The Departmental Annual Report 2004

House of Commons Transport Committee

Fourth Report of Session 2004–05

Report, together with formal minutes, oral and written evidence

Ordered by The House of Commons to be printed 2 March 2005

HC 409 Incorporating HC 1280-i, Session 2003-04 Published on 10 March 2005 by authority of the House of Commons London: The Stationery Office Limited £14.50

The Transport Committee

The Transport Committee is appointed by the House of Commons to examine the expenditure, administration, and policy of the Department for Transport and its associated public bodies.

Current membership Mrs Gwyneth Dunwoody MP (Labour, Crewe) (Chairman) Mr Jeffrey M Donaldson MP (Democratic Unionist, Lagan Valley) Mr Brian H. Donohoe MP (Labour, Cunninghame South) Clive Efford MP (Labour, Eltham) Mrs Louise Ellman MP (Labour/Co-operative, Liverpool Riverside) Ian Lucas MP (Labour, Wrexham) Miss Anne McIntosh MP (Conservative, Vale of York) Mr Paul Marsden MP (Liberal Democrat, Shrewsbury and Atcham) Mr John Randall MP (Conservative, Uxbridge) Mr George Stevenson MP (Labour, Stoke-on-Trent South) Mr Graham Stringer MP (Labour, Manchester Blackley)

Powers The Committee is one of the departmental select committees, the powers of which are set out in House of Commons Standing Orders, principally in SO No 152. These are available on the Internet via www.parliament.uk.

Publications The Reports and evidence of the Committee are published by The Stationery Office by Order of the House. All publications of the Committee (including press notices) are on the Internet at www.parliament.uk/transcom. A list of Reports of the Committee in the present Parliament is at the back of this volume.

Committee staff The current staff of the Committee are Eve Samson (Clerk), David Bates (Second Clerk), Clare Maltby (Committee Specialist), Philippa Carling (Inquiry Manager), Miss Frances Allingham (Committee Assistant), Miss Michelle Edney (Secretary), Henry Ayi-Hyde (Senior Office Clerk) and James O’Sullivan (Sandwich Student).

All correspondence should be addressed to the Clerk of the Transport Committee, House of Commons, 7 Millbank, London SW1P 3JA. The telephone number for general enquiries is 020 7219 6263; the Committee’s email address is [email protected]

Contents

Report Page

1 Introduction 5

2 The Departmental Report 6

3 The Department’s targets 10 Developments since publication of the Annual Report 10 Congestion 13 Targets for Rail Use 14 Local transport related targets 15 Bus quality contracts 15 Environmental targets 16 Underperformance 16

4 Efficiency savings 18

5 Agencies 20

6 The Future of Transport 22 Private sector investment 23

7 Conclusion 24

Conclusions and recommendations 24

Annex 27 Introduction 27 Preparations for severe weather 27 Impact of the severe weather 28 Conditions at Heathrow on 28/29 January 28 Service cancellations 28 Failings identified 29 De-icing policy 29 Provision for passengers 30

Formal minutes 31

Witnesses 33

List of written evidence 33

Reports from the Transport Committee since 2002 34

Summary

Each year, the Departmental Annual Report gives the Department for Transport an opportunity to set out what it is doing, why it is doing it, and how successful its policies have been. Used properly, it could set out a comprehensive and coherent picture of the Department’s policy and performance. The Department for Transport has failed to seize this opportunity. We believe that both the 2003 and 2004 Annual Reports have been inadequate. The next Annual Report must be more coherent. It should contain far clearer information about the Department’s major programmes, better, more comprehensible, information about the Department’s performance and a better account of the way in which the Department works with others to achieve its goals. The Department for Transport Annual Report should not be about the activities of the Department in isolation; it needs to include accounts of the work done by other departments, local authorities and the private sector.

The need for a clear, comprehensive, Annual Report is increased by the new White Paper on The Future of Transport. Only time will tell whether the ambitions of the 10 Year Plan for Transport have been abandoned, or whether the White Paper’s emphasis on sustained investment, improvements in transport management and planning ahead will instead ensure they are fulfilled. We need clear, comprehensive information which will allow us to judge the Department’s progress. The Department’s Annual Report must become the key document setting out the Department’s strategy and performance for both Parliament and the public. Otherwise there is a danger that official energy will go into producing a plethora of substandard documents, rather than a single, authoritative one.

1 Introduction

1. Each year, Government Departments produce an Annual Report on their activities. It is part of a series of documents regularly presented to Parliament. Annually, the Department for Transport requests expenditure through the Supply Estimates, and Supplementary Estimates, and reports financial performance in its resource accounts. In addition, it now produces an Autumn Performance Report, presenting an interim report of progress against its targets. 1

2. We make a practice of taking evidence from the Secretary of State and the Permanent Secretary on the Department for Transport Annual Report, and its associated documents. Since December 2003, the Department has also produced three significant white papers; The Future of Air Transport, The Future of Rail, and The Future of Transport.2 The Secretary of State told us that these three White Papers were “designed to set out the framework for transport in this country over the next 30 years.”3 We took the opportunity offered by the evidence session on the Departmental Annual Report to discuss this framework with the Secretary of State, and include some observations on The Future of Transport in this Report. We very much value the wide ranging discussion we have in the evidence session on the Annual Report and we are grateful to our witnesses. We would also like to express our thanks to our specialist adviser, Dr Greg Marsden.

1 Department for Transport Autumn Performance Report 2004, Cm 6403 2 The Future Of Transport: a network for 2030, Cm 6234, July 2004. The Committee under took enquiries into Aviation(Sixth Report of Session 2002-03, HC 454-I) and The Future of the Railway (Seventh Report of Session 2003- 04, HC145-I) before each of the relevant White Papers appeared. 3 Q 3

2 The Departmental Report

3. The Annual Report is an opportunity for the Department to give an overview of its performance, and that of its agencies. It should be part of a series of documents clearly setting out the Department’s aims, the way in which it intends to achieve these aims, how resources are being spent, what targets exist to measure its performance and whether or not those targets will be reached. Unfortunately, the Department’s Report fails to do this. The associated Autumn Performance Report also needs to be improved.

4. In summary, it is difficult to see the links between the Department’s strategic objectives and progress reports against the Public Service Agreement (PSA) targets agreed with the Treasury. The format is ill-considered: for example, the Autumn Performance Report does not explain the links between the PSA targets and the Department’s wider objectives, which are not even included. The spending review and annual report contain no details about the way in which expenditure is related to the Department’s objectives, or has been re–allocated to ensure that particular targets are reached. Finally, there is little information about the department’s performance management and monitoring framework, which is particularly important since the Department for Transport relies on many external agents, including some in the private sector, to achieve its goals. The Department’s own guidance on Local Transport Plans identifies key priorities shared between central and local government – congestion; accessibility; safer roads, air quality and quality of life.4 We believe that future reports should reflect these priorities. We recommend that the Department for Transport reflects on the various documents in which it reports progress. We believe the Department needs to make sure that they give a clear view of the Department’s aims and its success in fulfilling them, and that they form a coherent series.

5. The Annual Report itself lacks coherence. It is divided into eight chapters; the first two look at the year in brief and at the responsibilities and organisation of the Department. Each of the subsequent chapters looks at a particular topic: the strategic networks; railways; local transport; aviation and shipping; safety and security; and sustainable transport. The fact that analysis is divided between transport modes (“the strategic route network”, “railways”) and more thematic chapters (“sustainable transport”, “safety and security”) means that programmes can be double counted. These chapters are followed by appendices setting out public expenditure changes, recruitment in public appointment tables, departmental strategies and other detailed information, much, like the Public Expenditure Tables, prescribed by the Treasury. We recommend that the Department considers a radical restructuring of its report so that chapters are more clearly related to the Department’s strategy and its Public Service Agreement targets.

6. The Report fails to give clear information about the Department’s programmes. The narrative chapters (Chapters 2-8) vary in quality and in the amount and type of information they give. In fact, the Annual Report may include descriptions of every single one of the Department’s programmes, but because there is no coherent structure the reader cannot be confident that is the case. A common failing is that the individual chapters do

4 Full Guidance on Local Transport Plans, Department for Transport, December 2004, p 22

not allow the reader easily to grasp what has been done by central government, and what by local authorities or other bodies, or how responsibilities are divided.

7. For example, the chapter on local transport sets out the measures which have been introduced to support and improve bus services in England. However, it is unclear about the way which central government, local government and private providers work together, does not differentiate clearly between inputs, outputs and outcomes, and gives no sense that there is a strategy underlying the Department’s work. Instead we get a description of what appears to be a series of ad hoc support mechanisms. Successive paragraphs give a figure of £263m for the amount spent supporting socially necessary bus services. We are told that this includes money from central government from a Rural Bus Subsidy Grant and the Rural and Urban Bus Challenges. Rural Bus Subsidy Grant is said to have been £48.5 million; 42 projects were awarded funding of £20 million under the Rural Bus Challenge and £19.6 million appears to have been spent on the Urban Bus Challenge. The reader is left to deduce (perhaps incorrectly) that nearly £175 million was spent by local authorities on supporting socially necessary bus services.

8. Not only does the Report concentrate on inputs, the strategy underlying these inputs is entirely unclear. There is no indication as to whether the Rural and Urban Bus Challenges are one-off competitions, or run on a regular basis. It is clear that some Challenge funding goes to “Kickstart projects” which include proposals for pump priming the introduction of services which would ultimately become self supporting, but there is no clarity about what is done with the rest of the money, which supports the majority of schemes. We are not asking for the impossible: the Department managed to produce a clear account of the bus subsidy system in a 2002 Review – that kind of clarity is needed in the Annual Report.5

9. In addition to the failure to provide a clear account of policies and programmes, information about the outcomes of the Department’s work is either entirely lacking or bafflingly incomplete. We are told nothing which would enable us to judge the Department’s progress in making bus services more accessible, in the widest sense, such as whether there are now more services. The explanation for this lack of information - that “work is underway on the development of punctuality indicators, and more general indicators for access to services”6- is contained several chapters further on, in Appendix D. The Appendices tend to be more satisfactory than the body of the report, perhaps because they are more centrally prescribed. In our view, it is more important to ensure that the narrative sections contain real information about progress, than to avoid repeating information in the Appendices.

10. Information which purports to show progress can be frustratingly inadequate. For example, the Report notes that the 10 Year Plan contains a commitment to resurface all concrete trunk roads in England at an estimated cost of £180 million, and that “to date, the Highways Agency has resurfaced some 15% of the network.”7 Since no indication is given of the proportion of the network which was originally concrete, it is impossible to judge how well the Department is doing. The public cares about traffic noise - a recent petition to

5 Review of bus subsidies, Consultation on review of subsidies for bus services. Published: 6 August 2002. http://www.dft.gov.uk 6 p 130 7 Para 8.28, page 96

the House urged further resurfacing of the M2 – the Department’s Report should allow readers to judge progress.8

11. The narrative sections of the report contain extremely few tables or charts even though they would provide an extremely clear way to present information about progress, both past and expected. The best chapter is that on the railways, which, in addition to expenditure information, contains useful summaries of passenger kilometres travelled each year from 1997 to 2003, the percentage of trains arriving on time, and passenger satisfaction. Even here, we believe more information could be given, such as the development of freight over a similar period. The Annual Report should give far more information about the Department’s performance. Where possible, performance indicators should allow the reader to judge the effectiveness of a particular programme, rather than how much has been spent on it, or how many schemes have been started. It should also make far greater use of graphs and charts to show actual and projected performance.

12. The lack of clear information about trends over time is most notable in the financial information given. The Department includes little beyond the bare Treasury requirements. Some of the difficulties may arise from the Department’s arms length relationship with many of those responsible for delivering services, but sometimes information is omitted which is easily available. There is a page devoted to the Road Haulage Modernisation fund; it could easily have indicated how much was allocated in each of the three years of its existence; it fails to do so. We recommend that future editions of the Annual Report contain far clearer information about each of the Department’s major programmes. This information should cover expenditure and outputs over a five-year period. For major programmes, expenditure should be given both on a constant and a current cost basis.

13. The Department also faces a particular problem in its financial reporting, in that significant funds for local transport come from the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister through the Revenue Support Grant. Although this is given as a block, the Department should be able to give some details about what has been spent on transport. No details are given. We recommend that future reports should contain information about transport funding from all public sources, accompanied by a brief explanation of the funding systems.

14. The Departmental Report unfortunately concentrates on the parts of its work with clearly measurable inputs, and is far less informative about the areas where it works through others, particularly where there is no strong body to co-ordinate action. In consequence, it gives only a partial account of its strategy to:

Support the economy through efficient and reliable transport

The Annual Report tends to discuss reliability in terms of congestion reduction, or capacity increase, which the Department and its Agencies can clearly influence. It contains little or nothing about the robustness of the transport system, which is more complex. To take one

8 Supplement to the Voters and Proceedings, 27th January 2005, Petition from Residents of Doddington, Erriottwood, Kingsdown and Lynsted in Kent

example, there are regularly major disruptions due to the weather.9 Such failures can on occasion owe as much to human error as to the severity of the weather. An effective department will ensure that the disruptions due to human error are as few as possible. Our report on the Highways Agency explored the problems that were caused by a combination of severe weather and the inadequate communications strategies of the contractor concerned.10 In the process, we revealed causes for concern about the nature of the contracts the Highways Agency had put in place with private sector operators. This year, we have asked for similar information; it is apparent from the Highways Agency’s response, printed with this report, that its current approach is commendably thorough. It now regularly monitors and tests service providers’ readiness to respond to severe weather, and, where incidents occur, takes steps to learn from them, and encourage road users such as the haulage industry to learn from them. The Annual Report was an opportunity for the Department to set out the improvements the Highways Agency has made in its preparations for severe weather. It missed it. In future we would like clearer information about how the Department and its Agencies are handling risks of disruption to the transport network included in the Annual Report.

15. As the Annual Report notes, “The Department achieves many of its objectives by working in partnership with a wide range of public-sector and private-sector bodies.”11 There are some examples of the Department’s activities in individual chapters,12 but we would have expected far more systematic analysis of the Department’s relationship with its partners and sponsored bodies. The lack of information is particularly noticeable in relation to sectors where the private sector is heavily involved. The aviation sector, which, of course, is largely private, was disrupted by bad weather last year, and we asked our staff to draw up a note setting out the problems, which we print as an Annex to this report. The note reveals considerable deficiencies in the way that ice and snow were handled at Heathrow. Severe weather conditions are rare in the south of England, but airlines and airports should be prepared to work together to ensure that disruption is minimised and that hardship to passengers is kept to a minimum. That clearly did not happen last January. We would expect the Department to exert pressure on the industry to improve its performance but the Annual Report makes no mention of it. Where the Department is relying on delivery through others, it should make its role explicit, and provide more explanation about how the performance of others is being supported, and monitored.

9 The one exception is that the chapter on railways notes that programmes are in place to reduce the major causes of delay allowing particular problems, such as autumn leaf fall to be targeted; p 39 10 Eighth Report of Session 2002-03, The Work of the Highways Agency, HC 453 11 para 2.7, p 18 12 see the section on “Working in partnership” in chapter 5, p 53

3 The Department’s targets

Developments since publication of the Annual Report 16. The Annual Report 2004 was published in April 2004. It contains details of progress against the Public Service Agreement (PSA) made with the Treasury in the 2002 Spending Review. This agreement was revised in the Spending Review 2004, and a new Public Service Agreement containing revised targets was published on 12th July 2004.13 Before we took evidence we asked for a memorandum on recent developments, which we publish with this report.

17. Whereas the 2002 Public Service Agreement established a single objective for the department of “Reliable safe and integrated transport for everyone, which respects the environment.”, there are now four objectives:

Objective I: Support the economy through the provision of efficient and reliable interregional transport systems by making better use of the existing road network; reforming rail services and industry structures to deliver significant performance improvements for users; and investing in additional capacity to meet growing demand.

Objective II: Deliver improvements to the accessibility, punctuality and reliability of local and regional transport systems through the approaches set out in Objective I and through increased use of public transport and other appropriate local solutions.

Objective III: Balance the need to travel with the need to improve quality of life by improving safety and respecting the environment.

Objective IV: Improve cost-effectiveness through sound financial management, robust cost control, and clear appraisal of transport investment choices across different modes and locations.

These objectives give a much better picture of the range of Departmental activities, something harder to determine with only one catch-all objective.

18. There have been some changes to the PSA targets: a new joint target on greenhouse gas emissions has been introduced, the targets for London Underground target have been dropped (responsibility has shifted to the Mayor of London), the efficiency target is no longer a PSA target and revisions have been made to some of the remaining targets.14 The 10 Year Plan for Transport also set a number of targets, some of which have been subsumed into the PSA targets, some of which have been achieved, and some which appear to have faded from view. Dr Greg Marsden and Professor Peter Bonsall provided an analysis of evolution of government targets since the 10 Year Plan itself, which gives a fuller picture than the PSA revisions alone.

13 2004 Spending Review, Public Service Agreements 2005-2008, Cm 6238 14 The Department provided a table showing how the Department’s PSA targets had changed since 2002, which is printed with its evidence at the back of this report.

Table 1: Evolution of Ten Year Plan Targets and Commitments

Original Target (as in 2000) Status pre July 2004 July 2004 announcement statement/revised target

1 Reduce congestion on the inter- No definition for congestion The Department is urban trunk road network and has yet been agreed developing better in large urban areas in England measures of inter-urban below 2000 levels by 2010 and urban congestion and will publish new targets by July 2005

2 Increase rail use in Great Britain Government had conceded The rail patronage target (measured in passenger that the extra capacity needed has been abandoned. The kilometres) from 2000 levels by to allow a 50% growth in rail new rail target is to 50% by 2010, with investment in use is unaffordable. The 2000 improve punctuality and infrastructure and capacity, rail crisis had resulted in reliability of rail services while at the same time securing greater public interest in rail to at least 85% by 2006 improvements in rail punctuality performance. with further and reliability improvements by 2008

3 Increase bus use in England On track (almost entirely due Increase the use of public (measured by the number of to substantial increases in bus transport (bus and light passenger journeys) from 2000 use in London which represents rail) by more than 12 per levels by 10% by 2010, while at around 1/3 of the UK bus cent in England by 2010 the same time securing market) compared with 2000 improvements in punctuality levels, with growth in and reliability. every region

4 Double light rail use in England Increased tender prices have (measured by the number of led to the recent suspension of passenger journeys) by 2010 many proposed schemes from 2000 levels

5 Cut journey times on London The PPP deals were concluded There is now no national Underground services by during 2003 and the target relating to the increasing capacity and reducing underground is now the London Underground delays (specific targets were to responsibility of the Mayor. be agreed by Mayor after the There is a whole suite of PPP had been established) performance related targets embodied in the PPP contracts but this is now seen as a matter of London governance. To date, performance against benchmarks is mixed (NAO, 2004)

6 Reduce the number of people On target across all categories The target has been killed and seriously injured in of casualty (DfT, 2003) augmented by adding, Great Britain in road accidents “tackling the significantly by 40%, and the number of higher incidence in children killed or seriously disadvantaged injured by 50% by 2010 communities”. compared with the average for 1994-98

7 Improve Air Quality by meeting On track for all seven Unchanged our National Air Quality pollutants except NOx and Strategy objectives for carbon PM10 (but these too are “on a monoxide, lead, nitrogen downward trend” (DfT, 2003)) dioxide, particles, sulphur,

benzene and 1-3 butadiene. Joint target with DEFRA

8 It ought to be possible to Rail freight increased by 10% Target abandoned achieve an 80% increase in rail in the first year of the plan but freight by 2010 suffered through disruptions to the Channel Tunnel rail link. Insufficient funds were available to support the necessary freight infrastructure upgrading and there is a shortage of inter-modal interchanges

9 Triple the number of cycling The decline in cycling has Target abandoned to be trips compared with a 2000 flattened but performance replaced by a general aim, base, by 2010 against target very poor. supported by as yet unspecified local targets, “to increase walking and cycling in the next 20 to 30 years”

10 Achieve a 1/3 increase in the Substantial increases have been Local targets for bus proportion of households in reported service provision now rural areas within 10 minutes encouraged walk of an hourly or better bus service by 2010

11 By June 2001, no more than Not on target - 1.6 % of Incorporated into the new 0.5% of bus services cancelled services cancelled in 2002/03 combined public transport for reasons within operator’s compared to 1.8% in 2000/01. target control Failure related to a number of factors including labour market conditions

12 Bring down the average age of This target has been met (DfT, New target relating to buses to 8 years by 2001 2003) and a commitment has low floor or accessible been given by bus operators to buses. maintain this

13 Reduce rail overcrowding to Rail overcrowding standards Target abandoned meet SRA standards continue to be breached and there seems little prospect of solving commuter overcrowding on all stretches of the London network

14 Maintain our strategic road This target is being met. Target now specific to the network in optimum conditions Highways Agency

15 Provide sufficient resources to The condition of unclassified Target abandoned to be local authorities to halt the local roads continues to replaced by local targets deterioration in the condition of deteriorate although the local roads by 2004 and to backlog in other roads has eliminate the backlog by 2010. been halted in line with the first target. There is considerable on-going debate about the true size of the maintenance backlog.

16 Invest £121 billion of public Extra resources have now been Not officially a target but money by 2010 pledged to the £121m already the new total remains a committed but less private clearly defined statement finance has become available of investment intent than was originally anticipated. Rail costs have risen significantly so it is unclear whether spend is rising in real terms

Source: Marsden, G. and Bonsall, P. (2004) Understanding the role of performance targets in transport policy, Proc. European Transport Conference, Strasbourg, France, 4-6 October 19. It is helpful that both the Annual Report 2003 and Annual Report 2004 clearly set out not only the current Public Service Agreement targets, but those from earlier spending rounds. We welcome the fact that this approach has been continued in the Autumn Performance Report. The Autumn Performance Report notes that although the London Underground targets are no longer contained in the Public Service Agreement, the Underground’s performance indicators will still be monitored. We recommend that reports on the indicators continue to be included in future departmental Annual Reports.

20. The Table above sets out the evolution of targets in a summary form. There are some points we wish to make about particular measures.

Congestion 21. Last year we noted that “three years into the 10 year plan, the performance indicator to measure progress in reducing congestion on the interurban trunk road network is still in development stage.”15 The Spending Review sets a target to “reduce urban and inter urban congestion” although it notes “new targets to be developed by July 2005”.16 It is remarkable that, four years after publication of the 10 year plan, the Department for Transport should have what is effectively a target to set a target for congestion. The result is that the Departmental Annual Report for 2004 describes progress in terms of inputs, rather than outputs.

22. The Autumn Performance Review set out progress on developing congestion measures as follows:

Work is progressing on developing a basket of new congestion indicators,

currently including:

• reliability;

• average vehicle delay;

• average person delay (urban only);

15 Second Report of the Transport Committee, Session 2003-04, The Department for Annual Report 2003, HC249, para 8 16 Spending Review 2004, box 9.1, page 103

• time spent below specified threshold speeds (inter-urban only).

For urban areas, the target will relate to average delay per vehicle, as set out in the draft guidance for the second round of Local Transport Plans. Other performance measures will be available after July 2005.17

We consider the range of measures of congestion that the Department is developing is likely to be more satisfactory than the previous measure. We recommend that the Department ensures that there is full and regular reporting against the new congestion reduction target as soon as possible.

