-ranking British officials in the entire Middle East. Secondly, he had been serving as Colonial Secretary when the Struma incident had taken place. In the eyes of the extremists, he was at least therefore as guilty as MacMichael for the death of the Jewish refugees. On November 6 th , Lord Moyne and his convoy were ambushed in his car while arriving at his house in Gezira, Cairo. His private secretary, Dorothy S. Osmond, described the attack in detail: I then noticed two men standing with pointed revolvers. One of them was standing on the steps leading up to the front door. The second one was standing outside the right hand window of the car, next to which Lord Moyne was sitting. […] He then thrust his pistol through the window of the car, pointed his pistol towards Lord Moyne, and fired it three times. The shots were fired separately and slowly. 100 While the Minister was seriously wounded, his driver was shot by the second assailant. The secretary and Moyne’s adjutant, Captain Hughes-Onslow, survived the attack unharmed. The latter then tried to follow the fleeing men and alerted a nearby sentry leading to the immediate apprehension of the murderers. In the meantime, Osmond had called for medical assistance and Moyne was rushed to hospital where he died the same evening. The immediate assumption of the Minister’s office was that the outrage had been carried out by the Irgun.101 A confession by the two arrested men finally revealed their real origin. Although not discussed in literature, the Stern Gang had several members operating in Cairo and Lord Moyne was only one of many targets. According to the testimony of a detained Jewish terrorist, the Lehi initially planned to assassinate the Minister at the Cairo Embassy, Terence Shone.102 He only survived because he did not show up when the trap was set. After the shooting of Moyne, security measures obviously became too strict to carry out any further operations against the political elite. In addition to those who undertook the executions, several accomplices were also arrested by the police such as
100 Statement by Miss Dorothy S. Osmond, Personal Assistant to Lord Moyne, No. 4, 6 November 1944, CAB 104/254. 101 Cf. Minister Resident’s Office to Foreign Office, 6 November 1944, CAB 104/254. 102 Shone was believed to encourage the Arab Unity Movement which was considered as a threat to a future Jewish State in Palestine. Cf. Ambassador Lord Killearn to Foreign Office, 30 November 1944, CAB 104/254.
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Joseph Syttner, who was referred to as the Lehi’s leader in Egypt. The title and the fact that the Lehi presumably took revenge for his arrest give credence to the assumption that the Stern Gang had at least tried to found a local Egyptian branch headed by a high-level terrorist 103 . Compared to the attempt on the High Commissioner, the organisation had employed a different tactic which eventually led to success. Instead of attacking a heavily-armed convoy and taking part in a drawn-out gunfight, the two assassins acted quickly and efficiently. Another advantage was the fact that there was no escort and neither the driver nor Captain Hughes-Onslow was armed 104 . It would therefore be fair to say that the British had not expected that the Jewish terrorist would be prepared to carry out attacks outside of Palestine. The description of Miss Osmond additionally characterises the attitude of the Lehi men. They neither hesitated while murdering Lord Moyne nor showed any sign of instability or doubt. On the contrary, they executed their victim in cold blood. The public outcry was enormous, and the attack was not only condemned by the British. The very next day, Chaim Weizmann sent a letter to Churchill, expressing “the deep moral indignation and horror” 105 the murder had caused among world Jewry. Furthermore, he promised that the Yishuv would use all available measures to fight the problem of terrorism. Additionally, the Jewish Agency and the Vaad Leumi issued a similar statement, denouncing the terrorists and outlining the important role the British people were playing in fighting the Jewry’s biggest enemy, the Nazi regime106 . Both Weizmann and Ben-Gurion were well aware of the harm such acts would do to the Jewish cause; they were risking the loss of Great Britain’s and especially Churchill’s friendship sooner or later and endangered their prospects for an independent Jewish state.
103 Joseph Davidescu, the agent of the Defence Security Office who had captured Syttner was later shot at his home in Palestine. Teddy Kollek indicated that this was done by the Stern Gang out of revenge. Cf. Personal Telegram A.J. Kellar to C.G. Eastwood, 24 August 1945, CO 733/456/12; DSO Extract from Report on Interview with Kollek, 27 August 1945, KV 5/29. 104 Hughes-Onslow stated that he had tried to catch the assailants but then had decided to get armed assistance because he had been unaided. Cf. Statement by Captain Hughes- Onslow, ADC to Minister Resident, 6 November 1944, CAB 104/254. 105 Chaim Weizmann to Winston Churchill, 7 November 1944, PREM 4/51/11. 106 Cf. Statement by the Executive of the Jewish Agency and Vaad Leumi, 7 November 1944, PREM 4/51/11.
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Indeed, the Empire could not tolerate the terrorists and their challenges to both the security of its representatives and its prestige any longer. The assassination of Moyne thus helped cement and give support to the position of those, who had already called for more severe reactions against the Jewish community in face of the attempt upon MacMichael. From their point of view, the first essential step in terms of fixing the problem was to ensure that the two assailants would receive the maximum punishment, namely execution. However, the British did not urge the Egyptian Government to hand them over. On the contrary, London wanted the trial to take place under a neutral Egyptian court in order to avoid political complications. In doing so, the British would not become the target of Jewish or international campaigns for clemency or criticism 107 , but would of course be able to influence the situation. The British Ambassador in Cairo, Lord Killearn (1880-1964), immediately started to stress the importance of the case, and the Egyptian officials were not willing to risk their good diplomatic relations with the Empire. Britain finally managed to ensure that the terrorists were tried by an Egyptian military court under martial law which would result in the death penalty if the men were convicted.108 In a short trial which lasted only two weeks, both men were found guilty and sentenced to death by hanging. However, when the Egyptian officials hesitated to carry out the executions, even Churchill himself instructed Killearn to underline the British position once more: I hope you will realize that unless the [death] sentences duly passed upon the assassins of Lord Moyne are executed, it will cause a marked breach between Great Britain and the Egyptian Government. Such gross interference with the course of justice will not be compatible with the friendly relations we have established. 109 The suggestion by the Prime Minister and Killearn’s subsequent intervention seemed to have had an effect on the Egyptians, thus highlighting the degree of influence the Empire still had in its de-facto colony. Both terrorists were finally hanged on March 22 nd 1945. Apart from the trial, discussion arose in the War Cabinet concerning the appropriate behaviour to root out terrorism in Palestine. To give better insight
107 Cf. Michael J. Cohen, The Moyne Assassination, November 1944. A Political Analysis. In: Middle Eastern Studies 15/3 (1979) 362. 108 Cf. Ambassador Lord Killearn to Foreign Office, 28 November 1944, FO 141/1001. 109 Foreign Office to Ambassador Lord Killearn, 28 January 1945, FO 371/46110.
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into the situation, the new High Commissioner, Viscount Gort (1886-1946), was asked to give an evaluation of the current situation. From his point of view, the strongest measures which could be used were the suspension of Jewish immigration and crackdowns and searches of suspected weapon’s caches. However, he also stressed the difficulties linked to such actions 110 . Whereas crackdowns and weapon searches would probably cause severe resistance and therefore require large numbers of reinforcements, the suspension of immigration would challenge the entire moderate Jewish community which just had declared its willingness to fight terrorism as well. Gort therefore thought the best measure would be a statement from the Prime Minister which would denounce the terrorists and threaten to suspend immigration in the event of new guerrilla acts. Churchill gave his statement in the Parliament on November 17 th 1944. He expressed his consternation, referred to the offer of the Jewish Agency to cooperate and stressed that its leaders must keep their promises and act.111 But he did not mention the Government’s willingness to suspend immigration if terrorism would not cease. In a personal letter to Gort, he explained his restraint due to diplomatic matters: Suspension of immigration or threat of suspension might simply play into the hands of the extremists. At present the Jews generally seem to have been shocked by Lord Moyne’s death into a mood in which they are more likely to listen to Weizmann’s counsels of moderation. Proposed announcement would come as a shock of a different kind and, so far from increasing their penitence, might well provide a not unwelcome diversion and excite bitter outcry against the Government.112 Churchill was afraid that the threat of suspension could be interpreted as a form of collective punishment which might cause large-scale uprisings under the guidance of the extremists. Further, he did not want to exert pressure upon those who had fled the Holocaust and suddenly found themselves at the locked gates to their desired homeland. Suspension could also be postponed to a later point when the Jewish Agency would fail to fulfil the mutual agreement of cooperation.
110 Cf. Conclusions of the Meeting of the War Cabinet, 13 January 1944, PREM 4/51/11. 111 Cf. Prime Minister Winston Churchill on Palestine Terrorist Activities, 17 November 1944, CAB 104 254. 112 Prime Minister Churchill to High Commissioner Viscount Gort, 18 November 1944, PREM 4/51/11.
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However, the Prime Minister did not earn any support concerning this opinion. Among British officials in the Foreign Office, the confidence in the moderate parts of the Yishuv vanished whereas the criticism of the mild behaviour of the Government was increasing constantly, as the correspondence between the secretary to the Minister Resident, William Croft, and the Governor of Bengal, Richard Casey (1890-1976), shows. Casey asked which measures the Government was planning to carry out apart from deploring the murder 113 . In his reply, Croft expressed his disappointment: Nothing has happened yet and I should be agreeably surprised if anything does happen upon a large scale that you and I would consider adequate. We have put on the pressure from here as hard as we can, and we have full support from Killearn and Cornwallis. But I’m afraid there are those in the highest quarters who have more faith than you and I have in what Weizmann & Co. are willing and able to do. 114 Indeed, it seems to be questionable as to what affected Lord Killearn more, the assassination or the lack of a British response. Using heated rhetoric, he implored the senior officials in the Foreign Office “to overcome this shocking Colonial Office weakness”.115 In his eyes, the murder of Lord Moyne was only the result of a lukewarm British policy after the assassination attempt on Harold MacMichael. A continuation of that behaviour would definitely lead to more problems and tension. In this respect, he did not agree with the proposals made by Lord Gort but demanded total suspension of immigration and the usage of armed forces in order to send a clear signal. Killearn’s attitude reflected the typical Foreign Office stance of demonstrating strength; inaction may be interpreted as a sign of weakness by the Arabs rather than by the Jews and could therefore cause considerable harm to the British position throughout the Muslim world. The Government was not influenced by Killearn’s ideas and instead chose a more moderate way, following the Colonial Office but also the military’s suggestions. As the Chiefs of Staff (COS) concluded, all-out weapon’s searches could only take place after reinforcements arrived from Europe and would negatively affect the war effort against Germany; a prolongation of the war was
113 Cf. Governor Casey to Sir Croft, 16 November 1944, FO 921/21. 114 Sir Croft to Governor Casey, 25 November 1944, FO 921/21. 115 Ambassador Lord Killearn to Foreign Office, 23 November 1944, FO 141/1001.
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completely unacceptable.116 Therefore, the War Cabinet decided to refrain from any military operation in Palestine until another attack occurred. Further, no public statement announcing the suspension of immigration would be made, due to the reasons the Prime Minister had stated in his letter to Gort one week prior. The High Commissioner only received authorisation to hint at the possibility of such a measure in a personal talk with Weizmann if it would become necessary.117 In the end, the British did not retaliate to the assassination “of one of our most distinguished public men” 118 , as Killearn once stated, with either a political or military action. The Colonial Office and especially Lord Gort were obviously too anxious to avoid a large-scale public outcry in order to secure the peace in Palestine and to keep the country governable. In this respect, the proposals to impose a collective fine on the whole Yishuv and to deport some Zionist leaders were rejected 119 , although both measures had often been used during the Arab revolt. The Foreign Office, on the other hand, called for a symbolic act of revenge or intimidation rather than for a sustainable approach towards the solution of the problem. Both arm’s searches and the suspension of immigration would have affected the Yishuv as a whole and the Hagana which maintained the largest arms storages, but neither was responsible for the terrorist acts of 1944. Severe action directed against the Jewish self-defence organisation would have led to the termination of all cooperation which was essential for the fight against terrorism. Since the Lehi was operating in small cells in urban areas, the British needed an effective police force, precise intelligence work and Jewish informers rather than large military operations. The Jewish Agency and the Hagana were more suitable to round-up those responsible for the crimes. What followed the Moyne assassination was therefore not a British-Jewish conflict but a light Jewish civil war.
116 Cf. General Staff on Situation in Palestine, 24 November 1944, WO 32/10260. 117 Cf. War Cabinet Conclusions, 24 November 1944, CAB 65/48. 118 Ambassador Lord Killearn to Foreign Office, 23 November 1944, FO 141/1001. 119 Cf. Memorandum by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 13 November 1944, CO 733/457/9.
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4.3 HUNTING SEASON
The terror campaigns of the Irgun and the Stern Gang placed a heavy burden on the moderates within the Yishuv in two ways. Weizmann and Ben- Gurion feared that the British might exact revenge and punish the entire Jewish community; even if it was very unlikely, the worst case of retaliation could be the creation of an independent Arab state in the whole of Palestine. Under such a presumption, the long political negotiations and lobbying in Great Britain and in the United States were suddenly endangered by a small group of extremists. The second reason for the moderates within the Yishuv to be uneasy was that the officials of the Jewish Agency were driven by personal motivation. The establishment of the Irgun had been a first slap in the face to the Hagana which claimed to be the only national Jewish defence force. Since the Irgun had declared war on the Empire, they had also declared war on the leadership of the Jewish Agency which feared losing control over the Yishuv. Even if most of the people condemned the actions of the Stern Gang, they recognised the Irgun’s efforts to counter the unjust policy of the British. Above all, these groups of action attracted young men within the Yishuv. In contrast, the Jewish Agency appeared inactive and accomplished little to ease the worries of the surviving victims of the Holocaust despite its promising negotiations. In the opinion of the Jewish Agency, it suddenly became clear that immediate measures had to be taken against the terrorists, not only because of the need for maintaining productive relations with the British but also to secure that a future Jewish state was not run by the right-wing faction. The head of the Irgun, Menachem Begin, thus became the main enemy of the Jewish Agency; Ben-Gurion even compared him to Hitler 120 . In April 1944, a new policy of counter-terrorism was put into action. Efforts were to be made to disseminate anti-Irgun and anti-Lehi propaganda, as well as to isolate extremists. 121 In fact, these steps were still far away from active cooperation with the British. The Jewish Agency officials never grew tired of condemning the atrocities of the right-wing and underlining their will to assist the
120 Quoted in Segev, Palestine 471f. 121 Cf. John Bowyer Bell, Terror out of Zion. The Fight for Israeli Independence (London et al. 1977) 119.
