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As Mirrored in This Volume of His Letters, the Years 1937-38 Were For

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As Mirrored in This Volume of His Letters, the Years 1937-38 Were For THE LETTERS AND PAPERS OF CHAIM WEIZMANN January 1937 – December 1938 Volume XVIII, Series A Introduction: Aaron Klieman General Editor Barnet Litvinoff, Volume Editor Aaron Klieman, Transaction Books, Rutgers University and Israel Universities Press, Jerusalem, 1979 [Reprinted with express permission from the Weizmann Archives, Rehovot, Israel, by the Center for Israel Education www.israeled.org.] As mirrored in this volume of his letters, the years 1937-38 were for Chaim Weizmann the most critical period of his political life since the weeks preceding the issuance of the Balfour Declaration in November 1917. We observe him at the age of 64 largely drained of physical strength, his diplomatic orientation of collaboration with Great Britain under attack, and his leadership challenged by a generation of younger, militant Zionists. In his own words he was 'a lonely man standing at the end of a road, a via dolorosa. I have no more courage left to face anything—and so much is expected from me.' This situation found its prelude in 1936, when Arab unrest compelled the British Government to undertake a comprehensive reassessment of its policy in Palestine. A Royal Commission headed by Lord Peel was charged with investigating the causes of the disturbances. Weizmann, alert to the implications, took great pains to ensure that the Zionist case was presented with the utmost cogency. As President of the Zionist Organization and of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, he delivered the opening statement on behalf of the Jews to the Royal Commission in Jerusalem on 25 November 1936. He subsequently gave evidence four times in camera, and directed the presentation of evidence by other Zionist witnesses and maintained informal contact with members of the Commission. With its departure from Palestine early in 1937, he could discern the rough outlines of the recommendations likely to be submitted to the Government. For on 8 January one of the Commission's members, Professor Reginald Coupland, had broached to him the idea of dividing Palestine into two separate Arab and Jewish states. Weizmann's response was studiously non-committal. Palestine had already been partitioned to the detriment of the Jews, with the formation of Transjordan in 1921-22. As a solution partition ran contrary to the entire official Zionist position, which had stressed on numerous occasions the need for more vigorous application by the British authorities of the terms of the Mandate as ratified by the League of Nations in 1922. Zionist planning was predicated on the further development of the country under the aegis and protection of Great Britain; and now here was a far-reaching, almost revolutionary, proposal to abolish the Mandate completely. Finally, partition embodied the idea of Jewish statehood, a concept which few Zionists had hitherto dared to express publicly and even fewer considered practicable in the early future. Weizmann asked for more time, to consider the idea and to consult his colleagues. However, he subsequently explored the proposal with Coupland at some length, aided by the use of maps. They had a private meeting at which all remaining doubts were dispelled, and in a burst of enthusiasm Weizmann was reported to have remarked that 'we have laid the foundations of the Jewish State!' He felt inspired by the prospect of Jewish sovereignty at last, but nothing could ease the heavy toll which strenuous activities and tension had taken of him, both physically and mentally, during the previous year. He was worn out. And on his return to London the air of uncertainty which he found there added to his anxieties. His experience with English politics and politicians taught him, above all, the value of caution. As a statesman who preferred to deal with realities rather than with abstractions and pious wishes, Weizmann appreciated just how fragile was the dream of statehood. For partition to succeed it would first have to be endorsed by the Government and then be enforced against the opposition of both anti-Zionists and maximalist Zionists. He therefore took nothing for granted in the safeguarding of what he saw as the movement's best interests and in the encouragement of British leaders in the fateful decisions necessary. It was vital to prepare Zionist strategy for any eventuality. In his public statements the Jewish leader continued to insist on strict adherence by Great Britain to its obligations, and to a full implementation of the Mandate. In private discussion, however, Weizmann expressed guarded optimism about a fundamental re-ordering of Anglo- Zionist relations. He travelled to Paris to meet Leon Blum in January 1937, coming away with the French Premier's endorsement of partition and a Jewish State. And, availing himself of the delay in publication of the Royal- Commission's report, he retreated to the Continent for some much-needed medical attention and rest. These were but