Targets for Rail Use 23. The previous targets for rail were to increase the kilometres travelled by rail passengers, and to increase the proportion of freight carried by rail. The target for increasing the number of passenger kilometres travelled was not ideal, since it focused on intercity rather than local journeys, but at least it recognised that it was desirable to achieve some modal shift from the roads to other forms of transport. It is not surprising that this target has been abandoned. The Strategic Rail Authority forecast that the likely increase in rail passenger growth by 2010/2011 would be between 20% and 30%, rather than 50%, and costs on the rail network have escalated hugely. It is less clear why the target for increasing the amount of freight on rail has also been removed. The Secretary of State told us that the amount of freight carried had increased, and that “there are a number of reasons for optimism in the freight industry”.18

24. The new PSA target for rail is “to improve punctuality and reliability of rail services to at least 85% by 2006 with further improvements by 2008”. It conspicuously does not predict any increase in rail patronage, even though The Future of Transport indicates that it may be necessary to make further rail provision to meet increased demand and the Secretary of State told us that “I see the railways carrying more people”.19 We are disappointed that although the Department is aware of the problems which increased road usage will bring it has not set out aspirations for the growth of rail.

25. The Secretary of State told us that new target had been chosen because

The thing that is holding back the railways at the moment is reliability. If you want people to use the railways, as opposed to using their car, you have got to be able to tell them that if they come to the station the train will be there and it will get to its destination at the time it is supposed to get there. … That is why, for this three-year period that we fix these PSA targets, I was quite deliberate in saying “I want to concentrate on reliability”, because if you sort reliability a number of the other things you want to come alongside that, like increased usage, will follow from that.20

17 Cm 6403, p.8 18 Q 17 19 Q 30 20 Q 5

We welcome the fact that the PSA target to improve punctuality and reliability is precise about what performance will be delivered over the next few years, although this is the type of target which in the past might have been left to franchise specifications or Network Rail. We note that a longer-term target for modal shift has been replaced by a short term tactical target to improve the performance of the railways. Once the reorganisation of the railway is complete, we expect to see more strategic targets setting out the role that rail can play in an integrated transport system. We also recommend that future Annual Reports contain figures on rail passenger usage and rail freight so that trends in rail use can be easily monitored.

Local transport related targets 26. Previously, there were separate targets for bus and light rail, as shown in the table above. The Spending Review 2002 combined these into a new target to “secure improvements in the accessibility, punctuality and reliability of local public transport (bus and light rail) with an increase in use of more than 12% by 2010 compared with 2000 levels”.

27. The Annual Report 2004 suggests that this target is largely on course, although London is responsible for most of the growth in bus use. The Autumn Performance Report notes that “there was a significant drop in [bus] patronage outside London in 2003-04.”21 Despite this, the Government considers that improved bus services “will be key to reducing congestion and pollution and safer than travelling by car” and that “buses should be seen as an alternative to rail services in some areas.”22

28. In effect, the target for increases in light rail patronage has been abandoned, and the targets for increasing bus patronage have so far been secured by improvements in London services and the congestion charge. The Government has recognised the London effect, and we welcome the fact that the new target now requires growth in every region. We are currently undertaking an inquiry into light rail, as part of a wider inquiry into integrated transport, and will be looking closely at the extent to which it is realistic to see bus and light rail as comparable.

Bus quality contracts 29. The Future of Transport states that Passenger Transport Authorities would be given the ability to choose whether to channel subsidies towards rail or other forms of public transport. The Department proposes to give PTAs powers to set bus quality contracts in cases where they decide to transfer subsidy from rail to bus, and wish to ensure that bus routes, timings and fares will meet passenger needs. The Secretary of State told us that quality contracts could also be used as part of an overall coherent plan for reducing congestion, and that the Government was making:

21 Cm 6234, para 9.23 22 Cm 6234, para 5.7, p 67

quite specifically an offer to PTEs and to larger groups of councils to say “If you come up with a coherent transport solution we are prepared to make it easier for you to deal with the problems that you might otherwise have on buses.”23

The Minister for Transport, Mr Tony McNulty MP, reiterated this during the Standing Committee debate on the Railways Bill.

In the context of a fully integrated and comprehensive transport strategy for an area, we have said to authorities that we will consider allowing them to go down the route of the quality bus contract. Furthermore, we will allow authorities to dispense the bus service operators grant, rather than, as now, it going direct to the operators.24

30. The Railways Bill will allow quality contracts to be used when a local authority wishes to reduce rail services; we believe the Transport Act 2000 already gives local authorities the power to include integrated transport as a consideration when they draw up their bus strategies. The Secretary of State emphasised that a “coherent transport solution” would be needed before bus quality contracts were approved; we see no reason why such coherent plans should not include rail services which are maintained, or even strengthened, if local authorities think it appropriate.

Environmental targets 31. The Department now shares the target to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to 12.5% below 1990 levels and to move towards a 20% reduction in carbon dioxide emissions below 1990 levels by 2010 with the Department for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) and the Department of Trade and Industry. Transport produces one fifth of all domestic carbon dioxide emissions; we welcome the extension of the Government target to reduce greenhouse gases to the Department for Transport.

32. The DfT has long shared the target to “Improve air quality by meeting our National Air Quality strategy objectives” for a range of pollutants25 with DEFRA. As the Autumn Performance Report notes “there are some sites where, with present policies and technologies, it is questionable whether the targets for NO2 and PM10 will be met by the relevant dates. This is mainly due to emissions from road transport.” Table D8 of the Annual Report is largely incomprehensible and appears to be at variance with the table in the Autumn Performance Report. While the Autumn Performance Report sets out how the Department is working with local authorities to produce improvements, and mentions that there is an interdepartmental review of the Air Quality Strategy, it does not explain how DfT and DEFRA work together or how the Department identifies and manages its own performance against its joint target. It should do so.

Underperformance 33. It is clear from the Autumn Performance Report that the Department is facing difficulties with meeting a number of its targets. On rail punctuality, greenhouse gases and

23 Q 38 24 Stg. Co. Deb., Standing Committee A, Railways Bill, 13 January 2005, Col 247 25 carbon monoxide, lead, nitrogen dioxide, particles, sulphur dioxide, benzene and 1,3- butadiene

air quality, in particular, steps must be taken to bring performance back on track to meet the Department’s strategic objectives. In its response to our report on the Department for Transport’s 2003 Annual Report the Government reiterated its commitment to the strategic objectives of the 10 Year Plan, noting that the Progress Report identified areas where “further actions may be needed.”26 Some of these remedial actions should already have been identified, and in the Spending Review, Estimates, and Annual Report it should be clear how resources are being (re)directed to improve performance. At present, relating the strategy to expenditure and performance or understanding how expenditure has been redirected to improve performance is virtually impossible. We recommend that the Department ensures that when it reports performance against targets it says a great deal more about what it is doing to improve or secure future performance, and describes the impact of this work on its expenditure plans.

26 The Government's Response to the Transport Committee's Report on the Departmental Annual Report 2003, March 2004, Cm 6157, point 4

4 Efficiency savings

34. The Department has a target to achieve an annual 2.5% efficiency improvement across the Department; which can be achieved through: x Increased outputs/outcomes for the same inputs; x Constant output/outcomes from reduced inputs; x Reduced inputs from sunsetting unnecessary activities.

The Annual Report noted that the Department would meet its target for efficiency savings in 2003-04. It also indicated that work was being undertaken to prepare an Efficiency Plan for 2004-05, which would be underpinned by the emerging findings of the Gershon Review.27 The Department has now published Efficiency Technical Notes on its web site.

35. We welcome the success of the Department in meeting its 2.5% administration costs savings target for 2003-04 and in producing a plan of how it intends to achieve and measure efficiency savings across the 2004 Spending Review period, in line with Government requirements. While the previous targets for reduction were set in relation to the Department’s administration costs, the new targets cover the entire Departmental Expenditure Limit. However, while the Efficiency Technical Note included extensive information about the validation and reliability of its measures, the Autumn Performance Report provided no information how the savings it reported had been validated. We recommend that when it reports progress against its efficiency targets, the Department notes how that progress has been independently validated. In addition, we expect the 2005 Departmental Report to demonstrate that the expansion of efficiency targets to cover the whole Departmental Expenditure Limit, as opposed to purely the administration cost element, has not affected the quality of service delivery.

36. As a result of the Gershon Review of Government Efficiency, the Department for Transport is expected to realise total annual efficiency gains of at least £785 million by 2007 -08. We note that much of the saving will come from transactional services in the Driver, Vehicle and Operator Programme, from roads procurement programmes, by both Highways Agency and Local Authorities, and from local authority and Transport for London non roads programmes. We will be interested to see how much of these gains can in fact be secured, particularly given that many of them are expected to come from e- delivery of services within the Driver and Vehicle Operators group.

37. We were surprised to see that funds raised from introducing a Fixed Penalty system for Heavy Goods Vehicle and Passenger Services Vehicle operators were included in the Efficiency Technical Notes, even though no forecast is given of the revenue expected to be raised through fixed penalties. The baseline for such funding was zero. The Vehicle Inspectorate certainly enforced matters such as drivers’ hours and vehicle condition previously; we find it hard to believe that the introduction of fixed penalties will have absolutely no effect on the level of penalties imposed by the court or the Traffic Commissioners.

27 Appendix D, p.139

38. We strongly support introduction of a fixed penalty scheme. Unroadworthy lorries and buses cost lives, and tired drivers are a risk both to the public and themselves. Since the police are devoting less effort to policing on the roads, it is right that VOSA should have powers to enforce the rules. We expect that the number of operators penalised for breaches of the rules will increase sharply once a proper fixed penalty scheme is introduced. We support that, too. However, we believe including receipts from fixed penalties among departmental savings sends the wrong signal. Fines are a penalty for lawbreaking, not a tax. Including that revenue in the efficiency savings gives comfort to those who claim that law-enforcement is about raising money rather than saving lives. It should be removed.

39. When we took evidence we asked about the realism of the department’s targets for relocating staff away from the South East, we were told:

Mr Darling: A lot of our redeployment took place over the last two or three years, and we will continue to do that. I will give you one example: many of the staff at the new Rail Accident Investigation Branch, for example, will be in Derby; they do not need to be in London. ... We have moved more staff down to Hastings which, although it is in the South East, is an area which does need help, and also we have proposals to reduce the head count of the department further.

Mr Rowlands: …. It was commonly agreed that we would not move staff out of Hastings because it is a depressed area, albeit in the South East, and we would not move staff out of Southampton because that part of Southampton is one of the 88 Neighbourhood Renewal areas. So it is really just about the staff at headquarters level.28

40. We note that the Efficiency Technical Notes now identify 37 headquarter posts which will move (or have moved) from London. There are plans to increase the administration services shared by the Department and its agencies, and some of this work may be moved from London.29 There are also proposals to reduce the headcount of the central department by 200 by 2006-07. The total Department for Transport workforce for 2004-05 was 17,492; of these, around 1,400 work in headquarters in central London. The majority of the others work in Agencies located outside London. We are unsurprised that there is little scope for relocation.

28 Q 9 29 Q 12

5 Agencies

41. During this Parliament we have been taking evidence on each of the Department’s agencies in turn. We have been concerned about the extent to which the Department is in control of its agencies’ finances. We were extremely pleased to be told that financial systems had been improved, and that the Highways Agency now had a professionally qualified finance director, that the Department was intending to introduce monthly accounts, and that the departmental accounts were no longer being signed off late.30

42. As part of our regular monitoring of departmental expenditure we asked for a fuller description of the “immediate pressures” which had led to an increase in the Department’s funding in the spending review. As we had expected, these pressures had largely resulted from the rail industry, but we were also interested to note that the Highways Agency faced additional spending pressures due to changing assumptions about the Agency's PFI programme.31 Further questioning revealed that the Highways Agency has reduced the proportion of capital investment being delivered through its PFI programme, and even when PFI projects are used, the majority of these contracts will now be accounted for on- balance sheet. We welcome the Highways Agency’s new realism about the nature of the projects for which PFI is sensible, and its change of policy on PFI accounting; they may appear to increase public expenditure in the short term, but they give a more realistic assessment of public expenditure on roads.

43. We questioned the Department about the Highways Agency targets, which currently include Ministerial targets, Road Users’ Charter targets and Whitehall targets. We note that from 2004-05 there will no longer be separate ministerial and road users’ charter targets; this must be sensible. However, we are concerned that the new performance measures are in many cases less precise than before.

44. We asked the Department particularly about the Highways Agency’s previous performance requirement to survey all non-motorised crossing points in the core network, and to complete a five-year improvement programme by the end of March 2008. The Department told us that the list had not been developed into a five-year programme because of funding pressures, and that the Agency was now unlikely to be able to implement all identified non-motorised user crossings by 31 March 2009, and that it no longer had any target to do so. We were assured that “in developing the Business Plan consideration will be given to how best to meet the needs of non-motorised users within the budgets available.”32 The Department has an overall policy to increase walking and cycling; it should not be hampered by budgetary pressures within one of its Agencies. It is ironic that the Highways Agency target for non motorised crossings should be abandoned when local authorities are being urged to increase accessibility to walkers and cyclists by improving rights of way in both rural and urban areas.33 The Department must ensure

30 Q87-89 31 Ev 25 32 Ev 25 33 Full Guidance on Local Transport Plans, pp 7,24, 43, 83

that the Highways Agency takes the needs of non-motorised users seriously, and provides the crossings they need. This target should not simply be abandoned.

6 The Future of Transport

45. The 10 Year Plan was extremely ambitious. It set out targets for improvement in each transport sector. Many of those targets were carried through to the Public Service Agreements the Department agreed with the Treasury, which have evolved over the last four years. It is noticeable that The Future of Transport sets out more general policies, and lacks all targets save those set out in the Public Service Agreements with the Treasury, which we discuss in more detail below.

46. The Future of Transport is built on three central themes; sustained investment; improvements in transport management and planning ahead. It is in sharp contrast to the optimism of the original 10 Year Plan:

Our strategy for transport is to tackle congestion and pollution by improving all types of transport - rail and road, public and private - in ways that increase choice. It is a strategy for investment in the future to create prosperity and a better environment.

This requires a new approach, based on:

x integrated transport: looking at transport as a whole, matching solutions to specific problems by assessing all the options.

x public and private partnership: government and the private sector working more closely together to boost investment.

x new projects: modernising our transport network.34

47. When we asked the Secretary of State why he had abandoned ambitious targets for a plan which was much more general, he responded that:

many of the things set out in the 10 Year Plan are either being delivered or in the course of construction. Of course, four years on there are things that have changed. Every time I come to this Committee I point out that some of the assumptions made in relation to what could be done and the price at which they could be done have proved to be rather optimistic, and the railways is a classic example of that – light rail is another example. What we have done is to build on the 10 Year Plan.35

He maintained that three White Papers together set out “a clear direction of travel”, and should be read alongside the many other documents which set out more detailed projects.

48. Some recent developments have been distinctly discouraging: we note that the recent decision to combine all grants for sustainable transport into a single fund has been accompanied by a cut in such funds. The Department for Transport predicts that in 2005- 06 and 2006-07 £50.4 million will be available for rail freight grants and £19.2 million for road and water freight schemes; in 2007-08 “when rail freight grants are incorporated into the new arrangements, the total budget for all modes has been provisionally set at

34 Transport 2010: The 10 Year Plan, Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions, July 2000, p.9 35 Q 3

£22.6million”.36 Even so, the Secretary of State’s emphasis on producing change through an approach which matches solutions to specific problems may ultimately produce a high- quality, integrated transport network. His recent speech to the Future of Rail conference detailed the improvements this approach had already produced on the railway and suggested a welcome willingness to consider increasing the capacity of the network.37

Private sector investment 49. It may be significant that although The Future of Transport suggests that the public and private sector should work closely together to boost investment, there is now little information about the level of private investment in our transport system. The Departmental Annual Report contains figures for gross investment, including publicly supported investment by the private sector, but no figures for direct private sector investment. The Secretary of State told us that he anticipated the level of private investment in the transport network would remain at about the level predicted by the 10 Year Plan.

In the railways, it will continue to come from the train operating companies to some extent, it will come from the rolling stock companies, and also of course Network Rail raises a very substantial sum. There is also money coming through the Channel Tunnel link. In relation to roads, I anticipate money coming through. The exact number of PFI schemes probably will change over the next few years, but I think broadly the amount of money that we anticipated coming from the private sector over the period will continue. There will be fluctuations from time to time but I am reasonably optimistic there.38

Nonetheless, neither the Annual Report nor The Future of Transport gives any clear information about private sector funding. Although the Secretary of State may be right to be optimistic, it is notable that some recent, and welcome, changes may reduce private- sector willingness to invest.39

36 Department for Transport Press Notice, New Approach to Promoting Cleaner, Safer, Freight Transport, 1 February 2005, 007, GN REF, 11076 37 Future of Rail conference ,Speech by Alistair Darling, 3 February 2005.www.dft,gov,uk 38 Q 92 39 see, for example the change of policy about the use and treatment of PFI projects noted above

7 Conclusion

50. Our predecessor Committee, on which many of the Members of this Committee served, looked at the 10 Year Plan for Transport in detail, and we have also kept it under review. We have always considered it a brave but flawed document, and pointed out that some of its ambitions were unachievable. However, it had the advantage of clear targets. Moreover, if they were unachievable, they were at least bold. Last year, we noted that “it is vital that the Department demonstrates that it remains absolutely committed to achieving the strategic objectives set out in the 10 Year Plan.”40 The new White Paper on The Future of Transport may be based on the 10 Year Plan, but is conspicuously less definite about the measures by which the Department will be judged.

51. Only time will tell whether this is the result of increased realism about the accuracy of long-term forecasting, or whether it is the first step in a significant scaling back of the broader integrated transport policy underlying the 10 Year Plan. We will need information about the Department’s progress to enable us to judge both whether the new strategy does indeed share the vision of the Plan, and whether the Department is successfully delivering its aim of transport that works for everyone. Unlike the 10 Year Plan, The Future of Transport does not contain a commitment to regular review; we consider this sensible. As we noted last year, the review of the 10 Year Plan duplicated much of the information in the Annual Report. The quality of the Department for Transport’s Annual Report must be radically improved. Nonetheless, it is far better for the Department to produce a single, comprehensive and informative document setting out how its strategy is being achieved than to struggle to meet a variety of reporting targets through several substandard documents. Conclusions and recommendations

1. We recommend that the Department for Transport reflects on the various documents in which it reports progress. We believe the Department needs to make sure that they give a clear view of the Department’s aims and its success in fulfilling them, and that they form a coherent series. (Paragraph 4)

2. We recommend that the Department considers a radical restructuring of its report so that chapters are more clearly related to the Department’s strategy and its Public Service Agreement targets. (Paragraph 5)

3. The Annual Report should give far more information about the Department’s performance. Where possible, performance indicators should allow the reader to judge the effectiveness of a particular programme, rather than how much has been spent on it, or how many schemes have been started. It should also make far greater use of graphs and charts to show actual and projected performance. (Paragraph 11)

4. We recommend that future editions of the Annual Report contain far clearer information about each of the Department’s major programmes. This information

40 The Departmental Annual Report, Second Report of 3003-04, HC 249, para 12

should cover expenditure and outputs over a five-year period. For major programmes, expenditure should be given both on a constant and a current cost basis. (Paragraph 12)

5. We recommend that future reports should contain information about transport funding from all public sources, accompanied by a brief explanation of the funding systems. (Paragraph 13)

6. The Annual Report was an opportunity for the Department to set out the improvements the Highways Agency has made in its preparations for severe weather. It missed it. In future we would like clearer information about how the Department and its Agencies are handling risks of disruption to the transport network included in the Annual Report. (Paragraph 14)

7. Where the Department is relying on delivery through others, it should make its role explicit, and provide more explanation about how the performance of others is being supported, and monitored. (Paragraph 15)

8. It is helpful that both the Annual Report 2003 and Annual Report 2004 clearly set out not only the current Public Service Agreement targets, but those from earlier spending rounds. We welcome the fact that this approach has been continued in the Autumn Performance Report. The Autumn Performance Report notes that although the London Underground targets are no longer contained in the Public Service Agreement, the Underground’s performance indicators will still be monitored. We recommend that reports on the indicators continue to be included in future departmental Annual Reports. (Paragraph 19)

9. We consider the range of measures of congestion that the Department is developing is likely to be more satisfactory than the previous measure. We recommend that the Department ensures that there is full and regular reporting against the new congestion reduction target as soon as possible. (Paragraph 22)

10. We note that a longer-term target for modal shift has been replaced by a short term tactical target to improve the performance of the railways. Once the reorganisation of the railway is complete, we expect to see more strategic targets setting out the role that rail can play in an integrated transport system. We also recommend that future Annual Reports contain figures on rail passenger usage and rail freight so that trends in rail use can be easily monitored. (Paragraph 25)

11. The Secretary of State emphasised that a “coherent transport solution” would be needed before bus quality contracts were approved; we see no reason why such coherent plans should not include rail services which are maintained, or even strengthened, if local authorities think it appropriate. (Paragraph 30)

12. Transport produces one fifth of all domestic carbon dioxide emissions; we welcome the extension of the Government target to reduce greenhouse gases to the Department for Transport. (Paragraph 31)

13. While the Autumn Performance Report sets out how the Department is working with local authorities to produce improvements, and mentions that there is an

interdepartmental review of the Air Quality Strategy, it does not explain how DfT and DEFRA work together or how the Department identifies and manages its own performance against its joint target. It should do so. (Paragraph 32)

14. We recommend that the Department ensures that when it reports performance against targets it says a great deal more about what it is doing to improve or secure future performance, and describes the impact of this work on its expenditure plans. (Paragraph 33)

15. We recommend that when it reports progress against its efficiency targets, the Department notes how that progress has been independently validated. In addition, we expect the 2005 Departmental Report to demonstrate that the expansion of efficiency targets to cover the whole Departmental Expenditure Limit, as opposed to purely the administration cost element, has not affected the quality of service delivery. (Paragraph 35)

16. We believe including receipts from fixed penalties among departmental savings sends the wrong signal. Fines are a penalty for lawbreaking, not a tax. Including that revenue in the efficiency savings gives comfort to those who claim that law- enforcement is about raising money rather than saving lives. It should be removed. (Paragraph 38)

17. We welcome the Highways Agency’s new realism about the nature of the projects for which PFI is sensible, and its change of policy on PFI accounting; they may appear to increase public expenditure in the short term, but they give a more realistic assessment of public expenditure on roads. (Paragraph 42)

18. The Department must ensure that the Highways Agency takes the needs of non- motorised users seriously, and provides the crossings they need. This target should not simply be abandoned. (Paragraph 44)

Annex

Note to Transport Committee

Disruption caused by severe weather in January 2004

Introduction There was heavy snowfall during the early evening period on 28 January 2004. The press reported considerable disruption to transport services, particularly at Heathrow Airport, caused by this snowfall. We therefore wrote to transport providers including those airlines which had been reported as suffering cancellations and delays, requesting information on the affect on services of the severe weather.

The responses from Network Rail and London Underground gave a full account of the problems and clearly set out the lessons for the future. It was, however, noteworthy that we had four submissions relating to the disruption at Heathrow, three from airlines and one from the Airline Operators Committee. These responses highlighted some failings in the systems for dealing with snow and ice at Heathrow. Any reference to statements by the three airlines comes from their letters. The letter from British Airways (BA) is referenced SW 03, the letter from South African Airways (SAA) is referenced SW 05 and that from British Midland Airways (bmi), SW 06.

Preparations for severe weather A joint airport and handling agent ‘snow cell’ has been a feature of snow contingencies at Gatwick Airport for some time. A snow cell was set up more recently at Heathrow, in consultation with Gatwick, to monitor and coordinate snow clearance and aircraft de-icing activity. BA told us that during the winter season 2003/04 they operated a fleet of 16 de- icing rigs at Heathrow and 8 at Gatwick, each of which cost £300,000.41 A total of 210 BA staff at Heathrow and 62 at Gatwick are trained in de-icing activities. bmi and SAA have contracts with de-icing providers for the de-icing of their aircraft, although not all airlines operating into Heathrow have such a contract. bmi indicated in its evidence that this was a weakness in the system.42

The weather conditions on 28 and 29 January had been forecast several days in advance by the Meteorological Office. A moderate to high risk of settling snow on 28 January had been identified early on and on 27 January two potential snow bearing fronts were forecast. On the basis of this forecast both BA and bmi told us that they had staff on standby, including aircrew, and that their operations team had prepared a proposed cancellation list. In the days preceding 28 January BA had met with British Airports Authority (BAA) on a number of occasions to review contingencies both bilaterally and under the auspices of the Airline Operators Committee (AOC).43

41 SW 03 42 SW 06 43 SW 03

Impact of the severe weather

Conditions at Heathrow on 28/29 January During the early part of 28 January there were adverse weather conditions at other UK and European airports. The bad weather spread to the South East of England during the afternoon and Heathrow Airport was reduced to single runway operation to allow for anti- icing. Flow restrictions were enforced and inbound services from Europe were delayed at their departure airports.