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authorities, but in reality, they did not want to sell fellow Jews to the police. In keeping with this policy, the Jewish Agency proposed setting up a special armed unit (following permission of the British), consisting of 25 to 50 men who would be charged with rounding up terrorists.122 While they would be detained in Jewish settlements, the British authorities would only receive their names and, in return, promise to refrain from any searches for arms in Jewish settlements. However, the proposal was not accepted as it was not the Hagana’s but the Empire’s job to bring the terrorists to trial and keep them in internment. The Jews were only supposed to hand them over or offer valuable information which would lead to their apprehension. In keeping with this policy of compromise, the Jewish Agency tried to negotiate with both extremist organisations but did not succeed in gaining a truce. The beliefs of Begin and Ben-Gurion were just too different: whereas the former thought the Yishuv had the power to drive the British out of Palestine, the latter did not. 123 Even ignoring the ideological differences, the Irgun was simply not willing to give up its armed struggle. For that reason, several Agency officials called for more severe steps to be taken against the terrorists. For instance, Eliyahu Golomb (1893-1945), one of the Hagana’s chiefs, stated in a broadcast that “the organised Yishuv will fight against terrorism and will do it, not as a part of the Yishuv, but on behalf of it” 124 , which was interpreted as a declaration of civil war by some journalists. The left-wing of the Agency was obviously prepared for more intense measures and did not exclude the possibility of a internal Jewish war. However, the religious elements which traditionally tended to the right, disapproved of the idea of Jews fighting Jews as long as the White Paper existed and managed to calm those who were already preparing for the battle. The situation changed due to the bullets of the Lehi assassins. In fact, until November 6 th , the idea of partition had been revitalised and most of the influential British decision-makers headed by Churchill had been in favour of a separate Jewish State, but the assassination of Moyne resulted in the decision
122 Cf. SIME Cairo, Extract from Security Summary Middle East No. 181, 11 May 1944, KV 5/34. 123 Cf. Bowyer Bell, Terror 121. 124 Quoted in Cohen, Assassination 366.
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of the War Cabinet to postpone further partition plans sine die 125 . On the day of the attack, the executives of the Jewish Agency and the Vaad Leumi decided in a heated debate that an official appeal should be issued, urging the entire Yishuv and all Jewish institutions to active cooperation with the Government. On November 19 th , the following proposals were adopted by the Histadrut despite the opposition of the right-wing elements of the Inner Jewish Council: (1) To eject all terrorist elements from offices, workshops, schools and homes. (2) To refuse sanctuary and shelter to terrorists and drive them from their hideouts. (3) To resist threats and attempts at extortion. (4) To assist the authorities by information in detecting terrorists and disbanding their organisations. 126 These conclusions known as Ben-Gurion’s four points formed the basis for the Saison or Hunting Season, the manhunt for Irgun members carried out by the Hagana. The main idea was the uncovering of those terrorists who were mostly living incognito among the Yishuv, invisible to the British authorities. Ironically, the organisation which had been responsible for Moyne’s death was not the target of the operation. This operation aimed solely at breaking up the Irgun, for two good reasons. On the one hand, the Hagana and the Lehi leadership reached an agreement, and the latter ceased its activities immediately and would not carry out any terrorist attack for the next six months.127 Beyond that, the small Stern Gang was not as dangerous as the Irgun to the hegemony of the Jewish Agency. The Saison therefore offered a perfect opportunity to get rid of its political enemies. One of the Hagana’s strike forces, the Palmach, started to arrest Irgun members and, in breaking with the Agency’s proposal of April, handed them over to the Palestine police. Even though more than 500 suspected terrorists had been apprehended by the end of the year 128 , the British estimated the operation to be of little strategic value. It was their belief that the Jewish Agency only sought to appease them by turning over unimportant members, while protecting the actual leaders: They cannot shield themselves behind the threadbare alibi that they don’t indirectly control these underground bodies. You and I know they do. We’ve played gentlemen with these people for too long. They’re not gentlemen – they’re the most
125 Cf. ibid 370. 126 High Commissioner Viscount Gort to the Secretary of States for the Colonies, 3 December 1944, CO 733/457/9. 127 Cf. Bowyer Bell, Terror 128. 128 Cf. Saul Zadka, Blood in Zion. How the Jewish Guerrillas drove the British out of Palestine (London 1995) 53.
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clever and dangerous thugs in existence. If we don’t take it out of the hides of Shertok and Ben-Gurion & Co. – then I hope we will very greatly intensify our efforts to dig the underground rats out of their sewers and to expose the connection between them and the Agency. 129 Though exaggerated, this assumption was not completely incorrect. The operation had a tremendous impact on the Irgun and its capabilities to carry out further attacks, especially when the Hagana arrested the second commander, Eliahu Meridor (1913-1995). But even if Ben-Gurion and the others wanted to take the fight to the Irgun, they could only do so by ignoring the religious faction. If they did so, they would risk losing support amongst the Yishuv, which did not desire a civil war. On the contrary, many felt sympathy for the Irgun again because it did not answer the inner-Jewish crackdown with violence. This behaviour, of course, had strategic motives. Begin knew that it would increase his popularity if he refused to raise his hand against other Jews. In addition, his outnumbered organisation was not able to win or even survive an open confrontation with the better armed and structured Hagana. After more than six months of manhunts and round-ups, the Irgun had suffered heavy losses but still managed to survive whereas support for the Season among the Yishuv was vanishing. The situation got so bad that some Hagana members even started to join the former enemy in order to express their refusal towards the fratricidal strife and to call for a united front against the British.130 The Government’s inactivity concerning both their response to the terrorists as well as the general policy in Palestine were responsible for such a change. During the Season, the Empire offered relatively little in terms of military support and hoped that the bulk of the dirty work would be done by the Jews. On the political level, London shelved its partition plans after November 6th and turned to the European theatre of war, apparently postponing all further decisions concerning the Middle East until the upcoming general elections of July 1945. In face of this stagnation, the Jewish Agency had to give in and stop the Season. The frustrated Hagana leadership which had already buried its aspirations towards a political settlement decided to partly adopt the Irgun’s tactics; namely using violence in order to enforce its demands. After a short
129 Governor Casey to Sir Croft, 16 November 1944, FO 921/21. 130 Cf. Charters, Insurgency 53.
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break of detente, Palestine was hit by a new wave of terror, this time with the Hagana involved.
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5 THE REVIVAL OF TERRORISM
The end of the Second World War had a considerable effect on Palestine. Already before the victory over Germany, the Empire had eyed its allies with suspicion because of their growing interest in the Middle East. Both the United States as well as the Soviet Union seemed to be interested in the Iraqi and Iranian oil fields which had been up to that point, considered to be exclusively British. The Russians had become, above all, a serious competitor since the joint Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran in the late summer of 1941 which had secured the country’s oil resources for the allies. However, since then, the Soviets had tried to increase their influence in the entire region and had opened new embassies throughout the Middle East, obviously driven by the old tsarist attitude of being the decisive Near Eastern Power.131 In addition to this, even at the end of the current conflict, British military strategists were already preparing for the next conflict, namely the Cold War. In their minds, even though fascism had been defeated, imperial security concerns could still not be neglected or eased. In this respect, the role of the Middle East and Palestine was considered at least as important as during World War II. Due to its position, it was the only British territory suitable as a rally point for future attacks against the Soviet Union in the event of an armed conflict. The airports were of special significance because they allowed the Empire and its allies to carry out air strikes against key targets in the Soviet hinterland such as industrial facilities in the Ukraine or the oilfields of the Caucasus 132 . Therefore, a solid position and the maintaining of a military presence in the Arab world were essential to counter possible Russian aggression. A state of anarchy and its impact on the neighbouring countries would definitely jeopardize such plans. Unfortunately for the COS, the new Labour Prime Minister Clement Attlee (1883-1967) was more interested in domestic affairs than in the Empire and concentrated on the economic and social results of the war. However, since the refugee camps in Europe were full of Jews hoping for passage to Palestine and the White Paper was still being enforced, Attlee also had to think of Britain’s
131 Cf. Cohen, Retreat 155. 132 Cf. Cohen, Strategic Role 27.
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duty as the mandate power. In this respect, he had to continue the process of policy-making which had been interrupted after the assassination of Lord Moyne. But before a political settlement could be reached, Britain had to show the world that it was in a position to enforce its policies.
5.1 THE INTERNAL SECURITY SITUATION
One of the main arguments for British inaction after the events of 1944 was the shortage of troops due to the war effort against Germany. Without any reinforcements, the GOC in Palestine was not able to carry out any major operations. In addition, the army could not even guarantee the maintenance of law and order if there was a large-scale uprising by the Yishuv. Therefore, in November 1944, the War Office recommended the postponing of all risky actions, including strong counter measures such as the search for arms as well as the announcement of a future policy for Palestine.133 From the strategic point of view, it was essential to avoid any revolt until the military would be able to quell it without complications. The Cabinet’s advising body in intelligence matters, the JIC, drew a similar conclusion in terms of the internal situation in Palestine. In the event of the announcement of an unacceptable policy, the Jewish Agency would use their propaganda arm to appeal to world opinion, especially referring to the Jewish fate during the Holocaust. 134 In addition, the Yishuv would engage in acts of civil disobedience and the Jewish underground would continue to carry out acts of terrorism. An open insurrection was rather improbable, but still possible. If the above mentioned measures failed, the Hagana could wage an open war on the Empire. Another big problem would entail the reaction of Jewish soldiers serving in the British armed forces. There was the possibility that they might feel sympathy for the Jewish uprising which could lead to cases of passive disobedience and desertion, but also to the smuggling of arms and ammunition
133 Cf. General Staff to the Secretary of State for the Colonies on the Situation in Palestine, 24 November 1944, WO 32/10260. 134 Cf. JIC Cairo Note No. 12, 11 January 1945, CAB 119/147.
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and acts of sabotage. 135 In this respect, reliable imperial troops had to be moved to Palestine as soon as the war was over. After Germany’s defeat, the Colonial Office and the Foreign Office designed a joint paper containing several future options for Palestine which were subsequently evaluated by the Commanders-in-Chief (C-in-C) in terms of the military implications.136 From their point of view, partition was the worst choice because it would lead to both Jewish resistance in Palestine as well as open hostility from the newly formed Arab League. 137 In fact, such a scenario could even lead to a violent clash with regular Egyptian and Iraqi forces and provoke a war with the Arab world. On the other hand, the continued adherence to the White Paper would only result in new Jewish protests which could be dealt with much easier, especially in the light of the assumption that the Arab states would assist the Empire in case of a larger Jewish uprising. As an alternative to both afore mentioned options, the idea was proposed to maintain the status quo but to allow limited immigration. If both sides were informed about the planned policy beforehand, no violent large scale incidents could be expected. Yet the C-in-C were keen to outline the fact that the current garrison of only one infantry division and some air force units met the military recommendations for not a single one of the proposals. But even by mid-1945, it was difficult to find available troops for the mission in Palestine. Great Britain was still at war with Japan and needed forces for security duties in the occupied European territories as well. Furthermore, a large number of soldiers had to be demobilized and sent back to the mother country or to the colonies. Anyway, the deployment of Indian units in an Arab-Jewish conflict was not even considered due to the religious implications that the garrisoning of Indian Muslim soldiers would bring. In this respect, the implementation of a long term policy for Palestine was still not possible at this stage. In addition to their failure in finding a long-term plan, the Empire also failed to find an adequate short-term policy. In August, the General Staff’s evaluation
135 Cf. JIC Cairo Note No. 13, 9 February 1945, CAB 119/147. 136 Cf. Note by the C-in-C, Middle East on the Military Implications of the Palestine Policy, 16 July 1945, CAB 119/148. 137 By early 1945, partition was again favored by the Ministerial Committee on Palestine as the most suitable solution to the problem, but was opposed by the General Staff due to implications on the operations in Europe and in the Far East. Cf. General Staff to the Secretary of State on Future Policy on Palestine, 11 April 1945, WO 32/10260.
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of the situation was still non-existent, and the Colonial Office started to point out the necessity of immediate action due to the refugee situation in Europe and the increase in illegal immigration 138 . The quota of the White Paper had been reached in May 1944, and since then, further legal admission to Palestine had been dependent on Arab consent, currently numbering 1,500 people per month. In view of the events in Europe, the question was proposed as to whether free, unhindered immigration should be granted to the Jewish refugees. In September 1945, the COS recommended continued adherence to the White Paper until an appropriate long-term policy could be agreed upon.139 Furthermore, they pointed out that any announcements of future policies should be postponed to the end of October, when two additional British divisions would have been deployed to Palestine. This, however, meant a long period of inaction which irritated the Jewish Agency which just had shown their willingness to cooperate during the Saison. As mentioned above, the Hagana especially was losing its confidence in the likelihood of a pro-Jewish decision and favoured the idea of using violence as a means to achieve an independent Jewish state. The local British authorities were well informed about the feelings among the Yishuv and sent a warning to the Colonial Office. In the beginning of September, Colonial Secretary George Hall (1881-1965) informed the Cabinet about the situation in Palestine: I have received a letter from the Officer Administering the Government […] describing conditions in the territory in most sombre colours. Evidence is accumulating that on the side both of the Arabs and of the Jews the temperature is rising and that there is considerable danger of a violent outbreak of disturbances in the near future. 140 Hall also outlined the problems concerning the security forces. Already after the assassination of Lord Moyne, the War Cabinet had decided that the Palestine police should be brought up to full strength by all possible means.141 In September 1945, its British section still lacked 2,000 men (approximately a third of its entire manpower) and was running the risk of losing another 600 due to
138 Cf. Colonial Office to General Ismay, 18 August 1945, CAB 119/148. 139 Cf. General Staff to the Secretary of State on Future Policy in Palestine, 6 September 1945, WO 32/10260. 140 Memorandum by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Cabinet on Security Conditions in Palestine, 10 September 1945, CAB 119/148. 141 Cf. Secretary of the States for the Colonies to High Commissioner Viscount Gort, 27 November 1944, CO 733/457/9.
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expiring war contracts. In this respect, the police was in an even worse condition than a year before and completely unable to deal with a new wave of terrorism without the support of the military. When the Labour Government finally endorsed the continuation of the White Paper and terrorism continued, this reality would be made all too apparent.
5.2 THE UNITED RESISTANCE MOVEMENT
Undoubtedly, the Saison had divided the Jewish Agency and the Hagana into two factions. When Attlee won the elections on July 5 th 1945, the Zionist moderates expected a change of policy and a drift towards a pro-Jewish attitude which would restore the trust in the British mandate power. As the Jewish newspaper Davar stated, the “victory of the Labour Party [was] a clear victory for the demands of the Zionists in British public opinion”142 . In this respect, everybody including the right extremists was looking to London. During the following months, certain Hagana members even continued their cooperation with the British authorities, probably to show their goodwill and to prevent an occurrence similar to the Moyne assassination. In mid-August, for instance, Teddy Kollek (1911-2007), the future mayor of Jerusalem, provided the police with a tip which led to the arrest of 27 Irgun fighters. 143 However, the situation did not improve for the Zionist cause. Attlee, who had promised to abolish the White Paper and push for a Jewish state in December 1944 144 , had to deal with domestic reforms and a changed postwar world including the Indian question. Palestine was not on his immediate agenda anymore. In addition, the new Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin (1881-1951) was regarded as someone more favourable to the Arab stance rather than the Jewish position. On September 11 th 1945, the Government declared its adherence to the White Paper allowing further immigration only by Arab consent. 145 After months of complete inactivity, this decision finally drove the
142 Quoted in Bowyer Bell, Terror 140. 143 Cf. Extract from Report on Interview with Kollek, 18 August 1945, KV 5/34. 144 Cf. Bruce Hoffman, The Failure of British Military Strategy within Palestine 1939-1947 (= Underground and Resistance Studies 1, Jerusalem 1983) 18. 145 Qoted in Ritchie Ovendale, The Palestine Policy of the British Labour Government 1945- 1946. In: International Affairs 55/3 (1979) 411.
