California State University, Northridge Boundaries for the "Holy Land"

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CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY, NORTHRIDGE

BOUNDARIES FOR THE "HOLY LAND"

A thesis submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in

Geography

Saad Aldin Alazzawi

May, 1982 The thesis of Saad Aldin Alazzawi is approved:

California State University, Northridge May, 1982

ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This project is the conclusion of effort and research over the last fifteen years. With· the completion of the project (at last), I wish to express my appreciation to those who have assisted along the way.

I wish to acknowledge the following faculty members for their considerable help: Dr. Warren Bland for his involvement and supervision which was instrumental in completing the project, to Dr. Gordon Lethwaithe who provided valuable guidance, and to Dr. Robert Hoffpauir for his interest. I am also grateful for the graphic work done by Brian Whelan and Grant Langman.

My deep gratitude to my father, who has encouraged and supported me in my efforts.

Above all, my deepest appreciation to my wife,

Linda Farrah Alazzawi. Without her sincere effort

(with "consideration") this final product would not be possible.

iii SOURCES

Much of the information used in this study was found in the libraries of California State University, North ridge, and the University of California, Los Angeles. The

Map libraries of these universities were particularly help ful. In addition, a number of Israeli governmental and

Jewish Agency publications were obtained by the writer through their respective offices in Los Angeles and in

Israel.

The sources may be categorized as either field or secondary. Field sources include personal cont~ct in the

United States with Palestinian immigrants and Israelis,

Syrians from the Golan region, and Jordanians. Military data from Arab military personnel, political discussions with the official in charge of the Political Division of the Israeli Consulate in Los Angeles, as well as meetings with the Israeli Student Organization in the U.S.A., have all been helpful.

Secondary sources include monographs, periodicals, and reference works in English and Arabic, published in

Britain, the U.S.A., Israel, and the Arab countries. These, are supplemented by videotapes on the Palestine issue, as well as official government handbooks, census reports, and maps of boundary proposals and settlements.

iv $ •

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS iii

SOURCES iv

LIST OF MAPS vii

LIST OF TABLES viii

ABSTRACT ix CHAPTER

I . INTRODUCTION 1

Thesis and Objective

Physical Location

II. THE OTTOMAN PERIOD . 7 The Boundaries as Suggested by the Zionist Movement

III. JEWISH SETTLEMENT 1882-1914 26 IV. DEFINITION OF THE PALESTINE-SINAI BOUNDARY 33

V. NORTHERN BOUNDARY WITH LEBANON . . 40

VI. EASTERN BOUNDARY WITH TRANSJORDAN 45

VII. THE INFLUX OF JEWISH SETTLERS DURING THE MANDATE PERIOD ...... 48 Immigration

VIII. INTERNAL DIVISIONS 61

IX. THE PARTITION OF PALESTINE 69 The Actual Boundaries

X. BOUNDARY CHANGES AFTER ISRAEL'S INDEPENDENCE . 86

The 1948-1956 Era

v CHAPTER Page

The 1956-1980 Era XI. CONCLUSION

BIBLIOGRAPHY . . 110

vi List of Maps

Map Page 1. Pre-WWI Turkish Administrative Districts of the Holy Land ...... 9

2. Jewish Conceptions of the Jewish State 18

3. The Jewish State as Proposed by the Zionist Organization ...... 20·

4. Palestine Under the British Mandate, 1923 25

5. Formulation of Palestine-Egyptian Boundary, 1892-1948 ...... 34

6. Sykes-Picot Agreement 42

7. Palestine Land Sales Restricted Zones 59

8. Demographic Change in Palestine 68

9. Peel Partition Plan 70

10. Palestine Partition Commission Proposals, 1938. 72

11. Jewish Agency Proposal, 1938 .. 74 12. Jewish Agency Proposal for the Jewish State, 1946 ...... 77 13. United Nations Special Committee on Palestine Proposals, 1947 . . . . 78 14. Armistice Lines, 1949 89

15. Jewish Settlements Established 1870-1965 91

15(a)Jewish Urban Settlements Through 1965 . 92

16. Stages in Israel's War of Independence, 1947- 1949 ...... 93

17. Territories Occupied by Israel During 1967 War 101

18. Israeli-Syrian Disengagement Lines .. 103

vii List of Tables

Table Page

l. Jewish Immigration and Population in Palestine (1882-1972) ...... 53-54

viii ABSTRACT

BOUNDARIES FOR THE "HOLY LAND"

Saad Aldin Alazzawi

Master of Arts in Geography

May, 1982

The Holy Land, a region that stretches far beyond that of modern Palestine, or Israel, has long been a center of conflict. The primary focus of this thesis is to analyze the processes at work in achieving political boundary change within and around Palestine.

This study, covering the period from 1882 to the

1980's, seeks to define the factors contributing to the shaping of these lines, in terms of political geography.

The involvement of European powers, primarily the British, and the powerful influence of the Zionist movement, both inside and outside the region, brought considerable boundary change to the Holy Land. The role of Jewish immigration and settlement patterns as prime factors in the fluctuating borders is examined.

This thesis shows how the Zionists emp~oyed political

ix pressure during the Mandate Period, and especially during the partition plan discussions, which resulted in large acquisitions of territory. The Zionists have continued to exert political pressure on the world community to gain support for their actions aimed at achieving "secure" borders.

The recent settlement of the Egyption-Israeli border by no means signals an end to border disputes. The remaining occupied territories continue to tempt both the

Israelis and the Arabs to boundary change by military action. The large-scale settlement in the occupied West

Bank will continue to be an important issue in the estab lishment of any future "permanent" boundaries. Following the pattern of the past one hundred years, further boundary change can be expected.

X CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Thesis and Objectives

The Holy Land has long been a zone of conflict among

peoples and states. The region stretches far beyond modern

Palestine. It extends from the Mediterranean coast and

Sinai Desert on the west, to the Euphrates in the east and

the Taurus Mountains in the north. This entire area was

included in the Ottoman Empire until the late nineteenth

century, when European imperial powers began to develop

spheres of influence there.

The study covers the years from 1882 to the mid-

1970's. The year 1882 marked an increased involvement of

European po~vers and the Zionist movement in the area.

These involvements were ultimately to destroy the concept

of the region as a cohesive whole, and bring considerable

shifting of boundaries.

Political fragmentation of the Holy Land after 1882

brought the smaller region of Palestine to the fore. The

primary focus of this thesis is analysis of the process of political boundary change within and around Palestine. It

should be stressed at the outset that the concept of Pale

stine as a region separate from the rest of the Arab World

1 2

is a recent one. It derives largely from the period of

British dominance in the region.

The thesis will argue that the British desire to dom

inate the strategically impo-rtant Middle East, and the

Zionist desire to establish a Jewish National Home were critical factors in the creation of Palestine and the sub

sequent evolution of its boundaries. So far as we know, no study has yet concerned itself with the concept of evolving borders in the Holy Land, or attempted to trace

the process by which these borders came to be.

Except for the split-off of Transjordan and the re definition of the northern border, the borders established between 1916 and 1919 by British colonial forces were gen erally maintained until 1948. Since then, however, borders in the region have become unstable, and really amount to little more than cease-fire lines, subject to transgression at any moment by the parties involved.

This study seeks to define the factors contributing to the shaping of these lines, in terms of political geo graphy. It shows that they are linked first of all to dip lomatic factors external to the region and also to settle ment patterns within the Holy Land region. It will discuss how the intervention of external factors in the area, notably British expansionism and Zionism, resulted in the re-defining of the Holy Land as one of its sub-divisions,

Palestine, which has become identified with the Holy Land itself since the beginning of the British Mandate. 3

Physical Location

The ancient area known as Palestine, although quite small in area, is divided into clearly distinguishable regions. The deep rift of the Jordan Valley, the Dead Sea and the Arava Valley separate the country into a western

(Cisjordan) and eastern (Transjordan) area. Local climatic variations are reflected on both sides of the Jordan, and essentially differentiate the arid south from the Mediter ranean character of the northern and the central areas.

Western Palestine is marked by the presence of a mountainous region, an extensive system of anticlines most strikingly expressed in the Judean Mountains. At the

Western slope of the Hebron Mountains, there is a fifty degree dip for a length of 30 kilometers.

The western range is fractured by tectonic faults, predominant in Lower Galilee and Samaria. The east-to west fault dismembers the central mountain range and forms a number of valleys, the main ones being the basins and plains of Yizreel Harod and Beit Shean in the north, and

Beersheba in the south. Western Palestine is divided into the principal regions of Galilee, Samaria, Judea and the

Negev. The western range is bordered by the river Litani in the north and the Beersheba basin in the south. Its sub-regions are not absolutely uniform, as Upper Galilee is marked by karstic phenomena and is less arid than the other regions. The chalk forms broad hills with terraced slopes in parts of Galilee and Samaria while the Judean desert 4

steps are of hard limestone connected by chalk. The coastal plain consists of a belt of living dunes, especially in the south at a maximum width of 7 kilometers.

These dunes are connected with those of the northern Sinai.

In the north of the plain, the belt disappears. Earlier dunes have been consolidated into calcareous sandstone and form kurkar ridges. Strong abrasion has left few terraces of the ancient coast. In some places small hillocks have remained forming islands not far off the coast, the largest being across from Nahal Keziv. The coast is remarkable for its straightness which is broken only by the wide bay of

Haifa. Part of the coast is backed by a cliff 30 meters and more in height. Its length from Wadi El Arish to the mouth of the Litani River is 210 miles. Along its entire length run three narrow and distinct strips: the sea shore and belt of arid sand dunes; the western plain with its red sands, mostly in the Judean coast and in the Sharon, which allow permeability and aeration of the soil and form the ideal soil for citrus cultivation; the inner or eastern plain, marked by heavier, alluvial soils suited for vege tables, grain, cotton and sugar beets. The Negev coast has two parallel chains of low sandstone hills, some of the ridge crests retaining their strategic importance. The inner part of the Negev region has fertile soil with a subsoil very rich in water.

The Jordan rift valley.is part of the great African rift system. The greatest depth is at the bottom of the 5

Dead Sea, 800 meters below the Mediterranean sea level.

The Upper Jordan Valley has three subregions: the Hula

Basin, the Rosh Pinna Hill, and the Jordan gorge east of it.

The Hula Basin is surrounded by hills and mountains, the

Naftali Chain of Upper Galilee rising to 2,600 feet above the valley's bottom. The Metulla Hills connect the Basin's western rim with the massif of Mount Hermon, 9,232 feet above sea level. The Hula Valley is 25 kilometers from north to south and 6-8 kilometers from west to east. The

Central Jordan Valley is marked by the presence of Lake

Kinneret, 63.7 square miles in area, which is comparatively saline in spite of the input of Jordan freshwater. This part of the Rift is seismic in character, a fact exempli fied by numerous mineral and hot springs, among which are those of Tiberias. The Beit Shean Valley borders the Kin neret region in the north and tapers off before the Rift narrows to less than three miles, between Samaria and Gi lead. In this valley, the Jordan receives many tributaries from west and east, some of which carry water the year round along most of their length. Terraces cover the Beit

Shean Valley. The Harod Valley, and the Jezreel Valley, which it links to the Rift, both have rich good soil, with addition of organic matter from former swamps. Finally, the Lower Jordan Valley, beginning between Gilead and

Samaria, reaches the Dead Sea. Although soil salinity increases to the south, in its lower course, the Jordan receives many important tributaries from the west and east. 6

The Dead Sea itself covers the deepest continental depression in the world.

Most of the Transjordan highland, except for the

Gilead mountains, is a plateau formation, dipping toward the Syrian desert. In the north, from the river Yarmuk to the foot of Mount Hermon, the plateau is caused by a covering of basalt-lava. It is dominated by well- p~eserved extinct volcanoes. The western boundary of

Transjordanis sharply defined by the Rift faults, the east is more a transition zone, largely desertic. On the whole, geologically as well as climatically, Transjordan's regions are the continuation of their counterparts in Cisjordan.

Thus the Basan north of the Yarmuk to the Hermon massif and the northern slopes of the Hauran, Gilead between the

Yarmuk and Yabboq rivers, Moab and Ammon between the river gorges of the Yabboq, and Edom, from the Gulf of Eilat to the Wadi Hasi gorge, have their parallels west of the 1 Jordan.

1 Atl~S bf I~rael, 2nd ed. (Jerusalem: Survey of Israel, 1970). Efraim Orni and Elisha Efrat, Geo'graphy o'f' Israel, 3rd ed. (New York: American Heritage Press,· 1971), pp. 3-135. CHAPTER II

THE OTTOMAN PERIOD

In 1882, the Holy Land was part of the sprawling

Ottoman Empire governed by Sultan Abdul Hamid II (1876-

1909), whose successors were to bring the Ottoman line that had ruled the Empire for four centuries to a turbulent end.

The crumbling of Ottoman hegemony in 1918 (in the wake of defeat in World War I) marked the finale of more than a millenium of Moslem rule in the Holy Land and the end of a relatively stable era. Among the factors leading to the destruction of the Empire, two phenomena particularly affected life in the Holy Land and brought about ·permanent geopolitical and cultural changes.

In the late nineteenth century, the European great powers renewed their active interest in the Ottoman Empire.

Foremost among these powers was Britain, which saw in the

Middle East a means of strengthening her empire. The

British foothold in Egypt, gained in 1882, was in effect part of this process. The "spheres of influence" in the

Middle East which contributed to the dismemberment of the

Ottoman Empire were expanded during the 1876-1909 period.

Simultaneously, there was a development of national feeling among the Jewish communities of Europe, and this feeling centered on Palestine. The development and growth

7 8

of Zionist aspirations, although at first seemingly insig- nificant, came to exert a powerful force on Palestine.

During the Ottoman period, Palestine was divided into five administrative areas called sanjaks. The Sanjaks of

Beirut, Acre, and Balqa (Nablus) included the northern part of P.alestine (Map 1), and these in turn were incorporated in the Vilayet (province) of Beirut. This province formed the northern portion of Palestine, and the Jordan River,

Lake Hula and its marshes, Lake Tiberias, and the rest of the Jordan River to the south formed the eastern frontier. 1

The independent Sanjak of Jerusalem, which had direct relations with Constantinople, included the main parts of

Palestine. The southern part of the Negev, including the port at Aqaba, was included in the Sanjak of Ma'an which was under the Vilayet of Syria headquartered in Damascus.

Although the exact borders of the administrative districts were not marked and were not known to the inhabitants of the area, the people knew the authorities and the adminis- trators who were responsible for their villages and towns.

On its western side, of course, Ottoman Palestine was bordered by the Mediterranean Sea and by Egypt.

It was only with the Jewish national revival in the nineteenth century that Palestine became a pole of attraction for·massive Jewish immigration. A small Jewish

1Great Britain, Palestine Royal Commission Report (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1937, reprinted 194 5 ) ' p • ll 0 . 9 • .

