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SILVERBURG, Sanford Robert, 1940- ORGANIZATION AND VIOLENCE: THE PALESTINIAN ARAB NATIONALISTIC RESPONSE, 1920-1948.

The American University, Ph.D., 1973 Political Science, international law and relations

University Microfilms, A XERQ\ Company , Ann Arbor, Michigan

© 1974

SANFORD ROBERT SILVERBURG

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED ORGANIZATION AND VIOLENCE: THE PALESTINIAN ARAB NATIONALISTIC RESPONSE. 1920-1948

by

Sanford Robert Sllverburg

Submitted to the

Faculty of the School of International Service

of The American University

In Partial Fulfillment of

the Requirements for the Degree

of

Doctor of Philosophy

In

International Studies

Signatures of Committee:

Date

THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LIBRARY il

PREFACE

The political and violent conflict between the

Israelis and the Palestinians and that between Israel and the other Arab nations in the region began as a concerted effort on the part of Zionist Jews to establish themselves in the area of ancient Israel. Historically coincidental with the Zionist movement, the Arabs of the Middle East were contending and confronted with the problems of national identity.

In 1896 Theodore Herzl wrote Per Judenataat t a ficti­ tious pamphlet that was ultimately brought to fruition in actual form. A few years later, Negulb Azourl, a Christian

Arab living in Paris, founded the Ligue de la Patrie Arabe, which gave Impetus to the introduction of the western concept of the nation-state to the tribal organization and orienta­ tion of the Arab Middle East. But if there was a conflict between two national movements, there were also lntra- communal disputes. The Arabs had to fight the Turks and there were factional quarrels also, while the Zionists'

Internal foes were the assimilationists. This factor of

Internal disunity greatly inhibited the development of both movements in the region. Yet despite the lack of unanimity, the Zionists succeeded in establishing a Jewish state.

The ethnic identification among the Palestinians, ill within a burgeoning Arab national movement, was strictly limited to the Intellectuals and a selected group of others who had a feeling of true "national" spirit and was In evidence by their defense of the Islamic sites in Jerusalem.

But the Palestinian experience with the development of a

Palestinian national state was initiated only after it was forced to by the failure of the Syrian national movement in the post-World War I period. Finally, loyalties in Pales­ tine competed with national allegiance and collectively the

Palestinian Arabs faced the Zionists.

This dissertation is concerned with the social makeup of the Palestinian Arab community and its political dynamics.

We direct ourselves to a discussion of the attempt by the

Palestinian Arab community to develop a political organiza­ tion during the period of the British Mandate, 1920 to 1948, and the Palestinians' reaction to Zionist inroads and British administration.

The initial idea for this dissertation came from the influence of Dr. like Frank, whose graduate seminar on nationalism introduced us to the writings and ideas of professor Karl Deutsch. The factor of social mobilization as a prime determinant for cohesiveness and development of a political community, as described by Deutsch, was most important to our understanding and appreciation of the peo pies and times involved in our study. iv

Little successful research can be accomplished with­ out some financial assistance; ours was no exception. We owe a debt of gratitude to Dr. Martin L. Shotzberger,

President of Catawba College, Salisbury, North Carolina, whose efforts assisted us in obtaining grants from the Z.

Smith Reynolds Foundation, the Piedmont University Center of North Carolina, as well as Catawba College Faculty

Department monies.

Acknowledgement must also be given to those who assisted us in gaining access to depositories of the data employed. A great note of appreciation must be given to various archivists at the Public Record Office in London and those who assisted us in locating materials at the

Israel State Archives and Central Zionist Archives in

Jerusalem. A special note of appreciation goes to Dr.

Bernard Reich, George Washington University, Washington,

D. C., whose efforts helped us into the Benjamin Shwadran

Archives at the Reuven Shiloah Institute in Tel Aviv. Also,

Mr. John E. Taylor, of the Military Records Division at the

National Archives in Washington, D* C., must be thanked. It was Mr. Taylor who told us about the relevancy of OSS files to the study of Palestine and assisted us in securing them. TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

PREFACE ...... 11

NOTES ON TRANSLITERATION ...... x

ABBREVIATIONS ...... x

CHAPTER

I. INTRODUCTION ...... 1

Arab Nationalism ...... 2

The Influence of Zionism 9

The Advent of British Administration ...... 11

Scope and Purpose ...... 15

S o u r c e s ...... 18

II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ...... 20

Relationship of Europe to the A r a b s ...... 20

Klng~Crane Commission ...... 52

Paris Peace Conference ...... 60

Greater Syria (Mashru Suriyya al-Kubra) .... 71

T r a n s i t i o n ...... 72

Fertile Crescent Scheme ...... 78

III. PALESTINE: THE SETTING FOR MOBILIZATION . . . 82

Demographic Base of the Palestinian Arab Community .••••••••••••••••• 84

Land Settlement ...... 97

Education and Literacy 121 vi

PAGE IV. POLITICAL DYNAMICS IN ARAB PALESTINE: ORGANIZATIONS AND THE INITIATION OF THE MOVEMENT 136

Political Elites ...... 137

Political Parties ...... 153

Political Clubs ...... 165

Political Activities ...... 171

V. POLITICAL DYNAMICS IN PALESTINE: THE LAST PHASE 226

The 1939 London Conference ...... 256

Palestine During World War I I ...... 267

Alexandria Arab Unity Talks ...... 280

Post-World War II A f f a i r s ...... * ...... 301

The Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry .... 304

The Bludan Conference ...... 309

The Morrison-Grady Plan ..... 313

The London Conference ...... 314

The Establishment of U N S C O P ...... 326

S u m m a r y ...... 329

VI. POLITICAL VIOLENCE ...... 331

Violence in Palestine ...... 332

The Easter Riots of 1920 ...... 338

May Day Riots of 1921 342

Wailing Wall Disturbances, 1929 343

The 1933 Disturbances ..... 351

The Arab Revolt, 1936-1939 ...... 352 vii

PAGE

The Undeclared W a r ...... 369

Analysis of the Violence ...... 371

CONCLUSIONS...... 386

BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 394

APPENDICES ...... 416 vii

LIST OF TABLES

AGE

Delegations Received by Class ...... 53

Nature of Petitions Received ...... • 54

Palestinian Arab Population, 1922-1945. . . . 87

Palestinian Arab Population by Subdistrict. . 88

Rate of Increase of Arab Immigration Due to Immigration ...... 90

Medical Professions ...... 91

Infant Mortality ...... 91

E m i g r a t i o n ...... 93

Population Shifts and Growth ...... 95

Wages (1943) ...... 96

Land Utilization in the Middle East ...... 102

Land Ownership (ca. 1922) ...... 103

Land Ownership (1944) ...... 104

Jewish Land Purchases ...... 109

Government Public School System— Government Schools and Non-Government Public Schools . . 122

Palestinian Arab Newspapers ...... 132

Secondary Electors Elected, 1923 ...... 193

Jewish Immigration into Palestine 1882-1948 (May 15) ...... 374

Cumulative Zionist Land Acquisition . . . . . 376

Ranks Assigned to Four Factors at Six Major Outbreaks of Violence ...... ,...... 377 ix

LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURES PAGE

1. Palestinians and Arab Actor Relationships .... 218

2. Arab Birthrate and Jewish Immigration ...... 375 Notes on Transliteration

1. The Arabic diphthong is transliterated as a£; for example, Husayn and Shaykh.

2. The Arabic glottal consonant ayn is designated by a diacritical mark, c ; for example, c Isa al-c Isa or °Abdullah.

3. Anglicized forms of place names are maintained if used colloquially.

Abb revia tlons

ACSI, G2 Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U, S. Army. BSA Benjamin Shvadran Archives, Reuven Shlloah Institute for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv University, Ramat Aviv, Israel. CO Colonial Office. CZA Central Zionist Archives, Jerusalem, Israel. DGFP Germany, AuswSrtiges Arat. Documents on German Foreign Policy. 1918-1945. FO Foreign Office. FRUS Foreign Relations of the United States . ISA Israel State Archives, Jerusalem, Israel. JICAME Joint Intelligence Command, Middle East. NA National Archives and Records Service, Washington, D. C. OSS Office of Strategic Services. PRO Public Record Office, London, England. RG Record Group. USAFME U. S. Armed Forces, Middle East. WO War Office WNRC Washington National Records Center, Sultland, Maryland. CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Th« rtcrudeactnct of violent Palestinian irredentlsn after the 1967 Arab-Israeli nilitary conflict narked the third phase of a Palestinian national aovenent. This attenpt by Palestinians to create and identify with a poli­ tical order can be traced fron the early part of the tventi eth century. The Palestinian Arab national novenent began as an integral part of the far broader Arab national nove­ nent within the Ottonan Enplre.

The Palestinian national novenent was beset with difficulty fron the beginning. The West, through British adninlstratlon and Zionist conpetltion, hanpered the Pales­ tinians' free access to the neans for their developnent.

The initial phase in the Palestinian Arab national novenent the period fron 1920 to 1968, was one of gestation. This early period culnlneted in what Arab writers later referred to as "the Disaster" (karlthat) and "the Catastrophe"

(al-nakba). The first Palestinian war in 1948 was the capsheaf to the initial period and narked the end of the

Palestinian Arabs' Innocence in world politics. Here we disregard the Palestinian experience at the Paris Peace talks at Versailles, since it was not one of full lnvolve- nent or connltnent. 2

During the second phase, the Palestinians became a regional actor, albeit behind the scenes, attempting to regain what they felt was their fatherland and viewed as usurped. Singled out by their national brethren for the shame-ridden experience of 1948, the Palestinians became surrogates for national interests in a regional conflict pitting Arab nationalism agslnst Zionism. This period in the development of the Palestinian Arab national movement was characterized as the era of "the Return" (al-cAwda).

For this phase the end came on June 5, 1967, notwithstand­ ing the continuation of hostility.

Arab Nationalism

Arab nationalism began as a manifestation of cul­ tural identification, a culture that was distinctive from the overall Ottoman authority and the Empire. The exact origins of the Arab national movement are difficult to pin­ point exactly.^* However, we may note some of the more prominent cultural nationalists who sought to publicize the

Arab Muslim heritage. Among those we must mention is

Butrus al-Bustani. Bustanl emerged during the latter part

^George Antonius, the famed chronicler of Arab nationalism, claims that "It was at a secret gathering of certain members of the Syrian Scientific Society (1868) that the Arab national movement may be said to have uttered its first cry." The Arab Awakening; The Story of the Arab National Movement (New York: Capricorn Books. 1965 [1946]). p. 54. a of the nineteenth century. He was e Meronlte Chriatlan who later became a Protestant, notable because of his publishing efforts and his nationalist spirit.

In 1860 Bustanl founded the first modern Arabic newspaper, Nafir Suria (The Clarion of Syria) and ten years later an Arabic journal, al-Jlnan (The Gardens). With the latter publication cane his famous notto: "Patriotism is an article of faith," a concept he developed in which he sought local Arab autonomy under Ottoman aegis. Bustanl thought in terms of a distinction between the national feeling within the Ottoman Empire, the loyalty to the nation (watan) and the loyalty to one's country (blind), which for Bustanl was Syria.

Another prominent Arab cultural nationalist was

Nasif al-Yasijl, a Catholic Lebanese, also known for his capabilities in linguistics. Both Bustanl and Taslji were instrumental in bringing about a cultural revival among the

Arabs and providing the basis for the identification with a national heritage. In 1847 Bustanl and Tasiji together started the Society of Arts and Science; the former became its secretary, with the latter as its librarian. Later, in

1857, Bustanl and Yasljl established an exclusively Arab society, al-Jamciyyah al-cArablyyah al-Suriyyah (The Syrian

Arabic Society).2

2Ibid., p. 79. 4

The strictly western nation-state concept so widely accepted today was only an Influence during the second half of the nineteenth century. The Muslin concept of the state, and the one that was held to be valid throughout the Otto- nan period, was a formalised social structure to protect and actively enforce the sharica . But Islaa, as did western religions, went through a period of reform differing from

Christianity in its more contemporary historical appearance.

Contact with the West Introduced many Muslim Intel­ lectuals to the Ideas of a nation and a fatherland. This reform movement In Its early stages came to Egypt and

Turkey, but It also had a profound effect on Palestine. The reform In Islam^ led to the reconstitution of Jerusalem as an Important Islamic city. At this time Jerusalem became a district and directly subordinate to the authority in

Constantinople. This then led to an Increased importance for thoae religious and civil officials holding office in

Jerusalem and the position of mufti, generally members of local families, rose, while that of the qadie, appointed by the government in Constantinople, declined. Jerusalem was

^See Uriel Heyd, "The Ottoman cPlema and Westernisa­ tion In the Time of Sellm 111 and Mahmud II," Studies in Islamic History and Civilisation. Scripts Hlaroaolymitana. IX (1961), pp. 63-96 end Moshe Macos, "The cUlama' and the Process of Modernisation in Syria During the Hlneteenth Century," Asian and African Studies. VII (1971), pp. 77-88 and his Ottoman Reform in Syria and Palestine 1840-1861; The Impact of the Tanslmat on Politics and Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968). 5

■ade even aore important, end Paleetine in general, when the poaition of Mufti of Jerusalem came directly under the

Shaykh al-Ialam in Constantinople.

Toward the end of the nineteenth century this fledg­ ling reform movement was energized by the activities and writings of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Muhammad cAbduh, and

Rashid Rida.* To this effort at secular revision came a

Jerusalemite Christian Arab, Nejib al-cAzouri. While in

Peris, cAzouri formed the Ligue de ^a Patrie Arabs in 1904.

The following year he published Reveil de la Nation Arabs,^ and in 1907, with some assistance, published a monthly review, L * Independence Arabs.

The cultural impact of Arab nationalism on the Arabs

*See C. Ernest Dawn, From Ottomanlsm to Arablsm; Essays on the Origin of Arab nationalism fUrbana, 111.: University of Illinois Press, 1973), Chapter 5.

5cAzouri called for the establishment of an indepen­ dent Arab state stretching from the river Nile to the Euphrates. Harold Glldden argues that this would have actu­ ally meant two independent states: a constitutional monar­ chy from the Tigris-Euphrates valley to the Isthmus of Suez and from the Mediterranean Sea to the Gulf of cUmen. In this state the status quo of Lebanon, al-Yaman, and the Persian Gulf principalities would be preserved. The second state would have been an independent Empire, al-Hijaz, headed by the caliph. "Arab Unity: Ideal and Reality," The World of Islam: Studies in Honour of Philip K. Hltti edited by James Kritseek and R. Bayly Winder (London: Macmillan 4 Co., Ltd., 1960), p. 251. cAsouri also made reference or rather a warning against the ambitions of Jewish nationalists (Zionists) who might want to return to Palestine (Zion). 6 was than incrsassd with the Young Turk Revolution of July,

1908. The tyranny of Sultan Abdul-Hamld led the secret

Committee of Union and Progress to Instigate a military

coup d'etat. Ottoman rule had been excised and the Midhat

Constitution of 1876 reinstated, leaving the Arabs to think

that the liberal attitudes of self-government connected with this constitution would now be molded to thAir demands for hurriyyah (liberty). But the Arabs' demands soon diminished with the new Turkish parliament's program of

Turklfication of the Empire which did not attempt to demo­ cratically reflect the ethnic composition of the Empire.

Yet there were those who felt that the Araba could enjoy a modicum of autonomy within the Turkish governing orbit. Reform clubs were set up in several cltlea in the

Arab East, including Damascus, Cairo, Jerusalem, and Jaffa.

The efforts of these groups were met by strong reaction by the govesnment in Constantinople so the leaders moved the center of their activity to Paris. And on June 18, 1913, an "Arab Congress" was formed.

With the coming of World Her 1, political develop­ ment within the Arab world led to revisionism and a call for revolt against the Turks. The move toward Arab inde­ pendence from Turkish rule found its prominence in three societies: The Ottoman Decentralisation Society (Hisb al-La-Markaaiyyah), al-Fatat (The Young Arab Society), and 7

»1-Q«htinlyyah later reorganised and called al-cAhd (the

Covenant Society). Al-Fatat was by far the nost Important group. Founded in Parle on November 14, 1909, by a group of Arab etudenta, ita headquartera vaa ahlfted to Beirut In

1913 and Damaacua in 1914.**

Thla Arab national movement which ultimately gave riae to the Independence of many atatea in the Arab Eaat regiatered the namea of many Paleatiniana from tha time of

Ita humble beginnings. One study shows that out of a total of 387 algnaturea on talagrama of support sent to the Arab

Congress in Paris in 1913, 139 of them were Palestinians— more than any other national group!7 Another aource, a history of Palastlna, ahows that Paleatiniana were among tha ranks of tha flrat Arab nationalist sociatlas. Illus­ trative of this are the several that ware executed by

Jemal Pasha, the Ottoman Porte, for their activities:

Salim cAbd al-Hadi of Jenin, Hafls al-Sacld of Jaffa, and

All Nashashlbi from Jerusalam. Jamal Effandi al-Husaynl of tha Jerusalem al-Husaynls also participated in the early Arab nationalist movement and later played an impor­ tant role in Paleatlnlan politics. Finally, cAwni Bey

®For biographies of tha members see Dawn, op. cit.. Chapter 6.

7Ibid. 8 cAbd al-Hadl and Raflq at-Taaial, tvo vary prominent

Palestinians froa Nablus, vara aaabara of tha aoat aztraaa al-Fatat.8

But Arab lntallactuala vara blocked froa davaloping thair goals bayond discussions, not only by Ottoaan rapraa slon, but also by thair lack of experience with vaatarn philosophy and tha critical natura of thair own coaaunity.

Evan if tha Arab intallactuals vara to aaak a aolution in sons othar contaxt than thair natlonaliaa, thair hands would ba tiad by tha fact that at tha praaant stata of historical davalopaant natlonaliaa is the channel through which tha society's potential can ba directed to profasa...Tha fact that tha Arab intallectual ia forced to resort to a credo of aoaa kind in order to prevent political life as Wabar says, froa 'sinking into a feeling of futility,' puts hla on the dafanslva against hla European counterpart who haa his established institutions and can afford to look down on ideology as 'the opiua of tha intallactuals,' as a product of a process of rationalisation and as an obsolescent phenomenon.

Tha Arab Intallactuals saw tha problem unfolding as one in which a political ordar was to develop, enhancing tha ideas expressed by tha "cultural nationalists1': tha writers, historians, and tha general bourgeois. Tha davalopaant of anxiety for Arab rule was inculcated with tha glory of tha Arab past and tha hope for tha physical

8James Parkas, A History of Palestine from 135 A.P. to Modern Timas (Naw York: Oxford University Press, 1949), pp. 258-259. 9 Shimon Shamir, "Tha Question of a 'National Philo­ sophy* in Contemporary Arab Thought," Aslan and African Studiaa, 1 (1965), p. 47. 9 departure and axclualon of European Inperiallan.

The Influence of Zionlaa

Historically coincidental and concoaltant to tha davalopaant of Arab natlonaliaa was that of Jawiah national­ ise. In 1897 Theodore Hersl, a Hungarian-born Viennese journalist, created the Zionist Organisation for the expressed purpose of establishing a national hoae for world Jewry in Palestine. The Zionist Organisation began to structure Itself for the eventual iapleaentatlon of a western-oriented socio-political environaent in Palestine.

Subsequent Zionist Gongreases created various organs to develop a society on the base already in Palestine in the fora of fara coaaunltles (aoshavot) established in 1881-

1882.** Finally an official office was set up in Jaffa

It in 1908, known as the Palestine Office (Phlaatina-aat).

Even before the establlshaent of the British aandate and the issuance of the Balfour Declaration Arab hostility toward tha Zionists was evident. The hostility cantered on laaigration and land as it would for the next 50 years. The

*®For a discussion of cultural natlonaliaa in Pales­ tine see Adnan abu Ghaxaleh, "Arab Cultural Natlonaliaa in Palestine During the British Mandats," Journal of Palestine Studies. I, Ho. 3 (Spring, 1972), pp. 37-63.

**Tha Second Zionist Congress establlshad a bank, registered in London aa the Jewish Colonial Trust, in 1898. The Fifth set up the Jewish National Fund (Keren Kayeaet L 1Israel), and in 1908 the Palestine Land Davalopaant Coapany was aet up. 10

reactions of the native Palestinians toward the new Jewish

lnnlgrants was an extension of their already eatabllshed

antagonist and hostility. I Perhaps the singletost factor, linked with Zionist,

that affected the Palestine Arab national tovetent was the

British war-tine cotnlttent to the Jews in the fort of a

letter frot Lord Balfour, the British Foreign Secretsry, to

Lord Rothschild, a leading British Jew, in Novetber, 1917.

The letter led Zionists to believe that in return for their war-tine support the British governtent would do all it

could to establish a "Jewish national hote" in Paleetine.13

^For a dlscuaaion of the hostility of Nusllt Pales­ tinians toward Jews per se and European Jewish ittlgratlon to Palestine prior to the Balfour Declaration, see Neville Mendel, "Turks, Arabs and Jewish Ittlgratlon into Palestine, 1882-1914," j5t. Antony1s Papers, Mutber 17. Middle Eastern Affairs Mutber Four edited by Albert Houranl (London, Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 83-84. For the basis of the hostility based on class and the reaction accordingly see Ibid., p. 80. Mandel, "Atteapts at an Arab-Zionist Ententa; 1913-1914," Middle Eastern Studies. I, No. 3 (April, 1965), pp. 238-267; M. Perlnann, "Chapters of Arab-Jewlsh Diplo- tacy, 1918-22," Jewish Social Studies, VI, No. 2 (April 1944) pp. 123-154; Yaacov~RoT l^ r*The Zionist Attitude to the Arabs 1908-1914," Middle Eastern Studies. IV, No. 3 (April, 1968), pp. 198-242.

^^It is interesting to speculate on the thesla found In professor Mayer Verete's scholarship that had there been no Zionists at the tlte of the issuance of the Balfour Daclaratlon the British would have had to Invent then since their prlnary interest was the strategic value of Palestine not Zionist. "The Balfour Declaration and Its Makers," Mlddls Bastsrn Studies. VI, Mo. 1 (January, 1970), pp. 48-76. This position is also argued by Elie Kedourle, "The Chathan House Version," The Chathas House Version and 11

The Arab reaction In Palaatlna to tha publication of tha Balfour Declaration vaa anger, raaantaent, and

"friction" between Arab and Jaw.^4 Sir Gilbert Clayton, at the tine a lialaon officer between the Egyptian Expedi­ tionary Force and tha Foreign Office, wrote that both

Chriatlans and Muslims feared that the Jewa with their weatern orientation and technical "auperlorlty" would dominate Palestine and eventually all of Syria.The

Balfour Declaration becane a source of joy for the Zionists and an historical Infamy for the Palestinians.

Tha Advent of British Administration

As a geographical entity, Palestine was one of the pawns of the post-World War I European diplomacy, a part of geographic Syria (the sanjaka of Acre, Nablus, and

Jerusalem), at the time a vilayet (province) of the Ottoman other Middle-Eastern Studies edited by Elia Kedourie (London: Weidenfeld and Nlcolson, 1970), p. 391. For background material see Dan Z. Gillon, "The Antecedents of the Balfour Declaration," Middle Eastern Studies, V, No. 2 (May, 1969), pp. 131-150; Leonard Stein, The Balfour Declaration (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1961); J.M.N. Jeffries, Palestine: Tha Reality (London: Longmans, Green, 1939), pp. 88-186; Chaim Weismann, Trial and Error (New York: Schocken Books, 1966), pp. 223-252.

14F0 141/803, December 19, 1917; FO 371/3061/ 245447/214354, December 3, 1917, PRO.

**Stein, op. cit., p. 629. 12

Empire. In December, 1917, Syria, for administrative purpoaaa, was placed under the Occupied Enemy Territory

Administration (South) of tha allies, known as O.E.T.A. I.

By the Treaty of Sevres (1920) Turkish control over Syria was transferred to a aandatory power and later renounced totally by the terms of the Treaty of Lausanne (1923).

In the meantime, Palestine was delimited and placed under British supervision under a Class A Mandate by the

League of Nations.*** This was done even while Turkish suserainty over Palestine was neither fully nor formally renounced, but nevertheless gave it a national political distinctiveness it never had before. Finally, the O.E.T.A. administration in Palestine terminated on June 30, 1920, and on the following day began a civil administration under a British High Commissioner, thus transforming the status of Palestine into a de facto British crown colony.

Two unique characteristics of the Palestine mandate were later to dominate events. First there was more than one national group that sought independence and some sort

***Leagua of Nations, Mandate for Palestine and Memorandum by the British Government Relating to this Application to Transjordan, Approved by the Council of the League of Nations on September 16th. 1922, C.P.M. 466 (Geneva, September 2, 1926^* 13 of political control and autonomy within Palestine.

Secondly, the eastern religiously oriented political foundation of Palestine was replaced by western secular rule.

One group, the Jews, had been displaced from the region for several centuries, but maintained a continued physical presence, even If minimal, and a strong spiritual connection to Zion. The other group, the Arabs, howevsr, maintained a continued physical as well as spiritual attraction to the region from the seventh century.The introduction of these two cultures and two nationalisms created the conflict that accompanies this study.

In the immediate post-World War I period the Amir

Fayaal ibn Huaayn tried to represent the Arabs, Syrians, and those Palestinians considering themselves Syrians, both at the Versailles psace conference and as their monarch at home. Faysal was rebuked by the British, who refused to recognise him either diplomatically or as a true representative of the Syrian people. The former was for political reasons, while the latter was for a lack of

l^Thls Is to later mean eastern Palestine. Pales­ tine in 1920 included present-day Jordan which was carved out from the Palestine Mandate in 1922.

18 Palestine was conquered by the Muslim armies, headed by Khalld Ibn al-Walld, Usamsh ibn Zayd, and Umar 14 cultural understanding. This than formed tha aarly basis of hostility for tha Palestinians toward tha British. Tha denial of authority to Faysal to act as tha legitimate representative of the Syrians and an Arab kingdom was followed by French duplicity. British and French strategic

Interests carved out Palestine, geographically Isolating the

Palestinians from the Syrian people and state. All this time tha British remained In the position of being able to manipulate the options available to the Palestinian Arab community.

The Palestinians now found themselves In a precari­ ous position. They had considered themselves part of tha

Syrian nation and worked for Syrian political independence and aspired to Syrian political autonomy. The Palestinians now found it necessary to shift the direction of their nationalistic efforts to defend the distinctlvenese of their own nation. The Palestinians had to face the western administration of the West as did the other Arab states.

But they also had to contend with a people and counter- ibn al-cAs, from Bysantlum In 634-638 A.D. See [MaJor] S.K. Malik, Khalid Bin Walid: The General of Islam. A Study on Khalid1s Generalship (Lahore: Ferossons Ltd., 1971), pp. 79-90. 19 The Palestinian Arab community most often refers to the traditional elites who were the verbal spokesmen for the common masses which this study endeavors to study. IS movement that vaa aaan to ba an obatacla to furthar Arab national government and also a paraanant national body

fixed to tha locala da dlsputa. Thla was a trauaatlc experience. Profassor Hlshaa Sharabl, a Palestinian, says of this ganeral pattern that "Western laparlallsa was by

Its very nature coapelled to carry out policies and to aasuaa attitudes which vara lnlalcal to certain forns of social change.

Scope and Purpose

The purpose of this dissertation Is to study and analyse the development of the Palestinian Arab national movement during the period of the British mandate, 1920 to 21 1948. We are particularly lntarested in two major aspects of the political order during thla time: 1) the form and manifestation of the ideological commitment by the Palestinian Arab community to its political goal(s) and the internal and external factors that Influenced this commitment, and 2) the reaction and response to Zionist

20 Arab Intallactuals and the West: The Formative Tears, 1875-1914 (Baltimore, Md.: Tha Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), p. 134. 21 The use of 1920 as the beginning date la purely arbitrary and not lndlcatlva of the initiation of the nationalist movement being examined. It was chosen largely because it was bounded by the British administration and we do not limit our discussion strictly to events within this period to the exclusion of prior important data. 16 efforts end British administration by the Pelestlnlsn community. We will study the Ideology of the Pslestlnians through sn examination of their political gosls and socio­ political Infrastructure, emphasising the connection between them. The relationship betwsen the Palestinians and the Zionists will be exposed through a discussion of

the ensuing and often violent conflicts and Byxantine-llke compromises.

We are particularly concerned with the nature and composition of the Palestinian Arab community as It attempted to develop Into a cohesive political body. We will focus on intra-Arab factionalism, the most notewovthy and most publicised phenomenon to inhibit Arab unity, as

It manifested Itself In the Palestinian Arab community.

The agrarian nature of Palestine's geography and the dominant role of the family (cayle), the extended family

(al), and the clan (hamula) together dictated the nature of politics in Arab Palestine. Thus political elites within the Palestinian Arab community were members of prominent families as were political parties largely family organisations. The proximity of two ethnic groups

In a framework of political competition easily lent Itself to hostility and violence. Also, traditional modes of conflict resolution among those Palestinians accustomed to the folkways of a traditional society were continually 17 applied In inter-coaaunal conflict.

Tha Palestinians often found little succor for their cause froa the British adainistrative uabralla. Certainly there were aany In posts ranging froa general clerks to

High Coaniosloners who* to varying degrees* supported the basic Arab claia to Palestine. But the Interests of the

British Arabophiles, aore so In Jerusalea than in London* were tangential to strategic British political-ailltary

Interests. Thus the Palestinians found theanelves isolated and this condition in turn fueled their Intransigence toward accoaaodation.

Tha political dynaalcs of the Palestinian Arab national aoveasnt will be the core of the study. An his­ torical background will be provided In order to place further developnents in aoae sort of perspective. In particular we will concentrate on the social noblllsation of the Palestine Arab coaaunity; secondly* the directors of the aoveaent* tha elitas; and the political organisa­ tions the leaders worked through to achieve doalnance.

Since the entire aoveaent Is characterised by its violent nature* we will discuss the aajor eruptions of violence* both politically and non-polltically oriented.

Our treataent will be historically analytical. Our history will not be exhaustive; this is not our purpose.

He are aore concerned with explaining tha course of 18 political events of a coaaon phanoaenon, nationalisa.

Sources

For years the classic study of the developaent of the Palestinian Arab national aoveaent was J. C. Hurevltx's

The Struggle for Palestine, ^ relying heavily on intelli­ gence data the author had access to as a ailitary officer in World War 11. A bit less veil known, but of equal quality, written froa close observation, were the solid treataents of Palestinian Arab politics, Yacacov Shlaconi, cArvs Erets-Iaraal (The Arabs of Palestine),^3 and Michael

Assaf, Toldoth ha-cArvla be-Brets-Israel (A History of the

Arabs of Palestine). A aore recent study culainating approxlaately ten years1 research In Jerusalea and London was produced by Hebrew University professor Tehoshua

Porath, The Eaergence of the Paleatinian-Arab National

Moveaent (1918-1929).^ For a aore historically inclusive treataent, to Include the post-1948 and especially the post-1967 period, there is the book written jointly by

Wllllaa B. Quandt, Fuad Jabber, and Ann Mosely Lesch,

^2 (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1950).

2^(Tel Aviv: Aa Oved, 1946, 1947).

2*(Tel Aviv: Davar, 1944, 1945, 1967), 3 vols.

(London: Frank Cass, 1973). 19 26 The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism. Professor

Ibrahim Abu Lughod has also edited a compilation of studies on Palestine, largely researched froa secondary materials, 27 The Transformation of Palestine.

In addition to the books noted above and other pub­ lished sources, we have had access to the British adminis­ trative, diplomatic and military records regarding Pales­ tine held in the Public ReCord Office in London. Material has also been culled from the Israel State Archives and

Central Zionist Archives In Jerusalem. This has been standard fare for most observers of the Palestinian experi­ ence. To this we bring unpublished source data from the

Benjamin Shwadran Archives of the Reuven Shiloah Institute of Tel Aviv University and even more informative, the records of the Office of Strategic Services and other military Intelligence organisations which operated in the

Middle East during World War II.

^(Berkeley, Cal.: University of California Press, 1973). 2 7 '(Evanston, 111.: Northwestern University Press, 1971). CHAPTER II

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The Arabs had known something of modern Europe when

the forces of Napoleon destroyed the Mamluks In Egypt in

1798. The awareness of the West was further extended by

the contemporary Arab empire-bullder Muhammad CA11 Pasha,

during the first half of the nineteenth century. The cul­

ture clash of East and West in the Middle East germinated during this very period.* The reverberations of these

early contacts have recurred, often with different actora, but generally the same pattern of interaction.

Relationship of Europe to the Arabs

It is a fairly well held view among analysts of

Middle Eastern politics that the affairs of state for the region during the early part of the century were made at

Whitehall and the Qua! d'Orsay. Not only has this been highly held to be true in the West, but also, though not with quite the degree of self-satisfaction, in the Arab

East. The visionary efforts of European statesmen who saw

the political decay of the Ottoman Empire were not to save it, but to Implant their presence where it could serve

Europe the most good.

^Pertinent to this period is Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, Arab Rediscovery of Europe; A Study of Cultural Encounters (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1963). 21

It would M t v t llttlo purpose to present e thorough

historical treatise of the pre-World War I contacts bstveen

the Arabs and European powers; this has been done quite

adequately elsewhere. Furthermore, we are more concerned

with the Palestinian experience In particular. Neverthe­

less, a background to the Mandate Is provided since It will

provide soie perspective.

The Idea of the British using the Arabs against the

Ottoman Turks during World War I, and even before, is a well

told story. Al-Husayn lbn-cAli, the Sharif of Mecca and Its

Amir, was the principal Arab actor, either In an insatiable 2 fit to rule over a universal caliphate or to secure a

'brltlah commitment to recognise Arab sovereignty in the

territories which Arab nationalists had demanded" and In

which he later declared himself "king of the Arab country,"

(al-bildad al-carabiyah), In November, 1916.3

^Elle Kedourle, England and the Middle East: The Destruction of the Ottoman Empire, 1914-1921 (Londons Bowes and Bowes, 1956JI pp. 48-56. ^C. Ernest Dewn, "The Amir of Mecca Al Husayn Ibn-CA11 and the Origin of the Arab Revolt," Proceedings of the American Philosophical Sociaty. CIV, No. £ (February, 1960), p. 31. Dawn, elsewhere, contende that "Husayn ross In con­ junction with the Arab nationalists only after the failure of his efforts to find some accommodation for his political Interests within the fremework of the Ottomen Empire." See "Ideologicel Influences in the Arab Revolt," The World of Islam: Studies In Honour of Philip K. Hlttl edited by James Krltseek and R. Bayly Winder (London: Macmillan 6 Co., Ltd., 1960), p. 233. Dawn, most recently, again atatea his argu­ ment vice Kedourle. From Ottomanism to Arabian: Essays on 22

Within five months the Areb Revolt wee initiated against the Ottoman Turks when Husayn and his son, Faysal, destroyed the Hedjas railway near Medina, followed by an attack on Turkish forces In cities in the Hedjes and including Mecca.

Coaaunicatlons between the Arab notables and British figures not only gave rise to the Arab Revolt, but also affairs with far aore ranging importance. Field-Marshal

Earl (Herbert Horatio) Kltchner, as a British agent and

Consul-General in Egypt, went to see Husayn's son cAbdullah, when he was in Cairo as the guest of the Khedive "as early as the Spring of either 1912 or 1913."* Coaaentlng on the stability that cAbdullah brought to Arabia, Kltchner sounded hla out on the possibility of closer cooperation.

Kltchner saw cAbdullah again early in February and in

April, 1914,^ in an attempt to secure an alliance with the most powerful elements in the Arab world* to facilitate the destruction of the Ottoman Empire. Kltchner, it should be the Origins of Arab Nationalism dUrbana, 111.: University of Illinois Press, 1973), p. 68. 4Ibid., p. 19.

5Ibld.

*The British military also suggested some sort of an alliance between the Hedjasis and tha British. In October, 1914, Major Ganeral Sir John Maxwell, commander of the British forces in Egypt suggested this. A. P. Wavell, The Palestine Campaigns (London; Constable and Co., Ltd., rev. 23 added, was known to have harborad thoughts of crsating s nsw and independent caliphata In wastarn Arabia without tha control of aithar tha Ottomans or Europe.7 In this way ha fait tha British could maintain a firm and friandly foot­ hold in tha Middle East through good ralations with tha

Arabs. But aside from tha Ottoman Turks themselves, perhaps, tha greatest opposition to tha creation of a new caliphata tame from the vast Muslim population In India, o and Its reprasantatlvas in tha India Office. As a matter

ad., 1931)", p. 5 2 n T t ". e "! Lawrence also noted that tha young Egyptian nationalistic aspirant, cAsls cAli Mlsri, was also contacted by Kltchner. Sevan Pillars of Wisdom (New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1962), p. 58. This episode Is corroborated by Majid Khaddurl, "cAsl* cAli Mlsri and tha Arab Nationalist Movement," Middle Eastern Affairs, Number Four adlted by Albsrt Houranl (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 152. Kitchner's visits are also describsd by Zeine N. Zelne, The Emergence of Arab Nationalism; With a Background Study of Arab-Turklsh Relations in the Near East (Beirut: Khayats, 2d ed., 1960), pp. 123-126.

7Jukka Nevaklvi, "Lord Kltchner and the Partition of the Ottoman Empire, 1915-1916," Studies in International History: Essays Presented to W. Norton Medllcott. Stevenson Professor of International History edited by K. Bourne and D. C. Watt (Hamden, Conn.: Arehon Books, 1967), p. 318. Dawn remarks that Husayn, however, placed no value In Kitchner's vision. "The Amir of Mecca," op. clt., p. 29. fi Briton Cooper Busch, Britain, India, and the Arabs, 1914-1921 (Berksley, Cal.: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 61-62. 24 of fact, the Muslins on the subcontinent were taken com­ pletely by aurprlae by the Revolt and the India Office was q as concerned as the Ottomans over the developments In

Arabia.

On September 24, 1914, Captain (later Sir) Gilbert

H. Clayton, a British agent In Cairo, received a telegram from Kltchner Instructing him to prepare Sir Ronald Storrs,

Oriental Secretary, to have a messenger sent to cAbdullah with a communication to be representative of him. The message was to ascertain whether or not he and his father, as well as the Arabs of the Hedjas, would be, In Kitchner's words, "with us or against us," if the Germans forced the

Ottomans to make war on Great Britain.It was these early contacts, especially the communication of September

1914 by Kltchner and the Amir's reply, followed by the communication by Kltchner on October 31, 1915, which In a diplomatic minute by William J. Childs, a British Foreign

Office official, "prepared the way for the McMahon Corre­ spondence . "li­

lt was Sir Henry McMahon who replaced Kltchner as

High Commissioner. The much popularised and critiqued

9Ibid., p. 164.

X®(Sir] Ronald Storrs, Orientations (London: Ivor Nicholson 6 Watson, 1937), p. 173.

X1F0 371/14495, May 16, 1930, PRO. 25

McMahon corraapondanca haa baan moat thoroughly ravlawad

and analyzed by Iaaiah Friedman, vho avan after a reply by Arnold Toynbee (an hlatorian of mourn repute and an active participant In the formulation of the correspon- dence), haa preaented the aoat credible Illumination of

the Intent of both McMahon and the Brltlah in regard to

Palestine at thla tima.^^

Britain was responsive to Husayn's demands for Arab

Independence* But at the time of the correspondence

McMahon had In mind the restoration of soma aort of Arab

rule sana Turkish control, but not without a Brltlah super­ visory praaence. Both France and Great Britain were keenly

Interested In obtaining certain interaata In tha region

upon the final dislocation of tha Ottoman Empire and these

diplomatic rumblings were all part of tha strategy. The

academic struggle as to the meaning of this particular

place of diplomatic cable traffic revolves around the boundaries of the proposed independent Arab State. In

McMahon's second letter to the Amir, dated October 24,

1915, he limited tha area as follows:

*^"The McMahon-Hussein Corraapondanca and tha Question of Palestine," Journal of Contemporary History. V, No. 2 (July 1970), pp. 83-122; Arnold Toynbee, "The McMahon Hussein Corraapondanca: Comments and a Reply," Journal of Contemporary History, V, No. 4 (October 1970), pp. 185-201. 26

The two districts of Msrsinm and Alexandretta and portions of Syria lying to the wast of tha districts of Daiascus, H o b s , Hanna and Aleppo cannot ba said to ba purely Arab, and should ba excluded fron tha Units danandad. “

To ba sura, tha vagueness of tha language was also part of

McMahon's strategy. McMahon was cautious in prasantlng tha proposals, for there ware Arab obligations involved also.

This, basically, naant an active role in a revolt against the Turks.

Politically, it set one Moslen against another, and nllitarlly, it harassed Ottonan troops and occasionally disrupted connunlcatlons along the Hedjas railway. But between the original expectation, on which the deal between the British and Hussein was based, and the actual perfornance, there was a considerable gap...If any party renained in debt towards the other it was rather the Arab to the British than vice versa.

Friednan also chides Antonlus on the fact that he failed to take into consideration that "there was...no unilateral connitnent (in the Husayn-McMahon correspon­ dence) . The [Palestinian) Arabs were equally under

c. Hurewitz, Diplonacy in the Wear and Middle East; A Docunentary Record; 1914-1956. Volune II (Prince­ ton, N. J.: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc. 1956), p. 15. A study of this clause by Marnorstein concluded that its authorship was that of Sir Mark Sykes, a Near Eastern specialist and advisor to the Foreign Office. Enlle Marnorstein, "A Note on 'Danascus, Hons, Hana and Aleppo,'" Middle Eastern Affairs, Nunber Two edited by Albert Houranl (Carbondale, 111.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1961), pp. 161-167.

^*Frlednan, op. cit.. p. 103. For a view denegrating the oft held view of Lawrence and the British opposition see Sulelnan Mouse, T. E. Lawrence: An Arab View (London: Oxford University Press, 1966). 27 definite obligations to fulfill their part, and it was on the nature and quality of their performance that the

'permanence and strength* of the agreement depended.

Fayaal, after speaking with Kltchner, went to

Damascus to consult with his supporters. While there,

Faysal cemented his relationship to his followers by join­ ing the two major Arab nationalist societies, al-Fatat and al-cAhd. He stayed in Damascus briefly, leaving in April,

1915, for Constantinople to hold talks with Ottoman leaders and discuss the growing enmity between the Arab leadership and the Ottoman government.

During Faysal*s absence from Damascus, the combined membership of al-Fatat and al-cAhd devised their own diplomatic initiative to gain support for Arab indepen­ dence by an alliance with the British against the Turks.

Known as the Damascus Protocols, it called for the complete

Independence of the Arab East which subsequent to the War would be tied to England for purposes of defense and economy.These were the conditions set down by the Arab leaders for their participation in the Arab Revolt. These were also the conditions Husayn ussd in his discussions

l5Ibid. , p. 95.

^George Antonius, The Arab Awakening: The Story of the Arab National Movement (New York: Capricorn Books, 1965 [1946]), pp. 157-158. 28 with the British the following July.

Feysal was a bit hesitant about the acceptance of the conditions by the British. But after some persuasion nevertheless he agreed to take then to Husayn. With

Faysal's agreement to take the natter up with his father, several of the nationalist leaders signed a nanlfasto agreeing to the acceptance of Sharif Husayn as the King of the Arabs and secondly pronlsed rebellion In Syria If

Britain accepted the protocols as the basis of the agree- nent.^

Returning to the question of Arab loyalty during this period, another historical debate energes. During the latter part of August, 1919, Llnan von Sanders, the head of the Gernan nllltary nlsslon to the Ottonan arny, was lnforned by Janal Pasha, the Connander of the Fourth

Arny, that if he received certain guarantees fron the

Turkish governnent regarding the establlahnent of an Arab state, Sherlf Faysal could do nuch to strengthen the

Turkish position. A large English offensive was being prepared against the coastal sector and would have con­ fronted the Fourth Arny between the sea and the Jordan

River. Faysal was offering the Turks an opportunity to subvert the British effort. Von Sanders directed Janal

l?Mrs. Steuart Erskine, King Faisal of Iraq (London: Hutchinson and Co., 1933)7 p7 40. Pasha to the Turkish Chief of Staff, General Klasim, In the desire to Initiate negotiations vlth Faysal, also urging Enver Pasha to give the requested guarantees. The

Turks, however, considered It a ruse and allowed the opportunity to pass. But It does give soae Indication aa to the strength and loyalty of the Shariflan arwy.l®

Subsequent Interpretatlone of the correspondence abounded with skeptlcisa and second guessing. In a Foreign

Office siaorandus of Noveaber 29, 1920, written by Sir

Hubert W. Young, dealing with possible negotiations with the Hedjas, he wrote that “a literal interpretation of

Sir H. McMahon's undertaking would exclude froa the areas in which His Majesty's Governaent were prepared to recog­ nise the 'Independence of the Arabs' only that portion of the Palestine aandatory area which lay to the east of the

'district of Daaascas.'" The western boundary of the district of Daaascus before the War was a line bisecting

*®Liaan von Sanders, Funf Jahre Turks! (Berlin: A Scherl, 1922), pp. 330-331. Further evidence gives an even thinner bond between the between the Shariflan aray, the Palestinians and the British in teras of coaaitaent. Lord Allenby reported that there were no Palestinian Arabs in his aray. Great Britain, Aray, Egyptian Expeditionary Force, A Brief Record of the Advance of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force. July 1917 to October 1918. (London: 1919) , p^ 35. It Is even doubtful whether there were any Palestinians in the Shariflan aray. Philip Graves, Palestine, the Land of the Three Faiths (New York: George H. Dorsn Co., [1924]), pp. 112-113. 30 the Dead Sea; and following the Uadi Arava to the Gulf of

Akaba. The aouthern boundary of the diatrict of Damascus cut across the Hedjaz railway between Macan and Tabuk.

The eastern boundary was undefined, but may be taken as identical with the edge of the desert.

However, when Fayaal, representing the King of the

Hedjaz, met with R. C. Lindsay, representing Lord George

Curzon as the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in the Foreign Office on January 20, 1921, Faysal stated that

"the Arabs had always regarded both Palestine and the

Hinterland of Syria" as being covered by McMahon's pledge.

Certain remarks made to him by the British Prime Minister on September,19, 1919, and one passage in a letter addressed to him by Lord Curzon on October 9, [1919] had 20 confirmed him of this impression. He further pointed out that If the Brltlah interpreted vilayet in its

19F0 371/E14959/9/44, Confidential, PRO.

20FO/371/6237/E986/4/91, PRO. Another source Indi­ cates tha date of the letter to be October 15, 1919. Hansard, July 19, 1920, col. 147. One basis for the dif­ ferences in interpretation between Faysal and the British was found by Sir Hubert Young, who at the request of Curzon, checked the translation of the Arabic text of the correspondence and found the English version to be con­ siderably different from it. Sir Ronald Storrs was Secretary at the general period but on leave at the par­ ticular time of translation. Lord Blrdwood, Hurl Aa-Said; A Study in Arab Leadership (London: Cassell, 19^9^ p. 32, f2. 31 strictest sense It would also have Included Hons or

Hama.21

In a despatch froa Sir R. Bullard, the British agent In Jedda, writing to Sir George Rendel on November

22, 1936, some years later, he notes that “no portion of

Syria lay to the west of the Vilayet of Aleppo, for the

Vilayet of Aleppo...ran right to the Mediterranean and

Included the whole of the north-west corner of Syria."22

As can be seen, the Interpretation of the word

“districts" played a major role in the ensuing diplomacy.

George Antonius, a Greek Orthodox, Lebanese-born, later to become Palestinian nationalist spokesman, was first to publicise the Hueayn-McMahon correspondence,2-* though not completely. In his treatment he argues the Arab case for the inclusion of Palestine in the British commitment.2*

The British, on the other hand, read the ambiguous term

"districts" to mean "vilayet." This being the case, the vilayet of Beirut, including the sanjak of Jerusalem, was

21Ibid.

22FO 371/E7760/94/31, Confidential, PRO.

22Tha Arab Awakening, op. c J L t . , pp. 176-189.

2*Antonius's arguments are countered specifically by Sylvia G. Halm, "'The Arab Awakening' A Source for the Hlstorlanf" Die Welt Pes Islams, N. S. IX, No. 4 (1953), pp. 243-244, as well as Friedman's entire thesis, op. cit. 32 included in the reserved area ao that "the whole of

Palestine, west of the Jordan, was thus excluded froa Sir

H. McMahon* s pledge.*'2^

Portions of the McMahon correepondence were pub­ lished by the London Daily Mall in 1925, specifically the letter of October 24, noted above, and some others which were supposedly obtained by the paper's Jerusalem corre­ spondent, J. M. N. Jeffrie, froa Arab sources. In a letter froa Lord Monteagle to Sir John Shuckburgh, the

Parliamentary debate le discussed calling for the entirety of the correepondence to be published. Both the Foreign

Office and Colonial Office were opposed to the correepon­ dence being published, however, since it would have caused, so the British feared, "complications," in their relatione with the Arabs.

What H. M. G. will expose themselves to if they give their authority to the passage may be seen from the White paper Cmd. 1700 of June 1922; the Arab arguments on pages 25 and 26 of that paper (section 7 of the Arab delegation's letter of June 17, 1922) are almost Irrefutable, once the accuracy of the text of the passage has been established.2°

The entire correepondence was finally published by the Foreign Office on October 24, 1930, as Confidential

Statement of Britieh Policy in Palestine," June 3, 1922 in Great Britain, Colonial Office, Palestine. Correspondence with the Palestine Arab Delegation and the Zionist organisation, Cmd*I 1700 ^London: H«M.S.0., 1922), p . '2TT ------26PO 371/14495, 1930, PRO. 33

Print No. 13778, entitled e "Henorendun on the Exclusion of Peleetlne fro* the eree assigned fro* Arab Independence by the McMahon-Hussein Correspondence of 1915-1916 (with two aaps]."27 The seaorandus was actually written by U.

J. Childs for Shuckburgh. Childs went on to say, para­ phrasing auch of what was written and interspersing his actual words when required for clarity, the following:

The idea of the independent Arab state as formulated by

the British, at least until July 1915, "was confined to the Arabian peninsula and its Mohaaaadan Holy places."

This attitude was aade public in Arabia, Egypt, and the

Sudan.

The situation changed during the period of April to

June, 1915, with the Allied poeltlon at the Dardanellee and the perceived collapse of the Ottoman Eapire, the

Syrian Nationalist Coaaittee, with Its headquarters in

Daaascus, aligned itself with the Sharif of Mecca for the purpose of creating a Pan Arab Confederation. What resulted froa this was the Sharif's claim to territories beyond Arabia, Including Mesopotaala, Syria, in its widest sense, and Cilicia.

It was recognised that the British, because of their position vis-a-vis the French, were in no position

27FO 371/3824, 1930, PRO. 34 to aaki specific policy proposals to tha Arabs regarding tha future territorial disposition of Syria and Palestine.

With tha Allied defeat at Gallipoli in October,

1919, tha Immediate danger to tha Ottonan Empire was temporarily removed and German and Turkish influence received a reprieve, even if brief. On October 19, 1915,

Sir Henry McMahon telegraphed the Foreign Office for instructions. It seems that an urgent situation had developed; the Syrian Nationalists had been offered ell of their demands by Germany. It was neceasery, therefore, to act with some alacrity before Germany sent further asals- tence to Turkey. There was also that danger of the

Syrians being co-opted by Germany.

The Sharif's demands for enlarged boundaries coupled with the explanation given immediately afterward in Cairo, on behalf of the Arab nationalists, was described by McMahon as an ultimatum to Hie Majeaty's Government.

McMahon added that in the discussion at Cairo with the representatives of the Syrian nationalists, the letter had declared that the occupation by a foreign power of the

"Arab districts of Damascus, Heme, Horns, end Aleppo would be resisted by the Arabs by force of arms."

This was, it was pointed out, the minimum demand acceptable to the nationalists for Areh possession In regard to Syria. In thla way, possassion of these 35

"districts" would bring the Syrlsn sres of the proposed

federetlon Into geogrephlc proxlwlty with Arsbls end give continuous rsllwsy conunlcation from Aleppo to Medlns by

the Pllgrln Rsllwsy, slresdy In sxlstsnce.

Instructions were relsyed to NcMshon on October 20, sllowing considersble leewsy since the natter wss of such urgency. He wss, however, instructed to give eoae sort of sssursnce to the Arsbs thst would prevent their sllenstlon while st the ssne tine reserving Brltleh rights end Its sllies.

McMehon followed up by sending s reply to the

Shsrlf giving hia the underlying intentions of the British governaent without "lsylng down exsct definitions of terri­ tory." In order "to aske sure thst the Syrlsn sres which the Arsb Nstionsllsts deened vltsl to thslr csuse wss definitely sseigned to then, he sdopted the phrsse 'the portione of Syris west of the districts of Dsasscus, Hoas,

Hsas, end Aleppo.'"

By enploying the tera "districts" to represent the vilsyet of Syrls, the British sdopted the reeding which In

1915 gsve the Sherlf end the Syrlsn nstionsllsts both the whole vilsyet end the terrltorisl contsct with Arsbls.

The Hussyn-McMshon correspondence wss but one coa- pllcetlng factor to the Orientsl pussle to which aust be added the Sykes-Plcot egreeaent end Belfour Declaration. 36

When the news of the Balfour Declaration eventually became known In the Arab world, the reaction was, under­ standably dlsnay and disappointment. King Husayn was completely confused and requested clarification. This was net by a despatch by Commander David Hogarth of the Arab

Bureau In Cairo, who came to Jedda In January, 1918. The

"Hogarth Massage," as It came to be known, gave the King the assurance that "Jewish settlement In Palestine/ would only be allowed Insofar as would be consistent with the 2 A political and economic freedom of the Arab population.1

He said nothing about the creation of an Arab Sovereignty in the area, but merely reassured Husayn about the control of the Muslim Holy Places. ^

This was followed by the "Declaration of the Seven," referring to a group of seven anonymous Syrian national­ i s t s ^ vho addressed a petition to the British government

2 A Antonius, op. clt., pp. 267-268; Busch, op. cit. , pp. 192-193; Jukka Nekavivl, Britain. France and the Arab Middle East. 1914-1920 (London: University of London, The Athlone Press, 1969), pp. 61-62; Philip Knightly and Colin Simpson, The Secret Lives of Lawrence of Arabia (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, Ltd., 1969), pp. 107-108.

^ A . L. Tlbawl, "T. E. Lawrence, Faisal and Walsmann: Tha 1919 Attempt to Secure an Arab Balfour Declaration," Royal Central Asian Journal. LVI, Pt. II (June, 1969), p. 157.

^®Dr. Abdul Rahman Shahbandar and cAsls cAli Mlsri were two of this group. Birdwood, op. clt. , p. 33. 37 regarding Arab lndependenca. The anavtr cane on June 11,

1918, addreaaed to the group aa nembers of the Party of

Syrian Unity, delivered to then in Cairo by M. S. 0.

Walrond; it was a fornal guarantee of Arab independance.3*

For sone tine the iaeue of politica waa nixed with nornative overtones. Lord Balfour, writing fron Paris to tha Prine Minister in February, 1919, included the thought that,

in the case of Palestine we deliberately and rightly decline to accept the principle of self-deternina- tlon. If the present inhabitants ware consulted they would unquestionably give an antl-Jewlsh verdict.

Thus Balfour saw Palestine aa an exceptional casa largaly fron a Biblical perspective in which the Jews were seen as the enbodlnent of a religious fulflllnent. His inclination was to cone out again the sane year in a nanorandun dated

August 11, 1919, in which he wrote that,

3^The full wording of it was first reproduced in Statenents Made on Behalf of Hla Majesty1s Governnent During the Year 1918 in Regard to tha Future Statue of Certain Parts of the Ottonan Enpire, Cnd. 5964 (London: H.M.S.O., 1939), No. 2 and later as an appendix to Antonlua' book, see op. clt., intra pp. 270-274. It waa Antonlua who aald that this docunent was "by far tha noat inportant atatenent of policy publicly nade by Great Britain In connection with the Arab Revolt," Ibid.. p. 271. For the reply by the Foreign Office see CAB 27/27, PRO. For other critical connenti sea Nekavivl, op.clt., p. 61} Kedourle, England and the Middle East, op. cit., pp. 133- 135.

32CO 733/321/47756/317/ME/44/1919, PRO. 38

so far aa Palaatina la concarnad, tha povara hava aada no statement of fact which la not admittedly wrong, and no daclaratlon of policy which, at laaat In tha lattar, thay hava not alwaya lntanded to violate.33

The Machlavellian-llke character of Balfour, who acted aa the diplomat and atateaaan ha waa, waa not fully appreciated by tha aore populoua ataata of Arab aaaaea.

Opposition to Jewish settlaaent and Zionist aaplrations in

Palestine waa widespread aaong all levels of the Pales­ tinian coaaunlty and clearly recognised and sonatinas feared by the British officials.

The British becaae active in an attempt to moderate the foreseeable conflict between Arabs and Zionists, when on'June 4, 1918, General Allenby, at the suggeatlon of

Sir Gilbert Clayton,3* aade arrangements for the Zionist leader Chaim Weliaann to meet Amir Faysal. Thla they did at the latter*a camp at Macan, Transjordan. Welzaann was accompanied by Colonel P. C. Joyce, a British interprater33

33CO 733/321/132187/2117/ME/44/1919, PRO.

34 Tlbawi claims Sykes waa the initiator, "T. E. Lawrence," op♦ clt., p. 157. However, Foreign Office files indicate it waa Clayton, FO 371/27647/94197, June 13, 1918, PRO.

35FO 371/3391/102630/4079, June 7, 1918, PRO. See also Chaim Welsmann, Trial and Error (New York: Schocken Books, 1966), pp. 232-235. 39 ittachid to the Sheriflsn forces, sad Colonel T. E.

Lawrence.

Walsmann wee anxious to neat Faysal. Zionist efforts could be made much easier with the support from the chsrlsnstlc Arab leader. Besides his attempts to woo

Faysal were also Intended to bring pressure to bear on the

Palestinian leadership which was attempting to align

Itself closer to the main Arab movement, though with little response registered fron the major participants. Walsmann also saw the growing opposition of the Palestinians toward

Zionism In developing societies.^6

During the course of the conversation between

Walsmann and Faysal the former Is reported to have attemp­ ted to mollify Faysal's fears of Zionist encroachment upon

Muslim lands. Walsmann explained that he (read the

Zionists) sought British protection for Zionist colonisa­ tion and development projects. To this Faysal replied that he was in no position to taka a public stand on such a pre­ carious Issue. Tibawl interpreted this situation as

"Faisal as a soldier refused to enter Into any political discussion; policy, he said, was made In Mecca by his

*^For example. Par al-cUlum al-Islamivvah (The Islamic School for Sciences). Jam^iyyat al-Shabiba al-Yufiyyah (The Jaffa Touth Society). Jan^lyyair al-Tacawun al-Masaili (The Social Christian Welfare Association) and Al-Jamclyat al-Ahllyyah (The National Society). 40 father."37

The two leaders wet again In London and It wae more than mere chance or rare opportunity. Faysal's trip wae a delay en route to the Parle Peace Conference, as the repre­ sentative of the Hedjas. His stay In London was basically for consultation with the British regarding his overall demands for the independence of the Arab lands which were part of the Ottoman Empire, but more specifically geogra­ phic Syria--whlch of course included Palestine.

Lord Robert Cecil, from the Foreign Office, per­ suaded Lawrence to put pressure on Faysal to receive

Weizmann for a second time. This meeting came about in early December. Thus, on December 11, 1918, the two nationalist leaders met again at the Carlton Hotel in

London. Faysal was accompanied by Nuri as-Sacid, Rustum

Haidar, Lawrence, who acted as the interpreter, and cAwnl

Bey cAbd al-Hadl, a Palestinian (who will be discussed in greater detail below. X38 The Amir produced a map of the

37A. L. Tibawi, op. cit.. p. 158. For another view see Gabriel Stern, "The Welsmann-Felsal Agreement," New Outlook. XII, No. 3 (Narch-Aprll 1969), pp. 20-25. H. Perlmann differs considerably in Interpretation on most of the same events. "Chapters of Arab-Jewish Diplomacy, 1918- 22," Jewish Social Studies. VI, No.2 (April 1944), pp. 123- 154. For Sir Gilbert Clayton's report to the Foreign Office see FO 371/3398/105824/27647, June 12, 1918, PRO.

38Perlmann, op. cit.. p. 133. 41

Sykes-Plcot Agreeaent and was notlcaably dlaturbad. Hla feeling wae that It aerved the purpoaea of neither the

Jews nor the Araba. He felt hoatlle toward the French also, who had aistraated hla both privately and publicly.

Welxaann told Fayaal he knew of the agreeaent since 1915 and had protested agalnat It. He stated that in an inter­ view with Lord Cecil in 1916 he spoke of it and in a letter written fron Palestine on July 17, 1918.

Faysal wanted to know the details of the Zionists' prograa. Ueizaann was prepared for this and already had an "agreeaent" which was sore like a aodus vivendi. It contained nine articles dealing with joint Interests in

Palestine. Welzaann told hla, inter alia, that he;

1) expected the Peace Conference and Faysal to recognize

the natural and historical rights of the Jewa to

Palestine;

2) would ask for the appolntaent of Great Britain as the

Trustee Power which would set up governaent and peralt

Jews to share power;

3) deaanded reform of the land law in Palestine asking

land in the hands of ths effendls and usurers avail­

able to colonisation;

4) Intended to carry out public works projects;

5) stated that Jews would be allowed to contribute to the

total welfare of the country; 42 6) stated that the questions of boundaries and awqaf

would be left until more substantial political ques­

tions were solved between Zionists and Faysal; and

7) denied French Insinuations that Jews had any designs

on Muslin Holy Places.

Faysal assured Welzmann that he would cooperate at the Peace Conference. He told Welzmann that he would make a sincere effort to obtain Britain as the Trustee Power and If that failed he would try to get the United States.

He realized that if he failed he would be fighting for the 40 existence of an Arab state.

However, since Faysal understood no English, even with the able Interpretation of Lawrence, he nevertheless attached a reservation, In his own hand In Arabic. The note read:

If the Arabs attain their Independence as we demanded In our memorandum dated 4 January 1919 addressed to the British Foreign Office I shall approve of the articles contained in the [document]. If the slightest change or adjustment Is made [in meeting the demands], I shall not be bound by a single word in the contract (muqawalah) which will be null and void, and of no account and no validity, and I shall not be answerable in any way.**

39 This was an easily exploited Issue with the largely ignorant and highly rallgloua Arab masses suppor­ ted by statements from Jewish religious zealots.

40Z4/56, CZA.

4*Tlbawl, op. cit., p. 160. 43

Lawrence, as cha translator In presence, gave

Welzmann a copy of the reservation according to his free

translation. It read quite differently:

If the Arabs are established as I have asked In ay manifesto addressed to the BritishSecretary of State for Foreign Affairs I will carry out what Is written In this agreeaent. If changes are aade I aa not answerable for failing to carry out this agreeaent.4^

The reason for this apparent purposive substitution,

Tibawi would have us believe, was the result of Lawrence's 43 conversion to Zionlsa and becoming one of Its agents.

Hekavivi, on the other hand, viewed it as being "charac­ teristic of Lawrence's fallacious diplomacy that, embar­ rassed by Faisal's reservation, he gave a milder ver* sion."*4

The Weizaann-Faysal "agreement" was followed by other friendly correspondence between the Arabian monarch and Justice Fells Frankfurter, a U. S. Supreme Court

Justice and a Zionist, while the former was at the Paris

Z4/4115, CIA; David Hunter Miller, Diary at the Peace Conference of Paris. Vol. XIV (Hew York: Pri­ vately Printed [Appeal Printing Co., 1924]), pp. 226-234, 389-415. 4^Tlbawl, op. cit., p. 159. He writes: "It has until now been a secret that Lawrence had become Belfour's protege. For it was Balfour who appointed Lawrence advleor to the British delegation to the Peace Conference, contrary to the advice of the permanent staff of the Foreign Office. So when Welsmann called on Faisal, the interpreter was, to put It mildly, not opposed to the Zionist programme."

44Nekavlvi, 0£. cit., pp. 111-112. 44

Peace talks. Fayaal's lettera were generally friendly, recognizing the rights and demands of the Zionists.

An eyewitness to the King*a dispatch of the letter later claimed that Faysal expectad to be king and was satisfied with that role. He was satisfied to have Syria and give Palestine to the Jews. Even at the Peace Confer­ ence In 1919, he felt that the Balfour Declaration meant a

Jewish Commonwealth.^**

The vacillation on Fayaal's part has been explained as either his uncertainty to tha status of Palestine vis- a-vis his scheme for a Syrian-based kingdom and maintain­ ing his delicate balance within the Arab world or a reaction to Zionist political efforts. Contacts between

Faysal and various Zionist leaders continued, anyway, into the early 1920's.

Z4/56 CZA. The letter was drafted by Faysal, Lawrence, Welzmann, and Colonel Richard Melnertzhagen, the last named claims. Middle East Diary, 1917-1956 (New York: Thomas Yoseloff Pub., 1959), p. 15. A copy of the letter is also in Perlmann, op♦ cit., pp. 139-140. This version is, however, much different. The correspondence was reported In the Judieche Rundschau (Berlin), XXIV, No. 18 (March 11, 1919), p. 133 and a reply from Arthur Ruppln In Ibid., XXIV, No. 19 (March 14, 1919), p. 1.