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moderates of the Jewish Agency and the Hagana into the arms of the extremists. Instead of hunting down the terrorists, the Hagana started to negotiate with Begin and the Lehi’s leader, Nathan Yellin-Mor (1913-1980), about future actions against the British which resulted in the formation of the Hebrew or United Resistance Movement. Their first joint operation was entailed a series of explosions in the night of October 31 st which cut off the railway system in various places throughout the country and caused both human life as well as heavy damage to the Lydda station 146 . Unlike the Irgun in February 1944, the Hagana never issued an open declaration of war. But Teddy Kollek, who continued his cooperation with the authorities, confirmed that there had been three meetings between the right and the left underground during the last weeks.147 Yet the Hagana only had tried to calm the extremists. Since Kollek was considered as a reliable source, British intelligence was not able to evaluate the actual role of the Hagana at this stage. Nevertheless, when the incident was discussed in Parliament on November 5 th , the Colonial Secretary was in agreement with the High Commissioner’s suspicion that the attacks had been the product of all three underground organisations 148 . All in all, the reaction of the Empire was again very restrained, but close spectators could notice the first signs of the coming British offensive. At the end of September, the first reinforcements, consisting of the Sixth Airborne Division, had arrived in Palestine, thus enlarging the army’s striking force. Then, with the beginning of November, the moderate High Commissioner Gort was replaced by the more decisive Alan Cunningham (1887-1983) who was determined to end terrorism. Compared to the situation after the Moyne assassination, the Palestine administration thus found itself in a much stronger position. However, measures such as the increase of troops and the change of staff were definitely too little to impress the United Resistance Movement which continued its activity. Apart from direct attacks on British facilities, the Hagana concentrated on illegal immigration. Hagana fighters guarded the landing points
146 Cf. Extract from the Weekly Intelligence Reviews by the General Headquarters, Middle East Land Forces, 2 November 1945, WO 275/120. 147 Cf. Extract from Report on Interview No. 8. with Kollek, 20 October 1945, KV 5/34. 148 Cf. Note by the Secretary of State for the Colonies on the Hagana, 5 November 1945, CAB 119/148.
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of refugee ships at the Palestinian shores and did not hesitate to use their weapons in order to prevent the arrest of illegal immigrants by British soldiers. A commando unit even attacked the Athlit camp where the British used to intern illegal Jews, releasing 208 people but also killing a British constable and a Christian woman.149 By the end of the year, Palestine found itself in a very tense situation which was additionally fuelled by the occurrence of two incidents. On November 25 th , police and military forces got into conflict with a large armed Jewish crowd while searching for terrorists in a settlement, and had to open fire, killing six Jews and wounding several others.150 The army then cordoned the settlement and two other villages off and carried out interrogations and searches for arms which led to the arrest of a number of men. The behaviour of the British was severely criticised by the Yishuv, and the Histadrut even accused the soldiers and policemen of having invaded Jewish settlements in search of illegal immigrants and opened fire on purpose and without provocation. The British authorities were thus anxious to avoid any misinterpretations in the press, above all in American newspapers, immediately sending an official report by the High Commissioner to Washington.151 Colonial Secretary Hall also gave a statement in Parliament: It is necessary to take this opportunity to state categorically that the allegation to which some currency has been given that British troops opened fire without provocation on unarmed persons is completely without foundation. I am satisfied that the forces in Palestine have been displaying exemplary restraint in the face of great provocation. 152 Since the incident was the first violent clash between Jewish civilians and British forces after a long period of inactivity, the British suddenly found themselves in a rather complicated situation. The arrest and killing of terrorists whether in combat or after a trial was a self-explanatory issue which would not be condemned by the world public. However, the shooting of Jewish settlers, even if they were covert Hagana members, had to be justified, especially in face of the Holocaust.
149 Cf. Note by the Secretary of State for the Colonies on the Hagana, 5 November 1945, CAB 119/148 150 Cf. The Times, Law and Anarchy in Palestine. Organised Campaign against British Authority (8 December 1945) 5. 151 Cf. Colonial Office to Foreign Office, 29 November 1945, FO 371/45387. 152 Cf. Parliamentary Question on the Incident in Hogla, 3 December 1945, FO 371/45387.
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The second incident occurred outside Palestine in early 1946, when a Sudanese guard wounded a Jewish detainee in an Eritrean detention camp. The subsequent revolt of several fellow detainees was quelled by force and two men were finally shot and twelve others wounded.153 The Jewish community, which was opposed to deportation in general, again reacted via a public outcry. Interestingly, the detainees themselves managed to send a letter of outrage to various newspapers and institutions including the United Nations, the Vatican and the British Parliament, condemning the incident as an unjustified murder in cold blood.154 As had been the case in November, the British had to justify their actions and were anxious to carry out an official investigation. In any case, the idea of deporting Jews and detaining them in detention or concentration camps, which were actually a British invention, certainly did not increase the prestige of the Empire in the eyes of the world. The Jews demanded that the investigation was not only carried out by the British but called for the Red Cross and a Jewish delegation to take part. The British, for their part, allowed the inclusion of a rabbi who would examine the events of January 17 th . This was a rather essential step in order to appease the Jewish community and to prevent a greater uprising of the Yishuv. Ironically, the resident rabbi who had lived in the camp for six months wrote an article on the living conditions there but refused to publish it in the press because of personal fear.155 Since his report emphasised the comfort the detainees enjoyed in Eritrea despite their confinement, it would support the British attempts of justification rather than the Jewish propaganda. Therefore, the rabbi might be considered as a traitor to the Jewish case and easily become the target of an attack by the Irgun or the Stern Gang. In fact, since the first Irgun members had been sent to Africa in late 1944, deportation had become a popular procedure of dealing with suspected terrorists. Begin himself stated that deportation was “one of the most serious measures that the enemy had taken against us, apart from the nightmare of
153 Cf. High Commissioner Cunningham to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 21 January 1946, CO 537/1710. 154 Cf. Letter from Jewish Detainees in Eritrea to Pope Pius XII, 18 January 1946, CO 537/1710. 155 Cf. Internal Colonial Office Correspondence on Incident in Eritrea Detention Camp, 26 February 1946, CO 537/1710.
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hanging” 156 . The British reasoning behind bringing people to far, remote places was the fact that it was nearly impossible for the Jewish underground to carry out a successful rescue attempt or operation. In addition, the idea of being in exile somewhere in Africa and far away from Palestine represented a severe mental blow to Zionist thinking. In this respect, deportation was an efficient way of deterrence. Yet the British had to face some legal and organisational problems. Already before the shooting, several Jewish organisations criticised the illegal character of deportation because it usually took place without any trial. The British replied that detention and transfer to Africa were carried out under the Palestine Defence (Emergency) Regulations of 1945 which empowered the High Commissioner to take such measures for reasons of internal security.157 A similar regulation had already been applied to send the majority of the Arab Higher Committee to the Seychelles during the Arab revolt. But with their deportation, the detainees were no longer under the legal jurisdiction of the High Commissioner of Palestine but of the military authorities in Eritrea which had been under British military administration since its conquest from the Italians in 1941. In this respect, Cunningham was addressed by various representatives of the Vaad Leumi and the Jewish Agency but had no authorisation to deal with events happening outside of Palestine. The only thing he could do was to refrain from deporting more suspects to Africa but the idea of building a new camp inside the mandate area was finally abandoned because of grave security objections.158 Indeed, internal security was to be massively challenged within the next months.
156 Quoted in Zadka, Zion 146. 157 The Palestine Defence (Emergency) Regulations of 1945 were criticized by Jewish lawyers because of their totalitarian and undemocratic nature. In 1948, however, they were incorporated into Israeli law and have been in force since then. Cf. Colonial Office to the Board of Deputies of British Jews, 25 March 1946, CO 537/1709; Yvonne Schmidt, Foundations of Civil and Political Rights in Israel and the Occupied Territories (Vienna 2001) 302. 158 Cf. High Commissioner Cunningham to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 12 February 1946, CO 537/1710.
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5.3 THE BEGINNING OF IMPERIAL COUNTER-TERRORISM
It was certainly no coincidence that the next wave of attacks occurred in February, after the shooting in Eritrea. The Irgun launched a series of strikes on British airfields and destroyed 22 planes 159 , causing enormous financial damage. Unlike Gort, Cunningham was determined to break up the Jewish underground including the Hagana by using the military. He recommended occupying the buildings of the Jewish Agency and even placing its leadership, which was unable or unwilling to cease terrorism, under supervision. 160 However, the Cabinet wanted to play the diplomatic card once more. For that reason, London and Washington formed a joint initiative called the Anglo- American Committee of Inquiry which would concentrate on the question of immigration and advise both governments. An arrest of the Yishuv’s representatives would definitely result in a large-scale uprising and eliminate adequate working conditions; the Cabinet therefore rejected Cunningham’s proposal. Presenting its report in May, the Committee drew the conclusion that independence was not feasible at the moment and recommended the continuation of the Mandate 161 . In addition, it argued for the admission of 100,000 refugees (out of more than a million so-called displaced persons who were waiting in European camps). In fact, this was a concession to President Harry S. Truman (1884-1972) who had called for the distribution of 100,000 immigration certificates in August 1945 162 . Anyway, since the end phase of the war, the United States had become increasingly involved in the finding of a solution on the diplomatic level, taking notice of the significance of the Palestine problem and the Jewish cause. Truman’s predecessor Franklin D. Roosevelt (1882-1945) had adopted a pro-Zionist stance during his presidential campaign of 1944 in order to gain the support of influential and wealthy Jewish lobbies. American newspapers focussed on the development of the refugee situation
159 Cf. Hoffman, Failure 20. 160 Cf. Cabinet Discussion on Reaction towards Jewish Terrorism, 1 January 1946, CAB 128/5. 161 Cf. The Times, The Palestine Report (1 May 1946) 5 and The Palestine Report Press Release on the Report of Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry on Palestine, 16 May 1946, WO 204/10981. 162 Cf. Arieh J. Kochavi, The Struggle against Jewish Immigration to Palestine. In: Middle Eastern Studies 34/3 (1998) 149.
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and the Jewish plight during the Holocaust. Since the USA were at the zenith of superpower status and above all the main war creditor of the nearly ruined Empire, the American position towards Palestine became crucial. In this respect, Whitehall had to accept US participation. But neither the American nor the British negotiators had a concrete idea of the actual situation in Palestine, and while the talks in London and Washington were going on, things in the Holy Land headed for a catastrophe. After several acts of sabotage on the infrastructure, the Stern Gang attacked the camp of the Sixth Airborne Division in Tel Aviv, killing six sleeping soldiers in the end of April. On May 1 st , Attlee stated that Britain would only accept the Committee’s proposal to admit 100,000 refugees if the Jewish underground was disarmed and disbanded 163 . In face of such a dastardly act, a mere statement was definitely too little in the eyes of the military. The local troops were upset and urged for retaliation. But the High Commissioner was still not given the green light for a large-scale operation against the Jewish Agency and the Hagana. The Cabinet refused to give consent to such a plan since they feared a negative effect on American-British relations. As General Bernard Paget (1887-1961), the C-in-C for the Middle East, explained to the CIGS, these restrictions became a serious threat to internal security: If there is another incident involving cold blooded murder of British soldiers or Government officials we should be free to take drastic action as soon as we judge the time ripe to do so. If matter has to be referred to His Majesty’s Government opportunity may be lost. Moreover if nothing is done there is risk that troops will take law into their own hands. 164 The army’s state of mind had become especially warped by the Government’s leniency. During the period of instability from 1936-1939, most of the Arab attacks had been limited to Jewish targets and had not included such violent ambushes but even then the troops had been immediately called in to quell the revolt. This time, the common soldier could not understand, why he had to stand idly by while his comrades were being targeted or murdered. In addition, they felt betrayed by the Yishuv. Thousands of British soldiers had sacrificed their life in the fight against Germany in order to protect the Jewish race, and the reward now were Irgun bombs and Lehi bullets. British soldiers were not
163 Cf. Extract from the Weekly Intelligence Reviews by the General Headquarters, Middle East Land Forces, 3 May 1946, WO 275/120. 164 Personal Telegram form the C-in-C, Middle East to the CIGS, 4 May 1946, FO 371/52525.
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anti-Zionist when they arrived in Palestine, but they tended to become so after a couple of months, due to the permanent menace. The concerns about deteriorating moral and discipline therefore were justified. In a letter to the Prime Minister, the CIGS pointed out that marauding troops might have a worse effect on British prestige than a legitimate military operation in order to root out terrorism 165 . From the military point of view, they therefore recommended to give more freedom of action to the local authorities. Yet the proposal was opposed by the Ministry of Defence, which was also headed by Attlee. The Ministry feared that such an authorisation would result in unjustified reprisals against the Jewish Agency which could harm the ties with America and urged the High Commissioner and the military to deal with the real perpetrators on the local level 166 . Indeed, Cunningham wanted to arrest several members of the Agency’s executive council, but he agreed with the Ministry’s decision. Simple acts of revenge directed against the entire Yishuv would not result in a solution but in increased terrorism. Therefore, he refused the Sixth Airborne’s plea to impose collective fines on Tel Aviv or to blow up Jewish buildings 167 , which had been a very common measure during the Arab revolt. However, the military was not willing to accept this decision. In a meeting with the COS on May 15 th , the former GOC for Palestine, General John D’Arcy, once more underlined the necessity of appeasing not only the Jews and the American but also the own soldiers: Our forces were under extreme tension. They were veterans of battles in Europe in the last war. They had been taught to kill and were now placed under irritating restrictions. The recent murder of some members of the 6th Airborne Division had been followed by slight outbreak which was quickly brought under control. In itself, the incident had been of no great importance, but this was a beginning. If similar Jewish attacks occurred [I don’t think] it would be possible to restrain our troops as they had now reached [the] breaking point. 168 D’Arcy was anxious to make clear the local military implications of the Government’s behaviour. But his insistence did not lead to any success. On the next day, he joined a meeting with the Prime Minister and the Colonial Secretary Hall, giving his evaluation of the situation in Palestine. By outlining
165 Cf. Letter from General Ismay to the Prime Minister, 8 May 1946, FO 371/52525. 166 Cf. COS to C-in-C, Middle East, 13 May 1946, FO 371/52525 167 Cf. Ari J. Sherman, Mandate Days. British Lives in Palestine, 1918-1948 (Baltimore 2001) 177. 168 Note on Meeting of the COS with GOC General D’Arcy, 15 May 1946, FO 371/52525.