Pre-WWI Turkish Administrative Districts of the Map 1: Holy Land Alexandretta (Is kendrun) VI LA YET OF ALEPPO • Aleppo

SANJAK OF ALEPPO

SANJAK OF SANJAK OF HAMA

PROVINCE OF

SANJAK OF DAMASCUS

•DAMASCUS

SANJAKOF

1.1... ·- 0 ,_ Lake of Tiberias (Sea of Galilee) i..J..J ).. > "(' (./) SANJAK OF HAVRAN u.. - 0 1- • Amman UJ > <( _J >

EGYPT

50 40 30 20 10 0 50 Miles I I I I I I I 0 100 Kilometers Gulf of Aqaba

SOURCE : PalestineRoyal Commission Report, 1937. 10 community had persisted within Palestine since Biblical days. During the Ottoman period, Jews resided in the four holy cities, namely Jerusalem, Tiberias, Safad, and Hebron, where they normally enjoyed peaceful relations with the predominantly Arab population. Although Palestine was their home, they did not then express the same goal as some Zionists: the political establishment of a Jewish state. In 1845, there were approximately 12,000 Jews in 2 Palestine. During the years 1881-1882, numerous associa- tions were formed in Russia for the promotion of Jewish emigration to Palestine. "The religious-national longing for Zion in eastern Europe had deep emotional roots and constituted a great potential reservoir for a political 3 movement."

Although the term "Zionism" was coined only about 4 eighty years ago, the Jewish claim to Palestine has its basis in the Old Testament promises in the Book of Genesis.

The first reference to the Promised Land occurs in Genesis

12:7, "Unto thy seed will I give this land," referring to

God's promise of Canaan to Abraham. The promise is further delineated: "Unto thy seed have I given this land, from

2Robert H. Nathan, Oscar Gass, and Daniel Gremer, Palestine: Problem and Promise: An Economic Study (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1946), p. 52.

3walter Laquer, Hi'story of Zion·ism (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1972), p. 83. 4 rbid., p. xiii. ll

the river of Egypt unto the great river, the river

Euphrates" (Gen. 15:18) and "I will give unto thee, and to

thy seed after thee, the land wherein thou art a stranger,

all the land of Canaan, for an everlasting possession; and

I will be their God" (Gen. 17:18). "River of Egypt" and

"Brook of Egypt" are usually understood as Wadi el Arish,

although UAR publications have equated them with the Nile.

Thus, according to Zionist thought, the settlement

of the land of Canaan begun in ancient times under the

leadership of Abraham, followed by Moses, and completed

under Joshua and in recent times under the leadership of

the Zionist movement, is actually the fulfillment of God's

promise.

However, a survey of the Scriptures reveals that the

limits of Eriz Israel varied considerably from one cita-

tion and one era to the next, and that the area claimed is

greatly at variance with the area actually inhabited by

ancient Jewish people. Based on Deuteronomy 1:7-8, 11:24,

Joshua 1:4 and 13:2-5, one "ideal" boundary was interpreted

as extending from Mt. Amanus to the Brook of Egypt.

·According to the halakhic rules, the border extended from

the coast of Galilee to Ijon, to Hauran in the East, down

to Petra, along the desert, and back to the coast along . 5 th e Roman l 1mes. Also, II Samuel 24:2 and I Kings 5:5

5 "Halakhah" is a generic term for the whole legal system of Judaism, embracing all detailed laws and observ ances. Jewish tradition assumes that it goes back to Moses' time, except for later additions. 12

use the expression "from Dan even to Beer-Sheba," a much more restricted area of settlement quite different from the "ideal" boundary of the "promised land" achieved in

David and Solomon's day.

Maps of ancient Israel reproduced in editions of the

Bible are open to question in that they adopt the modern concept of boundary as a strictly defined line, which seems to be a recent one, linked to the surge of the national idea. Thus, the map lines drawn for the periods of King David, or the Kingdoms of Judea and Israel, or for

Herod's time, are largely arbitrary and could conceivably be drawn in a different shape--for instance, from one city to another, thus reflecting actual settlement.

The downfall of the Kingdom of Israel and the

Diaspora greatly modified the perspective of the establishment of borders. The hope for a re-establishment of

Israel became a dominant theme of the Jewish national idea, often backed by Messianic claims. For the Jews in the

Dispersion, as Fraenkel put it, "the longing for Jerusalem was always in their hearts, in their prayers,

Its sources are: the written law (613 commandments), statements handed down by tradition (Kabbalah), and oral law. Halakhah has binding force for orthodox Jews. The most famous halakhic writings are the "Halakhot Gedolot," code of the geonic period; the "Halakhot Kezuvot," a collection of halakhot of the geonic era, used in souther~ Italy; the "Halakhot Pesukot," or "decided laws," first known halakhic work of the geonin, written in the eighth century. Laws with Biblical authority are referred to as "Halakhah le-Moshe Mi-Sinai." Encyclopedia Judaica, lst ed., s.v. "Halakhah." 13

in their traditions, and in their daily lives, and it contributed to their continuing existence as Jews, de spite persecutions and expulsions."6

For centuries, this hope of returning to their land

lived on among Jews throughout the world. Attempts at re-establishing the state of Israel had been crushed de- finitively with Simeon Bar Kokhba's unsuccessful rebel- lion (135-138 A.D.), and throughout history a number of messianic movements sprang up centered around the longing for Israel. Such movements were the fifth century Cretan movement following a new Messiah who would lead the Jews back to the promised land, the sixteenth-century followers of David Reubeni and Solomon Molko among Portuguese Mar- anos and Sabatai Zevi's messianic movement in the seventeenth century.?

The Boundaries as Suggested by the Zionist Movement

During the Ottoman period, a few immigrants came from time to time to settle among the Jewish communities already present in the Holy Land. The immigrants were usually elderly·Eastern European Jews who came either for religious reasons or to seek refuge. They were unorganized and ill-prepared for life in Palestine. They had meager

6Josef Fraenkel, "Zionism" in Israel: A Survey and Bibliography, Muriel Emanuel, ed. and comp., (London: St. James Press, 1971), p.41.

7Encyclopedia Britannica, 11th ed., s.v. "Zionism". 14

financial resources of their own and mostly subsisted on charity from Jewish organizations and relatives at home. 8

It was only toward the end of the nineteenth century that the foundation of modern Jewish settlement was laid.

On July 7, 1882, a group of fourteen Russian Jews landed at Jaffa and made their way to Mikveh Israel, ari agricultural training center established in 1870. Thus began the 1882-1903 immigration wave, known later as the First

Aliyah.

In 1897, Theodor Herzl called a meeting of the First

Zionist Congress which opened in Basle, Switzerland on

August 29th. During the Congress, plans were discussed to re-establish Jewish settlers in Palestine, major decisions were made, and certain agencies, such as the

Zionist Organization, were created to work toward the goals set by the Congress.

Previous to this meeting, various suggestions for the establishment of a Jewish homeland had been made. As early as 1839, through a series of articles in the London Globe, the British Foreign Office advoacted the establishment of a Jewish homeland in Syria and Palestine which would accommodate substantial settlement by Jews. Many public figures, among them Lord Palmerston, supported this concept. Most significant was Herzl's work, D~r

8walim Fahmi, Al Hijrah Al Yahudiyah ETa FiTastin Al Muhtelah (Cairo: Mutba'at Al Jeblauwin, 1970), pp. 17- 18. 15

Judenstaat, written in 1895, in which he had not yet settled on the eventual location of a Jewish state, and was still contemplating settlement in Argentina; however, he realized the power of attraction exerted by Palestine as a historical homeland. I~ D~~ J~d~n~taat, he even considered how Palestine might be obtained from the

Sultan. 9

With the establishment of the Zionist Organization,

Zionist aspirations became firmly set upon Palestine.

Thus, when the British government, contacted by Herzl in

1902 through Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain, offered the Jewish people land in East Africa, it was refused. The Zionists felt that "the Movement could not risk any deviation from its central pupose of establishing a home for the Jewish people in Palestine "lO consequently the Kenya scheme was deemed unacceptable. In no uncertain terms, the Movement affirmed that the "connection between the Jews and Palestine was of the essence of the

9 In 1896, Herzl suggested to the Turkish Grand Vizier that Jews could resolve the Ottoman Empire's grave finan cial troubles in return for which the Sultan would relin quish h~s rule over Erez Israel and allow it to become a Jewish state. Upon refusal from the Turkish government, Herzl then proposed permission for a state under the Sultan's suzerainty, and this failing, in 1898, proposed to demand a charter for dense and concentrated Jewish settlement in Palestine with autonomy and the right to self-defense. Encyclopedia J~daica, v. 8, "Herzl," Jerusalem, Keter, 1971. 10 Laquer, p. 57. 16

Zionist creed."10 The question remained, however, as to exactly what area would be included in a Jewish homeland in Palestine.

Developments during vJorld War I brought about the necessary conditions for presentation of the issue in the international arena. \·Ji th the war nearing its end, the

British reached an agreement with the French as to the division of spheres of influence in the Middle East, and made certain promises to Sherif Hussein of Mecca. In ad- clition, through the declaration of Lord Arthur Balfour, the

Foreign Secretary, to Lord Rothschild on November 2, 1917, the British made clear their endorsement of some Zionist objectives:

Foreign Office, November 2nd, 1917

Dear Lord Rothschild, I have much pleasure in conveying to you, on be half of His Majesty's Government, the following de claration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations which has been submitted to, and approved by, the. Cabinet~ -- "His Hajesty's Government views with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best en deavours to facilitate the achievement of this ob ject, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country." I should be grateful if you would bring this de claration to the knowledge of the Zionist Federation. Yours sincerely, ARTHUR JAMES BALFOURll

11 Leonard Stein, The Balfour Declaration (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1961), p.4, p.30. 17

In response to this declaration, Zionists began to

plan for a Jewish homeland. The 1916 Sykes-Picot agree-

ment provisions were a setback to the aspirations of

Zionist leaders, for they had hoped that all the territory

to the south of Beirut and Damascus might be theirs.l2

Herzl had stated that the Jewish homeland was to com-

prise the area "from the Brook of Egypt to the Euphra

tes."l3 This concept has been subject to various inter-

pretations. The expression "the Brook of Egypt" has been

understood as a point located at El-Arish. However, Arab

sources have interpreted it as extending to the Nile.

Thus, according to the UAR reading of Herzl's text, the new Israel would then encompass a portion of Egypt, all of

Jordan, and substantial portions of Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and

Syria (Map 2d) .

These differences in interpretation contribute to the

confusion one encounters in trying to ascertain the actual

limits of the Jewish homeland as proposed by the various

Zionist forces. It does seem, however, that the boundary

proposals put forward in various Zionist publications were,

for the most part, based on economic, strategic and his

torical considerations, rather than strictly biblical ones.

Many felt that the frontiers "from the Brook of

12Great Britain, Palestine Royal Commission Report, pp. 16-17.

1 3Raphael Patai, ed., Complete Diaries of Theodor Herzl (London: Herzl Press and Thomas Yoseloff, 1960), vol. II, p.711. 18 • Map 2: Jewish Conceptions of the Jewish State

SAUDI ARABIA SAUDI ARABIA ---DJ

Sutr ~9 100 liMn 10 '"" I !--,-,..;..,_.._ --.< 10 100 I SO Kilomtlrn 10 100 ,',7 :;:::.. ".. J

2(c) The Jewish State as the Biblical Land of Gilead · 2(d) A Religious/ Historical View of the Jewish State TURKEY -~~~

SYRIA } · on•~ ~

/ IRAQ •Baghdad

Cairo

SAUDI ARABIA SAUDI ARAI31A

Sc~te Sulc SO 100 'lilu 0...... ,..--.---,. ~0 100 Moln SO 100 150 Koh.>mtlrrt 0 SO 100 ISO Kolomr lft)

SOURCES: 2 (a) : UAR Ministry of National Guidance, Documents and Papers on the Palestinian Question, vol. 1, p. 151, Cairo: State 1nformation Service, 1 9 6 9.

2 (b): .!!llS!.· p . 2 2 7 . 2 (c) : Vilnay, zev, The New Israel Atlas. New York: McGraw Hill Book Co., 1 969. 2 (d) : secure and Recognized Boundaries: Israel's Right to Live in Peace Within Defensible Frontiers, Jerusalem: Carta, 19 7 1' p . 9. 2(e): .!.12l.S.:· p. 23. SAUDI ARABIA

Sc•l• SO 100 Mi!n 19

of Egypt to the Euphrates" were not desirable because the Jews would be lost among the considerably greater non-

Jewish population. The leaders of the movement felt that the smaller area from Dan to Beer Sheba with additional region~ to supply a strong economic base and to provide 14 for military defense, would be most favorable.

Maps 2a-e show the varied concepts that were raised during the discussion of projected boundaries for the

Jewish homeland. Rabbi Isaac's 1917 model saw the boundaries of Israel extending from the Taurus mountains of

Turkey in the north to the Sinai in the South, with the eastern border running from Zintep to Al-Hirmil and down to the Jordan River (Map 2b).

When the Paris Peace Conference opened in January of

1919, among the proposals presented with respect to Pales- tine, was a Zionist plan which proposed that "majority rights" be given to the existing Jews in Palestine, although 15 Jews were far from being the majority. The proposal suggested at this time was based on a historical concept of the Jewish Presence in Palestine and also reflected military and strategic needs directed at exploiting water 16 resources and soil fertility (Maps 3a-b). The proposal took into account military needs which required control

14H. F. Fr ischwasser-Ra 'a nan,· The F·ron tiers of· a Nation (London~ The Batchworth Press, 1955), pp. 82-83.

15Ibl. d. , pp. 85 - 87.. 16 Laquer, p. 452. Map 3(a): Map 3(b): The Jewish State as Pro_posed by the Zionist Organization at the Paris The British Mandate (1921- 1923), Viewed by the Zionist Organization Peace Conference, 1919 as Open to Jewish Settlement

eDAMASCUS

~ ~ eDAM ASCUS ~ ~ ~ ';; Jl c: ~ m c: ~ 0"~:- t''" ' ,• ~ ';; Petah Tikvnh . ·:. · . ~ · OJef1us1~L~~ · ~mirlai · .:· ....(l :.: ,•., ...· 0 . .· ' -• ~ebrt?rl ' • . ,p.i\Li:si'INE- ERETZ IS~AEL ... . ·. '··. v' ·.- . ' t . ' .,•I ARAB STATE (ttie Je"Wisit Natibn~l Ho~et ;: :.·· • _,,.,..,. : ol ~ ' ; • • • .,~ ,• , .., ......

.~· •. ·.: ' · · ~ ~ . ... ' .~ . ;I' ·. : ..-. .· .,.

: · ~ · .~

',) ~ . ,..

SINAl

0 MAJOR JEWISH CENTER 0 MAJOR JEWISH CENTER SAUDI ARABIA

SCALE SCALE

75 0 25 Miles 25 0 25 Mil es 'o I ,• ., I •' J 0 0 3 0 Kilometers 30 0 30 Kilomclets

SOURCE: Ca• Ia, 1971, P. 21 . SOURCE: Ca,a, 1971, P. 23.

tv 0 21

over the Beka'a Valley which formed the entrance into

Palestine from Lebanon and Mt. Hermon, and the inclusion of

the Hauran and the adjacent Yarmuk Valley, to prevent inva-

sion of the Esdraelon lowlands. It also called for control

of the Hejaz Railway between Dera'a and Ma'an to supply

any eastern front as well as control the desert areas to

the south and east as protection against invaders.

