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Risk assessment for Water Pipes (RA) The risk assessment will help you chose appropriate materials for your development. If you require any help completing this form please contact Developer Services on 0330 303 0119.
Section 1: Development details Development Name Innovation Park, Medway Development Address Land adjacent to Rochester Airport, Maidstone Road, Chatham
Kent ME5 9SD. Grid Ref: 164727, 574332 OS Grid Reference (mid point) Developers Name Medway Council
Southern Water Reference number Please provide details below of the current and historical use of the site and adjacent sites. If your supporting information has details of the current and historical site use, please reference below the relevant sections of your report.
Part of the site is currently occupied by Rochester Airport (with a grassed runway) and a car park for a BAE Systems unit. The western part of the site is used as storage facilities for caravans, and Area 2 (east) is a car park. The site has previously been part of an aeroplane factory and electrical engineering works. Refer to Chapter 6 of Land QQuality Statement report.
Section 2: Preliminary risk assessment Has your desk study and site walkover identified any land potentially affected by contamination? Yes If the site is potentially affected by contamination but you have not completed any intrusive site investigation please provide details below of the rationale behind the intended pipe selection. If your supporting information has details of the rationale behind the intended pipe selection, please reference below the relevant sections of your report.
Section 3: Intrusive site investigation Have you completed any intrusive site investigation? Yes Have you completed any non-intrusive site investigation? Yes Please provide date(s) when the site investigation(s) was taken
Feb and March 2019
5 Contaminated land Assessment guidance
Section 4: Site remediation Please provide details below of any site remediation (which may include a change in site levels) already completed. N/A Has the PSRAS (Table 1) been completed using appropriate data after remediation? Remediation will not imapct pipe type Please provide details below of any site remediation and an analysis of whether this will affect your intended pipe selection. N/A Section 5: Final use of site Please provide details below of any chemicals (including fuel) to be stored on site and any other future contamination risks which may affect your intended pipe selection. If your supporting information has details of potential contamination risks which may affect your intended pipe selection, please reference below the relevant sections of your report.
The future site use is not anticipated to impact potable water pipe selection. No bulk fuel storage is proposed.
What water pipe materials are intended to be Barrier Pipe used on site? ______
If your supporting information has additional information to support your intended pipe selection please reference below the relevant sections of your report.
Based on the soil data from the SI, as presented in Chapter 9 of the Land Q uality Statement, the petroleum hydrocarbon concentrations exceed the PE and PVC thresholds and therefore Barrier Pipe will be required for new potable water pipes.
Section 6: Risk Assessor Name of person directing the risk assessment Matthew Larkin for water pipes Lustre Consulting Limited, Suite 1, Second Floor Risk assessor's address North, The Fitted Rigging House, The Historic Dockyard, Chatham, Kent, ME4 4TZ
Date risk assessment carried out 08/01/2021
Section 7: Declaration I confirm I have completed this form and provided supporting information in accordance with UKWIR Guidance for the Selection of Water Supply Pipes to be sued in Brownfield Sites. I also confirm that if any further relevant site investigation is needed and carried out, I will be required to submit an additional Risk Assessment for Water Pipes with the relevant supporting information. I understand the failure to supply any of the required information may delay my application being processed. Name Matthew Larkin Company Lustre Consulting Limited BSc MSc MCIWEM C.WEM Contact CSci RSoBRA Date 08/01/2021 Number 01634 75770 Signature Email Address [email protected]
6 Contaminated land Assessment guidance
Pipe selection risk assessment summary Testing must be undertaken on the materials in which the pipes are to be laid – whether existing ground materials, remediated materials or imported capping materials. Please use the appropriate testing data to complete the table below. Please note, if more than one pipe selection is being made, a completed Pipe Selection risk assessment summary is required for each selection.
What materials have been tested to populate the table below? Existing ground materials
Test group Testing PE Metal Laboratory Testing UKAS Maximum Maximum site Locations and depths where required? threshold Pipes/ Detection accredited Y/N concentration at concentration (see concentrations exceed Barrier Pass/ Fail? proposed pipeline note 3) proposed pipeline threshold Pipe depth (see note 2)
Total VOC's 0.5 Pass NOT TESTED, TESTING OF DETERMINAND NOT REQU.
Total BTEX & MTBE 0.1 Pass NOT TESTED, TESTING OF DETERMINAND NOT REQU. Where Total SVOCs (excluding PAHs Preliminary 2 Pass NOT TESTED, TESTING OF DETERMINAND NOT REQU. and those substances marked Risk with * Assessment EC5-EC10 aliphatic and aromatic (PRA) has 2 Pass hydrocarbons < LOD Y < LOD < LOD identified land EC10-EC16 aliphatic and potentially TP116, TP117, TP1288, 10 FAIL 350mg/kg 350mg/kg aromatic hydrocarbons affected by Y TP127, TP129, TP131, TP132, TP107, SA3, SA4 EC16-EC40 aliphatic and contamination 500 2,442mg/kg 2,442mg/kg and BH102. Depths from 0.1 aromatic hydrocarbons FAIL Y to 0.5m bgl. Phenols* (from SVOC analysis) 2 Pass > LOD Y
Ethers* 0.5 Pass NOT TESTED, TESTING OF DETERMINAND NOT REQU.
Nitrobenzene* 0.5 Pass NOT TESTED, TESTING OF DETERMINAND NOT REQU.
Only where Ketones* 0.5 Pass NOT TESTED, TESTING OF DETERMINAND NOT REQU. identified
Aldehydes* 0.5 Pass NOT TESTED, TESTING OF DETERMINAND NOT REQU.
NOT TESTED, TESTING OF DETERMINAND NOT REQU. Amines Fail Pass
Conductivity, (See Corrosive Pass Redox and note 1) NOT TESTED, TESTING OF DETERMINAND NOT REQU. pH Note 1 - Threshold: For wrapped steel, corrosive if pH<7 and conductivity >400µS/cm. For wrapped ductile iron corrosive if pH<5, Eh not neutral and conductivity>400µS/cm. For copper, corrosive if pH>5 or >8 and Eh positive. Note 2 - Water pipes are normally laid at 0.75-1.35m below finished ground level. Confirm pipes at level if no barrier pipe is needed. Note 3 - Also state if liquid free product is present in soil or groundwater
7 Contaminated Land Assesment Guide Developer Services
STAGE 2 DETAILED UXO RISK ASSESSMENT Report Reference: DRA-19-1123
INTEGRITY • PROFESSIONALISM • KNOWLEDGE Project Centre | Innovation Centre Medway
STAGE 2 DETAILED UXO RISK ASSESSMENT: Innovation Centre Medway
Prepared For:
Project Centre
Brimstone Site Investigation 1-3 Manor Road Chatham Kent ME4 6AE
Phone: 0207 117 2492 Web: www.brimstoneuxo.com
REPORT REF: DRA-19-1123 | Revision: 0 Prepared by: O. Brown 16/08/2019 Reviewed by: C.Bull 16/08/2019 Release Authorised by: A. Florence 17/08/2019 Report Issue Date: 19/08/2019
This report has been prepared in line with the specific requirement of the client’s contract or commission. It should not be used by any third party without the written permission of the UXO specialist. In preparation for this report the UXO specialist has obtained information from external, third party sources. The UXO specialist cannot be accountable for the accuracy of such data but where possible will endeavour in insure that only credible sources are accessed. This report has been prepared with consideration to the site conditions at the time of report order confirmation. The UXO specialist cannot accept liability for any subsequent changes to the conditions on site which may have an effect on the UXO risk. The report has been prepared in line with the relevant CIRIA guidance and UK legislation current at the time of report order confirmation. Changes to official guidance, legislation or technical risk assessment improvements could render parts of this assessment obsolete. The report should not be relied upon in the event of any such changes. If this report is to be used at a time in excess of two years after its issue date it is recommended that Brimstone Site Investigation be contacted to carry out a review of the report. The copyright for this report remains with the UXO specialist. No part of this report may be reproduced, published or amended without written consent from the UXO specialist. Project Centre | Innovation Centre Medway
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
RESULT: Brimstone Site Investigation concludes that UXO poses a LOW RISK, LOW-MODERATE RISK, MODERATE RISK and HIGH RISK to the proposed works.
THE SITE: The Site (centred on National Grid Ref: TQ 74484 64452) is located approximately 2.8km south of Chatham town centre, in the Medway area of north Kent. It is bound to the east by Roman Road / Maidstone Road (A229), to the west by Rochester Road (B2097), to the north by Marconi Way, and to the south by a small residential estate fronting Maidstone Road. The Site boundary encompasses Rochester Airport and is mainly occupied by the grass landing field area, comprising two intersection grass runways. In the north, a large carpark and two large commercial buildings are situated between the runways and a small triangle of hardstanding with a narrow road provides access to this area from Roman Road. The southern section of The Site comprises aircraft hangars with smaller ancillary airport structures and a hard-surfaced apron. A caravan storage site it situated at the very southern extent with a former building footprint and the existing Innovation Centre building (with its carpark) to the east.
THE PROPOSED WORKS: The Client’s commission includes for the design of highways, drainage and utilities provision. This infrastructure will serve many plots within The Site which are to be made available for development. The future developments could include buildings up to six storeys in height, which could require piled foundations. In addition, deep boreholes to aid surface water drainage into the ground below the chalk layer will likely be required. Such borehole would be drilled to a minimum depth of 20m bgl.
UXO RISK ASSESSMENT: German UXO: o Rochester Aerodrome was identified by the Luftwaffe as a primary bombing target during WWII. Original ARP records confirm that it was attacked at least eight times between 1940 and 1941. Furthermore, additional raids are known to have affected the wider study area. NB: Original wartime figures state that the wider area experienced a moderate bombing density. o Six of the air raids were small in scale (likely executed by solitary aircraft) one was a medium scale raid involving a group of fighter bombers and another was a concentrated large scale raid. NB: during two small scale raids incendiary bombs are understood to have been dropped on Site also. o Two detailed historical accounts of Rochester Aerodrome describe the large scale raid which occurred during daylight hours on the 15th August 1940. Some 80 medium bombers dropped nearly 300 HE bombs (mostly the 50kg type) on the landing field (central Site), both aircraft factories (northern Site boundary) and the housing estate immediately east of The Site. No RAF fighter interception was made, resulting in accurate bombing. 19 bombs exploded in the factories causing severe damage. Two UXBs were identified and defused within the factories also. NB: this raid alone would have resulted in nearly 30 UXBs (on average). A Luftwaffe aerial photograph taken during this raid shows the north-eastern part of The Site only. Smoke plumes from exploding bombs can be seen on Site and to the east. o It is not known to what degree different parts of The Site would have been accessed during the war. During the heaviest raid, the airfield’s military guard comprised a voluntary Home Guard unit; a part time force not billeted at the airfield. Therefore, it is unlikely that a large force of troops observed this raid. The southern part of Rochester Aerodrome appears to have been vacant during the Battle of Britain, having been abandoned by the pilot schools before WWII. Furthermore, after the August 1940 raid, the damaged aircraft factories were abandoned for the remainder of the 1940-41 Blitz. Therefore, it is conceivable that a UXB could have struck The Site unobserved during the heaviest raid or during the latter small scale raids. Project Centre | Innovation Centre Medway
o Furthermore, all the factory workers appear to have taken shelter in air raid shelters prior to the heaviest air raid commencing and a consequently there was only one fatality. Consequently, during the chaos of this intense bombardment it is quite possible that UXB falls were not witnessed. o The grass landing ground occupying most of The Site would have been heavily cratered during the heaviest raid. As such, there was likely large areas of soil debris on Site. It is conceivable therefore that a UXB dropped during the same raid struck an area of disturbed soil or a HE blast crater. A UXB entry hole within such conditions is unlikely to have been identifiable and probably would have gone unreported. o A UXB entry hole on undisturbed parts of the grass landing field would likely have been observed and reported at the time. However, it should be noted that in June 2019 a live German 50kg HE UXB was encountered during construction works in Kings Hill, Kent. The bomb was dropped during a heavy air raid on RAF West Malling. Historical analysis confirms that the bomb had struck an expansive area of grass surrounding the airfield’s munitions storage buildings. The fact that a UXB entry hole was missed here, in this very sensitive part of the airfield, indicates a similar scenario within the grass landing ground part of The Site cannot be completely discounted. o Some peripheral parts of The Site appear to have been unused and occupied by unmaintained vegetation and woodland during the war. It is quite possible that these areas were neglected. Evidence of a UXB strike here could have easily been overlooked. NB: the diameter of the smallest German HE bomb (which was also the most commonly deployed over Britain) was 200mm; creating a small, easily obscured entry hole. After a time, environmental conditions would cause the hole to collapse and in- fill, erasing evidence of the UXO strike. o The detailed written histories of Rochester Aerodrome do not describe any bomb damage or repair works to the aircraft hangars and other buildings in the southern part of The Site. As they appear to have survived the war on the 1946 aerial photograph and share the same structural footprints on pre- war OS mapping, it is likely that they were unaffected. A HE UXB strike to undamaged buildings would have caused substantial damage and incontrovertible evidence of its incidence. The incident would have then been reported and dealt with at the time. British / Allied UXO: o In 1940 the Short Bros factory and Rochester Aerodrome were designated as a Vulnerable Point and were therefore afforded a defence force; the 33rd Kent Home Guard Battalion, with D and E Companies specifically responsible for Rochester Aerodrome. Pillboxes, numerous slit trenches and roadblocks were constructed / dug around the airfield and airfield defence training exercises were likely carried out. By October 1941 a company of the 8th Battalion, Queen's Own Royal West Kent Regiment (regular army) had garrisoned the airfield. o The presence of ground defence troops at the airfield suggests that ammunition would have been stored on or near The Site and armed troops would have accessed most peripheral parts of the airfield. o Recent UXO finds in England confirm that Home Guard troops disposed of surplus ammunition when they disbanded in 1944 by unauthorised burial and they also buried ammunition caches in tactical locations to be exhumed and used during the anticipated German invasion, in 1940 and 1941. Some caches were forgotten and remain buried. The fact The Site was a defended facility, makes UXO contamination of this type more likely. o This type of random UXO contamination is associated with the behaviour of individual soldiers >70 years ago, making assessment of potential UXO contamination areas difficult. However, any unauthorised disposal of surplus / unwanted ammunition on Site is more likely to have occurred in peripheral areas of unused ground, possibly where dense vegetation provided cover for any such activity. Consequently, the areas of former woodland and the peripheral dense vegetation could be considered as higher risk areas. NB: one of these areas, in the north-east of The Site is known to be heavily contaminated with buried scrap metal, suggesting a possible disposal site. o A 25 yard gunnery range was constructed just within the south-western boundary of The Site prior to or during WWII, however such facilities are only likely to be contaminated with low hazard small arms ammunition. Small RAF practice bombs were used by many flying training units during WWII and Project Centre | Innovation Centre Medway
therefore the pilot school occupying the southern part of the airfield between 1938 and 1939, could conceivably have used these training aids, however this is considered unlikely. Furthermore, such devices only pose a relatively minor hazard. o 27 static HAA gun batteries were constructed within range of The Site immediately prior to WWII. From July 1943 an LAA unit, formed from the 33rd Home Guard battalion, operated nine Hispano 20mm cannons at positions within a few hundred meters of The Site and additional, distant LAA batteries are known to have been within range of The Site. Luftwaffe activity was frequent over Medway for much of the war and therefore, as The Site was mainly soft ground, it is quite possible that an unexploded AA shell could have landed on Site, become shallow buried and gone unnoticed. o During WWII Rochester Aerodrome was defensibly mined as an anti-invasion measure. Canadian pipe mines (50-70mm steel pipes containing HE) were hydraulically rammed into the ground beneath the grass landing ground, in a criss-cross grid pattern to depths up to 4m, but likely shallower. o It is considered likely that most of the mines on Site were removed during 1944. As part of the MOD’s Operation Crabstick, the landing ground was surveyed and nine more mines were removed during 1984. However, three inaccessible areas (beneath hardstanding / structures) within the northern half of The Site have been identified as being locations where pipe mines could remain up to the present day. NB: MOD records recommend that an army EOD unit should return to the airfield if any of these buildings are demolished in the course of redevelopment. o There are also doubts about the comprehensive clearance of all pipe mines during Operation Crabstick. For a number of reasons, mines could have been missed or only partially removed. Recent (post Crabstick) re-investigation by army EOD units at some other mined airfields found that they had not been entirely cleared, while on some sites, more pipe mines were placed than were recorded in the original wartime installation plans, and some were also encountered in the wrong place. NB: as with almost all UXO, any pipe mines left in the ground will only pose a threat if disturbed by engineering works. The Likelihood of UXO Encounter: o Operation Crabstick was unable to clear some pipe mined areas on Site, however will have likely mitigated the risk from pipe mines across the part of The Site surveyed. However, as this was an operation specifically targeted at one type of UXO, it is considered unlikely that any other non-linear (discreet) potential UXO targets detected during the survey were investigated. The large search areas involved in Operation Crabstick would have made investigating every discreet ferrous anomaly a huge job in itself. This suggestion is supported by the MOD’s Defence Infrastructure Organisation. Furthermore, deep buried German HE UXBs would have been buried beyond the detection range of the army’s survey equipment. o Only within the footprints of the few post-WWII constructed buildings on Site will the risk of shallow buried UXO be largely mitigated, as any such devices were likely encountered and removed from Site during initial excavations. o The likely lack of deep basement level excavations on Site post-war, indicates that deep buried German HE UXB could remain in-situ. A shallower, small calibre German HE UXB or AA shell could also conceivably remain within undisturbed soil, in between or below the foundations of the post-war buildings. o The precise locations of any future developments on Site were not finalised at the time of writing and as such, the types and extents of associated ground works were not known. However, it can be said that there is an elevated likelihood of shallow buried British LSA remaining within the Site peripheries. There is an elevated likelihood of German HE UXB remaining across most of The Site. Also, there is an elevated likelihood of pipe mines remaining at three specific locations within the north of The Site. o Planned borehole works within the runway area will be exposed to a deep buried UXB encounter. If pile foundations are proposed for future developments, it should be noted that piling is the engineering activity most at risk of initiating a German UXB at depth, due to the forces involved and the ‘blind’ nature of the intrusion. Project Centre | Innovation Centre Medway
o NB: experience shows that German HE UXBs can also be encountered at surprisingly shallow depths and therefore the possibility of such a UXB encounter during shallower ground intrusions cannot be entirely ruled out.
RECOMMENDED RISK MITIGATION MEASURES: Brimstone has identified elevated UXO risks on Site. The measures detailed below are recommended to mitigate the UXO risk to ALARP level. NB: for fully annotated Risk Maps, see FIGURE 11.
Risk Mitigation Measure Recommended For?