The snowfall was severe at Heathrow between 17:20 and 18:00 and at Gatwick between 17:50 and 18:35. The airlines gave some conflicting information about the situation at Heathrow. SAA said that Heathrow airport closed for a short period and then operated with flow restrictions whereas bmi said that Heathrow airport closed for departures until 20:30. BA told us that the snow cell was operational during 28 and 29 January but SAA said that it ‘stood down’ at 16.00 on 28 January just before the heavy snowfall. SAA said that as a result of the ‘stand down’ the airside taxiway was not gritted that evening.

When the snow storm began at Heathrow some 26 aircraft had to return from their taxi positions to stands in order to be de-iced for the second time. SAA said that this had a major impact on all operators at Heathrow. SAA had asked its de-icing contractor to reconvene the snow cell but the contractor was unable to send anyone, being in the middle of de-icing operations. The contractor told SAA that it was having difficulties operating on parts of the airfield and on the stands due to inadequate de-icing by HAL.

BA reported that during the evening of 28 January conditions on the ramp deteriorated rapidly, became unsafe and in some cases inoperable.44 Arriving BA flight crew on 29 January found that, although runways were generally clear, taxiways were contaminated with frozen slush and cul-de-sacs and ramp areas showed no sign of having been treated.

No services departed from Terminal 4 before 9:30 on 29 January because of the dangerous ramp conditions. Arriving aircraft were held on taxiways for up to two hours. The number of aircraft awaiting stands at all terminals forced National Air Traffic Services (NATS) to stop incoming flights for a short period to relieve the pressure. During this time no aircraft were allowed to depart for Heathrow from European airports.

Conditions on the ramp at BA’s Engineering base were similar to those in terminal areas during the morning of 29 January and the base was declared unsafe and closed. This meant that arriving aircraft, which would have been towed to the base, remained at the Terminals adding to the congestion at parking stands there. Air temperatures rose during the morning of 29 January and by 13:00 most stands across Heathrow were operational, as was the engineering base. However the impact of the disruption continued for some time.

Service cancellations Heathrow Airport operates at maximum capacity throughout most of the day. Under normal operating conditions arrivals of 40 aircraft an hour are regularly achieved. In snow

44 SW 03

and other low visibility conditions the arrival rate is greatly reduced, often to as low as 25 per hour. BA told us that when flow rates are reduced significantly there is insufficient airport capacity to cope with the resulting disruption and cancellations are unavoidable.

Over the two days of 28 and 29 January, out of a total of 733 BA services scheduled to depart from Heathrow and Gatwick, 161 were cancelled, either as a direct result of the weather conditions or as a consequence of them. In addition, a total of 17 arriving aircraft were diverted to alternative airports within the UK and 31 flights were subject to serious delays in excess of 3 hours.

When faced with the need to cancel services BA told us that their first priority was to maintain long haul services: the main consideration being the ease with which affected passengers can continue to their final destination. Other considerations are the frequency of service on a particular route, the option of alternative surface transport and the speed at which a particular service can recover. Furthermore the cancellation of long haul services has more long term impact on the positioning of crew and aircraft. bmi reported that a total of 82 services within the bmi group were cancelled on 28 January, 62 of which were to or from Heathrow. Of the 82, 53 were due to air traffic control (ATC) delays at Heathrow and the remainder were the result of closures of other UK airports. Two flights were also diverted. On 29 January bmi cancelled 29 services, 27 of which were to or from Heathrow because of air traffic control restrictions and the lack of parking stands. In addition two services from Norwich were cancelled due to the closure of Norwich airport.

One SAA flight was delayed because of need to de-ice but two further flights did not operate, one because of the night flying ban and the second due to the crew running out of hours.

Both SAA and bmi mentioned the fact the because of the delays to flights their services ran into the night time quota restrictions at Heathrow. SAA said that it was refused a dispensation:

It should be noted that we asked for dispensation for a departure during the night quota and this was refused, we asked on the basis of passenger hardship due to lack of accommodation. Concerns are being raised by a number of airlines as year on year the number of night quota movements are being reduced and this is impacting on our ability to operate our services when being delayed by circumstances outside of our control. This matter is being raised with the DFT by the LACC.45

Failings identified

De-icing policy All three airlines complained about the failure of HAL to de-ice aircraft parking stands. BA told us that BAA had a policy at Heathrow of giving priority to maintaining clear runways and taxiways rather that stands. BA said that because of the limited number of stands at

45 SW 05

Heathrow it is critical that aircraft are able to depart in order to make space for arriving aircraft. BAA has now responded to this issue and has revised its severe weather plans to have a more even balance of priority between the treatment of runways, taxiways and ramp areas. The new plans were tested during the less severe weather over the weekend of 28/29 February.

De-icing of aircraft is currently undertaken at the departure stand. This is time consuming and increases the amount of time the stand is occupied. It also means that an aircraft has to return to the stand for de-icing if it has been held in a queue after leaving the stand. This occurred on 28 January. Many airports provide a de-icing facility away from the Terminal closer to the point of departure. BA said that it would be working with BAA to explore the possibility of providing a separate de-icing facility away from the Terminal. bmi mentioned that its contractor was unable to provide sufficient de-icing fluid. BA also cited the “more mundane logistics of snow and ice clearance” which should be attended to in contingency planning meetings with HAL. BA reported that since the disruption of 28/29 January BAA had made significant improvements to the storage and availability of materials and the manpower deployed on ramp and terminal clearance.

Provision for passengers By the time SAA had to cancel its two overnight flights there was no hotel accommodation available and the passengers had to spend the night in the terminal building. SAA thought that there was a shortage of staff to assist the passengers. Moreover the restaurant outlets closed at their normal time. This meant that there was no food for the passengers other that the basic catering packs that the airline could provide.

Formal minutes

The following Declarations of Interest were made:

Mrs Gwyneth Dunwoody, Member, Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen

Mr Brian H. Donohoe, Special Constable in the British Transport Police and Member of Transport and General Workers’ Union

Clive Efford, and Mrs Louise Ellman, Member of Transport and General Workers’ Union

Ian Lucas, Member of Amicus

Miss Anne McIntosh, Eurotunnel, First Group, RAC, BA, BAA, BAe and Industry and Parliament Trust placement with Network Rail

Wednesday 2 March 2005

Members present: Mrs Gwyneth Dunwoody , in the Chair

Mr Brian H. Donohoe Ian Lucas Clive Efford Miss Anne McIntosh Mrs Louise Ellman Mr John Randall

The Committee deliberated.

Draft Report (The Departmental Annual Report 2004), proposed by the Chairman, brought up and read.

Ordered, That the draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph.

Paragraph 1 read and agreed to.

Paragraph 2 read, amended and agreed to.

Paragraph 3 read and agreed to.

Paragraph 4 read, amended and agreed to.

Paragraphs 5 to 14 read and agreed to.

Paragraph 14 read, amended and agreed to.

Paragraphs 15 to 41 read and agreed to.

Paragraph 42 read, amended and agreed to.

Paragraphs 43 to 51 read and agreed to.

Annex, as amended, agreed to.

Resolved, That the Report be the Fourth Report of the Committee to the House.

Ordered, That the Chairman do make the Report to the House.

Ordered, That the provisions of Standing Order No. 134 (Select committee (reports)) be applied to the Report.

Ordered, That the Appendices to the Minutes of Evidence taken before the Committee be reported to the House.

[Adjourned till Wednesday 9 March at half past Three o'clock.

Witnesses

Wednesday 23 June 2004 Page

Rt Hon Alistair Darling MP, Secretary of State for Transport, and Mr David Rowlands, Permanent Secretary, Department for Transport Ev 1

List of written evidence

DAR 01 Department for Transport Ev 17 DAR 01A Supplementary memorandum by the Department for Transport Ev 24 DAR 02 Highways Agency Ev 27

The following memoranda have been reported to the House, but to save printing costs they have not been printed and copies have been placed in the House of Commons Library, where they may be inspected by Members. Other copies are in the Record Office, House of Lords, and are available to the public for inspection. Requests for inspection should be addressed to the Record Office, House of Lords, London SW1 (telephone 020 7219 3074). Hours of inspection are from 9.30 a.m. to 5.00 p.m. on Monday to Fridays:

SW 01 Network Rail SW 02 London Underground SW 03 British Airways SW 04 Airline Operators Committee – Heathrow Airport SW 05 South African Airways SW 06 British Midland Airways Limited

Reports from the Transport Committee since 2002

Session 2004–05 First Report Work of the Committee in 2004 HC 251 Second Report Tonnage Tax HC 299 Third Report Disabled People’s Access to Transport: A year’s HC 93 worth of improvements?

Session 2003–04 First Report Traffic Management Bill HC 144 Second Report The Departmental Annual Report HC 249 Third Report The Regulation of Licensed Taxis and Private HC 215-I Hire Vehicle Services in the UK Fourth Report Transport Committee Annual Report 2002-03 HC 317 Fifth Report The Office of Fair Trading’s Response to the HC 418 Third Report of the Committee: The Regulation of Licensed Taxis and Private Hire Vehicle Services in the UK Sixth Report Disabled People’s Access to Transport HC 439 Seventh Report The Future of the Railway HC 145-I Eighth Report School Transport HC 318-I Ninth Report Navigational Hazards and the Energy Bill HC 555 Tenth Report The Work of the Vehicle and Operator Services HC 250 Agency and The Vehicle Certification Agency Eleventh Report National Rail Enquiry Service HC 580 Twelfth Report British Transport Police HC 488 Thirteenth Report The Rail Regulator’s Last Consultations HC 805 Fourteenth Report The Work of the Maritime and Coastguard HC 500 Agency First Special Report Government Response to the Eleventh Report of HC 1132 the Committee: National Rail Enquiry Service Second Special Government Response to the Ninth Report of HC 1133 Report the Committee: Navigational Hazards and the Energy Bill Third Special Report Government Response to the Twelfth Report of HC 1134 the Committee: British Transport Police Fifteenth Report Financial Protection for Air Travellers HC 806-I Sixteenth Report Traffic Law and its Enforcement HC 105-I Seventeenth Report Cars of the Future HC 319-I Fourth Special Government, Health and Safety Commission and HC 1209 Report Executive, and Office of the Rail Regulator Responses to the Seventh Report from the Committee, on the Future of the Railway Eighteenth Report Galileo HC 1210

Session 2002–03 First Report Urban Charging Schemes HC 390-I Second Report Transport Committee: Annual Report 2002 HC 410 Third Report Jam Tomorrow?: The Multi Modal Study HC 38-I Investment Plans Fourth Report Railways in the North of England HC 782-I

Fifth Report Local Roads and Pathways HC 407-I Sixth Report Aviation HC 454-I Seventh Report Overcrowding on Public Transport HC 201-I Eighth Report The Work of the Highways Agency HC 453 Ninth Report Ports HC 783-I First Special Report Government and Office of Fair Trading HC 97 Responses to the Seventeenth Report of the Transport, Local Government and the Regions Committee, The Bus Industry Second Special Government Response to the Committee's HC 1212 Report Fourth Report, Railways in the North of England

Session 2001-02 First Special Report The Attendance of a Minister from HM Treasury HC 771 before the Transport, Local Government and The Regions Committee Second Special Government Response to the to the Fifth Report HC 1285 Report of the Transport, Local Government and the Regions Committee, Session 2001-02, European Transport White Paper Third Special Report Government Response to the Eighteenth Report HC 1305 of the Transport, Local Government and the Regions Committee, Session 2001-02, National Air Traffic Services Finances

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 1 Oral evidence

Taken before the Transport Committee

on Wednesday 17 November 2004

Members present:

Mrs Gwyneth Dunwoody, in the Chair

Mr JeVrey M Donaldson Ian Lucas Mr Brian H Donohoe Miss Anne McIntosh Clive EVord Mr Graham Stringer Mrs Louise Ellman

Witnesses: Rt Hon Alistair Darling, a Member of the House, Secretary of State for Transport, and Mr David Rowlands, Permanent Secretary, Department for Transport, examined.

Chairman: Is there anyone with interests to declare? funding programme, which was unheard of in Clive EVord: Member of the Transport and General transport terms before, and it compares well with the Workers’ Union. three-year programme to which other departments Ian Lucas: Member of Amicus. are set. In that 10 Year Plan it set out a number of Miss McIntosh: I did have an interest in Railtrack, I things that it hoped it would do. A large number of currently have interests in Eurotunnel, First Group, them, of course, were indicative rather than a the RAC, BA, BAA, BAe and I am doing an IPT prescriptive list of what would be done and many of placement for Network Rail. the things set out in the 10 Year Plan are either being Chairman: Industry and Parliamentary Trust. I have delivered or in the course of construction. Of course, only ASLEF. four years on there are things that have changed. Mr Donohoe: Special Constable in the British Every time I come to this Committee I point out that Transport Police and a member of the Transport some of the assumptions made in relation to what and General Workers’ Union. could be done and the price at which they could be Mrs Ellman: Member of Transport and General done have proved to be rather optimistic, and the Workers’ Union. railways is a classic example of that—light rail is Mr Stringer: Member of Amicus, Director of Centre another example. What we have done is to build on for Local Economic Strategies. the 10 Year Plan. I would draw the Committee’s attention to the fact that in the last twelve months I Q1 Chairman: Secretary of State, you are most have published three White Papers, all of which are warmly welcome here this afternoon. We have a lot designed to set out the framework for transport in of questions for you. I am also sorry to say we are this country over the next 30 years. There is the going to have a lot of interruptions, so if we can aviation one we published in December of last year, restrict—I know you have a time bar at the end—the there is the Railway White Paper published in July suspension of the Committee for 10 minutes, will and then there is the general White Paper which was that meet with your approval? published later in that month. What they do is Mr Darling: I am more than happy just to go down, they set out the direction of travel—if I can vote and come back up. coin that phrase—for the department and for the Government’s policy. They should be read alongside, of course, other things that we publish Q2 Chairman: Did you have anything you wanted to which do tend to itemise particular projects. I think say to us in advance? Would you tell us, first, who what we have got across the piece, whether it is you are? aviation, road transport or rail transport, is a Mr Darling: I am the Secretary of State for coherent plan that if we stick to it and deliver it will Transport, and have nothing to declare. David make a diVerence in relation to transport. Rowlands, as you know, is the Permanent Secretary. I think, in view of the fact that we are likely to be heavily interrupted, you should just press on and Q4 Chairman: You have said that your strategy anything I have got to say I am sure I will find a way depends on planning ahead. Are you going to give us of saying in reply to your questions. specific plans for schemes that we can expect for the next ten years? Q3 Chairman: Secretary of State, the 10 Year Plan Mr Darling: It depends. Let us go through these was a very much lauded future plan for transport. things. If you take aviation, for example, there we set Why have you abandoned those ambitious targets out the fact that we think that over the next 30 years for a plan that is, really, much more general? we will need additional capacity, in particular we Mr Darling: I would not put it that way. Firstly, the may need four new runways, two in the South-East, 10 Year Plan was good, primarily because the then one in the Midlands and one in Scotland. It is an Secretary of State managed to secure a ten-year indicative timetable because there is uncertainty Ev 2 Transport Committee: Evidence

17 November 2004 Rt Hon Alistair Darling MP and Mr David Rowlands there in terms of the planning process and good as it should be. That is why, for this three-year when exactly these things might be required and, period that we fix these PSA targets, I was quite of course, there is our obligation to meet deliberate in saying “I want to concentrate on our environmental obligations, particularly at reliability”, because if you sort reliability a number Heathrow. There is an example where there is a clear of the other things you want to come alongside that, direction of travel, it has been welcomed by the like increased usage, will follow from that. industry and, I think, most people believe it is a good attempt to strike the right balance between meeting the anticipated pressures we will face in the future Q6 Mr Donohoe: In addition to that, is it not the case and, also, accepting the environmental implications that you would also like, when you are reorganising of aviation. If you take the railways, for example, the the franchises, to have built into that that people Railway White Paper majored on the organisation should not stand on trains for any length of time? of the railways, which of course, in my view, has The new Scotrail franchisee has actually made it as been one of the major things that have held up the part of the promise that they will not have any development of the railways over the last 10 years; passengers stand for more than ten minutes on any the railways has been through a terrible period, one train. Why do you not build that into every single way or another, and I think we now have a clear path one of the franchises? and a clear organisation that will work. In terms of Mr Darling: It would depend if it was a practical railway construction, if you like, the department’s proposition. Let us be blunt about it: if you compare programme is set out not just in the annual report Scot Rail to some of the train operating companies but, also, in the SRA’s report. I should add that next coming into the London stations you are dealing V year’s departmental report—or probably the one with a di erent order of magnitude of pressure. Scot after—will reflect the fact that there will not be an Rail themselves will accept there will be some SRA so it will have more detail in relation to the standing as you come into Glasgow and Edinburgh, railways there. If we come on to roads where, by in particular, because those are the two pressure their nature, there are many more construction points. What we have done is to improve not just the projects, what we do not do—and we are not doing quality but the quantity of rolling stock— in the White Paper—is listing “This is what we do in year 1, 2, 3 or 4” (or year 29, I suppose, in the Q7 Chairman: The quality of standing space? extreme). That is because that information is Mr Darling: No, the quality of the rolling stock, Mrs available, people can find out what is under Dunwoody, which I hope will make conditions construction. Of course, the very nature of road better for passengers. Obviously, we would like to development means that there are some things you reduce the time that people have to stand, although think you can do at this stage but further inquiries certainly I think if you ask passengers what they may complicate that. I think, in relation to transport want, yes, they want a comfortable ride but the key across the piece, we have got the money, we are thing they want is reliability, which is why I am improving the management of the transport concentrating on that. Of course, the other things system—which was somewhat neglected in the come alongside that and you want to make the past—and I think there is a plan for the future. The journey as enjoyable as commuting ever can be. You frustrating thing in transport, for all of us, is it takes want to make sure the trains are clean, and other a long time to deliver these things, by their very things as well. nature. Chairman: We will try and ask you some particular questions. Q8 Chairman: Secretary of State, if I am rough with my lot about the questions I think I am going to ask you to give a little less in reply. Q5 Mr Donohoe: What would you say is the main Mr Darling: I will be monosyllabic. target for the department in connection with the Chairman: Not quite, but somewhere in between. railway for the future? Mr Darling: It is improving reliability. The revised PSA reflects that. If you look at what has happened Q9 Mr Donohoe: Can I take you to another on the railways, despite the diYculties, the fact they question, Secretary of State, in connection with the carried a billion passengers last year, which is the staYng of the department itself. Eighty per cent of highest total since the early 1960s, shows that people your staV at present are employed outside London. want to travel by train, and the new rolling stock and Under the Lyons Review what additional jobs are so on that has been introduced has made a big you proposing to transfer outside London? diVerence. The thing that is holding back the Mr Darling: We have plans for 60, I think—and railways at the moment is reliability. If you want David may want to say something more about that. people to use the railways, as opposed to using their A lot of our redeployment took place over the last car, you have got to be able to tell them that if they two or three years, and we will continue to do that. come to the station the train will be there and it will I will give you one example: many of the staV at the get to its destination at the time it is supposed to get new Rail Accident Investigation Branch, for there. When I look at the figures, the reliability is example, will be in Derby; they do not need to be in improving all the time but, let us face it, we still have London. We do need some in the South East but a long way to go. The present overall rate of they will be in Derby. We have moved more staV reliability, although it is up on last year, is not as down to Hastings which, although it is in the South Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 3

17 November 2004 Rt Hon Alistair Darling MP and Mr David Rowlands

East, is an area which does need help, and also we of privatisation has taken some doing. You will be have proposals to reduce the head count of the pleased to hear, Miss McIntosh, we are well on the department further. way to doing it. Mr Rowlands: Two things, if I may: I talked to Michael Lyons about, basically, three blocks of staV Q15 Miss McIntosh: That is a debatable point that we have got in London and the South East: people we will have to save for another occasion. The new in Great Minister House, basically, in Central rail target set out in the Spending Review aims for London, a block of staV in Hastings and we have a further improvements in punctuality and reliability block of staV in the MCA headquarters in by 2008. How can you deem that to be a meaningful Southampton, and little bits and pieces in VROs and and reliable figure when we see that rail companies HGV testing stations. It was commonly agreed that simply are amending the timetable as they go along? we would not move staV out of Hastings because it Mr Darling: No, they are not doing that. There are is a depressed area, albeit in the South East, and we times when there are derogations from timetable, would not move staV out of Southampton because like there has been for some time in relation to the that part of Southampton is one of the 88 autumn, when we have got the leaf fall, and the rest Neighbourhood Renewal areas. So it is really just of it. We have not changed that. What I would like about the staV at headquarters level. We have to do and what I think we will do over the next few made sure— months is, in addition to the PPM target which we publish, give the public just a little bit more Q10 Chairman: What total is that? information. What is interesting is that if you take Mr Rowlands: At headquarters level, leaving aside some trains on the East Coast, for example, an awful headquarters staV not in Central London, we are lot of trains are arriving at time and one or two early, talking about, in round figures, 1,300 to 1,400 staV. but the whole figure is dragged down because there is Mr Darling: That is in Great Minister, in Central a tail of ones that can be quite badly delayed. I think, London. frankly, the more information we give the public as Mr Rowlands: Yes. to what is actually happening with these train companies, firstly, they can see what is going on and, Q11 Mr Donohoe: Where do you think you would secondly, it does bring pressure on some of these disperse these jobs? Is it possible you would even train companies to sort out the problems. For come north of the Border? example, there are too many delays being caused by Mr Rowlands: I think that is unlikely, I have to say. trains not leaving the depot in the morning on time and that can have a knock-on eVect. Incidentally, Q12 Chairman: You would be in very good touch setting up the joint control centres, again, is with the Scottish Parliament, if not with us. something that was disrupted at privatisation. We Mr Rowlands: Beyond the relatively small number have set them up for most other routes and that has you have identified, it is more likely that you are resulted in a huge increase in reliability, and that is looking at our shared services, which we want to something that we are pressing ahead with. build up, I think, but it may produce some more jobs in Wales. That is not a promise because there is a big Q16 Miss McIntosh: If you accept that rail freight is site, as you know, at Swansea and space there. in something of a crisis— Mr Darling: I do not accept that for one minute. Q13 Miss McIntosh: Secretary of State, at the same time that you cut freight transport facility grants you The Committee suspended from 2.44 pm to 2.51 pm have actually spent £1.3 million on consultants for for a division in the House the Rail Review. Do you think that was a good use of taxpayers’ money? Q17 Miss McIntosh: What are you expecting the Mr Darling: In relation to the freight facilities £22 million Strategic Rail Authority freight road-to- grants, what we did was continued with them but we rail money to achieve? said we were not taking new applications. In the Mr Darling: I contradicted you a few moments ago summer in the White Paper we said we wanted to but I now just happen to be looking at the figures move to a more generalised approach to freight, if here which show that the freight moved last year was you like; one that looked across all modes of travel. 18.9 billion tonnes per kilometre and for the I have an aversion to employing consultants if I can previous year it was 18.7. It is interesting that even possibly avoid it. though the grants have been closed to new applicants, the amount of freight moved went up. If Q14 Chairman: That makes you very unusual in this you look at the first quarter of this financial year, Cabinet, Secretary of State. there is an increase of 8.1% on the quarter a year ago, Mr Darling: I think government is not in the so what it shows is that freight is continuing to be business of providing a livelihood for consultants. moved and an increased amount of freight has been However, I do accept that there are some things on moved. The point of the grants is that I think we which we do not have in-house expertise and we need recognise that there are areas where maybe pump to get help from outside from time to time, and I priming can make a diVerence. What I do not want would not want to boost the figures we have just to happen is for the industry to come to rely on been talking about on a permanent basis. Yes, it was Government grants to make things happen. I am necessary to employ them because undoing the mess encouraged by the fact that, in the last year, while Ev 4 Transport Committee: Evidence

17 November 2004 Rt Hon Alistair Darling MP and Mr David Rowlands there have been disappointments, if you take the Q21 Miss McIntosh: Could I look at paths on the Royal Mail being carried, what is interesting is that, East Coast mainline with which you and I are most a few months later, the Royal Mail reconsidered familiar. The last two weeks have seen an their position and there is now Royal Mail being unfortunate derailment, in which happily no one carried back on the railways again. I also think that, was hurt, involving a freight vehicle; it also saw a if you look at the people now in charge of some of freight train break down. On both days, two Fridays these freight companies, they are very aggressive and in succession, there were severe delays. Are you still very imaginative about getting new business and looking at possibly developing, if you like, a third that is precisely how it ought to be. I know the point route to Scotland in parallel with the East Coast you are trying to make, Miss McIntosh, but I think route? Is that still in your Department’s thinking? there are a number of reasons for optimism in the Mr Darling: Basically, there are two ways into freight industry. There will be setbacks from time to Scotland by rail, from the east and the west. I do not time but I think there are reasons for optimism and think it would be a practical proposition to attempt that is one of them. a third crossing in the middle or anything like that.