In order to provide a strong economic base for the

new state, agricultural and industrial potential was to be

developed fully in an effort to achieve self-sufficiency.

Agriculture could not be productive enough without large-

scale irrigation, which in turn was dependent on the water

to the north and the northeast--the sources of the Jordan,

the Litani River, the snows of Mt. Hermon, and the Yarmuk

and its tributaries; Industrialization would also depend

on hydro-electric power supplied by the falls of the

Litani and the Yarmuk.

At the Peace Conference, Zionist proposals included

·advocacy of boundaries extended east of the Jordan to

incorporate an adequate supply of timber and a fertile

grain-producing area. Also the large tracts of land in

Transjordan and in the Negev could be purchased at a lower price than the privately owned lands of the coastal plain~7 The territorial proposals, as s·ta ted in "The Zionist

17Robert John and Sami Hadawi, The Palestine Diary (Beirut: The Palestine Research Center, 1970), p. "123. 22

Organization's Memorandum to the Supreme Council at the

Paris Peace Conference" are shown on Maps 3a-b. These

boundaries were reduced from.those originally proposed by

Theodor Herzl in Der Judenstaat or even claims based on

Biblical texts. Still, the territory sought was extensive.

In current (1980) terms, the territories they argued for

included the following:

1. The whole of Mandate Palestine.

2. Southern Lebanon, including the towns of Tyre and

Sidon, the headwaters of the River Jordan on Mt. Hermon,

and the southern portion of the Litani River.

3. Parts of Syria, including the Golan Heights inclu-

s ive of the town of Qunei tra the river Yarmuk and El-

Hammeh Hot Springs.

4. Within Jordan, the whole of the Jordan Valley, the

Dead Sea, and the eastern highlands up to the outskirts of

Amman, running southwards along the Hejaz railway to the

Gulf of Aqaba.

5. ~-lithin the UAR (Egypt), territories east of a line

drawn south from El-Arish on the Mediterranean to the Gulf 18 of Aqaba .

While the question of boundaries for Palestine was not settled at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, the his torical, economic, and military needs of the Jewish home

land, and the competition between France and Britain for

18 Frischwasser-Ra'anan, pp. 87-88. 23 continuing influence and dominance in the Middle East, continued to be the principal factors considered in the post

Conference subdivision of the relevant Ottoman regions. 19

In April 1920, at a meeting in San Remo of the

Supreme Council of the Allied Powers, it was decided that the Balfour Declaration would be included in the peace treaty with Turkey. Britain agreed to a settlement which 20 provided France with the Mandate for Syria. This agreement was not consistent with a promise by Sykes to Emir

Feisal regarding Syrian independence, and allowed the

French to take Damascus.

On July 24, 1922, the League of Nations approved the Mandata for Palestine, although a definite frontier agreement had not been reached. Zionist leaders continued to contact influential people-throughout the world in an effort to obtain a favorable frontier for the national 21 home. An intensive public relations campaign was launched to encourage the British to insist on a settlement that would broaden the available area. These efforts are reflected in the b~undary interpretation officially adopted by the Zionist Organization in 1921-23 for the

British Mandate. Modifying its 1919 boundary proposals,

19John and Hadawi, p. 124.

20united Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP), Report to the General Assembly (New York: U.N. , 1947), vol. I, pp. 18-19. 21 Frischwasser-Ra'anan, pp. 133-34. 24

it abandoned claims to Tyre and Quneitra on the northern frontier, but claimed twice as much territory east of the Amman-Kerak-Ma'an axis, which had been advocated as an approximation to the eastern frontier in 1919 (Map 3a): its limits also extended some 200 extra kilometers to the northeast (Map 3b).

However, French insistence that the basic elements of the Sykes-Picot Agreement be adhered to served to limit 22 the degree of success attending Zionist proposals. The final boundary agreement (Map 4) was signed by the British and Franch governments in March, 1923.

Throughout this period, the Zionist Organization's boundary proposals tended to ignore the pre-existing

Ottoman sanjaks. When the movement became firmly committed to securing Palestine as a homeland, contacts were made with several governments besides that of the Sultan, as the latter's response had been unfavorable to the estab lishment of a Jewish state or homeland in Palestine.

22 Ibid. 25 Map 4: Palestine Under the British Mandate, 1923

Alexandretta (lskendrun)

• Aleppo

• Nebek "'

•Amman

TRANS- JORDAN

EGYPT SCALE: 50 40 30 20 10 0 50 Miles ' I I I I 1 I 100 0 100 Kilometers Gulf of Aqaba CHAPTER III

JEWISH SETTLEMENT 1882-1914

While the Zionist Organization was bending its diplomatic efforts to securing favorable external boundaries, Jewish settlement was shaping an internal pattern which was to be expressed in future boundaries.

The small group of immigrants from Russia who landed at Jaffa on July 7, 1882 represented a section of the

Hovevei Zion (Lovers-of-Zion) movement known as Bilu.

Soon more Bilu members followed and the Hovevei zron movement, which was active all over eastern Europe, began organizing other groups to settle in Palestine. 1 The first

Aliyah, 1882-1903, brought approximately 25,000 settlers to Palestine, mostly from Russia, Poland, and Rumania. 2

One of the basic concepts of Zionism was 11 a turn to the productive branches of the economy, primarily to agri 3 culture. rr Most of the early immigrants settled in rural areas, but agricultural work was not, initially, as

1Anon., Immigration and Settlement (Jerusalem: Keter), p. 14.

2oscar I. Janowsky, Foundations of Israel: Emergence of a WeTfare State (Princeton,~----~~----~~~--~~----~~---- N.J.: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1959), p. 12. 3 Efraim Orni, · Agrarian RefOrm and SociaT Progress r~ IS~ael (Jerusalem: Jewish National Fund, 1972), p. 7.

26 27 economically successful as had been hoped. Like those before them, many immigrants became dependent on help from groups at home and especially from individuals such as

Baron Edmund de Rothschild. Other immigrants turned from productive occupations to land speculation.

The Ottoman Sultan Abdul Hamid II realized the dan- gers of widespread speculation, as well as the potential danger that Jewish settlement in Palestine might weaken

Ottoman control of the region. Therefore, in 1885, h~ enacted restrictions on Jewish immigration, acquisition of land, and establishment of settlements. 4 In spite of these restrictions, however, Jewish immigration continued.

The Jewish population in Palestine increased from 24,000 in 1882, to 47,000 in 1892, and 50,000 in 1900.

Between 1905 and 1914, the second big immigration wave brought 40,000 immigrants to Palestine5 as a result of systematic colonization policies developed by the

Zionist Organization with the assistance of the Jewish

National Fund. By 1914, Jews formed a higher percentage of the total population of the future Palestine Mandate than they did in any other country. However, the non-

Jewish population was also increasing and the absolute numerical difference was becoming greater. 6 Of the 700,000 inhabitants of Palestine at the beginning of World War I,

4 rbid., p. 230. 5oscar I. Janowsky, p. 13. 6Laquer, pp. 154-55. 28

only 85,000 (approximately) were Jewish, while immigration had increased: in the twelve months ending August, 1914,

6,000 more arrived than had come in any single previous year.

Nevertheless, during World War I, the Jewish population in Palestine declined from 85,000 in 1914 to 56,000 in

1918. This drop can be attributed to emigration, deporta- tion of those without Turkish citizenship, and a rise in the death rate caused by persecutions. 7

Prior to the immigration waves of the late nineteenth century, the small number of Palestinian Jews had largely concentrated in a few historical cities, especially Jeru- salem, Safad, Tiberias, and Hebron, but the concept of establishing a Jewish "home" led Jews, beginning in the mid-ninteenth century, to settle in rural areas. This sharp change in settlement patterns and the development of dependence on agriculture as the means of livelihood was designed.to increase, in the settlers, a sense of belonging 8 to the land.

Beginning in 1882, there was a rapid growth in the number of Jewish settlements. In that year, Rishon-le-

Zion, Nes Ziyyonah, Gedera, and Mazkeret Batya were established on the coastal plain and Zikhron Ya'agov on Mt.

7ESCO Foundation for Palestine, Inc., Palestine: A Study of Jewish, Arab, and British P'o1Tcies, Vol. 1 (New York: Yale University Press, 1970), p. 329. 8 Immigration and SettTem~nt, p. 106. 29

Carmel.9 In addition, Rosh Pinna and Petah Tiqwa were

revived. By 1898, fourteen new villages (moshavot), based

on village patt"erns that the settlers had known in eastern Europe, were established.

The Golan was of interest even during this early

phase of settlement. Here, land prices were low, and

settlers, mostly from eastern Europe, felt that the soil

and climatic conditions would allow them to practice a

familiar type of farming. In 1887, a group from Safad unsuccessfully attempted to farm a large tract of land at

Rumthaniya, in the upper Golan, about 15 kilometers south of Kuneitra. Again in 1898, ten families began settling on

some of the lands of the Bir Shequm village, about 5 kilo meters northeast of the present day kibbutz En Gev. How ever, by 1912, only six of the families remained at the site, and in 1920, it was abandoned altogether. In 1904, a small group attempted settlement in the Bethsaida Valley, but by the following summer, this site was also aban doned.lO

By the end of the nineteenth century, several thou sand of the 50,000 Jews in Palestine were living in agri cultural settlements.ll By 1903, 350,000 dunam (almost

90,000 acres) of land were in Jewish hands. Hany new

9E. Orni, p.229.

lOibid., pp.424-425.

llEsco, p.54. 30

villages had been founded, and in Jaffa, 3,000 immigrants had settled.12 Despite the 1885 edict aimed at limiting Jewish immigration and settlement, eighteen new settlements were established by 1909, the year Sultan Abdul Ahmid II was deposed. Methods such as buying land under assumed names and bribing officials to sanction purchases were commonly used to circumvent governmental restrictions.l3 Some of the settlements established during the first im migration wave (1882-1903) were Moza Tahtit, Metulla in the Hulah Basin, Bat Shelomo, Rehovot near Jaffa, Hadera in the northern Sharon, Kefar Sava in the Beer Ya'akov, two settlements in the Kinneret Valley, and Tel-Aviv. Systematic colonization policies were developed by the Zionist Organization and,through the Jewish National Fund, efforts were made to extend landholdings, establish new settlements, and consolidate existing ones. It was decided to concentrate on those areas not far from the urban centers in which Jews already constituted a sizable proportion of the population. These areas were Lower Galilee and Judea. The Palestine Land Development Company was formed to train Jews for settling on the land bought by the Jewish National Fund and Baron von Hirsch's Jewish Colonial Asso- ciation.

12rmmigration and Settlement, pp.l6-17. 13chaim Weizmann, Trial and Error: The Autobio of Chaim Weizmann (New York: Harper & Brot ers, 1 pp.26-27. 31

The Zionist Organization became an active factor in the building of the Jewish National Fund (JNF, or Karen Kayemeth Leisrael) in 1901. During the Ottoman period, the central task of the JNF was land acquisition in Palestine for Zionist settlement.l4 The first tract of land acquired was Kefar Hittim in Lower Galilee in 1904. In 1908, Ben Shemen and Huldah in Judea and Kinneret-Deganyah near Lake Kinneret were obtained and an afforestation project was begun.lS Between 1908 and 1913, 50,000 dunam were bought.l6 During the Ottoman Period, Jewish settlements generally concentrated on the coastal plain. The swampy tracts and Red Mousterian coastal sands there had been relatively empty of Arab settlement because they required drainage or irrigation before they could be utilized. Consequently, a higher percentage of such coastal lands was available for acquisition by Jewish settlers than was true in the natu rally more fertile hill country. With benefication, though, which was made possible by the superior financial resources of the Jewish settlers, these coastal lands were to become very productive. Important settlements were also located in north-' eastern Palestine, in drier and stony basaltic areas in

14E. Orni, p.l6. 15Immigration and Settlement, p .113. 16w. Laqueur, p.l53. 32

eastern lower Galilee, in the Kinneret and Hula Valleys, and along the upper Jordan River. The 1882-1914 period saw the establishment of over thirty new Jewish settlements. By the outbreak of World War I, Jewish holdings in Palestine totalled over 440,000 dunams or 110,000 acres.l7 Even so, only 14 percent of the Jewish population was categorized as rural in 1914.18

17R. Nathan, 0. Gass, and D, Creamer, p.52. 18M. Emanuel, p.l5. CHAPTER IV

DEFINITION OF THE PALESTINE-SINAI BOUNDARY

A long chain of events led up to the delineation of Palestine's western boundary. Though a province of the Ottoman Empire, Egypt enjoyed considerable autonomy by the beginning of the nineteenth century.l During Mohammed Ali's rule as Pasha of the province (1806-1849), Egypt had been granted, by special dispensa- tion from the Ottoman Sultan, the Sinai Peninsula and some

Red Sea garrison to~vns including Aqaba. But in 1892, after Egypt had already passed under British military occupation, the Ottoman government reasserted its right to the Sinai and the Red Sea forts on the grounds that these territories had been granted to Mohammed Ali only by a special dispen sation from the Sultan and had not previously formed part of the Pashalik of Egypt.2 At that time, the Ottoman government reaffirmed the Egyptian-Turkish boundary as run ning from Suez to El Arish (Map 5)3 a boundary which was,

1 Louis M. Bloomfield, Egypt, Israel and the Gulf of Aqaba in International Law (Toronto:Carswell, 1957), p.ll0.- 2Frischwasser-Ra'anan, p.35. 3Bloomfield, p.ll3.

33 34

Map 5: Formulation of Palestine- Egyptian Boundary, 1892- 1948

MEDITERRANEAN SEA

Bir Lahfan •\ ISRAEL

/ \ \ oAb"A\gU• \ • El Quseima / Bir Gifgafa e Bir Hasana • 7 \ \ \

\ \ El K"o

•EI Thamad\ \ ----._ ~}AT SINAl \ Bir Taba \

EGYPT \ \

SCALE ' 0 10 20 30 Miles

~ 10 ~·a 3B lo d Kiiometers RED SEA

Carta, 1971, p. 19; Safran, p. 333

• Boundary Prior to 1906

Sir Evelyn Barings (Lord Cromer) Decree (1892)

- Turkish Compromise Proposal

British - Mandate Boundary ( 1917 - 1948) 35 however, unacceptable to the British.

Indeed, after the assertion of British control in

Egypt, Palestine's strategic importance to Britain increased. It had been significant for potential development of land communications between the various British 4 territories, but now it acquired greater s~gnificance as the only likely place from which a land attack on the Suez

Canal could be mounted. Thus, Britain was particularly sensitive about developments in the Turkish-Palestine bordering Egypt, particularly in view of Turkish-German 5 rapproachement, and desired the boundary to be placed as far away from the Canal as possible. 6 Turkish plans for the construction of the Palestine-Suez and Hejaz rail- ways led to a clash of interests in which the "weaker side 7 had to give way." Thus, the definition of Palestine's south-western boundary came about as a result of Britain's attempts to protect her interests. 8

Britain's increased interest in the Egyptian-

Palestine borderland was evidenced and paralleled by

4Edward Mead Earle, Turkey, the Great Powers and the Bagdad Railway: A Study in Imperialism (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1923), p. 7.

5Bloomfield, p. 115.