UXO Safety Awareness Briefings Ahead of all intrusive works, within all Risk Zones
Construction phase open excavations (in inaccessible ground or brownfield EOD Engineer - On Site Supervision ground) and boreholes within zones of MODERATE RISK and HIGH RISK
Intrusive Magnetometer Probe Survey Pile foundations within zones of MODERATE RISK and HIGH RISK
Non-Intrusive Magnetometer Survey Ahead of extensive construction phase open excavations / earthworks (optional) within greenfield areas of MODERATE RISK and HIGH RISK
GERMAN UXO RISK MAP BRITISH / ALLIED UXO RISK MAP
LOW UXO RISK LOW UXO RISK LOW-MO DERATE UXO RISK (LSA, AA shells) MO DERATE UXO RISK MO DERATE UXO RISK (LSA, AA shells) HIGH UXO RISK HIGH UXO RISK (pipe mines, LSA, AA shells)
Project Centre | Innovation Centre Medway
CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...... ii Contents ...... 1 FIGURES ...... 3 APPENDICES ...... 3 1 INTRODUCTION ...... 4 1.1 BACKGROUND ...... 4 1.2 LEGISLATION ...... 4 1.2.1 Introduction ...... 4 1.2.2 Construction (Design & Management) Regulations 2015 ...... 4 1.2.3 The Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 ...... 4 1.3 UXO - THE ROLE OF COMMERCIAL CONTRACTORS AND THE AUTHORITIES ...... 5 1.3.1 Commercial Contractors ...... 5 1.3.2 UK Authorities ...... 5 1.4 UXO RISK IN THE UK ...... 6 1.5 UXO DETONATIONS ...... 7 2 ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY ...... 8 2.1 INTRODUCTION ...... 8 2.2 SPRC RISK MODEL ...... 8 2.3 ASSESSMENT STRUCTURE ...... 9 2.4 INFORMATION SOURCES ...... 9 2.5 ALARP PRINCIPLE ...... 10 2.6 RISK TOLERANCES ...... 10 2.7 RELIANCE AND LIMITATIONS ...... 11 3 THE PROJECT ...... 11 3.1 THE SITE ...... 11 3.2 THE PROPOSED WORKS ...... 11 4 SITE HISTORY ...... 12 4.1 INTRODUCTION ...... 12 4.2 OS MAPPING ...... 12 4.3 AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY ...... 13 4.4 ROCHESTER AERODROME ...... 14 5 UXO RISK - GERMAN BOMBING ...... 15 5.1 WWII BOMBING HISTORY OF THE SITE ...... 15 5.1.1 General WWII History of the South-East ...... 15 5.1.2 Site Specific History ...... 16 5.2 BOMBING DECOY SITES: ...... 17 5.3 WWII BOMBING RECORDS ...... 18 5.3.1 Introduction ...... 18 5.3.2 ARP Bombing Density Statistics ...... 18 5.3.3 Medway Bomb Census Map ...... 19 5.3.4 RAF Records ...... 20 5.3.5 Rochester ARP Records ...... 20 5.3.6 Secondary Source ...... 21 5.3.7 Abandoned Bombs Register ...... 22 5.4 LIKELIHOOD OF UXB CONTAMINATION ...... 22 5.5 LIKELIHOOD OF SUBSEQUENT UXB DETECTION ...... 23
Report Ref: DRA-19-1123 1
Project Centre | Innovation Centre Medway
5.6 BOMBING DURING WWI ...... 25 5.7 WWII GERMAN MUNITIONS ...... 26 5.7.1 Bombs Dropped on the UK ...... 26 5.7.2 Bomb Failures ...... 27 5.8 WWII UXB GROUND PENETRATION ...... 28 5.8.1 Introduction ...... 28 5.8.2 The ‘J-Curve’ Effect ...... 30 5.8.1 Site Specific Geology ...... 30 5.8.2 Site Specific Maximum Bomb Penetration Depth...... 31 6 UXO RISK - BRITISH / ALLIED MILITARY ACTIVITY ...... 32 6.1 INTRODUCTION ...... 32 6.2 POTENTIAL SOURCES OF UXO ...... 32 6.2.1 Introduction ...... 32 6.2.2 WWII Airfield Defence Measures ...... 32 6.2.3 WWII Home Guard and Army Troops ...... 34 6.2.4 Weapons Practice Ranges ...... 35 6.2.5 WWII Airfield Pipe Mines ...... 36 6.2.6 Anti-Aircraft Gun Positions ...... 39 6.3 THE HAZARDS POSED BY UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE ...... 41 6.3.1 Land Service Ammunition ...... 41 7 UXO RISK MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES ...... 47 7.1 INTRODUCTION ...... 47 7.2 EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CLEARANCE TASKS ...... 47 7.3 GROUND WORKS ...... 48 7.4 DEDUCTIONS ...... 48 8 CONCLUSION ...... 48 8.1 ACCURACY OF THE HISTORICAL RECORDS ...... 48 8.2 THE RISK OF UXO CONTAMINATION ON SITE ...... 49 8.2.1 Key Findings - German UXO Risk ...... 49 8.2.2 Key Findings - British UXO Risk ...... 51 8.3 SITE SPECIFIC UXO HAZARDS ...... 53 8.4 THE LIKELIHOOD OF UXO ENCOUNTER ...... 53 8.4.1 Introduction ...... 53 8.4.2 German UXBs ...... 54 8.4.3 British / Allied UXO...... 55 8.4.4 Deductions ...... 55 8.5 OVERALL RISK RATING ...... 56 8.5.1 Introduction ...... 56 8.5.2 Risk Tables - German UXO Risk Map ...... 56 8.5.3 Risk Tables - British / Allied UXO Risk Map ...... 57 9 RISK MITIGATION RECOMMENDATIONS ...... 58
Report Ref: DRA-19-1123 2
Project Centre | Innovation Centre Medway
FIGURES
FIGURE 1: Site Location Maps
FIGURE 2: Recent Aerial Photograph
FIGURE 3: Site Plan
FIGURE 4: Historical OS Mapping - 1938
FIGURE 5: Air Ministry Aerodrome Plan - Rochester 1953
FIGURE 6: Luftwaffe Target Reconnaissance Photograph - June 1939
FIGURE 7: Historical Aerial Photograph - circa 1946
FIGURE 8: Medway Bomb Plot Map - Newspaper Article
FIGURE 9: Luftwaffe Raid Aerial Photograph - 15th August 1940
FIGURE 10: Operation Crabstick Pipe Mine Clearance Map
FIGURE 11: Risk Maps
APPENDICES
APPENDIX 1: Recent UXO Incidents and Historical Analysis
APPENDIX 2: Data Sheets - German WWII Air-Delivered Munitions
APPENDIX 3: Data Sheet - British WWII Anti-Aircraft Munitions
APPENDIX 4: Data Sheet - British / Allied WWII Land Service Ammunition
APPENDIX 5: Data Sheet - RAF Practice Bombs
APPENDIX 6: Data Sheet - British / Allied WWII Cannon Ammunition
APPENDIX 7: Glossary
APPENDIX 8: Bibliography
Report Ref: DRA-19-1123 3
Project Centre | Innovation Centre Medway
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 BACKGROUND
Project Centre, referred to hereon in as The Client, has commissioned Brimstone Site Investigation, referred to hereon in as BSI, to carry out a Stage 2 Detailed Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) Risk Assessment of the proposed intrusive ground works at the Innovation Centre Medway site, referred to hereon in as The Site.
1.2 LEGISLATION
1.2.1 Introduction
There is no legal requirement for assessing the risk posed by UXO at UK construction sites, nor is there any specific legislation covering the management and mitigation of UXO risk. However, there are two main pieces of UK legislation that require responsible parties carrying out ground works to undertake comprehensive and robust assessments of potential risks and hazards to their employees.
1.2.2 Construction (Design & Management) Regulations 2015
Construction Design & Management (CDM) Regulations outlines the responsibilities of all involved parties, primarily the Client, the CDM Co-ordinator, the Designer and the Principal Contractor. CDM2015 states that a party has the ‘legal responsibility for the way that a construction project is managed and they are accountable for the health and safety of those working on or affected by the project’. All parties are obliged to:
o Provide an appropriate assessment of potential UXO risks at the site or ensure such an assessment is completed by another party.
o Put in place appropriate risk mitigation measures if necessary.
o Supply all parties with information relevant to the risks presented by the project.
o Ensure the preparation of a suitably robust emergency response plan.
1.2.3 The Health and Safety at Work Act 1974
Section 3 of this legislation covers the general public and other contractors on a site. It states that ‘it is the duty of every employer to conduct his/her undertaking in such a way as to ensure,
Report Ref: DRA-19-1123 4
Project Centre | Innovation Centre Medway
so far as is reasonably practicable, that persons not in his/her employment who may be affected are not thereby exposed to risks to their health or safety’.
‘In such cases as may be prescribed, it shall be the duty of every employer and every self- employed person, in the prescribed circumstances and in the prescribed manner, to give to persons (not being his/her employees) who may be affected by the way in which he/she conducts his/her undertaking, the prescribed information about such aspects of the way in which he /she conducts his/her undertaking as might affect their health or safety’.
1.3 UXO - THE ROLE OF COMMERCIAL CONTRACTORS AND THE AUTHORITIES
1.3.1 Commercial Contractors
If an elevated UXO risk is identified during the Stage 1 and Stage 2 Risk Assessment process, risk mitigation measures will be recommended. Commercial UXO contractors can provide geophysical surveys during the pre-construction phase. Such surveys are designed to identify potential UXO targets which can then be intrusively investigated. Subsequent UXO clearance or avoidance can then be recommended as appropriate.
In addition, EOD Engineers can be deployed to sites before and / or during the construction phase to provide UXO awareness briefings to staff, a watching brief for excavations and reactive response to any suspicious finds.
Having a qualified EOD Engineer on site will avoid unnecessary (potentially costly) call-outs to the authorities when a suspicious item is encountered, as the engineer will be able to identify whether or not the item is UXO and whether or not it is inert or live. If a high risk UXO item is identified the engineer will co-ordinate with the authorities, limiting disruption on site and putting in place safety measures, with immediate effect.
1.3.2 UK Authorities
If a suspected item of UXO is discovered at a UK site where no commercial UXO contractor is in attendance or quickly available, the local Police force will evacuate the site and establish a precautionary safety cordon, which could require the evacuation of neighbouring properties. They will then contact the MOD’s Joint Services Explosive Ordnance Disposal (JSEOD) office.
Report Ref: DRA-19-1123 5
Project Centre | Innovation Centre Medway
Based on the Police assessment, JSEOD will prioritise the incident based on criteria such as the likely type and size of the item and the site’s location / population density in the vicinity. The availability of JSEOD’s resources will also be a factor. If an incident is not given high priority, an EOD Engineer may not be made available for up to two days after the find was originally reported. During this period, a Police cordon would likely remain in place.
On assessing the item, the EOD Engineer may need to widen the Police cordon and order an evacuation of a larger area. NB: for German high explosive (HE) UXB finds in urban areas this usually results in the evacuation of thousands of people and the closure of local roads.
At low profile (usually rural) sites where UXO finds are frequent, for example on former military land, JSEOD’s limited resources will usually require it to recommend involvement of a commercial UXO contractor to manage the ongoing UXO risk. Most UXO found at such sites is small enough to be covered by the commercial UXO contractor’s clearance license, allowing for most, if not all, UXO to be disposed of quickly and safely as and when it is encountered.
1.4 UXO RISK IN THE UK
Fortunately, inadvertent initiations of UXO are rare, however, the legacy of UXO can cause significant delays to construction projects throughout the UK, with associated increases in costs. A list of recent German UXBs finds and examples of WWII UXB detonation incidents can be found at APPENDIX 1. In many cases these unforeseen problems can be avoided if an appropriate risk management procedure has been carried out at the initial stages of the project design process.
Thousands of items of British / Allied UXO and several German UXBs are exhumed by the construction industry and the general public each year, however, the vast majority go unreported in the media due to the potential negative impacts on companies and their projects. NB: the former tends to be smaller in size than German UXBs and therefore pose a relatively smaller threat. In the UK, the origin of buried UXO can be broadly categorised into three families;
1. Enemy Action: - During WWI and WWII the air forces of Germany, and to a lesser extent Italy, bombed targets throughout the UK. The German Navy bombarded several
Report Ref: DRA-19-1123 6
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coastal targets in eastern England during WWI and then in WWII German long range artillery on the French coast bombarded parts of Kent.
2. Allied Military Activity: During WWI and WWII several Allied nations used the UK as a staging area for military action in the European Theatre of conflict; most notably the US and Canada.
3. UK Military Activity: Domestic British Army, Royal Air Force (RAF) and Royal Navy (RN) training activities during peacetime and conflict as well as AA gun and rocket batteries during WWI and WWII.
1.5 UXO DETONATIONS
The effects of a UXO detonation occur extremely quickly and are almost always physically traumatic when personnel are involved. The effects of a detonation are heat, sound, blast and shrapnel. The detonation of a shallow buried 50kg HE bomb would damage masonry up to 16m away and unprotected personnel approximately 70m away. The accepted safety distance for a 500kg WWII HE bomb (with a ~250kg HE fill) is 1,000m.
For a UXO detonation to occur significant stimuli is required; UXO does not spontaneously exploded. WWII-era HE requires a significant quantity of energy to initiate, which is why construction works are particularly vulnerable to UXO. There are three ways in which an item of UXO could initiate:
o UXO Body Impact: A substantial impact onto the main body of a UXO; borehole rigs, piling rigs, jack hammers and mechanical excavator buckets.
o Fuse Impact: Environmental conditions during decades of burial can result in the primary explosives located in the fuse pocket to crystallise and become shock sensitive. It would then take a relatively small impact or friction impact to cause the fuse to function and detonate the UXO.
o Re-starting a Timer: A small proportion of German WWII bombs used clockwork fuses. In 2002 an Army EOD Engineer reported that the clockwork fuse in a UXB re-started. Decades of burial cause substantial corrosion in WWII German UXBs and therefore an incident such as this is extremely rare.
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2 ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY
2.1 INTRODUCTION
This assessment has been produced in accordance with the relevant CIRIA guidelines; Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) - A Guide for the Construction Industry C681 (published in 2009). CIRIA C681 is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information regarding matters of onshore UK risk in the UK.
2.2 SPRC RISK MODEL
The Source - Pathway - Receptor - Consequence (SPRC) risk model can be applied to buried UXO as follows:
Sources: For UK and Allied UXO sources can include; military firing ranges, military bases, military storage depots, munitions factories, wartime anti-aircraft weapons usage, etc. There are a number of ways in which enemy action during WWI and WWII could have resulted in UXO contamination. The source that has produced the most enemy UXO contamination is, by far, Luftwaffe air raids during WWII. This source alone has resulted in a variety of UXO (different types of bombs) each posing a specific hazard.
Pathways: For buried UXO, the pathway describes the activity(s) which results in the hazard (UXO) reaching personnel and / or assets. There are a number of pathways (construction methodologies) which require intrusions into the ground and each has the potential to be a UXO pathway. Common pathways are Ground Investigation (SI) works, Site Enabling Works, Various Excavations (soil stripping, levelling, shallow foundations, services, drainage, etc), pile foundations, etc.
Receptors: On construction sites the receptors are either works specific or external and vary in sensitivity. The former includes site personnel, project specific plant and equipment. The latter incorporates the general public, external structures in the vicinity and environmental receptors (atmosphere, soil, flora and fauna).
Consequence: The consequences of an inadvertent UXO detonation event have the potential to be significant, i.e when they affect human receptors (life or limb). Consequences for non-
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human receptors can be wide ranging and also significant. However, in real terms the likelihood of detonating UXO is far lower than that of encountering UXO. NB: a UXO find alone can still have substantial financial consequences due to project delay.
2.3 ASSESSMENT STRUCTURE
In accordance with CIRIA C681 this assessment addresses the following site specific considerations in the appropriate order:
o The risk that the site was contaminated with UXO; site specific history, conflict history and domestic military history.
o The type(s) of UXO that could have contaminated the site and their associated hazards.
o The risk that UXO remains on the site; post-conflict redevelopment / earthworks and military EOD activity.
o Maximum German UXB pentation depth; site specific calculation if required.
o The risk that UXO may be encountered during the proposed works; the extent of the proposed works.
o Risk Rating Assessment; Risk Mapping if required.
o Risk Mitigation Recommendations; if required.
2.4 INFORMATION SOURCES
In order to carry out an informed and accurate risk assessment BSI has sought information from a wide range of sources. In preparation for this assessment BSI’s Research Team has undertaken detailed historical research, including access of original archived records. The following is a general list of information sources that are consulted during the research process:
o The National Archives, London.
o The London Metropolitan Archive.
o Local Archive Centres.
o The Ministry of Defence.
o The Council for British Archaeology.
o Groundsure Mapping Services.
o Historical Aerial Photography (Historic England, Britain From Above, Bluesky).
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o Google open source mapping.
o The British Geological Society.
o Open sources; published book, articles, web resources.
o Site specific information supplied by The Client.
o BSI’s library and historical database.
o BSI’s ex-servicemen employees (including experienced EOD Engineers).
2.5 ALARP PRINCIPLE
The ALARP (as low as reasonably practicable) principle is a risk principle used in the regulation and management of construction industry risks. The term ALARP originated in UK legislation, namely the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974, which states that risks must be averted unless there is a gross disproportion between the costs and benefits of doing so.
The ALARP principle arises from the fact that infinite time, effort and money could be spent attempting to eliminate a risk entirely. It should not be understood as simply a quantitative measure of benefit against detriment. Instead, a best common practice of judgement, balancing risk and societal benefit.
The objective of a BSI risk assessment that identifies an elevated UXO risk is to prevent a client unnecessarily spending a grossly disproportionate sum of money reducing that project specific UXO risk. For a risk to be ALARP, it must be possible to demonstrate that the cost involved in reducing the risk further would be grossly disproportionate to the benefit gained.
2.6 RISK TOLERANCES
The BSI risk assessment process divides UXO risk into two tolerances:
Tolerable: Negligible Risk or Low Risk ratings are tolerable. However, for some sites, where the risk cannot be completely discounted at the Stage 2 risk assessment stage, it would be prudent to employ relatively low cost proactive risk mitigation measures prior to undertaking ground works. For example, a UXO Tool Box briefing to site personnel.
Intolerable: Moderate Risk or High Risk Ratings are intolerable. Therefore, pro-active risk mitigation measures should be employed prior to undertaking and / or during ground works;
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magnetometer survey and EOD engineer attendance on site respectively.
2.7 RELIANCE AND LIMITATIONS
This report has been prepared using published information and information provided by The Client which were made available at the time of writing only. BSI is not liable for any information which has become subsequently available. No third party liability or duty of care is extended. Third parties using information contained in this assessment do so at their own risk.
3 THE PROJECT
3.1 THE SITE
The Site (centred on National Grid Ref: TQ 74484 64452) is located approximately 2.8km south of Chatham town centre, in the Medway area of north Kent. It is bound to the east by Roman Road / Maidstone Road (A229), to the west by Rochester Road (B2097), to the north by Marconi Way, and to the south by a small residential estate fronting Maidstone Road.
The Site boundary encompasses Rochester Airport and is mainly occupied by the grass landing field area, comprising two intersection grass runways. In the north, a large carpark and two large commercial buildings are situated between the runways and a small triangle of hardstanding with a narrow road provides access to this area from Roman Road.
The southern section of The Site comprises aircraft hangars with smaller ancillary airport structures and a hard-surfaced apron. A caravan storage site it situated at the very southern extent with a former building footprint and the existing Innovation Centre building (with its carpark) to the east.
FIGURE 1: Site Location Maps FIGURE 2: Recent Aerial Photograph
3.2 THE PROPOSED WORKS
The Client’s commission includes for the design of highways, drainage and utilities provision. This infrastructure will serve many plots within The Site which are to be made available for development.
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The future developments could include buildings up to six storeys in height, which could require piled foundations. In addition, deep boreholes to aid surface water drainage into the ground below the chalk layer will likely be required. Such borehole would be drilled to a minimum depth of 20m bgl.
FIGURE 3: Site Plan
4 SITE HISTORY
4.1 INTRODUCTION
Site specific history can be assessed by reviewing historical OS mapping, historic plans of facilities and historical aerial photography. Also, by carrying out additional site specific research where appropriate. Below are descriptions of a selection of records relevant to The Site:
4.2 OS MAPPING
Review of Mapping
Period Map Date Map Scale Review
The Site is occupied by open fields and like today is bound to
- WWI 1907 1:2,500 the east and west by roads.
Pre The southern extent is occupied by Woolman’s Wood.
A Recreation Ground and Sports Ground have been established in the north-east of The Site.
1932/32 1:10,560 Fort Horsted (a military facility) has been constructed just east of The Site. re - WWII
P FIGURE 4: Along the south-eastern Site boundary, some 1938 1:10,560 medium / large buildings have been constructed on Site. An area of dense vegetation is labelled in the north-east.
FIGURE 5: This historic plan of Rochester Aerodrome was produced by the Air Ministry. In the south, The Site is occupied by three aircraft hangars, a - WWII 1953 1:2,500 FAA (Fleet Air Arm - Royal Navy air wing) School, air raid ost
P shelters and a number of small structures, some labelled scrap metal bins.
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In the north, The Site encompasses a number of additional small, unidentified structures and a small semi-circle of concrete. The Short Bros and Pobjoy aircraft factories are immediately north of The Site boundary. The adjacent small structures could be additional crap bins related to the aircraft manufacturing works. The vast majority of The Site is occupied by the landing field, comprising three grass runways. The Site is labelled Rochester Airport. An area of dense vegetation is now marked in the north-west corner. The FAA School is now labelled Works and another smaller 1962/64 1:2,500 aircraft hangar type building has been constructed in the south. The scrap metal bins and all other small structures in the north do not feature here.
Some dense peripheral vegetation lines the south-western and southern Site boundaries. - WWII ost
P Some small buildings have been constructed in the north. 1975/76 1:10,000 The footprints of the two south-western aircraft hangars have been extended.
The triangular hardstanding has been constructed in the north. The Caravan Park is labelled in the south. 1989/91 1:10,000 Commercial development has occurred immediately west and east of The Site.
4.3 AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY
Review of Aerial Photography
Period Photo Date Review FIGURE 6: This low resolution / small scale aerial photograph was taken by a German aircraft immediately pre-WWII.
It shows The Site generally as it appears on the 1953 Air Ministry plan.