Q18 Miss McIntosh: Your own Department’s Q22 Mr Donohoe: There are mountains there. annual report shows the level moved was down at Mr Darling: As Mr Donohoe is pointing out, there the end of 2003 from the previous year and are mountains and, as I think you know, Miss paragraph 4.1 states that the reason for this was McIntosh, or at least your ancestors knew, one of reflecting fluctuations in the demand for coal which the great things about Scotland is that we are well was just a one-oV because it does coincide with the protected but sometimes that can work against us. freight facilities grant and the track access grant having been suspended from January 2003. Q23 Chairman: It does not seem to stop you coming Mr Darling: I just quoted you figures showing that south, I notice! there has been an increase in freight carried. Of Mr Darling: We do like to come down and make sure course from to time, there will be variations. For that everything is all right down here as well. example, coal and steel for a long time were the staple diet, if you like, in the industry and changes Q24 Miss McIntosh: What is your information will take place from time to time and what we say in about EWS continuing through the Channel the annual report is that, in that particular year, Tunnel? there was a variation because of the amount of coal Mr Darling: I think undoubtedly they want to carried. If you look to the future, it is undoubtedly continue trading. It is not for me to talk about their the case that there will be further changes. What we business but I think that is in the public knowledge should be looking at is this industry getting into new because they have said so, they want to develop their markets, shifting stuV that it has not traditionally business between the continent and ourselves. done before. Q25 Mrs Ellman: This Committee recommended Q19 Chairman: It will be spaced, it will be train setting up a single rail agency to bring track and train paths, it will be ability to aggressively attack those closer together and you have not accepted that. markets. How are your proposals going to help more Mr Darling: Absolutely. accountability as far as the public/passengers are concerned? Mr Darling: What I wanted to do was to streamline Q20 Chairman: It is all right saying, “You are doing the structure that presently runs the railways and I all right without the cash lads, you are on your own” wanted to get rid of those organisations where I did if you do not very aggressively yourself address those not think there was anything added to it or where I problems of congestion. thought it duplicated things. Do not misunderstand Mr Darling: I think one of the prime concerns of the me, the SRA and Richard Bowker in particular did freight industry during the rail review was that they sterling work in sorting out some of the problems would get guaranteed access and guaranteed over a they took over and I will kneel to no one in my suYciently long period to be able to sell their services admiration of the work that he did. However, the to the market. As a result of the Rail Review, we view that I came to is that I thought it would be have done that. We have changed from the existing better to have one organisation responsible for the system which almost assumed that freight trains network operation, which would be Network Rail. I would be used on every line in the country even wanted to keep the train operating companies as the though, for example, there is no way that there is main interface with passengers because I think they going to be regular movements of coal trucks can grow and develop business, but obviously between Inverness and Kyle of Lochalsh, so why behind that someone has to take the ultimate pretend that there are going to be. If you take the decisions on timetabling and day-to-day operations main network, what we have done is reach which Network Rail will do and that structure is set agreement with them as to those areas they need to out in the Railway White Paper. So, you have the have paths on, those freight routes, if you like, up Government and the Department setting the and down the west coast. The West Coast mainline strategic direction of the railways because, after all, upgrade has increased the amount of the number of it is the Government of the day that pays for this and paths available for freight, so we are helping there. decides whether there should be more railway or less Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 5

17 November 2004 Rt Hon Alistair Darling MP and Mr David Rowlands railway, you have Network Rail responsible for day- strip it all away, only the Government can set the to-day operations and you have the train operating strategic direction of the railways. Successive companies working alongside that, the main governments of various colours have actually tried interface with the customers. Alongside all that, we to get rid of that responsibility but they find it always are rationalising the number of train operating comes back to them, so I am making a virtue of what companies because I think there are too many and we need to decide. Ministers and civil servants one of the many reasons for delays in the network is cannot do the day-to-day operations, that is a matter because of a conflict of interest, congestion if you for railway people. like, in parts of the network which we need to sort out. What I think we have now is a far more Q29 Mrs Ellman: Will your announcement be streamlined organisation and I think it is one that consistent with the contents of the White Paper? will work. I did go to some length to try and consult Mr Darling: Yes. with as many people as possible. Obviously some things we took on board and some things we did not. Q30 Mrs Ellman: You say that the Government One of the things we did take on board that you must be responsible for strategy. How do you see the recommended was in relation to safety where you future of the railways? Is it about progress or is it recommended that should come to the ORR which about managing decline? we are doing. Mr Darling: I think there was a period, indeed up to privatisation, where there was a general belief that Q26 Mrs Ellman: The retiring chief executive of railways were—“managed” is putting it too highly— Virgin, Chris Green, has said that he believes there in decline. I think railways have a good future. We will need to be a bringing together of these two under would not be spending the money we are spending public ownership; do you disagree with him? on the railways if we did not. If you look at transport Mr Darling: He did not say that to me and I have had generally, there is no way that we would be able to many conversations with him. enable people to move around this country without a good railway system, so the railways will need to Q27 Chairman: He only said it after he retired! carry more people and we will need to carry on Mr Darling: Well, it is amazing what can happen investing in them. If we do not do that, we will get when you retire. As I said right up front, I do think more and more pressure on the roads and, as well as that partnership in this industry could work. there being no transport policy at all, you would Partnership between the public and private sector have disastrous consequences not just on the and the railways works all over the world. It will economy but on the environment. I see the railways only work if you get the organisation and the carrying more people and, if we can get all these relationships right. What was very wrong about things right, I think railways have a good future. the privatisation model was that it got these relationships wrong and you can see the result of Q31 Mrs Ellman: You are reducing the number of that. I think what we have here is a relationship that the franchises. What is your thinking on that and can work, it brings additional money into the where do you see that leading? railways and, if you look at a number of franchises Mr Darling: Ultimately, what I would like to do is in this country, in terms of the services they oVer, the to align the Network Rail operating regions with a customer service if you like, and their flair and franchise because I think that will get rid of a imagination, it is better than what was before. There number of the operational diYculties that we have at are some franchises that are not so good and we need the moment. There is one good example of where to sort them out but I think there are many things this works well. South West Trains: basically it is that have been improved. only they who operate on one particular regional network of Network Rail. There is a joint operation Q28 Mrs Ellman: Can you confirm that the centre which I opened in January of this year which, Department for Transport will take over the as I was saying, has led to significant improvements functions of the Strategic Rail Authority? in performance because people are working Mr Darling: It has not taken all of them but it has together. That is a good example and it works well taken the strategic direction on some things like the there because really the only other people who get route utilisation studies and so on. That is going to onto those lines are some freight trains, there are no Network Rail and some of the operational stuV will other train operating companies operating there. If go to Network Rail. The Department is being you take, for example, an area where there has been reorganised. Within a very short period, within the a number of diYculties in the West Midlands, one of next two to three weeks, we will be telling our staV in the franchises that we are going to take away is the Department and the staV in the SRA of the new Central Trains. That franchise was formed really arrangements. If you forgive me, I do not want to set because, when they broke it up in the 1990s, they it out here because I think we have an obligation to were left with all these lines and they called them tell our staV first what it is going to look like but I Central. If you actually look at where it goes to, can tell you that it will look very diVerent to what Peterborough, Leeds and across to North Wales, it there is today because the Department’s role is going is hardly a coherent railway line. What we want to to be diVerent to what it is today and it will recognise do is to reallocate those services amongst other the fact that it is taking on responsibility that it has people like Silverlink, Virgin Cross Country and so not had before but I firmly believe that, when you on to get a more coherent railway system. What we Ev 6 Transport Committee: Evidence

17 November 2004 Rt Hon Alistair Darling MP and Mr David Rowlands are trying to do is to get something that is coherent Mr Darling: Mixed, I should think, is probably the and manageable and, if you do that, you will get best way to describe it. Some people welcome it, and better reliability and a better service. I have reduced those people who come from the school of thought from 25 down to 19 and there will, I think, be a that they would like to see going back to regulation further reduction to about 15 or 16 franchises and I or near to regulation or to make quality contracts think we need to work through some of the the thing you would do if things do not work out— diYculties, challenges and so on before we can get to in other words not part of an overall transport that stage. strategy—they would have liked us to have gone further. Generally speaking, especially when the Q32 Mrs Ellman: Do you see the working together White Paper was published, there was a welcome. As that you have referred to as leading to some form you know, there is a whole spectrum of views on this. of vertical integration and single point of accountability? Q37 Mr Stringer: Have the local authorities made Mr Darling: I suppose it is virtual vertical any particular comment that Section 124 of the 2000 integration. Formal vertical integration means that Act is to remain the part of the Act that, as I you have a company working and that is the area. understand it, you have to pass the threshold, which The diYculty with that is that I mentioned South is the only practical alternative— West Trains and that is a good example of a fairly Mr Darling: I have not had across my desk any discrete service. If you take Virgin Cross Country, I letters written to me saying that, but I think would not want a situation where the train leaving undoubtedly—because I know from talking to Penzance had to negotiate across six frontiers as it people—that some local authorities may have made went through other people’s areas. That is why we those representations. Whether they are so specific ruled out what people commonly understand as to cover that particular section I do not know and as vertical integration, the formalised vertical I would need to check for you. What I say to you, Mr integration. What I am very clear about is, if you Stringer, is I am well aware of the fact that there are want the railway to work, then, in one control room councils and individuals who would, in simple terms, for each area you need to have people sitting down like to make it much easier to implement quality so that, if there is an accident or if there is a delay, contracts, and there are others that take a diVerent you could take the decision to sort it out in the same view. I have said time and time again, it depends room the way they used to do in the olden days and where you are in the country. Bus services are it actually works. There are some things from the old generally working well and people will work with days that do work very well. that. Where there has been problems they are saying “No, we would like to change it”. Q33 Mrs Ellman: Would you rule out extending the close working between the franchise holder and the Q38 Mr Stringer: How is the introduction of quality track— contracts going to be tied into local transport funds? Mr Darling: No, I would not. I think they will work Mr Darling: In the White Paper, what we said was closer together. Indeed, the whole structure that we that where there was an overall coherent plan for have set up requires Network Rail and the train reducing congestion that might involve heavy rail, operating companies to work closely together, and I light rail, bus, maybe congestion charging—a whole think they can do that. Part of our problem in the range of measures—we recognise that it would be past was they did not always have aligned interests. very diYcult to do so if one element of it, like buses, It is very diYcult to get anyone to work together if for example, were uncontrolled and they could not one is pointing one way and one is pointing the be made part of a coherent plan. Under those other. I do see them working closely together, and I circumstances what we have said is we would then think what we have got here will work, which is why make it easier to allow a PTE to have a greater I puzzle at Chris Green because I do remember him control over bus services. So, for example, we could telling me he thought it was a jolly good idea. feed things into a railhead or something like that. Retirement does odd things to you, I suppose. What we are not agreeing to is a situation where, just because agreements have not been reached or the present system is not working, the default will be a Q34 Mrs Ellman: Did you discuss this policy with quality contract; it is quite specifically an oVer to passenger representatives? PTEs and to larger groups of councils to say “If you Mr Darling: We discussed it with the Rail come up with a coherent transport solution we are Passengers’ Council, which of course has made its prepared to make it easier for you to deal with the own—and you may want to come on to this— problems that you might otherwise have on buses.” That is the thinking behind it. Of course, the money Q35 Chairman: We may want to, so we will not need in the transport investment fund which we have been to spend a lot of time on that now. building up gradually, we have put aside to help Mr Darling: In which case, yes, we did, but I will finance a larger scheme of that nature. come on to what they suggested separately. Q39 Mr Stringer: Does that not still leave the power Q36 Mr Stringer: Have you received a positive in the hands of the private bus companies because response from local authorities to the consultation you still have to get over their practicality on guidance for bus quality contracts? thresholds? They can, for a very short period of time, Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 7

17 November 2004 Rt Hon Alistair Darling MP and Mr David Rowlands

ﬂood the area with buses, which might be what the imperatives rather than anything else. I think if you authority was saying they want, and then withdraw are going to have criteria you need to have them them, so that you cannot enforce a quality contract. fairly narrowly focused, although you can always Is that not a problem? add things in. It has always struck me that in the case Mr Darling: I do not think it will be a problem of regeneration it is a terribly diYcult thing to because the powers we envisage giving to local quantify, both in advance and in retrospect. authorities are designed to make sure that that problem does not arise. I make no bones about what Q44 Mr Stringer: It is a terribly important thing, is I am trying to get at here. If you go back to the it not? question of congestion, as you know, it tends to be Mr Darling: It is important but at times, as you conurbation based. What I am trying to do is to get know, it can be a very diYcult thing to work out an overall, coherent approach to that and as part of exactly what it is and, in retrospect, whether or not a package I am prepared to give councils the powers you achieved it. As you know, there are many they need, provided they are prepared to look at examples up and down the country that are a some—sometimes diYcult—decisions to go with it. triumph of hope over experience.

Q40 Mr Stringer: What is the extra power you are Q45 Mr Stringer: What worries me about those, as going to give them then, beyond reducing I say, admirable objectives is that when you go back consultation time down to six months? I am not clear seven years to the argument about putting transport about what that extra power is? with environment it was all about making sure that Mr Darling: It is the powers that we set out in the transport supported other government objectives, White Paper, and which would be included in the like regeneration, and I am worried that we could legislation to implement that White Paper. remove that as an objective. I would like reassurance—or not if that is the case—that you will Q41 Mr Stringer: You still have to pass that consider that as one of the objectives of Local Plans. threshold over this Section 124. You would not be Mr Darling: I am happy to consider it, Mr Stringer, repealing that section. but what I do not want to do is get a situation where Mr Darling: We are not proposing to. Our intention the criteria are so wide that, really, it would be very is the one I have just described. It is set out in the diYcult to reach a judgment on whether it was a White Paper, and as and when this legislation comes good thing or not. There are many transport before the House, if people think it does not achieve schemes that we support in which regeneration is what I intended to achieve then, of course, I will look one of the principal objectives, but in the LTP at it, but my intention is that, standing by what I process what we have tried to do is focus minds. have said in the White Paper, I want to make sure that if councils or PTEs adopt this wider policy Q46 Mr Stringer: As you know, when the White towards solving traYc congestion problems we will Y Paper was published I certainly welcomed the give them su cient powers to enable them to deal transfer of power to PTEs, to control rail budgets. with the problems that you outline in relation to What I was not aware of, and I would like you to buses. We do not want to have a situation where you explain why this happened, was that you were also have an otherwise coherent programme that would intending to remove the existing powers that PTEs be undermined by that. Equally, given that I believe have over rail franchises. in some parts of the country the relationship Mr Darling: At the moment the PTEs are co- between councils and buses are working well, what I signatories, as you know. Firstly, I do not think that do not want to do is to undermine that relationship. is necessary. Secondly, I can think of one case in particular where the signing of the franchise was Q42 Mr Stringer: So you are not shutting the door held up to some extent because a PTE was in the completely on that? position of having one line that stretched into the Mr Darling: I am not shutting the door on making it area of the new franchise and therefore it had to be easier for councils that have a coherent plan for a co-signatory, even though its principal place of dealing with congestion to do it; what I am shutting business, if you like, was far removed from where the door to is, if you like—and this is in very crude this franchise is. That just struck me as being a very terms—back to regulation. curious situation. There are two things I would like to do. One is, as I said to Mrs Ellman’s point, the Q43 Mr Stringer: Your objectives in the Local department will specify the direction of railways, it Transport Plans are commendable for reducing will specify the franchise area and, when it allocates congestion, pollution and increasing road safety and the franchises, what the franchise will look like. It accessibility. Why, in those objectives, are the wider will be open to a PTE, if it says “We want more than objectives of the department about helping that”, to say “Yes, we can have more of that” and, economic regeneration not put into local objectives of course, it will have to pay for that because that in Local Plans? goes with the whole thrust of what we are saying. Mr Darling: As you know, we are about to start on However, I do not think it is necessary for it to be a the second round of Local Transport Plans, the ﬁrst co-signatory. The precise mechanism we use will be ﬁve years almost being up. Of course, I am prepared set out in the legislation when it eventually comes, to look at suggestions but we have tended—and and, again, if that legislation is not suYcient or does this predates me—to concentrate on transport not work then of course the whole point of Ev 8 Transport Committee: Evidence

17 November 2004 Rt Hon Alistair Darling MP and Mr David Rowlands

Parliamentary scrutiny of these things is to make Mr Rowlands: E1? sure we get it right. The whole thrust of what I was trying to do in the White Paper is to simplify the Q51 Mr Stringer: Or E2. structures we have got at the moment and try and cut Mr Rowlands: No. You will not find it there out the number of people who are involved in these identified in the same way that you will find the things, not just to reduce costs but make it easier to specifics of SRA investment identified, because these actually run the railway. I do not think that PTEs are just main headings. In simple terms (because it is have got anything to worry about. What they are complicated, I am afraid) the funding for local concerned about is making sure that they have got authority light rail schemes is usually a combination the services they want, provided they are willing to of grant and credits. The grants come out of the local pay for it. Can I just say that I am glad that you authority transport capital provision and the credits welcome the whole idea of decentralisation, which I generally come out of something called the PFI think must be the right way to go in transport credits line. You will not find the PFI credits in the spending and transport planning anyway. department’s DEL at all.

Q47 Mr Stringer: I do but I am concerned that Q52 Chairman: That is, presumably, their fund— removing the Passenger Transport Executives from Mr Rowlands: I was not going to call it “largesse” having to sign the franchises physically takes them from Treasury but they are provided by the Treasury away from the table and runs counter to the idea that to the department outside of our DEL. I am afraid the PTEs should have a greater say in transport that is an over-simpliﬁed explanation of what can be policies in their areas. I wonder if you would quite complicated. reconsider that position. Mr Darling: I will look at any concerns they have got Q53 Mr Stringer: Do you think they should be in and I am aware of the fact that they have some your annual report in future? concerns here, but I do not think they are being kept Mr Rowlands: We would be very happy to look at it away from the table. After all, a lot of them will have and see what we can do. To pick up on what the views as to whether they want more—they may Secretary of State said, at some point this is going to actually want less—services, and that is something assimilate what the SRA does. We may want to they will be able to have views on. If they are going think about counter-balancing in more detail in to pay for more services they will most certainly be some other areas. sitting at the table with a cheque book at the ready. Mr Darling: I can help, Mrs Dunwoody. My view, So I do not think there is any fear of that. I just think for what it is worth, is that the more complete the we need to get away from the problem we have picture the better you can see these things. I think got at the moment where it is a complicated these annual reports will develop over time. Ours is arrangement. As I said to you, I can think of going to have to change as a result of the railways examples where PTEs, because of the way the service anyway, but I think the PFI point is a perfectly is spread across the country, therefore, for whatever good one. reason, had an inﬂuence which I do not think was ever intended. However, in relation to getting the Q54 Chairman: We are assuming that once you have services they want for the people they represent, I do Y absorbed all these functions then, of course, they not see any di culty with that. That, actually, is ought to be clearly shown because it will be in your what matters, at the end of the day. So I do not think interest to make it clear to Parliament where the they are being pushed out of the door—far from it; money is going and under what heading. when you follow our policy through to its ultimate Mr Darling: It also shows a complete picture of what conclusion they will have a lot more power and we are doing. responsibility than they have got at the moment. Chairman: Yes, that is always welcome to Parliament, if not to all of your colleagues. Q48 Chairman: I think we will want to see the wording of the legislation, not surprisingly. Q55 Clive EVord: Can I take you back to railways Mr Darling: Which you will. for just a couple of supplementary questions? We have recently had some new rolling stock on Q49 Mr Stringer: Mr Rowlands, in his very Network South East. Are you happy with the interesting performance before the Public Accounts reliability of that new rolling stock? Committee last Wednesday— Mr Darling: No. There have been too many teething Mr Darling: He has got the quote! problems. This is a problem for all the rolling stock, not just South Eastern Trains. Problems are well Q50 Mr Stringer: There are lots of interesting documented with the Pendolino trains. Bombardier quotes—mentioned that the amount of money for who make South Eastern Trains and also Southern’s light rail was under the heading “Local Transport trains are having problems. I think we can accept Capital Provision”. I have looked in the that, with anything new, there are bound to be departmental report and under either Table E1 on problems. These trains are more complicated than page 142 or Table E2 on page 144 there is a “Local the Mark I stock that has been taken oV. There is a Authorities” heading and a “Local Transport lot more computer-driven stock and there is a lot Investment and Expenditure”. I wondered whether more sophistication in the equipment they carry. that was the heading you were referring to. These problems are being sorted out but I think it Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 9