6 Ibid. , p. 112. 7 Ibid., p. 115.

8Frischwasser-Ra'anan, p. 35. 36

settlement proposals of two Zionist intellectuals. In

1899, David Trietsch outlined plans for development of

Jewish garden cities in the Sinai. His proposal was well received by Herzl, who requested a concession from Britain for implementation of the project in 1902. Perhaps because of uncertainty over the boundary, the British did not grant Herzl's request.

The western boundary of the future Mandate Palestine was actually formulated just after 1900. Britain's rejec tion of the Ottoman Empire's claim to the strategically important Red Sea forts led to a compromise offer from

Istanbul: namely Sinai could remain under Egyptian rule provided the forts along the Hejaz routes be returned to

Turkey. However, two acceptable interpretations of "Sinai" were involved. Since, as Bloomfield points out, the literal translation of the expression "Tor-Sinai" (desig nating. the area at stake) is "Mount Sinai," the Peninsula of Tor-Sinai or Mount-Sinai could be understood as refer ring to the mountainous peninsula in the south. 9 Hence, to the Ottoman government, it seemed that the boundary was to run from El Arish to Suez to Aqaba. The Turkish Grand

Vizier's message to Britain was apparently vague enough to allow the British to interpret the border definition as from El Arish to Aqaba (Map 5). The difference between the two lines was indeed significant since the latter allotted

9Bloomfield, p. 116. 37

the entire Sinai peninsula to Egypt. The British commu

nicated their acceptance of the El Arish-Aqaba line as the

boundary, and the continued administration of Sinai by

Egypt under these terms, to the Ottoman government. But

the latter made no response: it neither rejected nor

approved the unilateral action of the British government. 10

Britain was concerned that Turkey might try to gain

control of the area near the Suez Canal and, in the period

following 1892, steps were taken to strengthen the British position. After 1903, the British embarked upon a program of active policing of, and economic assistance to, the

Bedouins of the area. In 1906, the British began to con struct some barracks near Aqaba. At this time, they attempted to occupy Nakb el Aqaba and El Gattar, near the present location of the Israeli port of Eilat (Map 5 ) and to advance in the direction of Wadi Araba, an area close to the Hejaz Railway line, then under construction. The

Hejaz Railway, which would have provided a link between the

Mediterranean and the Red Sea from Damascus to Jidda, would have seriously interfered with Britain's control of routes

in the area, and posed a military threat to Egypt and the 11 Cana1. In the belief that the British were attempting to obstruct the building of the Ma'an-to-Aqaba branch line~

10 rbid., pp. 114-117.

11 Earle, p. 21. 38

12 Turkey sent troops to occupy the area.

Negotiations took place in Cairo and at this time

the Turkish delegate stated that Lord Cromer's frontier

decision of 1892 was invalid. The Turkish delegate stated

that the correct boundary line was triangular in shape and ran from the base at El Arish to the apex at Suez and back again to the base at Aqaba (Map 5). Lord Cromer's previous line had cut off Turkish territory- by simply running the boundary along the base from El Arish to

Aqaba. The-Turkish government then offered a compromise:

Sinai would be bisected by a line running south from El

Arish to Ras Mohammed, the southern tip of the peninsula.

This would have left the Suez in Egyptian-British hands, but provided Turkey with the western shores of the Gulf of Aqaba. However, the final _agreement mandated the withdrawal of Turkish troops to a line running from

Rafah on the Mediterranean to Taba, west of Aqaba. In modifying the Turkish compromise, the Rafah line reduced

Turkish-occupied territory conceded to British-dominated

Egypt by a twenty mile stretch in the north and by thirty miles in the central section·. This agreement moved the military, but not necessarily political, frontier about one hundred-miles east of Suez, on the eastern side of

Sinai, although most maps printed before 1892 showed the

12 Frischwasser-Ra'anan, pp. 36-38. 39

line at El Arish. This military demarcation line became

the boundary between Egypt and Palestine,remaining at

Rafah-Taba until 19.48. Turkish Palestine had been reduced

b y severa 1 t h ousand square ml'1 es. 13

Egyptian-British encroachment into what was known as

Ottoman Palestine was contemporary with the first w~ve of

organized Jewish settlement in Palestine. At the time,

there were no political elements domestic to Palestine that

could bring about boundary change in accordance with the patterns of Jewish immigration and settlement. Thus, the

two main factors that were to shape the fate of Palestine,

British presence in the Middle East, and Jewish settlement, were at work separateJy. For the period.concerned, British

aims and interests in the area effectuated a least a military boundary change involving theloss of Palestinian

territory to British-dominated Egypt and set the stage for eventual British dominance over the whole of Palestine.

This control would later prove crucial to the establish ment of the Jewish homeland in Palestine.

13rbid., pp. 39-40 CHAPTER V

NORTHERN BOUNDARY WITH LEBANON

The entrance of Turkey into the First World War provided the Great Powers with the opportunity to increase their influence in the Middle East. One early attempt to expand control in the area was made by Britain through the Egyptian High Commissioner, Sir Henry McMahon. Me-

Mahon's correspondence with Sherif Hussein of Mecca

(July 14, 1915-January 3, 1916) indicated that Britain was willing to grant the Arabs independence in return for Arab support against the Turks. Later, there was a disagreement between the British government-and Sherif Hussein over the terms of the agreement. Although McMahon's second note to

Sherif Hussein indicated that the agreement excluded "the districts of Mersin and Alexandretta and portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Roms, Hama, and Aleppo",l the British later claimed that the area ex cluded from the agreement included the Vilayet of Beirut, and the independent Sanjak of Jerusalem (or Lebanon and all of Palestine west of the Jordan), while the Arab

1united Arab Republic, Ministry Guidance, Documents and Pa ers on the Palestine vols. Cai~o: State In ormation Service,

40 41

nationalists believed that Palestine had been promised to them. Reacting to the news of the Hussein-McMahon corres pondence, the French government felt that is was necessary to define spheres of influence to protect its interests. 2

The Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 was a result of the

British-French negotiations and was intended to form the basis for ihe post-war partition of the Ottoman Empire.

The planned spheres of influence according to the

Sykes-Picot agreement are shown on Map 6. France would receive full authority over the "Blue Zone" which incor porated Cilicia and the coastal strip of Syria between

Alexandretta and Acre, including Lebanon and northern

Galilee with Safad, Hula, and the Upper Jordan. Zone A would form an Arab state under French protection, cover ing the Mosul area of Upper Mesopotamia with the central section of the main Baghdad Railway and the interior of

Syria to the north of the Yarmuk River, including the

Hauran and Golan areas to the northeast of Palestine.

Lower and central Iraq comprised the "Red Zone" which wa;s assigned to Britain. The British were to provide protec tion for that part of the Arab state called Zone B, which lay to the south of the Yarmuk, and covered the whole area between the Red Sea and Iraq, including southern Trans jordan and the Negev.

2 John and Hadawi, p. 54. 42

Map 6: Sykes- Picot Agreement Beirut

Sidon

Tyre J, Mediterranean Sea

Hai Lake Tiberia$\

b State Under the Protection of I ISRAEL - Great Britain, Franc~ - ~~;:~ ~R~i~i~ _, ~

Jaffa- Tel Aviv . _(B. ~?~~~ ?o_ri~ L ~j

Jerusalem•·

He:bro~ •Peaa Gaza· I ~§ Sea ~II - ~ 1

IT( · ~Jl ~~~ :"

EGYPT _

SCALE 0 10 20Miles 1 b 1b, 20 3~Kilometers I URCE: Vilnay, 43

"The Brown Zone," the area bordered by Acre, the

Jordan, the Dead Sea, and Gaza, was the most densely

populated area of Palestine, and would be international

ized by agreement between Britain, France, and Russia. 3

The French also wanted to include Metulla, which

commands the Jordan head waters in the northernmost section

of eastern Palestine, in their Syrian territory. However,

Metulla was attached to Mandate Palestine, along with the

surrounding area. As there was only one small Jewish

settlement there, it seems that this was des~gned to con

nect it with the northwestern side of the Mandate state.

On the other hand, French-Syria received the Golan Heights

in 1923 through adjustments with the British.

In the Sykes-Picot plan, the former promise to

Sherif Hussein was not considered and the cultural make-up

of the population of Palestine also played little part. The Lebanese Christian population was taken into account, as was the Biblical Jewish settlement zone of Dan-to

Beersheba, specifically quoted by Lloyd George, the British

Prime Minister. However, it remains that the main factors involved were the concerns of the great powers for the establishment of protected zones in areas strategically important to th_em.

As in the dispute with the Ottoman government over

3 uAR, Ministry of National Guidance, pp. 41-48. 44

the Sinai, the British secured consent for a vast area to be ultimately placed under their protection, virtually enclosing the "international zone" to the west and south.

The northern border of Palestine was to be in accordance with French rule in Lebanon and Syria. This border ran just south of Safad, contained in the French zone, with

Lake Tiberias at the northeastern corner. Thus, this new northern border lopped off significant sections of

Ottoman Palestine (Map 1) which had stretched to Saida

(Sidon) on the coast in the Sanjak of Beirut and much further east than Lake Tiberias. However, Mandate

Palestine was to see its northern boundary changed considerably from that created by the Sykes-Picot agree ment. The Mandate northern border ran north of Safad and northward around the Hula basin: it also encircled the

Lake Tiberias area completely. CHAPTER VI

EASTERN BOUNDARY WITH TRANSJORDAN

Under the Palestine Mandate, Great Britain had the right to define the area of Palestine open to Jewish set

tlement.l Despite opposition by the Zionist Organization

to any partition of Palestine which might limit future set

tlement of Jews, Great Britain detached the lands east of

the Jordan River from Mandate Palestine, and formally re cognized the kingdom of Transjordan as an independent

(Arab) state in May, 1923.

The establishment of Transjordan as a state which was ostensibly independent, but in actual fact a British client, probably represents a British attempt at compro mise, an attempt to mollify the ,conflict of Arab and Jew in the region.

In 1923, the Transjordanian lands were almost en tirely Arab in population whereas a substantial Jewish minority, perhaps 10 percent of the total population,2 existed west of the Jordan River. It probably seemed lo gical to the British that the strongly Islamic Arabs east

lpalestine Royal Commission Report, pp.300-301.

2Ibid., p.23.

45 46

of the Jordan should be separated politically from the mixed and potentially more volatile communities west of the Jordan. It was ~oped that reducing the size of Pales tine, and confining Jewish settlements therein, would reduce Arab opposition to Jewish immigration and improve

Anglo-Arab relations.

Although, as noted above, the Zionist Organization opposed the separation of Transjordan from Palestine, the

Jewish-community in Palestine probably benefited from it.

In the smaller Palestine of the post-1923 period, the Jews were closer together, more cohesive, and ultimately more defensible than would have been the case if they had been allowed to scatter themselves over the broader reaches of pre-1923 "Palestine." Hence, the separation of Transjordan from the rest of Palestine, although resented by the Zion ists, was largely possible due to concentration of Jewish settlements in the Cisjordan area. Had there been sub stantial Jewish settlement in Transjordan, creating a stronger minority within that territory, it might have been more difficult for the British to provide themselves with a stable area which could be indirectly controlled and link areas under British dominance. Had settlement been more significant in Transjordan, the basis for a future Jewish state might have been quite different, as the British might not have disregarded so blatantly the wishes of the Zionist leaders. 47

Thus, this period saw the appearance of a discern ible link between boundary changes and the pattern of

Jewish settlement and immigration, along with a reshaping of the Palestine territory according to British purposes, with a resultant subdivision of territory which would be maintained until May 15, 1948.

Transjordan combined stability with a type of political dependence which could make the Jordanian state into a valuable buffer zone for future Israel's otherwise wide-open eastern border. Jordan's reliability was largely a result of the fact that the British had, to a great degree, created it as a home state for Arab allies.

Formed by simply splitting the Jordan Valley into two

"banks," it consisted of a Palestinian population governed by a monarch--King Abdullah, put on the throne by the

British and backed by a Bedouin army. Perhaps this same policy could be detected in the establishment by Franco

British agreement of Lebanon as a separate state provid ing a smaller buffer zone on the nothern border. CHAPTER VII

THE INFLUX OF JEWISH SETTLERS DURING THE MANDATE PERIOD

During the British military administration of Pale- stine, which lasted until the end of the summer of 1920, immigration was officially prohibited. Indeed, the British authorities were reacting to the volatile political eli- mate. The frustrations of the Arab population, whose 1916 revolt against the Sultan had been prompted by the British with the promise of sovereign nationhood, was little understood by the Zionist leadership. Arab feelings erupted in an assault on the Jewish population on April 4, 1920.1

In this unstable period, and in spite of the official bar on immigration, 6,843 Jewish immigrants were admitted to Palestine between January, 1919 and September, 1920.2

The Mandate for Palestine directed the civil administration to "facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions and ... encourage ... close settlement by Jews on the land."3

1David Kimche, A Clash of Destinies (New York: Prae ger, 1960), p.202.

2 ESCO, p. 315.

3uAR, Documents and Papers, pp.l21-122.

48 49

In accordance with these instructions, in 1920, the administration enacted the first "Immigration Ordinance" which authorized the Zionist Organization to bring in 16,500 4 immigrants per year.

Immigration

The third immigration wave, which began in 1919, was in part a continuation of the second, which had been interrupted by the war. 5 Lasting until 1923, this wave· brought approximately 35,00"0 Jews to Palestine. The aliyah was characterized by the arrival of the halutzim (pioneers) 6 who came mostly from eastern and central Europe particu 7 larly from Russia, mostly entering without capital of 8 their own and becoming the backbone of the labor force.

They organized the Labor Brigade9 and played an important role in the creation of the Haganah, the Jewish army. 10

They became construction workers, building roads and houses, and they formed a large segment of the farm labor.

4 ESCO, pp. 315-316 5 . Immigration and Settlement, p. 20 6 Jacob A. Rubin and Meyer Baikal,·Pictorial History of Israel (New York: Thomas Yoseloff, 1968), p. 32. 7ESCO, p. 406 8 r nmngratlon . . an d Settlement,. p. 26

9Rubin, p. 38 10 rmmlgratlon · · an d s ett 1 emen t , p. 26 50 $ •

In addition to the laborers, there were approximately

8,000 middle-class immigrants in the 1920-1923 period.

This large influx of middle-class immigrants, however, marked the beginning of the fourth aliyah ( 1924-1926), when 60,000 Jews entered Palestine. Although large numbers of Polish laborers were included, the most significant element was the influx of businessmen, merchants, and manufacturers. About one-half of the immigrants during these two years came from Poland as a result of persecu- tion, economic problems in Poland, and limited opportunities elsewhere created in part by severe restrictions on immigration to the United States. Most of these immigrants had a little capital of their own, which they invested in small businesses and in housing construction. Settling in

Haifa, Jerusalem, and Tel Aviv, the middle class immigrants of this period were chiefly responsible for modern urbani- zation. They were also responsible for the founding of some new agricultural colonies, mainly those specializing 11 in oranges. By the end of this immigration wave, there were approximately 150,000 Jews in Palestine.

The 1922 White Paper established absorptive capacity as the limiting principle on immigration. However, this policy did not, in reality, introduce any new regulations 12 to stem the flow of immigrants to Palestine: in 1925

11Rubin, pp. 37-38; Dnmigration and Settlement, pp: 27-27. 51

alone over 34,000 Jews arrived.