46FC 25, P3, No. 10, March 16, 1942, BSA. Captain Tulin offered the information In a quastion and answer period after a talk glvan by Dr. Quincy Wright before the Arab Jewish Relations Study Committee In Chicago. The question of a "Jewish Commonwealth" was takan up by various officials In tha Foreign Office at tha time of the drafting of the Mandate. See F0 371/5199, PRO. 45

Whatever Faisal's own views on Zionists, and whatever advantage he nay have thought to gain from befriending it, the Palestinians, both Muslim and Christian, did not follow him in his plans. Their hostility was strongly manifested from the beginning. '

The Palestinians were conservative in outlook, superior in

education and culture in comparison to their regional

counterparts whom they tended to look down upon. Their

reasoning was quite opportunistic; they had too much to

lose by siding with the rebel movement of Faysal. But

they also had to contend with the growing strength of the

Zionists and in any case Faysal was at least an Arab.

Faysal also had to contend with the French who were

seen as poor seconds to the British, though he also dealt with them in 1916-1917, receiving some limited military

assistance. However, the French reached an accord with

the British for the disposition of Syria and Mesopotamia,

only after an accord had been reached between France and

Russia in order to ease the letter's fears. It was then,

in order to Insure the control of its newly acquired

position, that the French found it necessary to deal with

the British. Syria was the center of French historical

tradition in the Middle East dating from the time of the

Crusades, while Mesopotamia for the British was a buffer

and a nexus to its colonial India. The French and British

^Kedouria, England and the Middle East, op. cit. , p. 152. 46

thus devised en agreement whereby these Ottoman terri­

tories would be dlgeeted by the two parties subsequent to

the hostilities.

In regard to Syria, most was to go to Trance, as

well as the Mosul district In Mesopotamia. Palestine was

reserved for e special International regime. In addition

to the physical control of certain areas for the protection

of national Interests, there was the reservation that an

Arab State or a Confederation of Arab States would be set

up In both French and British sectors, to be under the

control of an Arab chief.This was largely contingent

on, however, the Arabs' capturing of the Inland cities of

Horns, Hama, Damascus, and Aleppo.

The French and Faysal were ultimately to quarrel

over the role the latter was to play In this scheme of

things. Damaacus was the former capital of the glorious

Islamic Ummayld Caliphate and was to be the capital of

Faysal's rule. It was also, In this respect, agreed on by

the allies that Arab troops would be the first to enter 49 Damascus. Indeed, this was the case claimed by Lawrence*7

48 E. L. Woodward and Rohan Butler (ode.). Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939, lot ser. vol. 5 TTondon: H.M.S.O, 1952), p. 244.

49 Seven Pillars of Wisdom, op. cit., chapter 19. 47

And Tibawi,^® while Antonlua charges it was "British cavalry" who entered first In the aornlng of October lf

1918.51 Wavell, Allenby*s biographer, describes the situ­ ation in a curious aannar, clalalng that "parties of Arab irregulars" entered, followed sonatina later by a brigade 52 of the Australian Light Horse troops. In official dis­ patches, however, the Australian Lieutenant General Sir

Harry Chauvel clalaed the honor for the 3rd Light Horse

Brigade and an Indian cavalry reglaent of the 4th and 5th

Cavalry Divisions in tha evening of Septeaber 3 0 . ^

The aost conclusive and credible story is presented by Kedourle, who provides a full narrative.According to

Kedourle, the Shariflan forces were "to be allowed" to enter Daaascus in order to enhance their clala to Syria

^®A. L. Tlbawl da l e s that on tha evening of Septeaber 30, the Arab Caael Corps was the first to enter the city. "Syria in War Tlae Agreeaents and Disagreeaents: Fresh Evidence fron the British Foreign Office Records [Part II]." Middle East Forun, XLIII, Nos. 2 4 3 (1967), p. 99.

^Antonius, op. cit. » p. 238.

^[General Sir] Archibald P. Wavell, Allenby, A Study in Greatness; The Bloaraphy of Field Marshall Vis­ count Allenby of Maglddo and Felixstowe C.C.B., G.C.M.G. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1941), p. 284; This"" Palestine Caapalgns (London: Constable and Co., Ltd., rev. ed., 1931), p. 229.

^Knightley and Slapaon, op. cit.. pp. 88-89.

5*Elle Kedourle, "The Capture of Daaascas, 1 October 1918," Middle Eastern Studies. I, No. 1 (October 48 which could than ba considarad to hava baan llbaratad

Ottoman tarrltory by tha actlona of tha Arabs and thua coma under tha tarma of tha "Declaration of tha Sevan" of

July, 1918. But It waa a unit of tha Auatrallan contin­ gent that entered flrat. In any case, when the Ottoman forces departed, Sharif Naalr, tha leader of the Sharlflan forcea In tha Damaacua vicinity, found tha Sharlflan flag flying from tha municipal building and a committee of local notablaa under Amir Sacld al-Jaca'irl controlling tha city, oatanaibly for tha King, In tha name of Fayaal and Huaayn. Fayaal entered Damaacua on October 3.

Following tha capture of Damaacua, under Allanby's direction, tha dlapoaltlon of tha Levant came under aerloua Anglo-French dlacueelon. French General Henri

Gourand waa made High Commlealoner for Syria, by the

Alllee, and Fayaal, with tha title of "General," waa dispatched to govern "Interior Syria" (Damascus, Home,

Aleppo, and tha area of TranaJordan). General Allenby, as the military governor of Palestine and Iraq, placed these areas under British rule.

Spurred on by Huaayn’a "capture" of Beirut and

Allenby'a diataataful mission to Induce tha Araba to move

Inland (since tha coastline waa not included In thalr territorial allotment), Faysal was to hava control of

1964), pp. 66-83, especially pp. 72-76, 80-81. 49

Transjordan without tha Lebanon. This was also done to abate the growing French apprehension of British and

French alas in the area. An agreement was reached on

October 19, 1918, between the British and French for the military administration of the region. Accordingly,

Palestine was to be partitioned as Occupied Enemy Territory

Administration South with the Arab-controlled area east of the Jordan River.

This was not the end of the parceling out of the land. On November 8, 1918, an Anglo-French Declaration waa issured, only three days after the ending of the War, directed to calm the fears of the people in the area. It read as follows:

The alms which France and Great Britain have in view of waging in the East the War let loose upon the world by German ambition is to ensure the complete and final emancipation of all those peoples so long oppressed by Turks, and to establish national govern­ ments and administrations which shall derive their authority from tha initiative and free will of the people themselves. To realise this aim France and Great Britain are in agreement to encourage and assist in the establishment of Native Governments in Syria and Mesopotamia» now liberated by the Allies, as also in those territories for whose liberation they are striving t^o recognise these governments Immediately they are effectively established. Far from wishing to impose on the people of these regions this or that institution they have no other care than to assure, by their support and practical aid, the normal working of such governments and administrations as the peoples themselves have adopted; to guarantee impartial and even justice for all, to facilitate the economic development of the country by arousing and encouraging local initiative, to foster the spread of education, to put an end to those factions too long exploited by 50

Turkish politics--such Is the psrt which ths two Allied Governments have set themselves to play In liberated territories.^

In a response to the Declaration, General Sir

Gilbert Clayton, as Chief Political Officer, cabled the

Foreign Office on December 2, requesting clarification of the communique regarding the status of Palestine. He stated that the general population felt It was lncludad in the statement, at least In principle. He continued with his position: "The line I have taken Is that I know no other interpretation of the declaration than that con­ tained in the text.5** The answer was ultimately to be made at the Paris Peace Conference. Even then there was considerable confusion. Balfour, In a memorandum addressed to Lord Curson, dated August 11, 1919, admitted that he could not conceive how the myriad of commitments, both vague and apeclflc, could be "harmonised."^7

2/244/POL/2261, ISA. Italics not In the Original. Compara thla to General Allenby' s proclamation to Jerusalemites after the capture of the city In December, 1917, as read by Sir Ronald Storrs: "The object of war In the East on the part of Graat Britain waa the complete and final liberation of all paoples formerly oppressed by the Turks and the establishment of national govarnments and administrations in those countries deriving authority from the Initiative and free will of those peoples themselves." Hansard, June 21, 1922 quoted In Palestine Papers, 1917- 1922; Seeda of Conflict compiled by Doreen Ingrams (Lon- don: John Murray") 1972), p. 20.

***Ib l d .*, Christopher Sykes, Crossroads to Israel

Fayaal continued to aancuvtr. In tha nagotlatlona

ha had with tha French, thay proposad on December 23, 1919

control "dea populations da langua Araba fixes sur la

tarritolra syrien."^® Thla seemed agraaabla to Fayaal

alnca thara waa nothing in hla countarpropoaal, of tha 59 aaia data that matched thla and tharafore it was

included In tha agreement between tha Franch government

and Amir Fayaal on January 16, 1920.®® Thla waa than

followed by tha English reading In tha Provisional Agree­ ment between Faysal and tha Franch government, on

58FO 371/5033/El646, PRO.

59FO 371/164835/ME/44, PRO.

60FO 371/I71637/ME/44, PRO. Tha Franch vara not to be outpoaltlonad by tha British if thay could help It. Tha Franch minister George Plcot and tha Franch Consul- General of Syria contacted Faldy al-cAlami (Muaa'a father) and warned him that tha Britlah had promised Palestine to Zionism. Thay sought his support with tha argument that France was staunchly Catholic and would not 1st tha land of Jesus go to those who crucified him. Tha insidiousness of tha argument was obvious to Faidy. RG 226 50106 S OSS, J1CAMK, November 15, 1943, WNRG. Walsmann told Melnerts- hagan that whan he first mat Clamancaau ha was "unsympa­ thetic" to 21onlsm, remarking, 'We Christians can never forgive tha Jaws for crucifying Christ.'" op. cit.. p. 22. This is tha basis for much of tha Franch subversion among tha Araba in an attempt to subvert tha British position. Tshir al-Husaynl, son of Kamil al-Husaynl, Mufti of Jerusalem, in a secret interview with F. H. Kisch, May 16, 1925, related a French scheme to gain control of Palestine. The Mufti engineered demonstrations in Jaffa and Jerusalem In 1920 in order to establish a National Government in Palestine with him as head. By creating sufficient dis­ turbances it was hoped that Britain would abandon hope for a Jewish National Home. The Latin Patriarch, Barlaaslna, 52

February 23, 1920.61 Thla agreement read In the confirma­ tion of the right of unification of "the populationa speaking the Arabic language and residing In Syria."

Ostensibly, Faysal was speaking "au non du peuple syrlen, c'est a la France qul 11 fait appeler pour cette mis­ sion. "6^ However, In the final agreement It was trans­ lated as "In the name of the Syrian nation he asks this from France."63

King-Crane Commission

Building upon the Arab intellectual's seizure of

Wilson's idealistic theories of self-determination, was now to come an American section of an Inter-Allied Com­ mission on Mandate in Turkey, to survey and assess local attitudes In Palestine. They arrived at Jaffa port on

June 10, 1919, headed by Henry C. King and Charles R.

Crane. Their purpose in the Near East was to learn about conditions and local attitudes "in order that President was supposedly the intermediary together with Jamal Effendl for a secret treaty with France. Provisions were that France, through Barlasalna, would supply arms and guarantee to protect rebels who may be driven Into Syrian territory by facilitating their crossing. In return, the Mufti was to support the French Idea of united Syria under a French protectorate. This information was given to the High Commissioner in the presence of Norman Bentwlch. S25/517, ISA.

61F0 371/164835/E 450, PRO.

62FO 371/5033/E/1696, PRO.

63FO 371/164835/ME/44, PRO. 53

Wilson and Che American people may act with full knowledge of the facts in any policy they may be called upon here­ after to adopt concerning the problems of the Near East."**^

However, its recommendations were far more specific in regard to Palestine and had clear implications as were seen in their wide acceptance by the Palestinian community.

The character and nature of the survey may be seen in the following two tables:

TABLE I65

DELEGATIONS RECEIVED BY CLASS

Political Groups Economic and Social Groups Religious Groups t Mayors and Muni­ Professions and Trades 1 Christians 53 cipal Councils 12 Farmers and Agricul- Muslims 18 Administrative cultural Workers 1 Jews 14 Councils 12 Young Men's Clubs 1 Druse 1 Councils of Chambers of Conerce 1 Other 3 Village Chiefs 22 Miscellaneous 1 Shayks 6 Arab Societies 2 Moslem Christian Committees 3

Totals 47 5 88 N-442 (Total Selection)

64 Harry H. Howard, The Klng-Crane Co— lsslon: An American Inquiry into the Middle East (Beirut: Khayats, 1963), p. 89.

^Parls Peace Conf. 181/9102/9, FRUS, Paris Peace Conference, 1919. Vol. XII, pp. 756-757. 54

Here we see Che overall social quality of the Interviews being largely from the more literate and intelligent sectors of the society. It should be noted that these figures represent the O.E.T.A. South area. A compilation of all the regions surveyed reveal comparatively similar

findings. Also striking is the large number of Christian

Arabs versus Muslims, partly attributable to the percent­ age of educated members of the population. But what is of primary significance is to be found in Table II regarding

the nature of government desired by the population.

TABLE II66

NATURE OF PETITIONS RECEIVED*

Qualifying Variable N Per Cent

Territorial Limits For United Syria 221 85.0 For Separate Palestine 3 1.1 For Separate Palestine Under British if French have Syrian Mandate 1 .3 For Autonomous Palestine within Syrian State 24 9.2 Independence For Absolute Independence of Syria 174 67.0 For Independence of Iraq (Mesopotamia) 26 10.0 For Independence of All Arab Countries 30 11.5 Form of Government For Democratic Kingdom 5 1.9 For Amir Faysal as King 2 .8 For Democratic Representative Government 0 For Guarding of Rights of Minorities 4 1.5

66Ibid.. pp. 758-759. TABLE II (continued) 55

Arabic to b« Official Language 10 3.8 For Abolition of Foreign Cepltulatlone 5 1.9 For Autonomy for all provlncea of Syria 0 Choice of Mandate Brltlah For Brltlah Mandate 48 18.4 For Brltlah Mandate If mandate la obligatory 0 For British "Assistance" 0 Total British First Choice 48 18.4 For British Mandate as Second Choice 2 .8 For British "Assistance" as Second Choice 0 French For French Mandate 17 6.5 For French Mandate If Mandate la obligatory 0 For French "Assistance" 0 Total French First Choice 17 6.5 For French Mandate as Second Choice 0 For French "Aasiatance" as Second Choice 0 Zionist Program For Complete Zionist Program (Jewish State and Immigration) 7 2.7 For Modified Zionist Program 222 85.3 Against Zionist Program 8 3.0 Anti-British 0 Anti-French General Anti-French atatements 4 1.5 Anti-Arab General Anti-Arab atatements 7 2.7

N"260 (Total Petitions Received)

*0.E.T.A South only.

Upon completion of their survey the Commission had certain recommendations that were far more specific in regard to Palestine than indicated by its statement of purpose. Their proposal contained basically six parts.

General recommendations included that Syria become mandated under the League of Nations and the unity of Syria be preeerved, the mandate should be a singular one, and Amir 56

Faysal at the head of a new state. Fifth, and of utmost

Importance to the Arab position, was the recommendation that the Zionist program in and for Palestine be modified since approximately 72 percent of the population of Syria were against the goals of Zionism.^

This gave further impetus to the rise of Arab nationalist sentiment and the hope that European imperial­ ism could be staved off in favor of the introduction of

Arab autonomy. A General Syrian Congress was held at

Damascus on June 8, 1919, to decide on the Arab role in determining the status of the Arab East. A British Foreign

Office spokesman wrote that it was the Congress and not 68 Faysal that sought a withdrawal of British troops. The

Congress made known its demands for a unified Syria to include Palestine and followed up with a denunciation of the Zionist program "in that part of southern Syria which 6 9 is known as Palestine." The Congress in Damascus was accompanied by demonstrations in Jerusalem followed by a

8^Ibid.. pp. 787-799; Howard, op. cit.. pp. 211-227 .

68FO/5033/E/1599/2/44, 1920, PRO. The Congress was convoked before the arrival of the Klng-Crane Commission in order to express its views to it, Abu Khaldun Satlc al-Husrl, The Day of Maysalun: A Page from the Modern History of the Arabs (Washington, D. C.t The Middle East Institute, 1966), pp. 130-132.

^Antonlus, op. cit., p. 44. 57 demand for: 1) an indapandant Syria with natural bounda­ ries, 2) non-separation of Palastlna and Syria, and 3) no

Zionism and no Jewish immigration.7®

In splta of these public demonstrations of support for the Arab cause, tha Issue of Palestine, it was under­ stood, was still to be resolved in Paris.

An unusual beginning of correspondence provides some insight into the portents of the British position at

Paris and in future years. On March 13, 1919, Lieutenant

J. H. Nutting, a veteran of tha Palestine campaign and later a representative of a British land syndicate Cox and

Co., inquired of the British government whether or not they would sell 10 to 20,000 or more acres of land in Palestine for settlement. It seems that many British and Australian veterans of the Palestine campaign wanted to homestead thera. Thay sought to Introduce mechanized farm equipment and Intended to conduct agricultural pursuits and develop the land. It was also proposed that it would serve as a check on German, Austrian, and Turkish designs on the area.71

Curzon, acting as Foreign Secretary while Lord

Balfour was attending the Peace Conference, replied on

70F0 371/E/1786/2/44, PRO.

7X2/34/8349/P/B, ISA. 58

March 21t 1919. He put Nutting off, telling him that the

eale of any land would hava to be deferred until the final

dlaposltlon of Palestine was decided upon at the Peace

Conference•^ On the same day he wrote to Balfour,

suggesting that If His Majesty's Government are to accept a mandate for Paleatine, It would be very desirable to secure beforehand some authoritative ruling as to the attitude to be adopted with regard to non-Jewish immigration...I would further auggest that in order to avoid aubsequent friction with the Zionists, such a ruling should properly form part of the terms of the Mandate i t s e l f . ' ^

Balfour's reply came in a letter dated April 2,

1919, In which he wrote*

It is proposed to include In the Chapter of the Draft Treaty of Peace with Turkey dealing with Palea­ tine a clause giving In general terms preferential immigration rights to the Jews. It is Intended to leave the terms of the clause vague in order that the future Government of Paleatine may not find Its hands tied unnecessarily and that It may to some extent be able to adopt tha necessary administrative measures, entailed by the clause, to the then existing condi­ tions.. .It Is also suggested that land concessions would be given preference to the Zionists.

However, neither Curzon nor Balfour had Intentions beyond

this. In earlier correspondence Curzon wrote to Balfour

of his opinion to limit the intentions of the Zionists with Balfour replying that his declaration did not includa

72 2/34/8349/P/C, ISA.

732/34/8349/P/D, ISA.

^*F0 800/215, PRO, cltad in Ingrams, op. cit.. pp. 57-58. 59

a Jewish Government of Palestine, Both agreed that this

was the goal of the Zionists despite their undeclared

intentions.7^

In a letter of February 11, 1920, Faysal asked

Allenby Britain's position in regard to the disposition of

Palestine and Mesopotamia since the European press had made the Husayn-McMahon war time agreements public.

Allenby's reply of February 18 was that Palestine again was to await the decisions of the Paris Conference.7®

Faysal was thus urged to attend the Peace Conference. He hed been informed of the Allied decision that they would not accept or even recognise the Damascus proceedings as being valid without a treaty commitment and hence it would be better if he were to state his case before the Peace

Conference.

In a conversation between Sir J. Tilley and General

Haddad Pasha, the latter egreed to go to Europe if Faysal

refused. He also noted that the question of Mesopotamia

and Palestine was only brought up as a "general question."

Tilley noted that "Faysal had always been in favor of

British advisors in Mesopotamia and was quite prepared to work with the Jews in Palestine."77 To this waa added a

75FO 371/E/18808/2/44, PRO.

762/34/8349/P/F, ISA.

77FO 371/E 1923/2/44, PRO. 60 conent by Major Sir Hubert Young that,

Felaal la only using Paleatine aa a weapon against the French. If we could get theai to agree to his being King of Syria, possibly excluding Lebanon, and at the sane tine give the necessary assurances about Palestine and Mesopotanla, he would drop the last- naned countries fron his progranne.'®

Paris Peace Conference

Faysal waa In Aleppo on Novenber 11, 1918, when he received a telegran fron Huaayn to go to Europe and then 79 on to France,' to attend the Versailles Peace Conference o Q as his representative. The French were noticeably cool to the Idea of Fayaal's appearance. The French Governnent notified King Huaayn that Anir Faysal would not be con­ sidered the head of any official nlsslon while In France.

The reason given was that Husayn had not fornally inforned then of his visit. But there was nost certainly tha ques­ tion of just whon did Faysal represent. Ironically enough

In a statenent nade by cAvnl Bey, the Palestinian lawyer who acconpanled Faysal to the Peace Conference, rebutting certain Zionist clains before the Anglo-Anerican Connis- sion of Enquiry on March 12, 1946, stated candidly that

Faysal "was not representing all the Araba at the tine."®*

^®Ersklne, King Feisel. op. cit.. p. 97. 79 Tha Hadjaa vat alloted two aaata*

80FO 371/e 2068/2/44, PRO, 81 Aharon Cohen, Israel and the Arab World (New Yorki Funk & tfagnella, 1970), p. lTTT 61

Faysal, as Huaayn's rapreaantatlva, also possd complica­

tions alncs many Muslim purists, regardless of the positive political results, continued to hold It against Husayn that he revolted against the Caliph. The Mufti of Jerusalem,

In 1919, when asked whether the Hedjazl leader had his political Interests In mind when promoting the Interests of the Hedjazls. The reply was curt: "Not at all. That

Is for the Bedouins across the Jordan. We are different

H fi 2 peoples. Our native country Is Palestine. Further­ more, Glidden tells us that,

the Rashldls of H'll and Shaykh Salim of al-Kuwayt turned for help to the Turks against British-supported lbn-al-Sacud. In al-Yaman, the Imam Yahya, preoccu­ pied by his quarrel with the British over his boundary with Aden (cAdan) refused to abandon his alliance with Turkey until the end of the war.

Upon his arrival In France, Faysal (accompanied by

Rustum Haidar and Nurl as-Sacld) was received by the

French President Poincare at Elyses Palace, but without diplomatic courtesy. As soon as Faysal arrived In Paris, he contacted cAwnl Bey cAbd al-Hadi8* and appointed him

82 FO 608/98 quoted In Aaron S. Klleman, Foundations of British Policy In the Arab World: The Cairo Conference of 1921 (Baltimore. Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, I770T7"p. 23.

B^Harold C. Glidden, "Arab Unity; Ideal and Reality,” Krltsech and Winder, op. cit., pp. 251-232.

®*cAbd al-Hadl has already been mentioned. Most of the material presented on him has bean culled from a 62

"Chief of the Arab bureau" of the Arab delegation. cAwni

Bey went to Paris In 1910 to study law at the University, receiving his diploma In 1914. World War 1 caught him in

Paris, and as he was an Ottoman subject he was also an enemy alien. As an alternative to Internment, he was per­ mitted to remain although within the city limits. In order to support himself he taught French [sic.] at the Lycee

Voltaire until the end of 1919.

After a brief stay in Paris, Faysal left for

London. While in England, Fayaal had numerous discussions with British officials, who generally encouraged him to accept French control of Syria, which was implicitly in the British interest. It was here also that Faysal became acquainted with the until then secret Sykes-Plcot agree­ ment. Here again, also, Faysal meets Welzmann, the

Zionist spokesman.

The Paris Peace Conference formally began on

January 18, 1919. Faysal had already submitted a position paper on the first of the year, spelling out his demands for a unified Syria under Arab rule.®^ He submitted a confidential report RG H 6 OSS 43706 C, MA, March 23, 1944. Lawrence wrote of him that he waa "more a garcon de cabarat than a statesman." F0 371/E 2354/35/88, PRO.

85 Palestine is described as a "province" Inhabited largely by Arabs and their Semitic brothers, the Jews. Faysal accedes to the real situation by accepting the 63 second ■•■ortndus on January 29, recounting the exploits and war efforts of Huaayn and the expressed idealise of

Wilson asking for the Independence of "the Arabic-speaking peoples of Asia, fron the line Alaxandretta-Dlarbekr south- ward to the Indian Ocean; no nention of Palestine was nade at this tine. Fayaal's written efforts were supple- nented by a personal appearance at the conference on

February 6. 8 7 Here he reiterated his clains and denands. He spoke of the Arab confederation with a special arrangenent for Syria and the Hedjaz with Lebanese autonony and an exceptional special regine for Palestine. President

Wilson's input at this nesting was a suggestion that an inter-allied connlssion be forned and sent to the Fertile

Crescent to learn the wishes of the people. Faysal readily accepted this proposal.88

The French were still intent on countering British and Arab advances so on February 13, when the Syrian ques­ tion cane up again, M. Chekri Ganen of the Syrian possibility of a nandate but it nust aid the econonlc sector of the connunlty. Note also that the nenorandun was circulated a week prior to Faysal*e arrival In France on January 7. David Hunter Miller, op. cit.. pp. 297-299.

86Ibid., p. 300.

®^David Lloyd George, Menoirs of the Peace Confer­ ence. Vol. II (New Haven, Conn.t Tale University Press, 1^39), pp. 673-677. 88 Paris Peace Conf. 160, 03101/31,FRUS, op. cit.. p. 891, 64

Commission was called upon to speak. Ganem waa the founder of the "Comlte Central Syrian," although, he had not been

In Syria for thirty-five years. He objected to Faysal being a truly representative figure for the Arabic-speaking people and sought an independent Syria with the supervision of France.®®

Faysal returned to Syria and on Hay 5, 1919, addressed a gathering of notables and coaaunlty heads in the Dasascus Town Hall. He reiterated his position of the unity of the Arab world and an Independent Syria, Hedjaz, and Iraq. Other areas were noticeably remiss In the capabilities for self-rule, even though all the Arab coun­ tries constituted a single nation (ummah).®0 Along with

Faysal returned cAwni Bey who was promoted to his staff in Syria as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. This remained the case until the French drove Faysal out of

Syria with cAwni Bey leaving with him.

Faysal's territorial claims, however, were not totally within his capability to achieve but had to come about by a reconciliation of French and British conflicting interests. The diplomatic battle ensued between

89 Paris Peace Conf. 180.03101/38, FEUS. Ibid.. pp. 1024-1044, especially 1037 for remarks on Palestine.

®®al-Husri, op. cit.. pp. 106-112. 65

Clemenceau and Lloyd Gaorga, randaring little fulfillment of either'a goals. Toward the and of August, 1919, Faysal wrote to Lloyd George stressing his Anglophile disposition and suggesting he be allowed to return to London to express himself more fully. Lloyd Gsorge cabled Faysal on

September 11 inviting him to London "when it was virtually certain that he would not be able to reach Paris before the talks were ovtr,"^

Lloyd George was to propose to Faysal that the

British military would withdraw from Syria and Cillela,

French troops were to occupy western Syria and Arab troops to occupy eastsrn Syria. Thus the Arabs wsre to hava control of the areas in question: "Homo, Hama, and

Aleppo," as well as Damascus and Amman. However, the

British were to remain in control of Palestine (actually

O.E.T.A. South). 9 2 When Faysal arrlvad in Franco on September 17,

Clemenceau refused to meet him. Then upon an urgent request from Lloyd George, Faysal left for England, arriving in London on September 19. He returned to Paris on October 20, finally meatlng with Clemancaau on November

27, reaching an accord whereby the French were to have

91 *Nevakivi, Britain. France, op. cit.. p. 198.

®^In his retinue were General Haddad Pasha, his interpreter, and Fu'ad al-Khatlb, his political advisor. 66

Arab acquiescence for their occupation of the Syrian coaat.

Faysal than left for Beirut on January 7,'1920.

Faysal's return to the Arab East signalled an Impor­ tant turning point In regional developments. It was a fairly well accepted position that Faysal would return with guarantees for what was taken for granted by so many of the

Arab nationalists. Arab independence was to be the natural outcome of the Wart especially following Arab support of the Allies. Arab nationalism, at this time, sprang from

Damascus, and it was also the center of Syrian nationalism which sought the integrity of Syria. At the head of this latter movement were the members of the Nadi al-Arabi (The

Arab Club), manipulating a highly unstable condition. The situation continued within controlled limits as long as the moderate members believed Faysal would not give up

Palestine and thought he could obtain his demands. But

Faysal returned without the demands balng satisfied. A serious problem then arose among the segment of the popu­ lation that was satisfied with the arrangement of a small but developed Syria and who did not strive for a Greater oi Syria. ■* Thus the return of Faysal created dissension among the Arab political groups, with the Difac al-Watani

®^This position was represented by the Dlfac al- Watani (Defense of the Nation). 67 representing the moderates end the Nedl al-Arebi, the extremists.94

To cope with the growing disastrous situation, a second Palestine Arab Congress was held on February 27,

1920. On March 7 resolutions were accepted proclaiming an Independent Greater Syria under the monarchial control of Amir Faysal. Also passed was the declsration that

Mesopotamia was to be ruled by Amir cAbdullah. The news was announced to the Syrian public on March 8 that Faysal was the King of the United Kingdom of Syria— Syria,

Lebanon, and Palestine.

Wilson's evoked principles of self-determination did not sit well with the British or French, so when the news of these resolutions reached their capitals, dis­ concertion ensued. The allied Supreme Council convened at

San Remo on April 19, and by April 25 the Arab nationalists were fully frustrated when Mesopotamia and Palestine were named British mandates and Syria, a mandate of the French.

The Syrian cabinet under the prime ministership of Rida

Pasha al-Rikabl reacted with expectable demonstrations against the decision. A new cabinet formed May 3 under

Hashem al-Atasl, the president of the Syrian Congress, vowed to oppose the Mandate and Zionist ambitions in

94Z4/3886/I, January 31, 1920, CZA. 68

Palestine.

In an attempt to regain Syria, Faysal'a brother cAbdullah, with a force of Arab Irregulars, left the Hedjaz

to occupy Transjordan in the name of Faysal. °Awni Bey met

Amir °Abdullah in Kacan in the winter of 1920, where he

remained in the Sharlflan camp for a week. cAbdullah then delegated cAwni Bey to go to Jerusalem to represent him in discussions with Sir Herbert Samuel, then High Commissioner

of Palestine. He was to tell Samuel of cAbdullah's inten­

tions to occupy Transjordan. cAwnl Bey, however, found

Samuel and his Chief Secretary General Sir Wyndham Deedes,

unfavorable to this. The British were then told that

cAbdullah would return to Arabia only under the force of

arms which brought an unofficial acceptance of the Arab proposal. Samuel then reported that the Colonial Secretary

Winston Churchill would come to Palestine and discuss and decide the matter.

cAwnl Bey returned to cAbdullah, in Macan, stressing

the British demand that no action was to be taken against

the French In Syria until the arrival of Churchill. In the meantime, Amman became occupied and a government was set up

there.When Churchill arrived in Cairo, it was cAwnl Bey

95 For an Interesting account on a major factor that maintained this government for cAbdullah, see Uriel Dann, "T. E. Lawrence in Amman, 1921," Abr-Nahraln. XIII (1972- 1973), pp. 33-41. 69 who brought a neiorandua from cAbdullah which raaultad in an agreement that Churchill would meet cAbdullah in

Jerusalem. When the meeting took place (March 20), it was between Churchill, Samuel, Oeedes, and Colonel Lawrence on one side talking to Sharif cAbdullah and cAwni Bey, his secretary and translator, representing Sharif Faysal on the other. the results of this first of three meetings were that the British would not oppose cAbdullah's presence in

Transjordan on the condition that he not take an anti-

French position or actions accordingly, and until the matter waa settled in London. However, cAbdullah's plan for an amalgamation of Transjordan and Iraq as well as a unitary Palestine on both sides of the Jordan was rejected by Churchill. cAbdullah was pleased, or at least

Impressed, with the portents of his new position. It appears that his position for Arab rule over Palestine, which was rebuked by Churchill and Samuel, had little effect when it waa aoothed by thoughts of personal gain.

Unofficially, Churchill confided in cAbdullah--in the presence of cAwni Bey--that as Britain's Colonial

Secretary he would attempt to bring unity to Britain's

Arab policy. Also an attempt would be made to appoint

Faysal King of Iraq and cAbdullah King of Syria. This was twisted about when in a cable to the Prime Minister in

March, 1921, Churchill wrote that the Arab character of 70

Transjordan was to b« ■aintained but it was to bs an Arab provlncs or an adjunct to P a l e s t i n e * cAbdullah, somewhat satisfied, returned to Annan and appointed cAwnl Bey to a position of Chlsf Chanberlaln (a post sinilar to a Chief

Secretary) .

The sane day Churchill net a deputation of the

Executive Connlttee of the Third Arab Congress, which was held in Haifa on March 28, 1921. Musa Kazln Pasha headed the delegation and presented Churchill with a nenorandun listing the denands of the Palestinians* Sir Herbert

Sanuel, it was charged, was a Jew and a Zionist and there­ fore could not be lnpartial. A sort of ultinatun was issued that unless the British assuned the role of assis­ tance to the Arab cause, other powers— Russia or Germany— would be contacted, preaunably to assist in the establish- nent of an Arab Palestinian govarnnent. The Palestinians' attack then turned to Zionisn and the Balfour Declaration, and it became obvious soon that there was adamant hostility toward both. They sought the renunciation of the entire concept of a Jewish national home in Palestine, the cessa­ tion of Jewish Immigration, and a reunification of Palestine 9 7 to Syria. Churchill's reply was a strong argument on

96PO 371/6342, PRO.

9*See Appendix C, Klleman, op.cit., pp. 269-273. 71

Britain's position noting that the Arab's fsars of Zionism wars unfounded. In any case, the Palestinians remained In ignorance In regard to their formal relationship to the

British or the Zionists.

Greater Syria (Mashru Suriyya al-Kubra)

The idea of a greater Syria--the whole of Suriyya. al-Shan--became a political question during the 1930's among the political rivalries of Iraq, the Amir cAbdullah of Transjordan, and the representative government of Syria which came to power in 1936. Iraq sought a settlement of the Syria issue in order to have a stable western border.

In 1931 King Faysal I obtained the support of a limited number of Syrians including Paris al-Khurl for a project uniting Iraq and Syria. However, the program failed when the Syrian National Bloc (al-Kutlah al-Watanlyyah) failed to give its support. In 1937 cAbdullah looked with favor to the recommendations of the Palestine Royal Commission to partition Palestine and annex the Arab Palestine state to Transjordan. He later renounced this approach when after the Iraqis becsme vociferous in their opposition.

In 1938 an Interparliamentary Congress of Arab and Muslim

Countries for the Defense of Palestine was held in Cairo.

The Syrian Delegation submitted a proposal that Palestine and Transjordan be permitted to rejoin Syria. Iraq again opposed the idea and defeated the proposal. In 1939 a 72 novement began under the leadership of Dr. cAbdul Rahnan

Shahbandar to reunite Ottoman Syria under cAbdullah. The

British were In favor of a Greater Syria but It failed due to French opposition and the Inability of the Arab states to coae to an agreeaent.

In 1940 cAbdullah sought out British assistance; however, all they did was to counsel restraint and patience.

The following year, cAbdullah wrote to Paris al-Khuri for support, who offered his own plan with cAbdullah as a aonarch. cAbdullah's atteapt to aid Shultrl al-Quwatly and

Sacdullah al-Jabri to a list of supporters In 1943 also failed.

Conversations that ultiaately led to the foraation of the League of Arab States In 1943 was a discussion of a

Greater Syria union with a confederation of Iraq and Syria.

Transition

On February 25, 1937, the leaders of the Palestine

National Defense Party (Hixb al-Difac), headed by the

Nashashibi faaily, had decided to cooperate with cAbdullah in order to unify Palestine and Transjordan. Their motto was "Independent Arab Palestine. However, when the report was prepared, it was reviewed by the Arab Higher

Coaalttee, headed by HaJ Amin al-Huaayni, a bitter rival

^Orients Hoderno. XVII, No. 4 (April 1937), p. 183. 73 of the Nashashlbl, and thus rejected the partition and wired the Arab kings for advice.^ While both cAbdullah and Raghlb Bey Naahaahibl reaalned silent, the Paleatinian

■asset were vocally supporting the recoaaendations of the report.The Iraq Prlae Minister wired the Higher

Coaaittee a strong denunciation of the plan, and on the following day, July 11, cAbdullah replied to the coaaittee that he was only trying to serve the Arab cause,*’®* On the aaae day, the National Defense Party condeaned the recoa- aendatlons of the Royal Coaalsslon on Palestine. 102 On

July 10, the Higher Coaaittee received a telegraa froa

Hikaat Sulayaan, the Iraqi Priae Minister, also rejecting 103 the partition proposal, followed by a slailar reply froa the Iraqi King Chasi the following day.3®^

The Iraqi Interest in Palestine was expressed to the Peraanent Mandate Coaaisslon of the League of Nations.

It deaanded an ianediate cessation of Jewish laalgratlon

99 New York Tiaes. July9, 1937, p. 11.

100New York Tiaes, July 12, 1937, p. 1.

lOlOrlente Moderno. XVII. No. 8,(August. 1937). pp. 396-397:------

*®2Naw York Tiaes, July 12, 1937, p. 1,

103Ibid.. July 11, 1937, p. 22.

*®*Ibld., August 3, 1937, p. 4. 74 and the creation of a unitary and Independent Palestine,105

Nurl as-Sacid, In February of the following year, In an

Interview on an Arab union mentioned the constitution for a Palestine Arab Governaent.^^ In October of the sane year, Tawflq al-Suwaydi, the Iraqi Foreign Minister, while

In London at the behest of the British, demanded the cessa­ tion of Jewish immigration and a constitution for an

Independent Arab Palestine.

Internel Palestinian disputes between the Husaynls and Nashashibls within the Arab Higher Committee created the condition for the latter to enter into negotiations with cAbdullah. To counter this move HaJ Amin al-Husayni traveled to Damascus (June 22, 1937) end then to Bluden

(June 28). He held discuesions with the Syrian President and Prime Minister and other notables. Including Riyadh al-Sulh. It was rumored that he sought advice on Prince

Muhammad cAll's (President of the Council of Regents In

Egypt) proposal to unite Egypt, Transjordan, and Palestine in a monarchy.

1Q50rlente Moderno. XVIII, No. > (March 1938), p . 115.

*^®New York Times, October 6, 1938, p. 11; October 7, 1938, p. 1.

^ ^ Oriente Moderno, XVIII, No. 7 (July 1937), p.337.

108Ibld., July 12, 1937, p. 1. 75

In October 1938, with the Mufti in exile in Beirut,

Feris al-Khuri was the head of the Syrian delegation to the

Inter-Parliamentary Congresa of Arab and Muslin countries

for the Defense of Palestine (al-nu1taaar al-barlanani

lj-al-bilad al-cArabiyah w-al-islanlyah li-al-dlfac can

Fllaatln). The resolution of its first session was approved by the Mufti. The resolution was presented to

the Congress on the following day. Of Interest to us were

two points in it:

The Governments of Palestine and Transjordan should be free to decide on the future of those countries and their foreign relations, and the advisability of their attachment to Syria so that the whole of Syria night constitute one political entity.

Such newly reconstituted Syria should seek a treaty of friendship and alliance with Great Britain and France similar to the Anglo-Iraql Treaty, which would safeguard the Interests of Great Britain and France and also the political, civil, and religious rights of Jews and others.

The Syrian proposal to Include Palestine with Syria again net with the disapproval of the Iraqis. It would be

Inopportune, they said, and the interests of the Congress

should be directed at saving Palestine. The issue was then

tabled by referring it to the Connlttee on Proposals who on

the following day rejected it.^H The final resolution of

109 * *Hew York Tines, October 8, 1938, p. 1.

^®Ibld., October 9, 1938, p. 39.

***Ibid.. October 11, 1938, p. 1. 76 the Congress, delivered on October 11, celled for the cessation of Jewish immigration, and the creation of an autonomous Arab Palestine. 112

In June 1937, Dr. cAbdul-Rahman Shahbandar, an ardent nationalist, In an interview for an Egyptian journal, approved the union of Syrian Palestine and Transjordan which he felt was, in fact, one country. With a monarch, 113 it would make for a more effective union.

cAbdullah, while speaking before the opening session of the Transjordanian Legislative Assembly on November 22,

1941, noted that Arabs would have to take the action neces­ sary to achieve Arab unity along the lines that Britain lent its sympathy.334 This was followed by a resolution written on January 6, 1942, by the Transjordanian Council of Ministers calling for a reunion of Ottoman Syria. It was presented to the British resident in Amman for communi­ cation to London, but there never waa an official answer.

After a sympathetic statement made by the British

Prime Minister, Anthony Eden, regarding Arab unity, Trans-

Jordan again presented the British with a proposal for

Syrian unity. The plan that would have included Palestine

H 2 ibjd.. October 12, 1938, p. 1.

1130riente Moderno. XVII, No. 8 (August 1937), p.372.

114Ibld., XXI, No. 1 (January 1941), pp. 15-16. 77 was a federation that was also to contain Syria and tha

Lebanon. This was, however, also rejected. cAbdullah contlnuad to prass for his plan through World War II.

Laaflata wars baing distributed In Dasascus on his bahalf calling for tha creation of a Greater Syria and for tha

British to taka over tha Syrian Interests In tha region.

During tha War cAbdullah received a latter of support fron tha Husayni Palestine Arab Party. cAbdullah even wrote a letter to Ahmed Maher Pasha, the Egyptian Prime Minister,

In which he stated his view that any Arab union program which disregarded the unification of Syria, Lebanon,

Palestine, and Transjordan would surely fall.XX^

A similar movement toward Syrian nationalism began in Lebanon In 1932 by Antun Sacada. At this time Sacada created an extreme rightist party, the Parti Populalre

Syrian (PPS) (al-Hisb al-Surl al-Qawml). Its Initial purpose was to press for the termination of the French mandats. Because of Its activities it was proscribed by the French. After Syria received its independence, the party sought a "Natural Syria" to include Syria, Lebanon,

Palestine, and Transjordan. This territorial objective was expanded in 1947 to include Cyprus and Iraq.****

X15RG 226 OSS 195898 C, NA.

116Patrick Seals, The Struggle for Syrlat A Study 78

Fertile Crescent Scheme

By the end of 1942, Britain had recognised the da

Jure governaent of Syria and Lebanon. Now Nuri ae-Sacid,

Iraqi Prlne Minister, drafted a lesorandui, "Arab Indepen­ dence and Unity," and early in 1943 submitted It to Richard

G. Casey, Brltiah Minister of State in Cairo.The plan became known as Nurl's Blue Book Proposal for an Arab union. The plan provided for a Greater Syria which would have included Lebanon, Palestine, and Transjordan, with a federation of Syria and Iraq. Together, the states would form a Fertile Crescent union.11®

The proposal had Brltiah support, but the Syrians and Lebanese were wery for fear of British political influence In Iraq and Transjordan. It waa also opposed by

■any Arab nationalists who looked upon Nurl aa an Anglo­ phile and cAbdullah as a paid agent of the British. France saw It as a British design to place the Levant under a

British sphere of Influence. Finally, the Zionists were opposed to the idea of a unitary Arab state as a grave of Poat-War Arab Politics 1945-1958 (London: Oxford Pni- veraity Press, 1965), pp. 64-(iS.

11^Majld Khaddurl, "Towards an Arab Union— The League of Arab States," American Political Science Review, XL, No. 1 (February 1946), p. 44. 118 Nurl's propoaala are detailed in Lorenxo K. Kiabal, The Changing Patterns of Political Power in Iraq, 1958-1971 (Mew York! Robert SpeTler & Sons, Pub., 1973), 79 potential threat to their political goals. Tha Idea was ultimately assumed by Egypt which sought a loose League of

Arab States.

The idea of a monarchial confederation of Iraq,

Transjordan, and Palestine was Faysal's during the latter part of World War 1 and didn't really develop into much.

During the Arab Revolt in Palestine in 1936, Sir A.

Clark Kerr, then British Ambassador to Iraq, wrote that

Nurl Pasha had aspirations of solving the Palestine problem by developing an Arab— read Iraqi— United States or an

Arab— again read Iraqi— Commonwealth. However, the scheme had few adherents. Iraqi Prime Minister Haji al Asll was sent to Rladh to discuss the matter with King Ibn

SAid.12° When he returned, he told Kerr that Ibn sAid was not in the least bit interested.121 in 1937, Hikmat

Sulayman, tha Iraqi Prime Minister, suggested the idea of

Major C. J. Edmonds, the British Advisor to the [Iraqi]

Ministry of the Interior, who was asked to transmit the plan to the British ambassador. When he heard it, however.

Appendix C, pp. 205-208. Officially entitled "Arab Inde- pendence and Unity: Memorandum on the Arab Cause" and originally published by the Government Press, Baghdad, 1943. See also Waldamar J. Gallman, Iraq Under Ganaral Hurl: My Recollections of Nuri al-Saiif, 1954-195TT (Baltimore, Md.t The Johns Hopkins Press, 1964^, p . 90.

H 9P0 371/20029/E 7217/94/31, PRO.

120F0 371/20029/E 6971/94/31, PRO. 121po 371/20029/E 7647/94/31, PRO. 80

he turned it down immediately without ever requeating an

opinion on it by hie government. It appeara that thie waa

strictly Nurl Pasha's plan. Tha Iraqi government alao had a plan to solve tha Palestine problem. According to their

plan, Palestine would have bean divided Into 21 cantonmanta

[ale.], with twice aa many Arab areas as Jewish. Each would become a federal state with lta own representatives.

There would be local autonomy for strictly local affairs.

Jewish immigration could proceed unfettered into Jewish areas. But Jewish Immigration into the Arab areas would 122 be at the discretion of the local governing bodies.

When faced with the opposition of Ibn Sacud, how­ ever, Nuri backed down. He then claimed that the proposal was never a concrete plan, merely an ultimate confederation of independent Arab states in close cultural, aocial, and economic relations, but not the establishment of a central­

ised federal government. It was Nurl's idea that the

confederation would begin with Iraq, Palestine, and Trans­ jordan. This would then create a solid Arab base from which the "Jewish Problem" could be solved with immunity.

The proposal was built upon the idea that Palestine and

Transjordan, or an amalgamation of tha two, would be

independent. Nurl's thoughts were later to change to a

122867N.01/1021, January 27, 1938, FRUS, 1938, Vol. II, pp. 894-896. ---- 81 mutually satisfying solution to the Arab-Jevish problem

In Palestine.

123 Ibid.. 867N.01/1055, pp. 903-913. CHAPTER III

PALESTINE: THE SETTING FOR SOCIAL MOBILIZATION

The goal of the Palestinian Arab national aoveeent was sose sort of autonomous political organisation. The fora of this political organization was most likely limited to the western nation-state system. The British Mandatory and the western-oriented Zionists, through their overwhelm­ ing presence, greatly limited whatever alternatives were available to the Palestinians. We may therefore look at the nature of the change in the social structure of the

Palestinian Arab community as it Increased its capability to control greater resources from a central authority to benefit the entire community in order to achieve this goal.

The mobilisation of a social unit, as employed by

Etzlonl, is "the process by which a unit gains significantly in the control of assets it previously did not control."^

Elsewhere Etzioni adds that this must be an ever increasing capability reaching more people constantly satisfying greater numbers of demands. Somewhat similar in interpre­ tation and use is Deutsch who theorises that the breakdown

^Amltal Etsionl, The Active Society: A Theory of Society and Political Processes (New York: The Free Press. r o f y , p TT b i :------

^Amitai Etsionl, "Mobilisation as a Macrosociological Conception," British Journal of Sociology. XIX, No. 3 (September, 1968), p . i4 3. 83 of "major cluatera of old, social, economic, and psycho­ logical commitments" brings about a condition in which

"people [are] available for new patterns of socialisation and behavior."^ For Deutach, social mobilization is more than an indicator of political development; it is a predic­ tive value for participation which in turn adds to the developmental value. This process was most favorably and successfully carried out by the Zionists in Palestine,

The process which characterized the political system of the Jewish community in Palestine was a process of the formation of a non-sovereign political centre which progressively increased its authority through the exercise of control over the mobilization and distribution of resources.^

But here again we must take care to note that the Zionists were western-oriented and trained, easily understood the

British, the British government in form and practice, and had a well articulated goal and plan to achieve it.

When considering the Palestinian Arab social and political system that existed during the period under study, we must view it in the context of its dependency upon an external political system. The fact that a non-

^Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," American Political Science Review, LV, No. 3 (Summer 1961), p. 494.

*Dan Horowitz and Moshe Llssak, "Authority Without Sovereignty: The Case of the National Centre of the Jewish Community in Palestine," Government and Opposition. VIII, No. 3 (Winter 1973), p. 48. See also Irma Schaaifhausen, Development through Mobilization of Own Resources Exempli­ fied by Israel (Hamburg: Hamburg Archives of World Economy, TTO*). 84 weatarn community was competing with a western community under the administration of a western government requires that the mobilization effort be placed in the perspective that these external forces were in fact Impediments to a self-generated transition*

The Palestinian Arab community in whatever effort it undertook to diversify and break down its traditional set­ ting was ultimately dependent, to some degree, on the

British or the Zionists.^ This idea will subsequently be viewed in terms of the growth in the Palestinian's social, economic, and political welfare.

Demographic Base of the Palestinian Arab Community

The Muslim character of Palestine, during the period under study, has never been seriously challenged. Most certainly Palestinian Arabs--Mualims and Christians com- blned--were in the majority for the period 1920 to 1948.

But of significant lntereat to us is how the population grew, whether largely through high fertility, Immigration, other means, or some combination thereof.

Demographic data for Palestine was notorious for the unreliability factor. Prior to the British Mandate, a

^The idea of dependency and social mobilization within the context of international relations comes from Jose A* Silva Mlchelena, "State Formation and Natlon-Bulld- Ing in Latin American." International Social Science Journal. XXIII, No. 3 (1971), pp. 384-1WI 85 census In Palestine aeant the registration of births, deaths, marriages, and divorces which was begun by the

Turkish authorities during the latter part *>f the nine­ teenth century. The first real or officially complete census data on Palestine were published In 1923 following the census conducted the year prior.® Even In the first fully conducted survey, difficulties arose. For instance, the geographic and cultural quality of nomadic life inter­ twined with Bedouin sedentary centers denied government access to sizeable portions of the population simply because they were nomadic and transitory.^ Much of what can be said about various demographic patterns of life In

Arab Palestine must be derived from the moot reliable sources, the census figures of the official reports of 1922

Palestine, Superintendent of the Census, Reports and Cenaral Abstracts of the Census of 1922, Taken on the 23rd of October. 1922 compiled by J. B. Barron (Jerusalem: Greek Covenant Press, [1923]). For a review of demographic data sourcea prior to thla, see D. H. K. Amiran and A. Shahar, "Estimates of the Urban Population of Palestine in the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century," Israel Explora­ tion Journal. X, No. 3 (1960), pp. 181-183. For a thorough examination of the formal materials available regarding sources of registration during both the Turkish and Manda­ tory periods, see R. Blumenthal, Charles Fraenkel, J. Raba, R. P. Alsberg, "Registration of Births, Deaths and Marri­ ages In European Jewish Communities In Palestine and in Israel,” Archivum, IX (1959), especially pp. 114-116.

^This was true for both official censuses in 1922 and 1931. D. H. X. Amiran, "Nomadic and Bedoln Population on the Census Returns of Mandatory Palestine," Israel Explora­ tion Journal. XIII, No. 3 (1963), pp. 247-252; H. V. Muahan, "Enumerating the Beduins of Palestine," Scripts Hlersolymlna. Ill (1956), pp. 265-280. 86

and 1931.8

The Pftlestlnlen population Is characterised quite

often by Its annual growth rate and presumably refers most

times to the Arab Muslim population. Notesteln and Jurkat

remark that Palestinian demography fits a colonial model:

a high fertility rate with the proportion of the Increase

dependent upon the level of mortality, and secondly, the Q Impact of westernization.7 Hlnden Initiates her study with

the announcement that "the average annual Increase of the

population of Palestine is the highest recorded anywhere

in the world today.A more conservative estimate of

Arab population growth rate in Palestine was turned in by

8 [Maj.] E. Mills, Report ££ th± Census &£ Palestine. 1931. Vol. I (Alexandria, 1933). For a descriptive note, see A. Zalman, "Census of Palestine, 1931," Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. XCVI, Pt. 4 (1933), pp. 6^0^-662. There was no census in 1941 due to the war and the Mandate was terminated in 1948.

^Frank w. Notesteln and Ernest Jurkat, "Population Problems of Palestine," The Mllbank Memorial Fund Quarter­ ly. XXIII, No. 4 (October 1945), p. 307. The measure of diffusion of westernization was by the increase and distri­ bution of [western] minority populations, p. 315.

*°Rlta Hlnden, "The Fertility and Mortality of the Population of Palestine," The Socioloaical Review. XXXII, Nos. 1-2 (January-Aprll 1940), p. 29* Her conclusions are countered somewhat by P. J. Loftus, "Featurea of the Demography of Palestine." Population Studies. II. No. 1. (June 1948), p. 92. 87

Bromberger.22

For our purposes here It is fortunate that Pales­ tinian society was a heterogenous one since population data were therefore compiled In a discriminatory manner, gener­ ally divided along confessional lines: Muslias, Jews,

Christians, and others (largely Druses). The demographic picture of Palestine may be illustrated by a series of tables of assorted data revealing the increase of popula­ tion, its distribution and density* Table III below gives the number of Muslims and Christian Arabs in Palestine from the first census in 1922 to tha end of World War II.

TABLE III12

PALESTINIAN ARAB POPULATION, 1922-1945

Year Total No. Christians, Settled Muslims Others

1922 (Census) 589,17? 797551 486,1?? 1931 759,700 99,008 693,147 1931 December 31 761,922 99,229 695,369 1932 " 778,803 102,889 712,250 1933 " 798,506 107,468 731,953

E. Bromberger, "The Growth of Population in Pales­ tine," Population Studies. II, No. 1 (June 1948), p. 78. 12 Palestine, Department of Statistics, Vital Statis­ tics Tables, 1922-1945 (Jerusalem: Government Printing Office, 1947), p. 1,

^Palestine, Department of Statiatics, General Monthly Bulletin of Currant Statistics. (Jerusalem. Mav T5I7TT p 7 T 88

TABLE III (continued)

1934 Decenber 814,379 113,200 747,826 1935 Tl 836,688 116,267 770,135 1936 II 862,730 119,884 796,177 1937 II 883,446 122,512 816,893 1938 II 900,250 123,813 833,697 1939 11 927,133 129,108 860,580 11 1940 947,846 133,149 881,293 tl 1941 973,104 138,294 906,551 tl 1942 995,292 140,305 928,739 tl 1943 1,028,715 144,994 962,162 1944 (Revised de facto 1,061,277 149,645 994,724 estimate) 1945 1,101,565 154,143 1,035,012 1946 If 1,143,326

Administratively the Arab population was settled throughout Paleatlne though more heavily populated In aone areas than others. The population, by eubdiatricts and 14 contrasted between the two censuses appears In Table IV.

TABLE IV

PALESTINIAN ARAB POPULATION BY SUBDISTRICT

Subdistrict 1922 1931

Total Population 590,890 759,712 Gaza 72,740 93,315 Beersheba 73,120 50,907 Jaffa 33,893 65,478 Ramie 40,225 57,887 Hebron 53,068 67,364 Bethlehem 14,428 13,047 Jerusalem 40,850 57,762 Jericho 1,769 2,949 Ramallah 24,168 31,897

14Ibld.. p. 3. 89 TABLE XV (continued)

Tulkarm 34,676 45,290 Nablus 55,444 67,314 Jenin 32,651 40,555 Haifa 34,528 52,830 Nazareth 14,936 18,019 Beisan 9,682 12,672 Tiberias 12,481 16,546 Acre 24,925 31,905 Safad 17,306 33,975

One factor that lenda itself to increased population

in a country is immigration. This is one of the most cited examples for the increase of Jewish population. This was also the case, though to a leaser extent, for the Arabs.

Parkes alludes to the immigration of Syrian Arabs for the benefits of a growing agricultural market in Palestine.*'*

It has been argued elsewhere that Arab immigration may be largely attributed to the higher living standards available

in Palestine.^ Table V gives some indication of the rate of Increase by Immigration for the period 1922 to the

second census in 1933,^

*^James Parkes, A History of Palestine from 135 A.p. to Modern Times (New York: Oxford University Press, 1949), P. 255.

l<»Yacacov Shlmconl, Aravel Erets Yisrael (The Arabs of Palestine) (Tel Aviv: Am Oved Publishing House, 1947), pp. 417-418. Shimconl claims it is largely due to Jewish enterprise.

Vital Statistics. op. clt.. pp. 84-85. 90 TABLE V

RATE OF INCREASE OF ARAB POPULATION DUE TO IMMIGRATION

Year Number Rate

1922-1931 Unknown 1932 918 1.30 1933 1,064 1.47 1934 1,151 1.55 1935 214 .28 1936 123 .16 1937 546 .68 1938 -6,785* -8.21 1939 2,244 2.64 1940 902 1.03 1941 -304 -.34 1942 -1,101* -1.20 1943 1,831 1.93 1944 -3,151* -3.21 m s ____ 1,838 1.81 *net emigration

Not only was the Muslim fertility rate extremely high in Palestine, but also with the Increase in health 18 services , there was a continued decrease in Infant mor- tality. Nevertheless, the quality of life did not rise appreciably because of the revaluing rural factor that

***Shimconi, op. clt. 91

TABLE VI19

MEDICAL PROFESSIONALS

Year Physicians Pharmacists Midwives

1928 205 59 119 1935 282 113 229 1939 305 109 267 1942 304 117 271 1944 326 126 297 dominated the Palestinian life style, which included larger families and therefore greater financial strain on the income earner and tended to lower the overall figure.

TABLE VII20

INFANT MORTALITY

Year Number of Infants Mortality Rate @1,000

1922 3,198 142.3 1923 4,238 158.5 1924 4,992 176.1 1925 4,884 173.4 1926 4,852 151.8 1927 5,893 192.5 1928 6,071 178.4 1929 6,052 183.1 1930 5,417 152.5 1931 6,179 167.6

19 Palestine, A Survey of Palestine. Prepared in December 1945 end January 1946 for Information of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry (Jerusalem. 19^6), p . 703. 20 Vital Statistics, op. cit.. pp. 56-57. 92

TABLE VII(continued)

1932 5,674 164.4 1933 5,653 156.8 1934 6,047 175.3 1935 5,912 148.1 1936 5,657 136.2 1937 7,219 179.3 1938 4,983 127.6 1939 4,785 121.5 1940 6,095 147.1 1941 5,797 131.7 1942 5,830 140.3 1943 5,611 113.1 1944 5,426 102.9 1945 5,172 93.9

With the advent of British rule In Palestine, several vestiges of Ottoman rule were discarded, thus pre­ paring the way for greater economic development and an

Increased standard of living, which In turn stimulated a higher population growth. Some of the measures the British directed their efforts in were to: eliminate the practice of tax monies necessarily and solely going to land owners; reduction of the tithe from 12 1/2 percent to 10 percent; a reduction of the rate of tenancy rentals; and the

Increase In the availability of physicians and health con­ ditions. While immigration, as cited above, Is a factor to increased population, Shlmconi also brings out the point

that there was also an increase In the level of satisfac­

tion, largely because of the standard of living, which

shows up In the dfcrease In the rates of emigration. 93 (See Teble VIII)

Immigration of non-Palestinian Arabs can largely

be attributed to the availability of employment at higher

wages than In the other Arab countries or Egypt. Much of

this immigration was seasonable labor. For example, the

Hawranis from Jebel Druze, north Transjordan, and southern

TABLE VIII21

EMIGRATION

Year Number

Prior to World War I Estimated 2,500-3,000 year 1920-1926 1,400-2,000 1926-1931 1,300-1,350 1931-1939 Approximately 300

Syria represented the largest portion of the seasonel

labor. The Egyptians were also prominent among those

seeking better living conditions. During the Second World

War when the British maintained a large military presence

in Palestine, Egyptian workers would come into Palestine

to find work. Many fellahln employed Egyptian workers

21 Shlmconl, op. clt,. p. 420; Welnryb claims wthat in the post-period Palestine was transformed from a country of Arab emigration into a country of Arab immigration," Bernard E. Welnryb, "Socio-Economic Relations of Arabs and Jews in Palestine," Contemporary Jewish Record. VII, Mo, 4 (August 1944), p. 377. 94 while they themselves went to work, for better wages, for 22 the British military. The Sinai-resident bedouin were also known to travel to Palestine during the summer months

for the harvesting of certain crops.

It is difficult to establish the exact number of

immigrants Into Palestine or those apprehended for Illegal

entry.Shlaconl claims a figure of 60,000 to 100,000

for the period 1920 to 1945.

The introduction of the Hawraols into the Palestin­

ian labor market posed a peculiar situation and a threat

to the Palestinian Arab worker and deprived legal Jewish

Immigrants of jobs. In February, 1935, in the census of

Haifa there were approximately 4,142 Hawranis. This is important because of the port facilities employing large 26 numbers of unskilled labor. Similarly, attention was

22RG226 OSS 97615C, September 2, 1944, NA.

23Ibld.. p. 421.

2*From 1935 to 1945, 10,184 Arabs and non-Jews (mostly Egyptians) were deported for illegal entry and 14,747 on their own accord although this entry was never formally registered. Bromberger, op. clt.. p. 76. Also see Loftus, op. cit.. pp. 92-95.

2*Shimconi, op. cit., p. 422. Approximately 1 0 , 0 0 0 Muslims were considered ^immigrants" in official terms and were added to the population when Palestine's borders with Syria and Lebanon were altered in 1923. Robert R. Nathan, Oscar Cass, Daniel Creamer, Palestinei Problem and Promise, an Economic Study (Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1746), p. 1377

26S25/10482, CZA. 95

drawn to tha port of Jaffa during the diaturbancea In 1936.

One of the principal reasona for the aucceaa of the atrlke

at the port w*s the exclualon of Jewlah workera and the 27 2,500 Hawranl Syrlana and Egyptlana who did work there.

Another form of Immigration to be Introduced la

Internal migration; for example, In 1922, 70 percent of the

Paleatinlan Arab population waa rurally settled. Thla

figure dropped to 60-62 percent by the 1931 census. We

may alao see this phenomenon by the growth of cities In

Palestine as depicted by Table IX.

TABLE IX28

POPULATION SHIFTS AND GROWTH ------Urban Population Rural Population (Towns) (Subdistricts)

Locale 1922 1931 1922 1931

Total 139,074 188,075 451,816 571,637 +Gaza 16,722 16,356 47,088 67,026 Khan Yunis 3,866 3,166 Msjdal 5,064 6,166 Beersheba 2,012 2,791 71,108 48,116 **Jaffa 20,621 35,506 13,194 29,866 Tel Aviv 78 106 **Ramle 5,837 8,211 27,222 39,674 **Lydda 7,166 10,602 +Hebron 16,074 17,276 36,994 50,088 Beit

22Davar (Tel Aviv), January 26, 1937.

28Vital Statistics. op. cit,. pp. 4-5. 96

TABLE IX (continued)

Jala 41 197 +Bethlehem 818 1,219 13,569 11,631 *Jeruaalem 13,413 19,894 27,437 37,868 Ramallah 125 520 24,043 31,377 Tulkarm 3,109 4,540 31,567 40,750 +Nablus 15,238 16,483 40,206 50,831 Jenin 2,307 2,600 30,344 37,955 *Haifa 9,377 20,324 24,528 31,500 Shafa Amr 623 1,006 Nazareth 2,486 3,226 12,450 14,793 Beisan 1,687 2,699 7,995 9,973 Tiberias 2,096 2,645 10,885 13,901 Acre 4,883 6,076 20,042 25,829 Safad 5,431 6,465 11,875 27,510 *Mixed Arab-Jewish populations **Arab towns near Jewish population centers +Arab towns In Arab areas

Population shifts, whether internally or between states. Is often indicative of a search for a better qual­ ity of life. This was partially the case in Palestine where the availability of employment was further made desirable by higher wages.

TABLE X29

WAGES (1943) (Mils)

Skilled Unskilled Labor Labor

Arab Palestine .350-.600 .200-.250 Egypt .070-.200 .30 -.050 Syria .150-.300 .80 -.100 Iraq .070-.200 .50

100 mils ■ 2 shillings

29Shimconi, op. cit. p. 425. 97

Land Settlement

The question of land settlement la perhaps the most singularly Important variable that Influenced the conflict

In Palestine.Palestine being a largely agricultural area with the bulk of the Inhabitants rurally settled and working the land further highlighted this factor. The situation was made thornier by the physical presence of two ethnic groups attempting to settle some portion of the land in addition to the ancient legal statutes controlling 31 settlement.

While land did pose a problem In the political con­ flict between the Jews and Zionists, it also was an impor­ tant aspect of Palestinian Arab community development.

SJoberg Instructs us that rural and urban communities are

3^The issue centers on Jewish/Zionist land acquisi­ tion. Edmund Asfour notes that "little is known of [Jew­ ish] land purchases before October 1920, when 40 per cent of the total area acquired by the Jews was already in their hands." In figures this was approximately 2.5 per cent of the total land area. "The Economic Framework of the Palestine Problem," Backdrop to Tragedy; The Struggle for Palestine by William R. Polk, David M. Stamler, Edmund Asfour ^Boston: Beacon Press, 1957), p. 330. A thoroughly exhaustive study with data extracted from the Land Regis­ tries in Jerusalem la forthcoming. From personal conversa­ tion with the author. Kenneth Stein, "Land Settlement in Palestine, 1919-1929," an unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan. 3 1 For a brief treatment of the legal aspects see Survey. op. cit., I, pp. 225-233. 98 32 are in thenselves subsystems within larger ayateaa. The relatlonahlp between thea ia deteralned by aeveral factors that differ with the level of developaent of the coaaunlty.