- WWII June 1939 Areas of woodland occupy the south-western corner and the north-eastern corners of The Site. Pre The airfield landing area appears to be entirely grass covered. approximately one year after the end of WWII.
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FIGURE 7: This photograph is a composite of three inaccurately aligned images. They were taken approximately one year after the end of WWII. The larger aerodrome buildings are all camouflaged. The landing area is maintained grass, contrasting with some unmaintained grassland at the north-western and western edges of The Site. No visible evidence of bomb damage is apparent on Site. The Site appears as it does on the historic OS maps, A pair of German bomb craters are visible just north-east of The Site, in open ground. circa 1946
NB: bomb craters on active WWII airfields were often infilled / repaired soon after they occurred, to allow flights to continue.
- WWII Two houses just east of The Site have been demolished, with just their ground floor slabs still visible. This is likely the result of WWII bomb damage. Post A small gunnery range is satiated at the south-western Site boundary. This range is typical of the era, comprising a tall wall separated from a firing shelter by a 25 yard range. A row of four (likely) Nissen huts is visible on Site. These prefabricated structures were widely used by the British military during WWII.
The wooded areas in the south and north-east have been cleared. 1960 The triangle of existing hardstanding is present in the north-east.
The Site appears largely as it does today. Although in the south-east, the 1990 two WWII-era hangars and the FAA School are still standing.
4.4 ROCHESTER AERODROME
Rochester Airport was established in the early 1930s as a municipal aerodrome by Rochester Corporation in collaboration with Short Brothers, who went on to produce the RAF’s first four engine bomber during WWII. Initially over a hundred acres of farmland (in mixed arable and pasture use) between the roads from Chatham and Rochester to Maidstone were obtained by means of a Compulsory Purchase Order (9th August 1933).
Three grass runways were established and the first hangar was built at the northern edge of the airfield. Soon after Pobjoy Air Motors Ltd (supplier to Short Bros) built a factory block to the east of the hangar, comprising two engineering shops, a test shop and offices.
In 1937 the Air Ministry approached Short Bros to manage a flying school at Rochester and the airport was extended south almost into the fork of the roads bounding The Site to accommodate this, and to avoid buildings obstructing the north-west to south-east runway.
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No.23 Elementary & Reserve Flying Training School (ERFTS) part of No.26 Group RAF, was established at Rochester in 1938. It took over the new southern part of the airfield, housed in a building just outside The Site boundary. The adjacent Hangar No.1 was built to house the school’s trainer aircraft and later that year a further school building at the very southern Site boundary was completed. This was used to train FAA pilots.
By 1939, on the eve of war, the Short Bros factory had been greatly expanded up to the edge of the Pobjoy factory buildings. Once war had been declared, the RAF and FAA schools were quickly evacuated to Belfast leaving the southern part of the airfield vacant and the north occupied by the two aircraft factories.
In 1945, with the war over, the aerodrome was returned to civilian use and Short Bros left. The RAF training school however returned and used the airfield until 1953, ending Rochester’s military involvement. The factory and airfield were then taken by a succession of firms.
5 UXO RISK - GERMAN BOMBING
5.1 WWII BOMBING HISTORY OF THE SITE
5.1.1 General WWII History of the South-East
In the summer and autumn of 1940, the Luftwaffe targeted the RAF’s airfields and support network with the attention of achieving air supremacy prior to a planned amphibious invasion of south-east England. The resulting Battle of Britain campaign (July to October) resulted in many air raids across England, although these were mainly concentred in the south-east.
In early September 1940 The Luftwaffe changed their tactics and commenced an indiscriminate carpet-bombing campaign over London. The resulting nine month Blitz began on the 7th September 1940 and ended on the 12th May 1941 - one of the heaviest raid of the Blitz. The vast majority of the Luftwaffe units based in occupied Europe were then redeployed to the Russian front.
During 1942 and 1943 a number of small scale fighter bomber raids were carried out against the Capital and towns in Kent, as well as the Baedeker Blitz against Canterbury. Then in 1944 the Luftwaffe commenced Operation Steinboch. This campaign comprised 31 major raids
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against London and other southern England targets, executed by inexperienced Luftwaffe crews, between January and May. However, poor navigation and improved defences resulted in unsustainable Luftwaffe losses. Many formations were broken up by RAF fighters, resulting in numerous random bombing incidents within the Home Counties, including Kent. The final major Luftwaffe raid on the Capital took place in May 1944.
In the summer of 1944, the Luftwaffe launched the V Weapons campaign. The V1 (Flying Bomb or Doodlebug) and later the V2 (Long Range Rocket) were launched from occupied Europe, with thousands falling in Kent. Both carried a large 1,000kg HE warhead and were constructed of thin sheet steel, which meant that any V Weapons which failed to detonate, tended to break up on impact. However, no V Weapon strikes affected The Site during WWII.
5.1.2 Site Specific History
The aforementioned pre-WWII German aerial photograph was obtained by the Luftwaffe and annotated as a target reconnaissance photograph. The image highlights Rochester Aerodrome as a target (encompassing almost the entire Site). It also notes that there were four ‘Flak’ AA gun positions defending the airfield, although the low resolution of the image means their positions are not clear. NB: the adjacent housing estate has been incorrectly identified as the airfield technical site.
The two neighbouring aircraft works at Rochester were producing aircraft and parts for the RAF at the outbreak of WWII and they were therefore considered to be vulnerable to enemy bombing. In preparation, the Pobjoy aircraft factory was camouflaged as farm buildings and a row of cottages, while the airfield itself was painted to resemble fields, with roadways. Furthermore, a number of air raid shelters were excavated around the airfield perimeter and close to the factories. Some, near the factories, were very deep and lined with concrete. There were also networks of smoke projectors installed in the wider area, to obscure visibility in advance of any German raiders.
The airfield was also located relatively close to the Luftwaffe’s River Thames flightpath and would therefore have been vulnerable to random ‘Tip and Run’ bombing incidents. These occurred when German bombers, harried by RAF fighters or caught in heavy AA fire, would
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indiscriminately jettison their bomb loads to aid their escape. Luftwaffe and corresponding RAF activity over this part of Kent was high for much of the war and therefore such incidents were commonplace.
Enemy action records for the Municipal Borough of Rochester list 1,497 buildings either destroyed or severely damaged and 519 civilian casualties (B. Ogley, 1994).
5.2 BOMBING DECOY SITES:
In mid-1940 the War Office began developing a number of Bombing Decoys with the intention of diverting a proportion of Luftwaffe bombs away from the real civilian and military targets. The decoys used either;
o A system of lighting to simulate an urban area or a military airfield’s runway (QL type)
o Deliberately started fires to simulate a previously bombed target (QF type)
o Dummy buildings and vehicles to simulate a military facility
Some 792 static decoy sites were built at 593 locations in Britain. They were estimated to have drawn at least 5% of the total weight of bombs away from their intended targets. By the end of 1941, airfield decoy sites had received 359 attacks compared with 358 raids carried out against the real airfields and by June 1944 approximately 730 attacks had been recorded on all decoy site types. No decoys were operational within a significant radius of The Site during WWII. Rochester Aerodrome was however given its own decoy airfield (designations: Q223A and C102A), approximately 3.4km to the east.
It was originally a 'K-Type' dummy buildings decoy that was constructed as part of the 'M- series' of industrial decoys. It consisted of a full-scale replica of the factory, complete with an aerial tower, dummy aircraft and derelict vehicles. The 'QF' decoy was later built as part of the 'C-series' of civil decoys for Rochester to supplement the 'K-type' decoy. It featured a series of controlled fires lit during an air raid to replicate a target struck by incendiary bombs. The 'K- type' decoy opened in 1940 and ceased operation in April 1943.
Two local residents’ eye witness accounts1 regarding this dummy site were found; ‘it was
1 www.medwaymemories.co.uk
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certainly bombed several time’ and ‘I was in the fire service at Gillingham until 1943 and recall that in 1940 the Luftwaffe pilots were indeed fooled - and wasted quite a number of bombs on it during the Battle of Britain’.
5.3 WWII BOMBING RECORDS
5.3.1 Introduction
The Bomb Census was undertaken by the Ministry of Home Security during WWII to try to provide a greater understanding of the effects the Luftwaffe bombing campaign was having upon Britain and to provide intelligence relating to bombing raid patterns, types of munitions used and consequent damage. The Bomb Census was compiled using information recorded by ARP wardens based in every bombed location throughout the UK.
Bombing incidents were reported to ARP wardens who kept a written record for their area of responsibility in the form of individual incident reports. In larger urban areas (mainly cities) these reports were used to compile bomb census / plot maps. ARP bombing records were gathered by the Ministry of Home Security and used to calculate bombing density statistics for every administrative area in the UK.
The detail and quality of information recorded by the Bomb Census was inconsistent for the early stages of the war, however, by 1941 procedures had been standardised. The quality of Bomb Census information also varied greatly depending on where in the UK the records were produced.
5.3.2 ARP Bombing Density Statistics
The table below records the Ministry of Home Security’s bombing density calculation for the Municipal Boroughs of Rochester and Chatham. NB: the border of these areas passed through The Site during WWII. The western part of The Site also encroached in the Rural District of Malling, however this is a much larger administrative area and therefore the bombing density figure is less accurate. It gives a breakdown of the types of large German bombs reported. These figures were sourced from the National Archives, London.
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Record of German Air-Delivered Ordnance Administrative Area Rochester Chatham Administrative Area Acreage 3,759 4,356 High Explosive Bombs (all types/weights) 295 262 High Explosive Parachute Mines 3 2 Flam (Oil) Bombs 4 0 40kg Phosphorus Incendiary Bombs 5 1 40kg ‘Fire Pot’ Incendiary Bombs 13 2 V1 Flying Bomb 4 0 V2 Long Range Rocket 1 0 Total (excluding V-Weapons and 1kg IBs) 320 267 Bombs Per 1,000 Acres 85.1 61.3
NB: 1kg / 2kg incendiary bombs (IB) and 2kg anti-personnel (AP) bombs were often too numerous to record accurately and therefore are usually not included in the Ministry of Home Security records. However, a second record of bombing figures (B. Ogley, 1994) lists approximately 1,535 and 14 1kg / 2kg IBs falling on Chatham and Rochester, respectively.
This same publication lists 238 HE bombs within the Municipal Borough of Rochester, a lesser figure than given above. NB: the primary source data for this figure is not given, however is likely to be local ARP, as opposed to the national Ministry of Home Security records.
5.3.3 Medway Bomb Census Map
A WWII-era newspaper article (Chatham Observer) displaying a bomb plot map of all bomb strikes within the Medway area was located. A section of this map is included at FIGURE 8. This is a hand drawn, small scale map with few geographical indicators, making accurate plotting of bomb strikes and The Site difficult. Furthermore, this is a secondary source of information with no confirmation of the source data. Consequently, it cannot be relied upon as completely accurate.
Three HE bombs are plotted in the north-west of The Site. A cluster of nine HE bombs is plotted just beyond the western Site boundary. However, a larger cluster of numerous HE bombs is plotted just east and south-east of The Site. NB: part of this cluster appears to occupy the area
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where the bombing decoy site was established.
5.3.4 RAF Records
Each RAF unit active during WWII kept an Operations Record Book (ORB); a daily diary of events at each airfield where the unit was active. ORBs provide a record of any Luftwaffe raids against the airfield in question. All original ORBs are held at the National Archives. Rochester Aerodrome was home to the RAF’s No.23 ERFTS at the outbreak of WWII, however the training school left Rochester during the war years. As such, no ORB for Rochester is available for the wartime period, 1940 to 1945.
5.3.5 Rochester ARP Records An original WWII typed list of air raids recorded within Rochester Municipal Borough, held at Rochester City Archives, was located. This list, entitled ‘Incidents 1939 - 1945’ includes several following significant entries. NB: Kent History Centre does not hold a large scale consolidated bomb plot map of Rochester Aerodrome. A collection of daily air raid plot maps is held, however these are very small scale maps showing the entirety of Kent county and are therefore of little significance.
th o 9 August 1940 - ‘High explosives. Rochester Airport and stadium. Stand damaged. UXB Borstal’.
th o 19 August 1940 - ‘High explosive. Rochester Airport and open fields’. th o 4 September 1940 - ‘Incendiary bombs. Rochester Airport. Casualties, 1 fatal 2 injured’. th o 6 September 1940 - ‘High explosive and incendiary bombs. Rochester Airport, stadium and Borstal’.
th o 16 October 1940 - ‘High explosives. Rochester Airport and Borstal. 3 houses demolished, slight casualties’.
th o 20 October 1940 - ‘High explosive near Short Bros’. th o 8 April 1941 - ‘Parachute Mines. Rochester. Houses demolished and damaged. Shop at Short Bros damaged. Casualties - 12 fatal, 94 injured’.
NB: this record is missing the heaviest raid on Rochester Aerodrome see below.
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5.3.6 Secondary Source
Two detailed historical accounts of Rochester Aerodrome and a detailed historical account of the Battle of Britain bombing campaign in Kent were reviewed (P, Lombardi 2015 - R, J, Brooks 1998 and D, Wood et al 1961). These records confirm that the aerodrome was subjected to one large scale concentrated raid and a small scale raid.
15th August 1940 at 15:30hrs a formation of some 80 Do17 medium bombers approached the airfield. They dropped nearly 300 HE bombs (mostly the 50kg type) on the landing field and both aircraft factories. No RAF fighter interception was made, resulting in accurate bombing. 19 bombs hit the factories. Hangars, large storage sheds, spare parts blocks and six planes nearing completion were destroyed. Production of the Short Stirling bomber was set back a year as key apparatus, tools and drawings were lost. The Popjoy aircraft factory was also hit. Two UXBs within the Short Bros factory were identified and defused.
A Luftwaffe aerial photograph taken during this raid is displayed at FIGURE 9. It shows the north-eastern part of The Site only. Many examples of smoke from exploding bombs can be seen on Site and just east of The Site.
The large number of bombs dropped on this one area during this one raid indicates that the Ministry of Home Security’s bombing density figures are likely missing bombs, as it is known that the two municipal boroughs sustained numerous further raids throughout WWII, resulting in hundreds of bomb strikes. NB: past experience shows confirms that this would not be the first time that the Ministry of Home Security bombing records are inaccurate.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that some UXBs recovered at Rochester Aerodrome were filled with sand (inert). It is possible that this was an act of resistance by conscripted Czechoslovakian workers producing bombs for the Luftwaffe.
4th September 1940 at 13:30hrs a small force of fighter bombers (likely ME 110s) dropped a small number of bombs causing further damage to the Short Bros factory, specifically the east end of the hangar block.
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5.3.7 Abandoned Bombs Register
Evidence of suspected UXB strikes was reported to an ARP warden who in turn reported its location to the local BDU. Occasionally, a combination of factors meant that the BDU had to simply record its location on an Abandoned Bomb Register and leave it buried in situ. The reasons for abandoning a UXB could be; a relatively safe location / position, access problems or a likely extreme depth of burial. Furthermore, BDUs in the most heavily bombed areas were constantly overstretched during WWII and therefore had limited resources available.
The Archive Office of the British Army’s 33rd Engineer EOD Regiment holds an Abandoned Bomb Register for Britain, a copy of which BSI has obtained. Considering the inaccuracy of WWII records the locations included in this register cannot be considered definitive, nor the list exhaustive and some of these Abandoned Bombs are known to have been since recovered or discounted.
The Department of Communities & Local Government also holds an Abandoned Bomb Register for the UK. No Abandoned Bombs are noted either on or in close proximity to The Site.
5.4 LIKELIHOOD OF UXB CONTAMINATION
Several factors govern the likelihood of a UXB actually striking a specific site during WWII. In parts of the UK where detailed bombing records exist it is possible to accurately predict whether any UXBs could have actually contaminated the area of the proposed works. These factors are discussed in the following table:
Density of Bombing
Rochester Airport was bombed during at least eight air raids. Number of Air Raids in Furthermore, additional raids are known to have affected the wider the Vicinity: study area.
Most were small scale (‘Tip and Run’) raids executed by solitary Intensity of these Air aircraft. However, one raid was executed by a group of fighter Raids: bombers and another was a concentrated large scale raid, resulting in nearly 300 HE bomb strikes.
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Bomb Strike Positions
It is not known how many bombs landed on Site. It is likely to be Distance between numerous however. At least seven smoke clouds (from HE bombs) can recorded Bomb Strikes be identified within the north-eastern corner The Site, on the 15th and The Site: August 1940 aerial photograph. Additional bombs fell on Site during this raid and several further raids.
The identity of bomb-sticks (individual bombloads) cannot be Alignment of recorded assessed with the records available. However, it is known that Bomb Strikes: multiple German bombers flew over The Site (whilst dropping bombs locally), raising the possibility of UXBs striking The Site.
Bomb Failure Rate Evidence to suggest that the generally accepted No evidence found. failure rate of 10% differs in the vicinity of The Site:
UXBs recorded in close Two UXBs were located within the factory at the northern Site proximity to The Site: boundary.
5.5 LIKELIHOOD OF SUBSEQUENT UXB DETECTION
Many factors govern the likelihood of a UXB strike being observed either during its occurrence or subsequently. These are discussed in the following table. NB: it should be noted that assessing the precise conditions that existed on a site >70 years ago can be problematic, especially in urban environments where the number of variables is great.
Historic Site Access A UXB falling on a site which was frequently accessed would have had a greater chance of being observed during its descent or subsequently. In frequently bombed residential areas, ARP Wardens carried out post-raid searches for UXBs. The importance of a site or facility is an important consideration. Many factories, gas works, power stations, docks, etc had teams of Fire Watchers tasked with extinguishing 1kg IBs and reporting UXBs.
It is not known to what degree different parts of The Site would have been accessed during the war. The southern part of Rochester Aerodrome appears to have been vacant during the Battle of Britain, having been abandoned by the pilot school before WWII. Furthermore, after the August 1940 raid, the damaged aircraft factories were abandoned for the remainder of the 1940-41 Blitz period, when all subsequent raids occurred on / near The Site. During August 1940, the airfield’s military guard comprised voluntary Home Guard; a part time force not billeted at the airfield. Therefore, during the heaviest air raid on the aerodrome, the whole
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southern area of The Site could have been unoccupied, greatly increasing the chances of any UXB falling here unobserved. Therefore, it is quite possible that during the 1940 bombing raids, most of The Site was not frequently accessed and some areas of dense inaccessible vegetation were likely neglected entirely. Some peripheral parts of The Site were insignificant, undeveloped plots of land and therefore are unlikely to have been subject to specific post-raid searches for delayed action (DA) bomb / UXB entry holes. Anecdotal evidence of a firewatchers position at the Short Bros factory was found. However, during the heavy raid of August 1940, this Bell Shelter near the factory entrance was damaged by a bomb. One of the guards was killed and the other was seriously wounded. Their observation of the aid can therefore not be relied upon. The air raid siren allowed most factory workers to reach their shelters in time. Any Home Guard troops at the airfield likely also took cover in their trenches. The intensity of the raid indicates that most personnel would have likely taken shelter and would not have witnessed the bombs falling. The very northern boundary of The Site, adjacent to the aircraft factories, and the four grass runways were likely searched for DA / UXB entry holes in the wake of the heavy raid on the airfield. Flying at the aerodrome would have been temporarily suspended if a suspected DA bomb entry hole was identified on a runway.
Bomb Damage A type of WWII specific ground cover, substantial bomb damage to a site will have resulted in conditions that would make the identification of a subsequent UXB strike extremely difficult. A HE bomb striking soft ground will have thrown up a large quantity of soil, as well as producing a crater. If this ground disturbance was not immediately repaired, any subsequent UXB strike could have been overlooked.
Following the HE bomb strikes on Site, the craters would have been quickly repaired to allow flying to continue. Hence the 1946 photograph does not show any craters on Site. However, this area is known to have been heavily cratered on the 15th August 1940. As such, there was likely large areas of soil debris on Site. It is conceivable therefore that a UXB from the same raid struck an area of disturbed soil / crater. Such a strike would have likely been unidentifiable, easily obscured in the ground cover. The detailed written histories of Rochester Aerodrome do not describe any bomb damage to the aircraft hangars and other buildings in the southern part of The Site. As they appear to have survived the war on the 1946 aerial photograph, it can be assumed that they were unaffected.
Ground Cover Type The type of ground cover at a site during WWII is significant as differing types will have had differing effects on the visual evidence of a UXB entry hole. Evidence of a UXB strike to manmade structures and hard-standing will have been long lasting and easily identifiable. A UXB strike to dense vegetation or very soft ground (marshland) could have easily been overlooked. In the extreme, a UXB landing in a body of water would have been immediately obscured from view and is highly unlikely to have been accurately reported and therefore recovered. A UXB entry hole on undisturbed parts of the grass landing field would likely have been observed and reported at the time.