The inability of the country to absorb, at this time,

so large a number of immigrants, was related to an acute

economic depression. In addition, a collapse of Polish

currency in 1925 left many businessmen in Palestine with out sufficient capital to complete projects already ini

tiated, a fact which had disastrous effects on the employ ment situation.l3 Unemployment was widespread, and the

Zionist Organization took on the financial support of the unemployed following demonstrations demanding either work, food, or return to the countries of origin.l4 Furthermore, in 1927, the beginnings of what was to be a world-wide de pression began to be felt in Palestine. Natural disasters in Palestine, such as a drought in 1926, an earthquake in

1927, and an invasion of locusts in 1928, added to the se verity of the economic crisis.l5

In 1926, 13,000 Jewish immigrants arrived, but more than half left again in the same year. In 1927, total im migration fell to 3,000 and there were almost twice that number of emigrants. Arrivals and departures were about

·equal--about 2,000 each--in 1928. By 1929, immigration was on the increase with about 5,000 immigrants, and one-

13Ibid., p. 291.

14John and Hadawi, vol. 1, p.l99.

15ESCO, p.291. 52

16 third that number of ernigrants. Despite what ardent

Zionists regarded as a disappointing first decade in the development of a national horne, by the end of 1929 the

Jewish population had grown to about 160,000--rnore than twice the number present in 1919 (see Table 1). But a stronger influx was to follow.

The rise of Nazi power in Europe led to increased immigration. At the end of 1931, the Jewish population in Palestine was 174,610. The immigration laws that were in effect during the thirties allowed a great number of

Jews into Palestine, then assumed to have the requisite

"absorptive capacity." The years 1933-1935 brought more than 150,000 immigrants, and in 1935 alone there were

61,472 authorized immigrants as well as a considerable number of "illegals," a substantial increase above an approximate 7,000 a year prior to 1931. By 1936, there were about 370,000 Jews in the Mandate, comprising about one-quarter of the total population, and by 1939 Jews numbered one-third of the total population. During the thirties, more than a quarter million Jews had migrated to Palestine.

The different categories of immigrants suggest a number of factors which may have affected the settlement patterns. Over the 1930-1933 period, there were about three and one-half times as many laborers as middle-class

16 John and Hadawi, p. 197; ImmigratiOn and Settle ment, p. 27. Ul w

Sources: The Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1949-50, pp. 13-29.

The Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1972, (Jerusalem: The Sivan Press, Ltd., 1972) pp. 22-127.

The Central Bureau of Statistics, lmmigration to Israel, 1972, (jerusalem: 1973) p. 3. TABLE 1. JEWISH IMMIGRATION AND POPULATION IN PALESTINE (1882-1972)

YEAR IMMIGRANTS POPULATION YEAR IMMIGRANTS POPULATION

1882 24,000 1944 15,552 553,600 1890 47,000 1945 15,259 579,230 1900 50,000 1946 18,760 608,230 1914 85,000 1947 22,098 1918 56,000 1948 (ending 5-14)17,165 1919 1,806 1948 101,828 758,700 1920 8,223 1949 239,576 1, 013 '900 1921 8,294 1950 170,249 1,203,000 1922 8,685 83,794 1951 175,095 1,404,400 1923 8,175 89,660 1952 24,369 1,450,200 1924 13,892 94,945 1953 11' 326 1,483,600 1925 34,386 121,725 1954 18,370 1,526,000 1926 13' 855 149,500 1955 37,478 1,590,500 1927 3,034 150,000 1956 56,234 1,667,500 1928 2,178 151,656 1957 71,224 1,762,800 1929 5,249 156,481 1958 27,082 1,810,200 1930 4,944 164,796 1959 23,895 1,858,800 1931 4,075 174,610 1960 24,510 1,911,300 1932 12,553 192,137 1961 47,638 1,981,700 1933 37,337 209,207 1962 61,328 2 '068, 900 1934 45,267 ·.· 253' 700 1963 64,364 2,155,600 1935 66,472 320,358 1964 56' 716 2,239,200 1936 29,595 370,483 1965 30,736 2,299,100 1937 10,629 386,074 1966 15,730 2,344,900 1938 14,675 399,808 1967 14,327 2,383,600 1939 31,195 427,812 1968 20,544 2,434,800 1940 10,643 456,743 1969 37,804 2,496,400 1941 4,592 474,102 1970 30,750 2,561,400 1942 4,206 484,408 1971 41,930 2,236,600 1943 10,063 502,912 1972 55,888

CJl ~ 55

immigrants, but over the 1934 to 1936 years, laborers out- numbered persons of "independent means" only two to one. 17

The economic boom which began in Palestine in 1933 was largely due to the influx of many German and Czechoslovakian

Jewish refugees who came to Palestine bringing with them substantial amounts of capital, as well as skills and . . 18 t ralnlng. Whereas such immigrants numbered only about

5 percent of the total in the years just prior to 1933, they comprised 18 percent in the 1933-1939 period. It would seem that such settlement would increasingly concentrate into urban areas. Another interesting feature, from

1934 on, was the entry of "Category B" persons, that is, orphans, religious persons, and students. Only 975 of this category were admitted in the six years prior to 1934, but there were 14,188 between 1934 and 1939, among which 19 4,635 belonged to the Youth Aliyah.

Throughout the British Mandate period, the Jewish

Agency also engaged in an active program of illegal immigration. Prior to the 1939 White Paper restricting

Jewish immigration, entry of Jews with capital along with their dependents had been unrestricted; only those who came in as "laborers" were subject to any quota--another

17 ESCO, pp. 677-678. 18 rbid., pp. 663, 694-695

19rbid., pp. 677-678. 56

factor which may have accentuated the urban bias of settlement patterns. Nevertheless, violations of the quota were 20 standard practices. The exact proportions of this illegal immigration are not known. One source estimates that during the entire British period, some 77,000 Jews immigrated illegally, and that 58,000 of these arrived 21 between 1939 and May 15, 1948.

During World War II, immigration dropped drastically.

At the beginning of the war and toward the end, immigration was impeded mostly by transportation difficulties. But from late 1940 until late 1944, much of continental Europe, normally the major source region of Jewish migrants, was under Nazi-German control. During this unhappy period,

European Jews were being denied basic human rights, including the right to migrate) were.~uthlessly persecuted, and finally, in the culmination of Hitler's New Order, were being exterminated en masse.

With the return of peace in 1945, many ·of Europe's relatively few surviving Jews looked to Palestine as their hope ·for a better life. In 1947, emigrants to Palestine 22 rebounded to 22,098. All in all, the period of the

British mandate saw the Jewish population of Palestine

20 John,. p. 331; E;SCO, pp. 680-681

21Fahmi, p. 84 22 I mm1grat1on . .• an d S ett 1 ement, p. 48 57

increase from 58,000, or 8 percent of the population, to 23 650,000, or 33 percent. During the period of British rule, approximately 500,000 Jews had migrated to Palestine~ The influx of Jewish settlers resulted in considerable

changes in settlement patterns. Increased emphasis on

rural settlement began late in the Ottoman Period. By the

end of the nineteenth century, several settlements had been

created, and in 1903, 350,000 dunams (90;000 acres) were 25 in Jewish hands.

Systematic colonization policies were developed by

the Zionist Organization after its first Congress; the

"practical" wing of the movement extended its efforts to

increase landholdings, establish new settlements, and consolidate those already existing. They concentrated on

those areas not far from urban.centers in which Jews already constituted a sizable proportion of the population, especially in Lower Galilee and Judea, and also expanded in the coastal plain. Nevertheless, in 1914, only fourteen percent of the Jewish population lived in rural settle- 26 ments.

During the British Mandate period, both the number of settlements and area of landholdings increased

23 Arthur Saul Super and David Lennon. Absorption of Immigrants, Israel Today, No. 18, (Jerusalem: Israel Digest, 1971)' p. 5. 24 Immigration and Settlement, p. 48. 25 ESCO, p. 54. 26Emanuel, p. 15. 58

significantly. By 1920, Jewish holdings amounted to

650,000 Palestinian dunams in area, and at the close of

1930, to almost 1,2000,000 dunams. During the Ottoman period, 33 settlements had been established, by 1930 they numbered 91, and there were 209 by the end of 1939.

These 118 new settlements were largely concentrated on what had become the most productive plains and valleys of Palestine. Most of the development took place on the coastal plain, particularly in the area extending from just south of Tel Aviv northwards to Haifa, in the valleys of Jezreel, Harod, Kinneret, and Hula, and in eastern lower Galilee.

Thus, the settlements formed something of an "N" shaped pattern, joining the dispersed settlement areas of the Ottoman period with a veritable belt of new settle ments along the sea coast and in a continuum throughout the fertile vallyes east of Haifa, and stretching to the northern part of Palestine, on both sides of Lake Tiberias, on the easternmost part of the territory. It also included a sizeable area just northwest of the Dead Sea (Map 7).

The concentration of settlement on the coastal plain is understandable. Large areas there were sparsely settled or unoccupied because the soils needed irrigation, drainage, or beneficiation before they could be made productive. Thus, they were not pre-empted by prior use.

The coastal areas were also attractive because they were most accessible to migrants arriving by sea, and most 59

Map 7:

Jewish - owned land D in Palestine

Hebron e

ZONE A

EGYPT

SCALE 0 10 20 Miles & 1b '2b 3'~ Kilometers

SOURCE: John, R., p. 3 3 3. Shaded areas indicate Jewish- owned lands as on May 11, 1 9 4 8, date state of Israel came into ex is· tence. Total area in Jewish ownership· 372,925 acres (or 5.6 7 percent) of total land area of Pales· tine: 6,580,755 acres. Zone A: transfer of land save to a Palestinian Arab prohibited, except in special circu mstances. Zone B: transfer of land by a Palestinian Arab save to a Palestinian Arab prohibi_ted, except in special circumstances. Free Zone: no restriction on transfer. 60

easily supplied from overseas. More easterly settlements tended to be located in areas of superior soils and especially at strategic sites along the Jordan River, whereas the northern settlements were strategic outposts slang the potentially shifting borders of French controlled

Lebanon and Syria. Not surprisingly, the thickly populated and solidly

Arab central area of Palestine, the arid Negev, and the dry southwest, were left practically untouched by Jewish settlement, except at a few scattered points. CHAPTER VIII

INTERNAL DIVISIONS

The great increase in the Jewish population of

Palestine during the 1930's made the non-Jewish elements more and more apprehensive about impending dominance by

Zionists and the potential establishment of a Jewish state.

This eventually was unacceptable to the non-Jewish inhabitants, and led to a number of revolts beginning in 1935.

It was felt in the non-Jewish community that such a large influx of immigrants constituted a threat to its political security and property rights. The British administration responded to these revolts by issuing the 1939 White Paper which limited the number of immigrants to "only" 75,000

Jews over the following five-year period.

The White Paper was not well received by Arab or Jews.

Although Parkes assers "the door to immigration to the

Holy Land was securely bolted by the authorities until 1 1942," many Arab leaders saw it as a palliative for Arab fears rather than as a serious device for restricting

Jewish immigration. Meanwhile, Zionist leaders were

1 James W. Parkes, A History of Palestine from 135 A.D. to Modern Times (New York: Oxford University Press, 1949; revised ed. London: Pelican Books, 1970), p, 341.

61 62

openly embittered by such restrictions. The White Paper seemed to bring about what Zionists had feared: a restriction of immigration into Palestine that could reduce the ratio of Jew to Arab, since the rate of natural increase for Arabs was then more than twice that for the Jews. 2

In this volatile situation, the numbers of settlements were being increased and geared to absorbing immigrants at an ever faster rate. In a number of communal villages, experiments were made in combining farming with industry for the purpose of absorbing the new settlers while maintaining the villages' distinctive social life.

A national service plan drew young people from the towns to work in pioneering on the land, developing their interest in establish~ng a National Home. It was during this period that a technique was developed for setting up a prefabricated village during the daylight hours of a single day, complete with watch tower and stockade. 3

Thus, the agricultural villages included, besides the kibbutzim or communal farms, the moshavot, or smallholders, and also privately owned land. Whatever the form, the

Jewish Agency and the Jewish National Fund were respon- ' sible for the distribution of settlements and immigrants.

In a sense, it may be said that even during the British

2 ESCO, p. 670.

3 Parkes, p. 334. 63

period, the Jewish community in Palestine had its own government and administration in the Jewish Agency.

Jewish National Fund settlement policies had serious implications for the Arab economic, political, and social base. Initially, the purchase of estates resulted in throwing many Arab tenant formers off the land. 4 The first important J.N.F. purchase under the Mandate was in the Jezreel Valley where seven Arab villages were bought.

Sizeable J.N.F. purchases in the Esdraelon and elsewhere evicted thousands. The Land Transfer Ordinance was easily disregarded as tenant farmers had little understanding of protections available to them through laws designed by foreigners, and were very open to direct pressure from their landlord--often their creditor--who wanted to sell.

By 1930, according to the Hope-Simson Report, the cultivable land in non-Jewish hands would not afford an average lot of more than 90 dunams to Arab farmers, while 180 dunams had been established as the average minimum neces 5 sary to maintain a fellah family.

In addition to losing their homes and the lands they and their families had worked for generations, Arabs were even denied employment as laborers. Jewish Agency policy was to employ only Jews, or as few non-Jews as the number

4Hadawi, vol. 1, p. 219. 5John Ruedy, "Dynamics of Land Alienation," in The Transformation ·of Palestine, ed. Ibrahim Abu-Lughod (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1971), pp. 119-138. 64

of Jewish immigrants allowed. It could be mentioned that

initially considerable Arab labor was employed, but this

was objected to on the grounds that a ''plantation" type

system was being developed with a social-ethnic cleavage

between "planter" and "laborer".

The Constitution· of the Jewish Agency, Land and Em

ployment Clause states:

The Agency shall·promote agricultural colonization based on Jewish labour, and in all works or under takings carried out or furthered by the Agency, it shall be deemed to be matter of principle that Jewish labour shall be employed ... 6

Similar statements were made by the Jewish National

Fund and the United Israel Appeal (Karen Hayessod) in their

land lease and loan contracts.6

At the close of the 1930's, Histadruth, the Zionist

labor organization, engaged in picketing against Jewish businesses that employed non-Jewish workers. 7 The princi-

ples of tozeret haaretz (products of the land) and avadah

Ivrit (Jewish labor), which had long been a part of Zionist

ideology, were now more fully put into practice. Such dis-

criminatory practices encouraged the development of two

separate economies, one Arab, the other Jewish,8 and were

a significant cause of the revolts that occurred in the

6Hadawi, pp.224-225.

7Ibid., p.zoz.

8ESCO, pp.559-560. 65

late thirties. The British White Paper of May 17, 1939 recognized the dangerous situation that had been created through the displacement of the non-Jewish communities and the denial of a means of livelihood. The White Paper authorized the

High Commissioner of Palestine to prohibit and regulate transfers of land, but these land transfer regulations were not issued immediately.