17 November 2004 Rt Hon Alistair Darling MP and Mr David Rowlands points to something else that I think is a big problem not a technical expert and, maybe in one of your in the railway industry. There has been a tendency inquiries in the future you might want to get the over the last 50 years that, whenever you order a new designers of the Pendolinos and all the other train train, you do something diVerent, they change the designers in and cross-examine them about it, but I specification and so on, and, if you do that, you will do know enough about it to understand that you do get teething problems. I think, especially given that have to make some adaptations and, in reply to Mr the Department pays for this one way or another, we EVord’s question, nobody can be happy that, when should be moving more towards the airline model we have introduced rolling stock in this country, we where basically you have short haul, medium haul have had more teething problems than we would and long haul and, yes, try and vary things when you like. need to but do not try and reinvent the train every time you order it. There have been too many teething Q59 Clive EVord: Are there any penalty clauses for problems, they are being put right but I think that, the companies that supply these trains? from the travelling public’s point of view, one of the Mr Darling: Yes, there are and I would be happy frustrations is that you have brand new trains but to let you have a note of them, but there are their reliability is lower than they ought to be. penalty clauses and there are incentives on the manufacturers to get it right. Q56 Clive EVord: Is there any comparison with trains that the same companies have manufactured Q60 Clive EVord: Can I just move on to light rail. that have been purchased elsewhere and is there any Should those local authorities that were planning analysis of our performance there? Are we getting light rail schemes give up on them? short changed here or are there similar patterns of Mr Darling: No, they should not and I will put this breakdown after new trains are introduced briefly. The problem on light rail—and this has elsewhere? happened in relation to just about every scheme we Mr Darling: It is sometimes diYcult to make have, especially the recent ones—is that the costs comparisons. We actually record and publish a lot of have gone up quite dramatically. Sometimes for information about these things but the same cannot generic reasons like the cost of moving utilities in be said for every other country in the world, even this country is much higher than it is in other parts other countries where these suppliers provide trains of Europe for example, although again the cross- and, in some cases, things are rather opaque to see subsidy there is sometimes not as clear as it might be what exactly has happened. I do not think it is a and there have been other elements like, for question of being short changed, the diYculty is that example, the risk that the private companies are these trains are all designed to run on particular taking on revenue, they are pricing that much higher lines. As you well know within the British railways than they were. My message to people is that light network, there are all sorts of diVerent requirements rail can be a good solution. It is not right in every and so on, but I think there are times when, as I say, place but it can be a good solution, but we have to our tendency to redesign things and to be the first make sure that we get our costs as low as possible people to say, “I want this to happen on this train” and we have to recognise firstly that in some places or “that to happen on another train” just makes for it is not the right solution and, in other places where added complication. it is the right solution, then we have to do everything we can to reduce the costs. At the moment, as is well Q57 Chairman: Secretary of State, we are all rather known, we are working with Manchester. In fact, sensitive about this because the same train that is not there was a meeting as I told the House yesterday working in the form of a Pendolino was seen by this and there will be further meetings. Leeds have just Committee working very eYciently in Korea put in a revised bid. There are other councils up and because it had been, frankly, redesigned by the down the country looking at them. People should be Koreans and rebuilt. I hope you are not assuming in no doubt: we are not simply going to write a that everything that comes, as long as it is cheque for whatever thing comes in. You cannot do standardised, is going to be suitable for the British that especially in the light of the recent NAO report railway industry. In fact, we would rather like some on light rail over the last 20 years in this country; it new trains that worked because that might be would be grossly irresponsible for us not to start original! querying things. As I said yesterday in reply to the Mr Darling: The Pendolino train comes from the Greater Manchester MP, since we have looked at same sort of train that is running in Italy and has Manchester and they have looked again at things, been for some years perfectly successfully. there are all sorts of things that are now becoming apparent that of course we need to sort. If we can Q58 Chairman: I can assure you that it does not run sort them, then there is no reason why light rail does in the same way. not have a good future. Mr Darling: No, it does not because it had to be modified to run on the railway line that we have here. Q61 Clive EVord: How do you expect public It is not like if you buy a Boeing Jet and you could transport to expand in those areas that were heavily fly it out of Washington, London or Tokyo because reliant upon light rail schemes? it is basically going through the same sky. As you Mr Darling: It may yet be in some of those areas know, track and train are rather intimately related that, if we can find something that works, something and that is why there have to be adaptations. I am that is aVordable, then we will develop the light rail. Ev 10 Transport Committee: Evidence

17 November 2004 Rt Hon Alistair Darling MP and Mr David Rowlands

What I have always said is that I suspect, in terms of for over seven years with 96.3% of scheduled public transport, you need the right mix of heavy rail kilometres operating together with the lowest excess and light rail and bus lane solutions. It is worth journey time for six years.” That is a start. Of course bearing in mind that buses carry more passengers there have been diYculties, the Northern Line for than any other form of public transport and, example and others, but I remain convinced that, if properly run and correctly put in place, they can be we can get the investment and get it properly highly successful. Leeds, for example, has developed executed, then the Tube will be in good shape in its bus services quite dramatically over the last few years to come. years. I never ever closed the door on light rail. I made the point when I made my statement to the The Committee suspended from 3.31 pm to 3.37 pm House in July that the problem in relation to for a division in the House Manchester, Leeds and South Hampshire was the fact that costs had escalated and we had to have a look at those costs and we had to work with those Q65 Clive EVord: Were the bonuses paid to directors authorities and that is what we are doing. of Tube Lines part of the PPP contract or is that something that was negotiated subsequently? Q62 Clive EVord: How successful have the new Mr Darling: I am not sure about that. light rail schemes been in Croydon, Nottingham, Mr Rowlands: I can hazard an answer. That is in Manchester and Tyne and Wear in attracting their employment contracts, between them as an passengers? employee of Tube Lines and Metronet, and nothing Mr Darling: They have been successful. You have no to do with the PPP contract as such. doubt read the NAO Report which is quite useful on this. If we take, for example, Manchester, the Q66 Clive EVord: Did you have any communication existing network in Manchester has carried more with Tube Lines over the fact that they were making passengers than was anticipated. The NAO does not £100,000 a day whilst they were running a service endorse an expansion to it but that was just a matter that was in decline at that time, yet still paid out of fact. Manchester has had its problems, like others. bonuses? Croydon has attracted a number of passengers but, Mr Darling: No. I did not, and I do not think the as you know, some of the financial forecasts have not Department did. quite worked out as they had intended. It is a little Mr Rowlands: No. early to say with Nottingham because it only started in March or April of this year. Part of the Tyne and Wear Metro has been open for a long, long time and Q67 Chairman: Is there any way in which you could part of it has been opened more recently. Others like have done? Is there any way in which the taxpayer SheYeld, the scheme has to be eVectively rescued can be protected from that kind of thing? because the forecasts were wrong because the Mr Darling: There is a contract with Metronet and housing that was there at the start was not there by with Tube Lines. the time the thing started. So, if you look at the NAO Report—and it is a very good NAO Report—I think Q68 Chairman: Is there anything written in there it is probably best to say that the position is mixed. that says that the taxpayer may have something to Mr Rowlands: The only thing I would add is, as I say? said last week at the PAC, though it is early days for Mr Darling: It is highly unlikely that the contract Nottingham, it fits what a light rail scheme really would specify how much Metronet or Tube Lines should look like. It was built with five park-and-ride would pay their employees. The contract is a schemes, it was built with an integrated timetable contract for delivery of services. How much people and through ticketing and certainly so far the are paid to do that would normally be a matter carryings are at the upper end of the forecast; it is between the company and its employees and not to carrying 25,000 people a day, so it works. do with the Government. Mr Darling: And I opened it! Q69 Clive EVord: How confident are you that the V Q63 Clive E ord: I am sure that makes it run PPP contract will deliver improvements in the latter more eYciently! Can I move on to the London part of the 30-year contract period? Underground. Are you satisfied with the Mr Darling: I hope and believe it will, and if you performance of London Underground since it look at it this way, these contracts are structured to transferred to PPP? deliver certain outputs in terms of more trains being Mr Darling: Yes, subject to this: it is now the Mayor available, signalling replaced, improvements to who runs it, so I do not deal with the day-to-day stations and so on, backed up by a rather large operations. amount of money going in. I am reasonably confident that they will deliver. Certainly, if you Q64 Clive EVord: You do fund it. look back at the history of the tube in the last 30 Mr Darling: Yes, I do fund it but I could do no better years, what it sorely lacked was that sort of than to quote my good friend, Mr Bob Kiley who investment and that sort of pressure to come up with said in his TFL Board report of 27 October of this the goods. That structure is now there. With both year and I quote, “The most recent four-week period TfL and the contracts they manage, it is important has seen the best train service performance results that they keep pressure on to actually deliver that. Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 11

17 November 2004 Rt Hon Alistair Darling MP and Mr David Rowlands

Mr Rowlands: Would it help if I added that the controversy, to demonstrate to people that these contracts specifically allow TfL in eVect every seven cameras work, and you can now see the evidence for and a half years to reset its requirement. Your each site. I also wanted to make sure that the question was how can we be sure it gets better? punishment fitted the crime. That is something that Because TfL are respecifying the requirement in a is properly within my judgement to exercise. way that should continue to drive that. Q76 Ian Lucas: Can I stop you there? On speed Q70 Clive EVord: They will be renegotiating cameras, I am with you. Can we focus on speed contracts with contractors that are already in place limits? It seems to me there is strong evidence, in fact for the subsequent period of the contract. your own website says that the 30 mph limit in most Mr Rowlands: They reset the requirement under the residential areas is no arbitrary figure; it is set contract, and there is an independent PPP arbiter to because there is a substantial diVerence in the risk of price that requirement. causing death or serious injury when driving even just a few miles per hour above 30 mph. Q71 Clive EVord: That is how we ensure Mr Darling: True. transparency and value for money? Mr Rowlands: Yes. Q77 Ian Lucas: Is it not the case that reducing the penalty for individuals who break that limit, let us Q72 Clive EVord: You are confident that that will be say, in residential areas, will send out completely the delivered at that time? wrong message to drivers? Mr Rowlands: Yes. Mr Darling: No, I disagree with people who say that. At the moment, if you go to court, having been done Q73 Clive EVord: The bidding negotiations cost for speeding, it is up to the judge to decide what somewhere in the region of £455 million. Over half happens to you. The judge will take into account all of that was reimbursed to the contractors. Did the sorts of things, but the seriousness of the crime is one Department have any say over whether that money of them. On speed cameras, what I wanted to move was reimbursed? away from was a flat rate, so whether you were doing Mr Rowlands: Yes. There was a long dialogue with 7 mph over the limit or 37 mph over the limit, you London Transport, as a result of which we agreed are treated the same way, unless someone sends you that we would reimburse bidders’ costs. Remember, to court. this competition went on an awfully long time. I think the point to bear in mind is that all successful Q78 Ian Lucas: Except that you can be disqualified. bidders look to recover their bid costs in their Mr Darling: What I wanted to do was to have a contract prices. If they do not, they go out of graduated system, because I think that is fairer. That business. This was just making visible what was is a matter of my judgement. When it comes before going on, and what it did do is provide them with a the House, the House can exercise its judgement. guarantee which did not come to pass that they would get bid costs reimbursed in the event the Q79 Ian Lucas: Can we look at the evidence for that competitions were terminated for reasons other than judgement? What is the evidence that people’s value for money. safety, individual pedestrians, cyclists in residential areas, will be improved by you reducing the penalties Q74 Clive EVord: Is there any mechanism for for speeding? checking whether those costs are reasonable, given Mr Darling: That is not the policy objective. that at the time of their being ratcheted up, you have no control over the expenditure? Q80 Ian Lucas: Why not? Mr Rowlands: These costs were I believe audited by Mr Darling: Because it is not. In relation to any London Transport. crime you want, we collectively here exercise a Chairman: You will realise, Secretary of State, that judgement when we specify what the punishment there are large areas of the report we have not even should be, as to whether we think it should be X covered. Mr Lucas will now want to move on, and number of years, or a monetary fine or a then we come to aviation after that. combination of both. That is a matter of judgement. For example, if you take drugs oVences and so on, Q75 Ian Lucas: What evidence is there that where penalties are a mixture, sometimes monetary, introducing a lower penalty for drivers found doing sometimes custodial sentences, it is a matter of 39 mph in a 30 mph road limit will actually judgement as to what deters people or not. There are improve safety? two separate issues here. One is there is no doubt Mr Darling: The decision to have a graduated that the faster you go, the greater your risk of system of penalties was reached because it is my seriously injuring or killing people. There is no judgement that it is a fairer thing to do to make the doubt about that. There is a separate judgement to punishment fit the crime. The policy objective was to be reached as to what the penalty ought to be make something fairer. In relation to whether speed depending on how fast you go, just as I say in court cameras are eVective, I think there is an awful lot of cases that judgement is being exercised every single evidence to suggest that they are, not least the day of the year. What I want to do is to have a fairer evidence that I published in the summer, but I did system, and it is my judgement—and of course, you this in two parts. Firstly, I wanted, because of all the are entitled to question my judgement—that people Ev 12 Transport Committee: Evidence

17 November 2004 Rt Hon Alistair Darling MP and Mr David Rowlands think it is right to have a punishment that fits the Q86 Ian Lucas: I know that there are certain areas crime. There are divided views about this. We where you are introducing trial projects of alcohol consulted on it, and it is perfectly obvious there are locks to prevent drivers from driving if they are divided views. However, that happens to be my view, convicted of driving with alcohol. Are you aware of for what it is worth. any schemes to introduce a similar scheme for speeders to prevent them from driving above the limit if they have speeding convictions, using Q81 Ian Lucas: Can I just be clear? You are saying technology to address that problem? that safety is not an objective of the policy? Mr Darling: We are trying out technology at the Mr Darling: The policy objective of speed cameras is moment where you have speed regulators on cars, improving safety. The policy objective in relation to set for a 30 mph speed limit, and we are trying this whatever the penalty ought to be is to make sure that out just to see what it does to driver behaviour the penalty is fair having regard to all the generally. But that is aimed at drivers in general. I circumstances. am not aware of any particular scheme that is directed towards someone who, say, is convicted of Q82 Ian Lucas: But should not the penalty be speeding X number of times being required to fit a relevant to the issue of safety? Should not the regulator. What we would want to do is look at the purpose of the penalty be to express that safety is outcome of the trial that we are doing at the moment desirable and that this is a serious matter, and that and see what is done to behaviour generally. Just the penalty should be harsher where individual looking at road safety, what is worrying if you look safety is prejudiced? at where the problems are occurring, there is the very Mr Darling: You are right. The whole point of worrying number of people where there is no other having a penalty is to indicate society’s disapproval vehicle involved and the car leaves the road. Maybe of whatever the behaviour happens to be. What I am that is speed in some cases or maybe it is drivers saying to you is that I think it is right that you can falling asleep. We need to look across the piece at diVerentiate between somebody who is just over the what is causing this increase before we decide what limit in an area and somebody who is way over the to do. limit. That is my judgement, and it will be for the judgement of the House when the thing comes before the House. Q87 Chairman: We are going to be interrupted by a vote shortly and I want to bring all my colleagues in because I know you are very pushed for time, and Q83 Ian Lucas: Do you not think you are in danger you have kindly agreed to come back. Can I ask you of sending out mixed messages here? now some apparently unrelated but actually direct Mr Darling: No, I do not. I do not accept that. I am questions about the Department just before we go? aware of this argument, and I do not accept that for Have you strengthened your financial systems since one moment. we asked you about the monitoring of executive agencies, Mr Rowlands? Q84 Ian Lucas: Do you think it is appropriate for Mr Rowlands: Yes, we have. The Highways Agency occupational motor cycle riding to be undertaken by has since May had a professionally qualified finance riders with only a provisional licence? I am talking director looking to reorganise his finance team. They about couriers, for example. now have monthly management accounts, monthly Mr Darling: I think that is something I would want risk monitoring . . . to take advice on because I do not have in front of me suYcient information to make a reasonable Q88 Chairman: They now have monthly judgement on that. management accounts which you see? Mr Rowlands: All of the agencies are giving us, on a Q85 Ian Lucas: The figures show that there is a monthly basis, their work books and we are moving worrying increase in the number of motorcycle over the next couple of years to produce monthly deaths occurring. What measures are you proposing accounts for the Department, so that we do not just to try and address that? do the accounts once a year, which is what you see Mr Darling: You are right that there is an increase. here. It is much tighter. You can see that in 2003 the There are more motor cyclists. There are more older accounts I signed oV should have been done in people taking to motor bikes. We are doing a November last year, and I signed them oV in January number of things. We are increasing the amount of this year. They were late. This year’s accounts had to advertising reminding people of safety, and we are be done a month earlier and they were signed oV in generally trying to improve people’s awareness of time, and they are good. the potential dangers when you cycle. Motor cycling is much more dangerous than driving a car. Of course, there are things you can do in relation to Q89 Chairman: So you can guarantee that you are motorcycle safety to the actual bike itself, but a lot keeping your beady eye on the situation in your of it is about driver behaviour and getting across to executive agencies so that you do not get into the people that you can get into trouble comparatively situation that the Highways Agency got into before? easily on a motor bike. Mr Rowlands: Precisely, yes. Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 13

17 November 2004 Rt Hon Alistair Darling MP and Mr David Rowlands

Q90 Chairman: Do you anticipate, Secretary of Q97 Chairman: Then why since 2001 has the pay bill State, the same level of private investment as component of administration costs increased by originally stated in your Ten Year Plan for 25%, while the number of staV has gone down? Transport? Mr Rowlands: If you have a pay bill that is going up Mr Darling: Yes. at about 3–4% a year, you accumulate that for a period of four years or so, and four times four is 16, for example. I think it is just a reflection of an Q91 Chairman: Where is it going to come from? increase in pay and prices together with things like Mr Darling: From the private sector. superannuation. Also, I am not sure our numbers have gone down. They have in fact gone up at Q92 Chairman: Which bits of the private sector? DVLA from what was about 5,700 to currently “The private sector” is a warm, wide phrase. What about 6,500. does it mean? Chairman: I hope I am wrong. We have got table A5 Mr Darling: In the railways, it will continue to come in appendix A, which shows your pay bill. from the train operating companies to some extent, Mr Stringer: That is for the Department, not for it will come from the rolling stock companies, and DVLA. also of course Network Rail raises a very substantial sum. There is also money coming through the Channel Tunnel link. In relation to roads, I Q98 Chairman: Sorry, the Department. It has anticipate money coming through. The exact increased from £206 million in 2000–01 to an number of PFI schemes probably will change over estimated out-turn of £257 million in 2003–04. the next few years, but I think broadly the amount of Mr Rowlands: That is not the Department. That is money that we anticipated coming from the private only the parts of the Department which are within sector over the period will continue. There will be the administration cost limit, which is the central fluctuations from time to time but I am reasonably department, and DVLA, because if you look at the optimistic there. first of the green lines, DVLA drops out and disappears from 2004-05 onwards because of its trading fund status. Q93 Chairman: So if you add public and private sector investment together, are there going to be more funds between now and 2010 than anticipated Q99 Chairman: So by a miracle of what you in your ten-year plan? might call creative accounting, we are shifting a Mr Darling: Our forecasts are that the numbers we considerable amount into a trading fund, and it does have published will remain as they are. We published not mean we have gone up by 25%? the latest update in July and nothing has happened Mr Rowlands: It has become a trading fund, just as since July to make me depart from what we said VOSA is a trading fund and DSA is a trading fund, then. as is VCA now as well.1

Q94 Chairman: An optimistic Secretary of State. Mr Darling: It is only three months. Q100 Chairman: Your other administration costs have gone up 67% since 1998–99. Why have they increased so much more than the pay bill Q95 Chairman: Mr Rowlands, why have the component? Can we look at table A5? The other administration costs of the central department and component of administration costs is up from DVLA risen by nearly 10%? £220 million in 1998–99 to £368 million in 2003–04. Mr Rowlands: Partly it is the underlying increase That is a rise of 67%. that came out of SR02, partly it is because we have Mr Rowlands: That is a reflection of the costs been given an extra £18 million a year by the in particular of the DVO, the e-enablement Treasury just like any other department to deal with programme, where they have spent considerable the way that superannuation payments have been sums introducing online systems in VOSA, in terms recalculated. The increase, when you begin to strip of the ability on the net now to book a practical all of that out, is pretty modest and going forward, driving test as well as a theory test. It is those strands it is going to be a real-terms cut because the 2006–07 that have driven it up.2 administrative budget from the central department was cut by £5 million over 2005–06 and it will be £10 million for the year after. So it is going down in Q101 Chairman: So you would not expect that future, not up. percentage to be repeated because you are now in place? Q96 Chairman: We did ask you if you could give a Mr Rowlands: I would expect that DVO group detailed breakdown of any significant increase in would continue to spend quite heavily on e- administration costs. It was one of the points that we enablement for several years to come. made last year. 1 It should be noted that the VCA is not, in fact a trading fund, Mr Rowlands: I will be honest; I do not think there but does however, operate like one. has been a significant increase in administration 2 The DVO have spent considerable sums introducing online costs. systems in DSA not VOSA. Ev 14 Transport Committee: Evidence

17 November 2004 Rt Hon Alistair Darling MP and Mr David Rowlands

Q102 Chairman: I would not expect them not to Q109 Chairman: They have put various comments in expend a lot of money, but fees are going to go up by their business plan, have they not? “We are 10% above inflation on average. Is that going undertaking to maintain new initiatives.” That is to really give you your extra enforcement, with your £12 million. Then there is a little one at the modernisation and IT? bottom here. “In order to deliver full e-enablement Mr Rowlands: For VOSA, they are embarked on a activity and ICT for merger initiatives, a further bid quite long-term strategy to refurbish and replace of £13 million is required. In total we run the risk of some of their estate. Their HGV testing stations are being potentially short of funding to the tune of now very old, for example. We loaned them £35 million.” £10 million in 2002–03 to start that programme. I Mr Rowlands: The answer is they have £12 million, think you are referring to their business plan, where they do not need £10 million and we are looking at they said they needed another £10 million for this the other £13 million. year. The Committee suspended from 4.01 pm to 4.08 pm Q103 Chairman: What about this £35 million deficit? for a division in the House Mr Rowlands: No, it is not a deficit. They said they saw a risk they would need £35 million. We have Q110 Chairman: Secretary of State, the Highways given them the first £12 million they referred to. Agency failed four of its 11 performance targets. One of them was a road users’ charter, in which there Q104 Chairman: You have given them £12 million was a sudden drop in previous performance on co- because they say they do think there might be a risk? ordinating major road works. Mr Rowlands: No, because they needed £12 million Mr Darling: Yes. Basically, they met some but they for increased enforcement. It was not in the baseline failed a number. I have had a look at it. for SR02 to 2002 so we have funded them on an annual basis and we have given them the £12 million Q111 Chairman: It talks about “co-ordinating major for this year. road works so that a minimum of 90% during the year are no more than 2.5 miles long and at least six Q105 Chairman: How much control do you have miles apart.” There is nothing that irritates the over their financial decisions? general public more than that. Mr Rowlands: If I may continue, we want to see from Mr Darling: Basically, what has happened is that all of our agencies their business plan for their e- they have met some but in other cases they have not enablement and their estate strategy, which are the met them, and sometimes they have just missed two other elements in the VOSA business plan, and them, but at other times, for example, a we have a business plan now from the DVO group reinstatement of road works where there have been including VOSA for the money they want to spend good operational reasons for doing something on further e-enablement. So we are actually moving diVerently because it is either more economical or to a place where we have a tighter look at what they where it is better in road management terms. What are spending. is best said about this is that the ones they have met, that is fine. There are numbers where we have to pay Q106 Chairman: That is what they intend to a little bit more attention. There is one in particular spend including this risk element. Will this extra that is a bit exasperating. They had a target of salting £10 million be in addition to the work that police all the roads they were responsible for within three forces would formerly have carried out or instead hours. The actual figure was 99.75. So it was not of it? 100%, but there was not a huge gap between there Mr Darling: Is this for the BTP? and 100. There are others where we need to look at these things a little bit further. Q107 Chairman: No, this is VOSA. We are on to the £12 million that you gave them on the risk. Q112 Chairman: Did you comment on the Highways Mr Rowlands: Part of this is the additional work that Agency’s priorities? After all, they did not meet the they undertook. There was a drive on vehicle target to improve the safety of non-motorised identification numbers to stop the motor trade crossing points, did they? ringing and using stolen cars and written oV cars. Mr Darling: Yes, of course we comment on them. The Highways Agency, although it is an agency, naturally we keep a close view on anything they do Q108 Chairman: So it is in addition to the work not meet. police forces do? Mr Rowlands: That was introduced. It brought VOSA a bigger inspection eVort and it has reduced Q113 Chairman: It was suggested that they were quite noticeably the number of stolen vehicles, diverting money from that programme. What was which are down 9%. We cannot prove the the total budget and how much was taken out of it? correlation but it has gone down, and increased the Mr Darling: The money from which programme? scrappage rates. So there is evidence that the money was well spent. I cannot actually prove that that Q114 Chairman: They had a budget originally for enforcement produced that result, but we think it this, the safety of non-motorised crossing points. did, if you look at the figures. They were supposed to improve safety. Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 15