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However, it should be noted that in June 2019 a live German 50kg HE UXB was encountered during construction works in Kings Hill, Kent. The bomb was dropped during a heavy air raid on RAF West Malling. Historical analysis confirms that the bomb had struck an area of grass field surrounding the airfield’s munitions storage compound. The fact that a UXB entry hole could have been missed here, in a very sensitive part of the airfield, indicates a similar scenario within the landing field part of The Site cannot be completely discounted. Within the two former areas of woodland on Site and within the narrow sections of peripheral unmaintained grassland and denser vegetation, a UXB strike could have been overlooked. NB: the diameter of the smallest German HE bomb (which was also the most commonly deployed over Britain) was 200mm; creating a small, easily obscured entry hole. After a time, environmental conditions would cause the hole to collapse and in-fill, erasing evidence of the UXO strike. A UXB strike to the buildings that did not sustain damage on Site would have caused obvious damage, resulting in incontrovertible evidence of its incidence. The UXB would have been reported and dealt with at the time.
5.6 BOMBING DURING WWI
During WWI, an estimated 9,000 German bombs were dropped on England and Scotland during 51 Zeppelin airship raids and 52 fixed-wing aircraft raids. The latter only attacked south- east England as a result of their limited range. London suffered the worst of the bombing with an estimated 250 tonnes of HE and incendiary bombs recorded across the Capital, over half of which fell on the City of London district.
The WWI bombing campaign waged by Germany was on a far smaller scale than the WWII campaign, in terms of the number of raids, the weight of ordnance dropped during each attack and the size of the bombs used. When coupled with the fact that most WWI bomb sites have since been redeveloped, German WWI UXB finds are extremely rare.
Furthermore, most air raids took place during daylight hours and as it was the first time Britain had experienced strategic aerial bombardment, the raids often attracted public interest and even spectators, increasing the chances of any UXBs being reported.
A very small-scale WWI Air Raids Map of Britain (sourced from the National Archives) confirms air raids over the wider Medway area. Further research confirms that no bombs fell within the study area. The closest raid occurred on the 3rd September 1917 at 23:10hrs when four Gothas flying east to west bombed Rochester Gas Works (approximately 4.1km north of The Site) and Chatham Naval Dockyard. The risk associated with WWI German UXBs is therefore low and will not be further addressed.
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5.7 WWII GERMAN MUNITIONS
5.7.1 Bombs Dropped on the UK
The Luftwaffe deployed a wide variety of ordnance against the UK during WWII. The design and specific usage of the various air-delivered munitions differs greatly. Some bombs achieved significant ground penetration and are therefore more likely to remain buried in the ground today. The design of each weapon allows an informed assessment of the hazards posed by a UXB. Data sheets on those bombs most likely to be encountered today are included at APPENDIX 2. Descriptions of the various families of bombs are presented below:
NB: the Italian Air Force’s CAI participated in air raids against targets in Essex and Kent during the Battle of Britain in 1940. However, the CAI was a small force, dropping a fraction of the ordnance that the Luftwaffe deployed.
o HE Bombs - Moderate charge / weight ratio: The most common type of HE bombs dropped were the SC (general purpose) and SD (semi-armour piercing) series of bombs. The charge / weight ratios were between 30% and 50% allowing for penetration through multiple floors / basements of buildings and fragmentation of the thick steel shell to create an AP shrapnel hazard. The most common weights were 50kg, 250kg and 500kg. Although six additional models between 1,000kg and 2,500kg were also deployed, ~70% of HE bombs dropped on the UK were of the 50kg type.
o HE Bombs - High charge / weight ratio: Blast Bombs, Parachute Mines or Land Mines had thin steel walls allowing for larger HE charges which detonated above ground, producing a far greater blast effect than general purpose bombs. These large weapons were parachute retarded with a ~40 mph rate of descent resulting in very limited or no ground penetration, depending on the ground cover. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that any unexploded blast bombs remain buried underground in the UK today.
o HE Bombs - Low charge / weight ratio: The PC series of bombs (500kg and 1,000kg) were armour piercing bombs used against heavily fortified defences and deep buried, reinforced bunkers, as such they were not commonly used over the UK. Charge / weight ratios were approximately 15%.
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o Small Incendiary Bombs - sub-munitions: The B1E (1kg) and B2E (2kg) series of sub- munitions were the most commonly dropped bomb of all types. Up to 620 x 1kg incendiaries could be packed into the largest ‘AB’ series cluster bomb canisters, which opened at a pre-determined height scattering the incendiaries over a wide area. These small bombs could fully penetrate soft ground due to their small diameter. The longer 2kg model incorporated an additional HE hazard, in the form of a small anti-tampering charge with a delay fuse. Over 100,000 were dropped on London alone during the Blitz.
o Large Incendiary Bombs - Thick skinned: The Brand C50 A had a thick steel body similar to an SC 50 but contained a mixture of incendiary liquids and Phosphorus. The C50 B was the same size but incorporated mostly White Phosphorus as its fill. The Sprengbrand C50 Firepot bomb also had an SC 50 shell but contained both Thermite incendiary containers (Firepots) and a small HE charge.
o Large Incendiary Bombs - Thin skinned: The Flam 250 and Flam 500 (Oil bomb) models had thin steel bodies enabling them to break up on impact and spread their oil incendiary mixture across the ground. As such they are unlikely to remain buried today. Furthermore, their unreliability resulted in them being withdrawn from frontline use by January 1941.
o Anti-Personnel (AP) Bombs: The SD2 ‘Butterfly’ bomb was a 2kg sub-munition dropped on several British cities and towns. It contained 225grams of Amatol however, had no ground penetration ability and therefore any unexploded SD2s would have been recovered during WWII, unless they fell into water.
o V1 Flying Bombs and V2 Long Range Rockets: In the final year of WWII Germany began using pilotless weapons against England, launched from sites in occupied Europe. Both V Weapons had 1,000kg HE warheads however, were thin-skinned constructions and therefore any that failed to detonate would have broken up on impact, resulting in a large debris field of incontrovertible evidence. As such, there is no risk from unexploded V Weapons today. Thousands landed in south-east England causing widespread damage in London especially.
5.7.2 Bomb Failures
Original War Office statistics record a daily average of 84 large German UXBs (not including
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1kg and 2kg sub-munitions) dropped on civilian targets throughout Britain between 21st September 1940 and 5th July 1941. 1 in 12 of these were Delayed Action (time delay fuses) bombs and therefore exploded sometime later, with the remainder being unintentional UXBs.
By the end of WWII empirical evidence indicated a (generally accepted) 10% failure rate for German HE bombs dropped on the UK as whole. However, it should be noted that this estimate is based on BDU figures collected during the war and therefore will not have taken account of the unknown numbers of UXBs that went unreported, i.e the German UXBs that are found every year by the construction industry. UXBs occur for one of the following four reasons:
o Failure of the aircraft’s crew to properly arm the bombs (charging the electrical condensers) due to human error or equipment defect.
o Failure of the clockwork mechanism in the fuses of Delayed Action bombs.
o Jettisoning the bomb from a very low altitude. Most likely if the bomber was under attack or crashing.
o Fuse malfunction due to a fault during the manufacturing process. This could be the result of accidental faulty installation or sabotage by POWs put to work in German factories.
5.8 WWII UXB GROUND PENETRATION
5.8.1 Introduction
During WWII the Research & Experiments Department of the Ministry of Home Security was tasked with analysing the varying penetration depths achieved by the Luftwaffe’s HE bombs. The Army’s Bomb Disposal Headquarters provided details of 1,304 UXB clearance tasks carried out on bombs which had penetrated undeveloped land (soil). In addition, the Research & Experiments Department carried out their own tests; 24 bombs were dropped into Chalk, under controlled conditions.
Records held at the National Archive include the results of this analysis. Once a pattern was ascertained from the 1,304 datasets, each bomb weight was amplified to produce a table of anticipated bomb penetration depths (below), including both average maximums and
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probable maximums.
Bomb SANDSTONE SAND GRAVEL CHALK CLAY weight (kg) Average (m) Max (m) Average (m) Max (m) Average (m) Max (m) Average (m) Max (m) Average (m) Max (m) 50 2.7 6.0 2.8 7.8 2.8 7.8 3.5 7.7 4.0 9.1 250 4.6 10.3 4.8 13.7 4.8 13.7 6.0 13.1 6.8 15.8 500 5.8 13.1 6.0 17.3 6.0 17.3 7.6 16.4 8.7 19.8 1,000 7.3 16.4 7.6 21.9 7.6 21.9 9.6 20.7 10.9 24.9
As the 1,304 datasets involved broadly homogenous geologies, the penetration depths given above are likely to be different for situations where a bomb firstly penetrates through superficial deposits or made ground and then through bedrock, as would be the case for many locations in the UK which were bombed. Furthermore, some locations in the UK are underlain by geology not included in the table above and therefore informed calculations of bomb penetration cannot be made.
In both cases, the above WWII-era data should be coupled with knowledge of the strength of various rock types to make inferences on likely maximum bomb penetration depths. To calculate a maximum bomb penetration depth for a specific site, one must use a number of assumptions based on the most likely WWII German bombing scenario:
o UXB Impact Velocity: The majority of German HE bombs dropped over the UK resulted from mass carpet bombing raids. These attacks were carried out at altitudes in excess of 5,000m which would have resulted in a 500kg HE UXB impacting the ground at an approximate velocity of 260m/s.
o UXB Impact Angle: Luftwaffe high altitude bombing resulted in strike angles of 10 to 15 degrees to the vertical. It must be assumed that the bomb was stable at the moment of ground penetration.
o Bomb Design: Some larger German bombs were occasionally fitted with “Kopfrings”; a metal ring, triangular in cross section, fitted around the nose of the bomb to limit ground penetration. It must be assumed that no such retarder units were fitted to the bomb.
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5.8.2 The ‘J-Curve’ Effect
During WWII, BDUs reported that most deep buried German HE UXBs were found to be in a horizontal or up-turned orientation. This observation confirmed the presence of the J-Curve Effect. As a HE bomb penetrates the ground, slightly offset from the vertical, its trajectory through the underlying geology curves towards the surface.
This phenomenon can be significant to a risk assessment as the J-Curve Effect results in a horizontal offset from the point of UXB entry. This is typically a distance of about one third of the bomb’s penetration depth. In the extreme, a low altitude attack resulting in a low angle UXB strike could produce even greater horizontal offset, up to 15m.
5.8.1 Site Specific Geology
WWII-era Site Geology
British Geological Superficial Deposit: Bedrock: Survey (BGS) 1:50,000 Clay-with-flints Formation (Clay, Silt, Sand and Seaford Chalk scale Mapping: Gravel) under all but the very south-western edge Formation (Chalk)
An SI report for The Site dated May 2019 was provided by The Client. The following significant information was included:
The Clay-with-Flints Formation was encountered to variable depths of 0.13 - 2.20m bgl up to 0.80 - 8.00m bgl.
It was recorded to comprise locally soft, but predominantly firm to stiff brown locally mottled orangish brown slightly sandy slightly gravelly to gravelly CLAY with occasional cobbles up to 400mm in size. Gravels and cobbles were of rounded flint, with rare gravels of chalk also recorded. Previous SI Data: The Seaford Chalk Formation was encountered from 0.15 - 8.00m bgl, down to the maximum investigation depths of 30m bgl. Its shallowest encounter depths were 0.15m bgl and 0.80m bgl, within the southern and northern parts of The Site respectively.
The formation typically comprised an initial layer of weathered low to medium density CHALK, transitioning into structured CHALK from depths of 7.60 - 15.00m bgl. Numerous Flint Bands were recorded throughout varying in thickness from 20 - 240mm
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5.8.2 Site Specific Maximum Bomb Penetration Depth
During WWII the Luftwaffe dropped many different types of HE bomb. The SC (general purpose) series was by far the most numerous and of this series, the SC 500 model (weighing 500kg) was the largest of the most commonly deployed and therefore this will be used as the benchmark weapon for the Maximum Bomb Penetration Depth assessment.
The presence of two differing natural deposits (superficial and bedrock) under The Site, makes calculating an accurate maximum bomb penetration depth difficult. NB: the empirical 1940s evidence appears to record UXBs travelling through geology of only one type. Each lithology will have had a differing decelerating effect on a HE UXB, both individually and in combination, thereby complicating the estimation of burial depth.
In addition, the on-Site thickness of superficial Clay with Flints deposit varies from 0m to 8m and therefore the bomb penetration depths will vary depending on specific Site location. It can be said that those parts of The Site where the superficial Clay with Flints deposit is at its thickest, will see the deepest maximum bomb penetrations.
Taking into account the above-mentioned factors, it has been assessed that a 500kg HE bomb would have had a maximum bomb penetration depth of 12m below WWII ground level and the average depth of HE UXBs would be approximately 5m below WWII ground level. Theoretically penetration depths could be greater if the UXB was larger, however, War Office statistics confirm that between October 1940 and May 1941 the majority of HE UXBs (>90%) were either 50kg or 250kg, with the 500kg bombs making up most of the remaining 10%.
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6 UXO RISK - BRITISH / ALLIED MILITARY ACTIVITY
6.1 INTRODUCTION
The table below lists all the modern and historical facilities and activities that could have potentially resulted in localised British / Allied UXO contamination in the UK. Those which are relevant to The Site have been discussed in the subsequent section(s).
DOES THE SOURCE HAVE THE POTENTIAL POTENTIAL UXO SOURCE TO AFFECT THE SITE IN QUESTION? Existing or historic Army or RAF Training Areas / Ranges
Existing or historic Military Bases and Other Installations Existing or historic Munitions or Explosives Factories Existing or historic Military Storage Depots Existing or historic Military Defensive Fortifications
Sites requisitioned by the military during conflict
WWII Pipe Mined Locations and Beach Minefields
WWII Light and / or Heavy Anti-Aircraft Fire
WWII Home Guard activity
6.2 POTENTIAL SOURCES OF UXO
6.2.1 Introduction
The wider study area was heavily militarised during WWII, the result of established military bases, an anticipated German invasion of Kent and several defended Vulnerable Points, including The Site. Research has located evidence of British Army (infantry) activity specifically on Site. The most likely potential sources of UXO contamination on Site are described below.
6.2.2 WWII Airfield Defence Measures
The Short Bros factory and Rochester Aerodrome were designated as a Vulnerable Point by the War Office and were therefore afforded a dedicated defence force; the 33rd Kent Home Guard Battalion. This unit which was largely made up of Short Bros workers from the airfield
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and the nearby seaplane factory on the Esplanade. The 33rd comprised eight companies and a bomb disposal squadron. A, B, and C Companies were headquartered at Fort Clarence, with D Company at Fort Horsted, E Company at Fort Bridgewoods, and F Company at Short Bro’s Esplanade seaplane works. D and E Companies were responsible for Rochester Aerodrome.
Although not fully equipped until the summer of 1941, it was well instructed. Its primary function was to engage any enemy landing on the airfield. Pillboxes, numerous slit trenches and roadblocks were constructed / dug around the airfield. Trenches doubled up as air raid shelters and as protected firing positions in the event of an enemy ground or parachute attack. NB: these were established during 1940, after the 1939 German aerial photograph. They were then removed / infilled by the time the 1946 aerial photograph of The Site was taken.
A Client provided archaeological assessment of the airfield identified evidence of a pillbox (defensive fortification) at the eastern Site boundary adjacent to Roman Road. It is likely that more pillboxes were built on Site but have since been demolished. The 33rd Battalion also had an armoured car stationed at Strood. If a siren sounded it was tasked with taking up its position on the bridge off the Cuxton Road.
Anecdotal evidence describing an additional unit of troops accommodated on the airfield in military Nissen huts near the north-eastern entrance, was found. This is supported by visible evidence of four such huts in that location on the 1946 aerial photograph.
In May 1941, South-Eastern Command sought to immobilize the aerodrome and transfer the present guard elsewhere. With Short Bros manufacturing dispersed to other parts of Britain, the airfield was only home to an RAF communication flight comprising three light aircraft. By mid-1941 the RAF flight had departed along with much of the military guard. By October 1941 a company of the 8th Battalion, Queen's Own Royal West Kent Regiment had garrisoned the airfield and Short aircraft production resumed the following year.
The presence of ground defence troops at the airfield suggests that ammunition would have been stored on or near The Site. Furthermore, as a designated Emergency Landing Ground, Rochester also had facilities for refuelling and rearmament of fighter aircraft. Therefore, it can be assumed that machine gun ammunition for RAF fighters was stored here.
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6.2.3 WWII Home Guard and Army Troops
The Home Guard, originally the Local Defence Volunteers, was formed in the summer of 1940. It was a volunteer force comprising men who were either too young, too old, or in reserved occupations (those jobs vital to the war effort). Battalions were established in most urban areas and some large organisations (such as railway networks) created their own platoons.
Their main purpose was to bolster regular Army units in the event of German invasion. By the end of June 1940, over one million had signed up. Initially, only shotguns, old hunting rifles, bayonets, knives and an array of improvised weapons were available, however by mid WWII, conventional weapons were available and some were even designed specifically for the Home Guard; such as SIP grenades (Molotov Cocktails) and the Northover anti-tank Projector. Furthermore, ammunition in very short supply during 1940 became more readily available.
Home Guard units had a variety of responsibilities; road patrols, manning Observation Posts at commanding points, reporting on enemy airborne landings, delaying the enemy at specified road-blocks, and organising mobile fighting patrols to harry the enemy.
Although detailed information of Home Guard activity on Site is lacking, it is known that these troops often carried out training exercises at airfields in collaboration with local regular army units. Such exercises usually involved a mock attack by one group, to test the defences of the defending group. Such exercises would be judged by a number of umpires, usually experienced RAF and / or army officers. Such training usually involved blank (inert) ammunition and the use of battle simulants such as smoke grenades.
During WWII there was an ill disciplined ‘out of sight out of mind’ culture in the army and particularly the Home Guard (a volunteer force). It would appear that faulty or partially spent ammunition was sometimes discarded in seemingly random locations, on civilian land, becoming buried over time.
Recent UXO finds confirm that soldiers in the home defence role purposefully buried caches of ammunition in tactical locations to be used in event of a German invasion. These weapons pits were frequently dug along defensive stop-lines and around the defended perimeters of Vulnerable Points, such as Rochester Aerodrome. These unmapped positions were sometimes
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forgotten about, resulting in UXO contamination. Similarly, there are examples of surplus (boxed) ammunition apparently buried as a hassle-free means of disposal, likely when the Home Guard was disbanded in 1944. As a defended area, there is the possibility of such UXO contamination on Site.
Any unauthorised disposal of surplus / unwanted ammunition on Site is more likely to have occurred in peripheral areas of unused ground, possibly where dense vegetation provided cover, concealing such activity. Consequently, the areas of former woodland on Site and the peripheral areas of dense vegetation could be considered as higher risk areas. NB: one of these areas, to the rear of the north-eastern Nissen Huts, is known to be heavily contaminated with buried scrap metal, suggesting a possible disposal site.
6.2.4 Weapons Practice Ranges
Military airfields home to a ground defence unit usually had a simple firing range on site. This range was continually used by troops to practice firing small arms (pistols, rifles, sub-machine guns) and to train with heavier machine guns if they became available, during the latter war years.
In addition, some airfields with training units used open ground within or adjacent to the airfield perimeter for low altitude practice bombing, using small RAF practice bombs which had spotting charges. The RAF’s standard practice bombs were small and relatively insignificant and therefore any that did not function as designed (penetrating soft ground) are unlikely to have been retrieved. As such, unexploded practice bomb contamination is a possibility at any such locations.
Potential contamination in and around practice ranges could include unexploded practice bombs, partially spent practice bombs, live / fused rounds (20mm calibre), unspent .303” and 9mm bullets, heavy metals contamination (Lead, Antimony, Barium, Copper), explosive propellant residues, and spent cartridges. NB: 303” and 9mm calibre ammunition was unfused solid shot and therefore poses little hazard.
A 25 yard gunnery range was constructed just within the south-western boundary of The Site prior to or during WWII. However, no evidence of the No.23 ERFTS engaging in practice
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bombing between 1938 and 1939 was found.
6.2.5 WWII Airfield Pipe Mines
Introduction
At the beginning of WWII, during the period of anticipated enemy invasion, a solution was sought to deny the use of RAF runways to enemy gliders and transport aircraft in the event of a German airborne attack, and so the Canadian Pipe Mine was devised by the 1st Canadian Tunnelling Company.