One aspect of Zionist response to the White Paper was an accelerated and selective purchase of land in mainly

Arab areas. These purchases were so chosen to provide the most favorable possible boundaries in the event of parti tion,9 particularly in the Beit Shean Valley and Upper

Galilee. The Land Transfer Regulations were devised to stop such purchases.

The Regulations designated certain areas in which transfer of land was allowed only to a Palestinian Arab, that is, Jews or Arabs could convey land to Arabs. In other areas, transfers were allowed only from a Palestin ian Arab to another Palestinian Arab, while in still other areas there were no restrictions on transfer. Exceptions could, however, be made at the discretion of the High Com missioner. These areas are shown as Zone A, Zone B, and

Free Zone respectively on Map 7. It appears that Zone A encompassed Galilee between Safad, Acre and Nazarethand the

9 Immigration and Settlement, pp. 92-93. 66

central part of Palestine including Samaria around Nablus,

Ramallah, and Hebron. Zone B consisted mostly of the northeastern areas east of Safad, around Lake Tiberias and in Beit Shean and a very small area on the southern coast north of Gaza. The Free Zone, on the other hand, encompassed most of the coast all the way up to Acre, with the exception of a narrow stretch of B Zone just south of

Haifa.

In spite of the Land Transfer Regulations, the

Jewish National Fund was able to circumvent the regulations and acquire some 275,000 dunams (68,750 acres) of land in prohibited and restricted areas between 1940 and

1947: Arabs were designated as nominal owners. Some

50,000 dunams (12,500 acres) were also purchased in the unrestricted area. Jewish National Fund holdings were thus almost doubled during those seven years, 10 creating a situation whereby approximately 24 percent of the Jews in Palestine resided in rural areas at the end of the

Brl 't' lS h perlo . d . ll During the era of British application of the land

Transfer Regulations, 81 new Jewish settlements were established in all regions, but most particularly in the area just north of the Negev, where eleven villages

10John, p. 334.

11ESCO, p. 1050. 67

were set up in a single night in 1946 and seven more in 12 1947.

Thus the pattern of territorial segregation of

Jewish and non-Jewish populations accelerated during the later period of the Mandate. Whereas in 1931 mixed areas were located in the cities and environs of Haifa, Jaffa,

Jerusalem, and Tiberias, and to a lesser extent in and around Safad, Nazareth, Beisan, Jericho, and Ramleh, the remaining areas were still basically non-Jewish or included 1 percent or less of Jews (Map 8a). By 1944, areas of mixed population were limited to Jerusalem,

Jaffa, and Haifa, and all-Jewish areas (Map 8b) had significantly increased.

12 rmmigration and Settlement, p. 93. ·1944 Palestine Population Population by Su bdistricts 1931

JEWISH () NON-JEWISH JEWISH (). NON-JEWISH

Scale of Circles Scale of Cirlces (Thousands of Person s) (Thousands of Persons)

125 • 1 150~ •2 95 .s 75 .25 50 ~-150 25 \..~1 25

e100% BEERSHEBA

m 00

.. CHAPTER IX

THE PARTITION OF PALESTINE

While Jewish settlement was creating Jewish-dominated areas, political forces were moving toward political partition. In response to a series of revolts in Palestine, a

Royal Commission, under the chairmanship of Lord Peel, was appointed in August 1936. In its report of June 1937, the

Commission recommended that the Mandate be terminated and that the country be partitioned into three parts: a Jewish state, an Arab state, and an international zone. Economic linkage would remain, but the principle applied would separate those areas in which Jews had acquired land and settled (in the North and West) from the areas mainly 1 occupied by Arabs. The frontier line was to stretch about

12 miles across, 20 miles south of Jaffa, then curve around the international zone (a sort of ellipse extending from Jaffa to Jerusalem), then northwest, west of Tulkarm and Megiddo, east to Beit Shean, and north again through

Lake Tiberias and the Hula Basin, ending approximately

12 miles north of Acre (Map 9). This frontier indicated a Jewish state to include all of Galilee, the Plain of

1Great Britain, Palestine Royal Commission Report, pp. 285-288.

69 70

Ma 9: Peel Partition Plan

- International Zone

fdl Jewish State LEBANON 0 Arab State

Mediterranean Sea SYRIA

•Amman

SINAl

SCALE 0 10 20 Miles 0 10 20 30 Kilometers 71

Esdraelon, and the Maritime Plain, to about ten miles south

of Rehovoth. Palestine, to the south and east of this line,

would be united with Transjordan. The report also stated

that there would have to be not only a transfer of lands,

but also "an exchange of population."2 Although the

proposal was not implemented, the issue of the departure

of the Arab population did come up in front of the relevant

commission's chairman: the British Colonial Secretary,

Ormsby-Gore, did suggest already that "it is quite possible 3 that the Arabs will trek voluntarily."

In February, 1938, a technical commission was

appointed to examine specifically the question of parti-

tion. The Woodhead Commission found that under the Peel

Commission proposal-'-without the "removal" clause--there

would be a substantial Arab population still residing in

the Jewish state (comprising 49 percent of its population),

and the Pee~ proposal was rejected.

Three proposals came out of the Woodhead Commission

(Maps 10 a,b,c). The Chairman (Sir John Woodhead) and one

other commissioner called for a plan which limited the

Jewish state to a strip of territory in the northern part

of the coastal plain. This area was approximately 75

2 Ibid., ch. XXII, passim. 3 Erskine Childers, "The Wordless Wish: From Citizens to Refugees," Information Papers no. 6, June, 1973, p. 176, . Association of Arab-American University Graduates, North Dartmouth, Mass. Map 10: Palestine Partition Commission Proposals, 1938

1 O(a) The "A" Plan of Partition 1 O(b) The "B" Plan of Partition 1 O(c) The "C" Plan of Partition

. British Mandated British Mandated British Mandated • Territory • Territory • Territory __ Jewish State Jewish State lill Jewish State QArab State 0 ArabState 0 Arab State

(I) ~ t/5 (!) Cl) t:: Cl) (I) '- t:: (!) §? t:: (I) ~ t:: (!) t:: ii: t:: ~ c:: (I) -& ~ ~ -& t:: (~'- ~ :0 " ...... (!) .!i :0 (!) .!i :0 ~ ~ ~

("!..,.., ... Hebron•

< . <:;(" < Q <:;(" < Q:' Q <:;(" 0 Q:' Q ..., Q:' ...,0 I ...,0 CIJ I CIJ I < CIJ <:;(" < Q:' <:;(" < f..- Q:' <:;(" f..- Q:" EGYPT \ j f..-

SCALE SCALE SCALE 0 10 20 Miles 1l o10 20 Miles ~ 1 I 1 I 10 20 do Kilometers I Aq~Daf 1 SOURCE: Palestine Part 1 t1~n Comm1ssion Report, 1938. • ....:) 1\:) I ' 73

kilometers in length and included an Arab enclave at Jaffa

and a corridor connecting Jerusalem to the sea. Another

member of the Commission recommended that the Esdraelon

and Jezreel valleys and Lake Hula and Tiberias be granted

to the Jewish state. The other commissioner found that no 4 form of partition was practica.ble.

In May, 1939, the British government published a

White Paper which recommended that within ten years an in-

dependent Palestine be established in which Arabs and Jews would share in accord with their population numbers. The

Zionist Organization reacted strongly against this propo

sal5 and submitted a proposal of its own which called for

enlarging the Jewish and Arab states, leaving a residual mandatory area. This would provide more areas for settlement and industrial and agricultural development, as well

as offer greater military security. Included in this plan

for a Jewish state was a large portion of the Gaza sub-

district, a part of the Beersheba sub-district, the

southern portion of the Beit Shean Plain, and an extension 6 across the Jordan ~iver into Transjordan (Map 11). Al- though unable to arrive at an acceptable solution, the

4 Palestine Royal Commission Report, pp. 86-96, 99-109,. 5 Great Britain, The Political History of Palestine under British Administration (New York: British Information Service, 1947), pp. 27-29. 6 Great Britain, John Woodhead, Chairman, Palestine Partition Commission Report, 1938, (London: His Majesty's Stationary Office, 1945, pp. lll-112. 74

Map 11: British Mandated • Territory 1111 Jewish State 0 Arab State

EGYPT

SCALE

Miles

Union, 1947. 75

government had intended to ask the League of Nations to

approve the White Paper proposal, but the Second World War

intervened.7

Following the war, an Anglo-American Committee of In

quiry was set up to consider some of the problems in Pales

tine. Among the proposals considered was that of parti

tion. The Committee rejected any type of partition or the

establishment of an independent state at that time. They

recommended that the Mandate be continued until a United

Nations trusteeship could be set up. In June and July of

1946, delegates from the United States and Britain were ap

pointed to discuss the possibilities of implementing the

recommendation of the report. Their recommendation, known

as the Grady-Morrison Plan, called for the division of Pa

lestine into four areas: an Arab Province, a Jewish Pro vince, a District of Jerusalem, and a District of the Ne

gev. The Arab and Jewish provinces would be largely auto nomous, but a central government, under the administration

of the British High Commissioner, would be responsible for

such matters as defense, law and order, foreign relations,

customs, and taxes. The delegation stated that the imple mentation of this plan was dependent on the support of the

United States government. This plan did not, however, meet

President Truman's approval. He supported instead a

7Great Britain, Political History, p.29.

8Ibid., pp.35-36. 76

"viable Jewish state, in control of its own immigration and 9 economic policies, in an adequate area of Palestine."

Truman forwarded·to the British the partition proposal of the Jewish Agency Executive. In addition to the area proposed in the Provincial Autonomy Plan, the Agency claimed all of Galilee, the Jezreel Valley, the entire coastal plain except Jaffa, all of the south and the Negev, the wilderness of Judea up to Jericho, and the western shore of the Dead Sea (Map 12).

Since both Arabs and Jews were opposed to the Grady-

Morrison Plan, the British delegation submitted another proposal at the Palestine Conference on February 7, 1947.

This proposal, known as the Bevin Plan, called for Britian to administer a five-year trusteeship over Palestine to prepare the country for independence under a central government and provided for the admission of 100,000 Jews during the first two years with further immigration depen- d en t on th e econom1c. a b sorp t.1ve capac1. t y. lO Wh en t h.1s plan also failed to get approval, the government submitted the problem to the United Nations.

The United Nations General Assembly appointed a committee, known as UNSCOP (United Nations Special Committee on Palestine) to investigate the problem. Two plans were submitted: one a partition with economic union (Map 13a),

9 John and Hadawi, p. 97. 10 Ibid., p. 119. 77

Map 12: Jewish Agency Proposal for the Jewish State, 1946

.International Zone

Jewish State

0 Arab State

EGYPT

SCALE

10 20 Miles Kilometers Map 13: United Nations Special Committee on Palestine Proposals, 1947

13(a) U.N. General

IJI Jewish State II Jewish State D Arab State LJ Arab State

m ~ (/) t:: t:: m m t:: t:: ~ ....f:: !!l !!l ~ ~ ~ ~

< < .<:<: "( Q Q 0:: .0:: 0 0 -:, -:, I I Cl) Cl) < < "( "( 0:: 0:: EGYPT ~. /-. /-.

SCALE I I SCALE Miles

Union, 1947.

-..1 00

.. 79

supported by the majority, and the other a federal state

(Map 13b), similar to the Grady-Morrison Plan that deline ated Arab and Jewish territories also referred to as states.

On November 29, 1947, the United Nations General

Assembly adopted the partition proposal (Map 13a), which divided Palestine into six parts, three of which were included in the Jewish state and the other three, with the enclave of Jaffa, in the Arab state. This type of division was used so that almost all of the scattered areas inhab ited by Jews could be included within one contiguous

Jewish state, even though this meant including large areas owned and inhabited entirely by Arabs.

In a demographical study based on Jewish Agency figures, Mandate authorities' departments, such as the

Department of Statistics, and on an Anglo-American Commit tee of Inquiry of 1944, Professor Abu-Lughod was able to analyze the partition of population groups according to religion in areas subsequently included in the Jewish state.

In the Jenin district, about one-fourth of the districts'

Arab population (61,210 in 1946 and including no Jews) lived in that portion which was allocated to the Jewish state. In the Tulkarm district, two fairly large Arab settlements as well as numerous smaller villages were included in the Jewish area; as of December 31, 1946, the nine districts of Safad, Tiberias, Acre, Nazareth, Beisan,

Haifa, Jaffa Beersheba, and Ramle included 530,56~ Muslims, 80 ' .

85,900 Christians, and 15,070 "others", and 6 of these 11 were partially alloted to the Jewish state.

Through tpe judicious placement of settlers, the

Zionists were also able to make an argument that territory

that was largely inhabited and owned. by Arabs be incorpo-

rated in a Jewish state. In 1946, the Jewish Agency made

estimates of the size and distribution of the population

and found that 85 percent of all Jewish residents of Pales-

tine were concentrated in three areas: new Jerusalem,

Jaffa-Tel Aviv, and Haifa. The remaining 15 percent were

scattered in a few isolated sections of the north (Safad,

Acre, Tiberias, Beit Shean and Nazareth). Jews constituted

a majority in only one small sub-district of Palestine,

Jaffa-Tel Aviv, where they formed some 70 percent of the

population. Tel Aviv alone contained.40 percent of all the 12 Jews in Palestine. Although there were only 4,000 Jews

in the entire southern district of Gaza and Beersheba, most

of the Negev was alloted to the Jewish state by the parti-

tion plan, with the exception of the Gaza Strip and a small

portion of the Egyptian border zone.

In other words, it seems that the boundaries of the

Jewish state were not drawn as a function of predominance

of Jews in any given area, but as a function of the minimal

11 Janet Abu...;.Lughod, "The Demographic Transformation of Palestine", in The Transformation of Palestine, ed. Ibrahim Abu-Lughod (Evanston: Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1971), pp. 139-163. 12 Ibid., p. 153. 81

presence of Jewish settlement in that area. The maintenance

of Jewish settlement areas as scattered enclaves in large

Arab-populated areas was no oversight. The leader of the

Palmach forces, active during the 1948 military operations,

Yigael Alon, had given the explanation for this policy:

The strategic considerations which had underlain the plan of Zionist settlement decided, in large measure, the fate of many regions of the country, including areas largely or entirely settled by Arabs, such as Tiberias, Tsemah, Beit Sh'an, Acre, Haifa, and Jaffa, all of which were surrounded by Jewish villages. These areas of Jewish settlement further inland, in the heart of Arab-controlled territory, consti tuted forward bases whose main function was to hold out at all costs until the advance of the main body of troops could link up with them.l3

These remarks suggest that settlement patterns were linked,

in the minds of the Zionist leadership, to strategic

considerations in terms of securing land in the event of a military solution to the boundary issue. The United

Nations partition plan ensured that the Arab state was to

include the fewest number of Jews and Jewish holdings as possible, all areas with a minimal number of Jews having been awarded to the Jewish state. To achieve this result, the U. N. formulated a plan which included two obviously vulnerable points by which sections of the Jewish state were connected at two small links, wedged between parts of the larger Arab state (Map l3a). One such point would

13 Dov Knohl, Siege in the Hills of Hebron: Battle of the Hetzion Bloc, (New York: Yoseloff, 1958), p. 376. 82

have been situated just north of Megiddo, linking portions

of the Haifa and Nazareth districts: the other on the

coastal plain, south of Rehovot. Significantly, the

military operations of 1948 overrode these limits and

closed those gaps with territory seized by the Jewish

forces.