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the Hagana’s participation in the last major outrages 169 , the General hoped to convince the Government to act against the Jewish Agency which was as responsible for the wave of terror as the right-wing organisations in his eyes. Despite D’Arcy’s statements the Government still did not authorise the High Commissioner to undertake any drastic action, being anxious to strain relations with the USA. In the meantime, the press had begun to take notice of this attitude of inactivity. The Times stated that “there is also embitterment with the Colonial Office, or more vaguely ‘Whitehall’, which is accused of dilatory methods, aimlessness, and incapacity to take firm decisions”170 . But things were to change very soon, when the next terrorist offensive was launched by the URM in mid-June due to Bevin’s anti-Zionist stance including a speech he delivered in Bournemouth, announcing the transfer of another division to Palestine 171 . Between June 16 th and 18 th , the Hagana blew up ten main bridges, the Stern Gang destroyed the railway workshop in Haifa, and the Irgun kidnapped six army officers in order to force the British to release two detained terrorists 172 . Already on the next day, the C-in-C referred to the Hagana’s operation “as demonstration of strength and attempt [to] coerce HMG” 173 . The blowing up of vital bridges clearly differed from its former activities which were usually linked to illegal immigration. The switch to the use of strong-arm behaviour indicated that the extreme elements within the Jewish Agency must have won control over the moderates, and thus, the military authorities feared a further increase of terrorist activity with the aim of currying favour for a pro-Jewish solution. They again tried to convince Whitehall of the situation’s gravity, and this time, the recent incidents began to lead to a reconsideration of policy. In public, Attlee threatened that the Empire would not accept the admission of the 100,000 refugees if the kidnapped officers were not
169 Cf. Minutes of Staff Conference, 16 May 1946, FO 371/52525. 170 The Times, Reflections in Palestine. Awaiting Action on Anglo-American Report (12 June 1946) 5. 171 Cf. Extract from the Weekly Intelligence Reviews by the General Headquarters, Middle East Land Forces, 21 June 1946, WO 275/120 172 Before the officers were kidnapped, the DSO had already known of the Irgun’s intention to take hostages in order to enforce the release of comrades. In the respective case, the High Commissioner commuted the GOC’s sentence from the death penalty into imprisonment for life. Cf. Extract from DSO Palestine Report, 15 June 1946. 173 C-in-C, Middle East to Cabinet Offices, 19 June 1946, FO 371/52531.
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immediately released. Additionally, the Cabinet came to the following conclusion: Discussion showed that there was general agreement that the situation called for firmer action. We could no longer tolerate a position in which the authority of Government was set a nought. Approval was given to a plan to arrest the leadership of the Jewish Agency and its military arm. 174 The Government thus followed the High Commissioner’s recommendation to direct action against the Agency and the Hagana and decided to satisfy the desire of the CIGS to leave the situation to the discretion of the local authorities. In the early morning hours of June 29 th , British security forces launched Operation Agatha, closing the country’s borders, cutting all telephone lines and imposing curfews in several Jewish cities and settlements. The Palestine Government had the following four goals: (a) to occupy the Jewish Agency in Jerusalem for a period necessary to search for incriminating documents. (b) to arrest certain members of the Jewish Political bodies, who were considered either to have been implicated in recent terrorist activities or to have been responsible for inciting the people to violence.(c) to occupy and search certain buildings in Tel Aviv suspected of being HQ of illegal armed organisations. (d) to arrest as many members as possible of the illegal armed organisation “Palmach”. 175 Apparently, Cunningham was well aware of the sentiments such an operation might provoke. During the morning, he issued an announcement explaining the reasons why the operation was carried out, trying to appease the Yishuv which had to face an attack on its legal and recognised representative. Therefore, the High Commissioner stated that the action had not been directed against the entire Jewish community but against those who had been responsible for the recent attacks. 176 He further emphasised that the British did not aim at the proscription or the closure of the Jewish Agency and by no means carried out the operation as an act of reprisal. In face of the recent events, the last statement was essential. After the killing of the paratroopers, some of their comrades had already tried to act in self-justice, and after the kidnapping in mid-June, an officer had shot a Jewish passer-by in panic, believing that there
174 Quoted in Hoffman, Failure 22. 175 Report on Operation Agatha by HQ British Troops Palestine and Transjordan, 9 July 1946, WO 275/27. 176 Cf. High Commissioner Cunningham to the Secretary of States for the Colonies on 27 June 1946 and on 28 June 1946, FO 371/52534.
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had been an ambush.177 The nerves of both sides were on the edge, and a minor incident might result in a massacre. Fortunately, there was hardly any armed resistance by the Jews, because they were caught completely unaware. Prior to the operation, the military planners had reduced the circulation of relevant information to the bare- minimum in order to avoid any leakage of details to Jewish agents inside the British forces.178 Both the High Commissioner as well as the new GOC Evelyn Barker, who had replaced D’Arcy in May, also congratulated the troops and expressed their appreciation for the manner in which the operation had been carried out.179 In total, only three Jews had been killed. With relation to the four goals, the officials considered the operation to be a huge success. Until July 1 st , the 17,000 soldiers and policemen involved had arrested 2,700 suspected Jews, and although there had been no systematic searches for arms, they had discovered large arsenals including 300 rifles, 8,000 hand grenades, and more than 400,000 bullets. 180 In addition, the security forces had seized documents dealing with the Hagana’s participation in the URM and detained high-ranking Jewish officials such as Moshe Shertok, Rabbi Fishman, the chairman of the Agency’s executive council, and David Remez, the chairman of the Vaad Leumi and the secretary of the Histadrut.181 The documents were of particular importance. In order to justify the operation, the Government had to prove its assumption that the Agency was in bed with the terrorists. Therefore they needed an unambiguous, official piece of evidence. Yet the Empire did not manage to get hold of the entire radical Agency’s leadership in order to redirect control back to the hands of the moderates. Important figures such as Ben- Gurion or Moshe Sneh (1909-1972), the Hagana’s military head, escaped. Operation Agatha, carried out on a Saturday and therefore also called the Black Shabbat by the Yishuv, was a creation by the local Palestinian authorities
177 Cf. High Commissioner Cunningham to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 21 June 1946, FO 371/52532. 178 In order to keep up appearances, even the preparations for the Jerusalem Horse Show had gone on, which should have taken place on that weekend. Cf. Report on Operation Agatha by HQ British Troops Palestine and Transjordan, 9 July 1946, WO 275/27. 179 Cf. GOC Barker to the Command of the Sixth Airborne Division, 30 June 1946, WO 275/29. 180 Cf. Report on Operation Agatha by HQ British Troops Palestine and Transjordan, 9 July 1946, WO 275/27. 181 Cf. Report on Operation Agatha by HQ British Troops Palestine and Transjordan, 9 July 1946, WO 275/28.
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and not by the Government in London, and it marked the turning point in the Empire’s policy from passivity to activity. But despite the initial British euphoria, it did not achieve its actual goal which was the cessation of terrorism. Among imperial officials, there was the common attitude to generalise the entire Yishuv as well as the underground 182 , and the Jewish Agency was believed to be in close connection with or even have control over the right-wing organisations. This was certainly not the case. When the British directed their action only against the Agency and the Hagana in order to destroy their commando-wing, it had no effect on the actual extremists of the Irgun and the Stern Gang. In this respect, this false estimation in terms of the biggest British military operation in Palestine was to result in the largest Jewish atrocity of the whole mandate period.
5.4 THE KING DAVID HOTEL BOMBING
The raiding of the Jewish Agency was not met with unanimous approval in Great Britain. In Parliament, the Government had to defend its policy in a heated debate with members of its own Labour Party who criticised the harsh operation. Member of Parliament Sydney Silverman even stated that the Black Shabbat was a declaration of war on the Yishuv, the burden of which the Empire was not able to carry at the moment.183 Exactly the same words had been used by Weizmann who had visited Cunningham in the afternoon of June 29 th , in an attempt to stop the ongoing operation. In fact, the URM was immediately thinking about an appropriate way to exact revenge. Earlier in that year, the Hagana had already considered an act of sabotage on the centre of the imperial administration located in the King David Hotel in Jerusalem but had never approved it. Immediately after the British attack on the Black Shabbat, it brought the plan back online and authorised the Irgun to carry out a bombing. 184 An attack on the senior executives, the military headquarters, and the main intelligence department
182 Cf. Debate in the House of Lords, 23 July 1946, FO 371/52543. 183 Cf. The Times, Firm British Action in Palestine. Mr. Attlee’s Defence of Policy (2 July 1946) 4; Personal Telegram from High Commissioner Cunningham to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 29 June 1946, FO 371/52534. 184 Cf. Zadka, Zion 89.
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would not only harm the Empire’s prestige and have a disastrous effect on British morale. It would also show that the British had not succeeded in breaking up the Hagana. Additionally, the underground believed that the hotel was the storage point for the incriminating documents which had been confiscated on June 29 th . An assault could destroy all evidence of cooperation between the Jewish Agency and the terrorists. In this respect, David Charters claims that the destruction of the documents was probably not the terrorists’ main concern, since the British had already had three weeks time to analyse them 185 , and already knew the Agency’s involvement in the URM. However, the analysis lasted considerably longer since the documents were all written in Hebrew, and the Palestine Police only had a handful of British officers who spoke the language 186 , as the Assistant Inspector General of the CID, Richard Gatling, pointed out. The lack of Hebrew speakers made the British dependent on Jewish policemen, who often cooperated with the Hagana and thus represented a security leakage. An appropriate counter-terrorism therefore was not possible, especially in case of eavesdropping operations. In the meantime, Weizmann, who had regained power within the organisation after the arrest and the flight of the radicals, was anxious to prevent a further escalation of conflict and tried to bring the Jewish Agency back to negotiations. When he urged the Hagana to cease its terrorist activities, Sneh refused but allegedly asked the Irgun for a postponement of the operation.187 However, on July 22 nd , six Irgun members dressed up as Arab workers gained access to the King David Hotel, placing milk cans filled with explosives in the basement of the building. 188 Although they were addressed by hotel employees and even became entangled in a short shooting with policemen, the assailants managed to get away. The incident obviously did not raise any suspicion among the security forces. When the cans were finally discovered due to a telephone warning, it was too late to deactivate the explosives. At 12:36, the detonation destroyed large parts of the hotel, killing 92 people and hurting 69 others. The majority of the victims were Arabs.
185 Cf. Charters, Insurgency 59. 186 Quoted in Bowyer Bell, Terror 270. 187 Cf. Michael J. Cohen, Palestine and the Great Powers, 1945-1948 (Princeton 1982) 91. 188 Cf. Zadka, Zion 86.
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Three hours later, the Defence Committee already discussed how the Empire should react in face of the latest attack. The first proposals came from the High Commissioner, who was in London at the moment. In contrast to his previous position of opposing collective punishment, he recommended a radical procedure which would affect the entire Yishuv this time. Aside from searches for weapons and the complete suspension of immigration, he recommended the confiscation of all Jewish funds.189 Concerning the arm’s searches, he was supported by the CIGS, Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery (1887-1976). In his opinion, the forces in Palestine would be able to sufficiently deal with the Hagana if there was no major uprising by the Jewish or the Arab community. The Prime Minister postponed making a decision until the Cabinet meeting of the following day. In the meeting, Colonial Secretary Hall first presented the estimation of the Palestine Government’s executive council and GOC Barker considering only two alternatives: an all-out search for arms or a final solution of the political problem 190 . Since the former would definitely lead to a state of war, they favoured the latter. Attlee rejected both proposals. A sudden implementation of a new long-term solution would mean an abrupt end to the Anglo-American negotiations in terms of a provincial Palestinian autonomy similar to the state of Transjordan, which functioned very well at the moment. In addition, there was no proof that the Hagana had participated in the latest assault. Therefore he did not want to carry out another operation which did not affect the actual perpetrators but the majority of the Yishuv. Unlike the discussions prior to Operation Agatha, the Cabinet saw the Jewish underground in a different light, and tried to figure out who the real terrorists were. However, it was decided to publicise the documents which proved the relationship between the Agency and the URM, obviously in order to gain some political capital. Apart from the public condemnation, this was the Government’s only immediate reaction to the bombing. Montgomery was furious about the renewal of the policy of inactivity due to political reasons. Similar to the situation after the Moyne assassination, something had to be done in order to show some imperial strength. Otherwise,
189 Cf. Notes on Defence Committee Meeting No. 23, 22 July 1946, FO 371/52543. 190 Cf. Minutes of Cabinet Meeting No. 46, 23 July 1946, CAB 128/6.
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the Empire ran the risk of losing its prestige throughout the Arab world. In addition, as it had been the Jewish intention, the attack came as a shock to the troops. If the Government did not give orders to retaliate, morale would be jeopardized once again. On July 25 th , the Cabinet rejected Cunningham’s initial proposals to suspend immigration completely and to impose a collective fine of GBP 500,000 on the entire Yishuv by confiscating Jewish funds.191 A collective fine would radicalise the moderates but it would have no effect on the Irgun and the Lehi. The suspension of immigration, on the other hand, was not feasible politically because Jewish admission to Palestine was of prime importance to the Americans. To ban immigration therefore would become an issue between the USA and the Empire and not between the illegal organisations and the mandatory power. However, the Cabinet approved a request by the CIGS which authorised the military to carry out searches for Irgun caches as long as any action against the Hagana was avoided. The intelligence services must have made clear the difference between the Hagana on the one hand and the Irgun and the Stern Gang on the other. Since the right-wing terrorists were mainly based in the cities, searches in rural settlements had little effect on them. For that reason, the army decided to confront them in their urban holds by trying to catch as many members as possible. On July 30 th , 15,000 soldiers and policemen cordoned Tel Aviv off during the early morning hours and imposed a curfew. This came as a massive blow to the city’s daily operation, due to the manner in which the security forces acted. They did not only search the houses for hidden weapons and terrorists in disguise but also checked the identities of the inhabitants with photographs and personal items 192 . Altogether, more than 100,000 people were screened within four days, half of Tel Aviv’s population. The course of Operation Shark was similar to its predecessor Agatha. Needless to say, the Yishuv complained about the misbehaviour of the British soldiers who acted too harsh and too violent. However, only four Jews were killed, and the army suffered no casualties at all. In fact, hardly any violent resistance occurred because the majority of the Jewish community had also
191 Cf. Cohen, Great Powers 92. 192 Cf. Operational Orders and Instructions for Operation Shark, 28 July 1946, WO 275/32.
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been shocked by the King David Bombing and thus obeyed the Hagana’s call to endure in case of British retaliatory measures 193 . In the end, the security forces had arrested 787 suspected Irgun and Stern Gang members, and had discovered more than 100,000 rounds, 20 mortars, and 4 machine guns, regarding the whole operation as a huge success. The British Military had shown that the terrorists were not able to challenge the Empire without facing the consequences. The deployment of large troops therefore must have made quite an impression on the outside world and especially on the Arabs. The underground itself was not impressed. Out of the total number of detainees, only high-ranking Lehi commander Yitzhak Shamir (1915- ) could be considered as an important catch. The majority were sympathisers whereas the real extremists such as Begin managed to escape. Thus Operation Shark had no long-term effect on either the Irgun or the Stern Gang and remained a mere attempt by the military to show its power. In general, the King David Hotel bombing was the last major episode in the history of the URM. The bombing led to public outcry throughout the world, and the British hoped that it would reduce American sympathy for the Jewish cause. The Jewish Agency and the Hagana were well aware of the negative effect it had on Zionist propaganda and condemned the attack immediately, thus distancing themselves from the Irgun which did not reveal the Hagana’s initial participation but tried to defend itself. Even decades after the bombing, Begin insisted that there had been three telephone warnings long before the detonation. 194 The British did not deny the warnings given but argued that there had not been enough time to evacuate the hotel. In any case, after approximately eight months, cooperation between the Hagana, the Irgun and the Stern Gang had reached its end, and the single factions went their separate ways again. Operation Agatha and the subsequent King David affair thus had the effect of removing the Hagana from the terrorist scene. But the split-up did not mean an end to terrorism in general. On the contrary, the right-wing underground intensified its activity and did everything in order to turn the Holy Land into hell on earth for the British.