The Canadian pipe mines used during WWII comprised 50-70mm steel pipes inserted into the ground using hydraulic pipe pushing equipment. They were laid in a criss-cross pattern, mainly under the concrete runways / grass flying fields of RAF airfields, between 1.8 and 4m beneath the surface. They were subsequently filled with Gelignite explosive.
Only nine airfields were identified for mining initially but this rose to include other locations and by the end of 1942, after the threat of invasion had receded, 30 locations were mined, not all of them airfields. It is estimated that over 40,000ft of pipe mines were installed.
During the war some of the pipe mines were made safe and removed because of the deterioration of the explosive filler but most were left in-situ. After the war Canadian engineers were tasked with removal but this was never completed in full. NB: during this period one clearance effort resulted in an inadvertent explosion and the death of a Ukrainian worker.
In 1981 WWII documents relating to pipe mined airfields were re-investigated by an Army EOD unit (33 Regiment, Royal Engineers) tasked with the clearance of all remaining airfield pipe mines in the UK - Operation Crabstick. However, Operation Crabstick did not always provide complete clearance of all pipe mines at the former airfield.
Recent (post Crabstick) re-investigation by Army EOD units at some former airfields found that they had not been entirely cleared of pipe mines while on some sites, more pipe mines were placed than were recorded in the original wartime installation plans, and some were also encountered in the wrong place.
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Rochester Aerodrome
The National Archives has recently (July 2019) declassified six historic MOD files comprising hundreds of pages of Operation Crabstick correspondence between 33 Regiment and various (civilian) interested parties. However, all the files contained detailed information relating to the EOD operations at six other airfields, not Rochester.
Several mentions of Rochester having previously been worked on were however included. It would appear that these documents were produced subsequent to the Operation Crabstick clearance operation at Rochester. These files contain correspondence confirming that a EOD reconnaissance of Rochester Airfield was conducted in January 1984 and the resulting clearance task was completed by July 1984. Another document listing the results of Operation Crabstick states that nine pipe mines were located and subsequently destroyed at Rochester. It also states that the airfield was cleared to practical limits.
An MOD letter dated June 1989 states that 33 Regiment have, quote; ‘checked the site except for those areas covered by buildings, concrete, roads, etc and a number of pipes were found. All have been safely removed’. The MOD cannot rule out the possibility that pipe mines reside beneath any of the inaccessible areas and therefore recommend that an Army EOD unit returns to the airfield if any buildings are demolished in the course of redevelopment.
Operation Crabstick documents relating to Rochester were also provided by The Client. A map of the airfield illustrating the positions of WWII pipe mines is displayed at FIGURE 10. This map shows the area searched / cleared (red shading) by the EOD team in 1984. It also shows some pipe mines extending beyond the clearance area, under hardstanding or buildings.
There is a darker shaded rectangular area in the north-east of The Site which the key identifies as an area of buried scrap metal that could not be surveyed accurately due to the interference caused by this concentration of inert ferrous material. However, this area does not appear to have a pipe mine mapped beneath it.
It should be noted that the quality of the map is poor. There could be a second area contaminated with domestic scrap metal following the alignment of an east / west pipe mine through the centre of The Site, as this could be the same aforementioned darker shading. It is
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ambiguous, although unlikely to be a local of scrap metal dumping, as it was part of the runways.
Case Study - RAF Manston
MOD records indicate that RAF Manston was pipe mined during WWII and the airfield was given a Class I Clearance Certificate after WWII, confirming that all mines were accounted for during the 1940s. However, during Operation Crabstick 34 pipe mines were recovered from the airfield.
Then between April and August 2001, four filled pipe mines and three empty pipe mines were recovered during two separate army EOD tasks at the airfield. It is understood that these were not planned EOD tasks but reactive tasks. Furthermore, in March 2019 pipe mines were again unearthed at Manston Airport. This confirms that Operation Crabstick did not provide complete clearance of all pipe mines at the WWII airfield. NB: it is not known whether these recent pipe mines were known to Operation Crabstick and inaccessible at the time or whether they were missed during Operation Crabstick.
Case Study - HMS Daedalus
The original pipe mine plan for this airfield recorded 265 mines laid out in 13 rows. During Operation Crabstick, the Royal Engineers cleared a total of 14 mines, nine of which matched the original map layout. Five were found were unexpected / unrecorded.
A subsequent army EOD operation carried out between September and October 2006 identified a further 20 pipe mines, four of which did not correspond to the original plan either. Some were still live and had to be destroyed in-situ. Anecdotal wartime evidence suggests that a second team of Canadian engineers may have been tasked with filling in any gaps left in the original layout during WWII, but the plan was not updated to take account of these additional mines.
In November 2017 another pipe mine was discovered by a contractor during construction works on a new substation at Swordfish Business Park within the perimeter of the former airfield.
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Case Study - RAF Hawkinge
Operation Crabstick documents confirm that this airfield was also given a Class I Clearance Certificate after WWII, confirming that all mines were accounted for during the 1940s. However, Operation Crabstick recovered and destroyed one pipe mine at RAF Hawkinge.
Then in November 2000, a commercial UXO risk company similar to BSI were contracted to provide EOD support to construction works at a site within the former RAF perimeter. During these works a number of pipe mines were encountered.
Discussion
It is considered likely that most of the mines on Site were removed during 1944. Nine more mines were removed during 1984, however three inaccessible areas within the northern half of The Site have been identified as being locations where pipe mines could remain up to the present day.
Furthermore, the possibility cannot be discounted that the original Rochester Aerodrome pipe mine map is incomplete / inaccurate, based on confirmed inconsistencies at other airfields. It is conceivable that other parts of The Site not surveyed during Operation Crabstick are also contaminated with pipe mines. Although, during WWII most of this land was developed and therefore could not have been easily mined.
BSI contacted the MOD’s Defence Infrastructure Organisation for comment relating to Operation Crabstick. It is understood that the technique for removing mines during Operation Crabstick was to attach one end to a tractor to pull them out of the ground. Some mines were very long and by the 1980s were heavily corroded. Therefore, in theory it is conceivable that a mine could have broken up on removal, leaving part of the mine buried in the ground.
6.2.6 Anti-Aircraft Gun Positions
LAA Guns: British and American airfields were all defended by light anti-aircraft (AA) batteries (as a minimum). LAA guns were usually dispersed around the airfield in isolated positions and were intended to engage the fast, low flying German dive bombers that targeted airfields. At first, army units on airfield ground defence duty were largely responsible and would have
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manned WWI-era Lewis machine guns or Bren (machine) guns in simple machine gun nests. However, by 1942 with the establishment of the RAF Regiment, larger calibre autocannons such as the Hispano 20mm and later, in 1943, Bofors 40mm guns were made available.
The Hispano could fire up to 700 rounds per minute and the Bofors could fire between 120 and 330 shells per minute. Each shell was designed to self-destruct if it didn’t strike an aircraft, however, inevitably some failed and fell back to earth.
HAA Guns: Large calibre guns (3.7” and 4.5”) for engaging high altitude bomber formations. Hundreds of permanent batteries were constructed in and around major cities and military bases during the 1930s. Some 2,000 of these guns were available during the Blitz. Each gun could fire between 10 and 20 rounds per minute and consequently HAA batteries could expend large quantities of shells during each engagement. Some airfields would have been in range of HAA batteries protecting local urban areas. Unexploded HAA shells could reach to 1.5m / 2.0m depth in soft ground.
Site Specific: 27 static HAA batteries were constructed within a 15km radius of The Site immediately prior to WWII. From July 1943 an LAA unit, formed from the 33rd Home Guard battalion, operated nine Hispano 20mm cannons at positions within a few hundred meters of the Short Bros factory.
Furthermore, a contemporary Medway WWII defences map plots six LAA batteries (within range of The Site) close to Rochester Aerodrome and to the north, defending Chatham Naval Dockyard. During 1940 >100 LAA guns were available for the Medway area. Most were small calibre Lewis machine-guns but some 40mm Bofors and Hispano-Suiza 20mm guns were also deployed.
20 additional LAA batteries were temporarily active in the Medway area between June and July 1944, as part Operation Diver, the defensive effort against the V1 Flying Bombs.
Luftwaffe activity was frequent over Medway for much of the war and therefore, as The Site was mainly soft ground, it is quite possible that an unexploded AA shell could have landed on Site, become shallow buried ad gone unnoticed.
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NB: a small number of WWI HAA batteries were also active in the region. These 3” guns saw much less action when compared to WWII AA defences and are therefore considered relatively insignificant.
6.3 THE HAZARDS POSED BY UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE
6.3.1 Land Service Ammunition
Land Service Ammunition (LSA) is a broad military term relating to a wide variety of weapons primarily deployed for land use. NB: Similar weapons (particularly artillery guns) were also deployed on naval platforms historically. LSA encompasses those types of ammunition that can be placed, thrown or propelled and as such is broken down into five main munitions families; Grenades, mortar bombs, artillery projectiles, anti-tank rockets and landmines.
The former three (detailed below) were produced / deployed in the greatest numbers historically and therefore are more likely to be encountered on UK sites today.
Anti-tank rockets were portable infantry weapons, however saw only limited service in the latter years of WWII. As such, the US made Bazooka and British made PIAT were deployed in relatively small numbers.
Landmines (both anti-personnel and anti-tank) were used by the British Army to fortify English beaches against an anticipated German invasion during WWII. However, as expected, each minefield was well documented and subsequently cleared during the 1940s.
Like German UXBs, LSA does not lose its effectiveness with age. Decades of burial can cause ammunition to become less stable and more sensitive. The potentially fragile state of expended, yet unexploded LSA, coupled with the relatively shallow burial state of such items, makes for a particularly hazardous scenario as LSA is more likely to be encountered and tampered with by unqualified personnel.
Data sheets on the most likely types to be encountered today and / or the most hazardous are included at APPENDIX 3.
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Grenades
A grenade is a short-range infantry weapon, essentially a small bomb, typically thrown by hand or launched from rifles or dedicated grenade launchers. A wide variety of grenades have been deployed in the UK historically, the most common being explosive (fragmentation or blast / concussion) grenades designed to detonate after impact or after a set amount of time.
They are divided into two categories; HE and Carrier (chiefly smoke for signalling and white phosphorus). Grenades were designed for both anti-personnel and anti-tank roles.
The Mills Bomb was the first modern fragmentation grenade produced for the British Army and was used in the WWI trenches from 1915. Updated Mills models were the mainstay of the Army throughout WWII and into the post-war period.
The striker of a Grenade (found buried on site today) may either be in contact with the detonator or still be retained by a spring under tension. As a result, any shock or vibration may cause it to function.
One primitive incendiary grenade produced in vast number during WWII was the SIP grenade. Unlike most grenades, these had no explosive element, relying instead on a chemical reaction between phosphorus and air to produce an intense incendiary effect and resulting burns hazard.
Mortar Bombs
A mortar is a simple infantry weapon that fires a projectile (mortar bomb) in a high-arcing ballistic trajectory, at low velocity, to a relatively short range. It is a compact, easily transportable weapons system used by British and Allied armies since WWI, when the British Stokes Trench Mortar became the first truly portable infantry mortar.
During WWII British mortars had a rate of fire of 30 bombs per minute with ranges in excess of 2km. The 2” and 3” mortars were the most common types used by the British Army.
Ammunition for mortars generally comes in two main varieties: fin-stabilized and spin- stabilized. Examples of the former have short fins on their posterior portion, which control the
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path of the bomb in flight. Spin-stabilized mortar bombs rotate as they travel along and leave the mortar tube, which stabilizes them in much the same way as a rifle bullet. Both types of bomb come in a variety of types; high explosive, smoke, parachute illumination, inert practice.
The mortar bomb is almost always nose fused with the tail piece comprising a ‘spigot tube’ (housing the propellant charge) screwed or welded to the rear end of the main body. A mortar relies on a striker hitting a detonator for explosion to occur. Like grenades, the striker of an expended but unexploded mortar bomb may now be in a very fragile state, after decades exposed to environmental conditions.
Artillery Projectiles / Anti-Aircraft Shells
Anti-tank guns and Howitzers have been in use with the British Army for over a hundred years. The former ranged from the Ordnance QF 2 Pounder (40mm) to the Ordnance QF 17 Pounder (76mm) in calibre. The latter ranged from the Ordnance QF 25 Pounder (87.6mm) to the BL 60 Pounder (127mm).
A wide variety of artillery projectiles have been deployed in the UK historically, by British and Allied Armies. In general, projectiles fall into two categories; Shot and Shell. The former are inert; solid metal projectiles containing no hazardous element, whereas the latter are hollow (like bombs), containing a variety of potentially hazardous fills.
Solid shot fall into four categories, mainly for gun proofing and target practice, however as they are inert they are relatively irrelevant with regards to present day UXO risk. Historically, there were three types of WWII-era British artillery shell: o Bursting Type - The filling (or part of it) caused the shell to burst. The most common filling was HE where the shell caused damage to material by the force of the burst or to personnel and aircraft by fragmentation of the shell casing producing shrapnel. NB: bursting shells were also used with chemical fillings. o Shrapnel Type - These usually burst in the air and projected their 'payload' forwards acting like a shotgun. The usual payload was shrapnel bullets however Thermite 'pots' were used during WWI. By the start of WWII shrapnel shells were obsolete for field artillery.
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o Carrier Type - These also burst in the air, however ejected their payload backwards after blowing the base plate off the shell. The most common fills used were smoke, star and flare shells. The latter two being designed to illuminate an area or target. Smoke shells were used to produce smoke screens and used various fillings (the common being white Phosphorus). Artillery projectiles were always painted, this protected the steel from rust but was also used to indicate the nature of the ammunition. The basic body colours for artillery were; Yellow (HE), Light Green (smoke), Black (Flare / Star) and Grey (chemical).
Most shells have a similar appearance. A data sheet of AA shells is included at APPENDIX 4.
RAF PRACTICE BOMBS
For training, the RAF used either service bomb shells inert-loaded with water or a chalk lime solution, or dedicated practice bombs (flash or smoke types). The latter are much smaller than WWII-era service bomb sizes and were also more numerous. Practice bombs were not designed to cause any damage and therefore could be dropped in a variety of locations.
The RAF’s standard WWII practice bomb came in four sizes; 8.5lb, 10lbs, 11.5lbs and 25lbs. They were painted white with 2 x ½ inch light green (smoke type) and ½ inch red bands (flash type) around the centre of the tail unit. NB: after decades in the ground, these colours will have substantially deteriorated. Smoke bombs were used for day bombing practice and flash bombs for night. Post-war finds indicate that the smoke type of bomb was more commonly used for training.
The flash type practice bombs only contain a 1lb spotting charge which although small, is nevertheless an explosive and therefore potentially dangerous. The fill comprises a mixture of gunpowder and magnesium turnings and causes a brilliant white flash on detonation. The associated hazard would be created by a small localised explosion caused by the bomb being struck with sufficient force.
In the smoke type bombs there is also a significant corrosive hazard. The bombs contain a liquid smoke producing mixture weighing approximately 1lb and comprising stannic chloride, sodium phosphate and titanium tetrachloride. NB: both bombs also contain a small explosive
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detonator charge, 10 grains fulminate of mercury.
A data sheet on WWII RAF Practice Bombs is included at APPENDIX 5.
Canadian Pipe Mines
The pipes were of varying lengths (typically 15-30m) and three inches in diameter and were filled with blasting gelignite, ‘Nobels 808’ or Gelignite in the form of paper wrapped cartridges 12 inches in length and 1.5 to 3 inches wide (depending on the diameter of the pipe). The filling did not occupy the full length of the pipe, the top cartridge being approximately 1.5 to 3m below the upper end of the pipe. Up to 200lb of high explosive was used in each mine. The upper end of each pipe was closed by a small metal cap.
Once filled, the charge was linked on a detonating circuit designed to be initiated in a similar way to a bridge demolition. The top of the pipes were approximately 0.4m below the surface of the ground and the bottom between 1.5 and 4m deep (the angle is installation ranged from 5 to 45 degrees from the horizontal). When fired, a considerable crater (generally anticipated to be 3.5 to 4.5m wide and 1.2 to 1.5m deep by the length of the charge) would cut across the runway.
An advantage of employing this method at the time was that the charge, being encased in mild steel pipe, was not subject to rapid deterioration (it should be noted however, that substantial maintenance was required after a 12 month period). The types of explosive used are very susceptible to deterioration on contact with water. While the Gelignite used to charge the mines is in itself a very stable and non-sensitive explosive, the by-product when exposed to water is Nitroglycerine (NG) which is very unstable and highly sensitive to shock and friction.
The NG collects in the lower end of the mine and crystals form in the fissures and joints of the pipes. The danger of a loaded mine is only relevant when consideration is given to physical contact with the mine, in particular, deep ploughing or drilling in which direct shock is applied is very likely to cause the NG to detonate. Such a detonation could initiate the charge of Gelignite left in the mine.
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20MM Autocannon Ammunition
During WWII, a number of RAF and USAAF fighters were fitted with 20mm autocannons; manufactured by the Swiss company Oerlikon and the French company Hispano-Suiza. These weapons were also used by UK based Army and Navy units in the LAA role. An autocannon is essentially a larger calibre machine gun utilising fused (not solid shot) ammunition.
Although cannon ammunition looks very similar to SAA, some projectiles incorporate a small, simple impact fuse and an approximately 4gram HE and / or incendiary fill. Although small, when compared with artillery shells, each bursting charge still has the potential to cause serious injury.
During WWII, Hispano-Suiza and Oerlikon produced a variety of 20mm ammunition types; High Explosive, High Explosive Incendiary, Armour-Piercing, Armour Piercing Incendiary, Target Practice (inert), Target Practice Tracer (inert). Each type was distinguished by the painted colour of the projectile head and colours varied between the two manufactures.
On some projectiles, the tracer became a self-destruct mechanism, detonating the bullet if no impact occurred after five seconds. This resulted in the potential for less collateral damage and far less unexploded 20mm rounds falling back to earth.
A data sheet on 20mm ammunition is included at APPENDIX 6.
Small Arms Ammunition (SAA)
Small arms ammunition is primarily cartridge-based, solid shot ammunition with a calibre <20mm. It covers ammunition used for side arms, rifles and light to heavy machine guns. Each 'round' of ammunition comprises a cartridge case, solid shot projectile (bullet), propellant and primer.
The most common types of SAA to be encountered in the UK are 0.303” calibre (the standard British and Commonwealth military cartridge from 1889 until the 1950s), 0.30” calibre (the standard American cartridge used during WWII) and 0.5” calibre (used by machine guns deployed on USAAF bombers based in Britain during WWII).
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As solid shot, spent SAA rounds do not pose a hazard. Unspent rounds comprise a small propellant charge within the cartridge, however SAA is generally stable and relatively safe to handle. NB: Unspent rounds can function if subjected to high heat, such as fire. Any detonation however would not be contained within a barrel and would only result in local, minor overpressure.
7 UXO RISK MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES
7.1 INTRODUCTION
Subsequent works on a UXO contaminated site could have resulted in the partial or complete removal of this UXO risk. Various construction works or earthworks could have uncovered UXO which would then have been reported and removed by the authorities. Alternatively, a site may have been subject to a military Explosive Ordnance Clearance (EOC) task, involving surveying, subsequent target investigation and removal.
7.2 EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CLEARANCE TASKS
The British Army, RAF and Royal Navy all have EOD units that are responsible for carrying out UXO clearance on their own bases and training areas. UXO found on civilian land is dealt with by whichever EOD unit is local and available.
BSI has access to a database of historic EOC tasks carried out by the British Army’s Royal Engineer EOD unit; the 29th Regiment. NB: this database is only complete up until the early 2000s and therefore does not include recent EOC tasks. No such database for the RAF and Royal Navy EOD units is easily accessible. Aside from Operation Crabstick (recording nine live mines found) the database does not contain any other Army EOC tasks in the vicinity of The Site.
UXO encounters on civilian land are often reported in the media and therefore a web search of local media outlets was also carried out. However, no reference to a recent UXO finds in the vicinity of The Site was found.
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7.3 GROUND WORKS
The vast majority of The Site has remained greenfield (the landing ground). Low-rise commercial buildings along the northern Site boundary and the exiting Innovation Centre in the south-east, appear to represent the only substantial post-WWII construction works on Site.