The United Nations partition plan allocated 56.4

percent of Palestine (including, admittedly, the nearly

empty Negev) to the Jewish state:most of the fertile and highly developed plains were incorporated therein. 14

Since only 5.6 percent of the land area was owned by Jews,

land ownership clearly was not the principal criterion used in defining the Jewish state.

David Ben Gurion summarized the approach taken by

Zionist organization to fulfill its objectives during the

British Mandate period in the following statement:

The Balfour declaration and the aim of the League of Nations Mandate would remain pieces of paper if we did not manage to bring Jews into Palestine and prepare the land for large scale settlement. Iflmigra tion and settlement would bring independence.l5

In addition to the settlement pattern, intensive

lobbying by the U.S.· government, in particular by President

Truman, played an important part in the assignment of non

Jewish zones to the new state. Significant in that respect were the steps taken by Chaim Weizman in securing the

14 John and Hadawi, vol.2, pp. 268-271

15navid Ben Gurion, Rebirth and Destiny of Israel (New York: Philosophical Library, 1954), p. 53. 83

inclusion of the port of Eilat in the Jewish zone. Indeed,

the Zionist movement's leadership was most concerned about

obtaining the control of that outlet on the Red Sea, com- 16 manding the Gulf of Aqaba.

The Actual Boundar~es

As advantageous as the U.N. Plan might have seemed,

the actual boundaries set in 1948-49 were stretched to

encompass a good portion of the projected Arab state.

By the beginning of 1948, David Ben Gurion had an- nounced that "the international calendar will not synchro 17 nize itself with ours." It was apparent that Jewish

leaders in Palestine were growing impatient with the continuing presence of British authorities in Palestine, and felt the need to prepare an offensive to affirm their military control over as much territory as possible. Before the U.N. General Assembly had voted on the partition issue,

Ben Gurion ordered secret mobilization of all Jewish forces in Palestine, and also sent missions to Europe to purchase massive quantities of arms. The Haganah High Command had a comprehensive master plan to be used during the remaining time of the Mandate: they estimated that the arms procured by Ben Gurion would arrive by October, 1947, and that Bri- tish withdrawal of military personnel would be sufficient

16 Eliahi Elath, Israel and Elath (London: Weidenfield and Nicolson, 1966), passim. 17 Ben Gurion, p. 211. 18 for major action by April, 1948. The Israeli military

historian Colonel Lorch has been very frank about the

existence of the various plans: "Plan C" for the pre-April

phase, and "Plan D", or "Plan Dalet" to be implemented when

the Haganah could feel reasonably safe from British inter-

ference and when mobilization would have reached a suffi 19 cient level to implement a large-scale action.

Thus although the British were officially safe-

guarding the territory until May 15, 1948, para-military

activity was already taking place within Palestine. Zionist

sympathizers in the British Army, such as Orde Wingate, 20 secretly trained Jewish_ comrnandos , and plans were de-

veloped for seizure of as much territory as possible within

and without the area given the Jewish state by the United 21 Nations Resolution.

As of April, 1948, only 30,000 Palestinians had left

the country, overwhelmingly from the well-to-do middle and 22 upper class families. However, according ta_U~N. reports,

18 Netanel Lorch, The Edge of the Sword: Israel's War of Independence, 1947-1949 (New York: Putnam, 1961), p. 88; David Kimche and Jon Kimche, Both Sides of the Hill: Bri tain and the Palestine War (London: Seeker and Wartburg, 1960), pp. 91-94. 19 Lorch, p. 87. 20 Leonard .Mosley, Gideon Goes to War: The Story of Major General Orde C. Wingate (New York: Charles Scribner, 1956). 21 Childers, pp. 177-181. 22 Ibid., p. 181. 85

by May 15 there were 300,000 Palestine-Arab refugees in the Jordan Valley, in Lebanon, and in Syria, out of a population of 1.4 million Palestinian Arabs.

This sudden increase in the numbers of refugees can be attributed to the massive terror campaigns launched by

Zionist commands-such as the Irgun Avai Leumi, famous for its massacre of 250 Arab men, women, and children in the 23 village of Deir Yassin, and also to the Haganah military 24 offensive launched in April, 1948. Military attacks, accompanied by psychological terror tactics, were used in

Haifa on April 21, Jaffa on April 25, and in Acre on April

27, then in Tiberias, and on April 28, all Arab vi~lages 25 between Safad and Tiberias were seized and destroyed.

Clearly, these military operations played a major role in modifying the boundaries which had been outlined by the U.N. partition plan. Indeed, Jaffa, Acre, Safad and the countryside to its south had been assigned to the Arab state, but the forced departure of their Arab populations made it possible for Jewish military forces to occupy these areas--as well as the intended International Zone of

Jerusalem--even before actual British departure.

23Jon Kimche, Seven Fallen Pillars: The Middle East, 1945-52 (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1953), p. 257. 24 Lorch, pp. 84, 89. 25 childres, p. 190, quotes Wilson, Gordon and Search; Kimche, Seven Fallen Pillars, pp. 233-234; Lorch, p. 103. CHAPTER X

BOUNDARY C}UffiGES AFTER ISRAEL'S INDEPENDENCE

The 1948-1956 Era On May 15, 1948, the Mandate expired. Israel de- clared itself an independent state and forces from Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon entered Palestine, ostensibly to protect the Arab population from further Jewish military encroachment and thereby guarantee the territorial integrity of the Arab-Palestinian state. The war of 1948 is referred to by the Israelis as the War of Independence or the War of Liberation, implying that it was a struggle to create an-independent Jewish state. However, such terminology conveys a distorted image, since neither the British nor.non-Palestinian Arabs were in control of Palestine. Palestinians viewed the war as one to ensure that the majority ethnic group of the people of Pa lestine would govern the country. Arabs constituted 69 percent of the population of Palestine in 1946, while in the area of the Jewish state, the Arab and Jewish popula tions were approximately equal.l Therefore, some

lunited Nations, Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestine Question, Official Record of the 2nd Session of the General Assembly, Append~x 1 to Report of Subcomrn~ttee I, 1946, p.270.

86 87

historians have suggested that ''Palestine War" is more 2 f a1r. 1 y d escr1pt1ve. . .

Although the war officially lasted eight months, un-

til the Egyptian armistice in February of 1949, the fight-

ing took place during only a small part of the time, being

repeatedly interrupted by truces and cease-fires imposed 3 by the United Nations.

At the close of the war, Israel held 23 percent more territory than had been granted to the Jewish state under the U.N. Partition Plan. Jerusalem was divided and the

Arab refugees in Syria, Lebanon, and the West Bank of Jor- 4 dan and Gaza numbered 750,000. Indeed, according to

Abu-Lughod's demographic analysis quoted above, the Israeli census taken in November, 1948, showed a total of 130,000 non-Jews in all of Israel, though some 900,000 non-Jews would then have been living in territories held by Israel had disruption not occurred.

Israel was able to occupy the entire Negev and Arabah

Valley and obtain access to the Gulf of Aqaba. All that was left to the Arabs was half the city of Jerusalem, the

2 David Waines, The Unholy War: Israel and Palestine, 1897-1971 (Montreal: Chateau Books Limited, 1971), p. 113. 3 Nadav Safran, From War to War: The Arab-Israeli Confrontation 1948-1967 (New York: Pegasus, 1969), p. 30. 4 sir Anthony Buzzard, Israel and the Arabs: The Way Forward (Oxford: The British Council of Churches, 1964), p. 3. 5 Eqbal Ahmad, "An Essay in Reconciliation", The Nation, March 22, 1980, pp. 341-343. 88

Nablus and Hebron Hills, and the Jordan Valley areas, which were added to the Kingdom of Jordan and the Gaza Strip 6 which was administered by Egypt. The territory gained by the Israelis in 1949 gave them approximately that which had been proposed by the Jewish Agency as the Jewish state in

1946 (Map 12) .

In the case of the Israeli-Syrian frontier, the Gen- eral Armistice Agreement, signed on July 20, 1949, stated that the Armistice Demarcation Line would be midway between the existing truce lines. Where these lines ran slong the international boundary between Syria and Palestine, the

Armistice Demarcation Line would follow the boundary line

(Map 14).

Where the Armistice Demarcation Line does not corre spond to the international boundary between Syria and Palestine, the area between the Armistice Demarcation Line and the boundary, pending final territorial set tlement between the Parties, shall be established as a demili tari.zed Zone from which the armed forces of both Parties shall be totally excluded, and in which no activities by military or para-military forces shall be permitted. This provision applies to the Ein Gev and Dardara sectors which shall form part of the Demilitarized Zone.7

Despite these restrictions, five Israeli settlements were founded in the Syrian Demilitarized Zones· in 1949 after the signing of the Armistice Agreement, allowing for a secret military presence in the Demilitarized Zone. North

6 Anon., Middle East and North Africa, 1967-68 (London: Europa Publications Limited, 1967), p. 329. 7 UAR, Documents and Papers, p. 360. 89

Map 14: Armistice Lines, 1949

SYRIA

Mediterranean Sea

Nablus •

Ramallah•

z <:( a cr; 0 -, I C/) z <:( cr; 1-

- Armistice Line SCALE 0 10 20 Miles ~ 10,20 /o Kilometers

SOURCE: Vilnay, P.108. 90

of Kinneret, also in the Zone, Israel began building the canal which later formed the National Water Carrier to supply the Negev se~tlments. Through military-insured settlement and construction in territory defined by the

Armistice Agreement as demilitarized, Israel was able to gain full control of the Syrian-Palestine border area.

The establishment of Israel allowed the Israeli authorities full control of immigration and settlement for the first time. Not surprisingly, both increased dramati- cally. Radical changes obcurred politically and culturally; 8 in many cases, complete "population transfusions" took place.

The distribution of Jewish settlements contributed greatly to the formation of the Israeli-Jordanian boundary in Judea and Samaria. Comparison of the Armistice boundaries (Map 14) with the Jewish settlements established by

1948 (Maps l5-l5a), makes it clear that areas where Jewish colonies were totally absent remained mostly under Arab control, while the presence of Jewish settlements almost ensured control of that area by Israelis. Only seven

Jewish settlements remained outside the Israel armistice lines: the villages of Atarot and Neweh Ya'aqov, Bet ha-

Arava, Kefar Darom, and the Izyon Bloc. The first two and the Izyon Bloc were located near Jerusalem, Bet ha-

Araba just north of the Dead Sea, and Kefar Darom in the

8 Alexander Berler, New Towns in Israel, (Garden City: Doubleday & Co., p. 48. Map 15: Jewish Settlements Established 1870 - 1965

1870- 1899 1900-1932 1933 -1947 1948- 1965

Mediterranean Mediterranean Mediterranean Mediterranean

Sea .. Sea Sea ..... ·'~ .. Sea ~ .• ": ... : ...... ,.\ ~ . ~·'. \ . .,,.. , .., ;:•. ··~ l .. ='·'. . ;~·,' .,. ; ,~ ~ ·...... :.·· .: ' ...... '\ '"\.•. ... :\ ".; ...:~: :, ···::: ••a..: •• ... ..·.·...... \.\. . ...· ~ ·: •••• ! .·-

SDURCE: Orni, P.248.

OlO 20 30 Kilometers CD I-' 92

15(a): Jewish Urban Settlements Through 1965

Urban Settlements Before 1917 * 1918-1931 0 1932-1947 X 1948-1954 • 1955-1965 +

r-. Mediterranean Sea : • (""Sh•'•o•

Herzliyya o o * Kefar Sava oo o I . oo*ePetah Tikvah J a ffa- T e I Av1v ••. j Rishon le-Zion * * e Lad ** • Ramla

*Rehovo~e Bet ... *Jerusalem Shemesh / eKiryat Gat

Beersheba e Arad +

+ Dimona

+ Yeroham

+ Mizpeh Ramon

SCALE

0 10 2o Miles I I ' 0 1h 2b 3b Kilometers 93

Map 16: Stages in Israel's War of Independence, 194 7 - 1949

• Jewish ·owned .:.~rea at beqinninq of war. m Areas token before M.~v 14 . 1948. lmlJAreas t;;i-en bet\\·een May 14 and June 11 . 1948 (before th e first cease- fire). .

• Areas ta~~n m th~ penod between the t\\'O cease - fi res {July 9 18, ; 9·1 8 \ ar.d until "Opera uon Te n Plagues. "

0 Areas af!ded in ooerations "Ten Pl agues ... "Ha-Har" and "Hiram" (October 15 - 31. 1948).

~Areas added"' operations "Lot" and "A, in" {December. i9-18!

DAreas added"' "Operation Uvda" (Marcn . 1949).

(ll]]]Areas given to Israel in the 1949 armistice agreements (was under Iraqi control).

ISRAEL

Mediterranean Sea

EGYPT

SCALE 0 10 20 Miles 0 10 20 30 Kilometers 94

Gaza Strip. These small communities, isolated from other 9 Jewish settlements, were abandoned early in the war.

However, an area of the Negev, which was entirely free of

Israeli settlements and sparsely populated by Bedouins,

was added to the Jewish state mainly through military oper-

ation in December, 1948 (Map 16), bringing Israel's western

border to the former Egypt-Palestine Mandate line.

Apart from the role of settlement patterns in deter- mining the Israeli frontier, it seems likely that an "under-

standing" between King Abdullah of Jordan and the Israeli 10 authorities helped shape the Israel-Jordan border. The

Iraqi Army controlled the front which reached within ten miles of the Mediterranean Sea (Map 16). The Armistice

Agreement stated that Jordanian troops would replace the

Iraqis and that King Abdullah would nego~iate on their

behalf. When Iraqi troops pulled out, the area was given

to Israel, some suspect by pre-arrangement with King Abdul-

lah. A sort of "trade-off" was effectuated: as Israel gain-

ed control over the Megiddo Pass area, Israeli-occupied areas

southwest of Hebron were handed over and added to Jordan.

The Egyptian-Israeli boundary remained the same as

the Rafah-Taba line of 1906. However, the Gaza Strip, a

small section of the proposed Arab state, was taken over

9 E. Orni, Agrarian Reform and Social Progress in Israel, p. 399. 10 Arie Bober, ed:, The Other Israel, (Garden City: Doubleday & Co., 1972), p. 48. 95

by the Egyptians, who administered it until 1967. Along

the Lebanese frontier, the line followed that of Mandate

Palestine.

The 1949 boundaries of Israel were determined by the

Armistice Agreements between the individual parties

involved: Israel, Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, and Egypt. The

United Nations partition decision of November 29, 1947 was no longer binding. That decision had proposed an entirely

different boundary arrangement for both Arab and Jewish

states, shaped by specific conditions that were no longer

applicable.

As was indicated previously, prior settlement was a major factor in the balance of forces and in the eventual

establishment of control. Practically all areas in which

there were Jewish settlements,. however few or isolated, passed under Israeli control, thereby helping to determine 11 what came to be regarded as Israeli boundaries. The

settlements have continued to be one of the key factors in

Israeli security.

