Olive Press Research Paper issue 4 february 2009 1 Churchill and the Jews: an assessment of two recent studies and their contemporary relevance by Michael Eldridge Churchill and the Jews: an assessment of two recent studies and their contemporary relevance by Michael Eldridge 2 Welcome to the Olive Press Research Paper – the replacement for the Olive Press Quarterly. This features articles that cover a wide spectrum of issues which relate to the ministry of CMJ. Articles are contributed by CMJ staff (past and present), also by Trustees, Representatives, CMJ supporters or by interested parties. Articles do not necessarily portray CMJ’s standpoint on a particular issue but may be published on the premise that they allow a pertinent understanding to be added to any particular debate. ‘The Faithful Friend of Zionism’ Among the many tributes paid to Churchill following his death in 1965 is one from Henry Sacher in the Jewish Chronicle which reads, ‘We Jews are under a special obligation to Churchill, the faithful friend of Zionism.’1 Sacher was one of the British Zionists who had helped with the drafting of the Balfour Declaration nearly fifty years earlier. Martin Gilbert’s recent book, Churchill and the Jews, seeks to show how this accolade came to be deserved, tracing Churchill’s involvement with the Jews from his opposing the Aliens Bill of 3 1904 which made it harder for Jews escaping the pogroms in Russia to enter Britain, to his pleading as Leader of the Opposition in 1948 for the immediate recognition by Britain of the newly self-declared State of Israel. Martin Gilbert is the official biographer of Churchill and Professor of History at Oxford; a prolific writer, he has also written books on the Holocaust and is the author of one of the major histories of modern Israel. But for many Jews Churchill proved a great disappointment and they hold that he did little to help them. The case to this effect is strongly argued by Michael Cohen, Professor of Bar Ilan University, whose 1985 book, also with the title Churchill and the Jews, was republished in a second edition in 2003. Gilbert includes Cohen’s book in his bibliography but otherwise simply ignores it. Where does the truth lie? Churchill had close dealings with the Jews, in particular, in three periods: when as Colonial Secretary 1919-21 he had special responsibility for Palestine and the Middle East; in his role in opposing both the Peel Commission’s proposals in 1937 and the infamous White Paper of 1939; and during the Second World War as Prime Minister 1940-45. Churchill’s Record as Colonial Secretary As Colonial Secretary in Lloyd George’s post-war Government, Churchill was charged with agreeing the terms of the Mandates for Palestine and the Middle East to be granted to Britain by the League of Nations. One significant step Churchill took was to separate the land east of the Jordan (now known as Jordan) from the rest of Palestine and to let the Emir Abdullah rule it in 1 Gilbert, 2007, p. 306. Britain’s name. For some Zionists at the time this was seen as a betrayal, for they believed that with irrigation this territory had great agricultural potential; they also saw it as part of the biblical land of Israel. But in fairness to Churchill, different and, many would argue, incompatible promises had been made to the Jews and Arabs respectively in the course of the War, and he believed, I think with good reason, that he was enabling Britain to honour the promises made to both groups. Further, not all Jews took this negative view. 4 Some thirty years later, James de Rothschild, a leading British Jew, wrote to Churchill, … you laid the foundation of the Jewish state by separating Abdullah’s kingdom from the rest of Palestine. Without this much opposed prophetic foresight there would not have been an Israel today.2 The Lloyd George Government was of course committed to the Balfour Declaration, but it is worth noting that Balfour himself did not mind if some other state such as Belgium or the United States was given the Mandate for Palestine.3 Initially Britain simply governed Palestine as an occupying power with a military administration, but this was soon to be replaced by a civil administration with Sir Herbert Samuel as the first High Commissioner. Samuel was himself Jewish and a moderate Zionist. Essentially some of the key British policies, for example, controlling the level of Jewish immigration, were developed in a pragmatic way under Samuel’s leadership. However, Britain needed a Mandate from the League of Nations to rule Palestine lawfully and the terms of the Mandate were set out in the 1922 White Paper which the League subsequently endorsed. Although in later years Churchill was to make much of the 1922 White Paper as a commitment which he personally owned, Cohen very clearly shows that Churchill made no personal contribution to its drafting, and only accepted the Mandate with great reluctance and under pressure from Lloyd George. In fact on three separate occasions, in October 1919, June 1920 and June 1921, Churchill had written to Lloyd George arguing that the acquisition of these ‘new provinces’ would be a mistake. Typical is the 2 Gilbert, 2007, p. 292. 