The phenoaenon of urbanization will speed the social aobillzatlon of a coaaunlty by bringing aore diverse groups of people and thus values into close contact. The exposure to new and different sets of noras will tend to adjust living patterns and pressure individuals and groups to reallocate values and in general intensify the aobillzatlon process.33

Palestine of the Mandate consisted of 26,319,000 34 aetric dunuas of land. Ottoaan rural land tenure, according to the Ottoaan Land Code of 1 8 5 8 , ^ “* classified land in five forms: aullc. air 1 . aawat. aatrukat. and waqf. Mirl. aawat. and aatrukat land are agricultural land which, according to Ialanlc law, belongs to the State

(al-raqaba); the others are either of a religious nature,

^Gideon Sjoberg, "The Rural-Urban Diaenalon in Preindustrial, Transitional, and Industrial Societies," Handbook of Modern Sociology edited by Robert E. L. Paris (Chicagos Rand McNally & Co* 1964), p. 131.

^Deutsch, pp. cit., p. 393*

^*1 dunum-0.247 acres; 1,000 dunuaa" 1 sq. kn.- 0 . 3 8 6 sq. mi. •% e Moshe Macoz, Ottoman Reform in Syria and Palestine, 1 8 4 0 - 1 8 6 1 : The Inport of the Tanainat on Politics and Society (Oxford: The cTarentfon Press, t?68), pp. 162-163. 99 wagf. or for strictly private ownership, aulk: each of these will be discussed subsequently.

Mirl land was that which was inheritable and granted by the state to an individual, although with ownership continuously held by the state. Mulk land was Individually owned property which was granted to him by the state. It, generally, was land that was conquered and given as fruits of war. These lands were also subject to the tithe. Mawat, or dead land, is basically unoccupied land and has ostensi­ bly been left for public use. A fourth fora of land was natrukah or public lands. This land say be allocated for the coaaunlty's use in general or for strictly public use.

Finally, a unique fora of landholding, known to Muslia law only, is waqf property. Briefly it is a religious endow- aent or trust in the fora of real estate.^

The foras of land thus discussed have been private ownership. However, joint ownership or coaaunal ownership g was also recognised by Ottoaan law; such was aasha tenure.

Masha0 land tenure existed in two foras in Palestine; one was village-held land (hag al-Musara°a). the other was village land that was divided aaong the aale residents.^

^^Moses Doukhan, "Land Tenure," Econoalc Organisa- of Palestine edited by Sa°id B. Hlaadeh (Beiruti Aaerlcan University of Beirut, 1938), pp. 75-90.

^ I b l d . . pp. 90-93; Raphael Petal, "Mushaca Tenure 100

Land ownership, of course, Is meaningless In Itself unless It Is worked for the benefit of the community or society forgetting for the moment the quality of land or

Its fertility value. Settlement in Palestine by the Arab population was determined largely not by the quality of the soil needed for agricultural pursuits but rather by

"Improvements in security conditions [which] made it possible for the peasant population to disperse over all the village lands."3® With the British regime came an increase in security conditions and the settlement frontier 39 moved further eastward of Jerusalem and Bethlehem. Along with security conditions were the domestic migratory move­ ment of peoples from the mountain regions of the northeast to the plains of the central and lowland of the western portions of the country. Amiran's study provides a useful guide to the westward line of settlement.

Whenever a satisfactory state of regional develop- ment and public security permitted the organic utilisa­ tion of the different parts of the country, the coastal plain gained supremacy and the leading city was a city of the plain. Whenever conditions In the country and Cooperation In Palestine." American Anthropologist. LI, No. 3 (July-Septamber 1949)^ pp• £36-445.

3®D. H. K. Amiran, "The Pattern of Settlement In Palestine," [Part I], Israel Exploration Jousnal. III. No. 2 (1953), p. 72. 39 Ibid.. pp. 75-76, 101

deteriorated and settlement In the coaatal plain became marginal, Ita towna decreased in importance, the upland towns gained in relative importance, and the role of the most Important city of the country reverted to Jerusalem, without any necessary increase in its population.

Development of the land, even within the constraints of economic conditions and prevailing traditions, lagged in overall importance. There were citrus and fruit orchards but there was a lack of a concerted effort or desire to make the most effective use of available land.

Reclamation of soil (in Muslim law this is known as ihya) appears to have been a concept either unknown or at least not fully accepted to the Palestinian community.^

This may be excused as considerable amounts of land were held by resident families with no particular interest in agricultural production. The utilization of the land in

Palestine as compared to other areas in the Middle East can be seen in the following Table.

40 Ibid., [Part II], III, No. 3 (1953), pp. 194-195. 41 The Mawat Land Ordinance of 1921 expressly forbade the reclamation of land without government acceptance as a measure to control Arab-Zionlst conflict. 102

TABLE XI*2

LAND UTILIZATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Country Total Area Cultlvatable Cultivated Irrlgatable Irrigated Area Area Area Area (Average)

Egypt 1,000,000 34,000 24,000 34,000 23,000 Turkey 763,000 300,000 87,000 30,000 4,000 Iraq 453,000 92,000 13,000 51,000 7,000 Syria 202,000 61,000 16,000 12,000 2,500 Palestine 27,000 12,000 9,000 4,000 400 Transjordan 90,000 4,000 3,500 600 200 Total 2,535,000 503,000 152,500 131,600 37,100

But if land was not fully exploited for the benefit

of the coanunityt blame cannot be placed aolely on the

fellah who worked the land. One glaring fact of land

distribution in Palestine was the apparent Inverse rela- 4 3 tionshlp between land owners and land workers, as well as

The Economist. July 15, 1944, pp. 81-82. The utilization of the land was further hampered by the econo­ mics of life in Palestine. The pre-war national income per head in Palestine was £26 versus £19 in Turkey and £10-£13 in Syria, Egypt, or Iraq. The average yearly income of an urban Arab family of five was £33 in Palestine and £47 in Cyprus, though the cost of living for the fellah with a family of five was £37 a year in Palestine and in Egypt £25 to £26. But the productivity was also low. Based on the 1934/1935 cropa Arab Palestine ranked with 148 international units with 420 to 580 In western Europe. 43 Land ownership does not necessarily mean residence since quite often land was held in absentia. Por statisti­ cal support of this, in two surveys conducted in 1936 and 1944, see The General Monthly Bulletin of Current Statis­ tics , XI, Nos. 1-3 (january-March 1946), p, 55. 103 the nationality of each category. In this respect Granott records that from official Ottoman data in 1909, within

three sanjaks of Jerusalem, Nablus, and Acre, 7 8 5 , 0 0 0 dunums of land were held by 16,910 families or 46 dunums per family. On the other hand, 67 percent of fellahin

families in the Jerusalem sanjak and 63 percent of the 44 sanj ak of Nablus held less than 50 dunums per family.

TABLE XII

LAND OWNERSHIP (ca. 1922)

Kaza (District) Number of Area (Dunums) Owners

Jerusalem and Hebron 26 240,000 Jaffa 45 162,000 Nablus and Tulkarm 5 121,000 Jenin 6 114,000 Haifa 15 141,000 Nazareth 8 123,000 Acre 5 157,000 Tiberias 6 73,000

Compare the district holdings to landholding in

1944 by family.

44 Abraham Granott, The Land System In Palestine; History and Structure (London: Eyre & Spottlswoode, 1952), pp. 38-39. 104

TABLE XIII*5

LAND OWNERSHIP (1944)

Family Location Area (Dunums) al-Husaynl Jericho 50,000 al-Hadl Nablus, Jenin 60,000 cAwnl Bey cAbd al-Hadi Nablus, Jenin 1,235 HI1ml cAbd al-Hadi Nablus, Jenin 741 TaJ i (al-Farouki) Ramie, Nes Ziona 50,000 al-Gusayn Ramie, Nes Ziona ? Tayan Jaffa 40,000 Beidas Tel Aviv ? Abu Hadra Gaza, Jaffa 30,000 Shawa Gaza 100,000 Zalach Tulkarm ? Hanun Tulkarm ? Samara Tulkarm ? Halil Haifa ?

Large estates held by a few families cannot be solely

explained away by bringing in the nature of feudalists. In

order to comply with strict Islamic teaching against

usury, real estate developed as a logical alternative for

investment and enjoyment. But land was later used anyway

for usurious rental purposes, placing a burden on the

fellahin.

The feudal-like pattern of land ownership also

addad fuel to the Intense emption of the Arabs toward

Jewish immigration and implicitly Zionist Ideology. Among

*5 Ibid.. p. 39; RG 226 XL770 OSS, June 14, 1944, NA; Aharon Cohen, Israel and the Arab World (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1970), p. T 9 7 . 105

the Arab propertied elaaa, Jewish Immigration aeant the

shattering of the traditional social system with educated

agricultural workers--the halutalm (pioneera)--with their

"progressive" social and political ideas. The Arab pro­

fessionals were antagonistic also, but out of jealousy,

while rabid Arab nationalism and the fear of competition

further fanned the emotionally charged issues.

The Zionist goal to establish a Jewish home in

Palestine was partially made possible by the introduction

of Jewish capital from Europe and America in land invest­

ment. Zionist ideology sought to develop a society***

alongside the Muslim community, but with its own ideology

that focused heavily upon a work ethic that required the 47 implementation of Jewish labor solely.

*^See Moshe Lissak, "Patterns of Change in Ideology and Class Structure in Israel," The Jewish Journal of Sociology. VII, N. 1 (June 1965), pp. 46-62; S. N. Eisenstadt, Israeli Society (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1967), pp. 143-153. 47 The foremost labor-Zionist ideologue was Aaron David Gordon with his philosophy known as the "religion of labor." It was Gordon's influence from the Second Allyah onward, in regard to labor, that influenced Zionlat-Arab relations. The slogan of the Second Aliyah's labor move­ ment was "conquest of labor" (kibbueh ha'avodah)• Jewish employers in the coastal plain di4 hire Arabs U t this phenomenon was largely limited to this geographical region and the period of the First Allyah. The land settlers of the First Allyah were chauvinistic East Europeans who maintained a French-Levantlne attitude and were predomi­ nantly capitalistic and coloniallstic. For the later period and the Hlstadrut1s Arab labor attitude see David 106

The antagonism over the Zionist policy regarding

Arab labor from the 1920's cantered on urban employment.

National Income in Palestine as derived from the tvo

communities was widely contrasted. For example, the Jews

received less than one-tenth of their income from agricul­

ture. while agriculture represented about one quarter of

that of the Arabs. Manufacturing, handicrafts, end con­

struction rspresented a significant contribution to the

Jewish community, but minimal to the Arabs.

The Arab worker was most certainly at a disadvan­

tage; the Jewish land owner paid the Arab less wages and

IQ often excluded the Arab from Jewiah-owned land. This was used extensively by the Palestinian Arab nationalists then and now as proof of the imperialist and colonialist^

Ben Gurlon's address to the Elected Assembly in 193i, "Jewish Labor: The Origin of Settlement." Rebirth and Destiny of Israel (New York: Philosophical Library. 1954). pp. 48-53. What discrimination there was later in not hiring Arab labor was based on the idea to insulate Jewish labor from devaluation. See Berl Katznelson. Revolutionary Constructionism (New York: Young Poale Zion Alliance. 1937). pp. 27-28.

^Nathan. Gass. Creamer, op. cit.. p. 147.

*®Cohen, op. cit.. pp. 167-169.

500ur reference to the belief by the Palestinians that the Zionists were "colonialists" is made complex by "the changing morality of colonialism [which] contributes to our lack of understanding." But since there is no accepted definition for social scientiats we would egree that it was at best a perceived condition. Ronald J. Bovarth, "A Definition of Colonialism." Current Anthro­ pology. XIII, No. 1 (February 1972), p. 45. 107

nature of the Zionist effort In Palestine. One need only

compare this situation to the intentional employment of

local Arabs by the pled noire of Algeria to illustrate the

efficacy of this charge. But it nevertheless served to

arouse the ire of the rural folk and by this supported the

traditional leadership. A more substantial observation is

that,

the potential proletarianisation of the Arab peasants was speeded by their eviction from the land purchased by the Jews, yet at the same time obstructed by their exclusion from the Jewish eco­ nomic sector and by the weakness of Arab capital­ ism.51

The Mandatory attempted to legislate protection for

Arab tenant farmers and the Arab small land holder. The

British wanted to protect them from balng evicted and dis­

possessed from their lands. This was done through the

Transfer Land Ordinance of 1920 and 1921, the Protection of Cultivators Ordinance of 1929, and the Amendment Ordl-

nence, No. 1, of 1932 and 1934.52

The question of Arab land alienation is cited most

often as a major factor contributing to perceived griev­

ances and ensuing conflict. Jewish land acquisition in

Ell Lobel, "Palestine and the Jews," The Arab World and Israel by Ahmad El Kodsy and Eli Lobel (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970), p. 68.

52CO 733/290/75072, PRO. 108

Palestine was of two types* The major fore of acquisition was 1) land obtained by Individuals and less so 2) by the

Jewish National Fund (JNF) or soee other agency. The problen was expanded when the question of land was linked with labor and employment. Jewish farmers and plant owners generally employed Arabs as well as Jews. On the orange groves before 1936, 60 percent of the workers were Arabs.

The JNF, it must be stated, however, did have formal restrictions permitting only Jews to work their land.

Originally this provision was introduced to prevent Jews from turning plantation outputs into profit-making ventures from cheap Arab labor and to insure the Zionist ethos of working the land. This must also be qualified by the fact that JNF land did not exceed three per cent of the total land held by the Zionists.^

Jewish land purchases can be seen in the following table.

53 FC 28, P6 No. 13, BSA. 109

TABLE XIV54

JEWISH LAND PURCHASES

Agency Date Total Area Comment (dunums)

PICA (Palestine 469,407 Colonization Assn. 1927-45 39,520 Government concession 429,887 Purchased from Arab land owners.

Palestine Land Development Co. 1911-35 512,979 Purchased from large landholders. 455,169 57,810 Purchased from fellahin.

Beersheba Sub- District Purchase 25,351

Huleh Concession 41,162

1936-45 89,914 Rural land acquired.

JNF 1885-30 270,084 239,170 Purchased from large absentee landlords. 25,555 Purchased from fellahin. 1931-1947 566,312

Total land In Jewish possession by end of June 1947: 1,850,000 dunums

That Jewish land purchases and holdings were not particularly extensive^ aeema to be Irrelevant to the

^Grannott, op. cit., pp. 275*278.

^Asfour charges, however, that the land "was located In the soat fertile parts of the country, which generally co-extended with the coastal and northern plains," op. cit.. E. C. Wlllatts, "Sons Geographical Factors In the Palestine Problem," The Geographical 110 evocation of anger on the part of the Arab community. For example, In 1931 Lewis French was appointed by the British to become the flrat Director of Development In Palestine and prepare a register of landless Arabs who were In such a state because of dispossession. French Investigated 1,367 claims by Interested parties by April 1932 and finally 5 6 accepted 72. In the government's Annual Administrative

Report for 1937, 670 families were reported to have been made landless, of which 372 were settled on other govern­ ment-provided land.^

Undoubtedly Arabs were made landless because of land purchased by Zionists or their formal organizations and subsequent eviction of Arab tenants and workers. However, the actual number of those made landless because of these efforts is very difficult to ascertain. In any case this condition became the bete noire of the Arab cause, though based on a visceral feeling. The [Sir John] Hope-Simpson

Journal*! CVIII, Nos. 4-6 (April 1947), Figures 7 and 10, pp. 159 and 163 respectively. This, ws would argue though Is an excuse if considered with Jewish land reclamation projects In Palestine.

56 Reports on Axricultural Development and Land Settlement in Palestine (London: H.N.S.O., 1931-1932). For a summary of French's proposals see CO 733/290/75072, PRO.

5?S25/6553, CZA. Ill

Report d a l e s that "thousands" ware evicted*® either

through outright lend purchase or unscrupulous handling of 59 Interpersonal relations between Zionists and Arabs. 7 The point at Issue was not who was exploiting the fellah, since

historically he was the source of exploitation per se.

It was tenancy which prevented the fellah from devoting proper attention to his land, froa Improving and fertilizing It. from planting trees and erecting permanent buildings and enterprises. [Arthur] Ruppin described In 1914 how in North Syria and Transjordan not a tree was to be found for miles and miles, since the fellah had no Interest In planting shoots In a soil from which he was liable to be removed at any moment. On the other side the large landholder endeavored to exploit the fellahin to the utmost limit in order to squeeze out of them the tenancy rent, which was the chief and often the only source of his liveli­ hood and wealth. ®

One caveat in the charges leveled against the

Zionists regarding land exploitation was the exact extent

*®Great Britain. Colonial Office. Report on Immigra­ tion, Land Settlement and Development. Cmd. 3686-3687 (London: H. M. S. 0., 1930T» p. 1?. This was supported by the Survey, op. cit.. I, p. 289ff. 5 9 J7This point is examined by Professor John Reudy; however, It Is not fully sustained by any statistical data. "Dynamics of Land Alienation," The Transformation of Pales­ tine t Essays on the Origin and Development of the Arab- Israell Conflict edited by Ibrahim Abu-Lughod (Evanston, 111.: University Press, 1971), pp. 119-138.

®^Grannott, op. cit.. p. 291. Dr. Ruppin was director of the Palestine Bureau. Reudy provides some opinion that the Zionist attitude on the barrenness of Palestine was false, Ibid.. p. 126. See also Richard Beaves and Zaynab al-Yafl. "Hal Hawwal al-Sahyuniyun al- Sahia' *lla Janna?" (Did the Zionists Change the Desert Into Paradise?) Shu'un Filastlniya I. No. 2 (1971). pp. 123-129. 112 of "cultlvatable" land In Palestine at any one given tine.

This factor leads to another complication: obtaining an agreed figure for the absolute maxinun area of Palestine itself.^1 However, what land was "cultlvatable" and held by Palestinian Arabs was not efficiently worked for the majority of those either living on that land or elsewhere in Palestine. Only four-tenths of one percent of Pales­ tinian Arab rural landowners held a minimum of 20 percent of the land In the plain region and 24 percent of the hill land, in 1936. This land did not produce nor enploy the maxinun feasible nunber of people according to Its capacity.®^

The continuous purchase of land by the Zionists plus the rapid natural growth of the Palestinian Muslin population created the conditions for congestion.Arabs evicted from Zionist-purchased land tended to nove to the cities where the urban-orlented European Jewish population

^ S a cid B. Hlnadeh claims "27,009,000 dunums (10,400 square nlles), of which about 26,319,000 dunums are land and 690,000 dununa are water." op. cit.. p. 43. Nathan and his associates claim 26,300,000 dunums, op. cit.. p. 184. Reudy writes that Palestine had a total Tend area of 26,320 square kilometers, or 26,300,000 dunums, op. cit.. p. 119.

^Nathan, op. cit.. pp. 186-187 and pp. 190-193 for a discussion on cultlvatable land. 63 Willatts, op. cit., p. 156. 113 tended to congregate. The British took formal steps in

1940 to remedy the condition of Zionist land purchases.

The British created three tones under the Land Transfers

Regulations. In one zone the Jews were prohibited from purchasing any land, in the second only conditionally, and in the third, unrestricted transfer was permitted.

The prime importance of non-Palestinian land owner­ ship is that it was not a contributor to the community's production or its quality of life. Rather, land owned by non-Palestinian Arabs was mostly for Investment purposes.

The Plain of Jezreel, for example, constituting an area in excess of half-a-milllon dunums, was held by a few fami­ lies. Even more provocative is that approximately half of this, the northern section consisting of approximately

180,000 dunums, 4,000 fellahin. and 20 villages, was owned by one very wealthy family, Sursok, "The Greek" banker, who resided in Beirut. The family purchased the tract in

1872 for £20,000.^ It was reported that 50,000 non-

64 Some of the more prominent families were the Khourl family of Haifa and Tweny of Beirut.

^^Grannott, op. cit.. p. 80. This came to 8 plasters s dunum which when sold to the Jews, from 1921 onward, went for £4 or more per dunum. Other lands valued at less than £1 during Ottoman rule rose to £3 by 1925. If the land had been even partially reclaimed and there was evidence of agriculture suitability the price rose to £6. Kurt Niedermaler, Colonisation Without Colonialism (Jerusalem! World Zionist Organisation, Department of Information and Organisation, Youth and Hechalutz Department, 1969), p. 5. 1X4

Palestinians owned land In Palestine by 1944, among whom were 100 Syrians and Lebanese, to Include the Amir Faur of

Syria who held 124 dunums.^

Land held as State Domain runs the gamut as far as calculations are concerned. The Hope-Slmpson Report, published In 1930, had the State owning 991,581 dunums.67

This was countered by Granovsky (Granott) who claimed

924,415.66 A third report by French spoke of 989,802 dunums.6^ By the beginning of 1945 this category of land holding was calculated at 1,179,846 dunuma.76 State lands were held at the discretion of the government and much of it was subsequently leased to the Arab population. The

Palestine Government, in 1936, records attested to this with a figure of 532,397 dunums.7^

On November 19, 1921, the British mandatory con­ cluded the Ghor-Mudawwara (State Lands) Agreement by which 72 Palestinian Arabs were given 381,771 dunums of lsnd from

66RG 226 XL 770 OSS, June 14, 1944, NA.

67Hope-Simpson, op. cit., pp. 172-173. 68 Abraham Granovsky, Land, the Jewish Reconstruction in Palestine (Jerusalem, 1931), p. J>6, — —

6®French, op. cit., pp. 34-35, 38.

7®Granott, Land Settlement. op. cit.. p. 102.

71Ibld.. p. 111.

7*Granott claims the figure 382,886 dunums, Ibid.. p. 100. 115 state domains In Beltsan. This Included 112t552 dunums of

Irrigable land, 129,696 dunuma of non-lrrigable land,

2,048 dunums of common land, and 137,910 dunums of unalloted 71 waste.

Problems regarding land ownership came up soon after the British assumed governing control of Palestine. One of the earliest problem areas was in the Beisan sub-district.

This area was unusual in the sense that the landowners were in great arrears to the Turkish government. A commission was appointed in 1870 to look into land ownership in the area. This commission found much of the land uncultivated and abandoned and in many Instances there was not suffi­ cient evidence to support proof of ownership of the land under Turkish law. So even though the Turkish government was the cause for much of the land to be abandoned, it waa nevertheless claimed to be State lands (j iftlik) and in

1872 placed up for sale at public auction. The area in question covered 381,771 metric dunums. But since there were no land deeds, though farmed by families for genera­ tions, the land was registered with Sultan Abdul Hamid.

^ I b i d . , p. 99. Hoshe Aumann, Land Ownership in Palestine. 1880-1948 (Jerusalem: Israel Academic Committee on the Kiddle East, [1971]), pp. 8-9; Great Britain, Colonial Office. Palestine Royal Commlsaion Report. Cmd. 5479 (London: H.H.S.O., 1937), pp. 260-TST; 116

When he wee deposed, the lend reverted to the Stete end after the Treaty of Lausanne It became the property of the

Palestine governnent. When Sir Herbert Samuel was faced with a solution, he found that the government had an uncontestable right to the land but a moral obligation to the cultivators. Samuel's solution was to have the culti­ vators pay a modest sum, over a number of years and thus have the land transferred to them. In this way 235,054 74 dunums were distributed among 2,538 Individuals.

On November 19, 1921, the Palestine government concluded the Ghor-Mudawwara agreement transferring con­ siderable dunums of state land to Arab cultivators. But when the British attempted to survey the lands in the

Beisan valley, they met with objections to the manner of the survey. The complaints centered mainly on the strenu- our manner the survey procedure was taking. The Survey

Commission, on the other hand, retorted that there was a lack of cooperation with the transferees who failed to report at designated times and their predilection to falsify their statements. In the opinion of the chairman of the Demarcation Commission, it was the Ghor delegates to ths 6th Arab Congress who were designing the complaints,

Albert Hyamson, Palestine Under the Mandate. 1920-1948 (London: Methuen 6 Co., Ltd., 1940), p. 82. 117 75 largely for political purpoaaa.

Through the intermediacy of Erneat Richmond, the

Aaalatant Secretary, a neeting waa hald vlth hln and Jubran

Iakandar Kozna and Mubarak al-Zughbi, the Arab representa- tivea on the Denarcatlon Coanlsaion.7^ The Arabs' complaint ran along the following llnea. The Ghor Belaan Land Agree- aent waa concluded on November 19, 1921, and the Araba were anxious to claim the land. They were alao auspicious of the government since the agreement had been signed 20 months prior and no action had been taken and 16 montha since the creation of the Demarcation Commission on

February 18, 1922. This then waa the basis for the filing of a formal complaint to the Arab Congress. They sought the registration of the lands in accordance with Article 5 of the agreement which provided for the registration of

Matruka lands to be registered in the names of the village.

Adding to the hostility and confusion was the apparent unscrupulous method by which s group of Zionist land agents attempted to gain access to these lands.77

Another area of contention was the Jewish colony of

752/180/POL/461/30, July 9, 1923, ISA.

762/180/POL/461/29, July 1923, ISA.

772/180/POL/461/14, ISA. 118

Hedara. The Inhabitants had kuahane78 covering a large

part of the land. The colony first cultivated a small part

of their holdings and leased the rest to neighboring

bedouin. These leases were first for a period of tvo years

and subsequently for one year. The land was properly

registered— though not necessarily surveyed— even prior to

World War I. In this way the land gradually diminished and

the area cultivated by the colonists Increased commensur-

ately. The bedouin were often employed by the colonists

receiving as much as P1300 per month in wages until they

were dismissed at the outbreak of the troubles in 1929 in

Jerusalem and other areas In Palestine.

The problem with the kushan regarding the Hedara

settlement was in Its description of the seaward side, which was sand dunes, and termed aa "the uncultivated

sands." The colonists nevertheless treated the dunes to

the sea as their rightful property, and even so in the

leases In the kushan then the land reverted to the govern­

ment. This created a difficulty with the Arabs If they

were taking possession of the sands on the basis of the

kushan then the colonists could not eject them.

The trouble began with the bedouins forcibly seising

possession of the land leased to them which was cultivated

78A document referring to the transfer of land or a house. 119 previously by the coloniets. The complexity of the sltu- etlon occurred since both claimed circuastancee be adjudi- csted would be conducted in two different courts, the civil or the lend court.

The colonists were under the impression thst the government could set adminietratively without regard to the courts, in the same way the Turks did. When the government didn't act in this way, the colonists considered them hostile to their lntereste. The Arabs also viewed the government with disfavor when the courts finally ruled in 7 9 the favor of the Jews.

Another area of contention eurrounded the legal ownership and eviction of Arabs from the Wadi al Hawarlth land. The lande were regietered in the Lend Regleter generally in smaller areas than they were in fact in order to evade payment of the werko tax. According to the Tapu

Laws of Palestine, no attention was paid to the registered number of dunuma, but only to the surveyed boundarlaa of the land. This was the case especially in the Tulkarm and

Nablus districts. The government's Survey Department measured all the lande of Wadi al Hawarlth on the payment of a certain price per dunum. The boundaries were fixed in the preeence of all the neighbors and the area wae found to

79Z4/2797/59, February 26, 1929, CZA. 120

exiat In excess of 30,388,275 nev dunuea from whet was

registered.

In September, 1928, the vendors of the lend sent notices to the tenants--84 familles--who rented the lend

from then end peld 1/5 of the produce apart from the usual

tithe to the government. On that notice the tenanta were

given one year's notice, or until October 1, 1929, to make

their arrangements and leave the land. As was the case with other land settlements, various types of compensation were discussed.

The Wadi al Hawarlth lands were mortgaged for

15,000 Napoleans to the French merchant, Astrange, and the advocates for the mortgagee. cAwnl Bey cAbd al-Hadi and an anonymous Individual obtained a Judgment and an order for the public sale of this land by the Execution Office of the government. By putting the land up for sale they were, by law, to have taken possession of the land in accordance with the new boundaries and the 30,388,275 new dunums. The

Jewish National Fund (JNF) was one of the bidders and remainad the last bidder and therefore an order was made by the Execution Office to the Tapu to register the land in

the name of the JNF.

On November 26, 1929, members of the JNF met with

Webb, the president of the Execution Office. Webb notified

them that If the tenants brought claim, in accordance with 121 the Tenants' Protection Ordinance, 1929, he would have to consider their claims and revoke the order for the delivery of the land. The representatives of the JNF replied that the ordinance came Into force on August 1, 1929, while the sale of the land was concluded In April, 1929. The land had been purchased publicly for £41,000 and there was no notice stating that compensation had to be paid to the existing tenants. It was the duty of the Execution Office, they claimed, to inform the purchaser. In any event, eviction notices were sent to the tenants on September 23, 8 0 1928, after the courts settled In favor of the colonists.

The Arab tenants continually refused to settle on any other land. Even after their eviction from the Wadi al-Hawarith land, they refused to settle on land the government had prepared for them in the Beisan district.®^

Education and Literacy

The political socialization process, recent research has indicated. Is an Important factor in creating conditions for sustained loyalty to the central authority of the State.

Through careful selection the young mind Is prepared for a life's career set for him by the Instructional guidelines

80 Ibid.. December 3, 1929. Q 1 q •‘•Su r v e y . op. cit.. I, p. 297, TABLE XV

GOVERNMENT PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEM - GOVERNMENT SCHOOLS AND NON-GOVERNMENT PUBLIC SCHOOLS

Government Schools Non-Government Schools (Muslim) Date No. No. Pupils School Age No. No. Pupils Schools Teachers Pop. Schools Teachers

1914-15 98 234 8,248 71,933 1919-20 171 408 10,622 1920-21 244 525 16,442 1921-22 311 639 19,639 42 114 2,287 1922-23 314 672 19,331 168,000 38 112 2,477 1923-24 314 685 19,164 47 131 3,044 1924-25 315 687 19.881 50 - 3,565 1925-26 314 687 19,737 45 140 3,445 1926-27 315 722 20,079 53 184 4,522 1927-28 314 733 21,259 73 181 4,525 1928-29 310 750 21,636 75 195 4,719 1929-30 310 760 22,956 94 237 5,644 1930-31 308 744 24,288 137 271 7,243 1931-32 305 783 24,837 215,000 157 330 9,127 1932-33 299 827 26,691 174 380 10,549 1933-34 320 933 30,842 174 404 10,862 1934-35 350 1,055 36,005 190 418 11,705 1935-36 384 1,480 42,765 183 440 12,100 1936-37 382 1,176 42,713 175 424 12,467 1937-38 402 1,246 49,400 184 461 13,966 1938-39 395 1,312 50,020 181 441 14,076 1939-40 402 1,340 54,376 178 442 14,123 1940-41 403 1,364 54,645 191 477 15,389 1941-42 404 1,456 56,558 177 467 14,639 1942-43 403 1,452 58.325 161 439 14,409 1943-44 458 1,734 64,790 300,000 150 443 14,767 1944-45 478 1,872 72,662 135 432 14,169 1945-46 514 2,156 81,042 131 - 14,649 1946-47 535 2,480 93,550 - -- 1947-48 555 2,700 103,000 330,000 - - -

Source: A. L. Tlbavl, Arab Education In Mandatory Palestine: A Study of Three Decades of British Administration (London: Laaac A Co., Ltd., 1956), pp. 270-271. 123 of che educational process of Che community. It la an opportunity to learn one's heritage and the tradition that forms the basis of the political socializing process.

Education was not one of the fortes of the Turkish administration In Palestine. In 1914, for example, there were 95 elementary schools and 3 secondary schools (!) with

234 teachers and 8,248 pupils, 1,480 of them girls. In addition to this state-supported school system were relig­ ious schools. During the same year 379 were recorded with

417 teachers and 8,705 pupils, 131 being girls. Education beyond this basic level was left to the colleges in Beirut, o o Cairo, or Istanbul.

The formal educational process In Palestine during the Mandate was fully assumed by the government. The

Department of Education was responsible for the public schools which were for the most part for the Palestinian

Arabs, since the Jews ran their own schools. Uhlle Arab schools were under the control of the government, Jewish schools were not. According to Humphrey Bowman, the first

Director of Education In Palestine, the reason for this difference of control was the overwhelming degree of

®^A. L. Tibawl, Arab Education In Mandatory Pales­ tine : A Study of Three Decades of British Administration (London: Luzac & Co., Ltd., 1957T, p. iO, 124

literacy In the Jewish community because of its largely

western heritage.88 In 1931 there were 308 schools, 589

male teachers, 155 female teachers, 19,346 boys, and 4,942

girls. Out of the total number of schools, 255 were in

villages and were for boys only; there were eight village

girls* schools with a total enrollment of 669.8*

The approach of the schools was basically to provide

a working knowledge of those subjects which would make the

students useful in the community. Thus the rural schools'

syllabus placed the greatest emphasis on teaching language

to Increase literacy. However, the schools went out of

their way to maintain tradition by providing more hours of

instruction in religion and the reading of the Qur'an than 85 to history and geography. This created a serious con­

flict between Palestinian educators and the Mandatory;

students were experiencing history in the making with the

blossoming of Arab nationalism, but It could not be

exploited in the schools. Urban schools lacked religious

training emphasizing Instead language and math; still not,

however, providing a structured approach to understanding

^ Middle East Window (London; Longmans Green, 1942), p. 254. 84 Khalil Totah, "Education in Palestine," The Annals, CLXIV (November 1932), p. 156. 85Ibid., p. 157. 125

the development of the Arab's cultural heritage. In fact,

direct teaching of contemporary history was excluded from the official syllabus, and Arab history was not In the opinion of nationalists given Its due share of the time allotted for history In this syllabus. Teachers were forbidden from belonging to certain clubs and associations. No teacher was allowed to publish any material other than textbooks (the publication of which was in any case controlled by the Department of Education) without the prior approval of the Depart­ ment.86

Secondary schools began their instructional approach by broadening the curriculum with the Introduction of

English.

School attendance by the community at the religi­ ously sponsored schools was poor. Considering that education was a religious function in traditional Middle 88 Eastern communities, this record of poor attendance was

®^A. L. Tibawl, "Education and Nationalism in Pales­ tine," Die Welt Des Islams. IV, No. 1 (1955), p. 18. The value of the government-sponsored education program may also be questioned In terms of what was offered and the needs of the natives by the nature of the alas of the educational program. For example, the secondary school program was designed primarily to prepare students to take matriculation exams which would, within the Palestinian social system, only Increase the social gap by adding to the ranks of the upper class Intelligentsia, 8 7 Totah, op. cit,., p. 158, Bowman found that although the needs were different In the urban and rural areas, the educational system was the same.

88Por Information on education in Arab countries In general and Palestine in particular see Aaron Cohen, Hinnukh v 1haakalah b-calam ha-caravi (Education and Enlightenment in the Arab World) (Tel Avlvt Hashomer Hatsair, 1944). 126

Indicative somewhat of Inefficiency or plain poor quality

of the schools provided by Palestinian Arab religious

Institutions or the sense of respect for these Institutions

held by the Palestinians, It was reported that approxi­ mately 68,000 Muslim youth received an education in 1941-

1942. From this number only 1,898 children, or less than

three percent, received their education from the educa­

tional facilities provided by the Supreme Muslim Council;

another 15,000 were educated at other non-governmental 8 Q schools. 7

The Supreme Muslim Council maintained 11 schools

with a student body of 1,898 and a faculty of 62 teachers.

Among these was a Muslim orphanage In Jerusalem where

there was an emphasis on manual trades and the al-

Ahmadllyyah College in Acre, where there were offered 90 courses In Islamic theology.

The dependence of the Palestinian Arab community upon the government for education was In part fostered by

the Mandatory's Institutionalized control over the Muslim

89 Shimconi, op. cit.. p. 83. See also Harold B. Allen, Rural Reconstruction In Action: Experiences In the Hear and Middle East (Ithaca. N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1955), p. 156. 90,... Ibid., p. 84. 127 educational achool system. As a result the government was able to satisfy only about half of those who wanted an education. The government, applying British standards of education, tried to Implement quality education.

Bowman, as the British representative, first made an attempt to raise the quality of the teachers; It Involved a four-year agreement with Individual Palestinian appli­ cants. Each year IS village schoolmasters would be selec­ ted for 12 months of "postgraduate" study. They were to be placed In a new agricultural achool at Tulkarm, estab­ lished by Sir Ellas Kadoorle. In four years, 60 village 91 teachers had been given additional training.

The Arabs charged that the government, while totally controlling the educational system, failed to encourage 92 local autonomy. This bitterness also erupted before the

Palestine Royal Commission, which came to Palestine to review the causes for the "disturbances" of 1936. Before the commission appeared Mr. George Antonious, who claimed that the government's educational program did not serve the community's social and cultural development because of

91 Allen, op. cit.. pp. 148-149.

92 Submitted In a memorandum before the Seventh Session of the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations. Minutes. p. 110. 128

Its catholic phllosphy and It also tended to Isolate and alienate the Arab from the government. Speaking for the

Arab Higher Committee before the Palestine Royal Commission was Dr. Khalil Totah, who had been Involved In education In

Palestine for a number of years. He charged the British

Mandatory was not permitting Arab control over its popula­ tion and secondly, that the education offered was designed 94 to the Arab's reconciliation of the status quo.

The charge made against British control of the educational system as being an Inhibitor to the development of a total Palestinian national outlook Is shallow. The

British did control the formal school system, many years the educational allocations from the budget were Insuffi­ cient, and there was no compulsory universal education.

But it should be recognized that in many instances the

British were following local tradition so as not to upset the local community, which, while not necessarily practical,

Is at least understandable. Also the British were In no position to inculcate a Palestinian Arab identity in such a strong institution as the school system. Their approach, which we feel was correct, was to provide an apolitical

^ Minutes of Evidence, op. cit., pp. 359-369.

94Ibld., pp. 351-352. 129 education to soae sector of the society. The schools were but one Institution In which the national socialisation process could take place. Far more pervasive was the religious-oriented Institutions that did In fact perform this function, but as we argue, with a dysfunctional approach. Motivation to constructive Identification often originates within the cultural setting of the community.

School children did participate in the national movement.

They took part in strikes and demonstrations. But formalized education remained a community-orientedgoal with the government providing the means.

Education and literacy are almost synonymous. Muslim society in Palestine as we have repeatedly noted remained highly traditional and highly Illiterate throughout the mandatory period. Which was the cause of the other is a complexity made more difficult to understand when placed next to the list of cultural contributions in literature and the arts made by the Arab East. Literature is most often the means of communication among the Intellectuals because of style, the language employed, hidden symbolism, and the price of purchase. Palestinian society was replete with writers, cultural, popular, literary, as well as q e historical. However, there is no indication that they

^ F o r a thorough examination of the belletrlstlc sector of Palestinian society, see Adnan Mohammad Abu 130 raised the quality of life for the community in material goods or created an image that brought external political support* It did add a qualitative factor to the hostile character of the national movement.

The press,for another example, Is a cheaper, more readable, more accessible, and of course a more timely communication medium. Newspapers appeared in Arab Pales­ tine in 1908, In Haifa with al-Karmel.edited by an Orthodox

Christian, NaJib Nassar; it disappeared in 1942. This was followed by what was to become one of the most popular papers, Falastin, founded by the prominent Jaffa Orthodox

Christian, cIsa al-cIsa. In 1939, Falastin became the first Arabic daily newspaper in Palestine. It was later

Joined by As-Sirat al-mustaqlm (1925) and Ad-DifaC (1934), all published in Jaffa.

Newspapers in Palestine were noteworthy in several respects. Positions taken by the individual papers repre­ sented uncontrovertible and dogmatic positions of a parti­ cular political posture. The papers did not consistently support any one political faction, though a reading of them

Ghaxaleh, "Arab Cultural llatlonallsm in Palestine, 1919- 1948," (unpublished PhD dissertation. New York University, New York, 1967).

96 The press was late in coming to Palestine in respect to the rest of the Middle East. It was known In Bgypt, Lebanon, and Syria by the end of the nineteenth century, finally in Palestine sometime In the early part of the twentieth century. 131 97 for any one period might tend to contradict thla. A tabulation of available newspapers can be found in Table

XVI.

In summary, the aeveral factora that could have broken down the traditional netting and replaced commonly held norma for new were inatead channeled toward the maintenance of the atatua quo. Ueatern education waa rejected by the Paleatinlana as a means of colonial repression and the battle of Zionist land acquisition con­ tinually had to be fought against competing communities but also from within, all forma of culture were directed toward opposition to the Zionists and the British.

The Palestinian Arab community labored under a dual raquirement. They not only had to ameliorate intra- community conflicts, but also had to face the continued competition of the Zionists. The role and presence of the

British also served as a determinant to the degree that the mobilization of resources could possibly take place, to be sure,

Economically, Palestine was largely tied to Britain because of its dominating presence. Despite this, Britain

97 Shlmconl, op. cit., pp. 405-409. The inconsis­ tencies of a newapaper'a poaltlon in regard to political party affiliation is a reflection more of the change in the posltlona of various political parties than in the Journal­ istic quality of the papers. TABLE XVI

PALESTINIAN ARAB NEWSPAPERS

Nane Language Appearance Owner Pub Ed Clrcu Pol & Purpose AIN UARON Sawt al- Sha^b Voice of the Nation Ar/Chris Weekly cIsa Bandak Sane Sane Pal. news, Def Pty, sent nost- ly to Bethle- nltes living abroad In US A AL JAFFA al-Dlfac The Defense Ar/Muslln Dally Ibrahln al- Sane 3,000 Nat. policy, Shantl leaning to the Independent Pty of Anln cAbd al- Hadi, at heart pro-Azis al-Slrat al- Mustaqln The Straight Road Ar/Muslln Daily Shaykh Ab- George 1,300 Now a national dallah al- Salih al- paper. Fomerly Qallqlleh Khurl leaned to the Def Pty of Raghbe Falastin Palestine Ar/Chris Dali i cIsa al-cIaa Yusuf Hanna 4,500 National, Anti- Zionist leaning to the Def Pty. largely read by Muslin TABLE XVI (Continued) al-Aqdaa Ar/Chris 3 tines Tamius Nasser Sane 4-500 National. Now Courage a week in debt due to lack of news print. HAIFA al-Bushra Ar/Muslln Monthly cAta'Allah al 1,000 Organ of the Annunciation Jalan dahri Ahaadiyah Moslea Moveaent of India. Inde­ pendent of Muslins generally. JERUSALEM al-Akhhar al- Ar/Chris Monthly Rev. E. M a n u r e S 460 Organ of the Kanassieh Arabic Church of News of the St. Paul of the Church Church Missionary Society (Brit.) al-Muyah al- Ar/Chris Monthly K. A, Gabriel Sane 1,000 Christian life Harr ah and work The Living tfater TEL AVIV Haqlcat al- Ar Weekly General Cooper­ Hlstadrut Dr. Shlnon Histradrut Prop Anr ative Assn of Harell to Arabs The Truth Jewish Labor

Source: RG 226 OSS 30170 S, Jerusalea, February 15, 1943. 134 had no favorite-nation clause In Import tarlffa for

Palestine's imports, but Palestine was a chief source for

Q O the export of British goods. This created a further difficulty for the Palestinian agricultural market to com­ pete internationally.

Continued Jewish Immigration, even though Intended for the Zionist experiment, added to the perceived fear by

Increasing the physical appearance of the Jewish community.

With the approach of World War 11 and the civilized world's knowledge and subsequent compassion for tha plight of

European Jewry, the British were forced to cede further recognition of the Zionist's Institutionalized political 99 apparatus, thus strengthening the Zionist presence. 7

Jewish land purchases did not deny land purchases from Arab Palestinians; but few Arab Palestinians from the rural areas could pay their taxea, without ever thinking about purchase of the land. Reudy correctly assesses the situation when he writes that "It was the ultimate political content of Zionist land acquisitions that drove the Pales­ tinian Arab leadership to oppose these purchases.

98 Nathan, op. cit.. p. 322.

^^Llssak and Horowitz, op. cit., p. 61.

*®®Reudy, op. cit.. p. 127. Emphasis is this author's. 135

But generally all the efforts on the part of the Palea- tlnlans failed,

101 In an attempt to frustrate Zionist land purchases the Arab Executive, In 1932, created a special commission to aafeguard Arab-owned land. The commission subsequently founded the Fund of the Arab Nation (Sanduq al-umnah al- carablyyah). a company that was initially financed with £P10,000, To create greater capital shares were issued, which were largely bought up by the Supreme Muslim Council. The entire project faltered and aborted only to be resumed again in 1935, failing again a few years later. Shlmconl, op. cit.. p. 352. CHAPTER IV

POLITICAL DYNAMICS IN ARAB PALESTINE: ORGANIZATIONS AND THE INITIATION OF THE MOVEMENT

Arab nationalism had as Its first spokesman Christian

Arabs who professed an abstract Ideal In terms of regionally cultural unity and political autonomy. Little attention was given to the form of political organization. What mattered was the protection of civil liberties within a self-governing cultural framework. But the theoretician's role serves as the guide only to the management of the reconstruction of values and structures. This is the function of the Individual nationalist and the various organizations formed to achieve the high level abstractions on the lower practical plane. The formulation of a revolutionary ideology was a difficult and complex process

In Palestine. Religious traditionalism was represented in political affairs by the most powerful elements; vestiges of a feudal order were ever present In the community. But more Importantly, the goal was never fully appreciated in the sense that It was never a singularly community accepted principle. Those who would lead a nationalist movement and those organizations most often linked to the movement were never capable of achieving success because of the limits of their expectations and achievements. He will thus begin our discussion with a description of the leading elements of the 137

Palestinian Arab national movement.

Political Elites

Quandt argues for a better methodological conduct of elite Inquiries through the application of comparison,^ and 2 if possible coupled with a time series analysis. However, in the case of Palestine, insufficient data are presently available. In such a case, Quandt writes that "some data that are of particular Interest in a given country--such as participation in a unique historical event— cannot be made comparable across countries."^ If as Quandt tells us that

"changes over time in the composition of political elites have often been seen as the reflection of broad social and political changes in society at large,1,4 then what one hopes to study by this was non-existent in Palestine since there was no apparent large or significant change In the quality of composition of political elites.

At no time was the Palestinian Arab national move­ ment a unidimensional effort, a singular goal with a common

^■William B. Quandt, "The Comparative Study of Poli­ tical Elites," Saae Professional Papers in Comparative Politics edited by Harry Ecksten and Ted Robert Gurr, I, No. 01-004 (Beverly Hills, Cal.t Sage Publications Inc., 1970), p. 180,

2Ibid., p. 182.

3Ibid. 4Ibid., p. 187 138 mass and leadership. We have discussed above how one of the

Pan-Arab ideals dissipated following which the aoveaent generated an ancillary interest in political representation for Palestinians solely. The roots of the movement may be found in the Pan-Arab appeal of individually Independent

Arab states linked to a common cultural and political entity. However, the Palestinians were actually molded into a political force through a circuitous route. The concept of an independent Arab Palestine was amorphous in the minds of most Arab nationalists, to Include Pales­ tinians. The positive notion of the state was sublimated in favor of the seemingly more pressing issue of countering western imperialism.

Certainly the movement had the semblances of leader­ ship whose vocal appeals added an image of legitimacy, but herein lay a prime problem. The diffuse nature of Pales­ tinian leadership within a traditional Islamic setting, as well as our desire to discuss leaders in several sectors of the society disallow Laaswell's western connotation in his analysis that, "those who get the most are elite; the rest are mass."^ The Palestinian national movement was more than an organising force to attain some level of political

5 Harold D. Laaswell, Politics* Who Gets What, When. How (New York: Macmillan Co., 1936), p. 13. 139

development end achieve political statue with the establlsh-

ment of political autonomy. By its very nature operating

against western cultures it Introduced measures which

would, in some limited sense, break down the social system,

open the ranks of public office to many, and give public

hearing to more than the leaders of the politlcel move­

ment . ^

We will employ the term elite to Include those

individuals who commanded the distinction of leadership of

the native Palestinian Arab community and recognized for it

by the British Mandatory and/or the Palestinian Arab com­

munity. Leadership here is understood as the capability

to Influence to act in a manner commended or suggested by

the communicator of the message. We are immediately con­

fronted with the distinction between the various loci of

authority. In this regard we are most particularly inter­

ested in those individuals whose primary tasks were

directed toward political affairs. With this emphasis we

may then Include resultant or secondary efforts such as the

^Michael C. Hudson doubts whether this was because of the elite structure in Palestine. He feels that while there may have been representation of the elites at the intermediate and lower levels of society there was little penetration or recruitment. "Development and Setbacks in the Palestine Resistance Movement," Journal of Palestine Studies. Ill, No. 2 (Spring 1972), pp. 72-73. This was partially borne out by our study of the direction of the Arab-initiated violence and its control. 140

use of terrorism end violence In the carrying out of armed

resistance of the Zionist and British presence. For

example, Uaj Amin al-Husaynl was quite clearly a political

elite but yet also a prominent organizer of the violence.

Favzl Bey al-Qawaqji, a Tripollan Syrian by birth, achieved

a position of authority and leadership primarily through

violence as the commander of the irregular forces in Pales­

tine during the Arab Revolt. Similarly, Ahmad Hllml Pasha

held a position of respect. He was a Muslim Turk who was

the chief auditor of the awqaf In Palestine and later the

general manager of the Arab Bank, through which much of

the nationalist's money passed.

Thus those who were In a position of authority as

decision-makers or personalized symbols of political values, were elites within the overall structure of the

nationalist movement. Our framework has as Its core those

positions whose primary function It was to hear the demands

of the masses and articulate them in one form or another

to other segments of the masses for purposes of mobiliza­

tion or to direct these demands to the British Mandatory In

order to place stress on the system. Moving away from the

core are those persons who were visible by the masses, were partaking In leadership functions within the movement

as accepted members of some formal Institution, did not make authoritative judgments, but on the other hand made 141 supportive allocations by virtue of their role. Still further out along a periphery are those we call elite- workers, who were participants as volunteers and gave support but did not add to the direction of the movement.^

As diverse as the degree of commitment is to parti­ cipatory action in authoritative political decision-making is the social background of the various elites. These elites whose participation in the movement was totally political were by and large native Palestlnlans, Sunni

Muslim and beyond this were members of prominent and distinguished families whose status was garnered because of the Prophet's lineage within Islamic history. The farther away the individual is from the political role, the greater the inclination that he is not a native Palestinian.

Comparatively, the role of Palestinian political elites is a crucial factor to the study of its national movement. Theodore Abel in his study of Nazi elites, prior to their consolidation of the party and control of politics in German, selected several factors that were required for the mobilization effort. He suggested that basically behind

?The core as we use it corresponds to what Edward Shlls explains as the center of society: the organiza­ tional and authority-ridden elite that create and maintain the values with the periphery, the masses of society. "Centre and Pariphary," The Logic of Personal Knowledge: Essays Presented to Michael Polanyl on his Seventieth ftlrtnday 11th MarclT 1961 (Glencoe, I l T . : The Free Press, 1961), pp. 117-130. 142 any political movement in order for it to be successful— to achieve a position of power--there must be an Ideology or an Issue that undergirds the diversity of individuals or small groups. Experiences or threats to the values of the individual must be a common factor. Secondly, there must be a strongly emotional reaction based on dissatis­ faction and opposition which will sustain the movement.

Next, personal values must be linked to the social values of the movement. Finally, a common source for dissatis­ faction must be found.® For Abel, charismatic leadership was the answer for this and to complete the link with o personal values and common welfare.

Leadership and elite recruitment In Palestine were functions limited by traditional societal patterns of the hamula (clan) and its chieftain. The hamula as a patri- lineage, patrllocal system was originally promulgated In order to maintain taxes, tenant and rents operative. The system therefore served as a method of maintaining tradition and its elites, inltally In the village but later becoming common throughout Palestine.

The strong role of the family Is a fundamental

g "The Pattern of a Successful Political Movement," American Sociological Review, II, No. 3 (June 1937), p. 349. 9 Ibid. 143

Islamic Institution and cloaaly associated with the

development of a Husiin society. The religious influence

of the family is then combined with the cultural heritage

of the bedouin and the desert, a tradition that pervaded

Islamic civilization.

In the desert bedouin social system the hamula was

the basic unit. Members of a particular hamula. in fact,

would have their own quarters built around the mosque and

the governor's quarters which was not only the center of

attention but also the geographical center of an urban

setting. Through time the original bedouin kinship organ!*

zatlon developed into a sedentarized social system and a 10 more urban society.

Nevertheless, family and extended family dominance

continued in Importance. A hierarchy of status was deter­ mined by the lineage to the Prophet Muhammad. These

families were found largely in the cities and therefore

recognizable power was also an urban phenomenon.

Palestinian Arab society emerged from the World War

I domination of the Ottoman Empire into a regional politi­ cal system with political pressures stemming from cultures quite different from one another. On one hand, the

10 Ira M. Lapidus, "The Evolution of Muslim Urban Society." Comparative Studies in Society and Hiatory. XV. No. 1 (January pp.'Tf-277 L 144 commonality of language and cultural heritage revolving around the strong bond of religion gave the community some unity and sense of purpose. While on the other hand, the

West was once again in firm physical control of the Arab.

East even though one could point to Britain's established presence in Egypt and the Sudan.

Palestinian society was largely peasant (fellahln) during the mandatory period and existed as a continuation of an ancient development. Conditions of life were main­ tained and uninterrupted for centuries with only slight modifications in the latter part of the 19th and early

20th centuries.The transition of the agrarian-oriented, rurally based Palestinian society was slow to change, and not without considerable inhibition evidenced by the

Ottoman rule.

In our description of Palestinian society, It would be useful to make a distinction A la Sjoberg, as long as we are discussing the material as well as cultural aspects, to designate Palestinian society as a feudal one rather 12 than a folk society. At least one sociologist denies the

*^See Moshe Macox, Ottoman Reform in Syria and Palestine 1840-1861: The Impact of the Tanilmat on Politics and Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), pp.Tj?- its: ■ 12 For a thorough literature review on this topic within an anthropological framework see Henry Rosenfeld, "From Peasantry to Wage Labor and Residual Peasantry: The Transformation of an Arab Village," People and Cultures of 145

feudal character of the Middle Eaat. C. A. 0, van

Nleuwenhuljze clalaa that since the feudalism of the

Middle Eaat doea not compare aignlficantly with the feudal­

iaa of Europe It la a false conparlson.13 The problea

arises, Indeed, In atteaptlng to discuss feudaliaa In the

Arab East In those teras used to describe the phenomenon

as It existed In Europe. Feudaliaa developed In the West

from econoalc measures of a natural economy with the basis

In the requirement for military protection of the Indi­

vidual. However, In the East, Muslim fiefs, either iqtac

(fief)^ or the kharaj (tribute) lands, developed as a

bastardization of the revenue tax system.

Palestinian Arab society was traditional in Its

societal makeup largely by virtue of geography. The Arab

the Middle Eaat. Volume 2t Life In the Cities. Towns. and Countryside edited by Louise E. Sweet (Garden City, N. Y.: The Natural History Press, 1970), pp. 143-168.

^ Social Stratification and the Middle Easti An Interpretation (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1965), pp. 15-17.

*^For a discussion of iqtac and lqtacat see c0mar es-Saleh el-Barguthy, "Traces of the Feudal System In Palestine." The Journal of the Palestine Oriental Society. IX, No. 2 (19757, pp. To-T?.

^Albert H. Lybyer, "Feudalism: Saracen and Ottoman," Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1931), VI, pp. 210-213, especially p. 210. See also Abraham N. Poliak, Feudaliaa In Egypt. Syria. Palestine and Lebanon (London: The Royal Asiatic Society, 19391). 146 village is patriarchal with the father being supreme. He disposes of all property, directs the activities of his wives and children and decides whom his sons and daughters shall marry. The family la part of an extended system, the hamula (clan), a group of families related by blood. In a large family, the eldest brother is the acknowledged head.

In the ramified hamula one of the constituent families is accorded preeminence over the rest. In each village, in accordance with the dual organization of primitive soci­ eties, there will be two or three ham111 in constant rivalry. The members of each hamula support the chieftain so that the entire village population is split into several factions. Each hamula tries to seek allegiances with other ham1il within the district which leads to the formation of regional associations of hams* il among which in the course of time ties of blood relationships are formed. Thus each district is divided into two or three associations of family rule which wanted the demands placed on the political system. The system developed among and during Turkish rule when the central authorities were too weak to extend complete control throughout the Empire and had therefore to rely to a considerable degree upon influential local personages.

The diffuse nature of the Palestinian Arab commu­ nity represented by the traditional family loyalty pattern 147 extended to the community's leadership. The community was unable to Identify with a single or central source of direction In the sense of legitimate authority to make decisions for the entire community. Power was concentrated

In clans and political parties which were nothing more than

conduits for personal accumulation of power and prestige

rather than Interest articulators or aggregators. It Is certainly true that the Husaynl family dominated Pales­ tinian politics for a number of years. But It wasn't because they satisfied the demands of the community. It was more of a question of to loyalty was owed In the form of political tithes.

The family (cayla) In Arab society serves as the focal point for almost all activity. The family becomes the substitute for government In a region where the function has been accomplished by the extended family system.

"The Arab's loyalty Is evoked only in personal relation­ ships." Anything besides the kinship group (ahl) Is beyond his pale of loyalty identification.^

Rarely does the Arab set his goal In the Interest of his nation* He alms primarily at the improvement of the fate and position of his family and religious group. In this respect there Is bigger social aim transcending these two groups.

16Sanla Hamady, Temperament and Character of the Arabs (New York) Twayne Publishers, I960), pp. ff7-88. 17Ibld.. p. 95. 148

Being part of an Oriental tradition, the Islamic social system does not permit deviation from the religious

Interpretation of reality and authority is based on those lines* Thus the western nation-state system was alien to the Palestinians as it was to many Arabs of the region.

Nevertheless, with the British administration came some semblance of Palestinian rule. What we found here is a stateless society. Fortes and Evans-Pritchard were early students of stateless societies In which the political 18 19 functions were performed by a clan or lineage. Easton puts forth the parameters of this form of social organiza- 20 tlon based largely on the work of Radcliffe-Brown: an obvious absence of a central source of authority above the 21 moat powerful level of lineage segmentation, and whatever

*®M. Fortes and E. E. Evana-Prltchard, African Political Systems (London: Oxford University Press. Inter­ national African Institute, 1940). It is not our purpose here to comment on the anthropological attributes of thia study but will note Paul Bohannan's comment on its inade­ quacy of bifurcating stateless African societies Into the extended family and those of the clan or lineage. He notes a further classification; those societies that are con­ trolled by kinship groups and non-klnshlp groups. Social Anthropology (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965) p"I 273.

19Davld Easton, "Political Anthropology," Biannual Review of Anthropology. 1939 edited by Bernard Siegel (Stanford Cal,: Stanford University Prase, 1959), pp. 214- 216.

20a . R. Radcliffe-Brown, "Preface," Fortes and Evana- Prltchard, op. cit. 21 cf. Michael G. Smith, "On Segmentary Lineage 149 organized authority exista exerciaea ita power through force. Syntheaizing the worka of aeveral anthropologists

Easton sought the variations in the support structure of the lineage segments of the stateless societies. He then suggested that the support structure is formed by varying formations of alliances or coalitions among the segments 22 which, in return, tend to be unstable. Unique to highly unstable segmentary primitive systems is disputes which

"are likely to occur over adherence to the political community or with respect to governmental roles and policies."23

Specifically, the Palestinian Arab community's political system in Easton's anthropological analysis would be called a "contingent political system." The political relationship among the various clans Is "acti­ vated for specific purposes and with respect to limited objectives and contingencies."

The extended family system in Palestine was bound to a vicious circle of unending duration. The linkage of family to a plot of land over a long period of time

Systems." Journal of the Roy*l Anthropological Institute. LXXXVI, Ho. 2 (19567, pp. 39-80. 22 Easton, op. cit.. p. 231.

23Ibid., p. 233. ISO reduced the number of alternetlve patterns of living to a minimum. While Palestinian politics revolved around this family rule, it was not a static arrangement. Some of the families derived their Influence from a single member's accomplishments which waned with the loss of that member.

Shimconi saw that the family's power disintegrated progres­ sively with the adaptation of Arab life to capitalism and western forms of life.^ This is further complemented by less prominent families achieving similar levels of status and also when members of the family ascribe to ideas not fully sanctioned by the family.

In both rural areas and the urban centers some number of families garnered political power and coalesced for various periods with no predisposition to a political cause. The more prominent of Palestinian families were concentrated in towns though they trace their origins to a village. The one major exception to this is in cities such as Jerusalem when claims to origin could be made by the Nashaslbis.

The groupings of families through intermarriage and extension into larger clan units has far more Importance to us here since much of the local politics turns on this situation. Regarding the basic pattern of family life in

2 4 Shlmconl, op. cit., p. 206. 151

Palestine, we aust note with earnest, Rosenfeld's study of

the Arab village fanily In which he concluded that ''there

never was a single 'traditional* family structure,^ The

paternal domination of the land would be sufficient reason

for the son's decision to remain on his father's land or

the obverse would bring a negative response or the departure

from the homestead.

But...when agrarian means were the only productive means available, even those with little land, or only an ox, could assume, buttressed as they were by those who had somewhat more, the patriarchal role. ®

The alternatives again were few, If indeed any. One could

remain within the village system, living with the results

of family-political factions and alliances and thus achieve,

as best as possible, the Ideal extended family patterns.

The fellah, however, was In such a condition so as to

obviate a higher level of livelihood. Unable to obtain

wealth. In terms of land or sufficient social mobility, In

2^Henry Rosenfeld, "Change, Barriers to Change, and Contradictions In the Arab Village." American Anthropolo­ gist . LXX, No. 4 (August 1968), p. 739. The kinship group may be added to the joint family and ordinary family system found in the Arab village, Aflf Tannous, "The Arab Village Community of the Middle East," The Annual Report of the Board of Regents of the Smithsonian Institution. i?4rr Tunzizz ton, D, C.: Government Printing Office, 1944), pp. 536-539. 26Ibld., p. 740. 152 order Co move Into a role capable of demanding a better

social position, he remained l_n situ.

Paternal control over the existing means, the need for bride price, etc., produced submissiveness In sons, the authority of village fathers, and the authority of lineage elders around whom factional discipline was maintained.

An ideological commitment by reference to the

family and the clan superseded any devotion to the nation and clearly dominated any local activity or participation.

The familial orientation and control over the individual was further characterized by a transferral of rival clan strife and the "dual organization" of much of the Pales­ tinian life style.28

Palestinian elites were fractionalized then largely due to their recruitment pattern and social stratification

27Ibid.

28E, N. Haddad, "Political Parties in Syria and Palestine (Qalsls and Yemlnl)," The Journal of the Pales­ tine Oriental Society. I, No. A (September 1921), pp. 209- 214; Raphael Patai, Golden River to Golden Road; Society. Culture, and Change in the Middle East (Philadelphia. Pa.: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1969, 3d enl. ed.), pp. 218-223; R. A. Macallster and E. W. G. Masterman, "Occasional Papers on the Modern Inhabitants of Palestine; Personal Names," Palestine Exploration Fund. Quarterly Statement. XXXVI (January 1904), pp. 150-160; XXXVII (January 1905), pp. 48-61; XXXVIII (January 1906), pp. 33- 50; "A History of the Doings of the Fellahin During the First Half of the Nineteenth Century, From Native Sources," Palestine Exploration Fund. Quarterly Statement. XXXVII (July 1905), pp. 343-356. 153 based on politico family rule. Certainly there was some charismatic leadership that gave some semblance of unita ry authority. Haj Amin al-Husaynl was a powerful leader In the Palestinian community. However, his source of author­ ity was religious, both in a spiritual and sociological sense, or as a result of fear from harm rather than any

Inherent personal qualities. Alvin Cohen provides a useful framework of analysis for the prominence of Haj Amin and

Husaynl dominance altogether among Palestinian elites.

Simply stated, the degree of lnter-ellte conflict In Arab

Palestine vss disunifylng which then created a power vacuum at the center enabling a single ellte--the Husaynis 29 In this case— to operate there relatively unchallenged.

Charismatic and personalized elite-leadership requires a greater degree of visibility by the masses in order to maintain the fabric of authority. Therefore, after the Arab Revolt in 1936-1939 when those elites were insulated from the Palestinian political system either their personal effect was lessened on the hold over the masses or in those cases where their role was continually revered their effect on the positive results of the move­ ment was somewhat negated. Elites found themselves

29 "Externalities In the Displacement of Traditional Elites," Economic Development and Cultural Change. XVII, No. 1 (January 1969), p. 7. 154 attempting to maintain their own positions or that of their factions rather than providing for their constituents or for any political process.

Implicit in the Palestinians' political goals was the need for political integration. Not only the closing of the elite-mass gap that existed but also bringing the heterogeneity of Palestinian society together for a single purpose with a common acceptance of a central authority.

Myron Weiner describes this as Integration "which holds a society and a political system together," regardless of the measure of development of that system. He goes on to indi­ cate that this must be accomplished at a level commensurate with what the political leadership needs to carry out its goals.Claude Ake continues that "in essence, the problem of integration is one of developing a political 31 culture and of Inducing a commitment to it." In Pales­ tine when we refer to political integration we not only refer to Muslim Arabs but to the Druse and Christian Arabs also who are groups culturally pluralistic. This becomes

^"Political Integration and Political Development," Politics in Transitional Societies edited by Harvey Kebschull~TNew Torkt Appleton-Century Croft, 1968), p. 265. 31 A Theory of Political Integration (Homewood, 111.: Dorsey Press, 1967X7 p. 1. 155

Important to the Palestinian experience since this divers­

ity referred to by Clifford Geerts as "primordial sentl-

ments, may work against political Integration.