7.4 DEDUCTIONS
Operation Crabstick was unable to clear some pipe mined areas on Site, however will have likely mitigated the risk from pipe mines across the part of The Site surveyed. However, as this was an operation specifically targeted at one type of UXO, it is considered unlikely that any other non-linear (discreet) potential UXO targets detected during the survey were investigated. The large search areas involved in Operation Crabstick would have made investigating every discreet ferrous anomaly a huge job in itself. This suggestion is supported by the MOD’s Defence Infrastructure Organisation. Furthermore, deep buried German HE UXBs would have been buried beyond the detection range of the army’s survey equipment.
Only within the footprints of the few post-WWII constructed buildings on Site will the risk of shallow buried UXO be largely mitigated, as any such devices were likely encountered and removed from Site during initial excavations.
The likely lack of deep basement level excavations on Site post-war, indicates that deep buried German HE UXB could remain in-situ. A shallower, small calibre German HE UXB or AA shell could also conceivably remain within undisturbed soil, in between or below the foundations of the post-war buildings.
8 CONCLUSION
8.1 ACCURACY OF THE HISTORICAL RECORDS
Occasionally, the accuracy of some historical records can be proven to be poor, when compared with other records. One significant consequence of this can be the possibility of unrecorded German bomb strikes in the vicinity of a study area. A review of the records gathered for this assessment has highlighted significant inconsistencies. The Rochester ARP
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bombing records do not record the heaviest air raid on Rochester Aerodrome. Therefore, it is conceivable that this account is missing additional raids on the airfield. Two separate sources record differing numbers of HE bomb strikes falling within the Municipal Borough of Rochester. This highlights the inaccuracies in wartime record keeping.
8.2 THE RISK OF UXO CONTAMINATION ON SITE
8.2.1 Key Findings - German UXO Risk
o Rochester Aerodrome was identified by the Luftwaffe as a primary bombing target during WWII. Original ARP records confirm that it was attacked at least eight times between 1940 and 1941. Furthermore, additional raids are known to have affected the wider study area. NB: Original wartime figures state that the wider area experienced a moderate bombing density.
o Six of the air raids were small in scale (likely executed by solitary aircraft) one was a medium scale raid involving a group of fighter bombers and another was a concentrated large scale raid. NB: during two small scale raids incendiary bombs are understood to have been dropped on Site also.
o Two detailed historical accounts of Rochester Aerodrome describe the large scale raid which occurred during daylight hours on the 15th August 1940. Some 80 medium bombers dropped nearly 300 HE bombs (mostly the 50kg type) on the landing field (central Site), both aircraft factories (northern Site boundary) and the housing estate immediately east of The Site. No RAF fighter interception was made, resulting in accurate bombing. 19 bombs exploded in the factories causing severe damage. Two UXBs were identified and defused within the factories also. NB: this raid alone would have resulted in nearly 30 UXBs (on average). A Luftwaffe aerial photograph taken during this raid shows the north-eastern part of The Site only. Smoke plumes from exploding bombs can be seen on Site and to the east.
o It is not known to what degree different parts of The Site would have been accessed during the war. During the heaviest raid, the airfield’s military guard comprised a voluntary Home Guard unit; a part time force not billeted at the airfield. Therefore, it is unlikely that a large force of troops observed this raid. The southern part of Rochester Aerodrome appears to have been vacant during the Battle of Britain, having been abandoned by the pilot schools
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before WWII. Furthermore, after the August 1940 raid, the damaged aircraft factories were abandoned for the remainder of the 1940-41 Blitz. Therefore, it is conceivable that a UXB could have struck The Site unobserved during the heaviest raid or during the latter small scale raids. o Furthermore, all the factory workers appear to have taken shelter in air raid shelters prior to the heaviest air raid commencing and a consequently there was only one fatality. Consequently, during the chaos of this intense bombardment it is quite possible that UXB falls were not witnessed. o The grass landing ground occupying most of The Site would have been heavily cratered during the heaviest raid. As such, there was likely large areas of soil debris on Site. It is conceivable therefore that a UXB dropped during the same raid struck an area of disturbed soil or a HE blast crater. A UXB entry hole within such conditions is unlikely to have been identifiable and probably would have gone unreported. o A UXB entry hole on undisturbed parts of the grass landing field would likely have been observed and reported at the time. However, it should be noted that in June 2019 a live German 50kg HE UXB was encountered during construction works in Kings Hill, Kent. The bomb was dropped during a heavy air raid on RAF West Malling. Historical analysis confirms that the bomb had struck an expansive area of grass surrounding the airfield’s munitions storage buildings. The fact that a UXB entry hole was missed here, in this very sensitive part of the airfield, indicates a similar scenario within the grass landing ground part of The Site cannot be completely discounted. o Some peripheral parts of The Site appear to have been unused and occupied by unmaintained vegetation and woodland during the war. It is quite possible that these areas were neglected. Evidence of a UXB strike here could have easily been overlooked. NB: the diameter of the smallest German HE bomb (which was also the most commonly deployed over Britain) was 200mm; creating a small, easily obscured entry hole. After a time, environmental conditions would cause the hole to collapse and in-fill, erasing evidence of the UXO strike. o The detailed written histories of Rochester Aerodrome do not describe any bomb damage or repair works to the aircraft hangars and other buildings in the southern part of The Site. As they appear to have survived the war on the 1946 aerial photograph and share the
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same structural footprints on pre-war OS mapping, it is likely that they were unaffected. A HE UXB strike to undamaged buildings would have caused substantial damage and incontrovertible evidence of its incidence. The incident would have then been reported and dealt with at the time.
8.2.2 Key Findings - British UXO Risk
o In 1940 the Short Bros factory and Rochester Aerodrome were designated as a Vulnerable Point and were therefore afforded a defence force; the 33rd Kent Home Guard Battalion, with D and E Companies specifically responsible for Rochester Aerodrome. Pillboxes, numerous slit trenches and roadblocks were constructed / dug around the airfield and airfield defence training exercises were likely carried out. By October 1941 a company of the 8th Battalion, Queen's Own Royal West Kent Regiment (regular army) had garrisoned the airfield.
o The presence of ground defence troops at the airfield suggests that ammunition would have been stored on or near The Site and armed troops would have accessed most peripheral parts of the airfield.
o Recent UXO finds in England confirm that Home Guard troops disposed of surplus ammunition when they disbanded in 1944 by unauthorised burial and they also buried ammunition caches in tactical locations to be exhumed and used during the anticipated German invasion, in 1940 and 1941. Some caches were forgotten and remain buried. The fact The Site was a defended facility, makes UXO contamination of this type more likely.
o This type of random UXO contamination is associated with the behaviour of individual soldiers >70 years ago, making assessment of potential UXO contamination areas difficult. However, any unauthorised disposal of surplus / unwanted ammunition on Site is more likely to have occurred in peripheral areas of unused ground, possibly where dense vegetation provided cover for any such activity. Consequently, the areas of former woodland and the peripheral dense vegetation could be considered as higher risk areas. NB: one of these areas, in the north-east of The Site is known to be heavily contaminated with buried scrap metal, suggesting a possible disposal site.
o A 25 yard gunnery range was constructed just within the south-western boundary of The Site prior to or during WWII, however such facilities are only likely to be contaminated
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with low hazard small arms ammunition. Small RAF practice bombs were used by many flying training units during WWII and therefore the pilot school occupying the southern part of the airfield between 1938 and 1939, could conceivably have used these training aids, however this is considered unlikely. Furthermore, such devices only pose a relatively minor hazard. o 27 static HAA gun batteries were constructed within range of The Site immediately prior to WWII. From July 1943 an LAA unit, formed from the 33rd Home Guard battalion, operated nine Hispano 20mm cannons at positions within a few hundred meters of The Site and additional, distant LAA batteries are known to have been within range of The Site. Luftwaffe activity was frequent over Medway for much of the war and therefore, as The Site was mainly soft ground, it is quite possible that an unexploded AA shell could have landed on Site, become shallow buried and gone unnoticed. o During WWII Rochester Aerodrome was defensibly mined as an anti-invasion measure. Canadian pipe mines (50-70mm steel pipes containing HE) were hydraulically rammed into the ground beneath the grass landing ground, in a criss-cross grid pattern to depths up to 4m, but likely shallower. o It is considered likely that most of the mines on Site were removed during 1944. As part of the MOD’s Operation Crabstick, the landing ground was surveyed and nine more mines were removed during 1984. However, three inaccessible areas (beneath hardstanding / structures) within the northern half of The Site have been identified as being locations where pipe mines could remain up to the present day. NB: MOD records recommend that an army EOD unit should return to the airfield if any of these buildings are demolished in the course of redevelopment. o There are also doubts about the comprehensive clearance of all pipe mines during Operation Crabstick. For a number of reasons, mines could have been missed or only partially removed. Recent (post Crabstick) re-investigation by army EOD units at some other mined airfields found that they had not been entirely cleared, while on some sites, more pipe mines were placed than were recorded in the original wartime installation plans, and some were also encountered in the wrong place. NB: as with almost all UXO, any pipe mines left in the ground will only pose a threat if disturbed by engineering works.
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8.3 SITE SPECIFIC UXO HAZARDS
Different types of UXO pose differing types of hazard, depending on their structural design, Net Explosive Quantity (NEQ), fill type and likely contamination depth. The table below lists the main types of UXO most often encountered on urban UK sites and their relative hazard levels.
UXO Type NEQ (NEQ Range) Likely Burial Depth Hazard Posed
25kg - 220kg WWII German General Likely deep burial (>3m) Purpose HE Bombs (most commonly deployed bomb weights) HIGH RISK WWII Canadian Pipe Shallow burial (0.4m to Up to 90kg per mine Mines 4m)
WWII British Heavy Anti- 1.1kg - 1.7kg Shallow burial (<1.5m) Aircraft Shells
WWII British Land MODERATE-HIGH <2kg Shallow burial (<1.5m) Service Ammunition RISK
WWII German 2kg 680g incendiary hazard + Shallow burial (<1.5m) Incendiary / HE Bombs ~500g explosive hazard
680g (incendiary, not WWII German 1kg IBs Shallow burial (<1.5m) explosive hazard) MODERATE RISK 500g of gunpowder + WWII Practice Bombs magnesium or corrosive Shallow burial (<1.5m) (flash fill) liquid fill
WWII British Light Anti- LOW-MODERATE 4g - 70g Very shallow burial (<1m) Aircraft Shells RISK
8.4 THE LIKELIHOOD OF UXO ENCOUNTER
8.4.1 Introduction
This report assesses the risk of UXO in relation to the proposed works, not simply the risk that UXO remains buried on site. The likelihood of UXO encounter during intrusive ground works will vary depending on the type of UXO and the type of construction methods employed during the project. Naturally, the greater the number, volume and depth of intrusions, the greater the likelihood of UXO being encountered, assuming UXO resides on site.
Within an area of elevated UXO contamination risk (delineated at ground level), the sub-
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surface volume of potential UXO contamination will comprise the natural soil / geology in between WWII ground level and the maximum bomb penetration depth. Therefore, any intrusions into this layer will be at risk of UXO encounter.
Any post-WWII fill material deposited on a site is unlikely to be contaminated with UXO and therefore the risk of encountering UXO on such a site could vary with depth.
In the wake of the initial nine-month Blitz, many cities and towns were left with vast quantities of bomb site rubble that required removal and relocation. This material was put to use for in a variety of ways, for example >750,000 tons of London’s rubble was used to build runways for new RAF and USAAF airfields and much of Liverpool’s rubble was used to create and maintain sea / flood defences throughout Merseyside.
It is quite possible that unexploded British AA projectiles and German 1kg incendiaries were overlooked during removal, resulting in UXO contaminated fill material ending up on otherwise low UXO risk sites, possibly many miles from any high bombing density areas.
8.4.2 German UXBs
Although most German HE UXBs came to rest several metres below WWII ground level, these weapons can be found at any level between just below WWII ground level and the maximum bomb penetration depth. There are a number of reasons why these heavy bombs might be found at surprisingly shallow depths;
o Tip and Run: When enemy aircraft had to take evasive action to escape RAF fighter interception and / or AA defences, they often dropped their bomb loads from a reduced height, potentially resulting in extreme J-Curve Effect.
o Deflection: The shape of German HE bomb nosecones meant they were susceptible to deflection when striking surface or shallow sub-surface obstacles, occasionally resulting in shallow burial or even UXBs skidding across hard-standing, roads, etc.
o Aircraft Crash Site: If an aircraft was unable to dump its bomb load before impacting the ground, due to mechanical fault, any externally fitted bombs could have become buried on impact.
German 1kg / 2kg incendiaries were cylindrical and approximately 50mm in diameter. They
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had tailfins, which meant they landed nose first, which in soft ground could result in full penetration of the bomb below the surface. Therefore, such items are usually found close to the surface.
8.4.3 British / Allied UXO
The nature of British / Allied military activity involving LSA / SAA and the smaller size of these munitions (in relation to German HE bombs) indicates that any resulting UXO contamination on a site will be limited to shallow depths, usually within 1.5m of the surface, unless any post contamination fill material has raised the ground level, effectively burying the UXO even deeper.
Domestic military LSA and SAA contamination will either be the result of expending dud ammunition (shells) which bury into the ground on impact or munitions purposefully buried, for a number of reasons. Either way, these types of UXO are all found at shallow depth.
8.4.4 Deductions
The precise locations of any future developments on Site were not finalised at the time of writing and as such, the types and extents of associated ground works were not known. However, it can be said that there is an elevated likelihood of shallow buried British LSA remaining within the Site peripheries. There is an elevated likelihood of German HE UXB remaining across most of The Site. Also, there is an elevated likelihood of pipe mines remaining at three specific locations within the north of The Site.
Planned borehole works within the runway area will be exposed to a deep buried UXB encounter. If pile foundations are proposed for future developments, it should be noted that piling is the engineering activity most at risk of initiating a German UXB at depth, due to the forces involved and the ‘blind’ nature of the intrusion.
NB: experience shows that German HE UXBs can also be encountered at surprisingly shallow depths (see APPENDIX 1) and therefore the possibility of such a UXB encounter during shallower ground intrusions cannot be entirely ruled out.
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8.5 OVERALL RISK RATING
8.5.1 Introduction
Ratings for the likelihood of UXO contaminating The Site, remaining on Site up to the present day and being encountered during the proposed works, inform the overall risk rating. The UXO risk on Site varies. Low, Low to Moderate, Moderate and High risk zones have been identified.
Various different types of UXO could remain on Site. This, coupled with the large size of and complex history of The Site makes for a complex risk landscape. Therefore, two Risk Maps (German UXO and British / Allied UXO) have been created. These are displayed at FIGURE 11 are described in the risk tables below.
8.5.2 Risk Tables - German UXO Risk Map
RISK TABLE: LOW RISK
UXO TYPE LIKELIHOOD OF UXO LIKELIHOOD OF UXO LIKELIHOOD OF OVERALL RISK (ASSOCIATED HAZARD) CONTAMINATION REMAINING ENCOUNTER RATING
WWII German General LOW LOW LOW Purpose HE Bombs WWII German 2kg LOW LOW LOW LOW RISK Incendiary / HE Bombs WWII German 1kg LOW LOW LOW Incendiary Bombs
RISK TABLE: MODERATE RISK
UXO TYPE LIKELIHOOD OF UXO LIKELIHOOD OF UXO LIKELIHOOD OF OVERALL RISK (ASSOCIATED HAZARD) CONTAMINATION REMAINING ENCOUNTER RATING
WWII German General MODERATE MODERATE MODERATE MODERATE RISK Purpose HE Bombs WWII German 2kg LOW-MODERATE LOW-MODERATE LOW-MODERATE Incendiary / HE Bombs LOW- WWII German 1kg MODERATE RISK LOW-MODERATE LOW-MODERATE LOW-MODERATE Incendiary Bombs
RISK TABLE: HIGH RISK
UXO TYPE LIKELIHOOD OF UXO LIKELIHOOD OF UXO LIKELIHOOD OF OVERALL RISK (ASSOCIATED HAZARD) CONTAMINATION REMAINING ENCOUNTER RATING
WWII German General HIGH HIGH MODERATE HIGH RISK Purpose HE Bombs WWII German 2kg MODERATE MODERATE MODERATE Incendiary / HE Bombs MODERATE RISK WWII German 1kg MODERATE MODERATE MODERATE Incendiary Bombs
Report Ref: DRA-19-1123 56
Project Centre | Innovation Centre Medway
8.5.3 Risk Tables - British / Allied UXO Risk Map
RISK TABLE: LOW RISK
UXO TYPE LIKELIHOOD OF UXO LIKELIHOOD OF UXO LIKELIHOOD OF OVERALL RISK (ASSOCIATED HAZARD) CONTAMINATION REMAINING ENCOUNTER RATING
WWII Pipe Mines LOW LOW LOW
WWII British Heavy Anti- LOW LOW LOW Aircraft Shells WWII British Land Service LOW LOW LOW LOW RISK Ammunition
WWII RAF Practice Bombs LOW LOW LOW
WWII British Light Anti- LOW LOW LOW Aircraft Shells
RISK TABLE: LOW-MODERATE RISK
UXO TYPE LIKELIHOOD OF UXO LIKELIHOOD OF UXO LIKELIHOOD OF OVERALL RISK (ASSOCIATED HAZARD) CONTAMINATION REMAINING ENCOUNTER RATING
WWII Pipe Mines HIGH LOW LOW LOW RISK
WWII British Heavy Anti- MODERATE LOW-MODERATE MODERATE Aircraft Shells LOW- WWII British Land Service MODERATE RISK LOW-MODERATE HIGH MODERATE Ammunition
WWII RAF Practice Bombs LOW-MODERATE LOW-MODERATE MODERATE LOW RISK WWII British Light Anti- MODERATE LOW-MODERATE MODERATE Aircraft Shells
RISK TABLE: MODERATE RISK
UXO TYPE LIKELIHOOD OF UXO LIKELIHOOD OF UXO LIKELIHOOD OF OVERALL RISK (ASSOCIATED HAZARD) CONTAMINATION REMAINING ENCOUNTER RATING
WWII Pipe Mines LOW-MODERATE LOW LOW LOW RISK
WWII British Heavy Anti- LOW- MODERATE MODERATE MODERATE Aircraft Shells MODERATE RISK WWII British Land Service MODERATE HIGH MODERATE MODERATE RISK Ammunition
WWII RAF Practice Bombs LOW-MODERATE LOW-MODERATE MODERATE LOW RISK
WWII British Light Anti- LOW- MODERATE MODERATE MODERATE Aircraft Shells MODERATE RISK
Report Ref: DRA-19-1123 57
Project Centre | Innovation Centre Medway
RISK TABLE: HIGH RISK
UXO TYPE LIKELIHOOD OF UXO LIKELIHOOD OF UXO LIKELIHOOD OF OVERALL RISK (ASSOCIATED HAZARD) CONTAMINATION REMAINING ENCOUNTER RATING
WWII Pipe Mines HIGH MODERATE-HIGH MODERATE HIGH RISK
WWII British Heavy Anti- MODERATE HIGH MODERATE Aircraft Shells MODERATE RISK WWII British Land Service MODERATE-HIGH HIGH MODERATE Ammunition
WWII RAF Practice Bombs LOW-MODERATE LOW-MODERATE MODERATE LOW RISK
WWII British Light Anti- LOW- MODERATE MODERATE MODERATE Aircraft Shells MODERATE RISK
9 RISK MITIGATION RECOMMENDATIONS
BSI has identified an elevated UXO risk across much of The Site. The measures detailed below are recommended to mitigate the UXO risk to ALARP level.
Risk Mitigation Measure Recommended For?
UXO Safety Awareness Briefings: To all personnel conducting Ahead of all intrusive works, intrusive works on site. An essential part of the Health & Safety Plan within all Risk Zones for a site. Conforms to the requirements of CDM2015.
Construction phase open EOD Engineer - On Site Supervision: Watching brief of shallow excavations (in inaccessible excavations. Portable magnetometer instruments for clearing ground or brownfield ground) ground ahead of SI borehole locations. Positive identification of and boreholes within zones of: suspicious (non UXO) objects. Liaison during confirmed UXO MODERATE RISK incidents. Provision of additional UXO Safety Awareness Briefings. HIGH RISK Intrusive Magnetometer Probe Survey: A range of intrusive magnetometer methodologies can be deployed to survey the ground Pile foundations within zones of (down to the maximum bomb penetration depth) prior to deep MODERATE RISK intrusive works; pile foundations. The appropriate technique is HIGH RISK governed by a number of factors, the most important being the site- specific ground conditions.