3 Cohen, 2003, p. 85. last such letter, part of which reads, The only wise and safe course would be to take advantage of the postponement of the Mandates and resign them both and quit the two countries [Palestine and Mesopotamia] at the earliest possible moment, as the expense to which we shall be put will be wholly unwarrantable.4 Though Gilbert does indicate briefly what he sees as Churchill’s initial reluctance to accept the Mandate, he quickly passes over the matter; he does 5 not tell us of these letters, though he must have been aware of them.5 When we come to the terms of the White Paper itself – these are the legal obligations which Britain by Parliamentary approval undertook to fulfil– there is much that fell short of Zionist aspirations. While its provisions affirmed that the Jewish community ‘should know that it is in Palestine as of right and not on sufferance’, they specifically dissociated Britain from such phrases as ‘Palestine is to become as Jewish as England is English’, and made quite clear that the development of a Jewish national home in Palestine is not to be ‘the imposition of a Jewish nationality upon the inhabitants of Palestine as a whole’. The Balfour Declaration itself said nothing about the rate at which Jewish immigration should be allowed. The White Paper ruled, It is necessary that the Jewish community in Palestine be able to increase its numbers by immigration. This immigration cannot be so great in volume as to exceed whatever is the economic capacity of the country at the time to absorb new arrivals.6 In 1921 there were 83,000 Jews living in Palestine; by the end of 1935 the number had become 355,000: this was the outcome of the policy set underway by Churchill’s 1922 White Paper. The Peel Commission 1936 saw the beginning of what is now known as the Arab Revolt. This was a concerted insurrection, first taking the form of a general strike, followed by 4 Cohen, 2003, p. 96. 5 Gilbert, 2007, pp. 35 -36. 6 The provisions are well summarized by Tessler, p. 173. the Arabs taking control of several important towns. It took the British three years to restore order completely, some 20,000 troops being tied down in the operation. Following the first phase of the rebellion, the Peel Commission was set up ‘to ascertain the causes of the disturbances, to ascertain whether either the Arabs or the Jews have any legitimate grievances, and to make recommendations for their removal.’ Lord Peel had been Secretary of State for India, and it is generally agreed that he and the Commission he chaired 6 brought to their task an objective, impartial approach free from political pressures. Because Churchill was responsible for the 1922 White Paper under which Palestine was being administered, he was naturally called to give evidence. However, under questioning Churchill made some very anti-Arab statements, and he asked for his testimony to be excluded from the published report, which was done. Nevertheless his evidence was recorded and provides some valuable insights into his thinking about the Mandate. Asked about the meaning and aim of the Jewish national home, Churchill indicated that if Jewish immigration, as controlled by the ‘economic absorptive capacity’ test, combined with natural increase, were to lead to a much larger Jewish population, ‘that population should not in any way be restricted from reaching a majority position.’ Indeed ‘some day, far off in the future’ he envisaged there being ‘a great Jewish state numbered by millions’. Asked to clarify when this might be, Churchill replied, ‘Over the generations or the centuries’. He was later asked whether this would not be an injustice to the Palestinian Arabs. Churchill protested, ‘Why is it injustice because there is more work and more wealth for everybody? There is no injustice.’7 From his replies it may seem that Churchill was adopting the ‘gradualist’ form of Zionism associated with Weizmann, but by speaking of ‘generations or centuries’ to come, he may in fact have been doing little more than asserting Britain’s right to hold the Mandate and control immigration indefinitely. In the result the Peel Commission concluded that the conflict was ‘inherent in the situation from the outset’. The Mandate had been founded in the belief of ‘the conciliatory effect on the Palestinian Arabs of the material prosperity which Jewish immigration would bring to Palestine as a whole.