brief interludes in Weizmann's sustained activity for a favourable report. At a dinner given by Sir Archibald Sinclair on 8 June, he discussed partition with a number of prominent British figures, including Winston Churchill and Leopold Amery, both former Colonial Secretaries known for their support of Zionism. This gave him a foretaste of the difficulties which lay ahead. His dinner companions, with the exception of Amery, vigorously opposed the partition of Palestine, on the grounds that it would be unworkable and a betrayal of Zionism. Churchill insisted that the Jews should persevere with the Mandate as the only course. Equally frustrating for Weizmann were parallel efforts at achieving a Jewish consensus in advance of the report. He argued within Zionist councils that partition, if implemented, would enable the Jews to embark on a great enterprise. Urging the immediate necessity of purchasing new tracts of land in Palestine, he explained how this would guarantee 'a wide and still more extensive domain in Eretz-risrael' . However, he found most Jews, even his fellow-Zionists, hesitant and divided over the prospects, implications and merits of a partition solution. Small wonder, therefore, that the last days before publication of the long-awaited Peel Commission Report saw Weizmann tense. He assessed the situation as leaving everything in a state of suspended animation. 'We are groping in the dark', he wrote to Stephen Wise in America. He was torn between the dangers of having Britain renounce its Mandate and the great appeal of Jewish self-government. He warned Wise of how essential it was that 'we should all stand united, keep cool heads, and not burn our boats on either side'. Finally, on 7 July, the months of speculation ended. The Peel Report, comprising 400 pages, was found, on balance, to be not unsatisfactory from the Zionist standpoint. While defining the nature, roots and causes of the enduring Palestine problem as a clash between Arab and Jewish nationalism, the Commission had been genuinely impressed by the manifold achievements registered in Palestine by the Zionist settlers. Weizmann could hardly have been unmoved at the praise expressed by so authoritative a body for Jewish endeavours in the economic, cultural and social revitalisation of the Holy Land, and its acknowledgement that, in terms of history, the Jewish people had a legitimate claim to Palestine. But so, according to the Peel Report, did the Arabs of Palestine. This basic situation of 'a conflict of right with right', and with a widening of the gulf between the Arab and Jewish communities, led the Commission to conclude that the British Mandate was no longer workable. Despairing of effecting a reconciliation between the two national movements, each bent on complete sovereignty over all of Palestine, the report advised that 'the only hope of a cure lies in a surgical operation': partition of the country into separate states. Simultaneous with publication of the report, the Government issued a statement of intent, recording its 'general agreement' with the report's arguments and conclusions. It described partition as 'the best and most hopeful solution of the deadlock' in Palestine, and proposed taking 'such steps as are necessary and appropriate' to implement the scheme. For Weizmann, here at last was something concrete, an explicit British policy for Palestine. It now became possible, indeed crucial, to debate the partition proposal openly, to rally Jewish support and to formulate a specific course of action. And as a practical politician he knew he must apply all his influence to ensure that the Chamberlain Government carried out its declared policy, with the best territorial conditions obtainable for the Jewish State. For more than a year Weizmann sought to close Jewish ranks while labouring to penetrate the innermost circles of policy-making in London. From July 1937, when partition first became a topic of serious public debate, until November 1938, when it was formally discredited and rejected by the Cabinet, he pursued these goals with more vigour than success. The partition concept threatened to create a schism within the Jewish world reminiscent of the clash between supporters and opponents of the controversial East Africa (Uganda) scheme which occurred during the Seventh Zionist Congress, attended by Weizmann, in 1905. This time the debate took place at the Twentieth Congress, at Zurich in August 1937, shortly after publication of the Peel Report. Both Weizmann and the partition proposal were subjected to intense criticism, with opposition bringing together such disparate groups as the Mizrachi religious Zionists, who viewed the Biblical boundaries of Palestine as inviolate, and the Socialists of Hashomer Hatzair, who stressed the feasibility of Arab-Jewish working-class cooperation and who therefore found the spirit of partition retrograde. This nucleus of Weinsagers', drawing supporters from the entire Zionist ideological spectrum, had its most determined advocate in Menahem Ussishkin, elder statesman of the movement and traditionally opposed to Weizmann's leadership.
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