Political Parties

Throughout the first two decades of the twentieth

century, Palestinian Arab political attitudes and demands

were aggregated and articulated first through the Musllm-

Chrlstlan Society then through Congresses. When Musa

Kazlm al-Husaynl, the repetltiously elected president of

these Congresses died, representation in Palestine assumed

another form— the political party.

Palestinian Arab political parties^ clearly

reflected the eastern tradition of personal family rule.

The political party aggregated the Interests not of the

individual but of the various elements of the hamula and

its extension. Shimconl notes the more obvious differences between Palestine Arab parties and the more commonly known

European types or even the Jewish political parties In

32i«The Integrative Revolution; Primordial Senti­ ments and Civil Politics In the New States," Old Societies and New States. edited by Clifford Geerts (New York; Free Press, 1963), pp. 105-157.

^ T h e very term used to label Palestinian Arab political parties, hisb. connotes something much different than what had developed in the West. In its original form hisb meant a tribe, clan or family. Its use developed Into an application of types of brotherhood societies and cul­ tural societies. In Palestine It more closely resembled a status society. 156

Palestine which were western-oriented anyway. He writes

that: there was lack of maas meetings, a lack of author­

ity evident when conventions are held, and no elective

bodies within the party. Instead, true to eastern form, members nominated themselves from a group of prominent

dignitaries. Furthermore, there was permanently pledged

or committed party membership. Dues-paylng, which beyond

the obvious fiscal benefits, is also a formal symbol of

party ties, was also lacking; Instead ad-hoc contributions 34 were solicited.

The Palestinian Arab political party operated In

the rarlfled atmosphere of the upper middle class gentry,

the Intelligentsia, the enlightened middle class along with selected town notables and the village chieftains.

However, what the western reader fails to realize often

that Shimconl divulges is that the Palestinian social

structure was rooted in the feudal-like reverence for this

selected social strata. Political parties were expected

to be the porte parole, so to speak, of the great unedu­ cated masses. The very essence of the Palestinian politi­ cal party system was that it did nothing more than mirror the social structure. What this also means is that with

^*Yacacov Shlmconi, Aravai Erets Yisraal (A History of the Arabs of Palestine) (Tel Aviv: Am Oved Publishing Co., 1947), pp. 336-337. 157 political party llnea drawn along family ties. Internal family dlasenalon was then tranaferred to the political affairs of the entire political community.

The two most powerful political families in Pales- tine were the Husaynis and the Naahashlbls. With both seeking total control over Arab Palestine they accumulated political allies as families lined up on one side or the other. Husaynl and Nashashibl forces were distributed as equally as possible as an unwritten rule in various posi­ tions of authority balancing off and deterring one another

from extreme acts. With the defeat of Raghib Bey

Nashashibl in the municipal elections in Jerusalem in 1934 and the resultant disproportionate power distribution in favor of HaJ Amin, and the death of Musa Kasim al-Husayni. events were marked for the end of the already moribund

Arab Executive. After the creation of the Supreme Muslim

Council with Haj Amin at its head the Husaynl family assumed almost total dominance and became known as al- mallisiyyin (the Councilites) while their antagonists, the

Nashashibls. became the al-mu°arldin (the Oppositionists).

One prominent third souce of power was the Istlqlal

(Independence) party, a pan-Arab organization but most popular In Syria. It was first founded in Paris in 1911 by cAwnl Bey cAbd al-Hadl and seven of his fellow students as Jaclyat al-cArablyyah al-Fatat (The Young Arab Society) 158 a secret and underground organization.

The members represented various sections of the Arab world and Included among Its ranks such names as the Amir

Faysal, Shukrl al-Quwatll, and Rlad as-Sulh, During World

War I( the aim of the party was to work with the Allies against Turkey and to Insure Arab Independence. It was only after Amir Faysal became King of Syria did the party surface— on February 5, 1919--under the name of Hlzb al­ lot lqlal al-cArabl. ^ cAwni B e y ^ brought the Istlqlal to

Palestine (other Arab states had their own Istlqlal parties) in Jerusalem on August 4. 1932, though making its headquarters in Nablus. Their platform had one particu­ larly outstanding or significant proposition. It sought the independence of all Arab countries which were viewed as an indivisible unit. Toward this end, they pledged themselves to cooperate with the Istlqlal parties of other

Arab countries. Regarding Palestine specifically, it was considered a natural part of Greater Syria. They also called for the revocation of the Balfour Declaration and

35RG 226 OSS 64706 C, March 23, 1944, NA; George Antonious, The Arab Awakening> The Stogy of the Arab National Movement {New Yorki Capricorn Books, 1965 [1946]), p. 292, f. 1.

36por additional information on cAvnl Bey see the entry for him in the HArab Who's Who" put together by the Palestine Administration In 1933. CO 733/249/17693, PRO. 159 37 the eetablishnent of an Arab parliament. Britain vaa singled out as an enemy of the Arab people and vere to ousted, by violence If necessary.3®

The Nashashibl family was for many years the foe and bitter political opponent of the Husaynl family. In order to better oppose the Mufti. Haj Amin al-Husaynl, a group of prominent Palestinians under the leadership of

Raghlb Bey Nashashibl formed the National Defense Party

(Hisb ad-dIfac al-watanl) In Jerusalem on December 3, 1934.

Their position was basically the achievement of Indepen­ dence for Arab sovereign politics and the refusal to

(ecognlze International commitments which would mean con- 39 trol or influence limiting Arab autonomy.

By far the most popular and the most powerful party that was founded during this transition period was the one

37RG 165 OSS 116519 C, JICAMK, WNRC; I. Chizlk, "The Political Partiee in Palestine! Arab and Jewish," The Jour­ nal of the Royal Central Aslan Society. XXI, Pt. 1 (January 193477 pp. 104-105; Shimconl, op. cit.. p. 346; Al-Jamlca al-Arabiyyah. August 4, 1932. Its Immediate membership included: Rashid al-Haj Ibrahim, Mucln al-Madl, cIzzat Darwazah, Subhl al-Khadra, Dr. Salim Salameh, Pahml cAbushl, Akram Zucaytar, Ajaj Nuweihad, Ahmad Hllmi Pasha and cAbd al-Baql.

^ Orients Moderno, XII (September 1932), pp. 437-438,

390SS 116519, op. clt. Members were: cAbd ar-Rahman at-Taji, cUmar al-Bltar, Sulayman ibn cAbd ar-Razzaq Tuqan, Mustafa al-Khayri, cAdil ash-Shawa, cIsa al-cIsa and Ibrahim Darwlsh. 160 under the direction of Haj Amin al-Husaynl, and the public leadership of Jamal Effendl al-Husaynl, Haj Amin's cousin.

The Palestine Arab Party (PAP) (al-Hlsb al-cArabl al-

Pllastanl) was founded In Jerusalem on April 24, 1935.

Actually, it was only after considerable deliberation that the Mufti made the decision to create a political party.

His reluctance was because of his preference to operate through the Arab Executive, an amalgamation of political positions and therefore more easily influenced and con­ trolled .

The party continued to operate under the personal domination of Haj Amin until 1939 when due to the exile, detention or close official surveillance of its leaders

It became dormant. It was revived In 1944 when Tewflq

Salah al-Husaynl, a brother to Jamal, became its Acting

President and Amil al-Ghuri its Secretary. In its revived form It had 45 members representing all sections of the country. The PAP was created largely as an attempt to maintain continuance of Husaynl dominance In politics once

Musa Kazlm died In 1934 and the Arab Executive lost potency.

When first organised It sought what It called a National

Pact: the Independence of Palestine and the lifting of the mandate, the preservation of the Arab character of Palestine

40 PO 371/16926/8/33, March 10, 1933; PO 371/16926/ 10/33, March 25, 1933, PRO. 161

and the opposition of the establishment of a Jewish

National Home, and also the binding of Palestine to the

other Arab countries In a completely Independent national

unit.4* Their policies were reorganized somewhat after Its

revival when their activities were directed toward organi­

zation, the release of its president Jamal al-Husaynl and

Amin at-Tamimi, then being detained by the British, and

Arab Unity.4*

An offshoot of the PAP was the Reform Party (Hizb

al-lslah). organized In Jerusalem on June 18, 1935. Its

primary and Immediate purpose was to permit Its leader,

Dr. Husayn Fakhrl al-Khalidi, to contest the mayoralty of

Jerusalem. The party had three secretaries, Dr. Khalldl,

Mahmud Abu Kader, and Shibll Jamal. It had no president,

though Dr. Khalldl was recognized as its leader. Its pro­

gram consisted of demanding the Independence of Palestine within the framework of Arab unity and considered Palestine as part of the Arab cause. Secondly, they declared their opposition by every means possible to the establishment of a Jewish National Home. They also endeavored to foster

41P0 371/18957/8/35, April 20, 1935, PRO.

42RG 226 OSS 115847 R, February 28, 1945, NA; FO 371/18957/3/35, June 30, 1935, PRO. In its revived form Its most active membership Included! Rafiq al-Husaynl, Abdallah Samara, Hashim Jayusl, and Musa aa-Suranl. 162 political rapport between Palestine and the other Arab

countries.^

The National Bloc Party (al-Kutlah al-watanlyyah) was founded In Nablus on October 4, 1935, under the leader­

ship of cAbd al-Latlf Bey Salah, a Nablus lawyer. In order

to permit his inclusion in the Arab Higher Committee which was made up of political party leaders. Its primary aims appear to have been to achieve the complete independence of

Palestine while maintaining Its Arab character within the

framework of Arab unity. An innovation that was Introduced

In Palestinian politics was that every member of the party had to take an oath not to compromise on the country's rights In any way end particularly not to sell or assist 44 in the sale of land to a non-Arab.

Another political organization resembling a politi­ cal party was the Arab Youth Congress Party (Hu 1tamar ash- ahabab). Two youth conferences held on December 4, 1932, and May 10, 1935, did much to bring about the formation of

*^Ibld. Some of their principal members weret Ishaq al-Budayrl, Husnl Khallfah, Nlmr Hanrad, George Salah, Ibrahim Haggi at-TaJl al-Farukl, cIsa Bandak, Hamed Omar, Dr. Yaqub Bardakash, and Muhmud Abu Khadra. There was mutual admiration and support betwean It and the Mufti. PO 371/18957/11/35, June 27, 1935, PRO. 44 Ibid. Some of their active members were: Andullah Mukhlis, Abdullah Mltrl, Hamdi an-Nabulsl, and Shaflq Aasal. 163 this political body. Tha First Youth Conference was con­ ducted In Jaffa under the chairmanship of Rasim al-Khalldi.

From this get-together resulted the "Arab Youth Covenant" declaring that the Arab countries were an Indivisible political unit and any division of that body was unaccepta­ ble to the Arab nation. Complete independence had to be the aim of all efforts In all Arab countries and a general condemnation of Imperialism which was to be opposed.

The second conference was conducted In Haifa under the chairmanship of al-Haj Muhammad Yacqub al-Ghusaynt the vice-president of the Arab Executive. Several recommenda­ tions were adopted on political, social and economic 45 Issues. The formation of this political organisation, another within the unique eastern framework, severed the generally accepted priorities for such Institutions.

Instead of representing some interest of the community, It served as a vehicle to Introduce youthful radicalism and a counterveiling force to the more traditional family set­ ting to Palestinian Arab politics. The Arab Youth Congress later served as a model for extremism and with a gain In

45 Ibid. The executive body of the conference Included Edmond Rock, Said al-Khalll, Lutf Odeh, Sella Shibab ad-Dln. The principal figures that emerged were Rasim al-Khalldl, who was later forced to leave Palestine, clsa Bandak, Haj Sacadl ash-Shawa, and Fuad Saba of the Reform Party, Hamdl an-Habulsl of the National Bloc, and Yusuf Abdo. 164

popularity puahad other political elements to new 46 extremes.

In the 1940's a small element of Palestinian society

sought to break away from the traditlonel patterns of

political party formations. One group was made up of

Istlqlallsts and members of the Pund of the Arab Nation

(Sanduq al-ummah al-carablyyah). Another faction was

associated with the Husaynl camp and Included members of

the Nashashibl family such as Anwar Nashashibi, Naslr ad-

Din Naahashlbl, end Khalusl al-Khayrl. This group was

closely tied to the activities of Muse al-cAlami who was

well respected among all elements of Palestinian politics.

The non-partisan group was called the Popular Party. A

third political formation was one with leftist leanings.

Many within thia political spectrum cooperated with one

another, both Jewa and Arabs, though the latter most often

took extreme nationalist stands when It was Ideologically

conducive to the Comintern's directives or because of the • 4 7 community's direction.

46 FO 371/16926/6/23, February 18, 1933, PRO.

47 See Yehoshua Porath, "Usbat Al-Taharrur Al-Watanl (The National Liberation League) 1943-1948," Aalan and African Studies, IV (1968), pp. 1-21. 165

Political Cluba

Consoclatlonal arrangements among th« Palestinians

Included the formation of various types of clubs and societies among the educated segments of the society. The club was generally a strictly male participatory organiza­ tion^^ with most clubs tending toward a social or cultural orlentat ion.

Some time after the British occupation of Jerusalem,

Khannah Ayout, the son of Salim Ayout, Intended to organize a society with the purpose of spreading pro-French propa­ ganda. He therefore contacted his close friend Hasan Sidqi al-Dajanl. They kept the real purpose of their organisa­ tion secret and publicly announced that it was a Palestinian patriotic organization to protect Arab interests in Pales­ tine. In their efforts they won the sympathy of Yusuf al-

Khatlb and Ahmad al-Khatlb, both Jerusalemites.

After several meetings they created the organization

Muqtataf al Dews. They were partly financed in their effort by the French. Dajani and Ahmad al-Khatlb soon thereafter

^®Women had their own organizations based on family lines and therefore feuded in the same way as their male counterparts. Some of them weret The Arab Woman's Federa­ tion (al-Ittlhad an-Niaa'i al-cArabl) led by Zalaykah Shahabl, Matilda Moghannan and the wivea of cAwni Bey cAbd al-Hadl, Rushdl ash-Shawaf Sadhigh Nassar of Haifa among several others; and The Society of Arab Women (Jamclyyat aa-Sayyldat al-cArablyyah), under the chalrwomanshlp of Shahandar Dusdar. 166 became French agents receiving monthly salarlea from the

French consul.

49 Yusuf al-Khatlb recruited 12 members all devoted to the Nashashlbl family in order to strengthen the posi­ tion of the organization in opposition to the Husayni- controlled al-Nadl al-cArabl (the Arab Club), another club set up In June, 1918, by Raj Amin al-Husaynl.

At their first official meeting Fakhrl Mashaahlbl was appointed first secretary. At their second meeting

Fakhrl suggested that the name of the organization be changed to Mutanda al-Adabi (The Literary Club),^® the name of an Arab national organization in Constantinople before the War. At this time it was also decided to give up the

French aid. The organization purged several of its mem­ bers while undergoing a complete reorganization. Hasan

Sidqi remained a member and also a French agent, though secretly, serving as a couriar for journeys to Damascus.

The main object of the Mutanda was to prepare the people to the demand of autonomy and oppose the partition of Palestine from Syria. They therefore arranged lectures

*9Fakhri al-Naahashibl, Abdul Kader Zshabi, Rushdl Shaas, Ibrahim al-Moukhlb, Farid Tabri, Haaaan Omar Dajanl, Fuad al-Nashaahibl, Omar Izenl, Ellas Blby, Shayky Yacqub al-Uzbaql, Ahmad al-Khatlb, and Salibeh al-Djoury.

^ F o r a secret list of individuals Involved in the Mutanda al-Adabi, the Nadi al-cArabl. the Muellm-Chrlatian Soclty, and the Black Hand see S25/517/ CZA. 167 in public places, provoking the masses, especially the fellahin and petit bourgeolse, and extolling the dangers they were exposed to by the Zionist presence. Their activities increased markedly with the arrival of the

Klng-Crane Commission. They never allowed a moment to slip by when they could not oppose the Husaynis, In an attempt to replace their domination of local affairs.

Fakhrl went to Damascus and interviewed Amir Faysal regarding Palestine. Faysal's position was clear: Arab politicians had to be pro-British. Later the British were to be used by the Arabs to control the Jews. This it seems was merely a play on the part of Faysal to strengthen his position by gaining support for the British which in turn would be his support.

Some time after his return Fakhrl learned that

Hasan Sidql and Ahmad al-Khatlb were French agents and so both were thrown out of the organization. Fakhrl then took over leadership and with the advice and council from Amir

Faysal directed the movement. But there was also some dissension among the groups. There were those who were anti-British inciting the people to rise up and there were also those who were pro-British.®** They continued to

51 Z4/3886/I, January 30, 1920, CZA. This file also contains the organization's constitution, Its branch locations and membership lists. 168 middle along and seemed either to die out or their member- ship was absorbed by another sore current attraction.

Other groups with far greater potential for action were the an-Mejadah (Auxiliary Troops) and al-Futuwwa

(the Chivalrous ones); both were listed with the government as boy scout organisations. The Hejadah was formed by the

Husaynis In Jaffa sometime In 1945 and began recruiting

Immediately, registering with the government in February,

1946. Originally it began as a Lebanese Muslim organisa­ tion to rival the Maronite Christian political organisa­ tion. In the summer of 1944, a group of members from the

Nejadah stopped off In Haifa on their way to Egypt. While there, they were the guests of the Muslim Sports Club.

They were very impressed with the organisation and In

September, 1945, went to Lebanon to visit the Nejadah headquarters, returning to Palestine to form their own 52 group.

Once formed, the [Palestinian] Hejadah was commanded by a Jaffa lawyer, Muhammad Nimr al-Hawarl. Its leadership was a triumvirate, represented by Yacqub Ghusayn, cIzsat

Darwazeh, and Haj Amin al-Hueaynl, who at the time was In exile. Its membership consisted mainly of shepherds,

52 FC28 P6 Mo. 13, BSA. 169

seasonal workers, In general the Palestinian lumpen. The

membership was divided Into active and supporting, the

main difference being the former wore uniforms, which they 5 3 purchased for themselves. All members paid an Initiation

fee of CPI and CPI/2 yearly. Their slogan was: "Arab

lands for the Arabs," and their stated aims were to unify

the youth and unify Palestine with neighboring Arab coun­

tries. It made its headquarters in Jaffa and had several

branches in other cities receiving military instruction

and training from ex-Arab Army officer.

The Futuwwa was originally founded by the Mufti In

1935, and modeled along Nazi-Fascist lines then promi­

nent.^ Disbanded In 1936 because of the disturbances it

was reorganized by the Husaynis In September, 1946, under

the command of Kamil Arlqat, a former Palestinian Police

(C.I.D.) officer, with Amil Ghuri acting as the liaison

officer between the PAP and the Futuwwa. Particularly

active in the Jerusalem suburbs, Its membership was made

53xn AP dispatch of August 31, 1946, gave their membership at 5,000. The New York Times. December 28, 1946 listed them with more than 25,000 men; Palcor, September 20, 1946, gave them 3,000 which was also claimed by Ejhnav, the Jewish underground paper. The New York Herald Tribune September 9, 1946, gave the combined strength of the Ne.1 adah and the Futuwwa as 10,000. 5*F0 371/18957/12/35, August 5, 1935, PRO. 170 up of the scions of the upper middle class, sons of shop­ keepers, government officials, and professional men.

The PAP first supported the Neladah when Jamal

Effendl returned from exile in February, 1946. He tried to gain control, but Hawari would not accept his assistance.

The Husaynis therefore decided to form the Futuwwa as a

rival organization.

On September 16, 1946, the PAP submitted a memorandum

to Lieutenant General Alan Cunningham, in an attempt to get

the Mandatory to sanction the organization as an army to

"defend the Arabs against Jewish terrorism.It took as

its slogan: "Prepare Strength Wherever You Find It." The members pledged themselves "to obey without question the orders of my superiors; guard my country and land...; to resist the establishment of the Jewish National Home and be ready to fight for my country and land."^

Both groups clashed because of the leftist orienta­ tion of the Majadah and the rightist orientation of the

Futuwwa. So faced with the possibility of disintegration

Hawari placed the Nejadah under the control of Jamal

Effendl and the Arab Higher Committee. But the Nablus branch of Neladah. financed by anti-Husayni forces, opposed

^^New York Times, September 17, 1946, p. 8.

^®BSA, op. clt.; New York Times. July 19, 1946, 171 the merger remaining for the purpose of protecting them­ selves from Husaynl-controlled terrorism.^

The efforts of these groups were eventually subsumed by the manipulations of the politicians who Initially formed them. They were auxiliary forces, supporting organi­ zations with little or no capacity for meaningful decision­ making. They therefore deferred to the inclinations of the parent units.

Political Activities

The Palestinian Arab hopes of a Greater Syrian state with the popular Amir Faysal as their monarch collapsed with his expulsion by the French in the summer of 1920. It was only then that the Palestinian nationalists turned their Interests to an Independent Arab Palestine. But

Palestine was under the effective control of Britain, under a mandate.

The relationship between the Palestinians and the

British Mandatory did not begin In a very auspicious manner. The Palestinian community was greeted with what was to them an undesirable appointment to the initial High

Judd L. Teller, "Behind Palestine's Arab 'Armies'i Power Politics and Mid-East Intrigue," Commentary. Ill, No. 3 (March 1947), pp. 243-249; Andrew Roth, "The Mufti's New Army," Nation, (November 1946), pp. 551-552. 172

Commissionershlp, Sir Herbert [later Viscount] Sanuel was not only a Jew, but also a Zionist. Samuel had been a financial and administrative advisor to General Allenby In

1920. Samuel's reports to Lloyd George's cabinet were very well received and were Instrumental In his appointment.

According to Lord Curzon, Samuel was appointed because of

"his high reputation and administrative expertise...his authority with the Zionists, coupled with his well known

C Q sympathies for the Arabs." However, this was not fully appreciated by the Palestinian Arab community. In a letter sent to the British liaison officer In Damascus, dated

June 25, 1920, and written by Aref al-Aref, at the time the

General Clerk of the Arab Palestine Committee, came an alarming response:

We consider this appointment as the first step to verify the wishes of the Zionists and believe It to be, as well, a clear proof for enforcing the final unjust decisions put down by the conference of San Remo, against which both the Arab nation at Palestine and abroad have already protested.59

On December 13, 1920, the Third Palestine Congress

5®This was also reported to London by the Chief Administrator O.E.T.A. (South), Major General Louis J. Bols. FO 371/5114, June 1, 1920, PRO. For particular Arab attacks, see FO 371/5120, June 26, 1920, quoted In Doreen Ingrams (comp.). Palestine Papers 1917-1922: Seeds of Conflict (London: John Murray, 1972}, p. 107.

59 2/32/CS 65/2A 7/7/20, ISA. The same letter was also sent to the Chief Administrator of O.E.T.A. (South). 173

was held In Haifa, the first Palestinian congress actually

conducted In Palestine. The Congress Implemented an Arab

Executive Committee,consisting of 24 Muslim and Christian

Arabs. In spite of the seemingly democratic nature of the

committee, It was clearly dominated by the Husaynl family

when Musa Kazlm Pasha al-Husaynl was elected its president,

and who remained In that office until his death In 1934.

This family role was further cemented by the appointment

of Jamal al-Husaynl as Its secretary, a position given him

partially because of his command of English.

The Congress met to make a determined stand against

the Mandatory and set the boundaries for the conflict that would ensue between them. They demanded from the govern-

60 The Arab Executive replaced the Muslim-Christian Committee, but It ceased functioning In 1936. However, It was never formslly dissolved. As elected. It consisted oft Jerusalem— Musa Kazlm al-Husaynl, Aref Pasha ad-Dajanl, Ibrahim Shammas; Nablus— Haj Tewflq Hammad; Tulkarm— Shaykh cAbd al-Latlf al-Haj Ibrahim; Ramleh— Shaykh Sulayman al-Haj al-Farukl; Acre— Abdul Fattah al-Sacadi; Jaffa— Dr. Yacqub Bartcoush; and Haifa— Mucln al-Madl. 2/152/2223/10, January 7, 1921. ISA. The Arab Executive was subsequently to become the Arab Higher Committee, the closest to becoming a central political authority In the Palestinian Arab community. Tha Zionist counterpart was the Jerusalem office of the World Zionist Organisation. There was also The National Council (Havaad Haleumi) of the Jewish community and the Jewish Assembly (Knes7et Israel). In 1929 the World Zionist Organization Executive was transferred to the Jewish Agency for Palestine (Hasochnut Hayehudlt). 174 ment61 the right of self-determination and the establish­ ment of some sort of a national government which would be responsible to an elected council. This council would be elected by those Arabic-speaking people residing in Pales­ tine at the outbreak of World War 1 . ^

The object of the Class A Mandate was to prepare the local population for some sort of autonomous self- government. Samuel wanted local representation In the governing process In keeping with this general political philosophy but was perplexed In finding an equitable solu­ tion and one that would be acceptable to both communities.

Elected membership undoubtedly would have meant Arab domination to the detriment of the Jewish population and therefore counter to overall British policy. As a conse­ quence, In October, 1920, Samuel created an Advisory

Council, consisting of official and non-offlclal members

612/244/POL/2063/21, February 3, 1921, ISA. Por those sent to Lord Curson, see 2/244/P0L/2261/4, February 23, 1921, ISA. For those sent to Churchill, see Ibid., March 15, 1921, ISA.

6 2 League of Nations. Mandates, Report of the Executive Committee of the Arab Palestine Congress. C.3.m. 1921.VI (Geneva, April ITT T5TT), pp. 10-11. 175 6 3 equally apportioned and appointed. Of the latter, four were Muslima, three Christiana representing the Greek

Orthodox, Roman Catholic and Protaetant community, and three Jews. This was Samuel's interpretation of British policy for an easy transition from Ottoman to British rule by maintaining as much of Ottoman tradition as possible.

The multi-communal composition of the Council was in keeping with the traditional Ottoman millet^ organization for plural societies within the Empire.

The Council had its first meeting on October 6, 1920 with the Muslim representatives pressing for the election of representatives.^ Because it had no real power to

^Great Britain, High Commissioner for Palestine, Interim Report on the Civil Administration of Palestine, 1st July. l920-30th June, 1921, Cmd. 1499 (London: H.M.S.O., M ) , p. lTrr~FO""J7I75T7T7 July 12, 1920, PRO. Viscount Samuel, Memoirs (London: The Cresset Press, 1945), p. 167- 168. 64 The Ottoman application of the Qur'anlc concept of millet permitted non-Muslim subjects some degree of autonomy within the Empire, however, never equal that of the Muslim community. The idea of a national unit within the Empire was unacceptable to the interests of the Porte who pre­ ferred to maintain national groups in a subj act status. Kamel S. Abu Jaber, "The Millet System in the Nineteenth Century Ottoman Empire," The Muslim World, LV1I, No. 3 (July 1967), pp. 212-223; J. C. Hurewlts, "The Minorities in the Political Proceas," in Social Forces In the Middle East edited by Sidney N. Fisher (Ithaca," TT: Cornell University Press, 1955), p. 214.

6SFO/371/5124, October 10, 1920, PRO. For a list of attendees, see 2/51, ISA. 176 enact or veto legislation, the Arabs felt that it had no purpose and was useless and therefore failed to continue to participate in its deliberations.

Problems soon arose from the peculiarities of eastern personalities as much as from western institutions being forced upon an eastern community. On March 21, 1921,

Ramil al-Husayni, the Mufti of Jerusalem, died. He was considered by the British authorities as a friend to the

Mandatory. As Mufti, Kamil assisted in mediating the complexity of inter-communal relations with the Zionists.

The British, viewing the combination of religious rules and the recognition of the importance of the al-Husayni family in Palestinian politics, often broke tradition in order to bring greater patronage to Kamil. In this way they hoped for Husayni support in maintaining quietude.

Kamil was given a British decoration*** and appointed qadl in addition to his position as Mufti, thus dissolving the traditional separation of those two offices. Still more accolades were given to Kamil; the ecclesiastical title of

Grand Mufti (al-Mufti al-akbar) was attached to his name.*^

**In May, 1921, the mayors of Jerusalem, Tulkarm, and Jaffa, the Muftis of Acre and Safed and the qadl of Jerusalem received British decorations for services rendered. GO 733/3/21723, May 22, 1921, PRO.

*^Yehoshua Porath, "Al-HajJ Amin al-Husayni, Mufti of Jerusalem«Hls Rise to Power and the Consolidation of His Position," Aalan and African Studies. VII (1971), p. 128. N.B. The title preceded the accession of Haj Amin; 177

With Ramil's demise, a power struggle emerged to

fill the Illustrious and powerful post. The al-Husaynls,

naturally anxious to maintain the position within the

family ranks, put up al-Haj Muhammad Amin al-Husaynl,

Kamil's half-brother, as their choice. Rising to meet the

challenge of the Husaynis was the Nashashlbl clan and clear

rivals to the Husaynis; their choice was Shaykh Husam al-

Dln Jarallah.

Elections for the position of Mufti of Jerusalem

were held on April 12, 1921, and Shaykh Jarallah took the

most number of votes while Haj Amin was listed as fourth. 63 The intrigues within the Palestinian Muslim community were not Impervious to the Inclinations of British Mandatory

functionaries. The Assistant Chief Secretary (Political),

Ernest T. Richmond, supported the Haj Amin forces while the

Chief Secretary, Sir Wyndham Deedes, and the Legal Secre­

tary, Norman Bentwlch, counseled against such a move.

Samuel, as the High Commissioner, it seems, favored Haj Amin

since he spoke to him about the possibility of assuming

however, it was still a Britisn invention. Kedourie credits Storrs with the creation of such an honorific title* Elie Kedourie, "Sir Herbert Samuel and the Government of Palestine," Middle Eastern Studies. V, No* 1 (January 1969), p. *9. 68 Support for Haj Amin was achieved from outside of Palestine as well with recommendations from the Amir Abdullah and King Paysal being sent to the government. S/2S/30008, ISA. 178 69 the position prior to the election. Somehow Shaykh

Jarallah was pressured Into withdrawing his name as a

candidate.The upshot of the various moves was that

Haj Amin was appointed the Mufti of Jerusalem.

Common sense would dictate that Samuel would under

normal conditions be hostile to the likes of Haj Amin.

Hla support of him attests to his supreme loyalty to

British Interests. One of the strongest reasons, we would argue, for Samuel's desire to have Haj Amin In the post was to maintain the delicate balance between the Husaynis and the Nashashibie since the latter had recently aaaumed

the office of mayor of Jerusalem from a British-deposed

Husaynl--Musa Kazlm. But what the British in effect did was to theocratize what is more commonly a secular

69 Porath, "Hajj Amin," op. cit.. p. 133. This Is at slight variance with Kedourle's version which places much heavier emphasis on the efforts of Richmond, op. cit.. p. 52. Even after Haj Amin's "election" to the position, Richmond argued for a higher salary for him because of the historical preeminence of the Mufti of Jerusalem over all other llwas. 245/2287/POL, October 20, 1921, ISA.

^ I n the opinion of Sir Alec Seath Klrkbrlde, at the time British Military rapresentative, Es Salt, Transjordan, and an Arabist, "We simply told the two top names on the list they were off and that was that." Larry Collins and Dominique Laplerre, 0 Jerusalem! (New Yorkj Simon and Schuster, 1972), p. ?6, fn. Given in a personal interview with the authors. 179 movement, and thus belittle the requirements for politi­ cal institutionalization.

In 1920, also, Musa Kasim Pasha al-Huaayni was the

Mayor of Jerusalem and a major participant in the 1920 disturbances. At that. Sir Ronald Storrs, Governor of

Jerusalem, according to his memoirs, decided to dismiss

Musa Kasim and replace him with Raghib Bey Nashashlbl, an 7 2 ex-deputy of the Ottoman Parliament. Thus, control of the Jerusalem Municipal Council passed from the Husayni to

Porath gives us some of the original thinking of the British military occupation authorities that gave rise to this situation. With British control over Muslim Pales­ tine, the religious ties were severed with Istanbul. Therefore the Shaykh al-Islam* s control over the muftis and the sharlca courts, as well as the Minister of Evkaf over the management of the awqaf, ceased. This then required some bureaucratic substitute. "Hajj Amin," op. cit., p. 128. Regarding the hostility between the Husaynis and Nashashibls and the appointment: Lieutenant Colonel F. H. Klsch, the Zionist Organization Executive Director, met with Raghib Bey Nashashlbl at the Italian Consulate on November 11, 1929. The principal purpose of their discussion was the disturbance that took place In Jerusalem a few months prior. But Raghib also offered other information to Kiach. He told him that when Samuel proposed to make Haj Amin Mufti, Raghib told Samuel: "If you wish to honour the Husselnl family, give them my office [the mayoralty of Jerusalem] but do not put into the hands of this criminal type the religious power." Z4/2797/112, Secret, CZA.

^ orientations (London: Ivor Nicholson & Watson Ltd., 1937), pp. 390-391. This Is at some variance with Hurewltz's explanation In which he claims Musa Kazlm was dismissed by the British In 1919 for both his political activities and "his refusal to collaborata with the British." "Arab Politics In Palestine," Contemporary Jawish Record. V, No. 6 (December 1942), p. 599. 180 the Nashashlbl family.^

The upsurge In Husayni public prominence also meant closer observation by the government. During January and

Pebruary, 1921, Jamal Effendl al-Husaynl came under the suspicion and surveillance of the police because of his activities In organizing various Arab societies. It was reported that on January 20 Jamal suggested the reorganiza­ tion of Mutanda al-Adabi, amalgamating it with the Y.M.M.A.

If this were agreed to, then all Christian members would be expelled. However, because of the hostility of the Pales- 74 tlnlan Arabs toward the Christians, no action was taken.

The Christian sector in Arab Palestine, It should be remembered, played an important role in providing a united front against the Jews. Their psrtlclpatlon In Musllm-

Christlan societies provided a useful Image of complete opposition toward the Jews and Zionism In Palestine.

On May 29, 1921, the Fourth Palestine Arab Congress met In Jerusalem. Its 87 delegates were s composite of the

Muslim and Christian communities. They met to voice their continued opposition to the Zionist presence and policy in

^ T h e Municipal Council was made up of six memberst two Muslims, the Mayor being one; two Christians, one Latin and one Orthodox; and two Jews, one being Deputy Mayor. 74 2/152/2223/10, February 15, 1921, ISA. 181

Palestine.7^ A decision was nade to send a delegation of

eight to London to campaign against the Inclusion of the

Balfour Declaration In the Mandate Itself. The delegation

was also a cross section of the Musllm-Christian community,

headed by Musa Kazlm. It consisted of Haj Tewfiq Hammad

(vice president), Shlbll Jamal Effendl (secretary), Mucln

Bey al-Madl, Amin Bey at-Tamlmi, Ibrahim Effendl Shammas,

Ruhi Bey cAbd al-Hadl, Fuad Bey Samad, and Miss Francis

Newton, a prominent British Arabophile and resident of

Palestine. ^

While in London, the delegation voiced their objec­

tion to what was then the draft Constitution of Palestine

that was ultimately published in February, 1922. They also

urged the revocation of the Balfour Declaration, repeal of

British Administrative measures and re-establishment of

Ottoman law, and the suspension of all Jewish immlgra-

^ F o r a full list of delegates and a chronolog of events, see Z4/4112, June 7, 1921, CZA; CO 733/4, July 7, 1921, PRO. For other Information regarding the Congress, see 2/244/2261/POL, July 1921, ISA.

76CO 733/13/30956, July 1921, PRO. Faidy al-cAdaml, Musa's father, was in London at the time. His personal assessment of them was less than generous. According to him, "they were a pathetic body. Apart from their secretary, who was a tourist agent and spoke some English, none of them had had any contact with the West, or spoke a word of any lan­ guage other than Arabic or Turkish; they were living In ano­ ther world." Sir Geoffrey Furlonge, Palestine la Mjf. Country: The Story of Musa Alami (New York: Praeger, 1979"), p. 80. 77CO 733/14/42702, August 11-22, 1921, PRO. 182

After speaking with officials of the British govern­ ment In London, three of the delegates ventured off to 7 8 Geneva where the League of Nations was meeting and after a long wait met with Lord Balfour. However, nothing came of the meeting. The Palestinians had little to hope for In negotiating with the British. Many of the British offi­ cials had low opinions of Arab political acumen. For example. In a letter from Sir John E. Shuckburgh, head of the Middle East Department in the Colonial Office, to

Deedes, Samuel's Chief Secretary, he wrote of what was expected of the Palestinians after the government sent a proposal to them.

They will probably send a contentious reply or, if they agree to come here and discuss details, will relapse into their old obstructive attitude. We shall then have to tell them, it seems to me, that we have nothing more to say to them and that we intend to proceed with our policy on the lines that we have marked out for ourselves. I hope that they will then go back to Palestine.'9

As expected, they had little to show for all their effort when they returned to Palestine in September the following year.

7 8 The Congress established a permanent office in Geneva, the Syro-Palestine Delegation, headed by Amir Shaklb Arslan.

792/158/POL/l/ll, March 16, 1922. ISA. 183

It was during the course of the negotiations that

Churchllly the primary British participant, wrote to Deedea after receiving a letter from the Palestinian delegation.

Tou see how hopeless It all Is! Anyway it Is our intention to send once more an argumentative reply in order to detain them in the country until the "nervy" season in Palestine is over.

But the following year he published the first of many White

Papers presenting Britain's position and the government's 81 Interpretation of its commitments.

Samuel, predicting that the Palestinian Arab delega­ tion would return empty-handed, suggested the formation of an Arab Federation In a semi-official letter to Curion In

December, 1922. It was a critical period. The British government in Palestine now first began to realise the predicament in which it found itself. In a letter Samuel wrote to the Duke of Devonshire In December, 1922, the problem was stated succinctly!

The sections of the Arabs who are polltlcal-mlnded and vocal, are, in large majority, openly discontented.

®°2/158/POL/1/15, April 22, 1922, ISA. 81 Great Britain, Colonial Office, Correspondence with the Palestine Arab Delegation and the Zionist Organisation, Cnd. 1700 (London! H.N.S.O., 1922). Churchill disclaimed, in pert, the Balfour Declaration Insofar as a British com­ mitment toward the establishment of a Jewish state in Pales­ tine. Instead what was called for was a cultural extension of world Jewry in a National Home In Palestine. This was not to mean, however, that a Jewish State could not ultimately exist in Palestine. 184

The Jews feel themselves seriously hampered la their work of development} they regard the future as insecure; they are most eager to arrive at an understanding with their neighbors...Moslem hostility anywhere Is an embarrassment; the risk of disturbance Involves expen­ diture upon the garrison, and considerations of national finances demand absolutely the reduction of expenditures to the minimum.

Samuel continued with his proposal reviewing and revising the proposal of Sir Mark Sykes for dealing with "the Arab question," [Sykea-Plcot Agreement] never mentioning It directly or specifically, and also a modification of his proposal put forth In 1920 at the time of his appointment, but made Impossible after the expulsion of Amir Faysal from

Damascus and the assumption of French administration In

Syria.

The proposal was that the British government would promote the formation of a Confederation of Arab States.

The central unit would be the Hedjax, Palestine, and

Transjordan. France was to have been consulted and invited to bring in Syria. Iraq would then have been encouraged to join Initially or after some waiting. Ibn Sacud and the other Arab princes were to be brought into the planning.

The constitutional organs were a council with a president, with delegates appointed by the adhering governments. The president of the council was to be the King of the Hedjas,

®^2/128, ISA. Similar santlments were expressed in a letter a few days before from Samuel to Devonshire. CAB. 24/140; FO 371/8998/206, December 8, 1922, PRO. 185

acting through one of hla sons as the deputy. The council would meet successively In convenient locations: Jeddah,

Baghdad, Jerusalem, and Damascus, all Important Islamic

cities. The executive power would remain with the govern­ ments of the several states except where It was necessary

to establish joint boards. The plan was discussed among

Devonshire, Samuel, and Curzon. Curzon felt that the

Initiative was the Arabs', while Devonshire was skeptical

of the whole deal; ultimataly the entire Idea was dropped.83

In this plan Samuel attempted to insure political stability

In Palestine In addition to strengthening the Mandatory's

position with the pro-government forces of the Palestinian

community. Samuel hoped that by getting the Palestinians

involved with their culturally affinitive neighbors their negativism toward Zionism would diminish and thus make the

Q i Mandatory's job easier.

In 1920 the Palestine government convened a confer­

ence of Muftis and Muslim notables to develop an organiza­

tion and constitution for an authoritative Muslim body.

The government thereupon issued an order creating a Supreme

Muslim Council (al-maj11a al-lalaml al-acla). This new

83Ibid.

84 The idea of an Arab confadaration of statas to include Palestine was again brought up by Samuel with London In December, 1922, but again rejected. POL/435/1, ISA. 186

body was lamedlately met with adamant hoatlllty by the

Muallm coaaunlty because of the Council's lack of complete

autonomy. Therefore, another commission was appointed

which drafted a new constitution and in December the

government Issued a revised order. 85

In the elections for the Council's president, also

called the Ral's al-culama', In January, 1922, Haj Amin

al-Huaaynl was elected for life and four of his adherents,

Muhammad Murad (Haifa), Haj Sacid Shawa (Gaza), Abd al-

Latlf Salah (Nablus), and Abdullah Dajanl (Jaffa) were

elected members for four-year terms each. (However, they

remained in office until the Supreme Muslim Council was disbanded In 1937). This was to prove to be an extremely powerful body. 86 The awqaf held large sums of money and

8^By the order of 1921. Theoretically this was a secular body elected by the Muslim community at large. It was to maintain control over religious and legal affairs, and supervise educational and welfare inetltutlons. Their functions Included: control of the awoaf. operation of the aharlca. and maintenance of mosques and nominations of Imam, khatlb, and wacir. See Shim°onl, op. cit., Chapter 5.

®8Slr Ronald Storra, as the District Governor, Jerusalem-Jaffa District, noted early In 1924, soon after the Council was formed, that It uaed Its rallgloua position to make resign, tranafer from their posts or dismissed for unconvincing reasons those qadis. manure of awqaf. or their subordinates who did not share or even advocate the politi­ cal views of the Council (this means Haj Amin). Storrs felt this was intrinsically Islamic since It was the mobil­ isation of the faithful to combat another movement. 242/POL/18/25, ISA. 187 real estate which was converted and transferred to other 87 sources for various revolutionary purposes*

The importance of control of the Council must have

seemed so also to the government which placed a rigorous 88 stipulation on whom the electorate could be. The second­ ary electors were to be those elected at previous Ottoman

®^The waqf fund administered large funds indeed. Total Income: £ 65,156,000 Total expenditure: 65,186,000

Salaries of the President and Members £ 2,186,000 Waqf Secretariat 9,080,000 Salaries of district staffs 4.478.000 Traveling Expenses, President and Members 1.094.000 Allotment to repair Mosque of Omar 10,000,000 Allotment for Muslim University 5,000,000 Actually the money was in the hands of the al-Husaynl family, and it was not always used as publicly declared. Although the Palestine Arab delegation was granted a loan of £600 from funds appropriated by the Council to maintain the Muslim Orphanage in Palestine, the loan was never repaid. In the opinion of Leonard Stein, Political Secre­ tary of the Zionist Organization in London, the loss of funds came about through the falsification of accounts for expenditure under the heading that funds were made available for political purposes. S25/4387, May 23, 1923, CZA. The Council received considerable support from the Palestine government also. For example, in the annual report of the Public Works Department for 1925-26, only £62 out of £1727 was spent on furniture for the department, while the rest went to pay for the furniahings of other government depart­ ments, Including the Council Palestine and Hear Eaat Economic Magazine. IV, No. 15 (November 15, 1929), p. 465.

88 Elections were conducted along Ottoman lines by primary and secondary elections. The electors in each village and quarter voted for secondary electors, and these electors then were put into colleges, each of which voted for a member of the Council. Voting rights were given to every male Palestinian 25 years or older unless disquali­ fied for several reasons. Turkish Constitutional Law 188 elections in May, 1914. Fifty-three of the 56 electors net on January 9, 1922. But the High Commissioner*a pro­ posal failed when Raghib Nashashlbl, in an attempt to forestall a Husaynl victory, tried to postpone the election and he and five of his supporters withdrew from the meeting 89 in protest.

On July 24, 1922, the British Mandate over Palestine was approved by the League of Nations. The following month saw the passage of the Palestine Order-ln-Councll,

August 10, 1922, which provided for a Legislative Council; this was to be a replacement for the old Advisory Council, a suggestion made to the Palestinians by the Colonial

Secretary, Winston Churchill, in June. The newly proposed 90 Council was to have eleven official and twelve unofficial members elected according to Ottoman Law and in compliance provided for one member of the legislative body to repre­ sent 50,000 male Inhabitants. But if the number of males in a district (sanjak) was over 25,000 and less than 50,000, it was entitled to elect one deputy. Twelve was a more liberal distribution. The concept of primary and secondary electors was also based on the Turkish electoral system recognising a general Ignorance of the fellahln masses. Therefore they elected whom they knew and respected best as a secondary elector who, it was assumed, knew better who the best individual was to be a primary elector. Secondary electors were divided into confessional colleges. The member of each community had to select one individual within their own community, except for lesser communities, i.e., Druse. 242/POL/452/1, March 13, 1922; 242/POL/452/3, August 16, 1922, ISA. 89 Kedourie, "Sir Herbert Samuel,1* op. cit., pp. 58-59. ^Kedourie claims ten, Ibid., p. 59. 189 with Article 2 of the Mandate, Including eight Muslins, two Jews and two Christians.

The proposal was refused and opposed by the Pales­ tinian Arabs who denanded conplete donination over the government officials and the Jews. When the government announced that elections for the Legislative Council were to be held, the Fifth Palestine Arab Congress was convoked in Nablus on August 22, 1922, and headed by Jamal Effendl Q 1 al-Husayni. A Other factors that lent themselves to

Palestinian opposition were for one the Kemaliat victories in Turkey which were received by the Palestinian Arab population in September, 1922, with great satisfaction.

There was the hope that perhaps the Treaty of Sevre could be revised and thereby the status of Palestine changed.

In this regard, several efforts were registered to gain

92 support from the Turks. Then there was also the resig­ nation of Lloyd George's coalition government replaced by the government of Bonar Law with the Duke of Devonshire in the Colonial Office.

Therefore, when the new Palestinian Arab Congress met, it protested against the new constitution as being

91 CO 733/25, September 8, 1922, PRO.

92CO 733/24/2, August 4, 1922; FO 371/8998/206, December 8, 1922; CO 733/28, Appendix A, December 10, 1922, PRO. inadequate for aafeguardlng the natural righte and national

Inspirations of the Palestinians.^ It also worked vigor­ ously against tha proposal forcing all the qualified par­ ticipants to withdraw and ultimately the proposal was abandoned. Jamal Effendl jousted with the Mandatory, showing them his mettle. He couched his objectives In purely legal terms, claiming that Article 23 of the Pales­ tine Order-ln-Council provided for the general election of members of the Legislative Council to be held not more than six months after the publication of the Order in the

Official Gazette. But, according to Jamal, the Official

Gazette also noted that the period ended on March 1, 1923.

However, the extension of the period of Secondary Electors to the 12th and holding the elections "in the last third"

[sic.] of the month was a contradiction of the Order. He further brought to the attention of the High Commissioner that the Nebl Musa festival began on the 30th and he didn't 94 want bad news to be published too close to that fastlval.

Deedes, the Chief Secretary, wrote Jamal Effendl that a proclamation had bean signed and was plannad to be published in the forthcoming Official Gazette providing

93 242/POL/452/38, Pebruary 27, 1923, ISA.

94242/POL/452/27, March 3, 1923, ISA. 191

under Article 57 that tha parlod undar Articla 23 should ba

axtendad to nina aonths. Alao tha parlod for receiving

noalnatlons for tha secondary alactora for the Legislative

Council was extended bacauaa tha parlod of eight days ori­

ginally found In the Proclaaatlon of February 6 proved to

ba inadequate. Jaaal alao wanted to know who the second­ ary electora noalnatcd were, and when the governaent would 9 6 publish their naaes. The result of all the deaands of

Arab pressure was to extend the election period froa six

to eight aontha after the Order-ln-Councll and Article 23 was aaended to read that the secondary electors for the

first general election of the Legislative Council should begin not aore than six aonths aftar publication of the

Order In the Gasette and the election should be held two aonths after that.97

Considerable evidence was later uncovered Indicating

intiaidation by the Husayni-doainated Mualia Christian 98 Association ussd to keep participants avay* Undoubtedly,

95242/POL/452/3Q, March 8V 1923, ISA.

96242/POL/452/34, March 6, 1923, ISA.

97242/F0L/452/37, March 9, 1923, ISA.

242/POL/452/105, June, 1923, ISA. The aatter was even discussed In the House of Coaaons. 242/POL/452/98, May 18, 1923, ISA. For specific accusations by the govern- aent, see 242/POL/452/81, April 16, 1923, ISA. The 192 99 th« Supreme Muslim Council v n also Involved. In any

case, the elections took place in early 1923, though not

widely representative of the Arab community. The proportion

of votes cast to the number of primary voters on the regis­

ters in the areas in which voting took place was: Muslim,

182; Jews, 50Z; and Christians, 5.5Z. There were alao a

intransigence of the Arabs was given support by Richmond from within the government. Harry C. Luke, District Governor, assured Richmond that the provisions of paragraph 3 of the Proclamation of February 7 were observed. The register of Primary Electors was duly published in several areas for a fortnight as provided, but no objections were received by the returning officers, either from Christians, Jews, or Muslims on the Register of Voters. 242/POL/452/75, April 10, 1923, ISA. However, Richmond still wanted to know whether the names of candidates for election as second­ ary electors was made public so that a primary elector could object to their nomination. 242/POL/452/80/13/4/23, ISA.

9^It Was generally believed by the Palestinian govern­ ment that the Council actively supported the efforts of the Husayni-domlnated Arab Executive. 2/172/POL/18/7, December 7, 1923, ISA. This position was also maintained by indivi­ duals who held minor appointments in the Council and whose tenure in office was insecure "unless they displayed enthusiasm for the 'National Cause,'" but little hard proof could be provided. 2/172/POL/18/19, December 13, 1923, ISA. Nevertheless it was reported that the mufti of Gaza, Mohammed Sacld Husaynl, had been taking a very active role in politics, though if there was any connection to the Council, it wasn't clear. 2/172/P0L/18/20, December 14, 1923, ISA. cAbdullah Mukhless, the secretary of the National Party objected to the activities of the Council in an official letter to the government. In it he stated that the Council used its employees, muftis and qadla. mamurs of awqaf. masuns of marriagas, imams and khatibs for preparing mazbatas and obtaining elgnatures, thereupon from villagers and townspeople confirming the Executive Committee and protesting the National Party. 2/172/POL/18/7, November 27, 1923, ISA. 193

number of unopposed returns. The total nunber of secondary

electors actually elected

TABLE XVII

SECONDARY ELECTORS ELECTED, 1923

Muslim 107 out of 663

Jews 79 out of 79

Chriatian 19 out of 59

Druse 8 out of 8

Total 213 out of 809

The failure of the elections was later accounted for by

Samuel in a formal government paper.

The High Commissioner still wanted some sort of

representative government. He now began to think in terms

of an Advisory Council of 12 nominated members and 10 102 official members. He requested advice from Roberln

Drayton, the Attorney General, as to what could be done

legally under the Palestine Order-in-Councll and the

Palestine Legislative Council Election Order of 1922. Both

pieces of legislation were passed on the assumption that

100Z4/1454, CZA; 242/P0L/452/76, April 11, 1923, ISA.

2®2Great Britain, High Commissioner for Palestine, Palestine. Papers Relating to the Election for the Pales­ tine Legislative Council. 1923. Cmd. 1889 (London* H.M.S.O., T?TJ). 102CO 733/46, June 15, 1923, PRO. 194 the Paleetlnlene would participate In electlona. What

followed wee an Order-ln-Council, Mary 29, 1923, In which the elections were annulled, postponing the setting up of

the Legislative Council. A new statement, the Palestine

Amendment Order-ln-Councll, 1923, was Issued the nember- shlp of an Advisory Council provided for 12 representatives for the population: eight Muslins, two Christians, and

two Jews, It was to have an added feature, an Arab Agency sinilar to the Jewish Agency, provided for under the pro­ visions of Article 4 of the Mandate. Nine of those invited to participate accepted; but seven later withdrew when pressure was brought to bear on then by those elenents that upheld the policy of non-cooperation with the Mandatory.

10^242/POL/452/73, ISA. The Palestine Order-ln- Councll provided for the constituting of a Legislative Council of 22 nenbers in addition to the High Connlsaloner. Ten of these were to be official and 12 unofficial. The High Connlssloner, as President of the Council, had the casting vote in case of a tie vote. This could not happen though in a full session with everyone voting. The Legis­ lative Council therefore had an unofficial majority. Fur­ thermore, the unofficial members were to be elected accord­ ing to the legislation of tha tines. Articles 3, 5, 12, and 14 of the Legislative Elections Order created a problem since Article 14 did not rule out the possibility of the proposer and seconder of one candidate consenting to the nomination of another candidate. Technically, then, two Christians could be nominated by 19 Christian electors.

*®*Grsat Britain, Colonial Office, Palestine. Correspondence with the High Commissioner on the Proposed Foundation of the Arab Agency, Cmd. 1989 (London: H.M.S.O., 1923). Among those invited to participate were: Raghib 195

The new proposal for eelf-government egeln wee

refused et the Sixth Areb Congress. The Palestine (Amend- aent) Order-ln-Councll, 1923, was therefore Issued placing

the administrative authority in the office of the High

Commissioner.X0^ The Sixth Palestine Arab Congress was

held at Jaffa between June 16-20, 1923, to discuss several

matters. It elected Musa Kasim as its president again and

adopted resolutions thanking both Muslim and Christian members who resigned from the Advisory Council, elected

economic and political committees, and decided to reject

the negotiated, but not yet signed, Anglo-Arab Treaty, as

it regarded Palestine. The treaty did little to satisfy

the Palestinian demands for autonomy and only strengthened

the position of King Husayn in the Arabian Peninsula by

guaranteeing the Independence ea well as the areas of Iraq and Transjordan.X0** The Palestinians objected vociferously

to the Husayn treaty and telegrammed their feelings to the

Bey Nashashibl, Aref Dajanl, Suleyman Tuqan, Amin al-HadlT, and lama 11 al-Husayni. Kedourle, &B.. cit. f p. 61. The Mufti was instrumental in this effort announcing that any Muslim participating in the election could not be burled in a Muslim cemetery. [Lieutenant Colonel] Frederick H. Klsch, Palestine Diary (London: Victor Gollancs, 1938), p. 308.

X0^Samuel Dele Myres, Jr., "Community Development in Palestine," Arnold Foundation Studies In Public Affairs. I, Mo. 2 (Fell 1932), pp. 2 ^ 9 . X06CO 733/46, June 22, 1923, PRO; 2/171/POL/17, ISA. 196

Xing. His reply, which c u t on June 19, was curt: "To

Muss Kasim Pasha-Jaffa. I beg that you will think good of

Objections were also raised about land ownership and

sales. Jamal Effendl noted thet there was an article of the

Mandate which permitted the High Commissioner one-third of

the government bid. He claimed that this land was being

given to the Jews through the Rutenberg Concession, the

granting of Caesaria lands and the exploitation of minerals

In the Dead Sea.

Lord Plumer succeeded Samuel as High Commissioner in

1925 (until 1928). Plumer was not enthusiastic about a

Legislative Council, but attempted to Introduce practical 108 accomplishments In local affairs. He was primarily

Interested in maintaining order In Palestine.At th®

Colonel Kisch In a report to the Zionist Organisa­ tion in London, dated June 27, 1923, reported the telegram as: "I hope you will have confidence In me." 2/171/17/4, July 1923, ISA.

lOScreat Britain, Colonial Office, Report by the British Government on the Administration of Palestine and Trans-Jordan for the Year 1930, Colonial Ho. 59 (London: H. M.S.O., 1431), p. 26. Toward the end of his tenure his Chief Secretary, Sir Stewart Symes, In a memorandum suggested a move toward the institution of a Legislative Council, noting the growing dissension and dissatisfaction among the intel­ ligentsia and growing constitutionalism among neighboring Arab states. CO 733/155, April 1, 1928, PRO.

109 Norman Bentwlch, England in Palestine (London: Regan, Paul, Trench, Trubuer and Co., 1 5 1 1 7 1 pT 168. 197 end of 1926v Plumer Introduced the Municipal Franchise

Ordinance. Thla was a British improvement on the Ottoman millet system. But the Palestinian Arabs failed to exploit the opportunity. (The Jews, however, developed the Vaad

Leumi (a National Council) and an elected Assembly.)

The order that Plumer wanted was interrupted in

April, 1925, when Lord Balfour came to Palestine to parti­ cipate in the dedication ceremonies of the new Hebrew

University in Jerusalem. As expected, the Arab Executive called for a day of mourning and a general strike.From

Palestine, Balfour journeyed to Damascus, where because of intense hostility the French authorities deemed it advisable to move up his departure data.*^ Events in Palestine, it

11°C0 733/92, April 21, 1925, PRO; Storrs, oju clt.. pp. 506-507. Samuel, Memoirs, op. cit.. p. 175.

^ * I n interviews between Tahir al-Husayni, son of Kamil al-Husayni, and Colonel F. H. Klsch, of the Zionist Commission, on April 30 and May 16, 1925, the former repor­ ted that the Damascus incident or demonstrations against Balfour had been organized by Haj Amin who had sent between £400 and £500 to Jenab al Kurd! and Tewflq Jana Yusuf al Isa, the proprieter of Allfba. The money, which was from Supreme Muslim Council funds, was sent by bedouins through Trans­ jordan. George Antonlus, at the time a worker of the Department of Education, had given the Mufti information as to the intended visit of Balfour to Damascus. Antonius, it was reported, always informed the Mufti about governmental action favorable to the Jews. S25/10018, Secret, May 19, 1925, ISA. For a description of Balfour's visit to both Jerusalem and Damascus, see: Norman and Helen Bentwlch, Mandate Memories, 1918-1948: From the Balfour Declaration to the Establishment of Israel (New York: SchockeiTBooks, 196TT, pp. 101-103. 198 was shown, were controllable by the powerful Husaynls as well as by the government In Jerusalem or London.

While the Husaynls were In a position to manipulate events In Palestine distinct from the legal authority of the British government, they were only one of the leaders.

The unorthodox manner In which the Husaynls achieved domi­ nance of legally constituted institutions in Palestine further intensified the factional dispute between them and the Naahashlbls. Those who were either a part of or sup­ ported them became known as the Councilites (al-nalllslyyin) so named for their control of the Supreme Muslim Council, while their antagonists became the Oppositionists (al- mucarldin) . In 1925, a preparatory meeting was held for the new electors for the Council by the secondary electors, in accordance with Article 4 of the Order Constituting the

Council which completed the draft of the Rais al cUlema 112 Election Law.

Norman Bentwlch, the Attorney General, noted that the proposal had a section setting up the election of the four members of the Council, to be held at the beginning of 1926, which departed somewhat from the Ottoman Election Lav of

Deputies (Article 5 of the Statutes of the Council).

112 2/190/POL/151/A/6/1, August 18, 1925, ISA. 200

The Nesheshibl forces met together on August 24 to decide upon their strategy and called upon the government 115 to alter the situation. Even though they walked out, they continued to object to the fact that the government took the occasion to change the electoral laws, substitu­ ting the Municipal Council for the Administrative Council.

This was done actually because four secondary electors of each kasa, vis-a-vis those who elected the present members of the Council, supervised the elections with the addition to six others when necessary if those electors felt it convenient

Elections for four new members were conducted in

January, 1926, and supervised by the Council itself. This led to "irregularities" and it was voided. The High

Commissioner then promulgated an ordinance authorising his office to select the members of the Council until such time as new elections would be held; however, no elections took place;*** Instead, they were appointed.**®

11^2/190/P0L/151/A/6/II, September 25, 1925, ISA.

1162/190, September 27, 1925, ISA.

***Great Britain. A Survey of Palestine: Prepared in December 1945 and January 1946 for tKe Information of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry (Jerusalem: Government Printer, 194&V, Vol. II, pp. 902-903. 118 The members appointed on January 4, 1926, were; Shaykh Mohammed Effendl Murad, HaJ Sacld Effendl Shews, Amin Effendl at-Tamlml, Abdel Rahman Effendl al Tajl. Z4/2797/94, CZA. 201

Not only membership in the Council, but also tha praaidancy of tha Council, van in dlaputa In 1926. Thara had baen no changa in tha Council*a constitution ainca 1921 and tha mucaridin vantad a changa; to be specific, they wanted a three-year elected tenure for tha president.

Furthermore, they demanded tha stipulation that the presi­ dent be neither a Mufti nor a Council official, and thirdly that the administration of the awqaf be decentralized. But again, since the mucaridln were in the minority, the final draft of the committee's report did not carry these propo­ sitions .

Instead, the legislative proposal, when published the following year in the Supreme Muslim Sharia Council

Ordinance of 1926, provided for a nine-year elected term of office for the president. But the president could remain in office for an additional nine-year term if the Council hadn't demanded his dismissal. They also recommended that the president of the Council should always be combined with

Shlmconl, op. cit.. p. 78. A committee to advise the Council on the revision of the constitution was created on May 16, 1926 after an order was promulgated on May 14. The chairman was HaJ Amin. The membership included: Abdullah Effendl Dajani, Amer Effendl cAbd al-Hadl, Raghlb Effendl Imam, Muin Effendl Madl, Mohammed All Effendl Tamimi, Amin Effendl cAbd al-Hadl; Advisors on Sharlca law were: Shaykh Tewflq al Telbl and Shaykh Musa al Budelri. On June 16, 1927 Raghlb Effendl al-Dajani was appointed vice Abdullah Effendl al-Dajani deceased. Z4/2797/94, CZA. 202 120 the office of the Mufti of Jerusalem. It was proposed also that the government not be able to interfere with the

Council's appointment of qadis (religious judges). The

legislation was not acted upon, however, because of the disturbances that occurred in 1929 and which Involved many of the persons involved with the legislative drafting.

Nothing really changed until October 1, 1937, when the

Mufti was dismissed as president of the Supreme Muslim 121 Council and was replaced by a three-man commission.

Welzmann was always Interested in broadening the base of the Zionist Organization with the inclusion of non-Zionist Jews who were interested in the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine, in accordance with

the Mandate. Ever since February, 1923, Welzmann had attempted to promote a Jewish Agency among various Zionists.

In 1928 the World Zionist Executive, which acted with the

[British] Government on National Home Affairs, took the new

*2®The fear of the Interlocking office-holding was also prompted by the position held by Jamal Effendl who was both the Secretary of the Supreme Muslim Council and a Joint Secretary of the Palestine Arab Executive.

*2*0n October 16, 1937, the Officer Administering the Government promulgated tha Defense (Muslim Awqaf) regula­ tions, 1937, empowering tha High Commissioner to set up an administrative commission. The commission was made up of two British officials, one of whom acted as the chairman, and one Muslim. In 1945-46 it was made up of one British offi­ cial and two Muslims, and from August, 1946, three Muslins. 122 title of Jewish Agency.

Once the Jewish Agency wee established as a purely

Zionist organization, there was the desire to expand It.

In 1927, a Joint Palestine Survey Commission was set up by

Louis Marshal, chairman of the American Jewish Congress and

Welzmann as the president of the World Zionist Organization

(WZO), to look Into the possibility of developing a Jewish national home in Palestine. The report that the Commission submitted concluded that the WZO had gained a good start In

Its goal but needed further assistance.This then lent support to the Zionists to persuade non-Zionists to parti­ cipate in an enlarged Jewish Agency. In the summer of 1929 the Sixteenth Zionist Congress met at Zurich and endorsed the provisions for an extended Jewish Agency.

Responding to this development within Zionist circles a Seventh Arab Congress was convened In Jerusalem on June

20, 1928, after being postponed for five years. It was attended by 300 delegates who demanded the creation of a

Palestine Arab parliament. One positive result was the

^^Although the Mandate called for the creation of a Jewish agency by Article 4, it was Weizmann's intent to get an all-Jewish representative body first. 123 ESCO, Foundation for Palestine, Palestine: A Study of Jewish, Arab, and British Policies (New Haven, Conn.t Tale University Press, 1947), Vol. I, p. 379. 199

Article 19 of the Order Constituting the Council prescribed

that the Committee of Control for the elections should be

composed of the elected members of the Administrative

Council and members of the Municipal Council, with the

President of the Municipal Council presiding. Instead, the

Supreme Muslim Council proposed the controlling committee

Itself be elected in each Kaza, thereby increasing the 113 possibility for Husaynl control.

At the meeting the majlisiyyln proposed that the

supervision of the forthcoming elections be left to the

secondary electors, since the Husaynl forces were in a

majority in that body rather than in the city councils

which the Nashashibls dominated, but as provided for in the

Council's constitution. The Nashashlbl forces, of course,

objected and offered a counter resolution. When the vote

on the amendment was to come up, they demanded that suffrage

be denied to those who were salaried from the Council or whose general welfare was dependent upon it; this affected

23 of the 56 members. The majlisiyyln naturally opposed

this, and since they were in the majority, the motion was c 114 voted down with the muaridln walking out.