Non-Intrusive Magnetometer Survey (optional): A range of non- Optional measure: ahead of intrusive magnetometer methodologies can be deployed to survey extensive construction phase large areas of land to a limited depth. Such surveys can typically open excavations / earthworks detect a 50kg WWII bomb at a depth of 4.5m, in “clean” ground. This within greenfield areas of: survey is only appropriate for greenfield land where “magnetic MODERATE RISK noise” is negligible. To extend survey range, a reduced dig and HIGH RISK secondary survey can be carried out.
Report Ref: DRA-19-1123 58
FIGURES: 1 - 11
1-3 Manor Road, Chatham, Kent, ME4 6AE
+44 (0) 207 117 2492 www.brimstoneuxo.com [email protected] Title: SITE LOCATION MAPS FIGURE: 1
N Project Innovation Centre Medway
Client: Project Centre 1-3 Manor Road, Chatham, Kent, ME4 6AE Report Ref: DRA-19-1123 +44 (0) 207 117 2492 www.brimstoneuxo.com General Site Location Info Source: Google (open-source) [email protected] Title: RECENT AERIAL PHOTOGRAPH FIGURE: 2
Report Ref: DRA-19-1123 Project Innovation Centre Medway +44 (0) 207 117 2492 N www.brimstoneuxo.com Info Source: Google (open source) Client: 1-3 Manor Road, Chatham, [email protected] Approx. Site Boundary Project Centre Kent, ME4 6AE Title: CURRENT SITE PLAN FIGURE: 3
N Project Innovation Centre Medway
Client: Project Centre 1-3 Manor Road, Chatham, Kent, ME4 6AE Report Ref: DRA-19-1123 +44 (0) 207 117 2492 www.brimstoneuxo.com Site Boundary Info Source: Project Centre [email protected] Title: HISTORICAL OS MAPPING - 1938 FIGURE: 4
N Project Innovation Centre Medway
Client: Project Centre 1-3 Manor Road, Chatham, Kent, ME4 6AE Report Ref: DRA-19-1123 +44 (0) 207 117 2492 www.brimstoneuxo.com Approx. Site Boundary Info Source: Groundsure [email protected] Title: AIR MINISTRY AERODROME PLAN - ROCHESTER 1953 FIGURE: 5
Report Ref: DRA-19-1123 Project Innovation Centre Medway +44 (0) 207 117 2492 N www.brimstoneuxo.com Info Source: RAF Museum Client: 1-3 Manor Road, Chatham, [email protected] Approx. Site Boundary Project Centre Kent, ME4 6AE Title: LUFTWAFFE TARGET RECONNAISSANCE PHOTOGRAPH - JUNE 1939 FIGURE: 6
Project Innovation Centre Medway
Client: Project Centre 1-3 Manor Road, Chatham, Kent, ME4 6AE Report Ref: DRA-19-1123 +44 (0) 207 117 2492 www.brimstoneuxo.com Approx. Site Boundary Info Source: N J Clarke. 1996 [email protected] Title: HISTORICAL AERIAL PHOTOGRAPH - circa 1946 FIGURE: 7
25y Machine Gun Range Repaired factory buildings
Two demolished houses 4 x military Nissen huts
HE bomb craters
Report Ref: DRA-19-1123 Project Innovation Centre Medway +44 (0) 207 117 2492 N www.brimstoneuxo.com Info Source: Google (open source) Client: 1-3 Manor Road, Chatham, [email protected] Approx. Site Boundary Project Centre Kent, ME4 6AE Title: MEDWAY BOMB PLOT MAP - NEWSPAPER ARTICLE FIGURE: 8
N Project Innovation Centre Medway
Client: Project Centre 1-3 Manor Road, Chatham, Kent, ME4 6AE Report Ref: DRA-19-1123 +44 (0) 207 117 2492 www.brimstoneuxo.com General Site Location Info Source: Kent History and Library Centre [email protected] Title: LUFTWAFFE RAID AERIAL PHOTOGRAPH - 15TH AUGUST 1940 FIGURE: 9
Project Innovation Centre Medway
Client: Project Centre 1-3 Manor Road, Chatham, Kent, ME4 6AE Report Ref: DRA-19-1123 +44 (0) 207 117 2492 www.brimstoneuxo.com Approx. Site Boundary Info Source: R J Brooks. 1998 [email protected] Title: OPERATION CRABSTICK PIPE MINE CLEARANCE MAP FIGURE: 10
Domestic scrap contamination / no survey possible
Pipe mines could remain here, up to the present day
N Report Ref: DRA-19-1123 Project Innovation Centre Medway +44 (0) 207 117 2492 www.brimstoneuxo.com Info Source: Rochester upon Medway City Council Client: 1-3 Manor Road, Chatham, [email protected] Approx. Site Boundary Project Centre Kent, ME4 6AE Title: RISK MAPS: LIKELIHOOD OF UXO REMAINING ON SITE FIGURE: 11
GERMAN UXO RISK MAP BRITISH / ALLIED UXO RISK MAP
High Risk of Pipe Mines
High Risk of WWII airfield defence ammunition
High Risk of WWII airfield defence Ammunition (LSA)
LOW UXO RISK LOW UXO RISK LOW-MODERATE UXO RISK (LSA, AA shells) MODERATE UXO RISK MODERATE UXO RISK (LSA, AA shells) HIGH UXO RISK HIGH UXO RISK (pipe mines, LSA, AA shells)
N Report Ref: DRA-19-1123 Project Innovation Centre Medway +44 (0) 207 117 2492 www.brimstoneuxo.com Info Source: n/a Client: 1-3 Manor Road, Chatham, [email protected] Approx. Site Boundary Project Centre Kent, ME4 6AE Title: RECENT UK & EUROPEAN UXO INCIDENTS AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS APPENDIX: 1
Recent German UXB Finds in the UK + Historical Analysis • 15th May 2017 - An SC250 (standard 250kg HE bomb) was found during shallow excavations at a building site in Aston, Birmingham. Historical Analysis: The UXB landed in a small back garden belonging to a terraced house, part of a row. It J-Curved under a neighbouring garden and came to rest at just 1.4m bgl. NB: These houses had not sustained bomb damage. • 2nd March 2017 - A 250kg HE bomb was found during deep excavations at a building site in Brondesbury Park, London. Historical Analysis: UXB landed in a large residential back garden. A single storey building was built on top of the UXB post-WWII. • 19th January 2017 - An SD50 (semi-armour piercing 50kg HE bomb) was dredged from the Thames during barge dredging works near Westminster Bridge, London. • November 2016 and February 2017 - 2 x 250kg HE bombs encountered during dredging works in Portsmouth Harbour dredging barge. In September 2016 a 500kg HE bomb was found during the same project. • 12th May 2016 - A 500kg HE bomb was found buried just 1m below the playground of the former Royal High Junior School in Bath. Historical Analysis: The UXB landed in a plot of neglected, unmaintained vegetation in between the school gym and main school building. • 23rd September 2015 - A 1,000kg HE bomb was encountered by a mechanical excavator on a building site in Paradise Street, Coventry. Historical Analysis: the UXB landed in a large residential back garden occupied by dense vegetation. A two storey building was built on top of the UXB post-WWII. • 10th August 2015 - A 250kg HE bomb was found immediately beneath a basement floor during refurbishment works in Temple Street, Bethnal Green (London). Historical Analysis: The UXB struck a house that had been damaged beyond repair during a previous air raid. The existing house was then built on top of UXB post-WWII. • 21st May 2015 - An SC50 (general purpose 50kg HE bomb) was found during deep exactions at a construction site. Historical Analysis: UXB landed in a large residential back garden. • 23rd March 2015 - A 250kg HE bomb was found during deep excavations at a building site in Grange Walk, Bermondsey (London). Historical Analysis: inconclusive - reported UXB position is likely inaccurate.
NB: Domestic UXO finds in the UK are too numerous to list. Between 2006 and 2009, over 15,000 items of British / Allied UXO (excluding small arms ammunition) were found on UK construction sites (CIRIA).
Initiation of WWII Allied Bombs • 6th January 2014 - Mechanical excavator stuck a WWII bomb in Euskirchen (Germany) causing it to explode, killing the operator and injuring 13 more, two critically. The explosion was so large it damaged buildings 400m away. • 1st March 2013 - During piling at a construction site in Ludwigshafen (Germany) a small buried WWII bomb exploded, injuring one worker. • 2nd June 2010 - A British 500kg bomb detonated whilst being defused, killing three EOD engineers in Goettingen, Germany. The bomb was found as builders dug the foundations for a new sports hall. Several houses had their fronts blown off by the blast. • 19th September 2008 - Seventeen people were injured and buildings were damaged when an excavator apparently drove over and set off a 250kg American bomb at a construction site in Hattingen, Germany. • 23rd October 2006 - A construction worker breaking up tarmac at the side of a highway near the south-western German town of Aschaffenburg was killed when his machine struck and detonated a WWII bomb. In addition, the blast injured several motorists who were driving past. • 2006 - A piling rig and dump truck were destroyed when a piling rig struck an Allied bomb on a construction site in Austria. • 2003 - In the Austrian city of Salzburg, two people were killed while attempting to defuse a 250kg Allied bomb. • 1994 - At a central Berlin construction site a piling rig struck a large WWII Allied bomb. 3 were killed and 14 more were injured. Dozens of cars in a 250m radius were wrecked, the top 10 floors of neighbouring office building collapsed and human remains were found 100m away. • 1990 - In Wetzlar (Germany) two EOD engineers were blown up as they removed the detonator of an allied WWII UXB.
Project Innovation Centre Medway
Client: Project Centre 1-3 Manor Road, Chatham, Kent, ME4 6AE Report Ref: DRA-19-1123 +44 (0) 207 117 2492 www.brimstoneuxo.com Info Source: Various [email protected] APPENDICES: 1 - 8
1-3 Manor Road, Chatham, Kent, ME4 6AE
+44 (0) 207 117 2492 www.brimstoneuxo.com [email protected] Title: GERMAN WWII AIR-DELIVERED MUNITIONS - MOST COMMONLY DEPLOYED HIGH EXPLOSIVE APPENDIX: 2.1
SC 50
Bomb Weight: 40-54kg (110-119lb) Explosive Weight: 25kg (55lb) Filling: TNT, Amatol or Trialen Charge/Weight Ratio: 46% Fuse Type: Electrical impact fuse or mechanical delayed action fuse Body Dimensions: 1,100mm length x 200mm diameter Appearance: Bomb body and tail painted grey/green with a yellow stripe on the tail unit. Steel construction. Variants: 8 x variants. Additional fittings: Kopfring nose for limited penetration and Stabbo nose for dive-bombing.
SC 250
Bomb Weight: 245-256kg (540-564lb) Explosive Weight: 125-130kg (276-287lb) Filling: TNT, Amatol and Trialen mix Charge/Weight Ratio: 44% Fuse Type: 1 or 2 electrical impact fuse(s) or mechanical delayed action fuse(s) Body Dimensions: 1,173mm length x 368mm diameter Appearance: Bomb body and tail painted grey/green with a yellow stripe on the tail unit. Steel construction. Variants: 8 x variants. Kopfring nose for limited penetration. Stabbo nose for dive-bombing.
SC 500
Bomb Weight: 480-520kg (1,058-1,146lb) Explosive Weight: 220kg (485lb) Filling: TNT, Amatol and Trialen mix Charge/Weight Ratio: 44% Fuse Type: 2 electrical impact fuses or mechanical delayed action fuses Body Dimensions: 1,423mm length x 470mm diameter Appearance: Bomb body and tail painted grey/green or buff with a yellow stripe on the tail unit. Steel construction. Variants: 3 x variants. Kopfring nose for limited penetration.
Project Innovation Centre Medway
Client: Project Centre 1-3 Manor Road, Chatham, Kent, ME4 6AE Report Ref: DRA-19-1123 +44 (0) 207 117 2492 www.brimstoneuxo.com Info Source: W, Ramsey.1988 / various news sources [email protected] Title: GERMAN WWII AIR-DELIVERED MUNITIONS - MOST COMMONLY DEPLOYED INCENDIARY APPENDIX: 2.2
B-1E Sub-Munition
Bomb Weight: 1-1.3kg (2.2-2.87lb) Incendiary Weight: 680g (1.4lb) Filling: Thermite Fuse Type: Simple impact fuse Body Dimensions: 247mm length x 50mm diameter Appearance: Grey body and dark green painted tail unit. Magnesium alloy case. Operation: Small percussion charge ignites Thermite (>1,000°C burn). Variants: Most common variant: B 1EZ included small HE charge Remarks: Drop containers varied in size. The smallest cluster bomb held 36 x B-1Es and the largest 620 x B-1Es.
Brand C50
Bomb Weight: 41kg (90.4lb) Incendiary Weight: 13kg (30lb) Filling: Main fill (86% Benzine, 10% Rubber) plus 4% Phosphorus in glass bottles Fuse Type: 1 x electrical impact fuse Bomb Dimensions: 762mm length x 203mm diameter Appearance: bomb body and tail painted grey or green with the rear of the bomb painted red and a red band around the centre of the body. Variants: C 50 B: 77% White Phos fill C 250 A: 87.7% Petroleum, 11.7% Polystyrene, 0.5% White Phos (185kg version)
Spreng-Brand C50 - Fire Pot
Bomb Weight: 34kg (75lb) Explosive Weight: 9kg (20lb) Filling: TNT burster charge, 6 x Thermite containers (fire pots) and 67 x small triangular incendiary elements. Fuse Type: 1 x electrical impact fuses or aerial burst fuse Bomb Dimensions: 711mm length x 203mm diameter Appearance: Bomb body and tail painted grey/green or pale blue with red base plug and red or green incendiary markings. Steel construction. Operation: A charge blows off the base plate, firing a plume of incendiary mixture 100 yds. Approx 1 second later the HE charge detonates.
Project Innovation Centre Medway
Client: Project Centre 1-3 Manor Road, Chatham, Kent, ME4 6AE Report Ref: DRA-19-1123 +44 (0) 207 117 2492 www.brimstoneuxo.com Info Source: W, Ramsey.1988 / various news sources [email protected] Title: BRITISH / ALLIED WWII LAND SERVICE AMMUNITION - MOST COMMON / HAZARDOUS APPENDIX: 3.1
No. 76 Self Igniting Grenade (SIP)
Construction: Glass bottle and metal stopper Weight: 0.59kg Dimensions: 152mm x 63mm Hazardous Fill: White Phosphorus and Benzene Fuse: n/a Appearance: White / off yellow milk bottle Hazards: Choking fumes of Phosphorus Pentoxide and Sulphur Dioxide, as well as heat. Severe burns if comes into contact with skin. Remarks: By August 1941 well over 6,000,000 of these grenades were available and mainly issued to the Home Guard.
No. 36 Hand Grenade (Mills Bomb)
Construction: Metal Dimensions: 95mm x 61mm Weight: 760g Fill weight: 71g Hazardous Fill: Baratol Fuse: Percussion cap and 4 second time delay fuse Hazards: Blast, fragmentation. ~30m effective range. Remarks: >70 million were produced between 1915 and the 1980s
No. 69 (Blast) Hand Grenade
Construction: Bakelite (plastic) Dimensions: 114mm x 60mm Weight: 383g Fill weight: 92g Hazardous Fill: Baratol, Amatol or Lyddite Fuse: ‘All-Ways’ Impact fuse Hazards: Blast effect. <20m effective range. Remarks: Green bands around the grenade signified a HE fill.
Project Innovation Centre Medway
Client: Project Centre 1-3 Manor Road, Chatham, Kent, ME4 6AE Report Ref: DRA-19-1123 +44 (0) 207 117 2492 www.brimstoneuxo.com Info Source: various sources [email protected] Title: BRITISH / ALLIED WWII LAND SERVICE AMMUNITION - MOST COMMON / HAZARDOUS APPENDIX: 3.2
2” ML Mortar - High Explosive
Weight: 1.02kg Dimensions: 51mm x 290mm Hazardous Fill: 200g of RDX/TNT Fuse: Impact fuse Appearance: Cylindrical shape. Brown body, green and red bands, five finned tail Variants: Several smoke, inert practice and parachute illumination versions were manufactured Remarks: Common anti-personnel weapon in use with British Army throughout WWII. >12.5 million HE rounds were produced in 1942 alone
3” ML Mortar - High Explosive
Weight: 4.5kg Dimensions: 81mm x 490mm Hazardous Fill: 882g of RDX/TNT Fuse: Impact fuse Appearance: Pear-drop shape. Brown body, green and red bands, five finned tail Variants: Several smoke, white Phosphorus, inert practice and parachute illumination versions were manufactured Remarks: Common anti-personnel weapon in use with British Army throughout WWII. >6.5 million HE rounds were produced in 1942 alone
PIAT Anti-Tank Weapon
Projectile Type: HEAT - shaped charge Projectile Dimensions: 400mm x 90mm Hazardous Fill: Hollow HE charge and small solid propellant charge Fill Weight: 1.13kg (charge) Fuse: Impact fuse Remarks: 115,000 launchers were produced in Britain during WWII and the PIAT was used by most Allied armies during this conflict
Project Innovation Centre Medway
Client: Project Centre 1-3 Manor Road, Chatham, Kent, ME4 6AE Report Ref: DRA-19-1123 +44 (0) 207 117 2492 www.brimstoneuxo.com Info Source: various sources [email protected] Title: BRITISH WWII ANTI-AIRCRAFT MUNITIONS - MOST COMMONLY DEPLOYED APPENDIX: 4
HAA Battery - 3.7” QF Shell
Shell Weight: 12.7kg Shell Dimensions: 94mm x 438mm Fill Weight: 1.1kg Fill Type: TNT Fuse Type: Mechanical Time Delay fuse Appearance: Grey body, copper driving bands, brass neck Rate of Fire: 10 - 20 rpm Ceiling: 9,000 - 18,000m Variants: HE or shrapnel shells. Note, the 4.5” gun was also used in an HAA role throughout the UK.
LAA Battery - 40mm Bofors Shell
Shell Weight: 0.84kg Shell Dimensions: 40mm x 180mm Fill Weight: 70g Fill Type: TNT Fuse Type: Impact fuse Appearance: Grey body, copper driving bands, brass neck Rate of Fire: 120 rpm Ceiling: 7,000m Variants: HE or AP shells. Both with rear tracer compartment
Z Battery - 3” U.P Rocket
Rocket Weight: 24.5kg Warhead Weight: 1.94kg Filling: TNT warhead. Black Powder solid fuel rocket motor. Fuse Type: Mechanical Time Delay fuse Rocket Dimensions: 1,930mm x 76mm Ceiling: 6,770m Operation: Fired from single, tandem and (later) 36 x rail launchers (Z Batteries). Limited use throughout the UK.
Project Innovation Centre Medway
Client: Project Centre 1-3 Manor Road, Chatham, Kent, ME4 6AE Report Ref: DRA-19-1123 +44 (0) 207 117 2492 www.brimstoneuxo.com Info Source: W, Ramsey.1988 / various news sources [email protected] Title: BRITISH WWII RAF PRACTICE BOMBS APPENDIX: 5
Mk.I and Mk.II: Smoke Bombs, MK III: Flash Bomb
Variants: Smoke bombs, Flash bombs Weights 8.5lb, 10lb, 11lb, 25lb Dimensions: Lengths: 16”, 18” and 22”, Diameters: 3”, 4” and 8” Hazardous Fill: Flash: gunpowder and Magnesium (1lb) Smoke: stannic chloride, sodium phosphate and titanium tetrachloride (1lb) Fuse: Impact fuse Appearance: White paint, black text, 2 x green lines (smoke) or 2 x red lines (flash) Remarks: The bomb head is inert weight. The rear half between the tail assembly and head contains the hazardous fill
Bottom Three: Diagrams of the three practice bomb weights, showing their internal design Right: Photograph of an expended 10lb practice bomb recently recovered by Brimstone at RAF Hucknall Far Right: Photograph of a complete, corroded 10lb practice bomb
Project Innovation Centre Medway
Client: Project Centre 1-3 Manor Road, Chatham, Kent, ME4 6AE Report Ref: DRA-19-1123 +44 (0) 207 117 2492 www.brimstoneuxo.com Info Source: various sources [email protected] Title: BRITISH / ALLIED WWII CANNON AMMUNITION APPENDIX: 6
20mm Cannon Ammunition (various)
Cartridge Weight: 256g (approx.) Total Cartridge length: 182mm (approx.) Hazardous Fill: Various HE, incendiary and tracer compositions. Typically TNT, Tetryl and Pentolite. Fuse: Impact fuse Appearance: Cylindrical shape. Brown body, green and red bands, five finned tail Variants: Oerlikon and Hispano 20mm ammunition was deployed in the UK during WWII. These varied slightly in shape and also in the colours used to identify different projectile types. Remarks: Today, 20mm rounds of WWII vintage may be found unexpended as full single cartridges or in belts of multiple cartridges. Or expended, i.e just the fused projectile without the brass base.