193 Cf. Zadka, Zion 96. 194 Cf. Cohen, Great Powers 90.
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6 THE CLIMAX OF OUTRAGE
According to Ritchie Ovendale, the British Army had control over the situation in Palestine by the end of August.195 However, this was a false conclusion. The events of the summer may have had a certain effect on the right-wing underground’s flexibility but it did not influence its will to carry on the fight. In fact, the Irgun and the Stern Gang were merely determined to keep calm in the immediate aftermath of the King David affair. However, Palestine only witnessed a short period of detente. Already in early September, new terrorist attacks took place on the eve of the London Conference, another attempt by the British Government to find a peaceful solution. The main plan put forth at the meeting was the Morrison-Grady plan which advocated two spheres of influence with provincial autonomy and a continuation of the Mandate. Whereas the Arabs accepted the plan, it was questionable in the run-up to the conference if the Jews would even participate. Since the British had not yet released the Jewish Agency’s officials detained during Operation Agatha, the relations between the British and Yishuv were still strained. In addition to this, those influential religious figures who opposed Weizmann still refused to accept any other solution than partition and the establishment of an independent Jewish state. In the meantime, the Jewish terrorists clearly expressed their opinion towards the new negotiations. On September 9 th , they blew up the house of the Area Security Officer of Tel Aviv, killing him and injuring his wife. The assault was only part of a series of attacks. Throughout Palestine, several shootings and bombings took place, leading to the death of another two soldiers and wounding several others. 196 It was an unambiguous signal towards Whitehall that the right-wing underground would not accept any conclusion drawn at the London Conference. The military answered with its last large-scale action of 1946 called Operation Hazard, imposing a curfew on Tel Aviv.197 Even though several arms’ caches were found, the terror did not cease. This was due to the
195 Cf. Ritchie Ovendale, Palestine Policy 426f. 196 Cf. The Times, Day of Bomb Outrages in Palestine. British Major Killed in Wrecked House (10 September 1946) 4. 197 Cf. Charters, Insurgency 120.
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fact that the army had again turned to operations in rural areas and searches in kibbutzim which led to heavy resistance and hurt the Hagana much more than the Stern Gang or the Irgun. Thus the real extremists took advantage of the situation and even expanded their activities.
6.1 INTERNATIONAL JEWISH TERRORISM
In the late summer, the right-wing underground opened a second front outside of Palestine. By August, the Security Service (MI 5) had been informed of joint plans between the Irgun and the Lehi to retaliate in the event that 18 Stern Gang members waiting on death row were executed. 198 Apart from the shooting of soldiers and policemen, which had become relatively commonplace for the British troops, the organisations also intended to kill prominent British officials throughout the Middle East and even in the United Kingdom. In retrospect, the validity of this information seems to be questionable since it was passed on by the Jewish Agency’s moderate representative in Cairo and its security liaison officer with the Defence Security Office (DSO) in Jerusalem at a time when the URM had already ceased to exist. In addition, planned assassinations were utilised by the Lehi but usually not by the Irgun. However, the British took the warning seriously and considered a range of possibilities in order to prevent the entry of terrorists into the mainland from Palestine. British interest must have been particularly peaked when the Agency reported that the right-wing extremists were planning to send five cells of operatives to London to collaborate with the IRA in order to “beat the dog in his own kennel” 199 . In any case, the local authorities in the Middle East were instructed to check all applications for UK visas in detail and passport controls were increased. Further, a terrorist index was prepared and distributed at the main entry ports, and MI 5 agents closely observed the activity and the staff of Zionist organisations within the United Kingdom. Apart from these preventive measures, the Palestine Government also tried to remove some tension when it commuted the death sentence for the terrorists to life imprisonment.
198 Cf. Notes for Director-General’s Meeting with the Prime Minister, 25 August 1946, KV 3/41. 199 Ibid.
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However, the attempt to hit the Empire outside Palestine was not cancelled but rather postponed, and was successfully realised in Italy. On the night of October 31 st , the British Embassy in Rome was the target of a bomb attack which destroyed large parts of the building but caused no victims save one injured by-passer. There was immediate suspicion among British officials that the attack had been carried out by Jewish terrorists, which was confirmed by the Irgun the next day, when they took responsibility for the attack. In the communique, which reached the British Ambassador in Rome, Noel Charles, via American correspondents, the extremists explained the reasons for their choice and their methods: [T]he British Embassy at Rome […] is one of the centres of anti-Jewish intrigue and the principal instigator of operations designed to impede the repatriation of Jews. […] Our troops took the following special precautions to avoid causing casualties among the Italian population, the attack took place at a late hour. All the approaches of the Embassy which stands by itself were placarded with warning notices and the few passers by (sic!) were given verbal warnings. 200 The outrage thus was designed as a symbolic act which was only directed at the building and not at the loss of life. In contrast to the King David Hotel, the Irgun played it safe, choosing an off-peak time for the attack. Further victims among the British and especially dead Italian civilians would not only harm Zionist reputation but also force the Italian Government to a more severe investigation and a harder line against the Jewish networks existing in the country. Since Italy was a crucial junction for most Jewish refugees on their way to Palestine, Begin did not want to endanger their position there. But the letter also emphasised the Irgun’s unaltered radical attitude and made it again clear that a political solution with the extremists was rather unlikely: The soldiers of I.Z.L. pioneers in the war of the liberation of the Jewish people will continue to fight against the British enslavers, the attack against the British Embassy in Rome [is] the opening of the military campaign of the Jews in the Diaspora. Britain has declared a war of extermination against our people throughout the world. 201 The announcement to wage a war on the Empire outside Palestine was not only a result of the British restrictions to Jewish immigration. The Irgun’s emblem on the top of the statement included a map with both regions, Palestine and Transjordan. Since its foundation, the organisation thus had not changed its political goals.
200 Ambassador Charles to Foreign Office, 4 November 1946, CO 537/1729. 201 Ibid.
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The success of the Irgun operation was possibly a result of internal sloppiness of the CID. On November 6 th , Cunningham informed the Colonial Office about a reliable police source which had already stated earlier that year that the Irgun had been planning attacks on British embassies and consulates throughout the world.202 Those in France and Italy had been of special interest, since they were considered to be the easiest targets. Obviously, the CID had neither investigated into the matter nor had they forwarded the information in order to improve the security situation in Paris and Rome, which may have put the terrorists off from attacking their initial targets. After the bombing, the British were anxious to throw light on the Irgun’s racketeering in Italy which resulted in two legal problems in terms of competence and international law. On the one hand, since the outrage had taken place on Italian soil, the British could not investigate as independently as they would have liked to. On the other hand, attention soon shifted to the refugee camps which were described as an “extreme Zionist enclave on Italian territory [and] a basis for terrorism within Italy”203 by Ambassador Charles. He regarded the camps to be both training sites for illegal immigration as well as arms’ caches for the underground’s supply. However, the camps were ran by the UNRRA and therefore under the sovereignty of the United Nations. Neither Italian nor British authorities were allowed to enter and carry out an enquiry, and especially the Italian Government was not keen on an international conflict with the UN or the United States. Shortly after the Rome incident, the British addressed their American counterparts, outlining the bad security situation in the camps and calling for an improvement which was an indirect demand for searches. But even if US Secretary of State James F. Byrnes (1879-1972) agreed that there should be extended cooperation between the Italian authorities and the UNRRA 204 , the Americans still opposed any restriction on the immunity of the relief organisations. The only concession made to the British was concerning the vehicles of the United Nations and the American Joint Distribution Committee
202 Cf. High Commissioner Cunningham to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 6 November 1946, CO 537/1729. 203 Ambassador Charles to Foreign Office, 5 November 1946, CO 537/1729. 204 Cf. Ambassador Inverchapel to Foreign Office, 10 December 1946, CO 537/1729.
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which looked similar to those of the Allied military authorities and thus were never checked by the Italian police. After the British intervention, both organisations had to mark their cars and trucks clearly as non-military in order to prevent any misuse by illegal persons 205 . The effect on the situation in the refugee camps thus was rather small. At the very least, the Italian police made a considerable effort to track down the perpetrators, and cooperated with a special British investigation squad including Richard Gatling and the Assistant Superintendent of the CID, John O’Sullivan, who were sent to Rome immediately after the incident. Their work led to the arrest of several suspects, who had engaged in anti-British activities and were suspected of being Irgun members, and additionally to valuable intelligence gains. O’Sullivan who had mingled with Palestinian Jews in Milan informed the Embassy that the Irgun was planning further attacks in Italy and London whereas the Stern Gang wanted to commit an assassination in Paris. 206 This information was backed by two Irgun bomb threats the British received during November. Whereas the first, written in French, was sent to the British consulate in Tunis, announcing an attack on the building, the second, written in Italian was found by a policeman in Naples, predicting the wreckage of the British Consulate in Paris. 207 Both letters stated that the assaults would be carried out within the coming days. However, there is no evidence that the Irgun really intended to commit these attacks. A short-time warning would limit the number of casualties, but an announcement several days beforehand would increase the safety precautions and make the operation nearly impossible. If authentic, the letters were a red herring rather than a real menace. In the end, no attacks occurred within the next few weeks. In mid-January 1947, the Irgun started to conduct a “campaign of nerve warfare” 208 , as Ambassador Charles put it, and issued a range of new terror announcements around the world. In Italy, letter bombs exploded in eight major cities, and several British institutions were harassed with bomb threats. The
205 Cf. Ambassador Inverchapel to United Kingdom Delegation to Council of Foreign Ministers, 22 November 1946, CO 537/1729. 206 Cf. Rome Embassy to Foreign Office, 12 November 1946, CO 537/1729. 207 Cf. Rome Embassy to Paris Consulate, Tunis Consulate to Foreign Office, 12 November 1946 CO 537/1729; 27 November 1946, CO 537/1729. 208 Ambassador Charles to Foreign Office, 14 January 1946, CO 537/2295.
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terrorists also sent letters to the Italian Prime Minister and several ministers, urging them to persuade the British to abandon their anti-Zionist policy. On February 13 th , the British Embassy in Buenos Aires received a message announcing a bomb attack within the next 25 minutes.209 On March 5 th , the Embassy in Santiago de Chile was informed that the building would be blown up within two minutes. 210 The Consulates in Chicago and in Tunis got similar warnings. In each case, no explosion took place but the local press was informed and the incidents created a certain public furore. In the meantime, the Stern Gang had prepared a death list and had sent threats to eight prominent British figures including the new Colonial Secretary Arthur Creech Jones (1891-1964), Field Marshal Montgomery and Christopher Mayhew (1915-1997), the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. The latter received the following note in December 1946: We are determined this time to squash you British sons of a bitch and we declare war to the finish against the British. For every Jew stinking British pigs kill in Palestine you will pay thousandfold in fetid English blood. The LHI has passed sentence of death on the British pig Mayhew. The execution will soon take place by silent and new means. 211 An attempt on Mayhew’s life failed to materialize. However, it is again doubtful if the Lehi ever really intended to attack British officials on English soil. When Lord Moyne had been shot, the extremists had issued no threat, using the lack of insufficient personal security to accomplish their mission. After the announcement, the Under Secretary would probably react concerned and alarm the intelligence service initiating an enquiry and increasing his protection. The threats thus served the purpose of unsettling the British administration, especially those elements which were supposed to have an anti-Zionist attitude such as the trio mentioned above. John Bowyer Bell mentions an additional reason for the psychological warfare. Since the issue had been picked up by the British press, the Palestine problem was on the tip of everyone’s tongue and every move monitored by the British public. 212 The Government thus had to explain why Zionist terrorists threatened to blow up British facilities on the other side of the world or kill British statesmen in London. In this respect, the hoax
209 Buenos Aires Embassy to Foreign Office, 24 February 1947, FO 371/61865. 210 Santiago Embassy to Foreign Office, 5 March 1947, FO 371/61865. 211 J.C. Robertson, MI 5, to Foreign Office, 11 January 1947, FO 371/61865. 212 Cf. John Bowyer Bell, Terror, 181.
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campaign of the underground served as risk-free publicity for the extremist fight. However, any hopes of a lasting phase of faked bloodshed were to be dashed, as this latest campaign was merely the prelude for the final wave of terror inside Palestine and ultimately the end of the Mandate.
6.2 BRITISH MILITARY AND POLITICAL REACTIONS
In the autumn of 1946, things in Palestine were becoming complicated, especially for the British forces. Although the army claimed that the military operations of the summer had been a huge success, its chief became the main target of international criticism. In the run-up to Operation Shark, GOC Evelyn Barker had instructed all British soldiers to cease any social intercourse with the Yishuv including any visits to Jewish bars, restaurants, and shops. In Barker’s mind, such a measure would “punish the Jews in the way the race dislikes as much as any, namely by striking at their pockets and showing our contempt for them” 213 . The military justified Barker’s statement as a necessary precaution to avoid any security leaks, and also the Government sought to back him due to the circumstances in Palestine. However, the GOC was heavily criticised by the Jewish community which accused him of being an anti-Semite. The world public, particularly the American press, showed little understanding for such a policy. A British caricature even portrayed him standing on a copy of Hitler’s “Mein Kampf”.214 Thus, Barker’s position as the chief of the British forces in Palestine became increasingly controversial. When representatives of the Jewish Agency additionally complained about the impossibility of cooperation with such a man, he was relieved in time. With the sacking of Barker, Cunningham lost his sole supporter from the ranks of the military. During autumn, a controversy between the army and the civil administration had arisen. Montgomery did not understand why the Jewish underground was still operating despite the army’s counter-insurgency. He did not consider tactical mistakes the reason for the failure but rather the restrictions imposed on the military by the High Commissioner. On November
213 Extract from The Times, 29 July 1946, CAB 127/280. 214 Cf. Segev, Palestine 479.
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20 th , he presented a report on the current situation in Palestine to the Cabinet Defence Committee: Since the 1 st October, 76 men of the army and 23 Police had been killed. Incidents of murder and sabotage were increasing, and rail communication was at a standstill. The army had gained the initiative against terrorism when they had been permitted to attack the illegal armed organisations in Palestine, but had since been forced to adopt a defensive role, which had seriously increased the strain on their morale. 215 From the point of view of the CIGS, the forces had to intensify their activities and use their full power to quell the terrorists, as had been the case during the Arab revolt. He thus criticised Cunningham’s inactivity after the Black Sabbath and Operation Shark which had offered the terrorist organisations the chance to recover. The new C-in-C for the Middle East, Miles Dempsey (1896-1969), agreed with Montgomery. Both urged for the use of stronger measures and more freedom of action for the military, especially in terms of retaliation. However, GOC Barker backed Cunningham, who was now opposing collective punishment. In a letter to Dempsey, Barker stated that the military would not be able to solve the problem without a political settlement.216 Instead of using the military, he recommended the full utilisation of the Government’s political weapons. In addition to this, the GOC referred to the large-scale operations as a way to appease the own troops rather than to effectively fight the terrorist organisations. On November 29 th , Cunningham, who demanded an excuse in face of the harsh criticism, met Montgomery in Jerusalem. However, the meeting did not yield any results and the disagreement between the military and the civil administration continued. The date of Montgomery’s call for a firmer military response before the Cabinet Defence Committee was probably not a coincidence. On November 18 th , British soldiers had raided a quarter of Tel Aviv, beating up Jews and destroying Jewish property. 217 Fortunately, no one had been killed but several people had had to receive medical treatment. The incident was interpreted as an act of reprisal by frustrated soldiers who had been sick of facing the death of their comrades from day to day without the ability to react. Even if the CIGS and Dempsey had intended to use Cunningham as a scapegoat for their failed
215 Note on the Cabinet Defence Committee Meeting, 24 November 1946, FO 371/52565. 216 Cf. Zadka, Zion 152. 217 Cf. Extract from the Daily Mail, 19 November 1946, CO 733/456/11.