1132/190/151/A/6/3, September 4, 1925, ISA. 114 « Shlmconi, op. cit.. pp. 78-80. 204 creation of an enlarged Executive Conittee with Musa Kazim al-Husaynl reelected as Its president, Jamal Effendl al-

Husaynl, cAvnl Bey cAbd al-Hadl, and Ellas Mogannam as secretaries.

Shortly after the arrival of Sir John Chancellor as the new High Commissioner, a delegation from the Arab

Congress approached him with the request for a representa­ tive and constitutional assembly.^24 Two months later,

Chancellor brought the issue up of a Legislative Council before the Executive Council of the Palestine Administra­ tion.

They approved of the Idea stipulating though that

It be a nominated body.22* Thereupon confidential conver­ sations were held between Musa Kasim, Raghlb Bey, and Ruhi

Bey cAbd al-Hadl, and Harry Luke, Chief Secretary, during 12 6 May, 1929. The Palestinians agreed to the proposal as long as they had an unofficial majority of one vote and the body was set up on the basis of the 1922 Legislative

Council. 22^

124CO 733/167/67105, January 15, 1929, PRO. 125 CO 814/25, March 3, 1929, PRO.

126CO 733/167/67105, June 14, 1929, PRO.

127CO 733/167/67105, June 12, 1929, PRO. 205

In June, 1929, Chancellor submitted his proposal to 1 28 the Colonial Secretary. The 1929 disturbancea put an

abrupt halt to the discussions, but Chancellor nevertheless

attempted to reopen discussions this time providing for the

1922 plan as the basis providing for a partially elected

Council.

If the 1929 disturbances were murderous for the Jews

they had a decidedly different result for the Husaynls.

It was clear assurance to Haj Amin and the Husaynl family

that their control over the Palestinian Arab community was

near total. Chancellor's administration were anxious to

maintain reasonable relations with the Palestinians and so whatever implications could be drawn to their Involvement

in the disturbances failed to be explained in any detail.

The Shaw Commission of Inquiry into the civil disorder

claimed the oft-quoted causes for the Initiation of Arab violence: Zionist land acquisition and Jewish coloniza­

tion.

The Shaw Commission's findings, the persuasion of

129 Great Britain, Commission on Palestine Disturb­ ances of August, 1929. Report of the Commission on the Palestinian Disturbances of August. 1 9 ^ , Cmd. 3537 (London: H.M.S.O., 1930). 206

Chancellor,130 and the newly elected Labour Government and

Ramsay MacDonald prompted the Arab Executive to send another delegation to London to negotiate with the British.

(The delegation was headed by Muea Kasim, the President of the Arab Executive, and Included Haj Amin, Mufti of

Jerusalem, Raghlb Bey, mayor of Jerusalem, cAwnl Bey, Jamal

Effendl, and Alfred Rock.)

Chancellor now found himself in a perplexing role.

Desirous of maintaining the support of the Palestinian leadership, as the head of the government he also had to protect the Jewish community. The Arab Executive faced him and threatened to bring about a boycott of the government 131 which Chancellor tried to prevent. The Executive Com­ mittee then demanded the suspension of Jewish immigra­ tion.13^ This last demand pushed Chancellor beyond the threshold which he would accept pressure from either com­ munity. Chancellor met the challenge by declaring that tha

Collective Punishment Ordinance applied to the entire

The Arab delegation was advised and encouraged to go to London by Chancellor. But he was soon sorry to sae so many "extremists" In its body. J. M. N. Jeffries, Palestine: The Reality (London: Longmans, 1939), pp. 618- ZW.

131C0 733/175, October 5, 1929, PRO. 132 CO 733/163, October 17, 1929, PRO. 207 133 country.

The pressure that the elites placed on Chancellor was

clearly to Insure their own position by creating the inage of Palestinian strength facing up to the British. But the

intensification of political radicalism among various

groups in Palestine tended to strain whatever control the

elites had over the masses. The Arab Executive met on

October 12 to consider calling a general strike which was ■ A I demanded by youthful militants. The Committee was able

to placate the vociferous demands, but as cAwnl Bey told

Chancellor, "the Executive Committee in their actions are not always their own masters, but have to yield to the 135 pressures of their followers.

The Arab delegation reached London on March 30 and met the following day with the Prime Minister and Lord

Fassfield, the Colonial Secretary. Chancellor had reported

that the situation in Palestine was under control,*3^ and

therefore the British tried to dissuade the Arabs from their

13*C0 733/175, October 12, 1929, PRO.

i35CO 733/163, October 19, 1929, PRO.

136PO 371/14486, April 2, 1930, PRO. 208 137 demend for self-government. Thla vaa tha British offar

In a coaproalse In return for concessions on Jewish immi-

gration restrictions and land sales. This caae out In

lnforaal meetings. One of the concessions was the appoint­

ment of the Hope-Simpson mission. But the negotiations

broke down over the question of the Palestinian's right to

initiate legislation in the Legislative Council. Passfleld,

speaking before the government, was prepared to grant

further concessions, but the Palestinians were not satisfied.

Yacqub Farraj was instructed by the delegation to begin

disturbances in Palestine to be coordinated with similar

demonstrations by Muslima in India against the British.

On May 12, 1930, the Palestine Executive of the

Jewish Agency was officially notified that the Palestine

administration had granted some 3,300 immigration certifi­

cates of labor immigrants for the period of April to

September, 1930. But only two days later, on May 14,

Chancellor, on instructions from the Colonial Secretary, withdrew the certificates grant and suspended all further

immigration until the dispatch of Sir John Hope-Simpson to survey the extent of landlessness and unemployment among

137 For the Palestinians' demands, see CO 733/187/ 77105, May 14, 1930, PRO.

*^®Jeffries, op. cit.. p. 260. 209 139 the Palestinians. The fornal results of these meetings,

though, was the publication of the report by Sir John Hope- 140 Simpson, and baaed upon a British White Paper known as

the Passfleld White Paper.343

Passfleld*a policy statement went far to appease the

Arabs' demands by curtailing Jewish Immigration and land

sales to Zionists. However, the uproarious reaction*-42 of

the Zionists led to pressure on the British to the extent

that they were forced to meet with Zionist leaders In an attempt to moderate the counterdemands•343 The Palestinians,

for their part, saw MacDonald's action as a result of

Zionist pressure in evidence In London.

In the end, Ramsay MacDonald was moved to write to

Welzmann on November 8, 1930, in order to "exchange views."

This went on for several months, resulting In another letter

139CO 733/188/77113/1, May 19, 1930, PRO. 140 Great Britain, Colonial Office, Palestine. Report on Immigration. Land Settlement and Development, Cmd. 3686- 3687 (London: H.M.S.O., 1930).

*-43Great Britain, Colonial Office, Palestine. State­ ment of Policy by His Maieatv1s Government In the United Kingdom. Cmd. 3692 (London: H.M.S.O., 1930); for the back­ ground to the drafting of this, see CO 7 33/183/77050/DA, November 11, 1930, PRO.

142C0 733/188/77113/1, May 17, 1930, PRO.

343Actually the British wanted to maintain the friend­ ship of both communities. CO 733/188/77113/1, May 22, 1930, PRO. 210 froa Priae Minister MacDonald to Weixaann on February 13,

1931. MacDonald held that the British Intended to uphold their obligation to the Jews throughout the world as well as those in Palestine, as bound by the Mandate, and that the concept of the Jewish National Hoae was still current as indicated by approval of further land sales and immi­ gration.144

The Arabs called MacDonald's report the "Black

Letter," and their hostility was vented in discussions with

Chancellor.14^ The Palestinians continued to lose faith in

Britain and thereupon turned to other leaders in both the

Arab and Muslim worlds for support.14** In January, 1931, already Lord Passfleld had written to Chancellor indicating the pressure of the government was feeling by the indigna­ tion felt by the Zionists which would force them to notify

Welzmann of some moderation on the part of the govern ment.14^ Passfleld, of course, realised that this would

144 Chaim Weismann, Trial and Krrort An Autobiography of Chaim Weismann (New York:' Schocken Books, 1^46), pp. 330- 336. This was for Welzmann a decisive movement In the Zionist movement. Ibid., p. 415. 145 CO 733/197, February 17, 1931, PRO. The moderate's position was made precarious and the extremist's were strengthened since it appeared that the British were in league with tha Zionists. Chancellor, himself, was very displeased with the latter also. CO 733/197/87050, February 13, 1931, PRO.

146CO 733/197, February 21, 1931, PRO. 147 CO 733/197, January 9, 1931, PRO. 211 place Chancellor In a difficult position, which he conunl- 148 cated to Chancellor.

In November, 1930, the government announced that It was going to revise Its White Paper. Even with this abrupt policy statement an astonishing passivity pervaded the 149 Palestinian community. There was clearly an undercurrent of Arab discontent but also a lack of direction and unity.

In an attempt to further build upon Husaynl control, an all-lslamlc Congress was held In Jerusalem In December,

1931, called by HaJ Amin. He easily got himself elected as the president of the elected Executive. The obvious facade of this Congress was later used by his critics to indict

148C0 733/197, February 6, 1931, PRO. 14 9 Jamal Effendl al-Husaynl was dispatched to London by the Mufti who was aware that the High Commissioner was critical of his activities. ZA/2797/102, CZA; CO 733/178, October 19, 1929, PRO. He was to conduct negotiations with the British about the draft ordinance (submitted In June 1929) dealing with the composition of the Supreme Muslim Council and control of waqf funds. CO 733/183/77050, October 22, 1930, PRO, The British government decided not to interfere, however. Royal Commission Report, op. clt.. p. 180; Neville N* Barbour, Nisi Domlnus: A Survey of the Palestine Controversy (London: Harrap, 1946), pp. lTO-131. It also led to the moderating control of the masses by Jamal upon his return. CO 733/197/87050, February 13, 1931, PRO. However, the Palestine administration correctly ascertained that It strengthened the position of the extremists. CO 733/197/87050, March 10, 1931; FO 371/15333, September 20, 1931, PRO. 212 him for his political manipulatIons * At HaJ Amin's

Insistence, the body of Mohamad All, the leader of the

Indian Caliphate Committee, who died the same year, was interred in the Haras. Later King Husayn of the Hedjaz enjoyed the same privilege. The British saw all these machinations as a revival of pan-Arab or even worse for them, pan-Islamic feelings. There is considerable doubt that it could have materialized at this time. Indicative of this was a lack of real external support which came in the form of evidence of activities in Syria,Lebanon, and Iraq.^^ In these countries there were demonstrations in support of the Palestinians but little motivation to provide any assistance beyond the display of anger.

In 1931^^ a new High Commissioner was appointed,

Sir Arthur Grenfall Wauchope. While Chancellor's programs

H. A. R. Gibb, "The Islamic Congress at Jerusalem in December, 1931," in Survey of International Affairs 1934 edited by Arnold Toynbee (London: Oxford University Press, 1935), pp. 99-108; Elie Kedourie, The Chatham House Version and Other Middle Eastern Studies (London: Weidenfeld and Nlcolaon, 1970), p. 195.

151F0 371/13753, August 29, 1929, PRO. 152 Ibid., September 9, 1929, PRO. 153 He was reappointed for another four-year term in 1935. 213 were designed to bring about an Arab state with a Jewish minority, Wauchope thought more along the linee of London's

proposals of a multinational state.

In August, 1931, toward the end of his tenure.

Chancellor revived the Idea of self-government through a

Legislative Council apparatus, but as stated above, it never materialized. Early in his post, Wauchope began private

talks with both Arab and Jewish leaders sounding them out

on such a possibility.*^ But both rejected the proposal when presented on the government's terms. Because Wauchope

felt he was gaining support from both communities, he

elected to reject the Colonial Officer's advice to drop the

project and instead continued to plan for its eventual adoption.In this regard he intended to wait until the end of 1933 to publicly state his proposal, in order to maximize his rapport. After discussions with London,

Wauchope proceeded to Geneva and presented his plan before

the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League.*^®

Wauchope sincerely felt that Britain could maintain

its strategic position only by granting certain concessions

ISA CO 733/215/97050/9, March 5, 1932, PRO.

155CO 733/215/97050/9, April 8, 1932, PRO.

*^Mlnutes of the 22d Session (Geneva, 1932, p. 82. 214 to the Arebs in order to lessen the level of hostility within the community. Of psrsaount importance to this was to bring up the level of existence of the fellahin.

In September, 1932, the Arab Executive, acting as a result of frustration over the lack of action in the intro­ duction of self-government, passed a resolution calling for an Arab participatory boycott of government posts and positions. But Wauchope would not be moved by this since he felt that he had sufficient support from the Mufti and some of the Nashashibl family.1^ To this the latlqlal arose to the occasion with cAwni Bey resigning from the

Road Board, thus embarrassing other Palestinian notables 158 serving with the government. Now Wauchope became con­ cerned lest the government be blackmailed by a work slow­ down, and sought London's approval to introduce his Legis­ lative Council proposal.

The latlqlal Indictment of the Husayni-controlled

Arab Executive led the latter to call a meeting on February

24, 1933, inviting the latlqlal and the Youth Congress. As could be expected, it resulted in open evidence of hostility

157CO 733/219, September 16, 1932, PRO.

158CO 733/219/97105/2, November 3, 1932, PRO.

l59Ibid. 215:. between the militant aepirents and the traditional elites.1,60 The appeal for moderation by Huaa Kazim suc­ ceeded and a deputation was elected to talk with Wauchope.

Discouraged by the lack of affective results from the meeting with Wauchope, the Palestinian leaders again met in Jaffa on March 26 to declare a boycott of "British goods and Zionist goods."1'61' The boycott and attending tension climaxed in October with violent disruptions in several cities. After this episode, Musa Kazlm retired from the presidency of the Arab Executive and died a few months later. Seizing the propaganda initiative, the Arabs attempted to use the October disturbances to pressure

Wauchope into setting the proposal for this Legislative

Council into actuality. Wauchope, though, wanted to see how his Municipal Ordinance worked out first.

The government, for its part, under Wauchope'a direction, attempted to bring self-government through the

Municipal Corporations Ordinance which was entered into force on January 12, 1934. Municipal elections, which were

160C0 733/234/39/33, February 25, 1933, PRO. It alao created a situation with the traditional elite groups who were forced into greater extremes in or to compete for the attention of potential recruits and supporters. FO 371/ 16926/49/32, December 16, 1932, PRO. 161 CO 733/234, April 1, 1933, PRO. 216 to have been held In 1930 and were suspended because of the violence the year prior, were now held In 1935 with 20 newly elected councils taking effect.

Wauchope was still disturbed, however, by the dis­ orders in which he saw the problems of land sales, evictions of the fellahin and increased Jewish Immigration as the source_ __ _ _ *162

The disturbances brought out more clearly than ever the lnterfactional disputes within the Arab community. The

Nashashlbis were attempting to build a unified front coalition with the latlqlal to force Haj Amin out of office.in addition, Amir Faysal viaited Palestine shortly before his death (September, 1933) and stirred up the masses which further Increased the hostility between the pro- and anti-Iraqi forces. After Faysal's death,

Ghussayn reorganised his Youth Party along Fascist lines in order to enlist new members.I44 What this did was to create a spiralling effect between the various factions to see who could outdo the other in their extremist image. By October

162 However, the peasants did not respond to the calls of agitators as in 1929. For a discussion of the disturb­ ances seet ESCO, op. clt.. Vol. II, pp. 770-773; Sykes, op. clt.. pp. 175^177; Survey 1934, op. cit.. pp. 279-283.

163FO 371/16926/9/33, March 15, 1933; F0 371/16926/ 11/33, April 1, 1933, PRO.

164FO 371/16927/21/33, August 19, 1933; FO 371/169271/ 23/33, August 30, 1933; FO 371/16927/23/33, September 28, 1933, PRO. 217

this aoveaent in conjunction with the Istlqlel developed en entire propaganda caapalgn. In fact, the latlqlal was

assualng a nore coherent political fora than any of the other political "parties," which was clearly recognized by

the governaent In Jerusalen.The Arab Executive, at this

tine, under the Influence of the aore aoderate Mashashibls, was reluctant to proceed along anti-British lines, but were forced to by the Husaynls In order to maintain support.

The inter-factlonal dispute that was brought out by the aunlcipal elections coincidentally had Pan-Arablsn as a variable because of the infusion of the Saudl-Yeaeni con­ flict Into the issue.In this conflict, the Nashashlbls supported the Aair cAbdullah while the Husaynls supported

Ibn Sacud. A graphic exaaple of the coaplex relationship aay be indicated by the following:

165 FO 371/18957/11/35, June 27, 1935, PRO. 166 FO 371/16927/26/33, Noveaber 15, 1933, PRO.

167F0 371/17878/4/34, April 1934, PRO; Survey 1934, ££. clt., pp. 183-184, 306-308, 310-321. FIGURE 1

PALESTINIAN AND ARAB ACTOR RELATIONSHIPS

Nashashibls Abdullah

Husaynls

Legend

^ Antagonism

______* Support

In Palestine the results of the election to the local municipality of Husayni opponents and the election of

Dr. Husayn Khalldl reasserted the Mufti1s antagonism to the 1 Nashashibls. Wauchefte watched with despair the growing 169 antagonism of the Husaynls and Nashashibls. Nashashibi supported newspapers attacked the Mufti on his associations with Italy^® and alleged sympathy with the Mandatory•

168P0 371/18957/18/34, Dacembar 19, 1934; 371/18957/ 3/35, January 30, 1935, PRO. Dr. Husayn al Khalldl ran against Raghlb Bey Nashashibi. The Jews supported al Khalldl because of their resentment toward the Nashashibls from the 1930 municipal elections. The Christians supported the Raghlb Bey.

169CO 733/278/75156, April 22, 1935, PRO.

*7®The attacks centered on the relationship between a Druse nationalist, head of the "Syrian Palestinian Delega­ tion" at Geneva and an Italian agent, Amir Sheklb Arslan, and the Mufti. PO 371/18957/2/35, January 21, 1935, PRO; ESCO, op. clt.. pp. 774-77. Italian money began reaching Husayni-controlled youth and sports organizations. PO 371/ 18957/6/35, March 25, 1935, PRO. 171PO 371/18957/8/11/35, April 1935, PRO 219

The Nashashlbi-controlled media took the occaelon to exploit the situation to Its fullest* A letter* supposedly written by Arslan to the Mufti, was published In Falaetln and al-Jamlyca al-Islaalyya (April 19, 1935) to the effect

that the Mufti supported Italy.3,72 The open publication of 173 the letter openly embittered each of the rivals* The

Mufti reacted with his own strategy designed to capture the

Interest of the fellah. He began to organize propaganda campaigns, carried out by the culema', against land sales to the Jews, and at one point suggested forming paramili­ tary groups to "control" the Arab land sellers.27^

The domestic political scene in Palestine began to worry many of the administrators In Jerusalem also. Their solution was to Ignore Jewish demands and service the

Arabs' needs. Wauchope spoke with Palestinian leaders and subsequently voiced his concurrence with this thesis to the

Secretary of State.173

Reacting to several Zionist demands for greater support in the creation of a National Home, the Arabs put

172There was considerable Muslim antagonism toward Italy for Its repression of Cyrenaican Muslims. FO/371/ 18958, April 24, 1935, PROy ESCO, Vol. II, o£. clt.. pp. 774-775.

173FO 371/18957/8/35, April 20, 1935; FO 371/18957/ 9/35, May 31, 1935, PRO.

17AF0 371/17878/3/35, January 30, 1935, PRO. 175CO 733/278/75156/pt. II, December 7, 1935, PRO. 220 forth another set of uncompromising counterdemands: a sovereign parliament, a banning of land sales, and the total cessation of Jewish immigration. In December, 1935, while these demands were being studied In London, Wauchope introduced another measure for self-government. It would be a version of the previously proposed Legislative Council with several major changes. The Council would serve as a balancing agent to the government. It would be empowered to debate and amend government bills and introduce bills, with the exception of fiscal measures. It was also to have freedom of speech limited by provisions against abuse against foreign states or rulers nor could it question the legality of the Mandate. Most importantly, the Council waa not to have assumed a governing role. The High Commissioner was under no obligation to it; rather, he retained all his ruling powers. The composition of the Council waa to have been made up of 28 members, five official members, 11 unofficial nemlneea, and 12 elected; three Muallma, four

Jews, and two Christians, all nominated by the High

Commissioner; two members from the commercial sector of the country; 12 elected members: eight Muslims, three Jews, and one Christian. The apeaker of the body was to be the

President or Rais and yoahev-Rosh was to be an appointed 221 office from outside Palestine.176 The Inherent naivete of the scheme was In the motivation for Its introduction, namely that Arab and Zionist interests could be reconciled through such a venture.

It was the Jews this time that took the position of adamant extremism with a categorical refusal. They were completely opposed to the scheme because they were not 178 represented on a parity with the Arabs. The Pales­ tinians reacted with considerably more political sense, realizing the political gains that could be achieved. The

Palestinians therefore asked for time to deliberate In order to present their position.

In a memorandum submitted to the government by four of the five political parties (the Istlqlal abstained) In

January, 1936, they indicated their more than neutral 180 attitudes toward the Idea by not rejecting It outright.

^^Sykea, op. clt,., p. 145. Great Britain, Colonial Office, Palestine. Proposed New Constitution. Cmd. 5119 (London: H.M.S.O., 1936) • The composition varies according to John Marlowe, Rebellion In Palestine (London: The Cresset Press, 19^6), pp• lTS-147.

*^Paul L. Hanna, British Policy In Palestine (Wash­ ington, D.C.: American Countll on Public Affairs, 1942), p. 118. 178 CO 733/293/75102, January 1, 1936, PRO. 179CO 733/293/75102, December 25, 1935, PRO. 180 R.I.I.A., Great Britain and Palestine (London: 222

The reintroduction of the Council proposal was to stave off bitterness in the community. Wauchope and the government awaited the conference of Arabs that was to take place on January 15.181 But there were deep cleavages between the rural youth and the older traditionalist leaders, as well as the split in urban political organiza­ tions.^8^ A week before the meeting in two sessions on

January 7 and 17, they discussed their reply to the High

Commissioner. Unable to obtain unanimity, they agreed to answer separately, so the meeting was postponed indefi­ nitely. Only the Reform Party and the Nashashibls Defense

Party were in favor of accepting the proposal. The latlqlal was split: cAwni Bey was for it, while Akram

Zucaytar and Hamdi al-Husayni were against it. The same happened with Ghusayn's party. The Mufti opposed it also.

There were even conflicts between the parties regarding the 1.83 proposed nomination of members.

H.M.S.O., 1946), pi 74; Memorandum Prepared by the Govern-" ment o_f Palestine, Colonial No. 133 (London: H.M.S.O., I?37), p. 65; ESCO, op. clt., Vol. II, p. 787.

181P0 371/20018/19/35, December 30, 1935, PRO.

182ro 371/20018/1/36, January 22, 1936, PRO. 183Royal Commission Report, op. clt.. pp. 90-91. 223

The Istlqlel with its inter-regional affinity kept close watch on the National Bloc and called for a strike for January 11 and a syupathy strike on February 4. The FAF then called a strike for the sane day, followed by a similar call by the other parties.*8* In February and March, the latlqlal leaders sought to coordinate their activities, but

Syrian leaders such as Nabih cAzmah and Sami Sarraj objec­ ted.*®^ Other Syrians who were in touch with the Muf11, 186 i.e., Riad as-Sulh, also objected. The Syrians did not want to bring British ire into play in conjunction with

French policy which would not be in their interest. Jamal

Husaynl therefore stated on February 28, 1936, that hostile acts against the British would have to be withheld until 187 they were strong enough.

In the meantime, the Legislative Council offer went to the Colonial office that looked with limited favor upon it, but was ultimately rejected by Parliament, actually holding the idea in abeyance until the anticipated visit by an Arab delegation, which was to be suggested to them by

Wauchope.

184F0 371/20018/2/36, February 18, 1936, FRO. 185 FO 371/20018/4/36, March 10, 1936, PRO.

186rO 371/20018/6/36, March 24, 1936, PRO. 187FO 371/20018/6/36, March 24, 1936, PRO. 224

The British refused to lapleaent the Arab deaand for total cessation of iaalgration, only a reduction. Regard­

ing land sales, Wauchope's proposal of a regional protection of cultivators was to be iapleaented. The plan was finally

coaaunlcated to the Palestinians, by Wauchope, on January 18ft 15, 1936. The Palestinians aet with Wauchope on January

I Q Q 19 to discuss the contents, and asked for tine to deliberate.

ConaunicatIon between Wauchope and London continued with Wauchope trying to iapress on the Cabinet the urgency

in coping with the increased hostility of the Palestinians

to the British. He was not entirely favorable to a Royal

Coaaission, since he felt the Arabs would boycott it. His

suggestion to invite an Arab delegation to London, soae-

thing already contenplated by the Palestinians, was 191 agreed to by the Cabinet.

Thus on April 2, 1936, Wauchope Invited an Arab delegation to discuss the Legislative Council with

l88PO 371/20018/2/36, February 18, 1936, PRO.

189CO 733/297/75156, February 13, 1936, PRO.

190FO 371/20018/5/36, March 17, 1936, PRO.

*8*Sykes, op. cit., p. 182; Royal Coaaission Report, op. cit.. p. 92; The Cabinet approved the suggestion on April 1, 1936. But intra-party rivalries, inept aedlation by the High Coaalssioner, and the growing ferocity of the strike obviated any positive effort to gather a group together. 225 192 London. However, after much internal disaenaion, the leadera of the five partiea decided not to aend one, after all.^^ xt waa obvlou8 anyway that the plan had faltered.

The traditional elitea, acting as mediatora between the Paleatlnian maaaea and the Brltlah government up to thla time could provide little evidence of meaningful

8ucceaa. Jewish immigration into Palestine in 1935, land sales to the Zionists, and evictions of the fellahin continued. The portents for violence, for lack of an alternative, Increased geometrically*

192 FO/20018/8/36, April 11, 1936, PRO.

193 FO 371/20018/9/36, January 6, 1937, PRO. CHAPTER V

POLITICAL DYNAMICS IN PALESTINE: THE LAST PHASE

Arab resistance and political activity culminated with the disturbances of the Arab Revolt, 1936-1939 (to be discussed also in some detail in Chapter VI). On April 25(

1936, a Supreme Muslim Committee, later to be known as the

Arab Committee (and also known as the Committee of Ten), was formed representing all the Palestinian Arab political parties, met in Jerusalem and formalized their union; it was the logical continuation of the defunct Arab Executive.

The first item of business was to call for a "peaceful" strike with the purpose of persuading the government to halt

Jewish immigration into Palestine.^

It would do well if we list the composition of the

Committee because of its continued Importance in the subse­ quent dynamics of the total movement. Haj Amin al-Husayni, the Mufti of Jerusalem and president of the Supreme Muslim

Council was its head; its secretary was cAwnl Bey cAbd al-Hadi, representing the Iatiqlaliats; Ahmad Hllml Pasha, its treasurer, the general manager and chairman of the board of the Arab Agricultural Bank, the precursor of the Arab

Bank; Raghlb Bey Nashashibi, leader of the Defence Party,

1C0 733/310/75328, April 22, 1936, PRO. Actually the Committee of Nablus iasued the first strike call on April 20. in

Jamal Effendi al-Huaaynl, Chen Secretary-General of the

Paleatlne Arab Party (PAP); cAbd al-Latif Bey Salah, leader of the National Bloc; Dr. Huaayn al-Khalidi, mayor of

Jerusalem and leader of the Reform Party; Yacqub Effendi

Farraj, a member of the Municipal Council and a leading personality of the Greek Orthodox Arab community; and

Alfred Rock, a rich orange grower and a leading personality 2 of the Arab Latin (Catholic) community.

The operations of the Committee were committed to

two basic functions: one, it was the legal representation of the Palestinian Arabs In their fight against Zionism, a sort of Jewish Agency. Toward this end, approximately

20 to 30 percent of the funds collected were spent in this manner, making representations to the government at home and abroad. Secondly, it served as a command post for the direction and financing of the general strike and accompany­ ing revolt.^ Funds were collected by cAbd al-Hamld Sacid,

Director of the Young Men's Muslim Association (Jamicyat

2 RG 226 OSS 126080 C, April 9, 1945, NA.

3Ibid. 228 al-Shubban al-Muslimin) (YMMA) of Cairo,^ and to some extent from Hebronites living there. Assisted by Muhammad All

Tahir of Nablus, who was employed by the Arab political weekly newspaper, E_s Saiasl al-Isbln. In Cairo, between

£5,000 and £7,000 per week were sent through the Arab Bank to the Arab Higher Committee and In this way £20,000 and

£35,000 from Egypt alone. One or two donations from the

Hedjaz under £1,000 were also sent through Egypt.^ The

Supreme Muslim Council had approximately £60,000 at its disposal and the Arab National Bank and the Mufti another

£1,000 that was placed for use by the Committee for the strike.^ There was also some talk of money coming from

Italian (Fascist) sources, but the charge was never really substantiated.7

The Committee had the image of the public figurehead for the revolutionary leadership of the strike and the move­

*The YMMA began in Egypt in 1929, created by cAbd al-Hamid Bey of Cairo, at the time an MP for the National Party. In 1932 Hamid Bey came to Palestine with the purpose of establishing branches in Jerusalem, Jaffa, Haifa, and in the larger villages and towns such as Sillwan, Ramleh, Tulkarm and Gaza, all to be connected to the main head­ quarters in Cairo.

SRG 226 OSS 126080 C, April 9, 1945, NA.

6C0 733/371/75528, October 12, 1936, PRO.

7C0 733/289/7504-8, May 15, 1936; FO 371/20021/ E4257, June 20, 1936, PRO. 229 ment. As was the case in the past where inter-factional disputes led one family to outdo the other in order to command the respect of the masses, it now Involved the traditional elites and the masses. Once the general strike was organized, it became a rallying cry for the public and Q forced the leaders to new extremes. In a discussion that

Wauchope, the High Commissioner, had with the members of the Arab Higher Committee, Raghlb Bey told him that "the people were ruling the leaders and not the leaders ruling the people;"^ this condition was reiterated soon thereafter by other public officials.

The Arab Higher Committee, in fact, was a more pub­ licized version of several popularly supported urban com­ mittees already established. Other national committees

(Lujnah Qawmlyyah) were appointed to take charge of the strike, first in Nablus and then in Jerusalem and Jaffa.

8C0 733/307/75438, May 4, 1936, PRO.

9C0 733/310/75528, May 5, 1936, PRO.

10CO 733/310/75528, May 30, 1936, PRO.

^ O S S 126080 op. cit. The Jerusalem Committee con­ sisted of cAbd al-Hami Shuman, President and Honorable Treasurer; Jamil Waleh, Jamal al-Husaynl, Sacid Ziyed, Muhammad Arjawali, Shaykh cAbd al-Barl Barakat and Haj Musa cArafah. There was also a separate Transport Strike Committee in Jerusalem headed by Hassan Sidql ad-Dajanl and Saleh Abdu. 230

An Arab Ladies Committee (Lujnah Sayldat al-cArablyyah) was also formed and it distributed clothes and food for

the poor,^

In early June a delegation of culema1 met with

Wauchope to complain about the overly vigorous manner in which the British troops and police were maintaining order.

During the course of their conversations they gave some

Indication as to the extent the Palestinians were willing

to commit themselves in the conduct of the strike within

the overall context of the movement. The Arabs realized

"that by attacking His Majesty's troops they [were committ­

ing] suicide, but as Your Excellency is aware, a deep erate X 3 man often commits suicide. More Importantly, it showed

the lack of appreciation of the possible rational manipula­

tions of violence. The Palestinian leadership looked upon

the political use of the strike in the religious framework of the jlhad.^ Their universe was one enveloped in the grandeur of the medieval Islamic Empire, all the while

12Ibid.

X3C0 733/310/75528, June 6, 1936, PRO. Emphasis Is author's.

^Within the Islamic theme of the Par al-Harb this community of non-believers is ultimately to be brought under the authority of the true faith through the jihad, or holy war; in the Christian world this was developed by St. Augustine as the concept of bellua justum. 231 falling to realize the complete historical role reversal.

Events were outpacing the elite's concept of the environ­ ment which marred their calculations of possible expecta­ tions and capabilities of participating actors.

After three months the Arab Higher Committee decided to make political overtures to the British, as the Arabs considered themselves riding the crest of a wave of victory.

Their purpose also Included the hope of countering Jewish propaganda that was exploiting the Arab excesses. The idea of sending an "official" delegation to London, however, was turned down by all the members of the Committee. Not to be discouraged, Jamal Effendi, the president of PAP, along with Shlbll Effendi Jamal and Izzat Tannus, two Christian

Arab Nationalists, formed an unofficial delegation and left for Britain on June 13. Upon their arrival on June 17, they were joined by Amll al-Ghurl, secretary of PAP. They spoke with officials of the Colonial Office:^ they demanded a fixed ratio between Arabs and Jews as the basis for further immigration. This proposal, however, was turned down by the British.1^ Later the entire Arab delegation met with the Secretary of State and repeated the argument and demands

15 CO 733/289/75154, July 14, 1936, PRO. 16 CO 733/289/75566, July 18, 1936, PRO. 232

of the Arab Higher Committee.^7 But their success could

only be seen in the establishment of an Arab Bureau in 18 London, The Palestinian position was to request assur­

ances from the British to "blindly accept to carry out the

recommendations of the Royal Commission." Shlbll Jamal

suggested to the British that the stoppage of Jewish immi­

gration be "camouflaged" under the cover of a request of

the Royal Commission. This request was also unacceptable,

if for no other reason than that the Commission didn't

exist yet!^9 In an attempt to convince the British Jamal

Effendi told them that the disturbances were not an attempt

to force the British hand, since he realized the Arabs were 20 too weak, but simply an expression of their despair.

In the subsequent debate in the House of Commons,

Ormsby-Gore delivered the government's position. Britain would continue to govern Palestine with its dual obligation,

it would suppress rebellion, and it would dispatch a Royal 21 Commission to Palestine to study the situation.

17Ibid.

18C0 733/297/75156, April 24, 1936; FO 371/20018/11/ 36, June 23, 1936, PRO.

19C0 733/321/75566, July 14, 1936, PRO.

20Ibid.

Z1Hansard, Vol. 313, cols. 1313-1395, June 19, 1936. The Cabinet made up its mind about sending a Commission on July 15. 233

The announcement of the Commission's appointment was met with unsuspected hostility. 22 But both communities began to ready themselves to put forth their respective cases. The Arab Higher Committee issued a rejection to the Commission refusing to participate until Britain agreed to suspend Jewish immigration.23 Realizing, though, that this ploy would lead the Arabs nowhere, they appealed to

Saudi Arabia2^ and Iraq to use their good offices to per- suade the British to meet their demands. 25 and thus, save face. It was. ultimately, these Arab leaders who brought

Palestinian leaders, such as the Mufti and cAwnl Bey cAbd al-Hadi, before the Commission. 26

22F0 371/20018/13/36, July 26, 1936, PRO.

23PO 371/20018/18/36, November 7, 1936; FO 371/20018/ 19/36, November 20, 1936, PRO.

^ A c t u a l l y the Saudis contacted the British some time before regarding the growing hostility. See C.P. 178(36) cited in Norman Anthony Rose, "The Arab Rulers and Pales­ tine, 1936s The British Reaction," The Journal of Modern History, XLIV, No. 2 (June 1972), pi ?15.

25FO 371/20804, January 6, 1937, PRO.

26F0 371/21870, February 14, 1939, PRO. Jewish leaders as well as the Palestinians contacted prominent non- Palestinian Arab leaders to bring the hostilities to an amenable conclusion. Numerous Interviews and secret conver­ sations were conducted in this effort in London during the period 1937 to 1939. For example, on July 30, 1938, Mohammad Mahmud Pasha of Egypt spoke with Dr. S. Brodetsky, Berl Locker, both of the Jewish Agency. And on August 25, 1938, David Ben Gurion spoke with Hafiz Wahba, the Sacudl Minister 234

The Royal Commission, appointed in July, arrived in

Palestine in November, headed by Lord Peel. Once the Pales­ tinians decided to appear before the Commission, their argu­ ments centered on what they opposed. As could be expected, the Arabs offered little In evidence as to what their achievements In developing a stable society with viable institutions were, though the lack of self-government was one of their prime grievances.

The Mufti1s appearance took precedent over any of 9 7 the other Palestinian representatives. His demands, in the form of a solution to the communal strife, were reitera­ tions of prior Arab demands: renouncement of the Jewish

National Home concept, immediate and total halt to Jewish immigration and land sales to the Zionists, and treaty arrangements with Britain establishing Palestinian lndepen- 28 dence as in the rest of the Arab East. The Commission not only took evidence from respondents in Palestine, but also considered the Interests of various elements of the to Great Britain. Ben Gurion sought the assistance of Ibn Sacud, who he felt had a strong personality that could deal with the lssue(s). S25/3052, CZA. 2 7 4'All Palestinians that appeared did so as a body representative of the Arab Higher Committee. 28 ESCO Foundation for Palestine, Inc., Palestine: A_ Study of Jewish, Arab, and British Policies (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press^ 1947), Vol. II, p. 815. 235

British government In London such as the military's con- slderatlon of the strategic importance of Palestine. 29

There was also the potential reaction within the framework of Pan-Arab or Pan-Islamic appeal, in other words, the 30 reaction of Saudi Arabia.

Whether or not the Commission's deliberations had anything to do with the increase or decrease in the violence is questionable. But the continued deterioration of secur­ ity, in any case, was a significant factor in Wauchope's decision to accede to his advisors' counsel to use force.

On May 23 he authorized the arrest of selected "agita­ tors."^ More than 60 of the so-called "agitators" through­ out Palestine were arrested and placed under police super­ vision.*^ This was followed on June 7 with the arrest of cAwni Bey cAbd al-Hadl, the secretary of the Arab Higher

29Britiah Interests in Palestine at this time were primarily to maintain a strategic staging area for the pro­ tection of the Suez Canal and access to India. Michael J. Cohen, "British Strategy and the Palestine Question 1936-39," Journal of Contemporary History. VII, Nos. 3 & A (July - October T772), pp. 173-175, especially p. 173.

30P0 371/21877, July 1, 1938, PRO. 31 Great Britain, Colonial Office, Royal Commission Report, Cmd. 5A79 (London: H.M.S.O, 1937), p. 98. Some of the harshest critics of British management or lack thereof, in the early stages of the strike, came from Britishers. See H. J. Simpson, British Rule and Rebellion (London: William Blackwood & Sons, Ltd., 1937), pp. 210-21A.

32Ibid 236

Committee33 and Fakhrl Nashashibi, former deputy-mayor of

Jerusalem, both of whom were Interned at Auja al-Hafir and

later transferred to the detention camp at Sarafand.

The Palestinian disturbances created an opportunity

for other Arab political aspirants to achieve notoriety

using problems encountered by the Palestinian national

movement as a pretext. Sir A. Clark Kerr, the British

ambassador to Iraq, reported that Nuri Pasha as-Sacid3^

had aspirations of solving the Palestinian problem by

developing an Arab--read Iraql--United States or an Arab--

again read Iraql--Commonwealth. The scheme had limited

appeal, however. The Iraqi Prime Minister NaJi al-Asll went to Riadh33 to discuss the matter with King Ibn Sacud.3^

Ibn Sacud was not interested in the scheme37 as he was

against any multi-national political organization that might

33He was allowed to leave the country for Switzer­ land, France and Egypt and was then succeeded by clzzat Darwazeh. When Darwazeh, in turn, was interned at Sarafand, he was replaced by Fuad Saba who was later also deported to the Seychelles Islands.

3*For a discussion of Nuri and Palestine see: Lord Birdwood, Nuri As-Said; A Study In Arab Leadership (London: Cassell, 19T9T, PP. 32-36, 165-1^9, 196-209.

35PO 371/20029/E6971/94/31, PRO.

36FO 371/20029/E7217/94/31, PRO. Actually the Mufti had requested the intervention by Ibn Sacud but was dis­ couraged by the British. CO 7 33/314/75528/44, April 30, 1936, PRO. 37FO 371/20029/E7647/94/31, PRO. 237 create an additional threat to hla religious and political position. Since Nuri Pasha could not get the accedance of

Ibn Sacud, he sent Said Haji Thabit to talk with the Mufti to convince him of the foolishness of the Arab Higher Com- 38 mittee in boycotting the Royal Commission. °

The British embassy notified Wauchope that Nuri 39 wanted to go to Palestine. But when Nuri suggested that

Iraq had an interest the British immediately looked askance at his mission.Nuri did go to Palestine and left on

August 30, 1936. The Arab Higher Committee then published a manifesto accepting Nuri's mediation, though continuing the strike. But Nuri's actions also incurred the continued wrath of the Sacudis.^3

38FO 371/20029/E7395/94/31, PRO. It was Batemen, the Head of the Eastern Department of the Foreign Office, who encouraged Nuri to further mediation efforts when both met at the Montreaux Conference (June-July 1936). CO 733/ 314/73328/44, August 17, 1936; FO 371/20025, September 1, 1936, PRO.

39FO 371/20023, August 22, 1936, PRO. AO HUF0 371/20023, August 24, 1936, PRO.

**F0 371/20024, September 3, 1936, PRO. A long-time acquaintance of Nuri was Lord Wlnterton. In 1936 he, along with Nuri and Lord Samuel, met in Paris to discuss compro­ mise measures. Wlnterton felt that a compromise was Impos­ sible with Nuri's Interference. According to Wlnterton, Nuri seemed to have the arrlere pensee that he was the deus ex machine for a federation of all Arabia. Alan Houghton- Brodrick, Near to Greatness— A Life of the Sixth Earl Wlnterton (London: Hutchinson, 1965), pp. 183-184. 238

Finally Wauchope had a meeting with the Palestinian leaders. Including the Huft1, °Awnl Bey, and Raghlb Bey, on

September 9. The Mufti proposed that London appearl to the

Arab princes to call on the Arab Higher Committee to terml- A 0 nate the strike. cAwni Bey proposed that Palestinian emissaries be sent to Arab capitals to appeal to their rulers for mediation. It was the Muf111s proposal that was accepted.43 The Arab Higher Committee waa to contact Ibn

Sacud and King Ghazi in an attempt to have them appeal to 44 the Palestinians to end the strike. Ya qub Ghusayn waa sent to Egypt to make contact with the Sacudis there.43 cAwni Bey went to eAbdullah^** and the Mufti established contacts with the Iraqis. Shaykh Kamil al-Qassab, the

Sacudl emmlssary, arrived In Palestine and conducted pre­ liminary discussions with the Arab Higher Committee.47

The makeup of the Arab Higher Committee, as It was a conglomerate of the various political parties which in turn was then compartmentalized, also represented the various

42PO 371/20025, September 8, 1936, PRO.

43PO 733/314/75528/44, Pt. I, September 12, 1936, PRO. 44 John Marlowe, Rebellion In Palestine (London: The Cresaet Press, 1938), pp. 163-164.

45FO 371/20018/16/36, September 28, 1936, PRO. 46 Marlowe, op. clt.. p. 165.

47F0 371/20018/16/36, September 28, 1936, PRO. 239

feuds Inherent In Palestine politics which in turn brought

further dissension within the organization. On July 3,

1937, for example, the National Defense Party seceded from

the Arab Higher Committee with Raghlb Bey Nashashlbi and

Yacqub Farraj, its two representatives, withdrawing. This was largely due to the personal manipulation of the British who expected Raghlb to be loyal to them. He was given encouragement to unite the Arabs behind him. However, when he withdrew from the Committee and failed to gain sufficient

Influence in order to minimize the Mufti*s pull, he was dropped by the British,^®

During the same month the decision was made to arrest the Mufti^ but he had prior word and took refuge in

the sanctuary of the al-Haram ash-Sharif. He was subse­ quently removed from the presidency of the Supreme Muslim

Council, and as chairman of the General Waqf Committee,

48RG 226 OSS 9208 R. June 29, 1944, NA. Nashashlbi's Defense Party, allegedly in collusion with cAbdullah, was to have accepted the Royal Commission's partition proposal annexing the Arab state to Transjordan and making ^Abdullah its sovereign. CO 733/332, July 19, 1937, PRO. 4 0 On June 22 the Mufti, with four colleagues, went to Damascus to meet with nationalist leaders and discuss plans that were being discussed on the solution to the problem. CO 733/326, July 5, 1937. The Mufti reportedly stated that he was going to declare war on the British on July 8. Ibid. When he heard about the resignations he Immediately returned to Jerusalem, the British felt for political terrorist pur­ poses. CO 733/332, July 5, 1937, PRO. This apprehension of 240 under provisions of the Palestine (Defense) Order In Council

1937.^ Most important was the dissolution of the Arab

Higher Committee,^* the organizational and Institutionalized

framework for the Palestinian Arab nationalist movement.

In October, 1937, disguised as a peasant, Haj Amin 5 2 left the sanctuary and fled to Gaza From there he boarded a sailboat that carried him to Ras al-Nakoura on

the Lebanese coast.^3 picked up by French authorities, he 54 then went to reside in a villa at Zuq, north of Beirut.

When the headquarters of the Arab Higher Committee were searched, only the Mufti's personal secretary, Subhi increased tension would have motivated the British in taking this major move. See also CO 733/332, July 19, 1937t PRO.

50CO 733/326, September 2, 1937, PRO. His removal was highly questionable, legally, since he was elected to the position for life by the Council in 1921.

“*^It was then publicly announced that the Committee would be reorganized in Damascus under the chairmanship of Haj Amin. The four members in exile were to be replaced by representatives from Iraq, Egypt, Syria and Transjordan. They were respectively: Sacld Bey Thablt, All Allouba Pasha, Nablh Bey al-Azmeh, and Dr. Subhi Abu Ghunelme. A1 Masir (Cairo), October 22, 1937. 52 General A. P. Wavell, the military commander in Palestine, was not permitted to arrest the Mufti. in such a holy place. In addition, plans to kidnap him were disap­ proved for fear of provoking an incident with the everpre­ sent armed guards of the Mufti. John Connell [John Henry Robertson). Wavell, Scholar and Soldier (Hew York: Harcourt, Brace & World^ 1964), p . 192,

^ N e w York Times. October 17, 1937, p. 1.

3*He continued his nationalistic activities from there, then Syria, finally escaping to Iraq where he 241

al-Khadra, was arrested.

One of the first Items on the Muft1'a agenda while

In exile In Lebanon was to set up an organization similar

to what he had In Palestine. He began by contacting per­

sons who were active In the Druze rebellion of 1925. Under

his guidance Izzat Darwazeh administered The Central Com­

mittee for Holy War (al-Lujnah al-Markazlyyah 111 Jihad).^

Al-Maktab al-cAlabl al-Qawml (The National Bureau), also In

Damascus, served as a propaganda disseminating agency. With

those organizations established, he recruited members, set

up plans, and organized for the purchase and smuggling of

arms, personnel recruitment, propaganda and finances.

collaborated^In the pro-Axls coup d'etat of Rashid UA11 al- Kllanl In 1941. When this failed, he fled to Nazi Germany where he spent the war years aiding their war effort. With their defeat he was captured by the French who "detained" him. He returned to the Middle East In 1946 to reside In Egypt and then Syria. cf. RG 226 OSS JICAME 50106 S, November 15, 1943, NA; Y. Porath, "Al-Hajj Amin al-Husayni, Mufti of Jerusalem--Hls Rise to Power and the Consolidation of His Position," Aslan and African Studies. VII (1971), pp. 121-156. For his relationship to the Axis powers and the al-Kilanl attempted power seizure, see Lukasz Klrszowicz, The Third Reich and the Arab East (Toronto: Press, 1966), passim.

55xhe Mufti in 1947 again exploited the Islamic principle of jihad when he created the Jihad Moqudes (the Holy War Strugglera), a paramilitary organization Incorpo­ rating the Futuwah. It was headed by Haj Amin's cousin, Abdul Khader al-Husayni, known as "Abu Musa."

56 S25/10098, July 1, 1938, CZA. 242

With the exile of the Palestinian's most prominent

leader, the movement and the resistance transferred the

loci of decision-making authority and action to the similar

revolutionary environment of Syria. A National Pan-Arab

Congress was held at Bludan, Syria, September 8-10, 1937.

The conference was organized by Nabih al-Adsma, the presi­

dent of the Syrian Committee for the Defense of Palestine.

No official Arab government delegation was present, but it

was widely represented: 138 representatives from Syria,

116 from Palestine, 82 from Lebanon, 33 from Trans-Jordan, e j 12 from Iraq, and 4 from Egypt. The resolutions were

similar to the orthodoxy that was becoming traditional:

1) Palestine is an inseparable part of the Arab world,

2) refusal of partition and the establishment of a Jewish

State, 3) adoption of a treaty guaranteeing the independence

of an Arab Palestine, 4) a demand for an Immediate halt to

Jewish immigration and enactment of prohibitive land trans­

fer legislation, 5) submission of the resolutions to the

League of Nations, 6) the Jews of Palestine to give up

political claims and remain as a minority, 7) Arab coopera­

tion with the British should depend upon a change in the

57CO 733/353, September 1937; CO 733/353/75718, September 25, 1937, PRO; R.I.I.A. The Survey of Inter­ national Affairs 1937 edited by Arnold Toynbee (London: Oxford University Press, 1937), pp. 551-553. 243

British foreign policy toward Palestine, and 8) Palestine

must remain Arab and all Arabs must do all possible to pre­

serve it as such.^®

The British Royal Commission Report was published on

July 7,^® along with official British concurrence.^ One of

the most significant features of the Commission's recom­

mendations was a partition plan for the country into three

parts, one each for the Jews and Arabs and one for the

Brit ish.

Welzmann was in general favor with the scheme though

the general Zionist body was not happy with the nature of

the proposal in respect to the boundaries of the proposed

Jewish state.Among the Jewish community at this time

came proposals for a binational solution to the conflict in

Palestine. Hashomer Hatzair wanted to create a socialist

society which would be binationalist with the Jews, however,

in the majority. Another proposal came from Judah Magnes,

S^New York Times, September 11, 1937, p. 9, 5Q Great Britain, Colonial Office, Palestine Royal Com­ mission Report, Cmd. 5479 (London: H.M.S.O., 1937).

®®Great Britain, Colonial Office, Palestine. State­ ment of Policy By His Majesty*s Government in the Onited Kingdom1'. Cmd. 5Tl3"TLondon: H.M.S.O., 1937).

61C0 733/328, July 19, 1937; CO 733/353, August 23, 1937, PRO. For a thorough examination of the Zionist's position see: Norman Rose, "The Debate on Partition, 1937- 38: The Anglo-Zlonist Aspect-I The Proposal," Middle Eastern 244 president of the Hebrew University, who spoke before the

Jewish Agency Council which net Innedletely after the 20th

Zionist Congress concluded in 1937, both In Zurich. Speak­ ing on behalf of non-Zlonlst American Jews, Magnes sought a blnational state with Britain as Its protector. Support for his plan came largely from his supporters, but he was severely criticized by the Zionists as a dreamer and totally unrealistic. The Zionists continued in their endeavor to develop a Jewish state In Palestine and partition offered them an opportunity to begin.

The Palestinians continued to maintain a maximalist position opposing any proposal that would give any part of 6 2 Palestine over to the Zionists. The following day the

Arab Higher Committee came out with a public rejection of the Commission Report and called for solidarity in the Arab and Muslim worlds. In this regard the Mufti, besides diplo­ macy, used terrorism and propaganda. He endeavored to obtain explicit promises from both Arab and Muslim govern­ ments which were League members and certain European states to pressure Britain to negate the commission's recommenda-

Studlea. VI. No. 3 (October 1976). pp. 297-^16: "II-The Withdrawal," VII, No. 1 (January 1971), pp. 3-24. 62 CO 733/332, December 21, 1937, PRO. 245

tions.**^ The Mufti reasoned that one of the League Council was sufficient to bring about a rejection of the partition

schene and find another solution. He placed considerable emphasis on persuading Turkey and the largely Muslim 64 ■ Balkans. Finally, the Arab Higher Committee's rejection was made known to the League of Nations and the added demand for an autonomous Palestinian state.^

To this point in time, the primary targets of Arab violence were largely Jews and Arabs. On September 26,

1937, Lewis Yelland Andrews, the acting District Commis­ sioner for Galilee, and his police escort, Constable Peter

R. McEwen, were murdered in Nazareth, while on their way to Sunday evening services, by three Arab assailants; the focus of the violence now shifted. This felonious act resulted in the promulgation of the Palestine (Defence)

Order-in-Councll, 1937. The Mandatory issued an official communique on October 1 decrying the organized terrorism, dissolving the Arab Higher Committee, and ordering the arrest of Jamal al-Husayni, Ahmad Hllml Pasha, Fuad Saba,

63uaj Amin spoke with the German Consul General at Jerusalem seeking German (Nazi) support to oppose British policy in partition. In return, Palestinian support for the "new Germany" was given. 1526/373532-23, DGFP. p. 755.

64Z4/4117, CZA; 7061/E524146, DGFP. p. 756.

65CO 733/333, September 13, 1937, PRO.

66a faw days prior to the assassination Andrews told 246

Yacqub Ghusayn, and Dr. Husayn al-Khalidi.

With the arrest of the Arab leaders and their depor- tatlon to the Seychelles Islands, action was taken to iso­ late the activities of the Mufti and minimize his effects on

the masses in Palestine to whom he remained a symbol of

Palestinian Arab nationalism. Mot all the leaders were arrested, however; Jamal Effendl escaped to Syria while

Rashid Haj Ibrahim, the manager of the Arab Bank in Haifa, was apprehended later and deported.

The removal of what effective leadership the Pales­

tinians had created a strain on the Palestinian community.

The British and the Zionists remained, but also the most

important personages of the Muf ti * s opposition. In addi­

tion, the situation also permitted non-traditlonal elements

to compete for national leadership and power ascendancy.

Regardless, the organized framework was broken down and

ideal conditions for the restructuring of the community

inadvertently introduced.

General Wavell in Haifa that he believed, for some unex- plained reason, that he was no longer marked for death by the Arab guerrillas, Connell, op. cit.. p. 191. Christopher Sykes concludes that he was killed because the Jews con­ sidered him a friend. Orde Wingate (London: Collins, 1959), p. 136. 67CO 733/332/75156, October 1, 1937, PRO. 247

Palestine, as we have noted, had been often a pawn

of other Arab statesmen. Just how the national movement was manipulated by outside forces can be visualized In the

dealings of Nurl Pasha, Judah Magnes, the Mufti, the

British, and the Americans. It Is also here that we see

how much of a parvenu Nurl Pasha really was.

After receiving a rebuff from King Ibn Sa°ud for his

Fertile Crescent Scheme, Nurl Pasha proceeded to Beirut to discuss matters with the Mufti. in an attempt to reach a

settlement between the Arabs and Jews. The Mufti told Nurl

that Magnes, at the time the president of the Hebrew Uni­ versity In Jerusalem, spoke with him regarding a mutually satisfactory solution to their problem. Magnes returned to

Beirut upon hearing of Nuri's presence and the three of them engaged In some sort of negotiating session. Magnes reportedly entered Into a tacit agreement whereby he accep­

ted a plan for a Jewish minority status in Arab Palestine.

However, when the Jewish Executive Committee was consulted about the proposal, they opposed it out of hand.

Nurl then proceeded to London, meeting with several

Zionist officials and Ormsby-Gore, telling the latter about his discussions with the Mufti and Magnes. Upon his return to Beirut, Nurl was contacted by Magnes and on February 6,

1938, a conference was held between Nurl, Magnes, and the 248

Right Reverend Graham Browne, the Bishop of Jerusalem, and

the leading Christian member of PAP, Dr. Izzat Tannus.

At this meeting Magnes offered basically the same

proposition he did at the meeting with the Mufti. but with

some minor alterations. But again the Jewish Executive

Committee refused to accept the plan.

Sometime thereafter, the Jewish Agency received

information regarding the gist of the talk Nuri had with

Ormsby-Gore in London and as a result embarrassed Magnes, especially when it was reported that Magnes was in favor of a permanent minority status for the Jews, when in fact he called for a provisional minority for a specified period of time.

The controversy revolved around the original draft of the Hyamson-Newcombe plan^® which provided that the maximum Jewish population would be less than 50 percent.

The draft was later modified by the Muftl^ to maintain the ratio of Jews at that time. There was also a third draft

69 Albert Hyamson was formerly Director, Department of Immigration, for the Government of Palestine. Colonel S. S. Newcombe was Treasurer of the Arab Information Bureau in London. Original draft in 867N.01/1055, FRUS, 1938, Vol. II, pp. 911-912. For the origin of the plan, see Susan Lee Hatls, The Bl-Natlonal Idea In Palestine During Mandatory Times (Haifa: Shlkmoma Publishing Co., 1970), pp. 174-193.

70Ibld., p. 912 249 by Nuri^* which provided for a maximum Jewish population of 72 X percent, which he understood to be less than 50 percent.

Negotiations continued when on December 15 Magnes met with Bishop Graham-Browne and Dr. Tannus on the best way to approach the Mufti. By December 22, Tannus and the Bishop visited the Mufti in Beirut, the latter acting as Magnes*

Intermediary so as not to inflame the British. The result of the meeting was the Mufti* s counter draft. When Magnes reported this version it was turned down by the Jewish

Agency Executive immediately. The Nurl draft resulted from discussions between him, the Mufti, the Bishop, and Dr. 7 1 Tannus in early February.'''

Nurl was also active in promoting a similar scheme through the Amir cAbdullah. In the early part of May, 1938, cAbdullah publicized a peace proposal, allegedly propounded by an "important non-Arab Muslim." According to this plan,

Palestine was to be annexed to Trans-Jordan for a period of

71Ibid., pp. 912-913.

7^The entire episode is reported in Ibid.. pp. 903- 927. See also Herbert Parzen, "A Chapter in Arab-Jewish Relations During the Mandate Era," Jewish Social Studies. XXIX, No. 4 (October 1967), pp. 203-233. In a letter from Chaim Weizmann to Ormsby-Gore, dated January 22, 1938, he claims that Nurl was prodded into this course of action by the Iraqis who considered him a nuisance, offering him all sorts of positions outside the country, even the ambassador­ ship to London. Z4/4117, CZA. 73867N.01/113, Ibid., pp. 921-927 250 ten years when Jewish immigration would be allowed in zones in which Jews were already residing, but not In Arab zones.

The Jews would live as a minority with guarantees* The

Mandate would remain for that period with the Jews having proportional representation in government. After ten years if the Arabs and Jews reached an agreement and lived together peacefully, Jews might emigrate to Arab areas and the

Mandate would be abolished. If there was no agreement, a solution would nevertheless be farther along since each community was already acculturated in their own zones.7* cAbdullah later refuted the charge that he wanted to be king of Palestine and Trans-Jordan but only to find a solution to the disturbances in the Holy Land. His plan, however, was rejected by the British.

The two most well-known leaders in the revolt were cAbd ar-Rahim al-Haj Muhammad from Dhannabah andcAref cAbdul Raziq from Nablus.7** Both claimed the title of

Commander-In-Chief of the Arab Revolt, which was some indication of the rivalry between them. The third leader was Abdallah Muhanna, commander of the southern district.

^ N e w York Times, May 8, 1938, p. 35.

75Ibld.. May 29, 1938, II, p. 2.

76other leaders were cAbdul Khader al-Husayni from Jerusalem and Yusuf Abu Durra from Galilee. 251

In March, 1938, a new High Commissioner arrived In

Palestine; he was Sir Harold MacMlchael. The following

month, on April 19, Major-General Robert Hadden Hainlng

took over command of the military forces in Palestine from

General Sir Archibald P. Wavell. Together they placed even

greater emphasis on returning security to Palestine. It was a sad state of affairs for the British, By the middle of October, the rebels held control over many villages in

the southern district as well as occupying the Old City of

Jerusalem.

The strength of the guerrillas was well recognized by the British. In a conversation between the Jerusalem

District Superintendent of Police, Major W. F. Wainrlght, and George Wadsworth, the U. S. Consul General at Jerusalem, it was admitted that:

There is no doubt that the bands are progressively larger, better armed and better led, that their organi­ sation reaches into every village and town of the hill- country from Galilee to Beersheba and that they haye the almost universal support of the [Arab] people.''

C. M. Prle-Gordon, a Secretariat official, also commented that "the position of the rebels has become much stronger... and large areas of the country must now be regarded as rebel territory.”78

77 867H.01/1147, FRUS. 1938, Vol. II, p. 943. 78Ibid., pp. 943-944. 252

Without any evidence of collusion or instruction, the rebels assuned a strategy developed by communist insur­ gents elsewhere. The guerrillas set up military courts and 79 a system of taxation; in a sense, a parallel government.

Actually, two types of courts were established, civil and military. Both were based on Islamic law with the civil court made up of a chief rebel officer and two civilians.

The military court had a chief rebel officer and two lower ranking officers. This court dealt mostly with cases of espionage, treason, and land brokerage or sale of land to the Jews. The courts were popular with the people because

1) there were no court costs or fees, which were usually exorbitant for the fellahln and 2) the villagers did not 8 0 have to travel from their homes.

The main victims of these courts were members of the

Nashashibl family, faction or other prominent Arabs who were opposed to the Mufti. As a result, many Arabs left Pales­ tine seeking refuge in other Arab countries.

By October, 1938, the British made a firm decision to

In communist terminology and insurgent strategy this is the united front from below or the "four class" approach. See Michael Charles Conley, "The Framework of Communist Strategy," Orbis, IX, No. 4 (Winter 1966), pp. 976-982.

80New York Times. July 12, 1937, p. 12. 253 combat the revolt and brought In military reinforcements and beefed up the police force. By the end of 1938, the troops had control over the countryside and the guerrillas.

It Is interesting to note two extreme versions of how the

British contained the violence and its effect. Baron trenchantly refers to the conclusions of the King-Crane

Commission and alludes to its naivete. He further writes

In a footnote:

The historic record indicates, however that a mere display of firmness, as under the regime of Lord Plumer (1923-28), sufficed to maintain order, while a vacillating policy ultimately encouraged the Arab revolt of 1936-38. Despite strong backing by the Axis, this revolt was speedily quelled when Britain showed real determination, backed up by the presence of only 16,000 troops under General Dill.**

While on the other extreme. Professor Sharabi is quick to assess that "it took one-third of the British Imperial 8 2 forces to contain it [the Arab Revolt], however."

The growing success of the British military meant commensurate difficulties for the guerrillas. Guerrilla warfare is a low-level military effort of an insurgencyt

8^-Salo Wittmayer Baron, Modern Nationalism and Reli­ gion (New York and Philadelphia; Meridean Books Inc. and the Jewish Publication Society of America, 1960), p. 344, f57. Italics in the original. o 2 Hiihan Sharabi, Palestine and Israel: The Lethal Dilemma (New York: Pegasus^ 1969), p. 1$8f.

We have defined insurgency elsewhere as "a situ­ ation in which a people may seek or are seeking revision of 254 employed because of severe political restraints. In this

situation the guerrillas were forced to use coercion upon villagers for support. It was reported, for example, that

Haj Mohammad was forcing village headmen to list able-bodied males for conscription.®^

When Hasan ad-Dajani was assassinated in October,

1938, by Mufti-directed terrorists, the Nashashibis began to organize "peace units" (Kataib al-Salam) and counter­ guerrilla organizations. One such group was led by a for­ mer guerrilla, Fakhri cAbd al-Hadi,®^ another by cAbd al-

Azziz Abu Riayah, on the behalf of Fakhri Naahashlbl.

The az-ZuCbi family was a prominent family in the

Nazareth area. During the Revolt, both the family and its several villages were terrorized by the armed bands under their political, economic or cultural environment through the application of some degree of violence, and the results thereof." Sanford R. Silverburg, "Insurgency in the Middle East," International Problems, VII, Nos. 1-2 (May 1969), p. 56.

New York Times. October 21, 1938, p. 7. 8 5 It was reported that Fahkri was in the service of the British. RG 165 OSS WDGS ACSI, G-2, April 23, 1943, WNRC. For his actions Fakhri was murdered by Khalil cAbd al-Hadl in April 1943 by a member of the Nablus branch, whereupon Shawqi, Fakhri*s son, avenged him. It was repor­ ted also that he was shot in the midst of 2,000 guests who were attending the celebrations of his son's wedding In the village of Araba, near Jenin. RG 165 G-2, USA7ME (Cairo), Periodic Report No. 21, Annex No. 2, WRNC. April 17- Aprll 24, 1943. 255 the leadership of Tuslf Abu Dura. The Zu°bl family then sent a group of representatives to Damascus to negotiate with the General Command. When their efforts proved unsuc­ cessful, they formed their own vigilante-like group, osten­ sibly to continue operations against the British and the

Jews, but In reality their task was to defend the Zucbi clan.i 86

Another such incident took pace on June 6, 1939.

Arab brigands, under the leadership of Mahfuz cAbd al-

Majid, had been terrorizing several villages south of

Nablus for several months. Some of the villagers from the area caught al-Majld and ten of his men asleep and turned 87 them over to the authorities.

MacMlchael and Hainlng both realized that the inten­ sification of hostilities in Europe would ultimately lead to war with Germany. This being the case, Palestine as a strategic center for British Commonwealth defense took on an even greater importance. In order to maintain an orderly presence conciliation with the Palestinians was in order, which meant the postponement of the partition

86yaccov Shlmconi, cArve Erets-Israel (The Arabs of Palestine) (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1966-47), p. 242.