Within boundaries established by the armistice,

Israel had large areas available for settlement. The mas-

sive number of immigrants that arrived immediately follow-

ing statehood were at first mainly accommodated in aban doned Arab villages an thecoastal plain and in the hills of

11 I mm1grat1on . . an d s ett 1 ement, p. 93 96

12 Jerusalem and Galilee. In the first few years of statehood, Jewish National Fund (JNF) holdings were doubled.

Abandoned Arab lands which were immediately cultivable or lands with potential for reclamation were transferred to the JNF as a "necessary preliminary for the mass settlement 13 of that period." By May of 1950, 123,669 immigrants 14 were settled in formerly Arab homes. Temporary camps

(ma'-barot) were also set up to accomodate the newcomers.

During this initial period, there was an enormous advance in the establishment of new settlements. Most of the first towns (Beit Shean, Akko, Lod, Ramla, Yavne,

Ashquelon, and Beersheba) were built adjacent to or in 15 former Arab centers.

From 1948 to the end of 1951, the number of Jewish settlements doubled. More than 300 were created in these first few years, but later, as immigration slowed, government agencies had more time to consider the results of past policies and to plan for the future. The temporary camps had inadequately served immigrant needs and settlement distribution did not "correspond either to the traditional idea of well-balanced settlement structure or to the needs

12 Ibid., pp. 56, 97. 13 orni, Agrarian Reform, pp. 27, 32. 14 rmmigration and Settlement, p. 57. 15 Erika Spiegel, New Towns in Israel: Urban andRe gional Planning and Development (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), p. 23. f or ml'1' ltary an d po 1'ltlca · 1 securlty· " 16 wh lC· h requlre' d t h at

a network of settlements be established throughout ·the 17 country, particularly in underdeveloped and underpopulat-

ed areas, and the government became intent on offsetting

the concentration of population in the coastal strip and . 18 Tel Aviv, Haifa, and Jerusalem.

\~ile the assignment of immigrants to developing

towns initially resulted in a more balanced distribution of the population, this balance has been difficult to maintain. In 1961, the development towns experienced a

40 percent turnover as compared with the national rate of

5 percent for that year. Generally, those wit~ greater economic opportunities migrated to the urban centers, leaving behind the less productive elements of the

population. Spiegel noted that the tendency to concentrate in the coastal zone and the big cities, which developed in the pre-state period, was still visible, by 19 1967, in nearly all spontaneous population movements.

The post-1948 distribution of population and settlements brought the most dramatic changes to the southern or

16 Ibid. , p. 9

17ornl, . Agrarlan . Re f orm, p. 247

18Israel, Ministry of the Interior, Planning Depart-, ment, National Planning for the Redistribution of Popula tion and the Establishment of New Towns in Israel, Inter national Federation for Housing and Planning, 27th World Congress for Housing and Planning, Jerusalem, 1964, p. 16.

19E. Spiegel, p. 179. 98

Negev area. There, Beersheba was developed into a major

Israeli city and a number of smaller centers and rural 20 settlements were established. The percentage of the total population located in the southern area grew from 0.8 percent in 1948 to 8 percent by 1961, while the percentage in the northern administrative district grew from 7.7 percent of the total to 10 percent, and the central district from

15 percent to 19.7 percent. During this period, there was a corresponding decrease in the porportion of the population 21 residing in Haifa, Tel Aviv, and Jerusalem.

The establishment of Israel also resulted in modifi- cation of farm patterns. The rural population increased from 12.7 percent of the total in 1948 to 17 percent in 22 1964. Farms became more specialized and more mechanized, 23 with an emphasis on export crops and villages_were_inte~ grated into comprehensive regional structures that reached to Israel's borders and allowed for more coordination of economic and security considerations than had been possible in the pre-1948 era.

Soon after the occupation of the Negev in 1949, Is- rael built a new paved road between the recently

20 Israel, Ministry of Interior, National Planning, pp. 4-5. 21 Ibid. , p. 6-7. 22 Ibid., p. 19. 23 Immigration and Settlement, pp. 98-99. 99

established port of Eilat and the major cities north of the

Negev. The Israelis were eager to develop trade through

this port, but the use of Eilat was impossible then because

the Egyptians had the Straits of Tiran under their control, ,. and they were refusing Israeli shipping passage through the

straits. The concluding of an arms agreement between Egypt

and the U.S.S.R. in 1955 served to make Nasser the undis- puted leader of the Arab East. Egypt began a build-up of

troops in the Sinai. Although this build-up and the block-

ade of Tiran contributed to the Israeli attack in 1956,

also of considerable importance was Nasser's national-

ization of the Suez Canal in June, 1956. Although the

nationalization of the Canal did not affect Israel directly,

since she had been denied its use, it did bring the Canal's principal shareholders, Britain and France, into the

conflict.

According to Safran, in October Britain and France

concluded a pact with ~srael to regain control of the

Canal. It was agreed that Israel would invade the Sinai, and Britain and France would enter Egypt to "stop" the war 24 and ensure an open Canal. Israel invaded on October 29, and with British and French assistance, took control of the entire Sinai in four days. Although Israel agreed to withdraw from most of the territory it occupied, aU. N.

Emergency Force was set up to patrol the Egyptian

24 Middle East and North Africa, 1973-1974, p. 366. 100

territories-- the Gaza Strip, Sinai, and the entrance to the 25 Gulf of Aqaba. The presence of the United Nations troops provided·the Israeli ships with "safe passage" through the

Tiran Straits: this was important for Israeli trade with

Africa and Asia, and particularly for the oil supplied by

Iran and Indonesia. Effectively, then, Israel's southern maritime access was extended as a result of the post-1956 presence of the U.N. Emergency Force.

The 1956-1980 Era

The period since the Sinai War of 1956 has been characterized by drastic fluctuations in the area under Israeli control. Israel obtained control of the greater part of the Sinai Peninsula as a result of her victory over Egypt, but had to withdraw within a few months because of pres- sures from the United States, the Soviet Union, and the

United Nations. In 1967, military victories over Egypt,

Jordan, and Syria allowed Israel to occupy the Sinai, the

West Bank, and the Golan Heights (Map 17). As of April 25,

1982, the latter two areas remained under Israeli occupation, while the Sinai territory was returned to Egypt as part of the peace settlement between Israel and Egypt.

The occupied West Bank and the Golan are important to

Israel in several respects, and Israel shows great

25 N. Safran, pp. 52-53. 101

M 17: Territories Occupied by Israel During 1967 War

.Territi orie. s of Palestine proposed under tPe U.N . partition plan ior the establishment '-----.JI of a Jewish state. SYRIA Territories of Pal-:!st1ne seized bv Israel in 1.948 and 1949 in excess of the U.N. partition plan.

I. ITerritor ies seized by Israel in June, l~ESTE RN GAL/ L E

• lrbid

Mediterranean Sea

JORDAN

U.A.R.-

EGYPT .SINA}

SAUDI ARABIA

SCALE

0 10 20 Miles 1 ~ 10 20 30 Kilometers Red Sea

SOURCE: Westerman, 102

reluctance to part with them. Seizure of the West Bank

from Jordan moved Israel's military frontier approximately

20-40 miles eastward to a truce line along the Jordan River

and Dead Sea. This iave Israeli coastal settlements, es

pecially those in the narrow "neck" between Tel Aviv and

Hadera, greater security than had been possible earlier when Jordanian forces stood as close as 13 miles from the

Mediterranean. Similarly, Israel's conquest of the Golan

Heights reduced the danger of shelling for existing Israeli

settlements in the north. Another advantage to Israel of

it occupation of the western slope of Mt. Hermon in Syria

and the adjacent lands stretching from the Golan Heights

to the Yarmuk River, was that this enabled it· ·to· destroy

the pumping station for the East Ghor canal. This elimi nated possible diversion of part of the water resources of

the Jordan River system which are vital to Israeli irri

gation schemes in the Negev.

While Israel's desire for "secure and recognized borders" is understandable, her settlement policies in occupied territories are less easy to interpret charitably.

Soon after the 1967 War, more than nineteen Israeli settle ments were established on the Golan Heights (Map 18) and a

development program began that has contributed to Israeli

reluctance to return the territory to Syria. Likewise, the very substantial Israeli settlement program in the occupied

West Bank seems inconsistent with ultimate Israeli with

drawal to her internationally recognized frontiers. 103

ment Lines

Damascus •

Dareiya••

LEBANON

SYRIA

ISRAEL

3CALE

Nazareth c 10 20 Miles • D 10 20 30 Kilometers 104

Consequently, it is easy to understand the Arab contention

that Israel's purpose in the Golan and West Bank is not

just temporary occupation in quest of military security,

but rather annexation of all of mandate Palestine and the

Golan to Israel.

Frustration with Israel's continuing occupation of

Arab lands led to the October War of 1973. Unlike previous

Arab-Israeli conflicts. this could be called a draw. Sub

sequently, Israel and Syria agreed to disengage their

forces and demilitarize the zone south of Mt. Hermon down

to Rafid, east of Quneitra and west of Ojeba. This zone

is marked by lines A and B (Map 18). Israel would stay to

the west of Line A (with the exception of the Quneitra area which goes to A-1) and Syria's forces would stay east of

Line B. Although Syria would technically administer the

demilitarized zone, no Syrians would live in it for the

fear of renewed fighting. Hence, through this agreement,

Syria in effect lost the use of land which it had regained

after the fighting.

As a result of U.S. sponsored peace negotiations,

Egypt and Israel agreed to a phased withdrawal of Israeli

forces from the Sinai. Initially the western two-thirds of the Sinai peninsula were returned to Egypt, with the

final one-third returned to Egyptian administration in

April of 1982. CHAPTER XI

CONCLUSION

As this thesis has sought to show,the borders around

and within the Palestinian territory have fluctuated since

the late 1890's, and these changes have in turn affected

the geopolitical morphology of the Holy Land itself as well

as the manner in which its territory has been conceived.

These changes, which have intensified since the

establishment of a Jewish National Home,and later the Stat~

do not solely reflect military strength in any true sense

or legal decisions enacted on the international level, but

also the results of a political campaign in the Middle East

along with Jewish settlement patterns, which some believe

were in accord with a pre-conceived plan.

We have seen that major parts of the area were added

to the Jewish state without consideration of actual settle

ment density or military presence, the Negev in particular.

The U.N. partition plan of 1948 indeed allocated the Negev

to Israel independently of any presence of substantial

settlements. Also, although there was no actual war in

1948 at the Lebanon border, a certain amount of territory

was annexed by Israel in Galilee within Mandate Palestine:

.but in excess of that allotted by the partition plan.

This process of annexation by default,so to speak,that is

105 106

without any serious opposition from neighboring states, was repeated in the western foothills of Samaria in 1949, when the Jordanians failed to replace the Iraqi troops and

Israeli forces were able to simply move in. The suspicion that some boundary lines followed pre-arranged decisions and a balance of world interests rather than precise military lines could be strengthened by reference to the

Syrian broadcast of the Golan Heights surrender before it had eventuated.

The hypotheses of this thesis were formulated five years ago, before the present peace treaty negotiations between Israel and Egypt had begun: however, these hypo theses already suggested that the 1973 War and the Disen gagement Pact might lead to such events. It could be argued that in the present stage,. actual changes of boundaries and territorial cession have become of lesser importance than the maintenance of.the status quo in the area by mutual agreement.

Indeed, during the 1973 War, both Syria and Egypt disposed of sophisticated armaments capable of inflicting severe damage to ·Israeli installations, but did not use them. Syria, for instance, was armed with long-range SAM missiles which could have penetrated far into Israeli territory without being intercepted. The fighting between

Syria and Israel was limited to a front-line border zone and did not, in effect, include its hinterlands, while

Israel also had the military strength to push further than 107

it did into Syrian territory. Thus, casualties seemed

limited on both sides to troops; civilian targets were

carefully avoided.

One factor paramount to boundary changes within the

Holy Land is the relationship between the concerns of great

pmvers with the area and the "elasticity" of the border

itself. Since the rift developed between the Ottoman and

British empires, changes were effectuated in response to

British desire for stability in an area beyond that actual

ly included by a given border. In particular, Britain's

concern over the Suez Canal Zone and Palestine in general

reflected its concern for the maintenance of connections

with India, then within its sphere of influence.

Thus, . the concept of "insecurity" can be used to

justify territorial expansion and boundary "rectification"

within the political parameters of the period. tVith

respect to the State of Israel, this writer suspects that

these parameters might have been the "ideological blitz"

created internationally by the Zionist Organization and

de facto cooperation and acceptance by the neighboring

Arab states.

The modern Zionist movement was born as a result of

the revived Jewish consciousness of a group subjected to discrimination and pogroms in some European countries, and

it drew on ancient Biblical roots. The establishment of a

Jewish state and continuing migration thereto was the

primary solution sought by the Zionists. However, Palestine, 108

the land chosen for the Jewish national home, has only li-

mited economic and especially agricultural potential, and

water supplies are limited: Jewish migration by contrast

theoretically is unlimited by Israeli law, a situation

which could put pressure on the boundaries. When the Zion-

ist Organization first used the term "Palestine" officially

at its congress of 1897, no boundary definition was stated,

nor was it included in·the memorandum to Mark Sykes on

January 31, 1917 detailing the political basis for the Jew-

ish national home. The Peace Conference Proposal of 1919

shaped Mandate boundaries according to the economic and

defensive needs of the time, largely in accordance with

British interests and concepts including the "Dan-to-Beer-

sheba" Biblical description proposed by British Prime

Minister Lloyd George. However, the Zionists, according

to Vilnay's Atlas, estimated these boundaries (Map 2d) to be fixed on the following historical basis:

the boundary lines on this map were fixed in ac cordance with the history of ancient Israel and of Jewish settlement in these areas as attested by historical scholarship and the archeological remnants that have been found there.l

Thus appear the uncertainties in which the proponents of the new Jewish state were to find themselves with respect to boundaries. With the placing of Palestine and Trans- jordan unde the British Mandate, and with the boundary adjustment that took place between 1919 and 1923,

1zev Vilnay, The New Israel Atlas (New York: McGraw Hill Book Co., 1969), p. 104. 109

"Palestine" started to take on a new shape which the Zion ists regarded as that of their national home, although the

Palestinian-Jordanian territory had been reduced--much to some Zionists' chagrin--from 45,000 to 10,000 square miles.

Nevertheless, the borders were drawn in accord with British perceptions and ·strategy at that time, and, as their fate was then tied to British protection, the Zionists could not effectuate boundary decisions exclusively according to their own ideological parameters. It was only when they freed themselves from British control that they were able to extend their territory in response to their awn strategy.

In the course of the partition plan discussions, the

Zionists aimed again at obtaining more territory than the great powers were willing to allocate to them. Even so, their political influence enable them to obtain the Hula

Valley, upper Jordan, and the Negev with access to Aqaba without actual settlements in the area. They were in a position to expand their frontiers in these directions only during the 1948 war, a fact largely due· to the inadequate military response from the Arab states.

Today, the issue of borders for the Holy Land remains a controversial one. On the one hand, specific territories remain in dispute thereby tempting boundary change by mili tary action. On the other hand, the very existence of the state of Israel on the territory of Palestine is viewed as an affront to Arab nationalism. Unfortunately, the future of the region still appear uncertain, at best. BIBLIOGRAPHY

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