17 November 2004 Rt Hon Alistair Darling MP and Mr David Rowlands

Mr Darling: I am not aware that they moved money met, because the Department could cover it in the from it. It is a target they have not met, and it is first instance, then we would recover it ourselves by clearly something we need to look at. seeking legislative approval, which I assume would have all-party support. Q115 Chairman: Can somebody have a look at that? I need to know. Q119 Miss McIntosh: Would the future of the rail Mr Darling: Of course. As I say, if you look at the review also require primary legislation? targets overall, there are 11 ministerial targets, they Mr Darling: Not all of it, but a lot of it will, yes. met seven, they missed four, but two of them were nearly missed in terms of the road user satisfaction and the major scheme milestones. The other ones Q120 Chairman: Can I ask you very briefly about were compound targets, which are the road users’ your financial support for ship cadets? How is it charter and the service standards. working? Mr Darling: The tonnage tax? It has worked well in the sense that we have now a number of companies, Q116 Chairman: Some of them are fairly important. 60-odd companies, who are engaged in it. They are Can I ask you about the accounting oYcer’s report taking on trainees. Where there is concern, of course, in the Highways Agency’s annual report. It says is their future employment. As you are well aware, “Significant work is necessary to bring risk handling not just within NUMAST, the shipping union, but and internal control up to a satisfactory standard.” others are beginning to say should there be further What does that mean and what is the diVerence guarantees? The big question is, if you have further between “risk management” and “risk handling”? guarantees, would companies presently in the Mr Rowlands: It is semantics. EVectively, they mean scheme say “We are willing to train but we cannot the same thing. What the accounting oYcer for the guarantee a job”? Would they go away? I have had Highways Agency is really reflecting is the work that discussions with NUMAST themselves and I think the Department more generally and indeed they accept this as a question that would have to be government departments at large need to do to get a answered. What they have done, which I tend to better appreciation of the risks that they face and a think is probably the right answer, is they have better understanding of how those risks are successfully negotiated a deal with a number of mitigated. There is a drive right across government shipping companies whereby they will not only to improve risk management and that is what you guarantee the training through the tonnage tax but are seeing reflected in what he said. also guarantee to keep people on at least for an initial period. They cannot guarantee it indefinitely, Q117 Chairman: It may be semantics, but he has of course. given diVerent categories, has he not? Risk management, medium to high assurance, risk handling and internal control, medium to low Q121 Chairman: Persuasion would in fact deal with assurance. some of this, because all the related industries to Mr Rowlands: To the extent that there is a shipping, insurance, etc, would be aVected if you do worthwhile distinction, I suppose risk handling is not have the work force coming through. the immediate day to day level, and risk Mr Darling: Absolutely. It would be a worry if we management is a wider process over time. did not have a cadre of people with sea-going experience. As you rightly say, we need them in the MCA for example. There are other on-shore Q118 Miss McIntosh: Secretary of State, I see industries that rely on that expertise. Actually, if you nothing in the supplementary estimates about the look at where we were half a dozen years ago, we deficit of £9 million in the ATOL air transport have made huge strides because of the tonnage tax. reserve fund for those charter carriers that If you look at the additions to the British flag, you sometimes, regrettably, go bust. We have been told would not have imagined that was possible in 1997, by a succession of Ministers that primary legislation taking a year at random. will be passed when your legislative timetable Chairman: We could expand that but we will not. I allows. That is a rather large order of estimate. I am am going to allow you to escape, but I want to ask sure you would wish to plug the gap. you about your departmental objective. Mr Darling: Yes, I would but I need parliamentary time to do it, and, as you say, successive Secretaries of State, and I think successive governments actually Q122 Clive EVord: On the Dartford crossing, why have said this. What I am clear about is if anything did you need to transfer £11.5 million to the happened, the Department would have to make it Dartford crossing maintenance fund when the good in the short term, but we would need to recover charges are still in place? the money because the exposure is potentially quite Mr Darling: I think this came from something in the large, and I am very confident, because I have made SR02 settlement, did it not? arrangements to do this, that if we needed to do it, Mr Rowlands: Essentially, what we are doing is we could do it very quickly. The legislation required really what government accounting requires us to to do this, I think I am right in saying, is a clause. We do, which is to account gross, so if you look in the should make sure that having done it, we would not report you will see all of the gross receipts coming in, have to go back to Parliament again, but you may £67 million a year, and then you have to put money rest assured that if the need arose, the need could be back into maintenance, into the maintenance fund. Ev 16 Transport Committee: Evidence

17 November 2004 Rt Hon Alistair Darling MP and Mr David Rowlands

So £67 million comes in, and we put £12 million back Q125 Chairman: How are you going to monitor in, rather than just netting it oV, which you might them and how will we know how well you have think would be more sensible, but in accounting performed? terms, we need to do it gross. So it comes in and we Mr Darling: It varies. You mentioned the airports. give some of it back. That is relatively easy to monitor, although it takes time to do it, in relation to the environmental impact. That is one example. On security, it is rather Q123 Clive EVord: What about the long-term future more diYcult. As I have said to you before, security of the charge? has moved to being part of our core business, and it Mr Darling: It is probably a policy issue. In relation will remain such for ever. As for monitoring it, that to the charge, I expect it will remain there. It is is much more diYcult, because by its very nature, it certainly part of the SR04 arithmetic, and I cannot is very diYcult to measure what you stop. hold out any prospects for it not being there. Q126 Chairman: Secretary of State, you understand perfectly we want to see clarity. We think you have Q124 Chairman: Can I just ask you ﬁnally this. a good tale to tell, and where you have problems, we There are other objectives in your annual report. just want to see what they are and we want to see You are going to provide for the development of what the diYculties are. We are very grateful to you sustainable airport and air space, improve logistics, for coming this afternoon. I am sorry it has been an modernise service for drivers, promote mobility, exercise in stretching your legs, but I am sure it has develop, monitor and enforce appropriate security. done you an enormous amount of good. We are very Are you going to do all of those? grateful to you for bringing Mr Rowlands with you. Mr Darling: Yes. Mr Darling: Thank you very much. Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 17 Written evidence

Memorandum by the Department for Transport (DAR 01)

SIGNIFICANT CHANGES AND DEVELOPMENTS SINCE THE PUBLICATION OF THE DEPARTMENTAL ANNUAL REPORT 2004 The Department received a request from the Clerk of the Transport Select Committee asking for a memorandum detailing any signiﬁcant changes and developments since the publication of the Departmental Annual Report in April. This memorandum is a response to that request.

Spending Review 2004 As the Committee is aware, Spending Review 2004 (SR04), published on 12 July, has given the Department a revised set of PSA targets for the period 2005–08. The new targets are set out at Annex A. The main changes to the targets are set out below. — In its eighth report the Select Committee stated that the measure used in the SR02 congestion target did not adequately reﬂect people’s understanding of congestion. The Department agrees, and SR04 announced that new targets would be introduced covering a range of issues including reliability. The new targets are now being developed and will be in place by July 2005. — The rail target now focuses exclusively on the punctuality and reliability of rail services, with a target to improve these to at least 85% by 2006, with further improvements by 2008. — The target to increase the use of public transport (bus and light rail) in England by 2010 by more than 12% compared with 2000 levels, now requires growth in every region. Improvements to accessibility, punctuality and reliability which formerly appeared in the PSA target are now set out in the overarching objective for local and regional transport systems. — The Department will share the existing joint Defra/DTI target to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to 12.5% below 1990 levels and to move towards a 20% reduction in carbon dioxide emissions below 1990 levels by 2010. — The transfer of responsibility for London Underground (LU) to the Mayor means that a PSA target has not been retained for LU. LU’s performance will continue to be monitored against the six performance indicators agreed with the Mayor, ﬁve of which become incrementally more challenging until 2010. — The road safety and air quality targets are unchanged.

EYciency savings The Committee has asked for details of promised eYciency savings. As part of SR04 the Department has undertaken to achieve 2.5% year on year eYciency savings on the Departmental Expenditure Limit (excluding spend on Rail, but including the element of the Revenue Support Grant attributable to transport) over the SR04 period. This target will replace the PSA eYciency target, set in SR02 and which entails a 2.5% eYciency gain against the Department’s Administration Cost Limit only. The 2.5% eYciency savings for SR04 are equivalent to £785 million in annual eYciencies by 2007–08. In accordance with the Department’s Spending Review settlement, 50% of the annual proposed eYciencies will be recyclable. The balance can be made up of a reduction in trading fund charges for the cost of transactional services provided by the DVO group of agencies, and improvements in the quality of the Department’s outputs, particularly on services delivered under long term contracts held by the Highways Agency. The Department’s EYciency Programme includes the following areas of savings, to be achieved by 2007–08: — Driver Vehicle and Operator (DVO Group) The DVO Group will increase the level of tax collected through Vehicle Excise Duty by £75 million per annum and achieve savings of £70 million per annum primarily through the development of transactional services and switching to electronic channels within the Group. — Roads Procurement The Highways Agency (HA) is leading a project to improve roads procurement by Local Authorities, which is expected to achieve annual eYciencies of £190 million. HA will also measure eYciency improvements achieved over the SR04 period on its existing roads procurement and maintenance contracts for strategic roads. — Non Roads Local Authority Spending Transport for London will achieve savings of £125 million through its EYciency Plan and will measure performance improvements to be achieved by the London Underground in the operation of its PPP contracts. Further eYciencies of £122 million will be made on other areas of Local Authority spending. Ev 18 Transport Committee: Evidence

— Developing the Department This work stream comprises a series of projects to improve eVectiveness and eYciency and create a more responsive, leaner, and better skilled centre of the Department. A key programme objective is to deliver an annual saving of £10.7 million by 2007–08. — Support Services Review The Department is currently reviewing the eYciency and eVectiveness of its Support Services. It will achieve savings of £16.1 million by standardising, simplifying and sharing support services functions across the Central Department and Executive Agencies. — Relocation The Department has identiﬁed over 60 posts to be located out of London and the South East by 2007–08 and will consider further relocations as the Department develops its future strategy. Almost 80% of DfT staV are already located outside London and the South East. A recent example of relocation is the movement of 155 Highways Agency staV in the last two years to oYces outside London. As part of these eYciencies the Department is committed to shedding 200 posts from the Central Department and 500 posts from the DVO Group by 2007–08.

Asset sales The Highways Agency is forecasting the disposal in 2004–05 of 214 properties and land no longer required for highways functions valued at £16.452 million. The properties comprise 67 residential properties, ﬁve commercial properties and 142 pieces of land. HA is also considering the disposal of land and property at Yate near Bristol, which is currently the main HA store for trunk road/motorway signalling which they are considering relocating. If this option is pursued the deal may yield in the region of £9 million.

London Funding Settlement The Spending Review provides a settlement for London covering the period up to 2009–10, giving a greater degree of certainty for Transport for London (TfL) over its long term funding. The settlement provides approximately £800 million above the 10 Year Plan for London over the ﬁve years to 2009–10. It also provides government support for TfL’s borrowing plans of £2.9 billion as long as they remain within the prudential code, and for grant levels to be reviewed in the light of commitments made when the PPP was signed. The table below shows the level of funding for London Underground and TfL over the next ﬁve years.

TOTAL FUNDING—GLA TRANSPORT GRANT

Year (£ million cash) 2005–06 2006–07 2007–08 2008–09 2009–10 2,161 2,383 2,544 2,528 2,651

The Mayor has agreed to sign the guarantees required by the IOC for planned TfL/borough transport projects which would also be needed in the event of a successful Olympic bid, and to fund them from within this settlement. TfL’s overall investment decisions in the light of this settlement will be set out in the TfL business plan, which will be published in October.

Finance tables The Committee drew attention to, and sought explanations for, significant diVerences in the DfT budget figures for 2004–05 shown in Table A1 of the Departmental Annual Report (the “DAR table”) and Table 9.1 of 2004 Spending Review: New Public Spending Plans 2005–08 (the “SR table”). Similar issues aVect the baseline figures for 2005–06. The first part of the diVerence between the two tables reflects the diVerent scope of the two sets of figures. The DAR table figures included spending both within the Departmental Expenditure Limit (DEL) and Annually Managed Expenditure (AME). By contrast, the SR table covered only spending within the DEL reflecting the fact that the Spending Review is concerned solely with DELs for each department. This diVerence in boundaries accounts for a diVerence of some £2 billion in 2004–05, this being the “cost of capital charge” for the Strategic Roads network, which is scored in AME. The remaining diVerences arise because figures in the SR table net oV: — in-year transfers to other Government departments, which reflect the “purchase” of services between departments; — in-year classification switches for components of the total budget, in particular switches between Capital DEL and “capital grants” within Resource DEL; and Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 19

— components of the settlement from the previous Spending Review that were to fund one-oV or non-recurring costs. Since publication of the DAR, the baseline has also been increased to reflect changes in the way civil service pension liabilities are reflected in public expenditure figures. The following table provides a detailed reconciliation from the budget figures in the DAR table to the figures shown in the SR table. (Figures may not sum owing to the eVect of rounding).

£ Million 2004–05 2005–06 Resource Capital Resource Capital Figures shown in DAR 9,540 3,652 9,949 3,300 Of which: AME 2,089 1,579 Total DEL 7,451 3,652 8,370 3,300 Changes to calculate baseline for SR2004: EVect of in-year transfers from/to other -8 50 -13 50 departments EVect of in-year Capital DEL to capital -15 15 -7 7 grant switches Removal of “time-limited” rail funding -385 -305 in the SR2002 settlement Late additions to baseline 7 10 SR2004 baseline 7,051 3,717 8,055 3,358 Allocation from Reserve 500 Figures shown in SR table 7,051 3,717 8,555 3,358

There are also diVerences between the “Administration Budget” figures shown in the SR table and the “Administration Costs” shown in Table A5 of the DAR. These reflect the combined eVect of extra provision in relation to pension costs and the reclassification of some expenditure so that it no longer scores in the Administration Budget. (This reclassification aVects costs in the Maritime and Coastguard Agency, the Air Accident Investigation Branch and the Vehicle Certification Agency.) Final decisions on detailed budget allocations within the Department have not yet been made. These will be taken over the next six months as part of the annual business planning process and will be published, in line with past practice, in the Departmental Annual Report 2005. The table below shows a comparison between SR04 figures and 10 Year Plan figures and is an indication of increased resources.

£ billion (cash) 2005–06 2006–07 2007–08 10 Year Plan Progress Report 11.2 11.5 12.0 Spending Review 2004 settlement 11.8 13.4 12.5

(1) Figures show spend within DfT’s Departmental Expenditure Limit, including spend on DVO Group agencies and the Maritime and Coastguard Agency which were originally excluded from the 10YP. Excludes spend on departmental administration and non-cash accounting charges. (2) The ﬁgures also exclude local authorities revenue spending on transport, which is channelled through the OYce of the Deputy Prime Minister. (3) Figures do not include the Communities Infrastructure Fund.

Transport Strategy White Paper:“The Future of Transport” The Committee will be aware that the Department published on 20 July its White Paper on transport over the next 30 years. The strategy is built around three central themes: — sustained investment over the long-term with higher planned spending over the next three years and continuing to grow in real terms through to 2015; — improvements in transport management—adding capacity where it is most needed, and getting more out of the capacity we have; and — planning ahead—sharing decision-making with regional and local stakeholders, making transport decisions alongside those for housing and economic growth. Ev 20 Transport Committee: Evidence

The most signiﬁcant new announcements in the White Paper are listed below.

Road pricing A study into the feasibility of road pricing in the UK was set up last year in response to the publication of Managing our Roads. The study brought together independent experts and key stakeholders to discuss whether a national road pricing scheme was feasible and how it might be delivered. The report (The Feasibility Study of Road Pricing in the UK) was published on the 20 July. The main findings of the report noted that national road pricing oVers huge benefits—potentially £12 billion a year in time savings and reliability gains in Great Britain alone. The benefits come from paying the costs of actual driving, with pricing set according to how busy the roads are. Current motoring taxes do not do this eVectively. The key is how, not how much, motorists pay for road use. Pricing would need to be part of a package of measures which address the causes of congestion and make an attractive oVer to those who currently drive in busy traYc, enabling them to make choices about how and when they travel. The study concluded that national road pricing is becoming feasible, but is at least ten to fifteen years oV. It concluded that it needs a suYcient level of public acceptability, which in turn needs trust in the scheme. The study also concluded that a concerted eVort was required at all levels of Government, including local authorities, to understand the make-up of congested traYc, the right package of measures to address the needs of road users, and the right prices on the roads. The Government welcomed the report. In response to the recommendations we have committed to: — inform the public about road pricing and lead a debate on what would make it acceptable; — seek to build a public consensus on the objectives of road pricing and how to use the revenues; — work alongside forward looking authorities and areas to help them put in place packages of measures which tackle local congestion problems. Resources from the new Transport Innovation Fund will be available to support packages which combine road pricing, modal shift, and better bus services; and — begin a process which would lead to international standards for in-car equipment.

Buses The Future of Transport emphasises our continuing commitment to realising the full potential of buses. In most areas this will be best served by continuing with the current partnership approach. It has been shown that where operators and local authorities work constructively together they can deliver higher patronage and better services. However, we want some authorities to consider a more radical approach giving them more control over bus services in speciﬁed circumstances as part of an integrated transport plan and approved by the Secretary of State. These circumstances include improving buses as part of measures to tackle congestion or where authorities are deciding a new balance between rail and bus. We have also announced we will reduce for all quality contract schemes the minimum period between making and implementing a scheme from 21 months to six months and that we will be issuing new quality contract guidance. The review of bus subsidies has been completed. It concluded that in general the costs and disruption of changing Bus Service Operators Grant would not be justiﬁed. However, where a service is procured under a quality contract we shall no longer pay this grant to the operator but transfer a parallel sum to the local authority for procurement of services. We shall consult Transport for London on implementing this change for franchised services in London.

Better decision making The Future of Transport sets out the Government’s commitment to improving the current arrangements for making decisions on transport. Central to this will be giving regional and local bodies more inﬂuence so that transport provision can be better tailored to local needs and preferences. We have already devolved responsibility for many transport decisions. In London, for example, the Mayor’s responsibilities allow him to prioritise major investment decisions across diVerent modes of transport without reference to central government. Outside the capital the key to better decision-making is seen to be setting a long-term ﬁnancial framework that will help regions come to informed views on strategic choices and investment priorities. Two experimental advisory boards were set up earlier this year to see how they would set about considering regional transport priorities—one in the South East and one in Yorkshire and the Humber. We will be evaluating their eVorts to prioritise spending options within purely illustrative budgets compiled just for this exercise. Their work will inform developing ideas on the possible role and status of such boards if set up across the country. A crucial issue will be how to take account of the potentially wide-ranging views of regional and local stakeholders both within the boards and outside them. Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 21

Detailed proposals will be worked up for consultation later in 2004, with the aim of issuing the first guideline budgets for the English regions alongside the Chancellor’s 2005 Budget Statement. The guidelines will need to identify separately long term indicative budgets within key programmes, potentially including those relating to regional development agencies, housing and transport of regional, rather than national, significance. For transport, this might initially cover budgets for local authority major schemes costing more than £5 million and schemes on the Highways Agency’s strategic road network which are of regional significance. Guideline budgets will be indicative and not a guarantee of funding. The bi-annual Spending Reviews would remain the basis for budgeting. As the process develops, regional and local stakeholder views will be taken into account at each subsequent Spending Review and reflected in funding decisions across diVerent elements of the transport programme.

Transport Innovation Fund The Future of Transport announced that we will establish a new Transport Innovation Fund. This fund will provide incentives for our delivery partners to develop and deploy coherent and innovative local and regional strategies to tackle the challenges of improving mobility and accessibility while minimising the impact on the environment and other people. We know how local traYc and travel patterns can be inﬂuenced to the beneﬁt of everyone, but these policies involve change for individuals, which can be diYcult. We will work alongside forward looking authorities to help put in place packages of measures and support their costs thorough this Fund. These packages will include road pricing, modal shift and better bus services. We will also support innovative mechanisms which raise funds locally. Allocations from the fund will also recognise the contribution that some regional and local schemes make to our national productivity. Mechanisms for deciding the allocations from this Fund, and its size, will be published in Budget 2005.

The Rail Review Another significant development since the Department’s Annual Report was published is the publication of The Future of Rail White Paper. As the Committee will be aware, this White Paper follows the review of the rail industry that the Secretary of State announced in January 2004. Its conclusions are based on analysis of the past and current performance of the railways. It also takes account of submissions from and discussions with key players from the industry and other relevant organisations not least of which was the Transport Committee’s own report on The Future of the Railway. As agreed with the Committee, this White Paper is also the Government’s formal response to the Committee’s report, although the Committee has requested a separate memorandum setting out the Government response to its report by 1 October. The new structure is based on the following six key changes: — The Government will take charge of setting the strategy for the railways. The SRA will be wound up, and its strategic responsibilities and financial obligations will pass to the Secretary of State. The Department for Transport will be responsible for setting the national strategy and outputs for the industry in terms of performance and capacity levels. There will continue to be a crucial role for the independent economic regulator, who will protect the rights of investors and customers and ensure the Government pays the proper price for what it is buying. New regulatory and contractual arrangements will be put in place between Network Rail and Government, to run alongside, and provide the context for, the franchise contracts with train companies. Combined with more robust information, this will enable the Government to act as a strong client to the private sector industry, protecting the interests of taxpayers and farepayers alike. — Network Rail will be given clear responsibility for operating the network and for its performance. With no one organisation clearly in charge, improvements in reliability have been limited, and the railway has not delivered the performance that passengers expect. Network Rail will therefore be given a strengthened role as operator of the network, with overall responsibility for its performance. Network Rail will lead industry planning, set timetables and direct service recovery and will be held accountable for ensuring that the network delivers a reliable service for its customers. — Track and train companies will work more closely together. The roles and responsibilities of each part of the industry will be clarified through new local agreements, and their incentives brought into line with one another. The number of franchises will be reduced and they will be aligned more closely with Network Rail’s regional structure. The industry has made it clear that it is committed to ensuring that these new arrangements drive more eVective working between Network Rail and the train companies in the interests of passengers. They will replace the current confrontational relationship with one based on aligned interests—and will create the scope for closer working in future where all parties agree to it. — There will be an increased role for the Scottish Executive, the Welsh Assembly Government and the London Mayor, and more local decision-making in England. Ev 22 Transport Committee: Evidence

The devolved administrations will take on increased responsibilities for passenger services and, where appropriate, infrastructure. In England, the Passenger Transport Authorities (which manage transport provision in some of the main metropolitan areas) will be able to buy additional services, and to transfer funding between rail and other transport modes. Transport for London will also have an increased role with regard to rail services in the capital. And the Government will promote the role of Community Rail Partnerships in improving the management of local branch lines. —TheOYce of Rail Regulation will cover safety, performance and cost. Bringing regulation of all aspects of the rail industry—safety, reliability and eYciency—together under a single public regulator will streamline the regulatory system, reduce bureaucracy, and ensure that these issues are looked at as a whole, and not in isolation from one another. This means responsibility for safety regulation will pass from the Health and Safety Executive to the OYce of Rail Regulation, and will remain independent of Government and the industry. A better deal for freight will enable the industry and its customers to invest for the long-term. Because of the high up-front investment costs for rail freight, businesses using these services need to be sure about their access to the network. But this has to be balanced with the fact that freight users only pay for the cost of operating their services and not for the costs of the underlying infrastructure. Freight operators will be given greater certainty about their rights on the national network, and a group of key routes will be identiﬁed on which freight will enjoy and pay for more assured rights of access. The Department is keen to press ahead with these changes as quickly as practicable and is developing a process for implementation with the industry and other key players. However, some aspects of this new structure will require primary legislation which the Department will introduce as soon as Parliamentary time allows.