87867 N.4016/89, FRUS. 1939, Vol. IV, p. 779. 256

8 8 proposal and a cessation of Immigration.

On December 23 came an announcement by the British

that a special deputation was being sent to study several 8 9 Peel Commission recommendations. When the Commission,

headed by Sir John Woodhead, arrived in Palestine In April

they found the Palestinians totally hostile to their presence and purpose.

The Commission left In August and on November 9 the

Palestine PartItlon Commission * s Report was published.

In It was a major statement that the Peel Partition scheme was Impractical. Instead, the Mandate was to continue and a round table discussion between the three major partici­ pants was to follow. The formal British declaration rejec­

ting partition came soon thereafter.

The 1939 London Conference

From 1939 forward, Arab terrorism directed against the British abated, but intra-Palestlnlan conflict

88C0 733/367, September 25, 1938; FO 371/21869/E7678, December 21, 1938, PRO.

8®Great Britain, Colonial Office, Policy In Palestine- Despatch Dated 23rd December. 1937 from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the High Commissioner for Pales­ tine, Cmd. 563? (London! H.M.S.O., 193&).

®®Cmd. 3854 (London: H.M.S.O., 1938).

^Great Britain, Colonial Office, Palestine. State­ ment by His Majesty * a Government in the United Kingdom, Cmd 5893 (London: H.M.S.O., 19387T 257 continued, especially between the Husaynls and Nashashibls.

Fakhri Bey Nashashlbl, a cousin to Raghlb, and the secre­ tary of the National Defense Party, endeavored to build up a prominent position for himself. His approach was to serve as the personal focal point for antl-Mufti opposl- Q O tion. On November 15, 1938, he wrote an open letter to the High Commissioner, Sir Harold MacMlchael, refuting the leadership of the Mufti claiming that his opponents repre- Q 1 sented more than half the Palestinian Arabs. The Mufti reacted with alacrity; Fakhri was billed by the Mufti * s supporters as the "hireling Fakhri,and condemned to death by a rebel court. He was refuted by several members of the National Defense Party, which was started up in

Egypt after Raghlb Bey fled Palestine for his life in the terror duel with the Husaynls. It was also probably fear that Raghlb Bey refused to have Fakhrl's statement linked to his party.

Early the following month, Fakhri led a delegation

Q 2 On June 30, Fakhri was shot at and seriously wounded in Jaffa, allegedly by some of the Mufti's men. His death warrant signed by Aref cAbd al-Razlq is found in M. P. Waters [Maurice Pearlman], Mufti Over the Middle East (London: Victor Gollancz, 1942), p. ?5.

93CO 733/386/75872, November 19, 1938, PRO. The letter was published in The (London) Times, November 16, 1938. 94RG 226 54614 S, OSS JICAME, January 6, 1944, NA. 258 of ten Arab notables Including several ahaykha and mukhtara who called on Major General Richard Nugent O'Connor, the

British military commander for the Southern District.

Claiming to represent 700,000 Palestinians, they sought to make four emphatic points. The delegation confirmed the contents of the letter recently sent to the High Commis­ sioner; they thanked the British military for their actions

In combatting the Arab terrorists; they were prepared to collaborate with the British to further rout out the terrorists; and they declared their friendship to and 95 desire for the British. Then In January, he took another step In his attempt to curtail the Mufti * s campaign of terrorism. He sent a petition to Arab kings and princes, ostensibly on behalf of Muslim widows and orphans, urging them to dispatch a Muslim commission to Palestine in order to survey and ascertain the extent of the damages resulting 9 6 from the terrorism.

However, Fakhri could get little assistance from anyone In power. With this loss of confidence, he then visited Syria and Iraq where he pretended that his political intrigues had the backing of the British government. But he

95 The New York Times, December 3, 1938, p. 8.

^ I b l d .. January 3, 1939, p. 3. 259 was still held in disrepute and was ultimately murdered on Q 7 November 9, 1941, in Baghdad, by a Nusaybah clansman.7'

His death only intensified the bitterness and hostility 98 between the Nashashibi and the Husayni families.

Immediately after the British government's Woodhouse

Commission rejected partition for Palestine, an invitation was Issued to the Palestinian Arab representatives and regional Arab representatives, as well as from the Jewish 99 Agency, in another attempt to gain a compromise solution.

A problem immediately arose as to the composition of the

Palestinian Arab delegation. Those most conceivable to be representatives were those involved in fomenting the previous three-year period of disturbances. The Mufti was in Beirut,

Raghlb Bey was in Cairo, further making the situation com­ plex.

^Fakhri Bey's activities were suspect by the Pales­ tinian Arab national leadership for years. As early as April, 1920, instructions were given that he be kept under surveillance since he was considered a spy against the Arab nationalist movement. Z4/2800/11/51, CZA. QQ A cousin to Fakhri told Bartley C. Crum, a member of the Anglo-American Commission of Inquiry, in 1947, that: "We have never avenged his blood... Sooner or later we shall catch up with the Mufti." Behind the Silken Curtain: A Personal Account of Anglo-American Diplomacy in Palestine and the Middle East (New Tork: Simon and Schuster, 1947), 184.

®®Cmd. 5894, op. clt., pp. 3-4. The conference was set up by Malcolm MacDonald, the colonial secretary, on November 23, 1938, and convened on February 7, 1939, in the Palace of Saint James. 260

The Mufti, even while in exile, insisted that the

Arab Higher Committee was the only acceptable representa­

tive of the Palestinians. In keeping with British Interests

to assuage Arab support, further steps were taken to gain

their favor(s). On December 7, 1938, those Palestinians

detained in the Seychelles Islands were released and per­

mitted to proceed to Beirut--after some negotiations with

the French— in order to facilitate the formation of an Arab

delegation and furthermore to consult with the Mufti. Not

surprisingly, the delegation chosen was largely composed of

members of the dissolved Arab Higher Committee: Jamal

Effendi al-Husayni, its president, cAwni Bey cAbd al-Hadl,

Dr. Husayn al-Khalidl, Alfred Rock, Amin at-Tamlnl as

members, and Musa al-°Alami as advisor. In addition,

George Antonius was to be secretary with Fuad Saba, assis­

tant secretary, and Yacqub Ghussayn and cAbd al-Latlf Bey

Salah as Councilors.

On January 16, 1939, the Arab Higher Committee met

in Beirut in order to prepare a position to be taken at the

future conference. They issued a statement demanding the

establishment of a national government for Palestine.

Another meeting was held later under the chairmanship of

Premier Mohammad Mahmoud Pasha of Egypt and a delegate to

the London conference. He attempted to moderate the

Palestinians' demands with the result that they altered 261

then to calling for the conplete stoppage of Jewish Immi­

gration Into Palestine and the abolition of political

Zionism. But the Mufti remained adamant to pressure for

representation by the Hashashlbis and his Defense Party.

Raghlb Bey, for his part, was demanding no leas than 50

percent membership in the Palestine delegation. The alter­

native was the nonparticipation of his party.The

Egyptian government again attempted to persuade the Mufti

to permit a Defense Party member to participate. They even

threatened not to attend the conference unless their

request was honored.In addition, the Palestine admini­

stration, as well as Tewflq Abu el-Huda, cAbdullah’s Chief 102 Minister, urged him to form a rival delegation.

Nuri Pasha as-Sacld also attempted, again, to serve

as a mediator. He was joined in this effort by Fuad Bey

Hamza, the Foreign Under Secretary of Saudi Arabia, and

even the Muftl1s cousin, Jamal; but the Muf11 would have

none of it. The three Arab diplomats returned to Cairo on

January 22 with the Mufti1s consent to permit two Defense

Party delegates to attend the conference. However, those

lOOjjev York Times. January 30, 1939, p. 10; 867N.01/ 1389: Telegram, FRUS, 1939, Vol. IV, p. 703.

101Ibid., January 24, 1939, p. 12.

102 AU*C0 733/398, February 27, 1939, PRO. 262 chosen were unsuited to the Party which insisted on their 103 right to choose their own delegates. Through separate deliberations between the British and the Nashashibis, an agreement was reached whereby the Defense Party could select its own delegates.104 It seeae(j as though the

British were caught in a web of their own making. On one hand, they were so anxious for a settlement that they accepted the Mufti1 a membership proposal*®3 but then worked the other side to get a compromise. Finally, the Mufti agreed, on February 9, that the opposition would be afforded two delegates--as long as one of them was not

Fakhri Bey!*®®

Raghlb Bey formed his own delegation with himself as

Its head and with Sulayman Tuqan and Yacqub Farraj as mem­ bers. Thus, there were two Palestinian Arab delegations at the London Conference. Later, due to the mediation of

Malcolm MacDonald, the Colonial Secretary, the two Arab delegations were united under Jamal Effendl's leadership.

The Saint James Conference was held during precarious times for the British. The possibility of war loomed

103867N.01/1393: Telegram, FRUS. 1939, 0 £. cit., p. 704. 104 867N.01/1407 : Telegram, Ibid.

*05New York Times. January 24, 1939, p. 12.

*06j. c. Hurewltz. The Struggle for Palestine (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1550), p. 9d. 263

heavily In Europe and the strategic potential of the

Middle East took on Increasing Importance, In the midst

of the "Munich Crisis" the Colonial Office gave serious

thought to using Jewish military forces to maintain British

Interests in Palestine, After the Chamberlain mission

and the belief that peace In Europe had been obtained, the

position of the Jews and their organization was no longer

as Important; but a political solution to the problem In

Palestine was.*08

British strategic planning for the Middle East now 109 counted on a friendly Arab world. This became the back­ drop to the British invitation of Arab representatives from

107co 733/367/75156/1, September 22, 1938, PRO.

*08There was, of course, some anticipation of the Jewish and Arab positions at the London Conference. In the event that the predictions were real and a deadlock, Lord Halifax, Foreign Secretary, wrote in a memorandum, that the British would have to bring Itself closer to the Arabs. FO 371/21869/E7678, December 21, 1938, PRO. This attitude was reinforced or supported by the High Commissioner, Harold MacMichael, from Palestine. CO 733/409/75872/55. January 11, 1939, PRO.

*°°Yehuda Bauer, From Diplomacy to Resistance; A History of Jewish Palestine 1939-1945. trans. Alton M. Winters (Philadelphia, Pa.: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1970), Appendix I, a segment of MacDonald's statement made during the February 14, 1939, session, pp. 361-363. For the Jewish-British discussions, see Ibid.. pp. 19-38; Major General 1. S. 0. Playfair, History of the Second World War. Military Series. The Mediterranean and Middle East. Vol. I (London: H.M.S.O., 1956), p. F 5 T 264 the Arab world to London In 1939. Those states that acted as mediators, for the British, with Palestinian extremists in 1936 were now asked to do the same.

Both delegations--Jewlsh and Arab--held separate meetings with the British. The Jews began their meeting on

February 8. The Arabs began theirs on the following day.

Both groups got together on February 22 for an informal discussion. The British proposals were made on March 1 5 ^ ^ and called for a federal state to be created with a Jewish

* population maintained at one-third of the total and Immi­ gration continually based on the economic absorptive capa­ city. After five years, there would be no Jewish immigra­ tion without the agreement of all parties.333 Both sides refused to accept the proposal and the conference ended on

March 17.33^

The Arabs objected to several points: no definite date was given for the establishment of an independent state and they also objected to the proposed admission of more | 1 O Jews, even for five years. The Arab delegates, with the

110 Ibid., Appendix IV, pp. 369-372.

111867N. 01/1593, FRUS, 1939, 0£. cit_., pp. 734-736. 112 867N.01/1481: Telegram, Ibid.. p. 737.

113867N.01/1596, Ibid., pp. 738-739. 265 exception of the Palestinians, met together in Cairo on the initiation of the Egyptian prime minister, Muhammad Mahmud,

As a result, they sent counterproposals to the British hoping that if these new proposals were accepted the Arabs would do their utmost to obtain an agreement with the

Mufti. The counterproposals sought a definite guarantee of a predominant Arab populated state after a ten-year transitional period.

The final decision of the British was published in the 1939 White Paper, published on May 17.*^ Not stated in the position paper, but intended by the British, was the ultimate settlement of the Palestine question favorable to the Jews by providing for a federal basis.

The White Paper called for the continuation of

British rule for ten years, at the end of which an indepen­ dent Palestinian state would emerge with treaty relations with Britain in order to sustain the economy. Jewish Immi­ gration for five years would be kept at 75,000, subsequent to which it would be halted completely unless agreed to

H^867N.01/1519: Telegram, Ibid.. p. 742.

115867N.01/1522: Telegram, Ibid., p. 743.

**®Great Britain, Colonial Office, Statement of Policy Presented by the Secretary of State for the Colonies.••(Mac Donald White Paper], Cmd~.6<5T9 (London: H.M.S.O., 1339).

117867N.01/1599 1/2, PRUS, 1939, ££. cit., p. 751. 266 otherwise by the Arabs. Arab land transfers to Zionists in much of Palestine was to be prohibited and restricted in others.

The Zionists were livid and publicly announced their intentions to combat it.*-*® Nor were the Palestinians totally in favor. Only cAbdullah and the Nashashibls sup­ ported the new British policy.**9 The Higher Committee's statement was split. While the accepted the basic princi­ ples, they continued to be unhappy because of the failure to grant complete independence. In the end they rejected the proposal.

In a discussion between Musa al-cAlami and an

American military intelligence officer, al-cAlaml stated that the Arabs were out maneuvered by the British at the

London Conference into a position with the image that they rejected the White Paper. Reminiscent of the myth center­ ing about the meeting between Nazi Foreign Minister Joachim von Rlbbentrop and British Ambassador to Berlin Sir Neville

Henderson, when the former read his government's peace terms

118 Welzmann, oj>. cit.. pp. 499-503; Bauer, oj>. cit.. pp. 42-67.

ll9C0 733/406, May 31, 1939, PRO.

120 A4UC0 733/408/75872/30, May 30, 1939, PRO. 267 12 X so rapidly that Henderson could not cake notes, al—

°Alan»i claimed that the paper was read to them at top speed by Malcolm MacDonald, Colonial Secretary, who demanded an immediate reply. Having no time to consider or even under- 122 standing it, they were forced to reject it.

Palestlne During World War II

November, 1942, was a turning point In the Pales­ tinian Arab movement. The publicity given the 25th anniver­ sary of the Balfour Declaration and speeches made by

l^ A . J. P. Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War (New York: Atheneum, 1968), p. 274. The British and the French, it has been reported, applied the same technique sometime after Israeli forces attacked Egypt in 1956. At this time Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, the Permanent Under-Secre- tary at the Foreign Office, delivered an ultimatum to the Egyptian Ambassador in London, Sarny Abdul-Fetouh, while his counterpart in the Quai d'Orsay delivered a similar message to Kamal Abdel Nahi. Neither Arab ambassador was offered a seat and demands for the acceptance of temporary occupation of Anglo-French forces around the Canal. Mohammed Hassanein Heikal, The Cairo Documents; The Inside Story of Nasser and His Relatlonshlp with World Leaders. Rebels, and Statesmen (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1577) ” p . 109.

122RG 226 OSS 43853, August 1944, NA: This account is also given in al-cAlami's biography but not with him as the source. Sir Geoffrey Furlonge, Palestine is My Country: The Story of Musa Alaml (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969), p*Z r ? 9 . William Quandt sees this point in time as an extremely important juncture in the development of a Pales­ tinian nationalist movement. In Quandt's opinion, "by refus­ ing the terms of the British white paper of 1939, Palestinian Arab leaders lost the possibility of obtaining international support for a unitary Arab-dominated state in Palestine." "Part II, Political and Military Dimensions of Contemporary Palestinian Nationalism," William B. Quandt, Fuad Jabber, Ann Mosely Lesch, The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism (Berkeley, Cal.: University of California Press, 1773), p.45. 268 prominent Brltains like General Jan Smutst and Lloyd George, and Wendell Wilkie in the United States added to the frus­ trations of the Palestinians. Those once pleased Arabs were now angry. They were torn between a desire to protest and a wish to obtain credit for having done nothing to impede the Allied war effort.

Toward the end of November, it was reported that a meeting took place in Jerusalem among the Husayni family on the questions of a political platform and the proposition of uniting the Arab leaders in a new bloc to defend the rights of the Palestinians. Even the possibility of col­ laboration with the British government was considered! cAbd al-Latif Husayni and Mohammed Rafiq al-Husayni sent a letter to Shaykh Yusuf Yasin, the Saudi Arabian Minister for Foreign Affairs, asking him to draw the attention of

King Ibn Sacud to the intentions of the western democracies toward Palestine after the war; Ibn Sacud was known to be highly pro-West and to have contacts with western leaders.

In addition, Munif al-Husayni was asked to make the most of these statements when disseminating propaganda among the 12 3 pilgrims at Mecca. J

In the middle of December, 1942, a small group of

123OSS 54614 S, o£. cit. 269

Arab intellectuals and politicians under the aegis of Musa al-cAlami Including Dr. Husayn al-Khalidi^^ and Dr. Izzat

Tannus met to consider the questions of the day. They discussed, inter alia. the neglect of the Arab cause result­

ing from the Mufti1s preoccupation with Axis propaganda to the exclusion of his compatriot's Interests,and the definite need for a new Arab political body enjoying the support of the other leaders. Early the following month,

Ahmed Hilmi Pasha,Rashid al-Haj Ibrahim, Ahmad Shuqayrl,

Raflq at-Tamlnl, Ahmed Imam, and cUmar al-Bltar joined in

^^Dr. al-Khalidi was removed from the mayorship of Jerusalem when it was learned that guerrilla activity in Jerusalem was aided by the Mayor's office and Muslim members of the municipality, and deported to the Seychelles Islands in 1937. He was released from his internship in 1939 taking up self-exile, mostly in Lebanon. He returned to Palestine in 1942.

^■^Hirszowicz dates the Mufti' s first official con­ tact with Nazi Germany as July 16, 1937, when he met with Consul-General W. Dohle, the German representative in Jerusalem, o£. cit., p. 34. It has also been reported, how­ ever that the Muf11 spoke to the German Consul-General in Jerusalem in March 1933, only two months after Hitler's rise to power, suggesting the organization of an antl-Jewish boycott in the Muslim world. David Yisraell, "The Third Reich and Palestine," Middle Eastern Studies, VII, No. 3 (October 1971), p. 353~ F T 5 T The Mufti's connection to the Nazis may, in part be termed nationalistic expediency. Simi­ lar activities were evidenced by Ghandl who gave some indi­ cation of friendship toward Japan when its military was approaching India. This was even more true of Indian revolu­ tionaries who formed a "freedom army" to fight with the Japanese. Sukarno and some of his colleagues collaborated with the Japanese, and some Latin American nationalists had contacts with Nazi agents as a form of opposition to the United States. 270 similar discussions thus widening the circle of discontent.

We have already noted that when the PAP was at Its peak of popularity and support It lost its strength when the source of its power and popularlty--charismatic leadershlp-- was taken away. Since party politics In Palestine was Indi­ vidual or personality-oriented rather than lasue-orlented, when the source was reintroduced the source of authority was also reallocated. Thus, when cAwnl Bey cAbd al-Hadi,

Rashid Ibrahim, and Subhl al-Khadra, among several others, representing the nucleus of the Istlqlal, assumed public leadership, power shifted In Palestine. Ahmad Hilml Pasha was one of these Istiqlallsts who returned to Palestine during the war,^® It so happened that Hilml Pasha was the founder and director of the Arab National Bank and a member of the Arab Higher Committee.

The war brought increased economic prosperity to

Palestine with the influx of the British military and Its war effort. Along with contractual spending, there was also the money spent by Individual soldiers and civilian workers in defense areas. The additional money that they spent went to the merchants and other elements of the middle level sector of society which in turn made this money

126 Exiled to the Seychelles Islands In 1937, he returned to Palestine in 1939. 271 available for investment through the Bank, which again

Ahmad Hilml Pasha played an Important role as its director.

Coincidentally, the Fund of the Arab Nation revived

Its activities under the directorship of several Istlqlal- lata, those already noted above* A connection was soon drawn between the Bank and the Fund, since the former backed the latter.127

The Fund and its supporters were attacked by Musa al-cAlami who claimed that it intended to undermine his all-Palestine scheme. The feud became quite disruptive until there was a reconciliation in November, 1945. The two major conflicting members signed an agreement whereby both Institutions would continue to operate, though super­ vised and administered by a joint commission, In actuality

HuBaynl-controlled however, and the pact never material­ ized.I28

In February, 1943, Ahmad Hilml Pasha and Awnl Bey urged Haifa Arab notables to consider the necessity for Arab unity and the formation of a representative Arab body. In support of this, but yet Independent of it, Anthony Eden,

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, made a statement on

I27 Shlmconl, op. cit.. pp. 354-355.

128Ibld., p. 355. 272

February 24 on Arab Unity that vaa favorably received In

Palestine. Rashid Haj Ibrahim and cAvnl Bey exploited the declaration in favor of the proposed Arab political confer­ ence. In company with Hilml Pasha they visited Amir cAbdallah to discuss the conference and federation.

Ibrahim's actions were considered with great suspicion by the Husaynis who feared he might be successful in creating a body to take the place of the Arab Higher Committee. It was also thought he might even find a leader to cooperate with the government to replace the Muft1.

In March Ibrahim applied to the Committee for author­ ity to convene a general conference of leaders "to create an

Arab political body by electing an executive Committee to represent and speak for the Arabs of Palestine." This request was designed to give the impression that the pro­ posed conference and the committee had some claim to official recognition, and Ibrahim was advised to consult the Local 129 District Commissioner.

The 14th Conference of the Arab Chambers of Commerce was conducted on February 27, 1943. Despite the original intent to limit the discussion for economic subjects, the conference did not confine itself to this. Instead, it went

129 RG 226 OSS JICAME 54614 S, January 6, 1944, NA 273 ahead and elected an Executive Committee Including Raahld

Haj Ibrahim, cUmar al-Bltar, Amll al-Ghurl, Boutagny, and

Ahmad Ullmi Pasha as the chairman. While the committee was set up under the cover of the Arab Chamber of Commerce, It could have assumed the function of an executive committee on behalf of the Palestine Arabs. The most obvious weak­ ness of the committee lay In the absence of any Husayni leader, nor did It Include Raghlb Bey or Sulayman Bey Tuqan though the Defense Party was represented by cUmar al-Bitar and All Mustaqln.

Within a month Ibrahim was convinced that the Defense

Party would have nothing to do with the proposed Palestine

Arab political conference. The Husaynis were also opposed to the Idea though they did support the formation of a political body with strictly limited powers. Accordingly, in the middle of March, a meeting was held at cAwnl Bey's house where it was proposed that a political body should be formed consisting of the Palestine delegation to the 1939

London conference. As two of them, Jamal Effendl and at-

Tamlml were in detention camps in Rhodesia, their places on the committee were to be taken by Amin's brother Rafiq and another member of the Husayni family. There seemed to be some doubt whether or not a Husayni would take an active part In such an arrangement. In the opinion of Tawflq Salah al-Husayni, they wished to give the impression that they 274

believed to be behind the activities of Ibrahim.*^

This mistrust and dissension led to another meeting

soon thereafter at which one of the primary interests of

discussion was measured to prevent the realization of the

project to revive the 1939 delegation.

In order to bring greater cohesion to the Pales­

tinian leadership, Jamil al-Madfaci, ex-Prime Minister of

Iraq, visited Jerusalem and met with Ahmad Hilml, cAwnl Bey,

and cAdil ash-Shawa. Hilml asserted that the Palestinians

would be unable to participate In the movement for an Arab

union as long as certain of the recognized Arab leaders

remained In exile or detention. He thus attempted to gain

support from Madfaci to have the Iraqi government place more

pressure on the British. He also remarked that Ibrahim

failed In his attempt to call a representative Arab confer­

ence and also he received threatening letters as a conse­

quence of which no Arab leader could be expected to risk the

accusation of treason and submit to possible persecution by

intimidation, without Husayni approval and support, any

political action that might affect the status of Palestine.

130 Ibid. 131 Ibid. Among the meeting participants were Musa al-cAlaml, Dr. Rushdl Tamlmi, Farid Anabtawi, Ahmed Imam, Yacqub Ghusayn, and Shaykh Raghlb ad-Dajanl.

i 275

With cAwni Bey's concurrence, they agreed to rely on Arab leaders outside Palestine who, while working for Arab free­ dom and independence and unity, should pay special attention to the claims of the Palestinian people.

Also from this the political future of Palestine seemed to be molded. Ahmad Hilml Pasha wanted a party to include as many as possible the old leaders who could have worked for the Palestinian Arab cause from the beginning.

But he considered such a party would be ineffective unless

It was supported by a strong group of the Mufti's adherents. cAwni Bey wanted to reorganize and strengthen the old

Istlqlal party. Rashid Haj Ibrahim favored a committee established in his home town, Haifa, to bring together all the political factions and elect an executive body. Raghlb

Nashashlbl and Dr. Husayn al-Khalidi advocated a committee based on the 1939 London Conference delegation supplemented by members of the Arab Higher Committee along with two extra members of their own Defense Party. Musa al-cAlami, Raflq

Tamimi, and Dr. Rushdl Tarairai favored a body composed of the

1939 delegation Including Jamal Effendi and Amin at-Tamimi.

Most Importantly, the Husaynis considered the reconstitution of PAP. They would agree in principle, to a body Including the 1939 delegation, but they also considered that they had the right to fill the five vacancies caused by deportation and death (Jamal Effendi, Amin at-Tamlmi, cIz*at Darwazah, 276

Alfred Rock and George Antonlous). Their suggestion was:

Rafiq Tarairai, Mohammed Raflq Husayni, Kamil Dajani, Amll al-Ghuri, and one other. In addition they also claimed the right to dictate on the so-called National Covenant, rather than on the 1939 White Paper and to name the secretary.

Hilmi Pasha and Dr. Khalidi induced the other leaders to fall into line with the demands of the Husaynis, but the Istiqlalists disagreed that a Husayni nominee should replace cIzzat Darawazah, claiming he was a member of their party before the formation of the Arab Higher Committee and went over to PAP. Ibrahim offered to assume the linkage but he appeared unacceptable to some who preferred Ahmed

Shuqayrl. Raghlb Bey claimed that the Defense Party had five representatives at the London Conference, while the

Husaynis made it only two. Raghlb countered with the refusal to participate in the face of Husayni adamancy, whereupon the Husaynis replied with blithe indifference.

They, instead, countered with a threat of their own, which was considerably more credible, namely that they would refuse to participate if the other factions supported the Nashashlbl contention.

Toward the end of October, the Husaynis again arranged to have a meeting to cone to some sort of agreement to have political unity. Disagreement, however, arose over their claim that the body had to be based on the 1939 277 delegation* It was argued that in such a body the PAP would have the right to nominate no less than eight members to take the places previously filled by the Muf_ti--who in fact never attended the conference— Jamal Effendi, Amin at-Tamiml, cIzzat Darwazah, a fugitive in Turkey, George Antonlous and

Alfred Rock, ceceased, and Musa al-cAlaml and Fuad Saba who, although both in Palestine, were unwilling to resume their membership in the delegation. This claim was subse­ quently challenged by Hilmi Pasha who contended that the

PAP should nominate only two persons, in replacement for the Mufti and Jamal Effendi.

An All-Palestine Conference of Arab Chambers of

Commerce was convened on November 11, 1943, in Jerusalem.

They met to consider the safeguarding of Arab national sovereignty in Palestine, measures to ward off the Jewish danger, and how to implement demands decided upon by pre­ vious Arab conferences. It was fairly well attended by the

Nashashlbls and their supporters making an appearance, but the Husaynis were registering their discontent with the attempt by the Istiqlallats to assume leadership.

Ibrahim raised the question of electing a body to represent the Palestinian Arabs at the forthcoming Arab

Unity Conference in Cairo. It was eventually agreed that a congress should be held to which should be invited the executive committee of the Arab Chamber of Commerce, 278

available members of the Arab Higher Committee and of the

London Delegation, leaders of all political parties, repre­

sentatives of the Arab labor organizations, Arab mayors,

and newspaper proprietors.

Ibrahim suggested that any particular person from

Palestine Invited by Nahas Pasha to the talks should be

regarded as the Palestinian representative. A subsequent

meeting for further discussion of these proposals was boy­

cotted by the Husaynis who held their own meeting on

November 26 to consider counter proposals. At that time

they decided that any representative body must be based on

the London Delegation to which the PAP claimed the right to

nominate eight persons. They further decided that even

after the formation of such a body they would not negotiate

with the Palestine government unless Jamal Effendi was per­ mitted to return and If the memibers of the other parties who contributed members to the London delegation refused to

collaborate with PAP would fill their vacancies also. The

PAP appeared to be convinced that they could command the

support of the majority of the Palestinian Arabs and seemed

prepared to take their own line Irrespective of whether the other leaders were averse to the Idea of the revival of the 13 2 Arab Higher Committee J and concentrated their hostility

132 The Arab Higher Committee vaa officially dissolved in October, 1937. 279

on Hilml and cAwnl Bey.

In August, 1943, Hilml Pasha reorganized the Arab

National Fund (Sanduq al-ummah al-cArablyyah). a one-time

fiscal conduit for the Muftl. ^ 3 The Fund was used to

focus attention on land holding and the British relation­

ship to Zionist land purchases. This Issue became so

Intense that by June, 1944, the Husaynis publicly endorsed

the National Fund.

Further undercutting the PAP strength was the pro-

Axls position of the Mufti. In order to check this,

several Husayni politicians decided to reestablish the

party. At a meeting in Jerusalem on April 28, 1944, 39

delegates set themselves up as the party's Central Committee

and founded several local committees. An Executive made up

of 12 members was constituted and Tawfiq Salah al-Husaynl

(Jamal's older brother) was named acting president.

In direct opposition to the latiqlal position of demanding the execution of the 1939 White Paper, the Husay­

nis maintained the same inflexible position with the time- honored demands: 1) Palestinian Independence within the

133 The Fund was founded In 1932 by the Husaynl- domlnated Arab Executive with capital of £P10,000, It did not function during 1936-1939. It was revived at that time by a group of Iatlqlallats. 280 framework of ATab Unity, 2) the establishment of an Arab government, and 3) the dissolution of the Jewish National

Home.

Alexandria Arab Unity Talks

Arab world politics were inextricably Involved in the intrigues of the fate of Palestine. King Ibn Sacud, though a major figure in the Arab and Islamic worlds, avoided pan-Arab conferences that sought solutions to any

Arab affair in an attempt to avoid making a public state­ ment which then might prove prejudicial to his preeminence.

In April, 1944, Nurl Pasha as-Sacld contacted Ibn

Sacud in order to convince him to participate in a pro-

Palestine conference. Ibn Sacud refused on the grounds that it was a high level question requiring British and

American participation. The price exacted by him, finally,

for his participation was an agreement to the effect that no Hashemite would be enthroned on any resultant combined state covering any part of or all of Syria, Lebanon, Pales­

tine, or Trans-Jordan.13^

134 RG 226 OSS 59098 C, February 18, 1944, NA. It was Ibn Sacud1s dislike for the Hashemites and his distrust of Faruq that led him to become suspicious of the conference altogether. RG 226 OSS L 48403 S, October 23, 1944, NA. The King also sought U. S. opinion regarding their position on an Arab union before he made his decision. 890B.00/283, FRUS. 1943, Vol. IV, pp. 852-853. 281

On July 12t 1944, Egypt announced that It Intended to Invite all the Arab governments to a preliminary meeting in Egypt; Palestinian representation was noticeably absent from the invitation. The Amir cAbdullah subsequently wrote to Nuri Pasha on August 14, 1944, telling him that the exclusion of Palestine would be a victory for the

Zionists.

Pressure came from other quarters also. The

Egyptians along with Shukrl al-Quawatli convinced Shaykh

Yusuf Yasln that the Palestinian Arabs should be represen­ ted at the Alexandri Conference and every effort should be put forth to reconcile rival Palestinian factions to enable a Palestine delegation to be formed. Even if this could not be done, it was not to hold up the conference, which then became a partial victory for Nahas Pasha who was find­ ing some difficulty in getting support for the conference.

In the meantime, an Advocates Congress was held in

Damascus in April, 1944, with regard to the Palestine question. The conduct of the Palestine Arab delegation made a generally bad impression upon the leaders of the

135 M. Khalil. The Arab States and the Arab League. Vol. II (Beirut: Khayats, 19627"^ p. 19,

136 RG 226 OSS 100291 S, September 19, 1944, NA. 282

neighboring countries. The internal controversy centered on the dispute between cAvni Bey versus cAbd al-Latlf

Salah, both of whom wanted the leadership of the dele­

gation.13^

As a result of this pressure was brought to bear on

Palestinians in Damascus to secure the establishment of a delegation. It was well known that the Husaynis were against a Palestinian representative body since they had no competent leader--Jamal al-Husayni was then in a deten­

tion camp in Rhodesia--knew that it would then have to be entrusted to cAwni Bey cAbd al-Hadl or some other prominent personality. They also sought a postponement in order to

regain public support, partially damaged by the widespread damage created by the disturbances largely engineered by

the Husaynis and secondly, the political blinder in backing

the Nazis.

But sufficient pressure was brought to bear on them that they sought--at least publicly--to favor the creation of such a body. However, when it came down to the actual working level, they placed serious obstacles in its way.

For example, they insisted that the delegation accept their

"Arab National Charter" as its policy, to declare Itself

137 RG 226 OSS 97615 C, September 28, 1944, NA. 283 against the White Paper, demands for the independence of the Palestine Arabs, the establishment of an Arab Palestine state, and the abolition of the Jewish National Home.

Raghlb Bey Nashashlbl and others replied that their demands were unrealistic. They argued that the Arabs could not oppose Zionism in 1944 as they had in the 1920's and they could not afford to Ignore the political progress the

Zionists made during the intervening period.

In the decisions regarding the makeup of the delega­ tion, the Husaynis offered a choice between basing it on the composition of the Supreme Muslim Council and that of the

London Delegatlon--ln which all parties were equally repre­ sented. However, at the time of those occasions the

Husaynis dominated each and were able to appoint their own

"advisors" and "secretaries." So at this time they wanted the status quo on the appointment of the administrative staff. (The staff, it should be noted, enjoyed the status of members.>138

Since the disbanding of the Arab Higher Committee the [Jamal] al-Hua*yni-[Amln] at-Tamlmi faction was the predominantly recognized spokesman for the Arabs both at the

London Conference and in most negotiations with the British.

138 RG 226 OSS 100291 S, September 19, 1944, NA. 234

The British attempted, through cAbd al-Hadi, to have the al-Hadl-Hilmi Pasha faction or party supplant the Husayni-

Tamimi group for Palestine's representation of the Arabs but the move f a i l e d . *39 The following of the Husayni-

Tamimi faction even Informed NahaB Pasha that they would recognize only their chosen committee as representatives of

the Palestine Arabs.

With the election of Tawfiq Salah al-Husayni as the

Acting President of PAP, Hilml Pasha began to gain influ­ ence. Internal struggles saw the Muhi-ad-Din branch and certain other sections of the family withdraw their sup­ port from PAP. This was further highlighted when cAbd al- 141 Hadl failed to unify the various political factions. In an an attempt to gain outside assistance to bolster the party's recognition, PAP had a meeting with Amir cAbdullah in Amman on December 23, 1944. In attendance were: Tawfiq

Salah al-Husayni, Rafiq at-Tamlml, Amil al-Ghuri, Farid

Anabtawl, and Abdul Rahim al-Nabulsl. cAbdullah listened to their arguments and then told them that he could not concern

139 RG 226 OSS 34751 C, January 20, 1944, NA.

“ °RG 226 OSS 71322 C, May 12, 1944, NA.

141RG 226 OSS 137366 S, January 5, 1944, NA. 285

himself with Palestine or its problems. His family, he

vent on to tell them, had been robbed of its Inheritance

by Ibn Sacud. Generally, he brushed them aside, asking to

be kept informed of their activities and have copies sent

to him of the reports and memoranda Issued by them from

their central office, but little nore.^^

Musa al-cAlaml had taken the lead in prominence from

the Husaynis and Nashashlbia who because of the feuding and

intrigues were worn down and no longer could maintain the

trust of enough of the power holders. It was through the

intervention of Dr. Husayn al-Khalidi that al-cAlami was

agreed to be the representative of all the Palestinian

factions.According to al-cAlaml*s biography he was working on one of his farms in the Beisan valley when he was called to Jerusalem. When he arrived he was "instructed

...to proceed to Alexandria...and to represent Palestine"

at the Preparatory Conference for the formation of an Arab

League. There were few other even plausible alternatives.

cAvni Bey Abd al-Hadi had returned to Jerusalem from Intern­ ment in 1942. He was then used by the British for their

142 RG 226 OSS 152079 S, January 8, 1945, NA. 143 Aharon Cohen, Israel and the Arab World (New Yorkt Funk & Wagnalls, 1970), p. 315. 144 Furlongs, op. cit.. pp. 130-131. 286 purposes but It failed, as noted above* He and Dr* Husayn al-Khalldi were spoken of to be joint secretaries for the unity talks in Cairo. But when cAwnl Bey took the position

that Dr. al-Khalldi might be Secretary, but he would have

to be Secretary-General, it fell through. cAwnl Bey would not have been acceptable as a leader and the Husaynis would not have participated in any movement in which he was the

prime mover.

Mustafa Bey al-Khalldi, the Mayor of Jerusalem, died on August 24, 1944. The socio-demographic complexity of

Jerusalem almost required that it be operated by a complex governing system. In accordance with the Municipal Corpora­

tion Ordinance of 1934, the city operated with a mayor and

two deputy mayors, both appointed by the High Commissioner

from among the cities Municipal Council. The Council was made up of six Arabs and six Jews elected in accordance with

the same Ordinance. The historical tradition of the

Jerusalem Municipality, dating from its formation in 1877, was that it have a Muslim mayor, and beyond that they be 146 from the al-Khalidl or the al-Husayni families. During

145 RG 226 OSS 92058 R, June 29, 1944, NA,

^^Durlng WWI the Turks set aside the tradition of placing the mayoralty of Jerusalem in the hands of one of the more prominent families there because of their leader­ ship abilities which could provide a greater threat to them 287

the period of the Mandatory the High Commissioner had

appointed Christiana and Jews to the position of Deputy

Mayor*

Jerusalem's Importance and connection with the Jews was religious as well as demographic since they maintained a majority status within the city, as opposed to the sub- district, throughout the Mandatory period.Therefore,

the Jewish community requested the government appoint Mr,

Daniel Auster, the Deputy Mayor and a Jew, to the position of Mayor.

There were several other candidates to complicate affairs: Dr. Husayn al-Khalidl, formerly appointed Mayor but deported to the Seychelles Islands; Nafiz al-Husayni a British puppet; Musa al-cAlaml, an al-Husayni adherent;

Judge Aziz ad Daoudl, from Jaffa; Aref Effendi al-Aref, considered a Zionist tool; and Raghlb Bey Nashashlbl. Not only was the office of the mayor in question, however, but also the composition of the Municipal Council since the in' terms of mobilizing the spirit of Arab nationalism. One exception was the appointment of Husayn Salim al-Husayni who was the mayor when General Allenby entered the city.

*^See letter to the editor, The Economist. August 3, 1968, p. 4; 0. Schmelz, "Development of the Jewish Popula­ tion of Jerusalem During the Last Hundred Years," The Jewish Journal of Sociology.II. No. 1 (October 1961), pp. 5^-)3; '*The Jewish Population of Jerusalem," The Jewish Journal of Soaiology. VI, No. 2 (December 1964), pp. 243-263. 288

1 A A Muslims now found themselves In a minority.

Replacing Sir Harold MacMlchael as Palestine's High

Commissioner in October, 1944, was Field Marshal The

Viscount Gort. Gort's tenure was marked by the termination of the Second World War and a sharp increase In the activi­ ties of the Jewish terrorist organizations. The murder of

Lord Moyne in Cairo by members of the Jewish Stern Gang and the arrival of Chaim Welzmann in Palestlne--his first visit since 1939— both in November, 1944, marked a relatively peaceful period for Gort who was not especially knowledge­ able in politics.

On March 21, 1945, the Palestine government took the

Jerusalem mayoralty crisis in hand. As a provisional solu­ tion, Gort called for an annual rotation of the office between a Muslim, a Jew, and a Christian. The plan was acceptable by the Jews but rejected by the Arabs so the plan was dropped. Then on March 22, the Palestine Gazette carried the High Commissioner's announcement of the appolnt-

148RG 226 OSS 103059 C, October 28, 1944, NA. The composition of the Municipal Council was: Mr. Daniel Auster, Acting Mayor, Jew; Anton Effendi Atallah, Deputy Mayor, Christian Arab; Anastas Effendi Hansla, Councilor, Christian Arab; Nafiz Effendi al-Husayni, Muslim; Subhl Effendi ad- Dajanl, Councilor, Muslim; Adel Effendi Jabr, Councilor, Muslim. 149 John R. Colville, Man of Valour: The Life of Field- Marshal The Viscount Gort (London: Collins, 1972), pp. 259- 266, especially pp. 261-162. 289 ment of Auster as the temporary Mayor. As a result of the government's comnunlque, the Arab parties came out with a strongly worded manifesto, headed by the Husaynls, who also organized and announced a one-day protest strike for March

24. The question of Jerusalem's mayoralty was seen by many

Arabs as a harbinger or precedent for the solution of the entire Palestine question. The decision by the government was seen as a further Infringement on the 1939 White Paper policy which, they felt, had to be defended. Not only was the Issue of a rotating mayor resented, but also the appoint­ ment of two British members to the Municipal Council. Some consternation was also evidenced at the distinction made between Christian and Muslim Arabs. The strike over the appointment was the first large demonstration since the

Arab Revolt,but had little Impact either on the govern­ ment or the community.

A second proposal was introduced to divide the city

Into communal municipalities. But this also had to be dropped after an obdurate Arab stand made the execution of the plan Impossible. Finally, out of desperation, frustra­ tion, and contempt, the High Commissioner authorized the

District Commissioner of Jerusalem to appoint a six man

1S0RG 226 OSS 92866 C, August 30, 1945, NA. 290 commission made up of British officials* Appointed on

July 11, 1945, they continued to operate the city until the end of the Mandate.

While on his way to the Cairo talks in January, 1944,

Rlad as-Sulh, the Lebanese Prime Minister, passed through

Palestine and met with a delegation from the PAP in Haifa.

They sought his assistance in gaining the release of Jamal al-Husayni and Rafiq at-Tamlmi [sic.] since they were con­ sidered the only effective and available Palestinian leaders. As-Sulh's reply was:

Suppose they were dead--what would you do then? Well do that now...Your extremism will harm you, just as the extremism of the Jews will harm them eventually. You must find some common ground with the Jews, just as I did with the Christians in Lebanon and Nahas is doing with the Copts in Egypt* I spoke to Nahas, and he is of the same opinion.***

With Jamal al-Husaynl, the Mufti. and Amin at-Tamimi all out of the country, Husayni dominance lost its legitimate political authority. What was left was an ersatz presence maintained by the Mufti's terroristic activities guided from

ISIr . Eugene Bovls, The Jerusalem Question. 1917-1968 (Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University, Hoover Institution Press, 1971), pp. 30-36; Hurewltz writes that it was five man commission, op. cit., p. 222.

15 2 Cohen, op. cit., p. 315; New York Times. January 8 , 1944, p. 2; as-Sulh met with Cohan once before with Ben Gurion in May or June 1934 to discuss Jewlsh-Arab under­ standing. David Ben-Gurion, My. Talks with Arab Leaders (Jerusalem: Keter Books, 1972TT P~* ^7? B. Riad as-Sulh was assassinated in July 1951 because of alleged discussions held with Israeli leaders. 291 his exile. No one was left with any qualities of leader­ ship. Since the Acting Presidency was reserved for Jamal al-Husaynl, the nominal head became Tawflq Husaynl, a former clerk In the Immigration Department. He was Ineffec­ tive but he had the Husaynl name; the real power was held by

Amll al-Ghuri.^^

A member of the PAP told Lowell C. Pinkerton, the

American Consul General In Jerusalem that the Husaynls felt political unity could be achieved at any time and rapidly, as well. After much consideration, however, it was decided that the time was not propitious since It would have meant one of two alternatives: cooperate with the British, but they showed no real Interest for this or oppose them consti­ tutionally or unconstitutionally. Accordingly, working through constitutional means offered no hope of achieving anything meaningful since there was not constitutional government and the British, it was felt, would brush aside anything they did not want to consider. Unconstitutional measures during wartime would probably not work out well for the Palestinians and would be ruthlessly crushed. Therefore there were no serious considerations. What they planned was to wait for a new High Commissioner and approach him with

153 RG 226 OSS 92058 R, June 29, 1944, NA. 292 154 whatever authority the Husaynls had at the time.

It was also thought that the Huaaynia hoped, by making no move toward creating an Arab repreaentative assem- bly, to force the hand of the Brltlah to releaae Jamal, aa they belleved--and correctly--that the British were behind the Cairo talks.In support of this contention Pinkerton wrote;

The influential Huseinis are not interested at the present time in the formation of an active political leadership and instead of resisting the small group which is trading on the Husseinl's name in the forma­ tion of the Palestine Arab Party, they are remaining silent.156

Inter-factional disputes among the Palestinians in search of power led some even to seek a solution with the

Zionists. During the latter part of December, 1943, Dr.

Husayn Khalidl and Musa al-°Alami invited Dr. Judah Magnes and Professor Norman Bentwich to a meeting to discuss a possible solution. Magnes and Bentwich provided a basis for the discussion. On partition the Jews were to get ter­ ritory to the south of a line from Haifa to Tulkarm, Jeru­ salem, Jericho and Amman: the entire coastline from Haifa to Egypt, all to Beersheba and Gaza area to the Egyptian

155RG 226 OSS 55911 R, January 29, 1944, NA. 156RG 226 OSS 100291 S, 1944, NA. 293

line, Che port of Aqaba and the Negev and Southern Trans­

jordan to and including Amman. The remainder, Akko (Acre),

Safad, Tulkarm, Nablus, Ramallah, Gailllee and northern

Transjordan to be entirely Arab. Secondly, the settlement was to be imposed by joint action of the United States,

Great Britain and the U.S.S.R.

The reply waB an emphatic no since there would be no

Arab support of the dimunitlon of Arab Palestine. They

replied that the British had agreed to a White Paper crea­

ting three "keys" in Khalldi's words: 1) immigration would be ended after the first five years unless the Arabs approved, 2) land sales were to be controlled to the advan­

tage of the Arabs, and 3) local autonomy and Independence with controlling voice left to the Jews in the clasie which

stated that if the Arabs and Jews do not agree, at the end of the 10 years further discussions were to be held.

They thus called for Jewish cooperation on Arab terms.

If such cooperation occured the Arabs promised that they would intervene with their Arab neighbors which by that time

there would be undoubtedly an Arab confederation to permit

some Immigration of Jews into their lands. They would bring

their skills to line but not control.

157RG 226 OSS 54561 C, January 20, 1944, NA. 294

While this was going on, Tawfiq Husaynl and Amil a1-

Ghurl continued their organizational efforts. But what this did, in effect, was to weaken the Husayni's hold and split the followers. Some British officials in the coun-

i CO try and in the Foreign Office, as well as American authorities and Arab ministers, pressed for the release of

Jamal Husaynl and Amin at-Tamlmi, In a detention camp in

Rhodesia, but met with stiff opposition from Sir Harold

MacMlchael whose answer was that he would not be responsi­ ble for the results if they returned.

In the preparations for the talks while Palestine was to have played a role, a lack of Arab leadership and no invitation by Mustafa al-Nahas Pasha, the Egyptian Prime

Minister, impeded any progress in this regard. Also the

Husaynls refused to take part in the discussions while Jamal

Husaynl was Interned. It was felt that efforts to force unity would only create greater fractionalization.

One of the obstacles to Palestine representation was again the fact that Nahas Pasha, who in addition to being the Egyptian Prime Minister, was also the Chairman of the

[Brigadier Iltyd (Ivan)] Clayton and Mr. [A. F.] Giles, for example, RG 226 OSS L 52978, February 4, 1945, NA.

159OSS 100291, ££. Cit.; RG 226 OSS JICAME 87814C, August 1, 1944, NA. 160RG 226 OSS 97960 C, September 2, 1944, NA. 295

Conference. When faced with the prospect of seating al- cAlami as the representative of Palestine, he found himself in a quandary, claiming that to do so "would annoy the

British."161

The unexpected assistance from King Faruq was then

Introduced. Faruq, who was at the time engaged in a power play with Nahas Pasha, took this opportunity to maneuver.

He had Invitations sent to al-cAlaml for Conference-related functions, addressing them with titles such as "Prime

Minister of Palestine" or "the Chief Palestine Delegate."

Embarrassed somewhat by this sort of attention, Nahas approached Musa with a diplomatic solution: Nahas was willing to permit al-cAlaml access to the last session of the Conference after all the resolutions had been passed, but prior to the departure of the delegates. In this way all would be able to hear al-cAlami state the case for

Palestine. When asked, Nahas claimed that the British had 162 given their assent to the proposal.

Because Palestine was not an official member of the

Furlonge, op. cit., p. 133. The British reasoning was fear of antagonlTTng the Zionists, pp. 134-135.

l62Ibid., pp. 133-134. 296

Conference, al-cAlaml was seated at a small side table.

He was accepted as an observer rather than a delegation.

Al-cAlaml was later joined at the third session by Husayn

al-Kibsi, the representative from the Yemen, also recognized

as an observer. However, they were brought to the confer­

ence table at the third meeting after an Impassioned plea

from Sa°dallah al-Jabiri, the Syrian Prime Minister and

al-cAlami's brother-in-law, whereupon al-cAlaml presented 1 £ 'I the case for Palestine.

In an attempt to consolidate his opposition, al- cAlaml contacted the PAP and requested, in writing, their approval of his conduct of affairs until that time. His request was met with a refusal. Tawflq Salah al-Husaynl,

the Acting President, gave al-cAlaml a verbal assurance

that the party supported him, but remarked that the party

wasn't prepared to extend themselves in the same way in

print. Some of the leaders were angered at al-cAlami's

v 1811 to cAbdalj.ah and Abdul Razzaq Tuqan.^^

Furthermore, a split had occurred between al-cAlami

and cAbd al-Hadi and Hilml Pasha. So acute was the dis­

agreement that al-cAlaml felt he could no longer represent

163 RG 226 OSS 101239 S, October 17, 1944, HA.

164 RG 226 OSS 151555 S, December 21, 1944, NA. 297

Palestine. On June 19, 1945, he wrote a letter to the

editor of Falastin,*^ the Defense Party newspaper.

The suggestion embodied a scheme which I had pre­ sented to the Preparatory Committee on October 5, 1944. The Scheme envisaged the establishment of a general national fund administered and supplied by the Arab states with a yearly budget of a million pounds for five years. It aimed not only at redeeming the land that is threatened to be sold to Jews but also at improving the conditions of the land by helping the fellah. After my return from Alexandria 1 met with my brethren the leaders of the six Arab parties that had delegated me on October 30, 1944 and discussed the objects and the pro­ tocols with them. I told them that I had been asked to make a report as to how my suggestion for redeeming the land should be put into action for study at the next meeting of the preparatory Committee. I requested them to supply me with information and proposals on the subject so that my report may be a full one. They approved the Protocols and sent a letter to the chairman of the Preparatory Commit tee... I learnt that other suggestions had been sent on the question of land redemption to the Arab states, from Palestine... Sugges­ tions were totally different from mine in their essence and principle. Some were based on the idea of forming a share holding company for exploiting the land with the yearly distribution of 4% profit to the shareholders, whereas mine was based on the fact that the Arab govern­ ment would pay sums not with the intention of profit or refundment but entirely on remedying and preventing causes that led to land sales.

Even while he was there at the Alexandria conference,

as the Palestinian representative, his position was being

undercut. Amil al-Ghurl, the Secretary of PAP, went to

Egypt in an attempt to persuade cAbd a1-Rahman Bey cAzzam

165RG 226 OSS JICAME 137152 R, June 27, 1945, NA. Musa's charges were subsequently refuted by Ahmad Hilmi Pasha, in a letter dated June 20, in Falastln. 298

Pasha to allow Palestine to be officially represented on the Economic Committee of the Arab League. In spite of pressure from All Mahlr Pasha, Abd al-Sattar Bey and

Alluba Pasha, cAzzam Pasha refused since the political status of Palestine was not settled. Mahlr Pasha attempted to persuade al-Ghuri and other Palestine Arab leaders, especially those of the PAP who were refusing to work with

Musa al-cAlaml, to set aside their differences.^**

At the fourth meeting of the Conference the question of Palestine was again raised by al-cAlaml. He came with a paper, signed by the five parties who formed the Palestine delegation to the 1939 Round Table Conference in London, naming him their representative to the Alexandria Conference.

He was then informed that there would be no strings (tahklid) attached to his presence, but since he didn't have any spe­ cific instructions he would not be permitted to participate as a full-fledged member but could hold to the position taken by the Round Table Conference at the time, although orally, the White Paper was acceptable as a minimum compromise.

Al-cAlarai,s solution to the Palestine problem was two-fold. He first wanted a renunciation of the use of force and violence; instead, persuasion would be used against

166RG 226 OSS 158624 S, August 1, 1945, NA. 299

World Zionism and the British through information-disserai- natlon or propaganda bureaus. Secondly, he wanted to cur­

tail Zionist land development in Palestine. He proposed a

Land Constructive Scheme (al-mashruc al-insha * 1), to be called the Arab Office Advisory Commit tee. Before the

Council he proposed

that Arab States should set up a fund to improve village conditions, particularly by relieving small­ holders of the Immediate fear of foreclosure by the moneylenders, in return for undertaking to turn their property into family waqfs, which would be inalienable for all time.

The idea was formulated at al-cAlami's house at the end of October, 1945, It was to have 24 members with Musa as Chairman. At that time 19 had already been selected: from PAP--Farid al-Anabtawi, Raflq at-Tamlrai, Musa al-

Surani, Ibrahim Sacid al-Husayni, Raghib Abu Saud al-Oajani,

Yusuf Sahyun, Mohamed al-Abumshi, Ahmed Abu Laban, cAbdallah

Samaria, Henry Cattan, and Butros Malak; from the Youth

Party, cAbd al-Haklm Jalabi, Mohamed Tawfiq al-Yahla, Jamal

Hamid, Shaykh Mustafa al-Khalrl, mayor of Ramleh; and a 169 neutral, Khalil Tuqan and Dr. Tawfiq Canaan.

The League agreed to open publicity offices in the

168 RG 226 OSS XL32406 S, November 15, 1945, NA.

l&9purlonge, ££• cit., pp. 136-137. 300 world's capitals and regarding the second proposal It would be worked out by the Economic Committee of the League, yet to be set up. The publicity office scheme was ratified and al-cAlaml was charged with Its organization. He received

12 thousand for this. The League's Economic Committee after

some study recommended the formation of an Arab Development

Society to have an initial Investment of £5 million over 5 years to be contributed by the League members.However, with the exception of Iraq all failed to comply with the agreement on their payments. Iraq gave only £250,000 over the first two years and then gave up when it saw that no other member was participating. Al-cAlami went ahead never­ theless, placing Tawfiq cAbd al-Huda as its Director-

General. Musa also traveled to other Arab countries attempting to solicit funds but found it Increasingly difficult. Those who contributed wanted to make use of the funds to make it impossible for Jews to buy land by outbid­ ding them. Al~cAlami wanted the funds to purchase land for

Arab use and improve it. He felt that there was enough land for each group. The problem was to build up the land on modern, scientifically agricultural lines. He was also worried about the money being misappropriated for personal

170 Ibid., p. 137 301 use— something alleged against the Mufti.

Post World War II Affairs

While at the Pan-Arab Conference, al- Alaml spoke on several occasions with Shaykh Yasin. He intimated a desire to meet King Ibn Sacud, but Yasin was non-committal. After the conference, Issidine Bey Shawa, Director of the Bureau c of Mines and Public Works in Saudi Arabia, asked al- Alaml why he didn't go to Jidda and he replied regarding his meeting with Yasin. Shawa suggested al-cAlami contact

Shukri Quwatli, President of Syria, for a letter of intro­ duction. Al-cAlaml did it and a telegram was dispatched to

Riyadh, While in Damascus al-cAlami received a call from

Amir cAbdullah in Amman who found out about the proposed trip and asked al-cAlami to visit him first. This al-cAlami did Immediately. Upon leaving Amman on his return to Jeru­ salem, he was recalled to Amman. At this time King Ibn

Sacud received the letter from Quwatli and also heard of al-cAlaml's repeated visits to Amman to his embittered enemy. cAbd al-Azlz Immediately called his Deputy Foreign

Minister and demanded to know why al-cAlami had not been previously invited to Saudi Arabia, while he was twice in

Amman. Izzidine Bey then stepped forward and assumed the

171RG 226 OSS 116438 C, February 16, 1945, NA 302 blame. Needless to say, an Invitation went out forthwith.

Al-cAlaml arrived at Jidda on January 13, 1945, by

U. S. Army aircraft from Cairo and was escorted immediately to Mecca. There he spolce with the King for five days, returning to Jidda on January 19.

Afterward al-cAlami visited the American legation and told its military attache that:

I have always disliked politics and have accepted this position only out of patriotic duty to my country. 1 dislike addressing conferences and having to meet diplomatic representatives but the job was pressed upon me and so I am fulfilling it to the best of my abil­ ity.172

At the war's end, only two political groups survived to maintain any semblance of authority, the PAP and the forces allied with the Arab National Fund, headed by Hllml

Pasha. cAbd al-Latlf Salah and Yacqub al-Ghusayn reconsti­ tuted the National Bloc Party in February, 1944, and the

Youth Congress Party in April, 1945. The other groups such as the Nashashlbi's National Defense Party and al-Khalidi's

Reform Party continued to operate in a perfunctory manner.

In November, 1945, the newly formed League of Arab

States,17** then in session, sent a representative, Jamil

172 RG 226 OSS L51555 S, December 21, 1944, NA.

17**The formation of a quasi-unified political Arab body was to have grave effects on the role of Palestinians in their national movement. The interjection of thair 303 174 Mardam, a Syrian political leader, to Jerusalem* There after only a week of mediation he achieved some success.

A new Higher Committee was established and announced on

November 23.^^ Five of the twelve seats were allocated to

PAP and of the remaining one each to be left to the heads of the pre-war parties and two to al-cAlaml and Ahmad Hilmi

Pasha. The presidency was kept vacant for the Mufti with the acting presidency to rotate among the various party func- tlonnaires. In order to placate the Istiqlalists. who refused to relinquish control over the National Fund, it was decided that the Arab Higher Committee and not al-cAlaml solely would supervise the Arab League's publicity and pro­ jected land schemes. The Palestinians were also given some assurance by the British that Jamal Effendi would be per­ mitted to return to Palestine. decision-making overshadowed the activities of the Pales- tinians, within an international political context. The Arab League states were recognized political bodies while the Palestinians were British colonial subjects even though they had "Palestinian" citizenship.

^^His mission was called the Joint Commission for Palestine. 867N.01/11-2745: Telegram: FRUS, 1945, Vol. VIII, pp. 834-835. 1 7 c The membership of the reformed Arab Higher Committee was: Tewflq Effendi Salah al-Husaynl, Acting Chairman, PAP; Amil Effendi al-Ghurl, Secretary, PAP; Raflq Effendi at- Tamimi, PAP; Raghib Bey Nashashibl, President, Defense Party; cAwni Bey cAbd al-Hadi, President, Istiqlal; ®Abd al-Latlf Bey Salah, President, National Bloc; Dr. Uusayn al-Khalidl, President, Reform Party; Yacqub Ghusayn, President, the executive of the Young Men's Congress; Musa al-cAlaml, non- aligned; and Ahmad Hilmi Pasha, manager of the Arab National Bank. 304

The Anglo-American Commit tee o f Inquiry

British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevln contacted

President Truman for his assistance In making recommenda­ tions to the British government on the Palestine question and the conditions of European Jewry.On November 13,

1945, a joint communique from London and Washington announced the formation of The Anglo-American Committee of

Inquiry Regarding the Problems of European Jewry and Pales­ tine.Hearings on these topics were to begin in

Washington, D. C., in January, 1946.

The Arab Higher Committee, speaking from Cairo,

Immediately rejected the Idea. But the Arab League assumed the Palestinians' option and offered to give testimony at the committee sessions. The Zionists were wary; however, 17 9 they offered full cooperation. The joint Anglo-American

Committee met in several cities in the United States,

176867N.01/10-1945, October 19, 1945, FRUS. 1945, op. cit.. pp. 771-772. For the reply see 867N.0l/l0-1945, October 24, 1945, Ibid., pp. 785-786.

177867N.01/1-1746: Ci rcular Telegram, January 17, 1946, FRUS. 1946, Vol. VII, p. 577.

*7®For the itinerary see U. S. Department of State, Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry: Report to the United States Government and Hla Halas ty11 a Government in the United Kingdom, Lausanne. Switzerland, April 20, 1946 ^Washington: D. C.: Government Printing Office, 194^T, p^ 52. 179 867N.01/1-946: Airgram, FRUS. 1946, ££. cit.. p. 576. 305

England, and in Europe taking testimony from a variety of sources: Arabs, Zionists, and their respective supporters.

The initial Palestinian Arab rejection of the pro­ posal to set up the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry was followed on January 6, 1946, with the decision by the Arab

Higher Committee to reject a British proposal permitting interim Jewish immigration. Instead the Palestinians demanded Independence and the return of Haj Amin, still in forced exile. On February 2, the Arab Higher Committee conducted a one-day strike against the Anglo-American Com­ mittee of Inquiry and sent diplomatic notes to the United

States and the United Nations charging that the British had violated their agreement to hold down Jewish Immigration into Palestine.

By early February Paris al-Khouri, the Arab League spokesman, met with the Anglo-American Committee, then meet­ ing in London. Al-Khouri warned that the Arabs would accept neither partition of Palestine nor continued Jewish immigra­ tion. When the Anglo-American Committee proceeded to Cairo in March cAbd al-Rahman Azzam Pasha, Secretary General of the

Arab League, appeared before it. Azzam Pasha announced that the Arab League would oppose the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine with all its power. He further demanded an 306 180 Independent Arab state In all of mandated Palestine.

Jamal Effendi al-Husaynl returned to Palestine in

February, 1946, and it was then hoped by many Palestinians

that he would weld the dissident factions into a unified

front.When by the end of March he could not persuade

the recalcitrant members, he took the acting president's

role. Jamal Increased the size of the Arab Higher Committee

to 28 members. In addition to the 12 agreed to in the

November meeting, PAP was to nominate two others with the

pre-war parties entitled to one each. The Istiqlal and

others challenged Jamal's authority to do this without their

concurrence.

The newly established Arab Higher Committee was for

the Palestinians the right move at the wrong time. The

composition of the Committee was that of the 1920's or

1930's at best and did not represent the change in the aspirant power seekers in the Arab Palestinian community.

The leftists and intellectuals did not see their demands capable of being satisfied by the old war horse team.

Again internacine conflict took precedence over centralized

180867N.01/3-146: Telegram, Ibid., p. 582. 181 To oppose the Husaynl-controlled and dominated Arab Higher Committee was the Arab Higher Front created by Dr. al-Khalldi and announced on May 29, 1946. Among its members were Raghlb Nashashlbl, cAwni Bey cAbd al-Hadl, and cAbd al-Latif Salah as well as Yacqub Ghusayn and his political party. 307

direction and decision-making.

The Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry issued its

report on May 1, 1946,(dated April 20) from Lausanne,

Switzerland, and published it simultaneously in Washington

and London. The findings of the Committee were unanimous

with their recommendations broken down into short and long­

term avenues of approach. For its short-term recommenda­

tions they called for 100,000 immigration permits to be

immediately issued to European Jewish displaced persons.

Further they sought to rescind the 1940 British land-sale

regulations which were Imposed on the Zionists in Palestine

in order to block further land transfers. The basic long­

term recommendation was that the British Mandate continue

though under a United Nations' trustishlp. This extension

of the Mandate was to continue over time gradually develop­

ing self-government through institutions capable of pro­

tecting the two communities and secondly that Jewish immi- 182 gration continue.

On May 15, 1946, the Arab Higher Committee, under

the aegis of Jamal Effendi, met in Jerusalem. It demanded

the dissolution of the Jewish Agency which was responsible

for the administration of bringing in Jewish immigrants.

The Higher Committee submitted three proposals to the United

182 Report, op. cit 308

States and Britain calling for the abrogation of the Man­ date and cessation of all Jewish immigration; secondly, the establishment of an Arab Palestine; and lastly, the expul­ sion of all foreign troops.

To an invitation from the High Commissioner, Sir

Alan Cunningham, to submit evidence before the Anglo-

American Committee, the Arab Higher Committee, on May 24, refused. The Arab Higher Committee retorted that the future of Palestine would have to be determined by the

Arabs themselves.

The reaction to the Anglo-American Committee's report by the United States came with President Truman's indorsement of the recommendation for increased Jewish immigration. The British, on the other hand, were not quite so sympathetic to the report's recommendations. The British government refused to Implement the procedure for increased

Jewish immigration. The Ylshuv's reaction to the report was acceptance but dismay at the British response. Coincidental to the various reactions was the much publicized "under­ ground" return to the Middle East of Haj Amin al-Husaynl.

X83867N.01/5-2746: Telegram, May 27, 1946, FRUS. 1946, op. cit.. p. 615.