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strategy 218 , they did not want to lose control over their soldiers. The call for a firmer policy thus could be seen as an attempt to counter the sense of helplessness which slowly began to catch on in the War Office. The Government still supported the High Commissioner. Since the London Conference was not yet concluded, Whitehall was not interested in unleashing new Jewish uproar with another large-scale military operation. On the contrary, Attlee was anxious to bring the Jewish Agency back to negotiations, and tried to do so by making several concessions. For that reason, he had even appointed Arthur Creech Jones, a supporter of the Jewish cause, as Colonial Secretary.219 In addition to this, Attlee considered the release of the detained Jewish officials as an act of goodwill. Although the military had recognized the political importance of such an action, it desired to outline the dangers of such a move. The General Staff did not only fear that the Jews and Arabs would interpret it as a sign of imperial weakness but additionally that it would have a negative effect on the morale of the troops on the ground.220 However, despite these reservations, the detained Jewish Agency representatives were released in early November. Unfortunately for the British, the decision did not lead to the successful resumption of talks between the British and Jews. Indeed, both the Arab and Jewish delegations attended the meetings but neither was willing to negotiate the Morrison-Grady Plan, as Cunningham pointed out later: [T]he Jews, strengthened by American support, increased their demands for a Jewish Palestine, or for free immigration and settlement in all Palestine, and only as a last resort a partition agreeable to them. The Arabs countered with a demand for an independent Palestine with a permanent Arab majority. Neither Arabs nor Jews would discuss any other proposals than their own. 221 Since both parties considered the country as their property, the negotiations headed towards a standstill. Among British officials, the hope of reaching an agreement acceptable to all parties was swiftly vanishing. The Foreign Office was the first to remark that it would perhaps become necessary to refer the
218 Cf. Hoffman, Failure 26. 219 Cf. Ovendale, Palestine Policy 429. 220 Cf. General Staff to the Secretary of State on Release of Detained Jewish Leaders. 4 November 1946, WO 32/10260. 221 Alan Cunningham, Palestine. The Last Days of the Mandate. In: International Affairs 24/4 (1948) 485.
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entire problem to the United Nations 222 , however, Whitehall did not want to throw in the towel yet. The last British attempt to solve the problem in-house coincided with the revival of the Cunningham-Montgomery-controversy. On January 1 st , the Cabinet Defence Committee again discussed the use of armed forces in Palestine in view of continuing terrorist activities. The CIGS was not willing to back down and described the deteriorating situation in Palestine once more. Furthermore, he criticised the poor state of the Palestine police which was still under strength and recommended the deployment of mobile units which were more suitable for countering the Jewish terrorists due to their flexibility.223 Colonial Secretary Creech Jones, on the other hand, was keen to note the political aspects and the difficulties a harsh military campaign would pose to the fragility of the London Conference. However, since further terrorist attacks were expected, the majority of the meeting’s participants considered the restoration of law and order as the most crucial step. Thus the Committee invited the War Office, the Colonial Office and the High Commissioner to set up a new joint directive for the troops in Palestine. The CIGS believed that if he was given a free hand, he would be able to quell the Jewish underground. In the Cabinet meeting of January 3 rd , he demanded all-out arm’s searches throughout the mandate area. Cunningham, who was in London and attended the meeting, stated that he failed to see the sense in “turning areas upside down where there was no indication of the presence of terrorists” 224 . Unlike its decision in November, the Cabinet followed Montgomery’s suggestion this time, announcing the new directive for the army in mid-January. The High Commissioner was now authorised to use the police and the military at his discretion, “whose […] efforts should be designed to take the offensive against breakers of the law and to ensure that the initiative lies with the forces of the crown”.225 This change of policy is most likely grounded in the fact that the negotiations at the London Conference had gotten bogged down and that
222 Cf. Richard L. Jasse, Great Britain and Palestine towards the United Nations. In: Middle Eastern Studies 30/3 (1994) 560. 223 Cf. Extract from the 1 st (47) Meeting of the Cabinet Defence Committee, 1 January 1947, FO 371/61762. 224 Quoted in Hoffman, Failure 28. 225 Secretary of State for the Colonies to High Commissioner Cunningham, 20 January 1947, FO 371/61762.
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nothing had changed in Palestine for months. Apart from enormous financial damage, the number of casualties on account of terrorism, illegal immigration, and military operations in 1946 numbered 212 people killed and 428 wounded; nearly half of the victims were British.226 Only a week after the Cabinet had enacted the new policy, the Palestine Government got their first chance to test limits of their new power. On January 26 th , a British civilian named H.A.I. Collins was kidnapped from his apartment in Jerusalem. The following day, a band of terrorists abducted Judge Ralph Windham while he was leaving the Tel Aviv District Court. Both actions were carried out by the Irgun which intended to swap the hostages for Dov Gruner, a detained Irgun member. Gruner had participated in a raid on the Ramat Gan police station in April 1946 but had been caught and sentenced to death. Since then, he had become an icon for the Irgun’s fight due to his firm Zionist position and his anti-British statements during the trial 227 , and the organisation tried everything to release him. However, the High Commissioner, who had commuted several severe penalties to more lenient sentences in the past, did not allow the terrorists to blackmail the Empire this time. He offered Gruner the opportunity to appeal to the Privy Council which delayed his execution for the time being. In addition to this, he met with several Jewish leaders including later Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir (1898-1978) and issued an ultimatum demanding the release of both men within 48 hours. 228 Otherwise, as Cunningham stated, he would withdraw the whole civil administration from Tel Aviv and impose martial law which would bring the city under the control of the army. The threat had an immediate impact. On January 28 th , Collins and Windham were picked up by the police. The Times concluded that the release was the result of pressure exerted on the Irgun by the Yishuv’s leadership.229 If this assumption was correct, it would back the British suspicion that the Jewish
226 Cf. Letter from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Member of Parliament Sir Ralph Glyn, 30 January 1947, CO 733/477/3. 227 Since Gruner considered Great Britain as an occupational power, he recognized neither her jurisdiction nor the trial against him. For that reason, the Holocaust survivor did not appeal against his death sentence which earned him case public attraction around the world. Cf. Zadka, Zion 110f. 228 Cf. Secretary of States for the Colonies to High Commissioner Cunningham, 28 January 1947, CO 733/478/1. 229 Cf. The Times, Kidnapped Judge Freed. Blindfold Walk from Hiding Place (29 January 1947) 4.
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officials would have been able to prevent terrorism in the past but were in fact not willing to do so. An alternative explanation could be that the Irgun feared losing support amongst the Yishuv, which had already been harmed by the King David affair. Since the imposing of martial law would have a negative effect on the civil community, the terrorists would be regarded as responsible for the Jewish plight. In the meantime, the Foreign Secretary had prepared a new proposal for the ongoing conference in London. It advocated a transitional period of five years and would result in the creation of an independent state consisting of autonomous Arab and Jewish cantons linked to a joint central government.230 However, Bevin’s plan, which was submitted to the Arab and Jewish delegations on February 7 th , was rejected by both parties. Whereas the Jews opposed a Palestinian state with an Arab majority, the Arabs feared that the Jews might try to transform their cantons into an independent Zionist state. The rejection signalled the definitive deadlock for the conference. As a consequence, Whitehall did not see any other alternative than to refer the affair to the United Nations. On February 18 th , Bevin announced the Government’s decision: We have decided that we are unable to accept the scheme put forward either by the Arabs or by the Jews, or to impose ourselves a solution on our own. We have, therefore, reached the conclusion that the only course now open to us is to submit the problem to the judgement of the United Nations […] We shall explain that the Mandate has proved to be unworkable in practice and that the obligations undertaken to the two communities in Palestine have been shown to be irreconcilable. 231 The COS disliked the conclusion. This was due to the strategic importance of Palestine, the maintenance of the Haifa naval base as well as several other air and land bases which were considered as vital to imperial security planning. With an independent state, even if bi-national, Britain could sign contracts in order to secure leases for military bases.232 A handover to the United Nations, however, would make such an outcome impossible. Anyway, the Foreign Secretary’s statement did not mean that the Empire would abandon the Mandate immediately and pull out of Palestine within the next months. The
230 Cf. Cohen, Great Powers, 217. 231 Quoted in Cohen, Great Powers 223. 232 Cf. Wm. Roger Louis, The End of the Palestine Mandate. In: Ends of British Imperialism. The Scramble for Empire, Suez and Decolonization, ed Wm. Roger Louis (London et al. 2006) 436.
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General Assembly was not supposed to discuss the problem until autumn. In fact, the announcement to refer the matter to the United Nations was Bevin’s last move in a game of brinksmanship. He believed that neither the Jews nor the Arabs were in favour of having the decision transferred to the United Nations.233 The announcement to do so would bring the factions back to negotiations, so that the involvement of the UN could be averted. However, Bevin had overplayed his hand. With the definite failure of the London Conference by the end of February, Britain had finally failed at mediating, and the United Nations slowly took over her role. The United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) was established with the purpose of examining the current situation and recommending the best possible solution to the General Assembly. It consisted of eleven neutral states, not including any Arab, Russian, British or American representatives. Alexander Cadogan (1884- 1968), the British UN representative, gave the Empire’s tacit approval for any decision made by the UN: If the United Nations could find a just solution acceptable to both parties, it would be welcome by His Majesty’s Government. But they would not have the sole responsibility for enforcing a solution which was not acceptable to both parties. 234 Obviously, there were already doubts in Whitehall if the United Nations would succeed where Britain had failed. On the contrary, the Government expected a clash between the Arabs and Jews and the necessity of international intervention, and it was determined to minimise the burden on the Empire. Even if there was no detailed plan or timeframe yet, it seemed that Britain’s days in Palestine were numbered.
6.3 THE END OF THE MANDATE
Already in early 1947, Britain undertook the first steps in preparing for a potential withdrawal from Palestine. In connection with the Gruner trial, the Irgun threatened to attack or kidnap British civilians. The abductions of Windham and Collins showed that these threats had to be regarded as serious. For that reason, the Palestine Government decided to evacuate all British service families, above all women and children, and non-essential
233 Cf. Jasse, Great Britain 568. 234 Ibid 570.
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administrative staff. The security forces then could restore law and order without any hindrance. 235 In the first days of February, Operation Polly was launched. By train, the military brought 1,800 people to Egypt. Special cases such as expectant mothers were directly transferred by plane to the United Kingdom. 236 The operation itself was carried out relatively quickly since the evacuation was supposed to be merely temporary and luggage was limited to one suitcase per person. Those who remained in Palestine started to live their lives behind barb wire and sandbag barricades. Already after the King David affair, the British had built security zones in Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, and Haifa. These Bevingrads, as the Jews called them, were extended during the new terror offensive and guarded by heavily armed troops. Of course, the Yishuv including the terrorists noticed what was going on because the majority of the British civilians had left the country or entrenched themselves. For the Irgun, it had become more difficult to carry out assaults on civilian targets. On the other hand, British behaviour confirmed the organisation’s strategy and gave morale to the terrorists, since it seemed they were winning.237 In this respect, the British evacuation was also counter-productive since it resulted in a renewal of terrorist activity. In addition, the evacuation of civilians to Egypt did not eliminate the danger. On February 4th , the Egyptian Prime Minister received a letter with death threats towards many British families now residing in Maadi in the event that Gruner was executed.238 The Egyptian police believed the letter signed by the Stern Gang to be a forgery since it had been posted in Cairo. In addition, Gruner was not a Lehi but an Irgun man. However, the writers seemed to be well aware of the whereabouts of the evacuated families even before Operation Polly was completed. The British authorities thus took the threat seriously and increased the security precautions. On Saturday, March 1 st , the Irgun launched a series of 16 attacks. The tragic highlight was the bombing of the British Officers Club in the Goldsmith House in Jerusalem, which was actually inside the security zone. Supported by
235 Cf. The Times, New Precaution in Palestine. British Women to Leave (1 February 1947) 4. 236 Cf. Military Headquarters, Palestine, to the Chief Secretary of the Palestine Government, 3 February 1947, WO 275/37. 237 Cf. Zadka, Zion 159. 238 Cf. Cairo Embassy to Foreign Office, 6 February 1947, FO 371/61865.
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machine gun fire, the terrorists rammed the barb-wire barrier with a lorry and threw satchel bombs into the building which finally collapsed.239 After the dust settled, at least 20 people had been killed and another 30 wounded. Since it was the Jewish Sabbath, the assaults caught the British off-guard. In addition, the Jews demonstrated that the British were not even safe within their Bevingrads. This time, however, the British were determined to retaliate. Cunningham did not only threaten the Yishuv and the terrorists with strong measures. On the next day, martial law was imposed and more than 250,000 Jews were confined to their homes in Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, Ramat Gan, and Petah Tikva. The army, now commanded by General Gordon MacMillan who had replaced Barker in February, took over from the civil administration. Civil courts were replaced by military courts, commerce and traffic completely stopped, and all civil facilities such as post or telegraph offices were suspended. 240 The military distributed food, observed the curfew, and carried out searches for arms and terrorists. Thus the status of martial law had a tremendous impact on civilian life. Since nearly the half of the entire Yishuv could not attend work, the Jewish economy suffered badly from the operation called Elephant. This was deliberately intended by the Joint Planning Staff which stated that “[s]uch measures by striking at the liberty and the pocket of the private citizens may induce them to co-operate by laying information against and refusing to shelter the terrorists”241 . This statement corresponded to Barker’s order in the run-up to Operation Shark but did not cause similar outcry because it was not made public. The imposition of martial law, however, did not achieve the expected goal. Whereas the civil population moaned under the restrictions, terrorism continued. According to Major Dare Wilson of the Sixth Airborne Division, the Irgun and the Stern Gang simply focussed on rural targets as long as the large cities were searched by the army 242 . Furthermore, instead of denouncing the underground, the Yishuv blamed the British for their collective punishment. Fearing a
239 Cf. Bowyer Bell, Terror 190. 240 Cf. The Times, Martial Law for Parts of Palestine. 250,000 Jews Confined to Homes (3 March 1947) 4. 241 Quoted in Hoffman, Failure 29. 242 Ibid 30.