Crossrail Since the Annual Report was written there has also been significant progress on Crossrail. On 20 July 2004 the Secretary of State announced: — his intention to introduce a Crossrail hybrid bill at the earliest possible opportunity; — his intention to change the ownership of Cross London Rail Links (CLRL), the Crossrail promoters, to give the Government greater control during the hybrid bill phase, while retaining a proper stake for London; — an invitation to CLRL to bring forward its final proposals on the Crossrail route; — the safeguarding of the central section on the route, while putting in steps to safeguard the rest of the route; — the Department and HM Treasury would work with the Mayor and the London business and finance community to find a funding solution that is equitable to all parties; and — the publication of the Montague Review’s report into the business case for Crossrail. Subsequently, on 26 July CLRL announced its preferred route as Maidenhead and Heathrow in the west through a tunnel under central London to Shenfield and, ultimately, Ebbsfleet via the Isle of Dogs and Abbey Wood in the East. The route no longer includes a branch to Kingston/Richmond in the west. September 2004

Annex A

DEPARTMENT FOR TRANSPORT—PSA TARGETS

Objective Target Amendment/addition SR 2000 Objective I: protect and Target 1: Improve air quality by meeting improve the environment our National Air Quality Strategy targets and integrate the for carbon monoxide, lead, nitrogen environment with other dioxide, particles, sulphur dioxide, policies across Government benzene and 1-3 butadiene. and internationally Objective III: promote Target 7: Reduce congestion on the inter- SR 2002 PSA target: modern and integrated urban trunk road network and in large Reduce congestion on the transport for everyone and urban areas in England below current inter-urban trunk road reduce the impact of levels by 2010, by promoting integrated network and in large urban transport on the transport solutions and investing in public areas in England below 2000 environment transport and the road network. levels by 2010 Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 23

Objective Target Amendment/addition Target 8: Increase rail use in Great Britain SR 2002 PSA target: Secure (measured in passenger kilometres) from improvements in rail levels in 2000 by 50% by 2010, with punctuality and reliability investment in infrastructure and capacity, with a 50% increase in rail while at the same time securing use in Great Britain from improvements in punctuality and 2000 levels by 2010. reliability. Target 9: Increase bus use in England SR 2002 PSA target: Secure (measured by the number of passenger improvements to the journeys) from levels in 2000 by 10% by accessibility, punctuality and 2010, while at the same time securing reliability of local public improvements in punctuality and transport (bus and light rail) reliability. with an increase in use of Target 10: Double light rail use in more than 12% by 2010 England (measured by the number of compared with 2000 levels. passenger journeys) by 2010 from levels in 2000. Target 11: Cut journey times on London Underground services by increasing capacity and reducing delays. Specific targets will be agreed with the Mayor after the Public Private Partnership has been established. Objective X: Improve health Target 18: Reduce the number of people SR 2002 PSA target: and safety by reducing killed or seriously injured in Great Reduce the number of accidents from work Britain in road accidents by 40% and the people killed or seriously activity, travel, and the number of children killed or seriously injured in Great Britain in environment. injured by 50%, by 2010 compared with road accidents by 40% and the average for 1994–98. Reduce the the number of children number of people killed or seriously killed or seriously injured by injured in Great Britain in road accidents 50% by 2010 compared with by 40% and the number of children killed the average for 1994–98, or seriously injured by 50%, by 2010 tackling the significantly compared with the average for 1994–98. higher incidence in disadvantaged communities. New target: Achieve annual 2.5% eYciency improvements across departments. SR 2004 Objective I: Support the Target 1: The Department for Transport economy through the are developing better measures of inter- provision of eYcient and urban congestion and will publish a new reliable inter-regional target by July 2005. They will also transport systems by making publish annual long-term projections of better use of the existing congestion. road network; reforming rail Target 2: Improve punctuality and rail services and industry reliability of rail services to at least 85% structures to deliver by 2006, with further improvements by significant performance 2008. improvements for users; and investing in additional capacity to meet growing demand Objective II: Deliver Target 3: By 2010, increase the use of improvements to the public transport (bus and light rail) by accessibility, punctuality and more than 12% in England compared with reliability of local and 2000 levels, with growth in every region regional transport systems Target 4: The Department for Transport through the approaches set are developing better measures of urban out in Objective I and congestion and will publish a new target through increased use of by July 2005. They will also publish public transport and other annual long-term projections of appropriate local solutions. congestion. Ev 24 Transport Committee: Evidence

Objective Target Amendment/addition Objective III: Balance the Target 5: Reduce the number of people need to travel with the need killed or seriously injured in Great to improve quality of life by Britain in road accidents by 40% and the improving safety and number of children killed or seriously respecting the environment. injured by 50% by 2010 compared with the average for 1994–98, tackling the signiﬁcantly higher incidence in disadvantaged communities. Target 6: Improve air quality by meeting the Air Quality Strategy targets for carbon monoxide, lead, nitrogen dioxide, particles, sulphur dioxide, benzene and 1,3 butadiene. (Joint with DEFRA). Target 7: To reduce greenhouse gas emissions to 12.5% below 1990 levels in line with our Kyoto commitment and move towards a 20% reduction in carbon dioxide emissions below 1990 levels by 2010, through measures including energy eYciency and renewables. (Joint with the DEFRA and the DTI). Objective IV: Improve cost- No target eVectiveness through sound ﬁnancial management, robust cost control and clear appraisal of transport investment choices across diVerent modes and locations.

Supplementary memorandum by the Department for Transport (DAR 01A)

EVIDENCE GIVEN BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND PERMANENT SECRETARY AT THE HEARING ON THE DEPARTMENTAL ANNUAL REPORT 2004

This memorandum responds to the questions put to the Department following the oral evidence given by the Secretary of State and Permanent Secretary on 17 November 2004. These questions were set out in a letter dated 26 November from the Committee Secretariat to the Department’s Parliamentary Clerk.

1. The Secretary of State promised a note on the penalties and incentives for train manufactures. (Q59)

Contracts for new trains usually include reliability conditions. Their form varies but the commonest types are: — a “miles per casualty” target, that is, the distance the trains are expected to run between breakdowns. Figures vary from contract to contract, but a requirement that trains should achieve 20,000 to 30,000 miles per casualty on delivery, rising to between 40,000 and 60,000 within two years would be typical; — an availability requirement, which may be applied where the manufacturer himself maintains the trains. The obligation is that he must provide a set number of trains, suYcient to run the service, from the maintenance depot each day.

Failure to meet targets of either type will trigger contractual damages. These usually take one of two forms: liquidated damages; or the withholding of a performance bond which becomes payable to the manufacturer only once the relevant targets have been met.

Details of the penalty clauses in individual contracts are commercially conﬁdential. The importance of these provisions to manufacturers can, though, be gauged from the fact that, since 1995, there have been 48 orders for new trains (comprising 4527 vehicles) worth, in total, £4.2 billion. Of that, some £420 million is at risk if manufacturers fail to meet contractual performance targets. Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 25

2. Mr Rowlands described the arrangements for agencies to give the Department their workbooks on a monthly basis. How long have these arrangements been in place? When does the Department expect to produce monthly accounts?(Q88)

Agencies have provided the Department with monthly workbooks since the introduction of Resource Accounting and Budgeting in 2001–02 and with monthly cash-based information before then. These workbooks provide details of expenditure and full year forecasts against budgets. The Department already prepares monthly management accounts and expects balance sheet and cash ﬂow information to be produced quarterly from June 2005 and monthly from December 2005.

3. The Chairman asked about the Highways Agency’s target on non-motorised crossing points. The Committee would like more information about why the target was missed. (Q112–113)

The target was to survey all non-motorised crossing points on the core network and trunk road network for access, safety and convenience. A five-year programme of improvements based on the survey would be developed by 31 March 2003. The improvement programme to be completed by 31 March 2009 and monitored through the Highways Agency work programme. By 31 March 2003, the Highways Agency completed surveys of all non-motorised user crossing points on the trunk road network and drew up a provisional list of improvements, which would oVer good value for money, for implementation by 31 March 2009. The list was not developed into a five-year programme because of funding pressures. As a result an in-year target was not set for 2003–04 and the Agency have since issued a correction to their annual report. Non-motorised user crossings are provided where justified as part of major schemes. In addition, small free-standing schemes are funded from the small schemes budget. Following the recent spending review settlement, the Highways Agency is developing its forward programme for small schemes, which also include high value-for-money safety schemes and junction improvements, as well as environmental improvement measures. The Agency is now unlikely to be able to implement all identified non-motorised user crossings by 31 March 2009 due to pressure on the small schemes budget. However, in developing its Business Plan for 2005–06 to 2007–08, consideration will be given to how best to meet the needs of non- motorised users within the budgets available. Non-motorised user crossing locations will be identified in the Highways Agency’s Route Management Strategies, which provide a framework for considering all potential issues aVecting the management and operation of a route in an integrated manner, so that forward programmes are developed on a comprehensive basis. Progress on delivery of non-motorised user crossing improvements will be monitored by the Agency.

4. The Spending Review 2004 provided the Department with £1.7 billion to cover “immediate pressures” over 2005–06 and 2006–07. What are these “immediate pressures”?

These pressures result predominantly from the rail industry—a peak in renewals expenditure by Network Rail following the Hatfield accident, as well as rising passenger franchise support costs. For future years, infrastructure costs will reduce, both as the current renewals peak passes and as Network Rail work towards the stretching eYciency target set by the OYce of the Rail Regulator in the recent Interim Regulatory Review. Nevertheless, financial discipline across the railway will remain essential. The reforms set out in The Future of Rail (Cm 6233) and embodied in the Railways Bill currently before Parliament, will form an important element in the maintenance of future cost control In addition, changing assumptions about the Highways Agency’s private finance programme have created further public spending pressures. At the time of the original 10 Year Plan in 2000, it was assumed that approximately a quarter of HA’s total capital investment programme would be delivered through oV- balance sheet Private Finance Initiative contracts, with these spread evenly across the years in proportion to conventionally-procured spending. The experience of HA’s first phases of DBFO schemes has, however, shown that these are best suited to the larger investment projects. As these fall in the later years of HA’s Targeted Programme of Improvements (TPI), this means that the public expenditure impact of delivering the TPI is higher than anticipated in the earlier years. Furthermore, the working assumption is now that most strategic roads PFI projects will be accounted for on the Government’s balance sheet. Whilst this does not aVect the overall economic cost of the projects, it brings forward the impact on DfT’s Departmental Expenditure Limit, giving a further pressure on overall spending. Ev 26 Transport Committee: Evidence

5. StaV numbers at the DVLA increased by 22% between 2000–01 and 2003–04. Do you still expect to reduce DVLA staV by 500 by 2007–08? Will the DVLA be able to operate eVectively with 500 less staV given its full work programme? The 22% increase in DVLA numbers in the four years 2001–02 to 2003–04 was a result of a mixture of volume growth, which averaged some 7% in each year over this period, and a range of new statutory and policy initiatives. During this period, the DVLA managed to achieve an improvement of 11.4% in eYciency. DVLA has undertaken a great deal of work over the last 12 months in terms of assessing the full positive impact on productivity of its introduction of new systems and processes, building in continuing growth assumptions and factoring in its planned resources to further policy and statutory changes. On this basis, as it has reported in its response to the Gershon Review, it is conﬁdent that it can continue to provide its services to existing standards with the estimated 500 less posts.

6. The Committee would be grateful for a copy of the review of the bus subsidies referred to in the Department’s memorandum on signiﬁcant changes and developments since the publication of the Departmental Annual Report 2004. The review of bus subsidies started in April 2002 and the Department published a consultation paper at an early stage, in August 2002, to seek views from interested groups. The outcome of the review of bus subsidies was published on page 70 of the White Paper “The Future of Transport” (Cm 6234) in July 2004. Nothing else was published or issued by the Department as a result of this review. The key elements of the outcome of the review are: — Guidance will be issued by the Department to help local authorities and bus operators assess whether Quality Contracts are appropriate in their area. The Department has already issued a draft of this guidance for consultation. — The Department will streamline the statutory procedure for Quality Contracts by reducing the minimum period between making and implementing a scheme from the current 21 months to six months. The Department’s guidance will make clear that use of the minimum period will only be appropriate for schemes with a limited impact on bus operators. — The Department considered a number of options for replacing or modifying Bus Service Operators’ Grant (BSOG), such as relating subsidies to the number of passengers carried or to the distance travelled. The Department concluded that the beneﬁts to be gained from any change are not certain enough to justify the costs and disruption at a time when we want operators to focus all their energy on improving services for passengers. — The Department will no longer pay BSOG, for any routes that are procured under a Quality Contract but instead transfer a parallel sum to the local authority for procurement of bus services. — The Department will also consult Transport for London on implementing this change for the existing franchised service in London. — The Department will review the case for a further round of funding for Kickstart projects, aimed at pump-priming patronage growth, in light of progress with the 18 pilots already being funded. — Rural Bus Subsidy Grant will be retained beyond April 2006 to give continuing support to local authorities in promoting rural accessibility. — The Department does not propose any changes to concessionary fares entitlement, but will look at streamlining the administration of concessionary fare schemes. December 2004 Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 27

Memorandum by the Highways Agency (DAR 02)

IMPACT OF THE SEVERE WEATHER ON THE STRATEGIC ROAD NETWORK Thank you for the letter of 12 January seeking information for the Committee about the impact of severe weather on the strategic road network. I take each of your points in turn below. However, I should ﬁrst explain that the Highways Agency continues to strengthen our extensive activity to keep traYc moving, ensure reliable journeys and provide better information throughout the year as well as during times of severe weather. We are better prepared than ever, having worked closely with our service providers at local level to ensure that we have robust and tested arrangements in place to combat ice, snow and other adverse weather. In addition we monitor closely our performance for lessons learned. We have developed a new partnership with the Met OYce to help us provide road users with the best possible information when they travel in poor conditions. The roll out of the new TraYcOYcer service (see below) will ensure progressively a greater presence on the network to assist road users and we shall take over the responsibility for setting electronic Variable Message Signs (VMS) from the Police. The development of the National TraYc Control Centre (NTCC) has seen, and will continue to see, a signiﬁcant improvement in information provision. The Agency has also been working hard to ensure better co-ordination with the Police, local authorities and other key stakeholders, as well as emphasising the need for road users to be properly prepared and heed weather warnings. Very importantly, the Highways Agency recognises the importance of learning from experience and for that reason we have and continue to be actively engaged with stakeholders in post-incident investigations.

1. The Extent of the Disruption Caused (i) The worst of the winter weather so far, in terms of impact on the network, has occurred in January. I attach at Annex A a table listing each incident that occurred in that month to date, by Highways Agency Area, the cause of that incident, the action that we took and the impact for the road user.

2. Powers to Close Roads (i) The Police currently control traYc on the Strategic Road Network (SRN) and the Agency manages the infrastructure (but see note ii below). In a severe weather context, this means that the Police take decisions to close or control the use of the infrastructure and the Agency takes measures, such as gritting or snow clearance, to keep the network safe and available for use. (ii) However, the Highways Agency is developing a new role to keep the traYc moving to make journeys as safe and reliable as possible. TraYcOYcers will patrol key parts of the strategic road network, attending incidents and assisting the Police, freeing Police resources to concentrate on incident investigation and tackling crime. The Police will retain overall responsibility for major incidents. With the roll out of joint Agency/Police regional control centres and Highways Agency TraYcOYcers, the Agency will start to take control of traYc in this context. For example, the Agency will be taking decisions to close or restrict the use of the Severn Crossing to high sided and other vehicles. (iii) In addition, the Agency provides information to motorists, via its website, the media and on VMS to warn the public of severe weather and to take appropriate action. Where appropriate this has included advising motorists not to travel. (iv) Incidents as a result of severe weather are managed in a similar manner to all other types of incident on the network. The police have primacy and are responsible for co-ordinating the response of the other emergency services, the Agency and local authorities. The Agency’s role in the response to an incident is to: — Reduce the risk of secondary incidents, protect those working at the scene and permit the release of Police resources through the provision of traYc management. — The Agency has established a National TraYc Control Centre that will implement strategic diversion routes (from one part of the SRN to another) and, on the instruction of the police, initiate agreed tactical diversion routes (on to the local road network). — The NTCC will provide car drivers, through VMS, and the media with information on the incident. Information is also posted on the Agency’s website, for those planning to travel. — Assess the damage to the infrastructure and make preparations that any repairs and clear-up operations can be completed as soon as possible after the Police have released the scene. (v) One area that may diVer during severe weather related incidents is the use of tactical diversion routes, where care is required as the local network may be in a poorer condition than the SRN. Ev 28 Transport Committee: Evidence

3. Weather Warnings Received by the Agency (i) The Agency has extensive arrangements in place to obtain good and up to date weather information. (ii) The Agency employs area and route based contractors, collectively known as service providers, to manage and maintain the strategic road network (SRN). A key requirement on these service providers is to obtain weather forecasts and to take appropriate action to minimise the impact of adverse weather on the network. (iii) The weather forecasters use, and our service providers have access to, the Agency’s network of road weather stations called the Road Weather Information System. The data from these weather stations, combined with weather forecasting information, is used to inform our service providers of hazardous conditions. This enables them to determine the type and time of appropriate treatments, eg gritting the carriageway or setting Variable Message Signs. When a treatment is required, the service provider asks the Police Control OYce or Highways Agency Regional Control Centre (now operational in the West Midlands and being rolled out to other regions) to set the relevant message to inform the road user of the hazards eg “strong winds slow down” or “gritting in progress”. As the Agency continues to take over responsibility for setting VMS signs from the Police, and dedicating a resource to this, the accuracy of those messages will improve. This will also ease the burden on the Police. These messages are displayed only in the area aVected by the hazard. (iv) We have 194 weather stations on the SRN. A key component of a weather station is a sensor buried in the carriageway that measures the surface temperature, depth of any standing water or presence of ice. Other sensors mounted on the weather station are typically wind speed and direction sensors, present weather detectors (to report visibility and precipitation type), air temperature sensors and atmospheric pressure sensors. In addition, many of the sites now include digital cameras to enable service providers to see conditions directly. (v) During periods of severe weather service providers often use patrols of the network as “spotters” and CCTV to collect weather information and the state of the network. TraYcOYcer and Police patrols also provide valuable information. (vi) As part of the forecasting service, service providers obtain severe weather warnings from the Met OYce. (vii) Severe weather is classiﬁed by the Civil Contingencies Secretariat at the Cabinet OYce and warnings are either national as part of the National Severe Weather Warning Service (issued from Met OYce HQ) or Motoring Weather Warnings (issued from regional Met OYces). It must be noted that the warnings are NOT speciﬁc to the SRN. (viii) Severe Weather Warnings can be issued as Flash Warnings, which are typically issued up to 6 hours in advance, or as Early/Advance Warnings, which are typically issued 12 to 48 hours in advance. Aside from the amount of notice given, the main diVerence between the two is that Flash Warnings are issued whenever any severe weather is expected whereas Early/Advance Warnings are only issued when conditions are expected to be widespread. A third category, Severe Weather Watch, is issued whenever there is a low risk of exceptionally severe weather occurring anywhere in the UK. (ix) Flash Warnings & Early/Advance Warnings are issued for: severe gales, heavy snow, heavy or freezing rain. Flash Warnings only are issued for: dense fog or widespread icy roads. In cases of exceptionally severe weather Flash Warnings, Early/Advance Warnings & Severe Weather Watches are issued for: severe gales/storms, very heavy snowfall, blizzards or drifting (x) Motoring Weather Warnings are issued for less-severe weather than Severe Weather Warnings and are primarily concerned with adverse conditions aVecting road traYc. They are typically issued up to 6 hours in advance. (xi) A more detailed account of how the Agency responds to these warnings is included at Annex B.

4. Highways Agency Advice to Motorists (i) The Highways Agency employs three meteorologists to advise on the timing and content of weather advice and driver information to motorists on the strategic road network. The meteorologists, from the Met OYce, are based in the National TraYc Control Centre at Quinton, Birmingham over the winter months and work closely with the Highways Agency Press OYce, which operates on a 24/7 basis. (ii) The meteorologists issue daily reports advising on weather conditions for each of the Agency’s 14 areas across England which are posted on the Highways Agency website. On days when severe weather is expected, the Agency’s press oYce issues a press notice containing the details of the severe weather warning and advice to motorists. Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 29

(iii) In 2004 the Agency issued 14 press notices in respect of snow and cold weather, eight for rain, wind and fog, and two for ﬂooding. In 2005 the Agency has so far issued nine press notices covering severe winter weather including high winds and heavy rain, snow and ice. (iv) The press information issued by the Agency is supported by interviews on radio and television by Agency managers who describe the nature of the severe weather, the action taken by the Agency’s maintenance teams to grit strategic roads and advice to drivers in the face of severe weather. (v) The Agency’s press oYce works closely with the Met OYce press oYce to coordinate advice to drivers. Information on severe weather is also available from the Highways Agency Information Line 08457 50 40 30. Each severe weather warning is issued in good time to motorists so that they can receive this information through the media or through our website. (vi) In the case of high winds in Cumbria after the New Year, the Agency issued severe weather warnings on 6,7,8,11 and 17 January to alert the drivers of high-sided vehicles and others that severe weather was expected and Agency managers gave press interviews about the conditions. (vii) Examples of recently issued press notices are attached at Annex C.1

5. Timing and Reasons for Road Closures (i) This is covered in Annex A.

6. Co-ordination with Responsible Authorities in Scotland (i) The NTCC has a formalised relationship with NADICS (the Scottish equivalent to NTCC) for the reciprocal sharing of information on incidents and their management. The Agency’s contingency plans identify contacts within the Scottish OYce and both the Agency’s and the Scottish OYce’s service providers have a good and well-practised working relationship for the management of the roads across the border.

7. Conclusion (i) The Agency seeks to continuously learn any lessons from incidents and other events aVecting the strategic network, as I hope this response indicates. I would like to draw your attention to two areas of activity related to your question. First, we have been closely involved in the de-brieﬁng related to the incident on the A74 close to Mossbank Viaduct on 22 December 2004. The Agency is playing a key part in the work to analyse how the incident was handled and in taking forward lessons learnt. I will share with you key learning points following the completion of that work with the Police and other stakeholders. Secondly, my TraYc Operations Director is personally engaging road haulage representatives on the question of attention to weather warnings and high-sided vehicles. Archie Robertson Chief Executive 3 February 2004

Annex A

Weather Related Road Closures (Full/Partial)—1 January 2005 onwards

Introduction

Variable Message Signs For the severe weather events that aVected the network in January, VMS were set with messages appropriate to the location. The type of messages that can be set to warn of severe weather are: Floods slow down Fog patches slow down Gritting in progress Skid risk slow down Snow plough slow down Spray slow down Strong winds slow down

1 See http://www.highways.gov.uk/news/archive.htm Ev 30 Transport Committee: Evidence

National TraYc Control Centre In January the NTCC processed over 400 Severe/Flash Weather warnings received from the Met OYce, considered the impact on the network and disseminated information to service providers, the media, the Web and the Agency’s Information Line. This enabled our service providers to plan treatment, it enabled us to advise drivers already en-route and enabled those planning a journey to check their route before setting out. NTCC is set up to make extensive use of weather related messages on VMS on a national basis. It works with the regional Police Control OYces and Agency Regional Control Centre to recommend a signing strategy that is not constrained by regional boundaries NTCC is also able to monitor the network by CCTV and ensure that VMS messages are set appropriately and removed when no longer required.

Incidents Around 50 overturned HGVs, 10 closures due to high winds, eight incidents involving fallen trees, two closures due to rain and ﬂooding.