X®^Haj Amin was being "detained" by the French for his collaboration with the Nazis. However, on June 8 he left France, under questionable circumstances, for Cairo and then left for Mashreq, Syria. 309

On June 2, 1946, the Arab heads of state were called together by Egyptian King Faruq at Inshas, Egypt. The primary purpose of the meeting waa to discuss matters deal" lng with antl-communlst measures to be taken Jointly. 185

But Palestine did come up In response to discussions on the

Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry recommendations. The

Arab leaders responded with the demand that Jewish Immigra­ tion Into Palestine be stopped and a halt to Zionist land sales. Another reaction to the report was the decision to provide funds for the Palestinians to carry on "their struggle."I06 This conference was followed soon thereafter by still another.

The Bludan Conference

The Arab League Council convened a conference at

Bludan, Syria, from June 8 to 12, 1946. The conference was held again in an attempt to consolidate the Arab's position on Palestine. 187 Two working committees were formed, one to

l®^Jon an(j David Kimche, Both Sides of the Hill; Britain and the Palestine War (London: Seeker & Warburg, 1960), p T T 7 .

1 A A Akram Zucaytar, The Palestine Question (Damascus: Palestine Arab Refugees Institute, 1958), p. 161.

187 The Political Committee of the Arab League had a series of meetings subsequent to Bludan regarding Palestine: Ag ain at Bludan In June, 1947, at Sofar In September, 1947, Aley in October 1947, Cairo In December, 1947, and February, 1948, Amman In April, 1948, and finally In Damascus in Hay, 1948. 310 study Internal Palestine affairs, the other, external

Palestine affairs.^88 After some Initial study the internal affairs committee recommended that measures be taken to: unify the Palestinian Arab political parties and factions, take measures to protect Palestine from further Jewish

Immigration, stop the sale of land to Jews, organize an

Arab boycott of Zionist industry in Palestine, and assess the results of violence that the Arabs might resort to.^-89

In order to carry out their first recommendation, an invi­ tation was sent out Immediately to Palestinian Arab leaders and they were brought to the conference.^®

The external affairs committee then brought out their report which called for submitting the Palestine question to the United Nations' Security Council, declaring Palestine an Independent state but in keeping within the framework of the UN Charter, it would be a trustlship with the Arab

League acting as the trustee. Lastly, they recommended the use of force as a last resort. 191

Once the reports from both committees were brought before the council there was considerable discussion and

l ^ An-Nahar (Beirut), June 11, 1946, p. 3.

189Ibld.. June 12, 1946, p. 1.

^ ^ Ibid.. June 14, 1946, p. 4. 19llbid. 311

disagreement. It was felt by some that If the caae waa

brought up before the United Nations the British would have

the final word. Secondly, if Palestine were declared

independent it would be more difficult to expunge the

British presence from the Canal Zone in Egypt.

Publicly, the conference decided on the formation of

a Palestine Committee of the Arab League, dissolving both

the reconstituted Arab Higher Committee and the Arab Higher

Front, replacing them with a Higher Palestine Executive in

Palestine.193 Further they called for the demobilization and disarmament of the Zionists and also the formation of a special fund to support the League's activities, to which all Arab governments were to contribute. 194 There were also several secret decisions— "Decisions of Bludan"— made specifically to place pressure on the British and American governments. It was decided that if the British and the

Americana accepted the recommendations of the Anglo-American

10 2 867N.01/6-2546: Telegram, Confidential. FRUS. 1946, ££. cit. . p. 635, n. 84; 890B.00/6-1946 cited therein.

^^The Mufti was made chairman, Jamal al-Husaynl, deputy chairman, Dr. Husayn al-Khalldl, secretary, Ahmad Hilmi Pasha and Amll al-Ghuri as members. Excluded from membership were the Defense Party, the Istiqlal. the Pales­ tine Arab Workers Union (Jamtat al-Ummal al-cArabiyyah). and the Arab Workers' Union~rittihad Nukubat al-uArabiyyah).

^•^An-Nahar. op. cit. 312

Committee of Inquiry and attempted to put them Into force,

the Arab countries would not grant any concessions to them.

They would do this not by supporting western special Inte­

rests In any educational Institutions, waging a moral boy­

cott, considering the cancellation of any concession In

the Arab world, and lastly, by complaining to the United

Nations and the Security Council.

Full military Intervention by League member states was rejected In favor of using the military as a deterrent

force. This added to planned assistance to Arab Irregular

forces which were to be active within Palestine and were to provide sufficient pressure to overcome Jewish military

resistance. This was not unanimously accepted, however.

The Syrians and Haj Amin were outspoken In their demands for military Intervention as soon as the British departed; the reasoning was obvious; a Palestinian state with Haj

Amin as Its head and with strong ties to Syria. cAbdullah was also anxious to intervene; Ernest Bevln had promised 1 - certain areas of Palestine to him but cAbdullah was even more covetous. Perhaps another reason for cAbdullah to

195 FRUS. 1946, ££. cit.. 890B.00/10-1647 cited therein.

[Lieutenant-General Sir] John Bagot Glubb, A Soldier With The Arabs (New York: Harper & Brothers. 1957). r. ------313 wane quick intervention by the Arab Legion was to counter the ambitions of the Syrians in northern Palestine and con­ trol the activities of Haj Amin.

The Morrison-Grady Plan

At the end of July 1946, the British Parliament held a debate on Palestine at which another government plan for the cantonizatlon of Palestine was unfolded. The plan delivered by Herbert Morrison, lord privy seal, became known as the Morrison-Grady Plan for its Anglo-American authorship. 19^ The plan was never officially published but it had been submitted to the Anglo-American Committee and rejected by them.19® The British Intended to discuss the plan with Jews in Palestine as well as in England and

America, Palestinian Arabs and Arab diplomats from the region. Haj Amin, however, was to be excluded from any of the talks.199

The plan would have divided Palestine into three

197 Henry T. Grady was the American Undersecretary of State. 198 Great Britain, Colonial Office, Proposals for the Future of Palestine. July 1946-February 1947 . Cmd. 7044 (London: H.M.S.O., 1947) ; 867N.01/7-2446: Telegram, July 24, 1946, FRUS, 1946, op. cit., pp. 652-668,

199 George Kirk, The Middle East. 1945-50(London: Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 224. 314 zones, two of which were to be partially self-governing

Arab and Jewish provinces with an overall central govern­ ment. Secondly, Jerusalem and the Negev area would remain under the direct jurisdiction of the Mandatory.2®** The plan was Immediately rejected by both the Jews^^ and the

Arabs.202

The Jews rejected the Idea of setting up a pale In

Palestine and It did not permit the full development of a

Jewish community In Palestine. The feelings of the Arabs were expressed by Jamal Effendl when on August 8, he had returned from discussions with the High Commissioner, who proposed that the Arabs attend a conference In London.

Jamal refused the High Commissioner's suggestion, stating that there would be no discussions on the basis of any proposed federal plan. 2 0 J

The London Conference

Again the Arab League stepped In to provide leader­ ship. Following the conference at Bludan, the Arab govern-

200867N.01/7-1946: Telegram, FRUS. 1946, o£. clt.. p . 647. 2®*867N.01/8-246: Telegram, August 2, 1946, Ibid. , pp. 676-677• 202 867N.01/8-1246; Telegram, August 12, 1946, Ibid., pp. 679-682. 203 867N.01/8-1546: Telegram, August 15, 1946, Ibid. . p. 683. 315 menta addressed memoranda Co the British government invit­ ing them to negotiate an agreement over Palestine In keep­ ing with the United Nations' Charter. The British accepted the Idea and sent an Invitation on August 12®4 tQ t |ie A r a |,

League states, the Higher Palestine Executive, and the

Jewish Agency to meet in London.

Azzam Pasha categorically opposed the British plan for a federal.situation as a form of partition. In any case, all the Arab states tended toward accepting the invi­ tation which they felt was the British answer to the Arab note drafted at the Bludan conference.2^ A conference of

Arab foreign ministers was then held at Alexandria. There the ministers adopted a position of unity supporting the

Palestinian Arab aspirations, and accepted the invitation to the London Conference. Arab Higher Committee members that spoke before the Council of Ministers of the Arab League expressed regret at the policies adopted as too noder- ate,^^ an indication of their continued adamancy against compromise through British mediation.

206 The British had told an American Cabinet Committee on Palestine on July 12 of their intention regarding the proposal. 867N.01/7-1946: Telegram, July 19, 1946, Ibid.. p. 647.

2®^867N.01/8-246: Telegram, op. clt. 206867N.01/8-1546: Telegram, Ibid., p. 683. 316

On August 26, 1946, the British announced Its Invi­ tation to the governments of the Arab states and the Secre­ tary of the Arab League. The Foreign Office announced the conference on Palestine would begin in London on September

9. Jamal al-Husaynl, the Deputy Chairman of the Arab

Higher Executive, who had on August 8 rejected an informal invitation on behalf of the Arab Higher Committee, now gave the High Commissioner an acceptance of all five members of the Executive, including the Muf t i! The Foreign Office answered Jamal with permission for Haj Amin, as well as detained Zionist leaders, to attend the Jewlsh-Arab con­ ference .

When Cunningham suggested that the Arab delegation be broadly based with members included from other than the

Executive, Jamal balked.Subsequently the Jewish Agency

Executive rejected the British invitation followed by a

British reversal of its invitation to Haj Amin (who still was considered a war criminal by the British). Not to be outdone, the Arab Higher Executive, on August 31, rejected the British offer to attend the London conference, claiming the sole right to choose its political leaders and they

207 Of the four non-Arab Higher Committee representa­ tives invited two, Suleyman Bey Tuqan, Mayor of Nablus, and Anton Attalah, a Christian Arab lawyer, declined. 317 therefore could not accept any invitation except on their own generated principles* Their real anger centered on the

British reversal on their invitation of the Mufti which the

Palestinians claimed was done because of Zionist Influence. cAbdallah appealed to Husayn al-Khalldi of the Arab Higher

Committee to reconsider its decision to boycott the confer­ ence. Hot to lose total representation the Mufti, however, did approve the Arab League's participation in the confer­ ence.

Now the Zionists came out with their statement, informing the British Colonial Secretary, George Hall, that it eould not participate in the conference unless their con- trol over Jewish immigration would be discussed.208 In order to get around the Zionists, the British then sent invitations to non-Jewlsh Agency Jewish organizations in an attempt to get them to attend the conference. But the

British invitation to non-representative Zionist and Pales- tinian Arab groups was rejected by all approached. 209

The conference was officially opened on September 9,

1946, at Lancaster House, by Prime Minister Clement Atlee, without the boycotting Jewish or Palestinian Arab represen-

208867N.01/9-546, September 5, 1946, PRUS, 1946, op. clt.. pp. 692-693.

209867N.01/9-1046, /-1146, Ibid., p. 696. 318 tatlves being present.jn their stead were the repre­ sentatives of the Arab League states and Azzam Pasha, in a consultive capacity. Atlee announced, initially, that

Britain was not committed to any federal plan and alterna­ tives were to be discussed. The Arabs' position was stated by Paris al-Khourl, chairman of the Syrian Chamber of

Deputies and leader of the Syrian delegation, on the second day of the meeting. The Arabs' proposal was that Britain relinquish the Mandate and call for an independent Arab state in Palestine by 1948. A full legislative program was then outlined and discussed among the various delegates.

The British, however, were not ready to act on the Arab's counterproposals and asked for a brief adjournment which was agreed to by the Arabs. 212 x

The whole idea of partition was rejected by the Arab delegates while the Zionists refused to attend unless the meetings had partition as a basis. As noted already, the conference was at a deadlock by September 13 when it recessed awaiting the British decision on the Arab counter­ proposals, the alternative to which, for the Arabs, was to

210 Ibid.

211867N.01/9-2346: Telegram, Ibid.. pp. 698-699.

212The meeting was to be resumed December 16. 867N.01 /10-346i Telegram, Ibid., pp. 700-701. 319 turn the case over to the United Nations,

Two days after the adjounrment, on September 15,

Cunningham met with Jamal Effendl In an attempt to get the

Arab Higher Executive to attend the conference. In response the Executive presented a five-point memorandum the following day to the Palestine administration calling for the dissolu­ tion of the Jewish Agency, control over their own funds, the

Imposition of collective fines on the Jewish community, and the institution of certain counterterrorist controls on

Jewish paramilitary organizations.

In London, Bevin spoke with the Arab delegates trying to convince them of the feasibility of the Anglo-American

Cabinet Committee's Provincial Plan for Palestine (the

Morrison-Grady Plan). Again Cunningham met with Jamal

Effendi in an attempt to bring him about to accept an invi- talon, but without results. Haj Amin announced that the

Arab Higher Committee's refusal to attend was based on the

High Commissioner's action on inviting other than Arab

Higher Committee Executive members to represent the Pales­ tinians.

The Zionist input now came from Welzmann, as president of the World Zionist Organization. Welzmann informed Bevin that the Jewish Agency would be willing to enter into nego­ tiations with the British if they would discuss a plan for 320

"a viable Jewlah state In an adequate area of Palestine."213

When the conference resumed on September 19, Arab delegates presented another set of counter proposals. The new plan offered Jews a minority status within an Arab

state, a provisional Arab-Jewish government, the drafting of a constitution, and arrangements for the election of a con­ stituent assembly. A nine-man committee (one Britisher and eight Arabs) was appointed to study the proposals for an independent Arab Palestine. To this the Zionist leaders in

London and Paris agreed to drop their boycott and left for

Jerusalem to consult with the Zionist Inner Council. The

The British, however, continued to refuse to release Zion­ ist leaders interned in Palestine, in order that they be permitted to participate in the conference. This action by the British went far to cause the Zionist Inner Council to vote against participation.

The British presented the conference with the

Morrison Plan of provisional autonomy but notified partici­ pants that alternatives were still open for discussion. But the conference adjourned again until December 16, in order to allow Bevin to attend a meeting of the Council of

Foreign Ministers in New York and to enable him to study the

Arab proposals, which were published on October 3. The new

^*^867N.01/10-1846: Telegram, Ibid., pp. 709-710 321

Arab plan Included an Interim government of seven Arabs, three Jews, and a Constituent Assembly of 60 members.

Within two years there was to be an Independent Arab state based on a constitution which prohibited Jewish immigra­ tion, maintained strict land transfer regulations, and limisted Jewish representation in the Legislative body to one-third. As soon as the constitution would be adopted and head of state appointed, parliamentary elections would be held.

In the middle of November it was announced that when the London Conference resumed hearings in December, the

Palestinians would be represented by observers, headed by

Jamal Effendl. This scheduled December meeting, however, was postponed until January, 1947.

In January, 1947, the Arab Higher Executive announced the appointment of five new members: Rafiq at-Tamlmi, cIzzat Darwazeh, Ishaq Darwlsh, Mucln al-Madi, and Hassan

Abu al-Saud. But Darwazeh, Darwish, and Shaykh al-Saud were still in forced exile, the former in Damascus and the latter two in Cairo with al-Saud returning to Palestine in June,

Already on September 30 a Palestine Arab government in exile was created in Alexandria, Egypt, with Haj Amin as President of the Republic and his cousin, Jamal Effendi, as Premier and Foreign Secretary. This was an apparent rejec­ tion of the Arab proposals presented at the conference. 322

1947. At the same time in Cairo the Arab League met and decided that each state should provide a representative delegation to the to-be-resumed London Conference. Azzam

Pasha declared that It would oppose partition and further

Jewish Immigration as well as demand Arab Independence for

Palestine. The League also dispatched a note to the

British requesting that they invite a Palestinian Arab 216 delegation, and restore the civil rights to Haj Amin.

A week later Jamal Effendl, acting chairman of the

Arab Higher Executive, stated that the Palestinians would attend the conference finally providing the potential input from the native actors. Jamal Effendl was to be the leader, along with Husayn al-Khalldl, Amll al-Ghurl, and Mu^ln al-

Madi, all of which were approved by London.

After being adjourned on October 2, the London Con­ ference resumed sessions on January 27. Zionist leaders continued to boycott the conference, however. Paris al-

Khouri, again head of the Syrian delegation, stated that the

Arabs* position had been stated previously In October.

Jamal Effendl, as head of the Palestinian Arab delegation, then made the Palestinian demands knows: self-government

215867N.01/1-647: Telegram, FRUS. 1947, Vol. V, p. 999.

22**Ibid. The British again Invited the Arab Higher Committee, dtf7N.01/1-210, 1-264, Ibid., which was accepted 867N.01/1-1147, 1-447, Ibid.. p. JW7 323 217 and total opposition to partition, which amounted to an announcement of the Palestinians' rejection of the Morrison

Plan.

During the January 30 session, Bevin spoke regarding the October counterproposals of the Arabs. But because of

Jamal Effendi's inflexible stand the British, he felt, would be forced to impose some sort of a solution, which would ultimately be given over to the United Nations for final approval and Implicit implementation.

By early February after several meetings, there was still little success. On February 7, Bevin introduced still another plan which subsequently was to take his name. The

Bevin Plan^l^ was a modified form of the Morrison-Grady proposal but like it it was rejected by both the Jews and

Arabs. Bevin's proposal was a five-year plan for semi- autonomous Jewish and Arab states in Palestine subject to the overall authority of the British, which was subsequently rejected by both communities. The boundaries were not set but to be determined on the basis of the respective people in each area. Jewish immigration was to be increased to

217867N.01/1-2847: Telegram, Ibid., p. 1016.

218867N.01/1-3147: Telegram, Ibid., pp. 1021-1022.

^*®Cmd. 7044, o£. clt. 324

4,000 a month for two years. This plan was to be operative for five years after which time, If It did not work, It 220 would then be submitted to the United Nations.

When Bevin met with the Arab delegation on February

14, he notified them that since no mutual agreement could be reached nor was acceptance of British proposals on the near horizon, the next step would be to present the problem of Palestine before the United Nations without a recommenda­ tion.^21 Almost Immediately, Fadel al-Jamall, Foreign

Minister of Iraq and Chairman of the Arab League, indicated that even If the United Nations came up with a solution, unless It fully satisfied Arab demands, it would be rejected.

In the meantime, the Arab League held secret meetings in Cairo on March 17 and March 23. The League delegates set forth a strong resolution on Palestine. As in so many past resolutions, the League pledged: the organization to the defence of [Arab] Palestine, to create a committee for the defence of Palestine, request funds to be supplied to the

Arab Higher Committee to enable it to Intensify Arab propa­ ganda, and educate overseas Arabs for the purpose of

220867N.01/2-1347: Telegram; 867N.01/2-1147; 867N.01/ 3-1447, Ibid.. p. 1044. It was the feeling of the Pales­ tinian Arab delegation that in an ensuing power vacuum with Palestine in contention between the Arabs and Zionists, the Palestinians would handle the situation, perhaps with the assistance of the Arab League. 221 867N.01/2-1447: Telegram, Ibid., p. 1047. 325 establishing an Arab university in Palestine. The resolu­ tion further called for the immediate and complete cessation of Jewish immigration into Palestine. As a corollary to the demand on immigration cessation, British efforts to curtail it were condemned as inadequate.2 2 2 It w a 8 a^BO at this second conference that cAbdullah announced his assumption of the responsibility to protect the Arab character of

Palestine.22^ Zn discussions with Arab leaders, cAbdullah agreed to support their efforts and was even friendly to their attempts at dissuading him from his dream of a

Greater Syria. cAbdullah was now interested in a Greater

Transj ordan. 22^

222867N.01/3-2647: Telegram, Ibid., p. 1065. 7 71 Kimche, o£. clt.. p. 55; 867N.01/3-2647: Telegram; 867N.01/3-2847: Telegram, FRUS. 1947, 0 £. cit.. p. 1065. n n / Ibid., p. 59. cAbdullah was shrewd. His spproach to the partition proposal was based on three major factors: his desire to control Palestine, the ambiguity of British policy, and those opposed to her territorial schemes. According to Abidi, cAbdullah's talks with the Zionists were to add to the facade of his agreement to the partition. Aqil Hyder Hasan Abidi, Jordan: A Political Study. 1948- 1957 (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1965), pp. 25-38. For a good discussion of cAbdullah>s contacts with Jewish leaders subsequent to the Amman talks which give some indication of his intentions, see Golda Melr, "Israel in Search of Lasting Peace," Foreign Affairs. Vol. 21, No. 3 (April, 1973), p. 449; Bernard Postal and Henry W. Levy, And the Hills Shouted for Joy: The Day Israel Was Born (New York: David McKay, Inc., 1973y, Chapter 10; Larry Collins and Dominique Laplerre, £ Jerusalem! (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1972), pp. 366-369; Zeev Sharef, Three Days (Garden City, N. Y. : Doubleday and Co., 1962), pp. 72-Z6; Marie Syrkin, Golda 326

The Establiahment of UWSCOP

On April 2, 1947, the British requested that the

Palestine question be placed on the General Assembly

agenda.22^ The General Assembly adjourned on May 15 after

adopting a resolution which established a Special Committee

to study the problem of Palestine.22^ The United Nations

Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) held Its first

meeting on May 26 and there decided to go to Palestine on

a fact-finding mission. Before the Committee arrived in

Jerusalem, Jamal Effendl announced an Arab community boy­

cott of UNSCOP which was done in addition to a one-day

strike when it arrived in Jerusalem on June 16.227 But

there was evidence of internal Palestinian dissent to the

Arab Higher Committee's decision as Jamal Effendl and Paris al-Khouri shortly thereafter spoke to prominent Palestinian

Arabs explaining the decision and trying to mollify them.

Meir, A Woman with a Cause. An Authorized Biography (New York: G.P. .Putnam* s Sons, 196T5*, pp. 195-20TT

22^United Nations. Official Records of the General Assembly. First Speclal Session. Vol. I. Plenary Meetings. Supplement No. lT, GA(S-T"5 (New York, 1947) , p . 183.

226501.BB/5-1647, FRUS. 1947, o£. cljt., p. 1085. This resulted in the creation of the UNSCOP. GA(S-I), Plenary, op. cit., pp. 197-203.

2 2 7 GA(S-I), Supplement No. 11, Vol. II, p. 5; 501. BB Palestine/6-2347, FRUS. 1947, o£. ci£., p. 1107. 228 501.BB Palestlne/6-1147: Telegram, Ibid., p. 1102. 327

While UNSCOP was In Palestine, It held public hear­ ings with a multitude of Zionist representatives appearing before it. Arab views were heard when UNSCOP went to

Beirut where It remained for four days. There the Committee heard from Lebanese Foreign Minister, Uamld Bey Frangleh, and Iraqi Foreign Minister, Mohammed Fadll al-Jamali. The arguments of Frangleh and Jamali were reiterated by

Jordanian Premier Samir Pasha ar-Rlfai when the Committee proceeded to Amman.

UNSCOP came up with a report on August 31, 1947, with a majority plan calling for partition and a minority position which called for a federal state. The Committee unanimously recommended that the Mandate be terminated with the governing authority transferred to the United

Nations. Palestine was also to be Independent, with a recommendation from many of the Committee's membership for a partition of land between Jews and Arabs. From two work­ ing committees that were established to look Into the pos­ sibility of partition came a majority and minority report.

The majority report called for a partition scheme, while the minority recommended a federal state.

Upon the submission of the partition report, the

Arab League was thrown into a quandary. An emergency meet­ ing was called for to be held at Soafar, Lebanon, on

September 16, 1947; Iraqi Prime Minister Salih Jabr 328 presided. Jabr called for the publication of the secret measures agreed upon at the Bludan conference, that Britain and the United States be formally notified of those mea­ sures and they would be put into effect if the Palestine question was left up to the United Nations. Jabr also called upon the member states to furnish contributions to the central fund to assist the Palestinians.

Still another meeting was held at Aley, Lebanon, and again with Jabr at its head. Here the Arabs decided on the establishment of an Arab General Headquarters and the com­ bined mobilization of their armed strength on the borders of Palestine.

On November 29, 1947, the United Nations' General

Assembly endorsed the partition proposal.The following day the Arab Higher Executive decided to call a three-day general strike throughout Palestine and to boycott any

229 United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly. Second Session. Resolutions. 16 September- 29 November. 19^7 (New York~j 1947). The partition proposal was referred to by the Palestinian Arabs as the "Death of a Thousand Cuts." Edgar O'Ballance, The Arab-Israeli War 1948 (New York: Praeger, 1937), p. 32. The proposal was, on paper and in theory unequal. It was to give 750,000 Jews who owned 1,588,365 dunums of land or 7 percent of the total area 55 percent of Palestine. The Palestinians who numbered 1,300,000 were to get 45 percent. For new moods of concili­ ation on the part of the Arabs on November 29, see 501.A Summaries/12-147: Telegram, FRUS, 1947. op. clt.. pp. 1293- 1294. 329

activity having anything to do with the partition pro-

poaal.

The Hebrew dally Haaretz reported on April 7 that

the Arab Higher Executive met in Damascus and decided to

assume control over Palestine upon termination of the

Mandate. A provisional Arab government for Palestine was

to assume control with Haj Amin as Its president, to have

been declared on May 15, with Its capital in Jerusalem or

Nablus, whichever was more feasible.

On May 15, 1948, the initial phase of the Pales­

tinian Arab national movement ended. Israel declared its

independence in that portion of Palestine allocated it by

the United Nations and thereby inhibited the development of a Palestinian Arab state within the totality of the

territory.

Summary

The Zionist leadership capitalized on its highly centralized governing structure by which the political leadership could command the bulk of the Yishuv. The

Zionist political structure was further protected by a civilian-controlled military organization, the Haganah.

Perhaps more Important was the d_e facto recognition of the

Zionist Organization's existence and competence to govern the Yishuv, by the British. The Zionists were unquestion­ 330 ably well entrenched In Palestine. They had a ready source of economic and personal wealth to draw from external to

Palestine. The Palestinians, on the other hand, continued to operate In a sporadic fashion, striking, creating various types of protest movements, limited guerrilla war­ fare, and depending largely on the other regional Arab states to place pressure on the major world powers for favorable decisions. Overseas Arab communities were mobilized to serve their cause but they never had the capacity for lobbying that national Zionist organizations could muster.

Most Important, the Palestinian leadership that was recognized as legitimate by the masses of Palestinians was external to Palestine proper. The Palestinians were there­ fore forced to play their role as a quasi provisional government In exile, a situation that continues to date. CHAPTER VI

POLITICAL VIOLENCE

The development of the Palestinian Arab national movement from an Incipient expression of attachment to

Syria in 1919 to the penultimate dissatisfaction at the establishment of Israel in 1948 violence was a common experience. Because of the predominance of this phenomenon the ideal explanation would include some sort of categorical enumeration of violent events. However, a diachronic description of violent events in Palestine during this period would be unworthy with data presently available.^

We have therefore concentrated on specific major outbreaks of violence: April, 1920; May, 1921; August, 1929; October,

1933; the Arab Strike and Revolt of 1936-1939; and the

"undeclared war," that period of inter-communal conflict that immediately preceded the open warfare that accompanied the Israeli declaration of independence of May 15, 1948.

^The New York Times Index reporting during the 1920's and 1930's was often spotty as was Orlante Moderno. Official British mandatory records were either missing or destroyed; when available, they tended to be cumulative not divulging incremental or daily details. The London Times * reporting was neither accurate nor comprehensive for this period and topic. Even the most comprehensive source, the seven volume study of professor Menahem Mansoor, was insufficient. Poli­ tical and Diplomatic History of the Arab World: A Chrono­ logical Study (Washington, D. C.: NCR Microcard Editions. m ¥ r . ------332

Our use of the term and concept of political violence follows Nleburg's definition which is all-inclusive to

Include the many facets of violence. Nieburg thus defines political violence as:

Acts of disruption, destruction, Injury whose purpose, choice of tragets or victims, surrounding circumstances, implementation, and/or effects have political signifi­ cance, that is, tend to modify the behavior of others In a bargaining situation that has consequences for the social system.

Violence in Palestine

Violence was known in Palestine long before the Man­ date or Zionist'colonization efforts. Nor was political violence even assuming the same targets, limited to the mandatory period.'1 Banditry and brigandage were common enough with traditional norms within Palestinian society, accounting for Its partial acceptance.^

^H. L. Nieburg, Political Violence: The Behavorlal Perspective (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1969), p. 13,

^In March, 1920, a full ten weeks before the formal granting of the Mandate to the British, Arab bands attacked the villages and Zionist settlements of Tel Hal, Hamarah, Kfar Gileadi, and Metullah, all In norther Galilee, destroy­ ing them and resulting In several deaths for the Jewish colonists. L In the opinion of professor Hanl Fakhourl, University of Akron, Department of Anthropology, tribal Institutional­ ized blood feuds reduces the level of domestic public vio­ lence. In a personal communication. See also Fakhourl's "Vendetta! An Anthropological Study of Blood Feuds and the Payment of Blood Money Among the Bedouin of East Jordan" (paper read at the 70th American Anthropological Association 333

The corporative structure of Palestinian society engendered greater conflict in the pre-mandatory period with the emergence of a new stratum of shaykhs. A similar pheno­ menon occurred in 18th century Syria. The Increase in vio­ lent conflict there at that time was "directly related to

the principal development of that century: the emergence of powerful local interests in Syria— the a°yan class in the towns and the multazim-shaykhs in the rural areas.^ Thus traditionalism was challenged from within the cultural set­ ting before the arrival of the British. Once the British mandatory was established physical evidence of a western bureacracy, which the British saw as a symbol of a western model which could be emulated, created an additional chal­ lenge to the Arabs. The British model was also closely similar in structure and orientation to the formal Zionist presence and organizational facilities. Together the

British and Zionist organization, as western institutions

Convent ion, November 1971, New York, if! Y .T; E.N. Haddad, "Blood Revenge Among the Arabs," The Journal of the Palaa- tine Oriental Society. X, No. 2 (April 1920), pp. 103-112; M. J. L. Hardy. Blood Feuds and the Payment of Blood Money in the Middle East (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1965T. For a reference to the socio-economic aspects of banditry and violence see Bernard D. Welnryb, "Socio-Economic Relations of Arabs and Jews In Palestine," Contemporary Jewish Record. VII, No. 4 (August 1944), p. 379.

^Shimon Shamir, "Belligerency in a Disintegrating Society— Factional Warfare in Ottoman Syria on the Eve of the Period of Modernization," Abr-Hahraln. XII (1971-1972), pp. 80-83. 334

inplanted within the Arab cultural setting, was unsettling

to the Palestinian Arab connunlty; it presented a clear cut

example of defiance to the accepted code of behavior in an

Islamic community.

The Palestinians have never been acknowledged as an

exceptionally violent people.^ But violence was a fact of

their cultural life intertwined with their religious heri­

tage. Islam is an excluslvist religion evidenced by its

bifurcation of the world into believers (Par al-Islam— the

Abode of Islam) and the world of the Infidel (Par al-Harb—

the Abode of War).^ This latter condition could conceivably

include Christian Arabs** and not be exclusively reserved for

^Banlel Lerner found among Palestinian respondents that they "tended much more frequently to endorse violent solutions" [than non-Palestinian Jordanians]. The Passing of Traditional Society; Modernising the Middle Bast (New York: The Free Press. 1958), pT 313. This, of course, must be taken in the perspective of a reaction toward Israel and the varied perceptions that lead to this degree of anger* See also, however. Mrs. [James] Finn. "The Fellahln of Pales­ tine: Notes on their Clans. Warfare. Religion and Laws." Palestine Exploration Fund. Quarterly Statement. II (January 1879). pp. 33-48. For a post-1967 study on the Palestinian proclivity toward the use of violence see Yasumada and Alice A. Kuroda. "Personal Political Involve­ ment of Palestinian Youths: A Study of Political Socializa­ tion in a Revolutionary Policy." Middle East Forum (Summer 1971), pp. 50-65.

^A middle ground does exist with the Par al-Sulh or Par al-cAhd. In this condition infidels may live among Mus- 1 1 ms upon cession of territory or payment of tribute follow­ ing a holy war. See Majid Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam (Baltimore, Md.t The Johns Hopkins Press, 1955), pp. 144-145.

®In 1936 Palestinian Muslims had a slogan that was 335 the Jews, even In the Arab-Israeli context. Religion, therefore, may be considered one basis for the Arabs' hos­ tility and predilection toward the use of violence as com­ pared to a more tolerant and cooperative position confronted with a plural community setting with those living in the

Par al-Harb.

Religion was the partial basis for the formation of terroristic societies in Palestine. In February, 1919, an organization called al-Qaf al-Suda (The Black Hand) was formed in Palestine. Its primary purpose and basic aims were to oppose the British and fight the Jews. During the course of its limited existence— it lasted but a few years— Wadrlh al-Bustani, the local advisor to the military government, gave out the proclamation: "Exterminate the danger before it is too strong and indefeatable..Kill the snail so long as

It is young. We will also kill traitors." In May, the organization changed its name to Gameish al-Fldaiya with its a headquarters in Damascus and branches In Jaffa and Ramleh. called out after Friday noon-day prayers while coming out of the mosques: "Tomorrow is Saturday and the day after is Sunday," (burka assabt wa-badu al-hadd) meaning that they would take care of the Jews first and then the Chriatians. "Sarih." "Frankly Speaking," The New Middle East, No, 13 (October 1969), p. 10. Q Members were Gabra al-Isa, Shaykh Raghlb al-Dajani, Ahmad All al-Dajani, Wadrih Isa, and Suleman Abu Razlih. 24/3886/1, January 30, 1920, CZA. 336

Again In 1922v for example, a terroristic organization, The

New Fearful Society (Al-Jamlyah al-Rahiba). was formed in

Nablus. As many similar groups, It maintained itself through solicited funds. Its aim was to rid the country of

British officials and In this attempt threatened the life of Colonel C. H. F. Cox, the Samaria District Governor.^

It appears, however, that this group did little and was of minor significance. Two years later, partly as an out­ growth of this movement developed the Muslim Self-Sacrific­ ing Society (Al-Jamiyah al-Fidaiya) operating out of

Jerusalem. Its sole purpose was to defend and support Haj

Amin, It had no particular meeting place and its members were given different jobs either with the Supreme Muslim

Council or with the Mosque. Its composition was made up of the lover classes of Jerusalem society and all were sworn to sacrifice themselves for Haj Amin and act as his body guard as well as carry out propaganda in his favor among the

Muslim inhabitants of Palestine.^

102/166/POL/12/l, August 3, 1922, ISA. Its chief director was Jamil Kemal, Anls Ahmed Tamiml assisted by Hafez Agha Tuqan, Izzat Darwazah, Farid Anabtavi, and Hamli al-Fltianl. "Volunteers” were: Hamdl Baler1 Tamiml, Shukr Sharabl, Fawzl Arafat, Muttada Khayat, Neglb al-Khayat, Abdallah Darwlsh Ahmed, and Rashid Fawzl Elsh.

U 2/166/POL/12/4, May 9, 1924, ISA. Some of its members were: Abdul Muhsin Sabbagha, Falz Tuqan al-Husayni, Mohammed al-Dabbagh, Abed Rashid, Arafat al-Ikermawi, and Rlzk (a Negro) [sic.]. 337

Another explanation for the prevalence of violence may be the lack of security due to a lack of government presence, which In turn failed to create conditions for security. Amiran In his studies of 19th-century urbani­ zation found that the fear of Bedouin raids (ghazw)--because of poor security— was one of the most potent factors in determining the pattern of settlement.^ This was also at the basis of the Anglo-American model of public administra­ tion for developing areas, developed as a reaction to com­ munist Insurgencies In Southeast Asia.

Revolutionary warfare operations have the greatest potential for success In areas that historically have not been subject to the operational administration of a particular nation-state. Operating within a rural milieu, an insurgency organization finds either alienated residents or, more frequently, residents whose entire socialization haa omitted little but the moat occasional reference to an outside government. ^

Thus violence In general was a pervasive factor to the life of the Palestinians and certainly in the communal relations with the Jews. But as It regards the development

12 D. H. K. Amiran, "The Pattern of Settlement In Palestine," Israel Exploration Journal. Ill, No. 2 (1953), p. 69.

^Charles A. Joiner, "The Ubiquity of the Administra­ tive Role In Counterinsurgency," Aslan Survey. VII, No. 8 (August 1967), p. 542. See also the discussion by the Bri­ tish expert Sir Robert Thompson, based on his experiences In Malaya and Vietnam. Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam (New York: Praeger, 1966), pp. 70-89. 338 of Palestinian nationalism It was the more concentrated and sanguinary outbreaks of violence that capture our attention.

The distinction between an actual and a perceived threat, that leads to a violent reaction or response, Is a thin one. Most certainly the Palestinian Arabs as the native population in Palestine viewed the actualization of the Zionist program as a threat to their national existence.

The systematic transfer of land was Indeed an Impairment of the economic Interests of many Palestinians. Also the thought of the Jews establishing a colonle du peuplement was anathema to a people that were in the midst of a period in their cultural history when they were attempting to restab- lish their Identity. The question of land sales loomed larger in Palestine largely due to the relatively small size of the liveable area. Moreover, we must also note that

Palestine and the Arab East, for the most part, represented a single Muslim civilization and while the Jews and Arabs were Semitic peoples they had not lived together in any numbers for centuries. Lastly, one must remember that Jewish immigration came at a rapid rate for the period of 1920 to

1948, rather than slowly and gradually. All these, and prob­ ably others, affected the course of events that led to

Individual and collective acts of notable violence.

The Easter Riots of 1920

The Muslim festival of Nebi Musa, an essentially 339 local--Palestlnian— religious doing, in 1920 case on April

14. During this period, pious Muslims traditionally per­ form a pilgrimage to the^alleged tomb of Moses, a prophet in Islam, found on the Jericho road. As was generally the case, several thousand fellahin arrived in Jerusalem from

Hebron. At the outskirts of the city they were greeted by

Musa Kazlm al-Husayni, the mayor, who delivered a very patriotic speech. This was followed by two men who dis­ played a large photograph of Amir Faysal, on the balcony of the Arab Club, and who shouted, "Long live our King— King

Feisall In the name of our King we urge you to fight the

Jewel With this, Arabs began to attack Jews throughout the city of Jerusalem. In the short period of three hours

160 Jews had been wounded.

When finally British troops interceded, order was maintained and several hundred Arabs were detained in a

14 Horace B. Samuel, Unholy Memories of the Holy Land (London: The Hogarth Press, 1930), pp. 55-57.

^ I t was reported an hour before the disturbances the mayor of Jerusalem informed Mr. Izhak Cohen, a merchant across the street from the Municipality, that he should close his shop early in anticipation of trouble. In addition most of the Arab shops in the New Street of the Old City were closed down at least an hour before and a few of the Arab shops on Jewish streets bore Arabic script indicating Arab ownership. Z4/10201, April 7, 1920; Z4/2707/130, CZA. Similar evidence is presented by Colonel R. Meinertzbagen, then Chief Politi­ cal Officer within the Administration. Middle East Diary. 1917-1956 (New York: Thomas Yoseloff, Publishers, 1959), pp. 79-69. 340 mosque overnight. However, when they were released In the morning the disturbances were resumed. The disturbances lasted from April 4 to the 10th, though sporadically, with casualties of 251 (9 killed, 22 seriously wounded, and 220 slightly wounded; five Jews killed, 18 seriously wounded, and 193 slightly wounded; seven British soldiers wounded at the hands of the mob).^

While the subsequent commission of inquiry, headed up by Major General Palin, never publicly reported its find­ ings, Sir Ronald Storrs, then Governor of Jerusalem, wrote later that "the immediate fomenter of the Arab excesses had been one Haj Amin al-Husseini, the younger brother of

Kamal Effendi, the Mufti.He was subsequently condemned by a Military Council and sentenced to ten years' imprison- 1Q ment. He, along with Aref al-Aref, 7 escaped to Transjordan

16 Report of the Court in Inquiry Convened by Order of H. E. The High Commissioner and Commander-in-Chief Dated the 12th Day of April 1920. July 1. 1920. pp. 75-77; FO 371/5121, August 4 , 1920, PRO.

^ Ibid.. The report was only made available for public viewing in the Foreign Office files in 1968. The Foreign Office told the Zionists that a civil inquiry was impossible under a military admlnistratioa and therefore they requested General Allenby to make suitable arrangements. Z4/1212/I, April 23, 1920, CZA. 18 Orientations (London: Ivor Nicholson & Watson Ltd.. 1937), p . i8$.

19RG 226 OSS 58789,C, February 15, 1944, NA. 341

and their sentences were later repealed by special pardon.20

The sentencing of Haj Amin boomed his prestige in the eyes

of the Arabs and was in fact the vehicle that started him

on his career as the arch-enemy of Zionism.

One of the general causes for the lack of control

over the spread of the violence was insufficient police

protection and the unreliability of Arab policemen, who in

the service of the British, could not or would not protect

the Jews. This would recur again in future disorders*

The principle in organizing the police force in

Palestine was community proportionality which was then

prorated. Furthermore, this was at the discretion of the

Military Governor whether it should be altered, especially

In the larger cities. For example, in the Jerusalem govern-

ate were 20 percent Jews and in the city 60 percent. There were nine police stations in Jerusalem with five in Jewish

centers. The proportion of police in Jerusalem was one Jew

to seven Arabs or 32 Jews and 200 Arabs. This was an objec­

tive for change by the Jerusalem Municipal Council and

Zionist Commission on several occasions prior to the outbreak

20 Norman Bentwich, 7_7 Years (London: Hutchinson, 1961), p. 73. Also jailed was Vladimir Jabotinsky, a Russian-born Jew who organized a Jewish defense organization. After the disturbances he was arrested on a charge of illegal possession of firearms, tried for subversion, convicted and placed in Acre prison. He subsequently received amnes ty. 342 21 of the vllence but to no avail.

Hay Day Rlota of 1921

During the evening of April 30t 1921, Communist literature, appearing in Hebrew, Yiddish, and Arabic, call­ ing for the proletariat to rise up against the British and establish a Soviet Palestine, was distributed.22 On the following day the traditional day for celebration by the western laborer, an authorized General Trade Union demonstra­ tion, the Achduth Avodah, as part of the Zionist May Day parade, conflicted with an unauthorized Communist demonstra­ tion of the Mlflogat Poallm Soclllstlm (Mopsl), a Trotskyite faction, in the streets of Tel Aviv. The police responded to the situation by accompanying the Communist demonstrators to the city's central square and dispersing them, which happened near the coterminous Arab Jaffa. Whereupon the

Arabs began to throw stones and then began to attack Jews In the vicinity. Crowds of Arabs went on to attack the Zionist

Commission Immigrant Depot, an immigrant hostel, leaving 13

Jews dead. In all, 25 Jews were killed the first day. On

May 5, on the first day of the Muslim festival of Nebl-Saleh, the Jewish colony of Petach-Tiqva was attacked by several

21Z4/1212/I, April 23, 1920, CZA

22CO 733/13, June 9, 1921, PRO. 34 3 thousand Arabs led by Shaykh Shakir Abu Klshk. Four Jews were killed this time. About the same time the colonies of

Kfar Saba and Rehoboth were attacked and destroyed. The following day Hedara was also attacked.^ In allt 95 per­ sons were reported killed with 219 wounded.^

Wailing Wall Disturbances. 1929

In the summer of 1929 the Sixteenth Zionist Congress was held in Zurich at which it was decided to extend the

Jewish Agency, permitting non-Jewish Zionists to participate in their movement. The Palestinian nationalists saw this as a method of increasing Zionist capability to increase financial resources for land purchases; Jewish immigration in 1929 was more than double from the previous year.^ All the prerequisites for communal violence in Palestine were present.

The immediate source of conflict lay at the religious edifice revered by both Jews and Muslims. At one end of the

Haram ash-Sharlf (The Noble Sanctuary) is the only remaining

2 i Samuels, op. cit., pp. 70-72.

^ T h e incident was discussed by Samuel in his report to London. CO 733/3/21723, May 2, 1921, PRO.

^Christopher Sykes, Crossroads to Israel (New York: The World Publishing Co., 1965), pp. lOT^l 66; Ben Halparn, The Idea of the Jewish State (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2d ed., 1969), p. 200. 344 wall from the third Temple of Herod. The Jews refer to It as the Walling Wall (Kotel Ha-Maarvi— the Western Wall); the Muslims refer to It as the Wall of al-Buraq (the name of the * legendary horse ridden by the Prophet).

Orthodox Jews were not permitted to enter the Haram-- law— because of Its holiness to them. Instead they traveled through an adjacent Arab quarter and through an alleyway leading to the Wall. The Arabs were particularly sensitive toward Jewish intentions in regard to the Wall, spurred on by a fear of the Zionists attempting to rebuild the Temple of Solomon on the same spot (on which the Dome of the Rock was built).

In 1919, Informal discussions were held between Chaim

Welzmann and Storrs, then Military Governor, regarding the possibility of obtaining by purchase certain rights for the

Jews to the Wall. A figure of £78,000 was revealed in Doar

Hayom (October 7, 1925). The idea was abandoned on the advice of Storrs, however. In May, 1920, Muslim authorities began certain repairs to the Wall, generally on Saturday, the Jewish Sabbath.^ On May 16 the Zionist Commission complained to Storrs and on June 14 the Chief Administrator

Christian cartographers during the 12th century referred to the area as Templus Salomonis and the Wall as Claustrum Salomonis. 27 Palestine. VII, No. 18 (June 12, 1920), p. 144 345 issued instructions to the Military Governor to halt all repairs on Saturdays*

The Muslims considered the Wall wagf property, but actually it was not placed under the Supreme Muslim sharica until December 21. Up to that time, the administration was

in the hands of the General Waqf Committee, instituted shortly after British occupation.

After a series of demands and counter demands, the

Palestine administration ruled that the Jews were not entitled to bring chairs or benches to the Wall. Problems continued when on April 1, 1923, the first day of the Jewish

Passover coincided with the Muslim Nebl Musa holiday and the police refused access to the Wall for Jews. Then on Sep­ tember 28, 1925, on the Jewish Day of Atonement (Yom Kippur). a bench and chairs were removed by police after a complaint was lodged by the Mufti.^

Problems continued when on September 24, 1928, again

Jewish worshippers attempted to place a screen in the alley­ way in order to segregate the men from the women during Yom

Kippur services, to be held the following day, in keeping with

Jewish law. The Arabs objected to this, fearing this would be used by the Jews as a claim to property rights. The screen was ordered removed by Edward Keith Roach, the Deputy

28 Z4/2797/16, CZA. 346

District Commissioner for Jerusalem, for fear of creating

or exacerbating racial conflict.

This incident served as a cause for specious anti-

Semitic attacks by the Mufti and exaggerated allegations

made against Jewish "greed.The Muf11 convened a General

Muslim Conference on November 1, 1928, in order to establish

a Society for the Protection of the Holy Places. He sent

*1 I secret messages to the Indian Muslims'’-1' in order to widen

the scope of his attack and broaden his support.

Apparently incidents continued. Muslims did much to

annoy Jewish worshippers, with the confidence of having legal

ownership of the Western Wall. Repair work was initiated in

the area and Muslim religious practices were introduced to

29 Douglas V. Duff, Bailing with a_ Teaspoon (London: John Long, 1953), pp. 169-175. Duff was the policeman in charge of the detail of the screen's removal. Roach and Duff arrived and spoke with the Beadle. Roach told the Beadle that the screen wasn't permitted and would have to be re­ moved. The Beadle, speaking in Yiddish, refused to do so during the prayer services. Roach stated that not only the screen but the carpets would also have to be removed since it was a "public thoroughfare." After some conversation, Roach permitted the Beadle to have the screen remain but it would have to be removed the following day. When there was some hesitancy on the part of the Beadle to do it until sun­ down, Roach volunteered Duff's duty to do it early In the morning. Z4/4103, September 1928, CZA.

30C0 733/160, October 1928, PRO.

3^The messages were sent to Maulana Shawkat cAli of the Central Khilafat Committee, Bombay, CO 733/173, October 17, 1928,.PRO. 347 create further annoyances. The grave injustice perceived by the Jews then led them to create a Pro-Walling Wall

Committee headed by professor Joseph Klausner, composed of extreme orthodox Jewish elements.^

These matters were to be generally referred to the

Holy Places Commission, but due to the objection of the

Vatican and a disagreement between France and Italy over who was to be chairman it was never set up.33 Storrs felt inadequate to adjudicate the matter as did Sir Harry Luke, the Deputy District Commissioner. The situation was also exploited by the Arab press and some of the Jewish press.

These events were only those leading up to the break­ ing point which came during the summer of 1929. August 14 fell on the ninth of Ab on the Jewish calendar, a day com­ memorating the destruction of Solomon's Temple, celebrated by the Jewish holiday of Tlsa B'Av and a demonstration was held. The following day a small group of Zionist extremists led a procession through Jerusalem streets to the Wall where

32 ESCO, Foundation for Palestine. Palestine: A Study of Jewish. Arab, and British Policies (New Haven, Conn.t Yale University Presa^ 1949), Vol. II, p. 602; CO 733/160, November 7, 1928, PRO.

33 H. Eugene Bovis, The Jerusalem Question. 1917-1968 (Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University, Hoover Institution Press, 1971), pp. 13-16; Norman Bentwlch, England in Pales­ tine (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co.. T732), pp^ 174-175. 348

they raised the Jewish flag and sang their anthem

(Hatlkvah).3^ The Muslims angered at the contemptuous behavior of the Zionists held a counter demonstration the

following day, Friday, not only the Muslim Sabbath, but

this time it was also the Prophet's birthday.33 After mid­ day prayers at the Haram the worshippers went to the Wall where they heard an inflammatory speech by Hasan Abu as-

Sacud, a shaylth at the Al-Aqsa mosque and a confederate of

HaJ Amin. Several religious articles belonging to the Jews,

found at the Wall, were destroyed.

A soccer game, on August 17, among a group of Jewish youths led to a fatal stabbing of one of them by an Arab.

Then came Jewish demonstrations and Arab counter demonstra­

tions. Events climaxed on Friday, August 23, 1929. The

Haram was crowded with the usual Junta*a (Friday) crowd of villagers from the outlying areas, though this time they came armed with sticks and clubs. During the noonday prayers, the Mufti and some of the shaykhs of the Mosque preached as usual; exactly what was said this time is debatable.3**

34CO 733/163, August 16, 1929, PRO.

35CO 733/175, August 15, 1929, PRO.

3^Edwln Samuel, then private secretary to Sir Harry Luke, acting High Commissioner (Officer Administering Government), claims that the Mufti preached an inflammatory speech against the Jews. A Lifetime in Jerusalem; The 349

In any case, Incited to a fevered pitch they exited

the Haram, attacking Jews wherever they could find them. In

the village of Motza, on the Jerusalem-Jaffa road, on the

outskirts of Hebron, numerous Jewish students were murdered

at the Slovadka Rabbinical College (Yeshiva). The local

shaykh. Taleb Morke, was called upon by the Muf t i to kill the

Memoirs of the Second Viscount Samuel (Jerusalem: Israel Universities Press, 1970), p . 106. In a letter from Dr. Chaim Weizmann, President of the World Zionist Organization and Jewish Agency for Palestine to the Right Honourable Lord Lloyd, Colonial Secretary, dated September 26, 1929, Weizmann refers to Information the latter had given him regarding the Muf t i's sermon. Lloyd alluded to its inflam­ matory nature and asked Weizmann not to make political gain from it, to which he agreed. Z4/2797/4, CZA. Inflammatory statements allegedly made are given by Horace B. Samuel, op. clt.. pp. 9, 11, 289. In the opinion of Chancellor, the High Commissioner, the Mufti staged the disturbances to test the loyalty and political reaction of the masses to his per­ sonal appeal; he wanted to know the extent of his power and support. FO 371/13753, September 16, 1929, PRO. This was confirmed by Luke when he spoke with Musa Kazim al-Husaynl. FO 371/13752, September 29, 1929, PRO. Evidence given before the Shaw Commission by two Arab policemen present at the time Indicated that the speeches "were of a pacifying character." Great Britain, Commission on Palestine Disturbances of August, 1929, Report of the .Com­ mission on the Palestine Disturbances of August. 1929, Cmd. 3530 (London: H.M.S.O., 1939), p. 6l. This is supported by Mrs. Steuart Ersklne, a well-known British Arabophlle, who wrote that "in the mosques there were pacific speeches. The Mufti was most anxious to avoid bloodshed, and did everything he could to keep his followers within bounds. An order was given to take the sticks away, but it was found to be impos­ sible, as many had already been admitted, and the men were coming from all sides. 'Arm yourselves with mercy,' said the Mufti. 'with wisdom and patience, for verily God la with those who fear themselves with patience.'" Palestine of the Arabs (London: George G. Harrap & Co., Ltd.^ 1935), p . 131. Christopher Sykes known for his pro-Zionist affections, writes that "they said nothing that could be called incite­ ments..." Crossroads to Israel (Cleveland and New York: The World Publishing Co., 1965), p. 109. 350 37 Jews in Hebron. In allv about 60 Jews were killed there.

On August 29, the Arabs attacked the Jewish Sephardlc quarter of Safed, followed by the burning of the rest of the

Jewish section of that largely Jewish city, killing 22

Jews.38 The disturbances in their entirety were extremely sanguinary: 133 Jews were killed and 339 wounded; 116 Arabs killed with 180 wounded.3^ The poor response by British and

3^For a description of the violence there see Frede­ rick H. Klsch, Palestine Diary (London: Victor Gollancz, 1938), p. 263; Sykes, oj>. cit. . pp. 118-119. The activities of the Mufti have never been completely assessed in regard to the 1929 disturbances. F. H. Kisch, of the Zionist Com­ mission held an Interview with Mahmud al-Fahum of Nazareth (Tewfiq al-Fahum was the head of the family). Klsch was told that on July 23 the Mufti along with Hasan Abu Sacud visited Jenin, Nazareth Tiberias and Safed talking with the Muslims at the sharlca courts telling them to be ready because the Jews were attacking the Holy Places. The Mufti returned to Nazareth on August 7 repeating the same charge and said that he would send the necessary Instructions through his agents. On August 23 Subhl Bey al-Khadra and the Mufti of Safed came to Nazareth and told them to carry out the instructions [presumably to attack the Jews]. Z4/ 2797/142, November 28, 1929, CZA. 3 8 Prominent in the attack upon Safed was an armed band of 27 men who were active in the northern area during the period of 1929 disturbances. Subsequently they sought refuge in the mountainous region near the Syrian border. In October, 1929, they organized themselves as the "Green Hand Gang," under the leadership of Ahmed Taflsh. The following month they were joined by Druze who participated in their ill- fated rebellion of 1925 in Syria. They continued their attacks on Jews and the British but by the early months of 1930 they had all but been wiped out or disbanded. CO 733/ 190, February 22, 1930, PRO.

3®Ibid.f pp. 103-106. There were Hebronlte Arabs, also, who did much to save the Jewish community. Shortly after the disturbances names of several dozens of Arabs, who helped save over 400 Jews, were published in lists signed by 351 worse by Arab policemen Co protect the Jews led many Arabs to believe that the government was In sympathy with their activities. They would later call out Doleh Macana, "the

Government is With Us."

The 1933 Disturbances

In March, 1933, the Arab Higher Committee called for a boycott of British and Jewish goods and institutions as well as Arab noncooperation with the mandatory. The viru­ lent Arab press began a series of attacks heightening the tensions. A demonstration was held to protest Jewish Immi­ gration and land sales on October 13 over the veto of the government. The demonstration was led by cAwni Bey cAbd al-Hadi, Jamal Effendi al-Husayni, Yaccuq Farraj, and

Moghannam Moghannara. The Arab Executive then planned a demonstration for Jaffa to be held on October 27. The High

Commissioner, General Sir Arthur Grenfell Wauchope, however, warned them against it^® and when It was held the demonstra­ tors classed with the police. The demonstration began after noonday Sabbath prayers at the largest mosque in Jaffa.

Demonstrations continued through the following day, this time in Haifa and Nablus. The two days of rioting resulted in the many rabbis, including Rabbi Meir Franco and Rabbi Yacacov Josef Slonim. Jerusalem Post Weekly, September 20, 1972, p. 12. 40 FO 371/16927, October 10, 1933, PRO. 352 deaths of two native policemen with 25 Injured; three

British policemen seriously and 15 slightly Injured; 25 Arab rioters killed, 30 seriously and more than 140 slightly injured.^ A third day of rioting took place In Jerusalem with three Arabs being killed and 70 wounded.

The Arab Revolt. 1936-1939

The immediate background to the Arab revolt serves as a description of the stimulus to the event itself. Zionist land colonization efforts and land purchases were making great strides in their program. In 1935 Jewish immigration more than doubled that of the Arab birth rate for that year by several thousand persons. Riots in Egypt and a national­ ist uprising in Syria added to the tenseness in Palestine.

The French High Commissioner in Syria, Comte Damien De

Martel, declared that Syria would have an autonomous govern­ ment which gave rise to Increased expectations by the Pales­ tinian Arabs. A treaty of alliance was concluded in Baghdad between a representative of King Ghazl of Iraq and King Ibn

Sacud of Saudi Arabia. Italy was embarrassing Great Britain by its military attack on Abyssinia and threatening the

British position in East Africa and the adjoining waterways.

Two incidents In 1935 served to bring tensions to the

41 New York Times. October 29, 1933, p. 26. 353 government's notice. On October 16, 1935, a consignment of barrels of cement shipped from Belgium arrived at Jaffa port. Inside them were concealed smuggled arms destined for the Haganah, the underground Jewish defense organization.

A The shipment was consigned to one Izhak Rattan. When the shipment was being unloaded, one of the barrels broke open with several rounds of ammunition spilling out. An Arab port worker witnessing this reported it to the police.^

The second incident took place on November 7, 1935.

A Jewish police sergeant was killed by an armed band. The police investigating patrol came upon the band near Jenin on

November 17. The band was under the leadership of Shaykh

Izz al-Din al-Qassem, a Syrian political refugee.^ He and three of his group were killed in an encounter with the

42 Ironically there was a prominent Palestinian Arab lawyer in Jerusalem named Henry Cattan.

^Efraim Dekel, SHAI; The Exploits of Hagana Intel­ ligence (New York: Thomas Yoseloff^ 1959), pp. 50-52; PO 371/ 18957/16/35, October 17, 1935, PRO. Actually this was the third such shipment. 44 Shaykh al-Qassem had a widespread reputation as a Muslim religious leader. He came to Haifa in 1921 after an abortive revolt in Syria. He taught in an Arabic school there, was a khatib (preacher) in a mosque and a secretary of the Y.M.M.A., becoming its president in 1926. He toured north and central Palestine exhorting the people to secretly arm themselves against the Jewish invasion. He was a religious leader who created a new puritan sect based on adherence to the teachings of the Qur'an in addition to cooperation with one's fellow neighbor, with complete disre­ gard for money and temporary gain and possessions. Through 354 police,4^ and they were immediately considered "martyrs"

(shahld).4^ His funeral, held in Haifa, served as a rallying cry for the masses and was well attended by Arab notables adding to the legitimacy of their acts in the perceptions of the Palestinians. his religious teachings and influence he was able to orga­ nize an Arab labor movement in the North, to better the housing conditions of the lowest and poorest classes ofArab laborers, and in general helped raise their standards of living. His movement was entirely independent of the Supreme Muslim Council. Sometime during the early 1930's he created his terror organization; they became known as Qassemai1 in. He forbade his men to shave their beards; thus they were called "The Bearded Shaykhs." By 1935 he had organized five committees: propaganda, military training, supply, intelligence, and foreign relations. He had recruited 200 members and had organized a reported 800 sup­ porters. Those who got away from the police attack near Jenin were called "Qassemiya" after its founder. FO/371/ 20018/18/35, December 4, 1935, PRO; Subhl Yasin, al- thawrah al-^arablyyah al-Kubra fi fHast in 1936-193? (The Great Arab Revolution in Palestine^ 1936-1939) (Cairo: Dar al-Katib al-Arabi, 1959), pp. 30-42.

45867N.00/283, FRUS, 1936, Vol. Ill, pp. 434-436. Other members of his band were captured on November 20, 1935 but weren't brought to trial until March 3 and October 19, 1936. Some were charged with the premeditated murder of Sergeant Rosenfeld, others with the murder of Constable Mott. Z4/15086, CZA.

46 Shahid is an Islamic concept, corrupted by medieval Christianity, where the death of the martyr is viewed as fi sabll Allah (in the path of God). Upon death he takes his place in the Dar al-Shuhada* (Abode of Paradise). 355

Within a week after Qassem's death the leaders of the five Arab parties met with Wauchope, submitting a memo­ randum (on November 26), demanding satisfaction for the general claims that had been put forth during the past years of the Mandate.47 Wauchope's alternative, he was told, was that uncertain conditions would prevail which they could not control.^® Indeed this was the case. Radical and revolu­ tionary groups emerged in several cities.4® These groups' general purpose was disruption and agitation.

A boycott of the government was to commence as of

January 15, 1936, if their demands were not n e t . ^

On April 15, 1936, Arab bandits attacked a bus on the

Tulkarm-Nablus road, killing a Jew and seriously wounding two others. Another passenger, who declared himself a

German Christian, was released. The apparent purpose of the attack was to carry on the work of the "Holy Martyr," Shaykh

47R.I.I.A. Great Britain and Palestine 1915-1939 (London: Oxford University Press, 1946), p. 74,

48CO 733/294, December 7, 1935, PRO.

4®Akram Zb°aytar led a group in Nablus; Hamdi a1- Husayni and Michel Mltrl, head of the Arab Labor Society in Jaffa, organized a group there; a Revolutionary Youth Com mlttee was created in Qallqllya; Salim cAbd al-Rahman headed an Arab "scout” group in Tulkarm; and a similar organiza­ tion could be found in Haifa under the direction of cAref Nuralla.

50CO 733/297/75156, December 14, 1935; PO 371/20018/ 18/35, December 4, 1935, PRO.

5XPO 371/18957/17/35, November 17, 1935, PRO. 356 al-Qassem. This was followed by the killing of two Arab laborers living near the Jewish colony of Petach Tlqva on

April 16. One of the Arabs identified the assailants as a

Jew, just before he died. In Middle Eastern fashion this was considered blood revenge (klsas or akhdh al-tha*r).

The following morning the funeral was held for one of the Jews killed two days prior and he was buried as a

"martyr." The cortege ultimately became disorderly and clashed with the police. A day of relative calm was dis­ rupted by an Arab demonstration before the office of the

District Commissioner in Jaffa. The Arab demonstrators complained of the deaths of the two Arab laborers killed on

April 16* While the demonstrators were milling about, two

Jews appeared and were immediately set upon. Demonstrating continued through most of that day, though with fearful 5 2 casualties: 7 Jews killed, 39 wounded.

The following morning isolated incidents of demonstra­ ting and rioting occurred in Jaffa, Jenin, Nablus, and

Tulkarm. The dally were: 5 Jews killed and 26 wounded; 2

Arabs killed and 32 wounded; 2 Jews died from wounds received 53 the previous day. The localized scene of the rioting now,

52867N.00/283, FRUS, ££. cit. 53 Ibid.; CO 733/310, April 19, 1936. 357 however, had expanded to the northern districts of Pales- t ine.

By June 20 a general strike was called for In Nablus

Initially, where an Arab Local National Committee [sic.] was formed, Tulkarm, Jaffa, and the Old City of Jerusalem. In 54 all, 20 strike committees had been In operation.

What appeared to be a spontaneous uprising against both the British and the Zionists was also a situation that was out of control. The first Arab parties to participate were the National Bloc and the Youth Congress. Jamal al-

Husaynl, sensing a fortuitous opportunity, called for a general strike to commence on April 21. The rest of the political parties then joined in with the PAP and endorsed the strike on April 22.^5 Also on April 21 the party leaders met with Wauchope who asked them to use their influ­ ence in quelling the disorders and secondly to name a dele­ gation to go to London and meet with the Colonial Secretary on May 4. The leaders told him that they would help in return for a government ban on Jewish immigration which would, they felt, 1) assist in bringing about order, 2) unquestionably help them save face with the masses and restore their faith in their authority and leadership, and

3) serve as a temporary demand for continued negotiations.^

54flew York Times, April 22, 1936, p. 9.

55CO 733/310/75528, April 23, 1936, PRO. 56Ibid 358

Under the existing conditions the leaders felt that it was

an Inopportune time to send a deputation to London.^

By the end of April strike committees were organized

throughout the country, though primarily in the towns and

larger villages; the rural areas were relatively unaffected

e q yet. A Transport Strike Committee was created in Jeru­

salem under the direction of Hasan Sidql Dajanl.

On April 25t the leaders of all the Arab parties

gathered and named a Supreme Arab Executive. The Committee

decided to continue the strike until: 1) Jewish immigration

was halted, 2) land sales to the Jews stopped, and 3) an

Independent government was established with a parliament.

On April 28, it was decided to send a delegation to all the

Arab countries to solicit their aid.

The move by the Arab Higher Committee toward greater

rigidity against the British by becoming more militant was

a move initiated by the Nashashibl forces. By it they hoped

to force the Mufti and Dr. Husayn Kahalidi into publicly

admitting their real hostility toward the British. This in

turn would confuse the British who until this time felt that

they could deal with the Mufti.

57CO 733/307/75438, May 12, 1936, PRO.

58FO 371/20018/9/36, May 6, 1936, PRO. 359

Wauchope still felt, however, that the situation 59 could be mediated If the Arabs could be heard In London.

He threatened the Palestinian leaders that this was their only alternative to the government implementing more force­ ful measures/0 But the Committee refused to budge from their position. Wauchope consistently then demanded a

Royal Commission be sent to review the situation. On May

14, Wauchope notified the Palestinians that a Commission would be sent.

The general strike, however, did not have the unani­ mous backing of the political leaders of the community.