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complete alienation between the Jews and the Empire, Cunningham repealed martial law on March 17 th , but also remarked that he would re-impose it if necessary. The official figure of detained extremists numbering 78 and including 15 Lehi members and 12 Irgun men must be taken with a grain of salt.243 There was no information given as to who the remaining 51 prisoners were and were probably not even real terrorists but common-people brought in to improve the statistics. In fact, martial law and the resulting unemployment and economic distress had two major disadvantages for the Empire. Because of the suspension of all civil services, no Government revenue could be collected. On the other hand, the British action did not increase the Yishuv’s willingness to cooperate and instead drove people to the underground. However, Whitehall had not been in favour of the High Commissioner’s decision. The ineffectiveness of the current attempt and its harmful effects on the local economy were recognised as outweighing any possible strategic benefits (which as mentioned above were little). However, there was fear that a withdrawal after only two weeks might evoke an impression of weakness and would increase the terrorist’s brazenness. Since martial law granted the best conditions to the military in order to pursue its operations, the Cabinet therefore thought about its re- imposition but under more relaxed restrictions and a probable extension throughout Palestine. Cunningham completely disagreed. Since 80 percent of the Jews were living in cities and terrorism was an urban phenomenon, an extension to the rural areas would affect the Arabs and further alienate them from the British administration.244 In addition, he stated that even the army command in Palestine was against such a move since there were not enough troops to effectively enforce martial law country-wide. The COS, who were instructed to figure out a scenario which would restore law and order, agreed with the High Commissioner. They recommended neither a country-wide nor a local imposition of martial law for a longer period but the resumption of the civil
243 Cf. Extract from the Weekly Intelligence Reviews by the General Headquarters, Middle East Land Forces, 21 March 1947, WO 275/120. 244 Cf. High Commissioner Cunningham to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 16 th March, FO 371/61770.
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administration. 245 However, they also stressed the necessity to intensify the pressure on the terrorists. The High Commissioner should re-impose martial law only locally and for short periods if the situation escalated. The General Staff thus regarded martial law as a policy of deterrence rather than as an effective measure to counter terrorism. Anyway, it still remained a part of the British administrative and military considerations for the next months. Apart from official operations on the large-scale, the British also started to carry out covert operations during their last days in Palestine. Already several months prior, press rumours had begun to circulate about the existence of a special anti-terrorist force based in Palestine following a discussion in the House of Commons. At that time, Attlee had been asked to consider the establishment of such a force consisting of ex-officers and men trained in resistance movements during the war.246 The force was finally established in the last days of March 1947. Similar to Orde Wingate’s Special Nights Squad during the Arab revolt, the former SOE member Alistair McGregor and Roy Farran, a veteran of the Special Air Service (SAS), chose twenty men from the ranks of the Palestine police to wage a secret war against the terrorists. According to rumours, the unit “eliminated as many insurgents in six weeks as a battalion employing cordon and search operations” 247 . However, the terrorist- like behaviour adopted by Farran’s men neither corresponded with the law nor increased the Empire’s prestige.248 Like Wingate, Farran was sent back to the United Kingdom and his unit disbanded. Farran and McGregor were not the only menace to the Irgun and the Stern Gang. Already in November 1946, British intelligence services had heard rumours that the Jewish Agency condemned the Irgun’s activities internally. Incidents such as the King David affair did more harm to the Jewish cause than good and the Hagana was instructed to “enforce national discipline even at the risk of civil war” 249 . Since the United Nations had taken on the Palestine
245 Cf. Report by the Chiefs of Staff on the Imposition of Martial Law, 26 March 1947, CAB 129/18. 246 Cf. A.C.W. Drew, War Office to E.K. Baker, Colonial Office, 11 September 1946, CO 733/456/11. 247 Charters, Insurgency 123. 248 Cohen, Great Powers 237. 249 High Commissioner Cunningham to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 4 November 1946, FO 371/52563.
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problem with the establishment of the UNSCOP, these fears of an all-out civil war were escalated. Further atrocities could turn world opinion in favour of the Arabs. Therefore, the Hagana started another offensive against the right-wing underground, known as the Little Season. This time, it did not hand over the extremists to the British authorities but dealt with them in-house. In this way, the organisation could not be accused of cooperation with the British enemy. Suspected Irgun men were shadowed, disarmed and often beaten up. However, neither the British nor the Jews themselves were able to stop the terrorists. On May 4 th , the Irgun launched an attack on the Acre Jail where Gruner had been hanged several weeks prior and managed to release more than 200 detainees. Ironically, the majority were Arabs, whereas only 30 Jews managed to make their way out of the prison, amongst them a handful Lehi and Irgun members. The operation’s success was still enormous, as a British intelligence paper describes in detail: This is a formidable achievement and valuable for propaganda. The I.Z.L. will claim that British mandatory rule is ineffective, […] a claim that may well bring in many new recruits. The attack harmed no Arabs, as indeed more Arabs were released than Jews. It touches no Jewish pocket, and, unlike the blowing up of the King David Hotel, will horrify no one. 250 The operation did not alienate the Irgun neither from the Yishuv nor from its international supporters but dealt a blow to the Empire’s prestige. Concerning the conflict with the Hagana, the incident thus improved the organisation’s position within the Jewish community since a successful assault on the medieval prison had been considered as impossible prior to the incident. Regardless of the currying of any favour amongst their peers, the terrorists continued their unpopular operations. Many Irgun members were still in prison with some of them awaiting the death penalty including those who had been captured in the course of the Acre breakout. Therefore, the extremists stuck to the tactic of taking hostages in order to save the lives of their comrades. Two British policemen were kidnapped in Ramat Gan in the beginning of June but were able to escape shortly thereafter. Not discouraged by this failure, the Irgun managed to abduct another two British sergeants working for the intelligence services in Netanya on July 12 th . Four days prior, three Irgun members had
250 Extract from the Weekly Intelligence Reviews by the General Headquarters, Middle East Land Forces, 9 May 1947, WO 275/120.
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been sentenced to death due to their participation in the Acre operation. Begin considered the fight against the British as a legitimate war. From his point of view, Irgun members caught by the British were not terrorists but prisoners of war. Thus they were under the protection of The Hague and Geneva Conventions which forbade execution. The organisation thus urged that “if the criminal hand is raised against our captive comrades, we shall make our arrows drunk with the hangman’s blood” 251 . However, the British regarded the extremists as ordinary criminals and were not willing to back down. Another large-scale search operation named Tiger was launched, and the area of Netanya was placed under military control for two weeks. Despite the Hagana’s assistance, the British efforts did not lead to the rescue of the soldiers. Since Cunningham did not commute the death sentence, the convicted terrorists were hanged on July 28 th . In retaliation, the Irgun murdered the two sergeants. The dead bodies were found in a wood nearby Netanya, hanging from the trees. Their assassination was already a tragedy but the Irgun knew very well how to worsen things. When British soldiers tried to cut down their comrades, a mine exploded tearing one of the dead bodies apart and hurting another officer. The terrorists had booby-trapped their victims. In addition, the soldiers found a piece of paper listing the reasons for the execution: (1) illegal entry into the Jewish homeland; (2) membership of the British criminal organisation known as the Army of Occupation, which was responsible for torture, murder, deportation, and for denying the Hebrew people the right to live; (3) illegal possessions of arms; (4) anti-Jewish spying in civilian clothes; (5) premeditated hostile designs against the underground movement. 252 The Irgun thus had turned the tables. In order to justify their proceeding, Begin and his combatants had simply copied the British jurisdiction, but adding a rather brutal component. As a consequence of this brutality, British soldiers and policemen lost their temper which resulted in several incidents in Tel Aviv. Jewish property was attacked, and when bands of young Jews tried to strike back, the army opened fire. During the incident, five Jews were shot and 25 Jewish shops destroyed. 253
251 Quoted in Hoffman, Failure 32. 252 The Times, British Sergeants Found Murdered. Bodies Hanging from Tree near Netanya (1 August 1947) 4. 253 Cf. The Times, Palestine. Steps to Combat Terrorism (6 August 1947) 3.
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The High Commissioner eyed the situation with displeasure. In the past, he had opposed any action of retaliation which was directed against the civilian population. After the execution of the two Sergeants, however, he was in favour of a strong military reaction in order to appease the army and wanted to re- impose martial law. This time, the army dissuaded Cunningham from his idea. General John Crocker (1896-1963), the new C-in-C for the Middle East, pointed out that the army did not have sufficient troops in the area due to the insecure situation in Egypt. 254 In addition, since the United Nations had taken on the problem, the moderates within the Yishuv were more likely to cooperate. A military solution thus was both unfeasible as well as diplomatically unwise. At this stage, it became finally clear that the army was not, and probably had never been, an appropriate medium to deal with the problem. In this respect, Cunningham’s demand to increase the number of troops in Palestine was ignored by Whitehall. In fact, a discussion arose dealing with a possible reduction of the forces. Both the opposition as well as the public had already started to criticise the British presence in the Holy Land which had cost the lives of so many British men over the last three years. The hanging of the sergeants fuelled negative sentiments and resistance to Britain’s role as the mandate power. Apart from anti-Jewish demonstrations in various cities throughout the United Kingdom, politicians and newspapers called for an immediate withdrawal.255 Relatives of the soldiers urged the Government with letters and petitions to pull out. In the face of such a display of barbarism, neither the physical threat to British citizens nor the enormous financial costs seemed to be justified. By mid-1947, approximately 100,000 British soldiers, a tenth of the entire British Army, secured a country of the size of Wales with not even two million inhabitants. 256 Apart from the expenditures incurred by garrisoning so many troops in one country, the Empire had to pay for the damages caused by the terrorists and to rebuild the destroyed infrastructure. Despite the Empire’s international obligation as the mandatory power, internal
254 Due to growing nationalism, the political sovereignty of Egypt and the status of the Suez Canal including the military base had become a flashpoint in Anglo-Egyptian relations for the previous few years. Cf. Cohen, Great Powers 248. 255 Cf. Ritchie Ovendale, Britain, the United States, and the End of the Palestine Mandate 1942-1948 (Woodbridge et al. 1989) 212. 256 Cf. David Reynolds, One World Divisible. A Global History since 1945 (New York 2000) 77.
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pressure and problems at home led many to question why Britain still bore the burden of Palestine. On July 31 st , the UNSCOP report on the future of Palestine was issued. It recommended partition and the creation of two independent states including a transition period of two years under the custody of the Empire.257 The decision was met with dislike by Whitehall. If Britain should observe the execution of the UNSCOP’s proposal, she would most likely get caught in the crossfire of a probable Arab-Jewish conflict. In view of these considerations and of public opinion, the Cabinet discussed an earlier withdrawal. Two further aspects had a remarkable effect on the further development. First, the fate of the immigration ship Exodus attracted worldwide attention. Similar to the Struma, the courageous struggle of its passengers became a national Jewish myth and created large international sympathy for the Jewish cause. The British, who were determined to prevent illegal immigration and had sent the refugees back to Europe, became the target of large-scale criticism. The other, epoch-making event was the independence of India in August. For Attlee, the decolonisation of India served as a role model for the retreat from Palestine and he wanted to deploy the same policy. On September 17 th , he wrote that Britain should “withdraw […] by a definite date which should not be longer than six months, even if no other mandatory has been appointed and no agreement has been come to between the Arabs and the Jews” 258 . In this way, both factions had to make their own way as had been the case on the Indian subcontinent. In a meeting three days later, the Cabinet finally concluded that Britain would surrender the Mandate in 1948. The decision to withdraw changed the role of the Empire drastically. The British were no longer considered as the main, colonial enemy but as “an unwelcome third party […] trying to keep peace in a bitter communal conflict” 259 . Attacks on British targets continued but were greatly reduced. On the other hand, the number of clashes between Arabs and Jews increased. When the General Assembly voted for partition following the UNSCOP’s proposal of
257 Cf. Jasse, Great Britain 570. 258 Quoted in Wm. Roger Louis, The British Empire in the Middle East, 1945-1951. Arab Nationalism, the United States, and Postwar Imperialism (Oxford 1986) 474. 259 Charters, Insurgency 124.
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November 29 th , the situation worsened and Palestine risked descending into chaos. The Arabs were horrified by the idea of an independent Jewish state within Palestine, and the Arab Higher Committee declared a three-day general strike. Subsequently, Arab militias started to attack Jews throughout the country. When the Jewish underground responded, the country began to head towards a civil war. In fact, the moment the Hagana had been waiting for had finally arrived. Well structured and trained, the covert Jewish national army proved to be superior to that of its opponents. Despite reinforcements from the neighbouring Arab countries, many British military strategists predicted, quite correctly, that the Jews would win the war. 260 The hanging of the two sergeants remained the last major incident of Jewish terrorist action against the Empire. The underground had to concentrate its energy on the Arabs. Nevertheless, the British found themselves in an unpleasant situation during their last months in Palestine. Since September, they had been preparing to withdraw and avoid any involvement in the conflict. But on the other hand, they were still the mandatory power, and therefore responsible for the maintenance of law and order. To save face before the world public, the Empire could not simply run away and wash their hands of atrocities amongst the civil population. But when the Irgun and the Stern Gang committed a massacre leaving some 100 Arabs murdered in the village of Deir Yassin on April 9 th 1948, the army did not intervene. This was due to the shortage of ground forces; the only possibility for a reaction would have been an air strike. Yet the idea was dropped and the matter left to the Hagana and the Jewish Agency’s to take care of.261 In fact, the Agency had already taken over all governmental affairs in the Jewish areas and replaced the British as the official authority. On May 14 th , Ben-Gurion finally proclaimed the independence of the state of Israel in Tel Aviv. Among the cheering crowd, there were the fighters of the Hagana as well as the extremists of the Irgun and the Stern Gang. The next day in Haifa, the last British High Commissioner boarded the ship which should bring him back to the United Kingdom. Cunningham felt that the British “left with
260 Cf. Naomi Shepherd, Ploughing Sand. British Rule in Palestine 1917-1948 (London 1999) 241. 261 Cf. Bowyer Bell, Terror 296.
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dignity, using all [their] efforts to the last for the good of Palestine” 262 . After 28 years, British rule in the Holy Land had come to an end. War and terror, however, continued.