KEY TO AGENCY AREAS Area Region Covered

1 Cornwall and Devon 2 Somerset, Avon, Wiltshire, Gloucs 3 Hampshire, Surrey, Berkshire, Oxfordshire, Dorset, Wiltshire 4 Kent, Surrey, West and East Sussex 5 M25 Sphere (inc associated link roads and stubs and tails in London), Berks, Bucks, Herts, Essex, Kent and Surrey 6 Herts, Essex, Cambs, Norfolk and SuVolk 7 Leics, Lincolnshire, Notts, Derbyshire 8 Bucks, Herts, Beds, Essex, Cambs, Northants, Oxon, Leics 9 West Mids, Hereford, Worcestershire, Shropshire and part of Warks 10 Cheshire, Greater Manchester, Merseyside and parts of Lancashire 11 Warwickshire, Leics, StaVs 12 Yorkshire and Humberside Ports and Motorways 13 Cumbria and parts of Lancashire 14 Northumberland, Tyne and Wear, Durham and North Yorkshire Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 31 use the al. ected. ected. c flows were V V Y s had to use the nly caused slight delays ective and tra c. Media warnings advising V Y ered severe delays (up to one hour) ered severe delays (up to one hour) V V because of the increased journeyOther time. road users not a su Other road users not a because of the increased journey time. su our network to assist the V ecting carriageways. A major County emergency was V NORTH WEST c. Carlisle, together with power cuts and structural damage was Y c was diverted via the compromised. Additionally, more than 200 other trees on HA Y ected the network on the late on Saturday evening 8 January but the clearance and V and A65. 2005. M6, A66, A590, A595, A5092 recovery of vehicles continued well into Sunday 9 January a trees were blown onto or closures. Situation eased so far as rain and wind was concerned Additionally, more than 50 were deployed at 3 further M6 junctions to advise of road incidents on our network. road closures and additional mobile Variable Message Signs under Police supervision. There Road closures were implemented o were no injuries in any of the County. Mobile VMS was deployed on the M6/A74 to warn of overturned vehicles. Most were generator and heating equipment plus provision of sandbags. of lane closures at the present. Assistance was given in providing vehicle, lighting, no full closure but a multitude Cumbria Police HQ and Managing Agent representative was delays to tra For the remainder, there was causing major problems. A Gold control was set up at and re-opened at 11:31. Slight declared within Cumbria as major flooding in Appleby and Junction 43. It closed at 04:15 a A689 onto the A69 and back to property adjacent to roads have been blown down but without Weather Related Road Closures (Full/Partial)—1 January 2005 onwards columns. Tra comments in adjacent between Junctions 44 and 43. network and remove fallen trees where safety was “passable with care” see the M6 S/B to be closed teams of tree surgeons were engaged to systematically cover the trees, routes described as over on the A74/M6 causing hardshoulder or down embankments were left until later. Two overturned vehicles or fallen network. 21 HGVs were blown any vehicles disabled on the carriageway but those on partial or lane closures due to the Area 13 (mainly Cumbria) many of the closures. Police arranged for earliest recovery of 18:25 on 8 January 2005. approx 21:00 and lifted at January 2005. Lancashire. closure but a myriad of considerable disruption over crash cushion or emergency vehicles. Police did the same on significantly below norm and North Remainder of network no full and storm force winds causing we provided protection to carriageway blockages by using quite e Cumbria 44/43. memory, with torrential rain to implement because of the storm force winds. In many cases, drivers not to travel seem to have been Area 13— A74/M6 between Junctions in the area within living incidents on the network. Lane closure was almost impossible to tra to Bowes. Closure implemented at at Penrith to warn drivers. Police contacted media. A69 or M62 as diversion. They Brough. re-opened at 12:05 hours on 4 Bowes and hours on 3 January 05 and between Closure implemented at 23:55 at Penrith to warn drivers. Police contacted media. A69 or M62 as diversion. They HA Road/ 8 Jan 05 Area 13 All parts of Full closure of southbound One of the most severe storms HA Managing Agent crews were fully deployed attending The closures o 6 Jan 05 Area 13 A66 Brough Closed to high-sided vehicles. Strong winds. Highways Agency positioned a mobile Variable Message Sign High-sided vehicle Date Area Location Full/Partial Closure Cause of Closure Local HA Action Impact on Road User 3 Jan 05 Area 13 A66 Closed to high-sided vehicles. Strong winds. Highways Agency positioned a mobile Variable Message Sign High-sided vehicles had to Ev 32 Transport Committee: Evidence ort V e A69 or ered severe V c and delays were Y om Junction 39 was via c built up later in the Y elays. c via the A684 to the M6 at Y ected. V ect. NILO and HA Area Team notified V There was constant liaison withtry Police and to keep closure as short as possible. not a increased journey time. Other road users c Y to escort V c management making Y culties with recovery extended the closure. to minimise the congestion, Police Y cers (HATOs) in the West Midlands and will be Y the site safe, accessible, and clearing debris. Support Unit assisted with tra back onto its wheels, and Highways Agency Incident Highways Agency recovery vehicles righted the HGV country. The M6 was closed from Junction 27. O standard operating procedure for HATOs across the This practice is being used by Highways Agency Tra vehicles immediately behind the scene of the incident). hours. and updated as the incident progressed. delay re-opening, which was finally lifted at 11.55 e and some nearside bridge parapet damage did not Junction 37. This seemed to have little sweeper for this purpose. Some central barrier damage send tra had to be removed and AmeyMouchel provided morning on the approaches to Kendal to When vehicles removed a substantial amount of debris changed the diversion route during the Some di in anticipation of partial re-opening of carriageway. to quantify) were experienced. In an e provided lighting units and lane one closure was put on locked and severe delays (MAC 13 unable and treated as a potential fatal. AmeyMouchel morning, Kendal became virtually grid NORTH WEST exposed Gathurst Viaduct. working environment for Highways sta Weather Related Road Closures (Full/Partial)—1 January 2005 onwards (Continued) hours on 20 Jan 2005 hours and removed at 1045 contacted media. delays (up to one hour) because of the 26 and 27. winds while travelling over temporary closure, therefore providing a sterile between Junction reopened 11.10. blew onto its side in high (an operating method used by the Police to facilitate a hours. 01:15 and 11:55 Closed between second vehicle. injuries became known. Police then closed down scene slight. As tra County Cumbria seriously injuring driver of commenced by Police when full extent of driver’s impact on diverted tra town Kendal. HGV ran into first vehicle removed. Recovery of vehicles had been organised and hours of the diversion, there was little (Tebay). Nearest Following Southbound rigid carriageway once vehicles and loads had been hours of morning, during the first few Junction 38 over by high winds. 39, and attended scene to organise clearance of join M6 at Junction 36. During early just North of carriageway of M6. articulated HGV was blown with closure of Southbound carriageway at Junction the A6 to Kendal then A591/A590 to re- Bowes. Closure implemented at 2235 Message Sign at Penrith to warn drivers. Police M62 as diversion. They su HA Road/ 8 Jan 05 Area 10 M6 Southbound Full closure. Closed 06.30, Unladen curtain-sided HGV Greater Manchester Police implemented a rolling block Moderate d 20 Jan 05 Area 13 M6 Southbound Full closure of Southbound Serious RTA. Southbound Incident Support Unit attended and assisted Police The diversion fr Date Area Location Full/Partial Closure Cause of Closure Local HA Action Impact on Road User 19 Jan 05 Area 13 A66 Brough to Closed to high-sided vehicles. High winds. Highways Agency positioned a mobile Variable High sided vehicles had to use th Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 33 derate ect on V c. Y re only at this c. Y c management, making the site safe and Y carriageway. After the water subsidedreopened the at road 09:30 was the following day, 21 Jan 05. were were full and overflowing onto the accessible, clearing up debris. A Highways Agency Incident Supportwith Unit tra assisted Environment Agency (EA). The EAthat were the satisfied spillage had been contained. Contractor to clear up the spillage, and notified the entered the watercourse. The Highways Agency used a specialist cleaning booms and sand granules. Very little spillage spillage was contained with the deployment of Although the fuel tank had split, the minor diesel removed during improved weather conditions.sign The has subsequently been removed. an Incident Support Unit until the sign could be sign remained in place and this was monitored by NORTH WEST shoulder. these were repaired. down car also on the hard- were deformed/dislocated from their sockets, and problems. not deemed safe for a crane to be deployed so the which resulted in stability have been required. Due to the high winds it was Weather Related Road Closures (Full/Partial)—1 January 2005 onwards (Continued) 09:30 on 21 Jan 05. flooding arose because neighbouring watercourses hours. at base of pole supports, repair but in order to facilitate this a crane would and remained in place for 24 caused damage to the fitting thoughts were to take the sign down to enable the travelling public. near Junction 7. Closed 21:00, reopened A Lane 2 closure was implemented at 21:00. The Roundabout caused by heavy rainfall. the scene to assist with the initial clear-up of water. Bowden Bowden Roundabout reported and an Incident Support Unit attended near Wigan. overturned onto a broken culvert. Barrier damage was such that 20 posts 17 Southbound 08.30, reopened 13.14. the hardshoulder where it fuel tank, which was split and overhanging a delays to tra Eastbound. Closure commenced 16:46 high winds. High winds hardshoulder closure was implemented. Initial location with no adverse a HA Area Road/Location 20 Jan 05 Area 10 M56 near Closure of lane 2 near Heavy rainfall. At 19:58 flooding at Bowden Roundabout was Moderate delays to tra 12 Jan 05 Area 10 M6 Junction 16- Lane 1 closure. Closed High winds blew HGV onto The impact caused severe damage to the HGV’s 10KM (6.2 mile) tailbacks. Mo 11 Jan 05 Area 10 M65 Junction 2 Hardshoulder closure. Large sign blew loose due to On notification of the safety issue with the sign, a Hardshoulder closu Date Full/Partial Closure Cause of Closure Local HA Action Impact on Road User Ev 34 Transport Committee: Evidence minute tailbacks c Slight delays c Slight delays c Slight delays c Slight delays c Slight delays Y Y Y Y Y c to lift the vehicle tailback at peak times Y erent HGV’s. NILO were kept erent HGV’s. NILO were kept erent HGV’s. NILO were kept erent HGV’s. NILO were kept erent HGV’s . NILO were kept V V V V V took place when gale force winds subsided (23:10) instructed a lane 2/3 closure to protect the vehicle. Recovery plastic bottles. Crane failed to upright the vehicle. Police upright and onto the hardshoulder. Vehicle ladened with empty seconded a crane which stood in the tra at facilities in Haydon Bridge. incident to relieve flooding anddrivers assist to in Haydon evacuating Bridge. vehicle Approx 50 drivers temporarily held Slight delays road opened at 09.00am. informed throughout the day about the closures. and when they dealt with di management at all scenes. Lanes were opening and closing as informed throughout the day about the closures. and when they dealt with di management at all scenes. Roads were opening and closing as informed throughout the day about the closures. and when they dealt with di informed throughout the day about the closures. and when they dealt with di management at all scenes. Roads were opening and closing as informed throughout the day about the closures. and when they dealt with di management at all scenes. Roads were opening and closing as 11:00—13:00. NILO kept informed of open/close times. Stannington Village. 30 NORTH EAST Weather Related Road Closures (Full/Partial)—1 January 2005 onwards Darrington n/b) management at all scenes. Roads were opening and closing as 11 Jan 05 MAC 12 M62 (J23-J22 w/b) Partial (Lanes 2 and 3) HGV blown over Receive report of RTA, ISU dispatched to scene. Police Severe delays. 20 mile 8 Jan 05 MAC 14 A69 (Brampton r/bt) Full Road flooded North Pennine Link Group (TMC for Roadlink) attended Diversion along B6318 until 8 Jan 05 MAC 12 M18 (J6-J7 n/b) HGV’s blown over Police, Recovery and ISU at scene along with tra 8 Jan 05 MAC 12 M62 (J31-J30 w/b) Partial (Lanes 2 and 3) HGV blown over Police, Recovery and ISU at scene along with tra 8 Jan 05 MAC 12 A1 (Wentbridge– Partial (Lane 2) HGV’s blown over Police, Recovery and ISU at scene along with tra 8 Jan 05 MAC 12 M1 (J39-J40 n/b) Partial (Lanes 2 and 3) HGV’s blown over Police, Recovery and ISU at scene along with tra 8 Jan 05 MAC 14 A1 (Scotch Corner) Full s/b Tree blown over Tree removed Moderate delays 8 Jan 05 MAC 14 A1 Various HGV’s blown over Police, Recovery and ISU at scene along with tra Date8 Jan 05 HA Area MAC Road/Location 14 A1 (J59-J63) Full/Partial Closure Full Cause of Closure Local HA Action HGV’s blown over Police, ISU and recovery team on scene. Road closed from Diversion placed through Impact on Road User Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 35 in high winds winds MIDLANDS EAST AND EAST MIDLANDS Weather Related Road Closures (Full/Partial)—1 January 2005 onwards Hinckley Nottingham 09:04 8 Jan 05 Area 11 A5 eastbound by Paynes Garage, One lane closed Fallen tree due to high winds Tree removed Minimal 06:25 8 Jan 05 Area 11 A5 near Hanover Hotel, Hinckley One lane closed Fallen tree due to high winds Tree removed Minimal 8 Jan 05 Area 7 M1 S/B Jcn 27 to 26 Partial (lane 1 & 2 closure) Lorry blown over by wind None Minor—as early Saturday morning 19:06 7 Jan 05 Area 11 M69—Marker post 100/2 to 123/9 One lane closed Sign blown on to the carriageway Remove sign from carriageway Minimal 20:40 20 Jan 05 Area 9 A449 at Himley Partial Fallen tree due to high winds Deployed Tree Specialists to remove Minimal 8 Jan 05 Area 7 M1 N/B Jcn 26 No lane closure needed Corrugated sheet blowing around carriageway None Minor—as early Saturday morning 13:20 20 Jan 05 Area 9 M42 N/B Jct 7a Partial Overturned Lorry8 due Jan to 05 high Area 7 Assisted Police with A453 emergency Crusader closure Island Minimal Partial Tree down None Minor—as early Saturday morning Date13:00 20 Jan 05 Area 9 HA Area A435 at Portway Road/Location Partial Full/Partial Closure Cause of ClosureDate Fallen tree due to8 high Jan winds 05 HA Area Area Road/Location 7 Deployed Tree Local Specialists HA to M1 Action remove N/B Jcn 27 exit slip road Minimal Partial Full/Partial Closure Impact Cause on of Road Closure User Tree down on hard shoulder None Local HA Action Impact on Road User Minor—as early Saturday morning Ev 36 Transport Committee: Evidence Bridge re-opened. Cleared 1 Hour after the 20 mins while TMC attended to clear tree. obstructed for approx c reopened on 11 January c Due to the reduced capacity Y Y c restricted to max queue of 5 miles Y ce and HAIL Minimal. One lane was Y er lanes between 18:29–18:49. Speed Minimal. V ce and senior managers provided regular updates and Y interviews to the media. Press O the road could be reopened as soon as it was safe to do so. HA Our agents worked with the emergency services to ensure that maintain public safety. West Tunnel. NILO advised. developed in each direction. diverted through East Tunnel. Northbound Tra Agents implemented standard procedure. Southbound tra restrictions also used later that evening between 19:44–20:02 occurrence and no further action was required occurrence and no further action was required occurrence and no further action was required occurrence and no further action was required occurrence and no further action was required. SOUTH ect of Thurrock Crossing being closed in both directions. M25 tra SOUTH WEST V visibility. by NTCC. regard to the need to smoke reduced Blackwall Tunnel and the A2 using variable message signs set was safe to do so having wind and rain on was diverted in both directions via the pre-planned A13, A102, when the Police declared it Junction 31. E carriageway at such that this was inevitable. This resulted in the Dartford- 10 January and fully Weather Related Road Closures (Full/Partial)—1 January 2005 onwards 2 miles east of Monkton Caravan Park, lane due to wind closures Crossing Crossing Area 1 no weather related Dartford Crossing the M25 anti-clockwise Junction 30 & Junction 2 of the M25. The smoke density was reopened on Monday 21 Jan 05 Area 2 M48 Severn Bridge Full High winds. MA notified NILO and kept NILO informed. This is a routine Road closed for 19 hours. 12 Jan 05 Area 2 M48 Severn Bridge Full High winds. MA notified NILO and kept NILO informed. This is a routine Road closed for 18.5 hours. 10 Jan 05 Area 2 M48 Severn Bridge Full High winds. MA notified NILO and kept NILO informed. This is a routine Road closed for 8 hours. 8 Jan 05 Area 2 M48 Severn Bridge Full High winds MA notified NILO and kept NILO informed. This is a routine Road closed for 18.75 hours. 2 Jan 05 Area 2 M48 Severn Bridge Full High winds. MA notified NILO and kept NILO informed. This is a routine Road closed for 4.75 hours. ! ! ! ! ! 19 11 9 9 Jan 05 Area 5 M25 & Dartford Full Major fire adjacent to Police and Fire Services decided to close the carriageway at Severe. Road partially 7 Jan 05 DBFO 22 A35 Maungate Partial Tree falling across NILO alerted Travel Media, Press O 6 8 Jan 05 Dartford A282, Dartford Full High winds. QEII Bridge closed due to high winds from 00:23—12:40. Our Severe. 1 Date1 Jan 05 HA Area Dartford Road/Location A282, Dartford Full/Partial Closure Partial Cause of Closure Local HA Action High winds. Our Agents introduced Bu Date HA Area Road/Location Full/Partial Closure Impact Cause on of Road Closure User Local HA Action Impact on Road User Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 37

Annex B

THE HIGHWAYS AGENCY’S RESPONSE TO SEVERE WEATHER

1. Introduction There are ﬁve severe weather types that impact on the network: wintry weather (including ice and snow), intense or prolonged heavy rainfall, high winds, fog and high temperatures. The process of predicting the occurrence of severe weather and the management of any resulting incidents is the same but the Agency’s approach to each weather type is slightly diVerent.

2. Extreme Winter Weather (i) The Secretary of State as highway authority for the Strategic Road Network has a duty to undertake precautionary treatment to, as far as is reasonably practicable, prevent the formation of ice on the highway and to also remove accumulations of snow. On behalf of the Secretary of State, the Agency contracts out the management and delivery of the winter service to service providers. (ii) The Highways Agency: — Specifies the service level required. — Appoints Service Providers (Agents and Term Maintenance Contractors) who deliver the Service. — Provides and monitors funding. — Monitors performance of the Winter Service contracts. — Provides strategic winter service facilities, vehicles, plant and equipment. — Provides an integrated road weather system. (iii) The Service Provider: — Plans and delivers the winter service to contract specification. — Provides all labour and de-icing materials. — Provides Winter Service facilities, vehicles, plant and equipment required to deliver the service in addition to those provided by the Highways Agency. — Maintains all facilities, vehicles, plant and equipment provided under the contract. (iv) In addition the service provider is required to: — Prepare, publish and work to a comprehensive and detailed plan for dealing with snow and ice conditions, tailored to suit the individual needs of their specific network. — Achieve a maximum treatment time of three hours for the precautionary treatment of the area road network. — Be capable of delivering a continuous 24-hour service during the winter period of October to April. — Manage the storage of de-icing material stocks. (v) The service is delivered from 150 depots around the network and utilises 457 salt spreaders, 353 snowplough blades (that are fitted to the spreaders) and 26 snow blowers capable of moving between 1,500 and 2,000 tonnes of snow per hour. The usual treatment regime utilises salt and the service providers typically spread between 300,000 and 500,000 tonnes each winter. Other anti- icing materials (urea and potassium acetate) are used on structures that may be damaged by chlorides. (vi) Part of this fleet is held in reserve (in that it is not required for normal operations) and spread around the network such that service providers can use it during severe weather. The reserve fleet will also be moved to where it is moved around the network. (vii) In some parts of the network, service providers are required to make further arrangements such that additional resources can be used, where appropriate, to clear snow. (viii) When severe weather is forecast the service providers will establish an operations centre, called a “snow desk”, capable of continuously managing the Agency’s response, co-ordination with the emergency services and providing information and briefing to the National TraYc Control Centre and Agency managers. Ev 38 Transport Committee: Evidence

(ix) Since the severe weather in January 2003, the Agency has learnt the lessons of the incidents on the M11 and has: — Comprehensively reviewed and updated its winter maintenance procedures. These procedures and service provider readiness have been tested in so-called “snow desk exercises” (the rigorous testing of plans, readiness to respond and the parties’ understanding of their respective and collective roles and responsibilities) and through audit. — Implemented a new approach to providing drivers with information to inﬂuence them about when and if they should be making their journey through improved consistency and quality of the information they receive. Actions include: improved links between the HA and Met OYce press oYces have been developed to ensure messages to drivers on severe weather are consistent; a new winter driving leaﬂet to advise motorists how they can be prepared for winter and severe weather, a dedicated resident meteorologist service, provided by the Met OYce from the NTCC, to provide detailed, road-orientated weather forecasts together with an assessment of weather related disruption. These forecasts and dedicated support will be used in the Agency’s external communications, by Agency staV to manage severe weather events and in TraYcOYcer operations. — Implemented a new regimen of contingency plans and trained service providers and Agency staV on their use. Much of this capability is used for all types of severe weather.

3. Severe Rainfall (i) Heavy and prolonged rain, causing widespread flooding that aVects the road network such as that in the spring of 2001, or sudden extremely heavy downpours, often associated with a thunderstorm causing accumulations of water on the network and poor visibility, can cause problems. (ii) Following the flooding in spring 2001 the Agency has reviewed problem sites and modified drainage or management of the network, such as more frequent emptying of drain gully pots to remove detritus and therefore permit the system to operate at maximum capacity. This often happens in the autumn during leaf fall. (iii) Total or partial flooding of a road is identified either by the Police, TraYcOYcers and service provider vehicles. The aVected part of the network is protected by traYc management and, if appropriate, diversion routes implemented. Service providers can then take appropriate action to remove the standing water.

4. High Winds (i) High winds can aVect some of the Agency’s larger bridges (particularly the “1st” Severn Crossing). In particular they can also aVect drivers of high-sided goods vehicles and caravans. (ii) In particularly exposed areas, where high winds have caused accidents, the Agency has erected permanent signs to warn drivers. In addition, the Agency utilises variable message signs to warn drivers of high winds. (iii) The Agency issues warnings to drivers via VMS and press releases to take particular care through press notices, variable message signs, the HA website and the HA Information Line. We warn drivers, especially of high-sided vehicles, towing vehicles and road users on two wheels to take care.

5. Fog (i) Reduced visibility, particularly when it occurs in patches, can cause signiﬁcant problems for drivers. The Agency’s approach is to warn drivers through electronic signs of the presence of fog. A message “Fog Slow down” can be set either automatically or manually by the Police or Highways Agency Regional Control Centre (as they become operational). On some parts of the network, particularly on the M25, the Agency has installed fog detectors that automatically set matrix signs. (ii) The Agency’s queue protection systems detect traYc speed on 30% of the network and will automatically set advisory speed limits and warning signs. These warnings are particularly important when there is reduced visibility.

6. High Temperatures (i) Hot weather should have no impact on the country’s roads. A range of high performance road surfaces are used that will minimise any adverse eVects of high temperatures combined with heavy traYc ﬂows. These road surfaces are designed to withstand extremes of temperature and have undergone extensive testing. These surfaces have been found to be very durable and have performed well. Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 39

(ii) Of greater concern are motorists caught in congestion as a result of an incident who can require welfare if they are trapped for some time. There are good examples where welfare has been provided and the Agency is working to identify best practice that can be implemented across the network.

7. Climate Change (i) The Agency has been considering the impact of possible climate change on strategic road network for a number of years commissioning the report “Climate Change and the Highways Agency” from TRL in 2001. (ii) Since this time the Agency has been working with the UK Climate Impacts Programme in initiatives related to transport and also contributed to the DfT report “The Changing Climate— Its impact on Transport”, 2004. (iii) The possible impacts arising from changes in rainfall and rainfall patterns have been identiﬁed as being of importance to both the integrity of the road infrastructure and its likely availability for use. In response to this the advice provided in the Agency’s Design Manual for Roads and Bridges (DMRB) has recently been changed to reﬂect the forecast changes in rainfall intensity used in drainage design. A related change will shortly be made to the design of storage facilities within drainage systems following discussions with the Environment Agency. (iv) Work is underway to examine the other weather related parameters that govern the Agency’s operations and the scale and nature of forecast climate change on these. This work will lead to further amendments to the DMRB and other advice as appropriate.

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