Raghib Bey sought the abandonment of the strike and sup­ ported the plan to send a delegation to London. The Mufti argued for the strike and had the majority behind him.***

When this became obvious, Raghib joined with the Mufti in 6 2 order to close ranks and give the Illusion of unity.

The strike, once set in motion, was supplemented by appeals in the form of persuasion and intimidation. Civil

59 CO 733/310/75528, May 4, 1936, PRO.

6 0 Ibid.

^However, the Mufti appealed to Wauchope to bring about a change in the government's policy. Ibid. Wauchope duly pressed London for the changes demanded by the Mufti. CO 733/297/75165, April 29, 1936, PRO. 62867N.00/287, FRUS, 1936, ©£. cit. 360 disobedience was called for by many strike committees through non-payment of taxes. Young toughs (shababs) insured compliance by those who hesitated. It wasn't long before the movement caught the appeal of the fellahin who were non-participants at first, but by the end of April it became more representative of the total Arab population.

With the success of the strike in slowing down the dally economy of the country the Arab Higher Committee saw its success and became more bold and intransigent in its demands. A meeting was held in Jaffa on May 13 at which the more youthful participants urged a boycott of Jewish and

British goods, the release of political prisoners, and the cancellation of land transfers for the past five years, and the abolition of a recent collective punishment order.

In June 1936 several of the Arab leaders prepared 64 themselves to go to London to negotiate. They admitted to authorities there that the were largely in the hands of the people and in fact Jamal Effendl and cAwni Bey were

A report submitted to the government by Air Vice- Marshal R. E. C. Peirse, the commanding officer of British military forces in Palestine and Trans-Jordan. CO 733/317/ 75528, September 14, 1936. PRO. 64 _ On June 12 Jamal Effendl, Shlbli Jamal, Dr. clzzat Tannus, and cAbdul Latlf Salah were granted entrance visas to England and a letter of Introduction to Sir John Malley of the Colonial Office, all by Wauchope. CO 733/321, June 23, 1936, PRO. 361 threatened not to weaken the Palestinians' position through any concessions,^

But the claaor for continued rebellion had not abated and on July 27 celebrations of all hue, to Include numerous

Incidents of violence, were held in commemoration of the

100th day of the strike. Wauchope, now under considerable pressure, acceded to William Ormsby-Gore's suggestion to suspend Jewish Immigration during the conduct of the Royal

Commission's Inquiry if the disorders ceased unconditionally.

Then on July 29 William Ormsby-Gore, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, announced the government's decision to send a Royal Commission to investigate the cause(s) of the dis­ turbances.

In August and September the strike took on the charac­ teristics of a low level protracted conflict. Given the political context in which we are discussing what were once brigands and bandits were now politically motivated agents; they became guerrillas. During this early stage they were relatively harmless and represented more harrassment than ! anything else. Their operations were confined to the North,

Galilee in particular. The geography of the region, moun­ tainous and its proximity to Syria, which was a continuous source of arms and men marked these forces. By the end of the strike their numbers totalled about 5,000 men.

65Ibid. 362

The rebels were organized into two general types of organizations: regulars or Mujahidin (Holy War warriors), who operated against the British and the Pediya (martyrs), whose operations tended toward random acts of terrorism and low level Incidents of violence.®^

The guerrillas did know the countryside and did have the support of the populace; voluntary at this early stage.

As time went on, the Identification of the peasants with the guerrilla movement Increased, changing the character of the guerrillas to a more truly nationalistic body.

By this time also the Arab revolt had become an expression of the extent of the bitterness and fear held by the Palestinian fellah toward the Zionists. The Palestinian experience suggests, however, that Wolf's necessary criterion for peasant participation in a rebellion against oppressive landlords is inadequate. ^ To join the Palestinian guer­ rillas came several Syrians. By far the most reknowned was 68 Fawzi Bey al-Qawaqji, a Pan-Arab nationalist and a soldier

^ J o h n Marlowe, Rebellion in Palestine (London: The Cresset Press, 1946), p~ 156.

^^Eric R. Wolf, "On Peasant Rebellions," International Social Science Journal. XXI, No. 2 (1969), p. 2871 Wolff s other criterion that there be a "peasantry located in a peripheral area outside the domains of landlord control" does not apply at all to Palestine since it was the landlord who led or at least supported the peasants in their attacks on the Zionists and the British. 68 Qawaqji was born in Tripoli, Syria, ca. 1896. He 363 of fortune, who cane along with 25 fully armed Iraqi youths.After he arrived he set himself up as the

"generalissimo" of the rebels in "Southern Syria." From various headquarters he organized were issued "communiques" and "proclamations" describing his exploits. Qawaqji was joined in his efforts by Shaykh Mohammad al ash-Shammar, another Syrian who also participated in the Druze rebellion graduated from the Ottoman Staff College in Istanbul and served in the Turkish army during W. W. I. When France occupied Syria, he became an intelligence officer in the French army, earning the Legion of Honour. He then switched his allegiance to the Druze in their rebellion in 1925 and after they were defeated and he was sentenced to death, escaped to the Hedjaz and served as a military advisor to King Ibn Sacud. He later obtained a commission in the Iraqi army and served as the commandant of the Military Training College of Iraq. He "resigned" his commission and at the "suggestion" of Jacfar Abu II Tumman, Minister of Internal Affairs, left Iraq to fight with the Palestinians, in August, 1936. He remained in Palestine until October, 1936, when he fled to Baghdad after being forced into Transjordan by the British army. He was later exiled to Kirkuk. While there he was on friendly terms with many British officers he formerly fought against. In 1941 he helped fight the British in Iraq as a guerrilla and again in Syria. When Syria was Invaded by the British he was wounded in the face when strafed in a car by a lone British aircraft. He and his son were flown to Vienna where the latter died, and Fawzi remained in serious condition for months. He remained there until 1948 when he returned to Palestine as the commander of the Army of Deliverance or the Liberation Army (Jaysh al- Inqadh.)

69RG 226 OSS 126080 C, April 9, 1945, NA. They also brought with them quantities of arms, rifles, a few machine guns and bombs. Trucked through Iraq and Transjordan they crossed at Jlar Damlya and delivered them to cAbd al-Rahman Haj Muhammad at his mountain hideout in the Nablus district. 364 and who brought with him 40 other "volunteers." Together they controlled the rebel forces. Al ash-Shamoar had actually been operating for some time in the Jenin area.^

September was a decisive month for all the actors Involved in the strike. The British cabinet met to decide how this direct affront to British authority was to be i e t . ^ The decision was made to send a military division to Palestine and the rebellion was to be crushed under the direction of

Lieutenant-General Sir John G. Dill. 7 2

These measures were translated into their practical meaning to the Palestinians by Wauchope, in individual meet­ ings with Haj Amin, Raghib Bey and cAwnl Bey.7^ This was followed by a manifesto Issued by the Arab Higher Committee, the next day, indicating their loss of confidence in the

British in the manner they were conducting the entire affair.^ 7 4

By the end of September, the writing was on the wall.

While the Arab Higher Committee believed in their mission,

70F0 371/26824/8265/# 1456/254/31, PRO.

71C0 733/297/75156, September 2, 1936, PRO.

72CO 733/314/25528, September 10, 1936; PO 371/20023, September 3, 1936, PRO. At the time Palestine was an Air Force Command under Air Chief Marshal Sir Richard Plerse who then served as Dill's second In command; Palestine also then came under Army Command. 73Ibid. 74CO 733/311/75528/6, September 12, 1936, PRO. 365

it now appeared to be a hopeless case against the armed

might of Britain. Therefore a delegation from the Committee

was dispatched to talk with Ibn Sacud, with cAwni Bey going

to Amman to discuss the situation with cAbdullah. These

talks in conjunction with those already held between the

British, Ibn Sacud, cAbdullah, and King Ghazi did much to

bring about the end of the strike. The following month an

appeal from Amir cAbdullah,^ King Ibn Sacud and King Ghazi

was made public. They formally sought the end of the dis­

turbances. A congress of delegates from the various strike

committees was called and for two days in early October the

question of the calling a halt to the strike was discussed.

A formally published agreement was made public on October 11

ending the strike.

When the Royal Commission's report was finally made

public, it called for restrictions on Jewish immigration

because the economic absorptive capacity was not sufficient

to permit peaceful coexistence. It was met with dissatis­

faction by the Arabs who felt that the report's plan for

partitioning of Palestine was 1) another British attempt to

divide and conquer, and 2) it took away the coastal access and the more agriculturally suited lands from them and gave

75 867N.00/380: Telegram, FRUS, 1936, Vol. II, p. 449. 366 them to the Zionists.All In allt the Commission's find­ ings and recommendations were unsuited to the situation.

Coming at the end of a fierce struggle compromise was not accepted as an honorable conclusion.

It has been generally argued that the Arab Revolt was a civil disorder that was largely manipulated by the Mufti and the Husayni-dominated Arab Higher Committee. Abdel

Rahman puts forth a convincing counter argument that the initiation, ferocity, and duration of the revolt was with the masses and that far too much credit has been imbued in these charges. In fact, both the Muftl and the Committee,

Abdel Rahman argues, became spokesmen for the populace and the extremists ruled because of it.77

Although the Arab Higher Committee called off the strike, there was no evidence that the community took this to mean anything like long-lasting peace. No arms were turned in, but more important, those factors that led to the initial outbreak did not subside. By the beginning of 1937, with only three months respite, it was obvious to all that there would be a resumption of violence. The previous seven

76867N.01/775: Telegram, FRUS. 1937, Vol. II, p. 892.

77Abdel Wahab Ahmed Abdel Rahman, "British Policy Towards the Arab Revolt in Palestine, 1936-1939" (unpub­ lished PhD dissertation, University of London, London, England, September 1971), pp. 107-112. 367

78 months brought consideration casualties. But now again individual incidents of violence and assassination were on the upswing. Discontent centered about the Royal Commls- sions's report and its call for partition which greatly split the Palestinian leadership. Also at this time a change in the British military leadership takes place despite previous

Intentions of the War Office; General Dill is now replaced 7 9 by Major General A. P. Wavell.

During the post-initial phase of the revolt, it was a period for the gestation of the already deep seated frus­ trations of the Palestinian community. The murder of L. Y.

Andrews, the acting District Commissioner for Galilee, seemed the act that unleashed a second wave of violence in

Palestine. It appeared that the Palestinians* target during this period was directed against the Mandatory with the

7 S 195 Arabs killed and 804 wounded. Great Britain, Colonial Office, Report by His Majesty1s Government In the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland to the Council of the League of Nations on the Administration of Palestine and Trans-Jordan for the Year 1936. Colonial No” 129 (London: H.M.S.O, 1937), p” Jo. 16 police and 22 soldiers killed, 104 police and 148 soldiers wounded, 145 Arabs killed and 804 wounded. CO 733/311, November 20, 1936, PRO. 79 Wavell was notified by General Sir Charles Deedes, the War Office's Military Secretary, that he would replace Dill only if the Royal Commission Report was "taken quietly," which it wasn't. John Connell (John Henry Robertson], Wavell. Scholar and Soldier (New York; Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1964), pT 184. 368

Intent to have the British abandon the policy of partition and adopt a policy that was more In line with the long range interests of the Palestine community. ,

A new factor was added to the violence, Jewish reprisals. After a period of self-restraint (havlagah) sectors of the Jewish community mobilized for the physical defense of the community and to further institutionalize the Yi_shuv.®®

Guerrilla activities by the Arabs also resurged. The center for the direction of the guerrilla activities was in

Damascus, formerly the center of the recruitment of the guerrillas and their leaders. It was no mere coincidence that the Mufti and Jamal Effendi made their headquarters there.

A central committee for the defense of Palestine which had been established in Damascus extended its branches to Lebanon, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt. The function of the Committee, which was run jointly by Nabih al-Azma and a secret group of the Husseini faction, was to collect funds and to purchase and smuggle arms and ammunition, and other supplies to Palestine for the pro­ motion of guerrilla warfare.

Three distinct guerrilla groups operated in Palestine now. One in the Jerusalem District (Jaffa, Ramleh, Jericho,

8 0 See Amos Perlmutter, Military and Politics in Israel: Nation-Building and Role Expansion (New York; Praeger, 19^9), especially Chapter.2.

®*Abdel Rahman, op. clt.. pp. 210-211. cIzzat Darwazah shared in the leadership of this General Command. 369 and Hebron), another in the Samaria District (Nablus, Jenin,

Tulkarm), and a third in Galilee (Safad, Tiberias, Beisan,

Nazareth, and Acre). A very important distinction that must be applied to the groups at this time is that their leader­ ship as well as the fighters were native Palestinian Arabs.

The success of the Arabs was up until this point one of attainment of self-esteem and the opportunity to bask in the thoughts of historical glories. But it did not bring them any closer to their espoused goals.

The Undeclared War

The Partition Resolution before the United Nations in November, 1947, called for the allocation of territory to each community, the Jews and Arabs. It also provided for a five-man United Nations Palestine Commission (Bolivia,

Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Panama, and the Philippines).

However, no enforcement instrument was even enacted, nor was the Commission ever permitted into Palestine by the Mandatory.

The passage of the partition proposal signalled another but far more significant setback for the Palestinian national goals. The period between the passage of the Resolution,

November 30, and the date of the Israeli declaration of 8 2 Independence, May 15, marked a period of violence known as

®^0n May 15 Israel declared itself a state within the area allocated it by the resolution and assumed control over 370

"the undeclared war." Within days, attacks on Jews became noticeable and Jerusalem began to form ghettoed barricades.

During this period large numbers of Arab "volunteers" Infil­ trated Into Palestine from all of the surrounding Arab states and small scale military operations foreshadowed the larger conflict of May, 1948.®^

In addition to Irregular military forces entering

Into the arena to do battle the Transjordanian Arab Legion took positions in strategic locations in Palestine.8^ It is interesting to note here that a couple of months prior the

Damascus press had been talking about the formation of an

Arab government in Palestine under the Presidency of Haj Amin 8 5 al-Husayni. But in an interview between Wells Stabler, U. all of Palestine after protracted conflict with Palestinians and several other Arab states in the first Palestine war ending in 1949.

^ T h e Liberation Army was comprised of approximately 4,000 men which included in its ranks 1,500 Palestinians. They entered Palestine over a period of four months beginning in January, 1948. Qawaqj1 was the Army's commander, setting up his headquarters at Jabac. cf. Fauzl Al-Qawuqji, "Memoirs, 1948," Part I, Journal of Palestine Studies. I, No. 4 (Summer 1972), 27-58j Part H , No. 1 (Autumn 1972), pp. 3-33; [Major] R. D. Wilson, Cordon and Search; With 6 th Airborne Division in Palestine. 1945-1948 (Aldershot: Gale & Polden, Ltd., 1979), pp. 181-269. Arab constables also began to desert from the police force in large numbers, taking their arms with them, with a daily average of 15. 867N.01/ 12-3147: Alrgram, FRUS. 1947, Vol. V, pp. 1324-1325.

8A867N.01/10-1147: Telegram, FRUS. 1947, op. cit., p. 1179. ------

85867N.01/12-2347: Telegram, Ibid.. 1319. 371

S. Vice-Consul at Jerusalem and the Amir cAbdullah In Amman when the latter was asked who was to represent the Pales­

tinians the reply was that the mayors and municipal heads would be the "popular voice."®®

Analysis of the Violence

Huntington discusses "political development" in terms of a relationship between political participation and poli­

tical Institutionalization. The argument goes that "as political participation increases, the complexity, autonomy, adaptability, and coherence of the society's political insti­ tutions must also increase if political stability is to be maintained.Political participation, Huntington explains, are those factors of modernization such as socio-economic development and social mobilization whereas political devel­ opment is dependent upon the structure of the polity and its

types of leadership.88

We accept this as an independent premise to which we hypothesize that: If political institutionalization must be

86Ibid. Q 7 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press7 1968)7 p. 79 and as he explains in "The Change to Change: Moderni­ zation, Development, and Politics," Comparative Politics, III, No. 3 (April 1971), pp. 304-305, fn. 42.

88Change to Change. op. clt., p. 315. 372

at a level commensurate to political participation in order

to sustain political stability, which is in turn determined

by the degree of social frustration and mobility opportuni­

ties, then institutionalized violence will inhibit those

factors that mediate circumstances giving rise to instability.

Next, we argue that violence when institutionalized to lessen

social frustration, unless it satisfies the demands of those

perceiving the causes of deprivation, will cause the pheno-

8 Q menon to be dysfunctional.

Violence in Palestine, we argue, even when popularly

Initiated was indiscriminately channeled for purposes of

Individual, family, or clan self-interest. The motivation

toward violence by the masses was manipulated by traditional

elites within an accepted soclo-cultural framework in which

legitimacy and family-authority represented a symbiotic relationship. Elites therefore directed the activities of

the masses toward goals which were stated in community- accepted terms; i.e., religiously imbued principles. Regard­ less of what prompted the masses to act, by their commitment

8 9 Muller employs a similar proposition: The "poten­ tial for political violence will vary directly with belief that political violence has led to goal attainment, regardless of relative deprivation." Edward N. Muller, "A Test of a Partial Theory of Potential for Political Violence," American Political Science Review, LXXVI. No. 3 (September 1972), p. 931. 373 to do so they compromised any position of apathy they might have maintained before and by this ascribed themselves to the position of one or the other family-elite positions.

We now look at the violence in terms of its impact with its correlation to three Important variables often linked to the violence. We have created a Violence Index 90 (VI) to give us some Idea of the total forceful impact of each of the six major outbreaks of violence in Palestine during the mandatory period. Table XVIII provides the necessary data base for Jewish Immigration from which we may extrapolate an explanation. Figure 2 provides some indication for the justification of perceptions and to measure the differences between the perception and reality.

We can also see from Figure 2 that immigration threatened the demographic size of Palestine actually only once prior to the Arab Revolt in 1936, assuming here that yearly incre­ mental rates, versus cumulative rates, affected the outbreak of the disturbances during the most proximate period. A second assumption is built in here also that the Arab or

Oriental birth rate was traditionally higher than the western or Jewish birth rate anyway so that only the exogenous factor of Immigration could offset the demographic ratio. Table

XIX provides a yearly total for land acquisition by various

90 See Appendix IV. 374 TABLE XVIII

JEWISH IMMIGRATION INTO PALESTINE, 1882-1948 (May 15)

Date Number* Rate** Ally* Muslim Populatlon+

1882-1914 55-70,000** Aliya 1 1882-1903 1919 1,806 32 20-30,000** 1920 8,223 135 Aliya 2 1904-1914 1921 8,294 115 35-40,000** 1922 8,685 104 Aliya 3 1919-1923 1923 8,175 91 35,183 1924 13,893 146 1925 34,386 285 1926 13,855 96 1927 3,034 20 1928 2,178 14 1929 5,249 34 1930 4,944 30 Aliya 4 1924-1931 1931 4,075 24 81,613 172,745++ 1932 12,553 69 16,881 1933 37,337 177 19,703 1934 45,267 177 15,873 1935 66,472 206 22,306 1936 29,595 80 26,042 1937 10,629 27 20,716 1938 14,675 36 16,804 1939 31,195 72 26,883 1940 10,643 23 20,713 1941 4,592 10 25,258 1942 4,206 9 22,188 1943 10,063 20 33,493 1944 15,552 30 32,562 1945 15,259 28 40,288 1946 18,760 32 1947 22,098 36 Aliya 5 1932-1948 1948 (May 15) 17,165 73 366,061

*Rate of Immigrants settling 9 1,000 Jeve. **Rough estimate. ♦Yearly Increase. ♦♦Difference from the first census, 1922.

Source:* Israel. Central Bureau of Statistics. Statistical Abstract of Israel. 1968. No. 19 (Jerusalem: 1968), p. 90. FIGURE 2

ARAB BIRTHRATE AND JEWISH IMMIGRATION

70 ds 65

60

55

50

45

40

35

30

25

20 Arab UirtlTrate 15

10 Jewish 5 lgration

0

o CM co » Os Os OS O' Os Os Os O' O ' O' O' OS O' O' O' O' O' O' O' O' O' OS O' O'O' O' O' O' O' TABLE XIX

CUMULATIVE ZIONIST LAND ACQUISITION

Year Land (dunums) Per Cent of Total Land Area

1920 650,000 2.469 1921 651,048 2.473 1922 741,833 2.818 1923 781,192 2.968 1924 798,685 3.034 1925 843,450 3.204 1926 1,019,574 3.873 1927 1,038,552 4.022 1928 1,077,547 4.094 1929 1,099,062 4.175 1930 1,163,579 4.421 1931 1,182,944 4.494 1932 1,201,529 4.565 1933 1,220,422 4.637 1934 1,257,413 4.777 1935 1,319,527 5.013 1936 1,392,432 5.290 1937 1,410,578 5.359 1938 1,439,945 5.471 1939 1,467,225 5.574 1940 1,495,198 5.681 1941 1,517,679 5.766 1942 1,532,209 5.821 1943 1,551,019 5.893 1944 1,569,054 5.961 1945 1,577,365 5.993 1946 1,577,365 5.993 377

Zionist groupins, individuals and different organizations whose sole function it was to obtain land.

Using our Violence Index as the dependent variable, we correlate the factors of Jewish immigration, Zionist land acquisition, and available government resources for Pales­ tinian Arab communal development to partially determine the relationship of the variables to the Increasing force of the violence. The statistic employed here is the Kendall Coeffi­ cient of Concordance,

TABLE XX

Ranks Assigned to Four Factors at Six Major Outbreaks of Violence

VI 4 3 1 2 6 5 Immigration 1 2 3 4 5 6 Land Acquisition 1 2 3 4 5 6 Government Resources 1 3 2 4 5 6

W - .785 p> .05 N - 6

The correlation obtained indicates that there was some actual basis to Increased hostility in the form of violent acts on the part of the Palestinian community when directed toward the British or the Zionists.

Palestinians often excused Zionist inroads in the

^Sidney Siegel, Nonparametric Statistics for the Behavioral Sciences (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co.. 1956). pp. 229-239. 378 development of a Jewish political community to the active or sometimes latent support afforded by British mandatory officials. This, however, cannot be supported empirically, although by Implication the Mandate provided for the estab­ lishment of a Jewish national home. The Zionists, while it must be admitted, created conditions for the Palestinians to perceive a threat to their welfare, did in fact not intend to do so, but on the contrary acted purposlvely to provide for their own self-sustainment. The first Aliya, or wave of immigrants, of the mandatory period wau the third

(1919-1923). It was basically a group of halutzim or pioneers and was largely represented by persons without any visible means of support. This situation greatly Q 2 strained the economic absorption of Palestine. This con­ dition was "normalized" by the fourth Aliya (1924-1931)

^^The principle of "economic absorptive capacity" was most often applied to the cultivatable areas of Palestine and the distribution and density of the Arab and Jewish popula­ tions In these areas in turn related to acceptable Jewish immigration quotas. The Zionists viewed the principle as an expanding one created by innovative enterprise; the Mandatory used the same principle as a restraint on Jewish demands. Robert R. Nathan, Oscar Gass, Daniel Creamer, Palestine; Problem and Promise. An Economic Study (Washington, D. C.s Public Affairs Press, 1946), pT 61"; Nevlll Barbour, Nisi Dominus: A Survey of the Palestine Controversy (Beirut: The Institute for Palestine Studies, 1969), pp. 109-110, 1 5 1 - 1 6 4 . For two opposing views on the theme see Shulamlt Carmi and Henry Rosenfeld, "Immigration, Urbanization and Crisis: The Process of Jewish Colonization in Palestine During the 1920,s," International Journal of Comparative Sociology, XII, No. T (March 19^1)7 pp. i 1-77 ana Nathan 379 since many of the new immigrants arrived "with means

[between £250-500J.”93

Secondly, the Increased number of persons added to the census with a record level of unemployment during the period 1923-1924 of about 25 percent, would under normal conditions create more severe economic conditions. But by

1925, unequaled immigration was matched by unprecedented prosperity. Most of the capital that was brought in by the fourth Aliya immigrants went for building. This was coupled by the statistic of 80 percent concentration of the immigrants settling into urban centers which in turn increased local purchasing power.The 1930's experienced active Zionist investment in citrus groves and export, and intensive farming with efficient methods of cultivation, irrigation, and animal husbandry, all of which provided for an adequate economic absorptive capacity. In any case, the conflict was inevitable given the ambitions of the tradl* tional Palestinian elites and the factor that,

practical Zionism meant putting a colonizatory pro­ ject into practice in Palestine. This project was to be achieved through Jewish land purchases, development, settlement on the land, health, education, and welfare services, industry...[Tjhe logic of voluntary

Weinstock, "The Impact of Zionist Colonization on Pales- tlnian Arab Society Before 1948," Journal of Palestine Studies. II, No. 2 (Winter 1973), pp. 49-677

9-*Carmi and Rosenfeld, op. clt.. p. 45. 94 Ibid., p. 46. 380

colonization meant putting Into effect what we have termed a 'working agreement' between pioneer-workers who would carry out the provlalon colonizetion- settlements, and Jewish national capital that would provide the means for It. 95

When violence erupted In Palestine and was Arab initiated It rarely took place where there were concentra­ tions of Jewish immigrants or settlers. The factor of Jewish immigration was a major source for friction and violence and inter-communal conflict. Rather, incidents of violence were provoked in metropolitan centers, generally in Arab sectors or mixed cities or traditionally Arab populated sectors, supporting our contention of elite manipulation versus popu­ lar spontaneity.

The use of violence for the most sustained period, the

Arab Revolt, was directed toward insuring the authority of one or the other family's control over the Palestinian Arab community's affairs. In this most critical period the

Palestinian Arab leadership failed to give the violence an ideological basis by which the movement could benefit; instead, personal use of violence led to divisiveness• ^

9^Ibid.. p. 56. For a discussion of institution- building of the Zionist sector in Palestine see Amos Perl- mutter. Anatomy of Political Institutionalizationi The Case of Israel and Some Comparative Analysis ([Cambridge. Mass.]: Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, August 1970)

®®This is substantiated by the large numbers of intra- Arab community assaults and deaths resultant therefrom. See 381

We also note that of the two main adversaries of the Pales­ tinian Arabs it was the Mandatory not the Jews that bore the brunt of the vlolencel^ This condition forced the

British into a deeper held feeling for the Zionists and a tighter coalition with the YjLshuv, relying on it to support the British in its defense efforts but more importantly implicitly recognizing the institutional value of a Jewish defense organization.

Zionist-initiated military and terroristic activities which were carried out against the Palestinian Arabs and the

British were almost entirely through three paramilitary organizations: the Haganah (Defence), the Irgun (Irgun Zval

Leumi. Etzel. National Military Organization in Israel) and the Stern Gang (Le * Home Herut L 1 Israel, Fighters for the

Freedom of Israel).All these groups had their origin as a response by the Jewish community to the sanguinary attacks on it by the Palestinians during the 1929 disturbances.

Jewish-inltiated violence began in earnest only after the passage of the 1939 Passfleld White Paper which sought to the wPeirse Report on the 1936 Disturbances, April 1^ - September 14, 1936," in WO 32/4177, PRO. 97 Amos Perlmutter, Military and Politics in Israel: Nation - Building and Role Expansion (New York: Praeger. pp. 30-317------

®®See Yehuda S. Brenner, "The 'Stern Gang' 1940-1948," Middle Eaatern Studies, II, No. 1 (October 1965), pp. 2-30. 382

curtail further Jewish Immigration Into Palestine.

While the Haganah was strictly controlled by the

Jewish Agency, the Irgun and Stern Gang, both minority bodies

within the Ylshuv. operated Independently of any central

organization. The efforts of all the Jewish military

organizations were met with severe military sanction and

retribution by the British to include imprisonment, deporta­

tions, and executions.

Several major differences were evidenced between the

Palestinian Arab and Jewish-sponsored military and terrorist

activities. Unlike the Muslim community, the Jews generally

had full control over most of those who participated in the military activities. Extreme acts of violence were con­ demned by the Jewish Agency and neither the Irgun nor Stern

Gang were actively supported by the Jewish Agency or the

World Zionist Organization. Moreover, Jewish public opinion clearly was not favorably disposed toward the Irgun or the

Stern Gang. When violence was employed within the Jewish community, it was to bring dissident elements into line with

the Jewish Agency's policy, not vice versa.

Violence among the Arabs has had a long and noble history. The much credited historian, Bernard Lewlsh, in

9 9 The Zionist opposition toward the Mandatory con­ tinued with the Blltmore Program of 1942. Accordingly, the Jewish Agency became the sole agent to achieve Jewish sove­ reignty in Palestine without reliance upon the Mandatory. 383 his historical treatment of the Ismaili assassins, writes that "regicide--both political and idealistic— was familiar from the very beginning of Islamic political history.

Islam itself realizes the spread of the word of the Prophet by the sword. The pervasive character of religion in Arab culture and national character adds to the succeptibility of an Arab society to employ violence. The traditional elite hold over the masses in a feudal-like order was in keeping with the primordial tribal tradition of ingroup solidarity

(asablyyah). The need for social unity then meshed with the acceptance of strong authoritarian personalities.

Since the unity of the group takes on such signifi­ cance, those who accept this social role are rewarded, while those who reject it are branded with shame (hashuma). Thus, for the Arabs, shame assumes a much more trenchant connota­ tion than in the West because it destroys a basic element of the Arab social unit. The only way to eliminate shame is by revenge.This serves as a key to the explanation of the intra-Arab-communal violence.

1 0 ° The Assassins: A Radical Sect in Islam (London: Weidenfeld and Nlcolson, 1967), p7 126.

*®^Harold W. Glldden, "The Arab World," American Journal of Psychiatry. CXXVIII, No. 8 (February 1972), pp. 98-99. See also Sanla Hamady, Temperament and Character of the Arabs (New York: Twayne Publishers, i960), pp. T5-T?. 384

To understand the orientation toward the Zionists we expand upon the notion of shame. With the Arab value system, one of the major attributes of prestige is the ability to dominate others, "which is measured by those who are seeking to dominate others by upsetting the balance of power to their own advantage and those who resist such attempts by seeking to maintain the balance of power." 102

The Zionists were perceived as an infidel, imperialist force attempting to dominate the faithful in Palestine which would inevitably bring shame on the community.

The traditional Palestinian elites were then faced with the problem of not only developing a political organi­ zation, but also with defending the community against a possible revolutionary change in its cultural framework.

In order to gain independence and autonomy, the Palestinians had to face the British while at the same time attempt to create internal unity. The Zionists also posed the problem of inhibiting the free development of the Palestinian Arab community, were symbols of the West, and to be considered dangerous.

Intra-communal hostility and violence was easy to

Justify; this was merely the governance of tribal law. The

British represented the West and an imperial and colonial presence, an embodiment of a resurrected crusader army. The

102Ibid., p. 99. 385

Zionists, however, were conceived In far more extreme terms.

The Zionists planned for a continued presence and therefore a continued threat to the Palestinians' political goals and an abomination to an Islamic community. Violence was there­ fore a prerequisite for the holy war-like strategy. CONCLUSIONS

The peace arrangements of World War I separated

Palestine from Greater Syria and In doing so gave Pales­

tinian nationalists an opportunity— or rather forced one

upon them— to create an autonomous political entity. By

May, 15, 1948, however, the then assumed goal of the Pales­

tinian Arab nationalists received a major setback. A rather

significant portion of geographic Palestine, already trun­

cated once, was denied them by its occupation and formal

politicization by the Zionists. By July of the following

year, with two major exceptiona— Judea and Samaria making up

the West Bank and the Gaza Strip— the remainder of Palestine was denied them. Needless to mention, a nationalist move­ ment without territory is meaningless. Thus the first phase

of the Palestinian Arab nationalist movement failed to materialize.

Because Palestine had historically, culturally, and

ethnically been an integral part of Syria, its separation

placed the region in a unique position and Palestine speci­

fically under a difficult regime. Palestinians were faced with what they saw as a challenge from the West to deny them

independence and political autonomy. Their reaction was to

reinforce the traditional lines of authority within a transi­

tional socio-political environment; the masses in Palestine

rallied to the traditional family leaders, who in turn 387 supported Faysal. But while they did, they totally failed to grasp, understand, or appreciate the weight brought against it by the presence of the British Mandatory, but more Importantly, by the western-oriented Zionist community*

The Palestinians never directed themselves to a positive program of community integration nor did they seriously plan a governing infrastructure.

The efforts of the Palestinian Arab community were not structured in a way to provide for a central authority that could be recognized in turn for the distribution of welfare needs of the masses. The Arab Higher Committee remained the one nationally representative body whose author­ ity rested on religious traditionalism rather than any poli­ tical acumen. It, in turn, was used as a conduit for the accumulation of al-Husaynl personal, family, and clan power.

The maneuverings by the Arab Higher Committee and its com­ panion Supreme Muslim Council focused the goals of the

Palestinians on an abstract view of a state that was little more than an area to farm without the competition of the Jews or the administration of the British.

The goal of the Palestinians was indeed an independent

Arab state, but the direction of their efforts was befuddling.

There was a blatant mismanagement of communal affairs for this purpose. Little attempt was made to coordinate activities in the economic, social, and political sectors of the community. 388

Existing talent of all hues was not fully exploited nor

directed for the general welfare in terms of institutional­

izing even the traditional mores and folkways for incorpora­

tion into a political organization. Charges of pro-Zionist

allegiance or alignment, laid to the British, must in great

part, be labeled excuses for this mismanagement, poor judg­

ment and a lack of perception. There were certainly numbers

of Arabophlles in London and Jerusalem willing to work with

and for the Palestinians, given an opportunity which the

latter denied them. It must be admitted here that this, of

course, would have meant a compromise of long held values,

but we also argue that this is one important requirement of

development.

If there was a nemesis beyond the limits of the Arab

community itself, it was not primarily the British. The

Zionists offered a continual symbol of the West and the

"haves" with the Palestinians the East and the "have nots."

The competition between the two groups for a basically wes­

tern goal required not only an understanding of the basis

for it, but also the organizational framework; in this sense

the Palestinians never really had a chance. Tied to the

traditional setting of a semi-modern trlballzed Islamic

society, they came up against an industrially socialized group, who even though set forth to set up a politically agrarian colony (In some form) nevertheless had the 389 experience of living and growing up in that setting which

they sought to develop. Secondly, by 1948 the Zionists represented the only community in Palestine to have a viable governing structure. The Palestinians certainly had the semblance of leadership in the traditional ruling elite.

But we believe that it can be stated with a degree of proba­ bility that even if there was no Jewish community to con­ tinue to offer competition, friction and hostility would have been rampant between the varied vlers for leadership within the Arab Community.

The Palestinian Arab national movement during its initial phase must be considered in the wider context of an historical and political development within a swirl of other

developments. Internally it w s b part of a system in contact and contrast with Zionism and a British governing administra­ tion. As a subsystem in a regional system it was a submove­ ment of a regional development. And as a development in the international political system we must take into account the linkages evidenced by American, British, and French partici­ pation. The Zionist movement also developed worldwide and had its effect upon the Palestinians from without.

While all these forces played some role in Palestine between 1920 and 1948, this is not to say that the level of

Involvement was the same for all actors at all times; this was not the case. Palestinian Arabs and Palestinian Jews, 390 because they had a decisive interest in Palestine maintained the most concerted and sustained interest throughout. Even the British who were present for the entire period must not be given as much credit since from World War IIf they took an active role to disengage. Non-Palestinian Jews were noticeable because they emigrated from Europe to Palestine; many gave huge sums of monetary support but were never formally a part of the Zionist effort until after 1929.

Similarly, non-Palestinian Arabs were interested in what was going on in Palestine, but they also had their own national movements to involve themselves with, until 1936 when their active participation was solicited and offered. From that point in time they also were a viable force that had to be considered in any analysis of the situation.

As we have held above it was the view of the Zionists and the British, during this period, that the only logical goal of either community was the nation-state. This view, still held in some circles today, especially in the West, rests on the thesis that since the western nation-state is the only possible political organization for a people to achieve, then western civilization becomes a model for others to emulate. Thus the West becomes the modern model for the

Third World, underdeveloped and lesser developed countries.

In order to achieve the goal of the nation-state, the argu­ ment continues, the polities must "modernise" or 391

synonymously, "westernize."

In Palestine we know that many Arabs came to benefit

from the influx of Jewish capital. Also Arabs who lived In

the proximity of Jewish settlements, urban or rural, lived with a higher standard of living than Arabs who resided elsewhere in Palestine. Yet many of these same Arabs par­

ticipated in the violence directed against the Jews.

The Marxist-Socialist influence of Zionism built into

its ideology the solution to the class struggle they saw in

Palestine. The wealthier would develop the land for the benefit of all. Modernization, even in the context of this early phase, was still considered the panacea. But the empirical studies conducted by Perea with Israeli and West

Bank Arabs cast doubt on these assumptions. In one study,

for example, the findings were ominous:

It has been demonstrated not only that modernization does not eliminate hostility towards Jews, but that nationalism seems to fill some of the psychological needs arising in the wake of modernization. If our findings are valid, one can hardly avoid the pessimistic implica­ tion that further modernization will aggravate the con­ flict in and around Israel.

But in the context of the British mandate in which the Pales­

tinian Arab community was competing with and battling against

^Yochanan Peres, "Modernization and Nationalism in the Identity of the Israeli Arab," Attitudes Towards Jewish State­ hood in the Arab World edited by Gil Carl AlRoy (New YorTTi American Academic Association for Peace in the Middle East, 1971), p. 164. 392 the western Zionists we are nevertheless forced to conclude that Marlon Levy was correct when he wrote:

The patterns of the relatively modernized societies, once developed, have shown a universal tendency to penetrate any social context whose participants have come in contact with them. From many points of view it makes little difference whether these patterns penetrate at least partially by the will and preference of the relatively non-modernized peoples or whether they have patterns thrust upon them. The patterns always pene­ trate; once the penetration has begun, the previous Indigenous patterns always change; and they always change in the direction of some of the patterns of the relatively modernized society.

The presence of two different and sizeable ethnic communities greatly Increased the level of hostility of the conflict and added to its complexity. The communal strife that accompanied the political issues was only intensified in the self-justification of community goals and means.

Attempts by elements of either community to mediate and moderate the differences and bring about a compromise soution not only failed outright but also brought repudiation of the less orthodox positions and may have even created conditions for greater hostility. With no solid political base, the Palestinian Arab leadership had to revert to family influence, religious authority, and Islamlcized political goals. Thus the entire effort of the Palestinian

"Patterns (Structures) of Modernization and Political Development," The Annals. CCCLVIII (March 1965), p. 30. 393

Arab nationalists turned Inward and ethnic Identification

took on greater Importance, especially when faced with a

countering ethnic group.

With no central directorate, little organization

skills, and no bureacratlc framework, the expectation for

any sophistication In the employment of violence was low.

This we then add to the following dictum: The use of vio­

lence Is enigmatic and paradoxical because of both Its

Inherent force and the delicateness of the conditions which

It affects and therefore In the way It must be employed for

positive results. The Palestinian elite structure attempted

to marshal, through religious Invocation, the values of the

Palestinian masses around the virtues of religiously

Inspired violence to bring honor to a shame-ridden situation.

But the elites lacked proper, or at least sufficient, con­

trols over the masses and violence became uncontrolled and

random to the movement's total discredit.

In the end the Palestinian Arab community languished

In the eventual deportation of its political leadership at

a critical period, its organized defense system removed

through encounters with British police and military as well

as Zionist paramilitary organizations. In addition, land con­

tinued to be accumulated and developed by the Zionists with

the ultimate condition that the Palestinians, as a national

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Weizmann, Chaim. Trial and Error. New York: Schocken Books, 1966.

Wilson, [Major] R. D. Cordon and Search: With 6th Airborne Division In Palestine. 1945-1948. Aldershot: Gale & Polden, Ltd., 1949.

Yasln, Subhl, al-thawrah al-carablyyah al-kubra f1 filaatin 1936-1939 (The Great Arab Revolution In Palestine, 1936- 1939). Cairo; Dar al-Katib al-Arabi, 1959.

Zelne, Zeine N. The Emergence of Arab Nationalism: With a Background Study of Arab-Turkish Relations in the Near East. Beirut: Khayats, 1960, 2d edition. 405

PUBLICATIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT, LEARNED SOCIETIES, AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

Aunann, Moshe. Land Ownership In Paleatlne 1880-1948. Jerusalem: Israel Academic Committee on the Middle East. [1971].

Cohen, Aaron. Hlnnukh v 1haskalah b-calam ha-caravl (Education and Enlightenment In the Arab World). Tel Aviv: Hashomer Hatzalr, 1944.

Katznelson, Berl. Revolutlonary Constructionism. New York: Young Poale Zion Alliance, 1937.

Niedermaier, Kurt. Colonisation Without Colonialism. Jerusalem: The World Zionist Organization. The Department of Information and Organization. The Youth and Hechalutz Department, 1969.

Perlmutter, Amos. Anatomy of Political Institutionaliza­ tion: The Case of Israel and Some Comparative Analy­ sis . Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, August 1970.

Poliak, Abraham N. Feudalism In Egypt. Syria, Palestine and the Lebanon. London: The Royal Asiatic Society. 1939.

Schaafhausen, Irma. Development Through Mobilization of Own Resources Exemplified by Israel. Hamburg: Hamburg Archives of World Economy, 1964.

PERIODICALS

"A Note on one Cause of the Recent Disturbances In Palestine," The Journal of the Royal Central Aslan Society, XXI, Pt. 1 (January 1934), 129-131.

Abel, Theodore. "The Pattern of a Successful Political Move­ ment," American Sociological Review. II. No. 3 (June 1937), 347-352,

Abu Ghazaleh, Adnan. "Arab Cultural Nationalism in Palestine During the British Mandate," Journal of Palestine Studies. I, No. 3 (Spring 1972), 37-63.

Abu Jabber, Kamel S. "The Millet System in the Nineteenth Century Ottoman Empire." The Muslim World, LVII, No. 3 (July 1967), 212-223. 406

Alaml, Musa. "The Lesson of Palestine," The Middle East Journal, III* No. 4 (October 1949), 37 3-405. al-Qawuqjl, Fauzi. "Memoirs, 1948," Part I, Journal of Palestine Studles, I, No. 4 (Summer 1972j^ 27-58; Part II, II, No. 1 (Autumn 1972), 2-33.

Amiran, D. H. K. "Estimates of the Urban Population of Palestine In the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century," Israel ExploratIon Journal, X, No. 3 (1960), 181-183.

_____ . "Nomadlc and Beduln Population on the Census Returns of Mandatory Palestine," Israel Exploration Journal, XIII, No. 3 (1963), 247-252.

_____ . "The Patterns of Settlement In Palestine," Israel ExploratIon Journal. Ill, No. 2 (1953), 65-78.

Beaves, Richard and Zaynab al-Yafl. "Hal Hawwal al- Sahyunlyun al-Sahla* 111a Janna?" (Did the Zionists Change the Desert Into Palestine). Shu'un Filastlnya, I, No. 2 (1971), 123-129.

Bluraenthal, R., Charles Fraenkel, J. Raba, R. P. Alsberg. "Registration of Births, Deaths, and Marriages in European Jewish Communities in Palestine and in Israel," Archlvum, IX (1959), 101-119.

Bromberger, E. "The Growth of Population in Palestine," PopulatIon Studies, II, No. 1 (June 1948), 71-91.

Carmi, Shulamit and Henry Rosenfeld. "Immigration, Urbani­ zation and Crisis: The Process of Jewish Colonization in Palestine During the 1920s," Internetlonal Journal of Comparative Sociology. XII, Nol I (March 1971^ , TT-sTT Chizik, I. "The Political Parties in Palestine: Arabs and Jews," The Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society, xxi, pt. i 7 j anuary 193*7. 94-128.

Cohen, Alvin. "Externalities in the Displacement of Tradi­ tional Elites," Economic Development and Cultural Change. XVII, No. 1 (October 1968), 65-75.

Cohen, Michael J. "British Strategy and the Palestine Question 1936-39," Journal of Contemporary History, VII. Nos. 3 & 4 (July-October 1972), 157-143. 407

. "Sir Arthur Wauchope, the Army and the Rebellion in Palestine, 1936." Middle Eastern Studies, IX, No. 1 (January 1973), 19-34.

Conley, Michael Charles. "The Framework of Communist Strategy," Orbis. IX, No. 4 (Winter 1966), 976-982.

Dann, Uriel. "T. E. Lawrence in Amman, 1921," Abr-Nahraln, XIII (1972-1973), 33-41.

Dawn, C. Ernest. "The Amir of Mecca Al Husayn Ibn-cAli and the Origin of the Arab Revolt," Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, CIV," No. 1 (February m o ) , 11=54 . ------

_____ . "The Rise of Arablsm in Syria," The Middle East Journal. XVI, No. 2 (Spring 1962), T 7 T - 1 T F ;

Deutsch, Karl W. "Social Mobilization and Political Develop­ ment," American Political Science Review, LV, No. 3 (September 1961), 493-514. el-Barguthy, c0mar es-Saleh. "Traces of the Feudal System in Palestine," Journal of the Palestine Oriental Society. IX, No. 2 (1929), 70-79.

Etzionl, Amitai. "Mobilization as a Macrosoclological Conception," British Journal of Sociology,XIX. No. 3 (September 1968), 243-253.

Friedman, Isaiah. "The McMahon-Husseln Correspondence and the Question of Palestine," Journal of Contemporary History. V, No. 2 (July 1970), 83-122.

Ghory, Emile. "An Arab View of the Situation in Palestine," International Affairs. XV. No. 5 (September-October 1936),264-699.

Gillon, Dan Z. "The Antecedents of the Balfour Declaration," Middle Eastern Studies. V, No. 2 (May 1969), 984-988.

Glidden, Harold W. "The Arab World," American Journal of Psychiatry. CXXVIII, No. 8 (February 1972), 984-988.

Haddad, E. N. "Blood Revenge Among the Arabs," Journal of (he Palestine Oriental Society, I, No. 2 (April 1920T, i o 3- t t t : 408 ______. "Political Parties in Syria and Palestine (Qalsls and Yemini)," Journal of the Palestine Oriental Society, I, No. 4 (September 1921), 209-214.

Halm, Sylvia G. "'The Arab Awakening' A Source for the Historian?" Die Welt Pea Islams. N.S. IX, No. 4 (1953), 237-250.

Heyd, Uriel, "The Ottoman cUlema and Westernization in the Time of Selim III and Mahmud II," Scripta Hierosolyrai- tana. IX (1961), 63-96.

lllnden^. Rita. "The Fertility and Mortality of the Popula­ tion of Palestine," The Sociological Review. XXXIII, Nos. 1-2 (January-Apr11 1940), 29-49.

. "Palestine and Colonial Economic Development," Politleal Quarterly, XIII, No. 1 (January 1942), 91-99.

Horowitz, Dan and Moshe Lissak. "Authority Without Sove­ reignty: The Case of the National Centre of the Jewish Community in Palestine," Government and Opposition. VIII No. 3 (Winter 1973), 36-60.

Houranl, George F. "Palestine as a Problem of Ethics," Middle East Studies Association Bulletin, III, No. 1 (February 15, 1969, 15-25.

Hovarth, Ronald J. "A Definition of Colonialism," Current Anthropology. XIII, No. 1 (February 1972), 38-45.

Hudson, Michael. "Developments and Setbacks in the Palestine Resistance Movement," Journal of Palestine Studies, I, No. 3 (Spring 1972), 64-84.

Hurewltz, J. C. "Arab Politics in Palestine," Contemporary Jewish Record, V, No. 6 (December 1942), 59^-617.

Jeffrey, Arthur. "The Political Importance of Islam," Journal of Near Eastern Studies. I, No. 4 (October 1942) 383-386.

Joiner, Charles A. "The Ubiquity of the Administrative Role in Counterinsurgency," Aslan Survey. VII, No. 8 (August 1967), 540-554.

Kedourle, Elle. "Sir Herbert Samuel and the Government of Palestine," Middle Eastern Studies, V, No. 1 (January 1969), 44-68” 409

» "The Capture of Damascas, 1 October 1918f" Middle Eaatern Studies. It No. 1 (October 1964), 66-83.

Khaddurl, Majid. "Towards An Arab Union— The League of Arab States," American Political Science Review. XL, No. 1 (February 1946), 9 4-98.

Lapidus, Ira. "The Evolution of Muslim Urban Society," Comparative Studies in Society and History, XV, No. 1 D'anuary 147377 13-307 ------

Macoz, Moshe. "The cUlema* and the Process of Modernization in Syria During the Nineteenth Century," Asian and African Studies. VII (1971), 77-88.

Levy, Marion J., Jr. "Patterns (Structures) of Moderniza­ tion and Political Development," The Annals, CCCLVIII (March 1965), 29-40.

Lissak, Moshe. "Patterns of Change in Ideology and Class Structure in Israel," Jewish Journal of Sociology. VII, No. 1 (June 1965), 46-62.

Loftua, P. J. "Features of the Demography of Palestine," Population Studies. II, No. 1 (June 1948), 92-114.

Macalister, R. A. and E. W. G. Masterman. "Occasional Papers on the Modern Inhabitants of Palestine: Personal Names," Palestine Explorat ion Fund. Quarterly Statement, XXXVI (January 190i), 150-160; XXXVII (January 1905), 48-61; XXXVIII (January 1906), 33-50.

______. "A History of the Doings of the Fellahin During the First Half of the Nineteenth Century, from Native Sources," Palestine Exploration Fund. Quarterly State­ ment, XXXVII (July 1905), 343-3537

Mandel, Neville. "Attempts at an Arab-Zionlst Entente: 1913- 1914," Middle Eastern Studies. I, No. 3 (April 1965), 238-267.

Michelena, Jose A. Silva. "State Formation and Nation- Building," International Social Science Journal, XXIII, No. 3 (1971), 354-398.

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Muller, Edward N . "A Test of a Partial Theory of Potential for Political Violence," American Political Science Review, LXXVI, No. 3 (September 1972|), 928-959.

Notestein, Frank W. and Erneat Jurkat. "Population Problems of Palestine," Mllbank Memorial Fund Quarterly, XXIII, No. 4 (October 1945), 307-352.

Parzen, Herbert. "A Chapter in Arab-Jewish Relations During the Mandate Era," Jewish Social Studies, XXIX, No. 4 (October 1967), 203-233.

Patai, Raphael. "Mushaca Tenure and Cooperation In Pales­ tine," American Anthropologist, LI, No. 3 (July-Septem- ber 1949), 436-445.

. "On Cultural Contact and its Working in Modern Pales­ tine," American Anthropologist, No. 67, N.S. XLIX, No. 4, Pt. 2 (October 1947), 5-48.

Perlmann, M. "Chapters of Arab-Jewish Diplomacy 1918-22," Jewish Social Studies, VI, No. 2 (April 1944), 123-154.

Porath, Yehoshua. "Al-Hajj Amin al-Husayni, Muflt of Jeru­ salem— His Rise to Power and the Consolidation of His Position," Aslan and African Studies, VII (1971), 121-156.

______. "Usbat Al-Taharrur Al-Watani (The National Liberation League) 1943-1948," Asian and African Studies, IV (1968). 1-21.

Ro'i, Yaacov. "The Zionist Attitude to the Arabs 1908-1914," Middle Eastern Studies. IV, No. 3 (April 1968), 198-242.

Rose, Norman Anthony. "The Arab Rulers and Palestine, 1936, The British Reaction," The Journal of Modern History, XLIV, No. 2 (June 1972), 213-231.

. "The Debate on Partition, 1937-38: The Anglo-Zionist Aspect-I, The Proposal," Middle Eastern Studies. VI, No. 3 (October 1970), 297-318; "II-The Withdrawal," VII, No. 1 (January 1971), 3-24.

Rosenfeld, Henry. "Change, Barriers to Change, and Contra­ dictions in the Arab Village," American Anthropologist. LXX, No. 4 (August 1968), 732-752. 411

Roth, Andrew. "The Mufti's New Army," Nation. (November 1946), 551-552.

Samuel, Edwin. "The Ottoman Legacy to Israel," Jewish Journal of Sociology, II, No. 2 (November 1960^, 219-235.

Schmelz, 0. "Development of the Jewish Population of Jeru­ salem During the Last Hundred Years," Jewish Journal of Sociology, II, No. 1 (October 1961), 56-7 3.

_ . "The Jewish Population of Jerusalem," Jewish Journal of Sociology. VI, No. 2 (December 1964), 243-263.

Shamir, Shimon. "Belligerency in a Disintegrating Society- Factional Warfare in Ottoman Syria on the Eve of the Period of Modernization," Abr-Nahraln. XII (1971-1972).

_ . "The Question of a 'National Philosophy* in Contem­ porary Arab Thought," Aslan and African Studies. I (1965), 1-47.

Sheffer, Gabriel, "Intentions and Results of British Policy in Palestine: Passfield's White Paper," Middle Eastern Studies, IX, No. 1 (January 1973), pp. 43-60.

Silverburg, Sanford R. "Insurgency in the Middle East," International Problems, VII, Nos. 1-2 (May 1969), 60-62.

Smith, Michael G. "On Segmentary Lineage Systems," Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, LXXXVI, No. 2 TT9TST, 39-80.

Stern, Gabriel. "The Welzmann-Feisal Agreement," New Outlook. XII, No. 3 (March-Ap rll 1969), 20-25.

Tannous, Afif I. "The Arab Tribal Community in a Nationalls State," Middle East Journal, I, No. 1 (January 1947), 5-17.

Teller, Judd L. "Behind Palestine's Arab 'Armies': Power Politics and Mid-East Intrigue," Commentary. Ill, No. 3 (March 1947), 243-249.

Tibawi, A. L. "Education and Nationalism in Palestine," Die Welt Pea Islama. IV, No. 1 (1955), 4-20. 412

______. "Syria in War Time Agreements and Disagreements: Fresh Evidence from the British Foreign Office Records," Middle East Forum. XLIII, Nos. 2 & 3 (1967), 77-109.

. "T. E. Lawrence, Faisal and Weizmann: The 1919 Attempt to Secure an Arab Balfour Declaration," Royal Central Asian Journal, LVI, Pt. II (June 1969), 156- tst:

Totah, Khalil. "Education in Palestine," The Annals, CLXIV (November 1932), 155-166.

Toynbee, Arnold. "The McMahon Correspondence: Comments and a Reply," Journal of Contemporary History, V, No. 4 (June 1970), 185-201.

Verete, Mayer. "The Balfour Declaration and its Makers," Middle Eastern Studies, VI, No. 1 (January 1970), 48t 76.

Weinryb, Bernard D. "Socio-Economic Relations of Arabs and Jews in Palestine," Contemporary Jewish Record, VII, No. 4 (August 1944), 375-384.

Weintraub, D. and F. Bernstein. "Social Structure and Modernization: A Comparative Study of Two Villages," American Journal of Sociology, LXXI, No. 5 (March 1966), 509-521.

Willatts, E. C. "Some Geographical Factors in the Palestine Problem." The Geographical Journal, CVIII, Nos. 4-6 (April 194777 155-170.

Woolbert, Robert Gale. "Pan Arabism and the Palestine Prob­ lem," Foreign Affairs. XVI, No. 2 (January 1938).

Yisraeli, David. "The Third Reich and Palestine," Middle Eastern Studies. VII, No. 3 (October 1971), 343-354.

Zalman, A. "Census of Palestine, 1931," Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. XCVI, Pt. 4 (1933), 6 6 0 ^ 6 2 .

ESSAYS AND ARTICLES IN COLLECTIONS

Dawn, C. Ernest. "Ideological Influences in the Arab Revolt," The World of Islam: Studies in Honour of Philip K. Hitti. Edited by James Krltzeck and R. Bayly Winder, London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1960. 413

Easton, David, "Political Anthropology," Biannuel Review of Anthropology. 1959« Edited by B. Slgel. Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press, 1959.

Geertz, Clifford. "The Integrative Revolution: Primordial and Civil Politics in the New States." Old Societies and New States. Edited by Clifford Geertz. New York: The Free Press, 1963.

Glbb, H. A. R. "The International Congress at Jerusalem in December 1931," Survey of International Affairs 1934. Edited by Arnold Toynbee. London: Oxford University Press, 1935.

Glldden, Harold C. "Arab Unity: Ideal and Reality." The World of Islam: Studies in Honour of Philip I t . Hitt i. Edited by James Krltzeck and R. Bayly Winder. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1960.

Gurr, Ted Robert. "Psychological Factors in Civil Violence." Anger. Violence and Politics: Theories and Research. Edited by Ivo R. Feierabend, Rosalind L. Felerabend, Ted Robert Gurr. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall, 1972.

Halpern, Ben. "Israel and Palestine: The Political Use of Ethics," People and Politics in the Middle East. Edited by Michael Curtis. New Brunswick, N. J.: Transaction Books, 1971.

Hurewitz, J. C. "The Minorities in the Political Process." Soclal Forces in the Middle East. Edited by Sidney N. Fisher. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1955.

Kedourie, Elle. "The Chatham House Version." The Chatham House Version and other Middle-Eastern Studies. Edited by Elle Kedourie. London: Weldenfeld and Nicolson, 1970.

Khadurri, Majid. "cAziz cAli Mlsri and the Arab Nationalist Movement," Middle Eastern Affairs. Number Four. St. Antony1s Papers. Number 17. Edited by Albert Houranl. London: Oxford University Press, 1965.

Lobel, Ell. "Palestine and the Jews." The Arab World and Israel. Ahmad El Kldsy and Eli Lobel, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970. 414

Handel, Neville. "Turks, Arabs and Jewish Immigration Into Palestine, 1882-1914." Middle Eastern Affairs. Number Four. St. Antony1s Papers. Number 17. Edited by Albert Hourani. London: Oxford University Press, 1965.

Marmorstein, Emile. "A Note on 'Damaacas, Horns, Hama and Aleppo,1" Middle Eastern Affairs. Number Two. St. Antony * s Papers Number 11. Edited by Albert Hourani. Carbondale, 111.: Southern Illinois Press, 1961.

Myres, Samuel Dale, Jr. "Community Development in Palestine." Southern Methodist University Arnold Foundation Studies In PubTTc Affairs, l"I No. 2 (Fall 19 3 2).

Nevakivi, Jukka. "Lord Kitchner and the Partition of the Ottoman Empire, 1915-1916." Studies in Internetional History: Essays Presented to W. Norton Medllcott. Stevenson Professor of International History. Edited by K . Bourne and D. C. Watt. Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1967.

Rosenfeld, Henry. "From Peasantry to Wage Labor and Residual Peasantry: The Transformation of an Arab Village." Peoples and Cultures of the Middle East. Volume 2^: Life in the Cities. Towns. and Countryside. Edited by Louise E. Sweet. Garden City, N. Y.; The Natural History Press, 1970.

Shils, Edward. "Centre and Periphery." The Logic of Personal Knowledge: Essays Presented to Michael Polyani on his Seventieth Birthday 11th March 1961. Glencoe, 111.: The Free Press, 1961.

Sjoberg, Gideon. "The Rural-Urban Dimension in Preindustrial, Transitional, and Industrial Societies." Handbook of Modern Soc iology. Edited by Robert E. L. Faris. Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1964.

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ENCYCLOPEDIA ARTICLES

Lybyer, Albert H. "Feudalism: Saracen and Ottoman." Ency­ clopedia of the Social Sciences. VI, 210-213, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1931. 415

UNPUBLISHED MATERIALS

Abdel Rahman, Abdel Wahab. "British Policy Towards the Arab Revolt In Palestine, 1936-1939." Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, the University of London, London, England, 1971.

Abu Ghazaleh, Adnan Mohammad. "Arab Cultural Nationalism in Palestine, 1919-1948." Unpublished Doctoral Disserta­ tion, New York University, New York, New York, 1967.

Fakhouri, Hani. "Vendetta! An Anthropological Study of Blood Feuds and the Payment of Blood Money Among the Bedouin of East Jordan." Paper read at the American Anthropological Association Convention, New York, New York, 1971.

NEWSPAPERS

New York Times. 1937-1939, 1945-1948. Orlente Hoderno, 1935-1936. 416 APPENDIX I

POLITICAL BLACK LIST "a "1

Jerusalem Shaykh Abdul Kader Muzghar (head of the Nadi al Arabl in Damascus) Shaykh Hassan Abu Saud Jamal Bey Husaynl Hassan Sldql al Dajani Musa Kazlm Pasha Aref al Aref Jam Amin al-Husayni Shaykh Said al Khatlb Fahkrl al Husaynl Kamel Budeirl

Jaffa Mahmed Aziz al Khllal Shaykh Raghib al Dajani Dr. Ibrahim Khamanay Sellm Abdul Rahman

Phoenica Rushdi al Shawwa Rashid al Haj Ibrahim Ahmed al Imam Subri Ayoub Mohamed Murad

Samaria Izzat Darwazah Hafez Tuqan Mohamed All at Tamiml

Galilee Kadri Hfez

^People to be actively watched.

Source: 2/152/223/POL/131 A, December 16, 1920, ISA. See also 2/152/2223/P0L, ISA dealing with political suspects. 417

APPENDIX II

POLITICAL BLACK LIST "B"1

Jerusalem Dr. Zeki Abu Saud Aref Pasha al Dajani Rushdl Sahceth Abdul Kader ash Shehabl Ahmed Muhmud est Shrlf Abdullah Bshelr Omar Mohamed Sultan Issaf Nashashibi Hassan al Budeirl

Jaffa cUmar al Bltar Ahmed Omar Shaykh Tewflq Taybl Aref al Haj Ibrahim Mohamed Said al Shantl Shaykh Mustlfa al Khery Shukrl al Tagl Yusel al cIsa cIsa al cIsa Dr. Isaac Cohen Suleyman al Tagl

Phoenicia Fuad Saad Rida Mahmud Fadda Aziz Mlkati Yusef al Khalil Rafiq Bedour Bey Nejlb Nassar Wadi Boustanl Moeln al Madi

Samaria Haj Tewflq Hanad Mohammed All Darwazah Yusuf cAbd al-Hadi Mustafa al-Musa Hajla 418 APPENDIX II (continued)

Galliee Husayn al Obeld 11 Slghbl Ibrahim al Fahoom Taher al Taberi Tewflq Bey Fahoom Fadil al Fahoom Abdullah Bey al Fahoom Sacid al Fahoom Fadd al Kang Abbass

Gaza Said Zein al Din

Not to be closely supervised but with possible qualification for nA" list. 419 APPENDIX III

SECONDARY ELECTORS Officials of the SMC Llva of Jerusalem A. Kaza of Jerusalem Haj Amin al Husaynl President of SMC Raghib Bey Nashashlbl* Aref Pasha Dajanl I Shaykh Abdel Fatah Darwish

B. Kaza of Hebron Shaykh Mukhlis al Hamouri* Shaykh Tewflq Tahbub Mamur Awqaf Hebron Shaykh Abdallah Tahbub Imam of Hebron Mosque Shaykh Abdel Haimal Khatib Imam and Khatib of Hebron C. Kaza of Beersheba Shaykh Selim Bselso Mufti of Beersheba Shaykh Hmamad Sanla Shaykh Jaber Weheigi Shaykh Saad al Riatt D. Kaza of Gaza Haj Said Effendl al Shawa Member SMC Mahmud Effendl Abu Khadra* Shaykh Muhyeddin Abdul Shafi Mamur Awqaf Gaza E. Kaza of Jaffa and Rami eh Abdallah Effendl Dajanl Member SMC cUmar Effendl Bitar* Mutawalll waqf Tewflq Bey Ghusayn Shaykh Sulayman Tajl* Liwa of Nablus A. Kaza of Nablus Ahmad Effendl Shakaac* Haj Nimr Effendl Hammed Mamur Awqaf Nablue Haj Abdul Rahman Effendl Nabllsl* Fares Effendl Mascud* B. Kaza of Tulkarm Shaykh Abdel LetIf Haj Ibrahim Qadi of Ramleh Shaykh Yusef Kalaj Shaykh Muhammad Awartanl Licensed to perform marriages Meral Effendl Meral Licensed to perform marriages C. Kaza of Jenin Nefl Effendl Abushi Abdul Kader Effendl al Yusef* Hassan Effendl Abu Saad Shaykh Adeeb Effendl al Khaldi Mufti of Jenin 420 APPENDIX III (continued)

D. Kaza of JABACin Abdel L A t l f Bey Seleh Member SMC Sulayaan Bey Tuqan* Sheykh Abdul Rahman el Khatib* Seld Effendl Kamal III. Live of Akke A. Ka z a of Acre Sheykh Abdelleh Jezzer Aqdl and Mufti of Acre Abdul Fatah Effendl Saadi* Hassan Effendl Badr Tewflq al Abdallah* B. Kaza of Haifa Shaykh Muhammad Murad Member SMC Naif Effendl Madi* Tewflq Bey Khalil Haj Khatib Effendl Taha C. Kaza of Nazareth Tewflq Bey Fahum* Muhammad Said Effendl Ubaid Fadl Effendl El Kanj Said Effendl Abu Hamad* D. Kaza of Safed Shaykh Assad Kaddurah Mufti of Safed Fayed Effendl Khadra Selim Effendl Shamma Mamur Aytarn Haifa (i.e. Administrator of Orphan Funds) Ahmad Effendl Nlhawi Qadi of Nazareth E. Kaza of Tiberias Abdel Salam Effendl al Tabari Mutawalli Wagf Taher al Tabari Qadi and Mufti of Tiberias Ishak Tsherkesi

*0ppositlon to the SMC 4 21

APPENDIX IV

VIOLENCE INDEX

W VI (K + 7)P

Where;

VI - Violence Index

K * Number Killed

W - Number Wounded

P ■ Population

D - Duration in terms of days