262 Cunningham, Last Days 490.
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7 CONCLUSION
Britain’s withdrawal from Palestine was definitely one of the darkest episodes in her imperial history. As the mandate power, she neither managed to stop the insurgency nor did she succeed in mediating a peace between the Arabs and the Jews. It is not the intention of this paper to give an explanation of the British failure to find a peaceful solution. The purpose of my work is rather to highlight the reasons for the Empire’s inability to stop terrorism. To start with, the emergence of the Jewish underground was partly the Empire’s own fault. Intelligence reports show that the British knew about the existence of a secret Jewish underground army already in the 1930’s. Yet they did nothing to break it up. On the contrary, British intelligence officers even trained and equipped Jewish men in order to assist the regular forces during the Arab Revolt and the Second World War. Later, many of these guerrillas turned their weapons against their former teachers. Since many of them had also served in the British Armed forces during the Second World War, they knew the British Army and its tactics and protocols inside out. In contrast, the British had no idea how to handle their new enemies. From the first major attacks in 1944 until the withdrawal in 1948, British policy was characterised by disagreement, passivity, and indecisiveness. After the assassination attempt on MacMichael and the Moyne assassination, the Foreign Office urged the Government to show strength and resolve, having the Empire’s overall position in the Middle East in mind. Killearn especially feared that a mild reaction might be interpreted as weakness by the Arabs. He thus wanted to make an example rather than to find the actual culprits. The Colonial Office, on the other hand, wanted to avoid any form of collective punishment. It thus opposed ideas such as all-out searches for arms or the complete suspension of immigration since such a reaction was supposed to drive more Jews into the arms of the extremists. In any case, the War Office stated that there were not enough troops to carry out any retaliatory measures due to the war effort in Europe. As long as the fight against Germany was going on, Palestine was on the waiting list.
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The futile efforts of the British to counter terrorism and guerrilla warfare might be confusing especially if one considers the situation in Ireland. Already in the Irish War of Independence from 1919 to 1921, the Empire had been attacked by the IRA but had managed to prevail. However, there was a significant difference between Ireland and Palestine i.e. immigration. The Jewish plight in Europe had increased the number of refugees pushing towards the borders of the Holy Land. Those who managed to immigrate despite the Empire’s restricted admission policy were potential reinforcements for the underground; above all people from Eastern Europe who radicalised the Yishuv and tended to join either the Irgun or the Stern Gang. Unlike Ireland, Palestine had become a dynamic body, and the British had problems overlooking the situation. In this respect, the British failed in tracking down the terrorists. In the Irish uprising as well as in the Arab revolt, the guerrillas had been supported by large parts of the population. The British then had known their enemies and had been able to fight them. Jewish terrorism, on the other hand, was not an insurgency on a large-scale. After the attacks, the members of the Irgun and the Stern Gang disappeared into the hustle and bustle of the large cities. However, both organisations did not enjoy much support or sympathy from the Yishuv. In fact, they acted independently. The British assumption that the Jewish Agency was able to control them proved wrong. In contrast, the moderates wanted to dispose them since they represented a threat to the Agency’s hegemony and the Jewish cause in general. Cooperation between the Hagana and the British police thus would have been a possible way to secure positive results. The Saison proved that the Hagana was willing to do so. Yet the authorities’ inactivity and the adherence to the White Paper even after Attlee’s election victory drove the moderates towards the extremists. Without the Hagana’s assistance, the counter-insurgency failed completely, not the very least due to British carelessness in terms of security. Already in face of the Moyne assassination, it had been concluded that the state of the Palestine police should be improved. A year later, it still lacked 2,000 men. Until the end of the Mandate, it never reached its full strength. Another fault was the fact that there were only a handful of people in the CID who spoke Hebrew. The police therefore were dependent on Jewish staff, a grave leakage
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of security. For that reason, the terrorists always had an informational advantage, whereas British intelligence services barely managed to infiltrate the Jewish organisations. The Empire could only react; the underground was always one step ahead. In this respect, the only initiative was the establishment of the special units. By adopting Irgun- and Lehi-like methods, they eliminated several terrorists without any trial. For the Empire’s prestige, such a proceeding was not tolerable in the long run. The discussion as to the imposition of collective penalties on the Yishuv never concluded. The military was above all in favour of such drastic measures, as had been the case during the Arab Revolt. CIGS Montgomery wanted to tap the full potential of the Palestine Defence (Emergency) Regulations of 1945, giving the military full freedom of action. From all measures, only the deportation of suspects proved successful since it was a severe blow to the terrorists’ moral. It was not enough to break it though. On the other hand, the majority of the cordon-and-search operations were failures. Despite the various intelligence reports on the terror organisations, the military still believed that it could quell the insurgents in the rural areas. The searches in the kibbutzim only affected the Hagana and alienated it from the mandatory power. When the army finally changed its tactics and concentrated on the cities, they again chose the wrong target. Operation Agatha was only directed against the Jewish Agency and thus fuelled anti-British sentiments among the moderates. The only suitable mission the British carried out was Shark. But due to poor intelligence information and individual faults of soldiers during the operation, the majority of terrorists managed to escape. At the end, only one high-ranking Lehi commander was caught. As Bruce Hoffman concludes, the reliance of the military turned out to be the wrong way in general. 263 Even when martial law was imposed, terror did not stop. The restrictions only hampered the daily life of the Yishuv and impinged on the economic viability of the country and therefore the Empire. Furthermore, the army was not able to maintain martial law for a long period of time. The random imposition actually showed the military’s weakness. The 100,000 men stationed in Palestine could not handle a band of terrorists.
263 Cf. Hoffman, Failure 34.
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Apart from the wrong tactics, there is another important aspect which hampered the army’s utility. Against the Arabs, the British forces had carried out their missions rather unemotionally because the single soldier had not been personally afflicted. The Jewish terrorists, on the other hand, knew how to emotionalise their warfare. Their targeted assassinations and the ambushes on military staff brought the army to its limits. The fact that highly disciplined British soldiers and policemen repeatedly lost their temper and beat up innocent Jews in the streets of Tel Aviv shows the success of the terrorists’ policy. Moreover, the terrorists paid the British out in their own coin. The common British practice of flogging criminals may serve as an example. By the Yishuv, this punishment was considered as a Nazi method humiliating the Jewish people and increased the hatred towards the British. 264 Several times, the Irgun thus kidnapped British soldiers and civilians, and released them shortly after. In the meantime, they had been flogged in revenge. However, the British also brought emotion into the conflicts since they adhered to the policy of torture, deportation, and hanging. All of these measures had already proven effective against the Arabs. In case of the Jewish insurgency, they led to a radicalisation of the right-wing underground. A British inspector, a known torturer, was shot in Jerusalem in October 1946. The URM stated that he had been executed because of maltreatment, torture and persecution of Jews. 265 The two sergeants hanged by the Irgun in summer 1947 were murdered due to similar accusations. Thus, the British soldiers found themselves in a difficult situation. Sent to Palestine in order to secure the country, they were called murderers and had to fear for their lives every single day. On the other hand, they were not allowed to retaliate. Consequently, they started to question their mission in the Holy Land. The British press and public did the same. On the one hand, people did not understand why young British soldiers died in a far away land, obviously without any reason. In addition, the enormous costs made a continuation of the Mandate increasingly unpopular. The imperial burden had become too heavy, at least for the British presence in Palestine. Great Britain lost her faith; the terrorists did not.
264 Cf. Shepherd, Ploughing Sand 230. 265 Cf. High Commissioner Cunningham to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 31 October 1946, FO 371/52563.
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To conclude, I want to refer to the role Jewish terrorism played in Whitehall’s decision to terminate the Mandate. Martin Jones is right when he assumes that there were various reasons such as the failure of Anglo-American cooperation, the UN vote in favour of partition, or continuing illegal immigration and attacks 266 . The latter brought the Palestine issue to public attention in the United Kingdom. It is not a coincidence that the Cabinet enacted the withdrawal from the Mandate in mid-September, not even two months after the sergeant’s affair. Returned to the United Kingdom, Cunningham stated that “[f]or three years or more we had been ruling in Palestine without a policy, amid turbulence, vilification, assassination and kidnapping” 267 . The Jewish insurgency had left marks on the British mind. Despite the failed political negotiations with the Jews and the Arabs, Britain could have stayed for another indefinite period. In face of terrorism, she did not want to. In this respect, the Jewish terrorists were not responsible for the withdrawal from the Mandate. However, their bullets and bombs destroyed the colonial idyll and thus shortened the Empire’s presence in the Holy Land.
266 Cf. Martin Jones, Failure in Palestine. British and United States Policy after the Second World War (London et al. 1986) 343. 267 Cunningham, Last Days 490.
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8 BIBLIOGRAPHY
8.1 PRIMARY SOURCES
Holdings at the National Archives, London (Former Public Record Office)
Cabinet Papers (CAB) CAB 65/48 CAB 104/254 CAB 119/147 CAB 119/148 CAB 128/5 CAB 128/6 CAB 129/18
Colonial Office (CO) CO 537/1709 CO 537/1710 CO 537/1729 CO 537/2295 CO 732/88/22 CO 733/456/11 CO 733/456/12 CO 733/457/3 CO 733/457/9 CO 733/477/3
Foreign Office (FO) FO 141/957 FO 141/1001 FO 371/45387 FO 371/46110
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FO 371/52525 FO 371/52532 FO 371/52531 FO 371/52534 FO 371/52543 FO 371/52563 FO 371/52565 FO 371/61770 FO 371/61762 FO 371 61865 FO 921/211
Prime Minister’s Office (PREM) PREM 4/51/9 PREM 4/51/11
War Office (WO) WO 32/10260 WO 201/188 WO 201/189 WO 204/10981 WO 275/27 WO 275/28 WO 275/29 WO 275/32 WO 275/37
Security Service / MI 5 (KV) KV 3/41 KV 5/29 KV 5/31 KV 5/33 KV 5/34 KV 5/35
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Special Operations Executive (HS) HS 3/207 HS 3/209
Press Articles
The Times, Palestine Terrorism. Warning and Appeal to the Jews (12 October 1944) 4. The Times, Terrorist Acts in Palestine. New Warning System (17 October 1944) 3. The Times, Law and Anarchy in Palestine. Organised Campaign against British Authority (8 December 1945) 5. The Times, The Palestine Report (1 May 1946) 5. The Times, Reflections in Palestine. Awaiting Action on Anglo-American Report (12 June 1946) 5. The Times, Firm British Action in Palestine. Mr. Attlee’s Defence of Policy (2 July 1946) 4. The Times, Day of Bomb Outrages in Palestine. British Major Killed in Wrecked House (10 September 1946) 4. The Times, Kidnapped Judge Freed. Blindfold Walk from Hiding Place (29 January 1947) 4. The Times, New Precaution in Palestine. British Women to Leave (1 February 1947) 4. The Times, Martial Law for Parts of Palestine. 250,000 Jews Confined to Homes (3 March 1947) 4. The Times, British Sergeants Found Murdered. Bodies Hanging from Tree near Netanya (1 August 1947) 4. The Times, Palestine. Steps to Combat Terrorism (6 August 1947) 3.
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8.2 SECONDARY SOURCES
Monographs
Bell, John Bowyer, Terror out of Zion. The Fight for Israeli Independence (London et al. 1996).
Bethell, Nicholas, Das Palästina-Dreieck. Juden und Araber im Kampf um das britische Mandat 1935-1948 (Frankfurt/Main et al. 1979).
Charters, David A., The British Army and Jewish Insurgency in Palestine, 1945-47 (Basingstoke et al. 1989).
Cohen, Michael J., Palestine and the Great Powers, 1945-1948 (Princeton 1982).
Cohen, Michael J., Palestine: Retreat from the Mandate. The making of British policy, 1936-45 (London 1978).
Gelvin, James L., The Israel-Palestine Conflict. One Hundred Years of War (Cambridge et al. 2007).
Heller, Joseph, The Stern Gang. Ideology, Politics, and Terror, 1940- 1949 (London 1995).
Hoffman, Bruce, The Failure of British Military Strategy within Palestine 1939-1947 (= Underground and Resistance Studies 1, Jerusalem 1983).
Jones, Martin, Failure in Palestine. British and United States Policy after the Second World War (London et al. 1986).
Louis, Wm. Roger, The British Empire in the Middle East, 1945-1951. Arab Nationalism, the United States, and Postwar Imperialism (Oxford 1986).
Ovendale, Ritchie, Britain, the United States, and the End of the Palestine Mandate 1942-1948 (Woodbridge et al. 1989).
Reynolds, David, One World Divisible. A Global History since 1945 (New York 2000).
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Schmidt, Yvonne, Foundations of Civil and Political Rights in Israel and the Occupied Territories (Vienna 2001).
Segev, Tom, One Palestine, Complete. Jews and Arabs under the British Mandate (New York et al. 2000).
Shepherd, Naomi, Ploughing Sand. British Rule in Palestine 1917-1948 (London 1999).
Sherman, Ari J., Mandate Days. British Lives in Palestine, 1918-1948 (Baltimore 2001).
Zadka, Saul, Blood in Zion. How the Jewish Guerrillas drove the British out of Palestine (London 1995).
Collections
Balfour-Paul, Glen, Britain’s Informal Empire in the Middle East. In: The Twentieth Century, eds. Judith M. Brown / Wm. Roger Louis (= The Oxford History of the British Empire 4, Oxford 1999) 490-514.
Cohen, Michael J., The Strategic Role of the Middle East after the War. In: Demise of the British Empire in the Middle East. Britain’s Responses to Nationalist Movements, 1943-55, ed. Michael J. Cohen / Martin Kolinsky (London 1998) 23-37.
Louis, Wm. Roger, The End of the Palestine Mandate. In: Ends of British Imperialism. The Scramble for Empire, Suez and Decolonisation, ed Wm. Roger Louis (London et al. 2006) 419-447.
Robinson, Francis, The British Empire and the Muslim World. In: The Twentieth Century, eds. Judith M. Brown / Wm. Roger Louis (= The Oxford History of the British Empire 4, Oxford 1999) 398-420.
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Journals
Abboushi, Wasif F., The Road to Rebellion. Arab Palestine in the 1930’s. In: Journal of Palestine Studies 6/3 (1977) 23-46.
Atran, Scott, The Surrogate Colonization of Palestine, 1917-1939. In: American Ethnologist 16/4 (1989) 719-744.
Bauer, Yehuda, From Cooperation to Resistance. The Haganah 1938- 1946. In: Middle Eastern Studies 2/3 (1966) 182-210.
Brenner Lenni, Zionist-Revisionism. The Years of Fascism and Terror. In: Journal of Palestine Studies 13/1 (1983) 66-92.
Brenner, Y. S., The ‘Stern Gang’ 1940-48. In: Middle Eastern Studies 2/1 (1965) 2-30.
Cohen, Michael J., The Moyne Assassination, November 1944. A Political Analysis. In: Middle Eastern Studies 15/3 (1979) 358-373.
Cunningham, Alan, Palestine. The Last Days of the Mandate. In: International Affairs 24/4 (1948) 481-490.
Jasse, Richard L., Great Britain and Palestine towards the United Nations. In: Middle Eastern Studies 30/3 (1994) 558-578.
Kochavi, Arieh J., The Struggle against Jewish Immigration to Palestine. In: Middle Eastern Studies 34/3 (1998) 146-167.
Nashif, Taysir, Palestinian Arab and Jewish Leadership in the Mandate Period. In: Journal of Palestine Studies 6/4 (1977) 113-121.
Ovendale, Ritchie, The Palestine Policy of the British Labour Government 1945-1946. In: International Affairs 55/3 (1979) 409-431.
Sheffer, Gabriel, Appeasement and the Problem of Palestine. In: International Journal of Middle East Studies 11/3 (1980) 377-399.
Sheffer, Gabriel, British Colonial Policy-Making towards Palestine (1929- 1939). In: Middle Eastern Studies 14/3 (1978) 307-322.
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