Recent WWII 20mm rounds find
Bottom Right: Colour WWII belted identification of Hispano rounds 20mm rounds Bottom Left: Colour identification of Oerlikon rounds
Project Innovation Centre Medway
Client: Project Centre 1-3 Manor Road, Chatham, Kent, ME4 6AE Report Ref: DRA-19-1123 +44 (0) 207 117 2492 www.brimstoneuxo.com Info Source: various sources [email protected] Title: GLOSSARY APPENDIX: 7
AA Anti-Aircraft (defences) AFS Auxiliary Fire Service AP Anti-Personnel ARP Air Raid Precautions ASW Anti-Submarine Warfare BDU Bomb Disposal Unit (historic term for EOD) Bgl Below Ground Level EOC Explosive Ordnance Clearance EOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal FP Fire Pot (German bomb) GI Ground Investigation HAA Heavy Anti-Air (gun battery) Ha Hectare (10,000m2) HE High Explosive IB Incendiary Bomb Kg Kilogram LAA Light Anti Air (gun battery) LCC London County Council LRRB Long Range Rocket Bomb (V2) LSA Land Service Ammunition Luftwaffe German Air Force OB Oil Bomb (German bomb) PM Parachute Mine (German bomb) RAF Royal Air Force RFC Royal Flying Corps RN Royal Navy (British) RNAS Royal Naval Air Service ROF Royal Ordnance Factory SAA Small Arms Ammunition SD2 2kg AP bomb (German bomb) SI Site Investigation U/C Unclassified (German) bomb UP Unrotating Projectile (British 3” AA rocket) USAF United States Air Force (Post-WWII) USAAF United States Army Air Force (WWII) UX Unexploded UXB Unexploded Bomb UXO Unexploded Ordnance V1 German Flying (pilotless) bomb - “Doodlebug” V2 German LRRB - “Big Ben” WAAF Women’s Auxiliary Air Force WWI World War One WWII World War Two
Project Innovation Centre Medway
Client: Project Centre 1-3 Manor Road, Chatham, Kent, ME4 6AE Report Ref: DRA-19-1123 +44 (0) 207 117 2492 www.brimstoneuxo.com Info Source: n/a [email protected] Title: BIBLIOGRAPHY APPENDIX: 8
• Bates. H. E, Flying Bombs Over England, Frogletts Publications Ltd, 1994. • Bulloch. G, Steeds J E, Green K, Sainsbury M G, Brockwell J S & Slade N J, Land Contamination: Technical Guidance on Special Sites: MoD Land, Environment Agency, 2001. • CIRIA, C681: Unexploded Ordnance (UXO), A Guide for the Construction Industry, 2009. • Clarke. N. J, Luftwaffe Target Reconnaissance, German Aerial Photography 1939-1942, 1996. • Clarke. N. J, Adolf’s British Holiday Snaps: Luftwaffe Aerial Reconnaissance Photographs of England, Scotland and Wales, 2012. • Cocroft. W. D, Dangerous Energy, Historic England, 2000. • Dobinson. C. S, AA Command: Britain's Anti-Aircraft Defences of the Second World War, Methuen Publishing Ltd, 2001. • Dobinson. C. S, Fields of Deception - Britain’s Bombing Decoys of World War II, Methuen Publishing Ltd, 2013. • Fleischer. W, German Air-Dropped Weapons to 1945, Midland Publishing. 2004. • Jappy. M. J, Danger UXB: The Remarkable Story of the Disposal of Unexploded Bombs during the Second World War. Channel 4 Books, 2001. • Morris. J, German Air Raids on Britain: 1914-1918, Nonsuch Publishing, 2007. • Price. A, Blitz on Britain 1939-45, Sutton Publishing Ltd, 2000. • Ramsey. W, The Blitz Then and Now: Vol 1, Battle of Britain Prints International Limited, 1987. • Ramsey. W, The Blitz Then and Now: Vol 2, Battle of Britain Prints International Limited, 1988. • Ramsey. W, The Blitz Then and Now: Vol 3, Battle of Britain Prints International Limited, 1990. • Whiting. C, Britain Under Fire: The Bombing of Britain’s Cities 1940-1945, Pen & Sword Books Ltd, 1999. Additional: • Brooks. R, J, Kent Airfields in the Second World War, Countryside Books, 1998 • Gulvin. K, R, Kent Home Guard: A History, J. M. Preston, 1980 • Headland Archaeology, Archaeological and Built Heritage Impact Assessment - Innovation Park Medway, 2018 • Lombardi, P, Short Stirling: The First of the RAF Heavy Bombers, Fonthill Media, 2015 • Ogley. B, Kent at War: The Unconquered County 1939-1945, 1994. • Rootes. A, Front Line County Kent at War 1939-45, Robert Hale Ltd, 1980. • Smith. V, Kent’s 20th Century Military and Civil Defences Part 2 - Medway, Kent Archaeological Society, 2014 • Wood. D, et al, The Narrow Margin - The Battle of Britain and The Rise of Air Power 1930-1940, Tri Service Press, 1961.
Project Innovation Centre Medway
Client: Project Centre 1-3 Manor Road, Chatham, Kent, ME4 6AE Report Ref: DRA-19-1123 +44 (0) 207 117 2492 www.brimstoneuxo.com Info Source: n/a [email protected] 1-3 Manor Road, +44 (0) 20 7117 2492 Chatham, www.brimstoneuxo.com Kent, ME4 6AE [email protected]
INTEGRITY • PROFESSIONALISM • KNOWLEDGE
Central Consultation and Enforcement Team Maidstone Fire Station Loose Road Maidstone T 01622 212421 ME15 9QB E-mail [email protected]
Medway Council Planning service Your ref: Gun Wharf MC/19/1556 Dock road Inspector: Chatham Watch Manager Mark Thompson Kent Date: ME4 4TR 19 June 2019
FAO. Prem Velayutham-Smith
Dear Madam
County of Kent Act 1981 Section 53
Re: Innovation Park, Rochester,, Kent, ME1 2XX Planning Application No: MC/19/1556
I write with reference to the above planning application. The plans on the documents available on the planning portal do not show sufficient detail of the access to the site for the fire and rescue service, as required by section 53 of the above legislation. In order that I can confirm that sufficient access is provided, I ask that you forward more detailed plans to this office. I enclose a copy of our Guidance Note 007.
If you are in any doubt as to the obligations placed upon you by the legislation, or if there is any relevant matter upon which you require clarification, please contact this Fire Safety Office.
Yours faithfully,
Mark Thompson
Fire Safety Watch Manager
Printed in black and white www.kent.fire-uk.org Chief Executive ‘Reducing our impact on the environment’ Ann Millington
Page 1 of 3
GN.007 – Guidance for Providing Adequate Access for Fire Appliances Under the County of Kent Act 1981
1 Town and Country Planning
Unless it is endorsed, or is accompanied by a notice, indicating that Section 53 of the County of Kent Act 1981 applies, a planning permission is exempt from any requirement concerning means of access to a building, or neighbouring building.
Section 53: Access for Fire and Rescue Service
District Councils are required to reject plans deposited under Building Regulations unless after consultation with the Fire and Rescue Service (Fire and Rescue Authority) they are satisfied that the plans show:-
"That there will be adequate means of access for the Fire and Rescue Service to the building, or the building as extended, and
That the building, or the building as extended, will not render inadequate the existing means of access for the Fire and Rescue Service to a neighbouring building".
2 Access Requirements for the Kent Fire and Rescue Service
The access requirements resulting from a Building Regulations application are in two parts. The first is the access to the proposed buildings or extended buildings at the site upon which the building work is to take place. This is termed the 'on-site' access.
On-site access is a requirement of the Building Regulations 2010 Volume 1 and 2 and must be complied with to the satisfaction of the Building Control Authority. Also compliance with Part B5: Section 16: Vehicle access of the Approved Document B to the Building Regulations fulfils the on-site access requirement of Section 53 of the County of Kent Act, and those of the Fire and Rescue Service.
The second part of the access requirement of Section 53 of the County of Kent Act is the 'off-site' access.
This consists of the following –
Access to the building site road(s), and
Access to any adjacent building(s) adversely affected by the building work, by or from a suitable existing road.
3 Off-Site Access
Roads, bridges etc. meeting the criteria detailed below –
Roads not less than 3.7 metres wide with at least the carrying capacity of the required fire appliance (see the Dimensions Table below).
Having no overhead structure or cables less than 4 metres above the ground.
Printed in black and white www.kent.fire-uk.org Chief Executive ‘Reducing our impact on the environment’ Ann Millington
Page 2 of 3
Bridges having a weight restriction of not less than the weight of the Kent Fire and Rescue Service fire appliance expected to use it (see Dimensions Table below).
Where "Pinch points" are permitted, with the prior approval of the Fire and Rescue Service and the local authority, they are not to be less than 3.1 metres wide (see Dimensions Table below).
4 Minimum Acceptable Access Dimensions
The Table below details the minimum acceptable dimensions required for access by the Building Regulations, Kent Fire and Rescue Service appliances are in brackets below.
ACCESS FOR FIRE AND RESCUE SERVICE
Printed in black and white www.kent.fire-uk.org Chief Executive ‘Reducing our impact on the environment’ Ann Millington
Page 3 of 3
Protecting and serving the people of Kent
Mr David Nunoo Direct Line: 01622 653234 Senior Engineer Highways E-mail: [email protected] Project Centre st Unit 2 Holford Yard Date: 1 March 2021 London Ref: MW-375/20/3237/AF1 WC1X 9HD
Dear Mr Nunoo,
Thank you for the opportunity to comment in regard to:
Application: MC/19/1556 Location: Innovation Park Medway, Laker Road, Rochester, ME1 3QU Proposal: The Town and Country Planning (Development Management Procedure) (England) Order 2015 (Regulation 38) and the Town and Country Planning (Environmental Impact Assessment) Regulation 2017 as amended - preparation of Local Development Order and accompanying Environmental Statement in support of the creation of a mixed use business park, featuring c101,000sqm of predominantly high tech and innovation oriented E(g)/B2 commercial uses.
We have reviewed this application in regard to Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
21.docx
- 03 (CPTED) and in accordance with the National Planning Policy Framework (NPPF). Please note we - utilise the PCPI (Police Crime Prevention Initiatives) Secured By Design (SBD) standards and specifications when commenting on developments. For this scheme the SBD Commercial 2015 and SBD Homes 2019 guides, which can be downloaded from the SBD website at: https://www.securedbydesign.com/guidance/design-guides . We also use the PCPI Park Mark Safer Parking Scheme when commenting on car parks and parking areas, further information is available on the BPA (British Parking Association) website at: http://www.parkmark.co.uk/ .
We understand that Project Centre are working as client representatives for Medway Council for this DOCO reviewDOCO Innovation Park Medway Laker Road Rochester01 scheme and that the scheme was granted approval on 17th June 2019 and that “Project Centre is \ facilitating the design of the access routes within the scheme”.
We note that the scheme will comprise two sites, Northern and Southern and I will comment against each site below in regard to the road layouts and access at this time. We understand that the developer will contact us in due course regarding the design of each commercial unit and carparking
areas etc. 375)Medway Innovation Park RochesterAirportsite
- (MW
Northern Site \ Medway \ The three new junctions (The Gateway x 2 and The Boulevard) onto Laker Road are noted on drawing number 1000005680-4-N-0100-00 Rev A. Provided these junctions comply with current
Medway Council / KKC Highways / Highways England standards and specifications and that Kent 1 CPDA 1 PlanningApplications
Fire and Rescue Service (KFRS) have been consulted regarding access for their vehicles, then the \ CPDA
access points, they appear acceptable from a policing access aspect. KFRS can be contacted via \ PVP PVP Dept
email at [email protected] . \ Groups \ The two emergency access routes to either side of Runway Park will need to have vehicle gates or lockable dropping bollards, to secure these routes against unauthorised vehicle access.
kisprod.netr.ecis.police.uk
\ \
Kent Police, Sutton Road, Maidstone, Kent, ME15 9BZ This is available in
Telephone: 101 Website: www.kent.police.uk large print on request Kent Police : Form No. 3058c rev 5/08 v5.1
Lighting. Please note, whilst we are not qualified lighting engineers, any lighting plan for the whole site (Northern and Southern) should be approved by a professional lighting engineer (e.g. a Member of the ILP), particularly where a lighting condition is imposed, to help avoid conflict and light pollution. Bollard lighting should be avoided, SBD Homes 2019 states:
“18.3 Bollard lighting is purely for wayfinding and can be easily obscured. It does not project sufficient light at the right height making it difficult to recognise facial features and as a result causes an increase in the fear of crime. It should be avoided.”
Lighting of all roads including main, side roads, cul de sacs and car parking areas should be to BS5489-1:2020 in accordance with SBD and the British Parking Association (BPA) Park Mark Safer Parking Scheme specifications and standards.
Any lack of lighting for unadopted roads is a concern as it will encourage business and vehicle owners to install ad-hoc lighting, likely to cause conflict and light pollution. A professional lighting engineer will be able to design a plan to aid security without risking light pollution, a dual solution is possible.
Southern Site
We note the new access road to serve the Innovation Centre Medway. We understand that the footways will be 1.2m in width. We recommend that footways should be 3m in width in line with SBD specifications, for both the Northern and Southern sites.
The three junctions from Maidstone Road and the remaining junctions opposite the parking area
into the site between are noted on drawing number 1000005680-4-S-0100-00 Rev A. Provided these
21.docx
- 03 junctions comply with current Medway Council / KKC Highways / Highways England standards and - specifications and that Kent Fire and Rescue Service (KFRS) have been consulted regarding access for their vehicles, then the access points, they appear acceptable from a policing access aspect. KFRS can be contacted via email at [email protected] .
Lighting should conform to BS5489-1:2020 as detailed for the Northern site above.
This information is provided by Kent Police DOCO’s and refers to situational crime prevention.
This advice focuses on CPTED and Community Safety with regard to this specific planning DOCO reviewDOCO Innovation Park Medway Laker Road Rochester01 application. \
Yours sincerely
375)Medway Innovation Park RochesterAirportsite
Adrian Fromm - (MW
Designing Out Crime Officer \ Medway Protecting Vulnerable People Command \ PVP Central Community Safety Unit
CPDA 1 PlanningApplications
\
CPDA
\
PVP PVP Dept
\
Groups
\
kisprod.netr.ecis.police.uk
\ \
Kent Police : Form No. 3058c rev 12/05 v2 This map is reproduced from Ordnance Survey material with the permission of Ordnance Survey on behalf of the Controller of Her Majesty's Stationery Office © Crown copyright. Unauthorised reproduction infringes Crown copyright and may lead to prosecution or civil proceedings. (100032379) (2020) | Contains Ordnance Survey data © Crown copyright and database right (2020) HAZARD WARNING: ELEVATED UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE RISKS HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED ACROSS THE SITE. THE CONTRACTOR SHALL TAKE MEASURES TO ENSURE THAT NOTE: RISKS TO THE HEALTH & SAFETY OF ALL USERS IS MITIGATED TO ALARP LEVEL, INCLUDING BUT NOT 1. Refer to GA's and Setting-out drawings for location. IPM Norther Site Planting Schedule LIMITED TO CARRYING OUT MAGNETOMETER SURVEYS 2. To be read in conjunction with the following drawings and AND THE ENGAGEMENT OF A QUALIFIED EOD ENGINEER. documents: Innovation Park Medway Specification. SERVICES, OVERHEAD LINES AND HIGH VOLTAGE Shrubs ELECTRIC CABLES HAVE ALSO BEEN IDENTIFIED ON THIS 3. All planting details, refer to dwg. 1000005680-4-N-DW-3410, to Number Species Pot Size Density Specification SITE. THE CONTRACTOR SHALL EXAMINE THE STATUTORY be checked on site by the Supervisor. 94 No. Hebe 'Caledonia' 2L 3/m² UNDERTAKERS PLANS AND TAKE MEASURES TO LOCATE 4. The Contractor is to check all drawing information prior to AND IDENTIFY THESE AND OTHER SERVICES ON SITE commencement of works. Any discrepancies or issues to be 600 No. Hebe rakaiensis 2L 3/m² linear planting in regular distance - 4 per metre 79 No. Hebe pinguifolia 'Pagei' 2L BEFORE COMMENCING WORK. ROUTES OF SERVICES reported to the Supervisor immediately. 3/m² SHALL BE PHYSICALLY MARKED OUT ON SITE. THE 59 No. Euonymus alatus 5L 5. All dimensions are in millimetres unless otherwise stated. 1/m² CONTRACTOR SHALL OPERATE A PERMIT TO DIG SYSTEM. 11 No. Hamamelis x intermedia 'Jelena' 5L 6. Hatch patterns are for clarity of drawings and do not represent 1/m² actual materials. 16 No. Hamamelis x intermedia 'Pallida' 5L 1/m² 7. Refer to outline specification for material type descriptions. 303 No. Skimmia japonica 'Fragrans' 5L 3/m² 8. Do not scale from drawings. 46 No. Viburnum x bodnantense 'Dawn' 5L 3/m² 9. Contractor to be aware of risks identified in the Designers' Risk 227 No. Mahonia aquifolium 'Apollo' 5L 3/m² Assessment. 41 No. Viburnum opulus 'Compactum' 5L 3/m² 10. Contractor to check all quantities, dimensions and units shown 93 No. Hebe 'Champagne' 2L 3/m² on drawings prior to placing orders. 11. Soft Landscape Contractor to arrange the planting layout. 12. To be maintained 0.75m clear space around tress. Herbaceous 13. Topsoil - TS6 Topsoil by Bourne Amenity or equivalent and Number Species Pot Size Density certified to BS 3882:2015 Multipurpose Grade, tested by Tim O'Hare Associates or equivalent approved. The soil classification 310 No. Anemone hupehensis 'September Charm' 2L 9/m² and structure is to be Sandy Loam with a medium to coarse 1337 No. Geranium phaeum 'Album' 2L 9/m² granular structure. The source/site of the topsoil is to be 323 No. Geum ‘Prinses Juliana’ 2L 9/m² specified. Topsoil and Subsoil and other Growing Media to be 269 No. Agastache 'Blue Fortune' 2L 5/m² 230 No. Echinops ritro 'Veitch's Blue' 2L suitable for purpose in accordance with Medway Council 5/m² Specification. 340 No. 2L Gaura lindheimeri ‘Whirling Butterflies’ 5/m² 14. Subsoil - Free draining subsoil by Bourne Amenity or equivalent 644 No. 2L Sanguisorba officinalis ‘Tanna’ 5/m² and certified to BS 8601:2013, tested by Tim O'Hare Associates 340 No. Sedum spectabile ‘Autumn Joy’ 2L 5/m² or equivalent approved. High in sand content (minimum 65%) 230 No. Verbena bonariensis ‘Lollipop’ 2L 5/m² with at least 50% of the particles falling into the 'medium' 1242 No. Convallaria majalis 2L 9/m² (0.25-0.5mm) size range and less than 2% organic matter 1242 No. Geranium 'Rozanne' 2L 9/m² present. 1242 No. Geranium pratense 'Mrs Kendall Clark' 2L 9/m² 15. Plants/Trees to be materially undamaged, sturdy, healthy and 1242 No. Geranium sanguineum 2L 9/m² vigorous. According to relevant parts of BS 3936. Should also be 829 No. Helleborus argutifolius 2L 9/m² grown in the United Kingdom for at least one growing season, unless otherwise approved. 829 No. Monarda 'Fireball' 2L 9/m² 16. Trees to prepared and transplanted according to BS 4043. 419 No. Penstemon 'Raven' 2L 9/m² Underground guying system also to BS 4043. 1276 No. Pulmonaria 'Blue Ensign' 2L 9/m² 17. Refer to EMEP Ecological recommendations for bat and bird 823 No. Anemone sylvestris 2L 5/m² 285 No. Aster amellus 'King George' 2L boxes number and location, habitats protection and mitigation 9/m² measures. 285 No. Bergenia cordifolia 'Purpurea' 2L 9/m² 18. Refer to Arboricultural Report for any tree removal. Existing trees 424 No. 2L Sedum spectabile ‘Autumn Joy’ 9/m² and root protection areas to be protected in accordance with BS 667 No. Bergenia 'Silberlicht' 2L 9/m² 5837. 447 No. Geranium macrorrhizum 'Bevan's Variety' 2L 9/m² 19. Manufacturers to provide specification documents, data sheets 447 No. Tiarella 'Spring Symphony' 2L 9/m² and installation method statements for all products, to ensure 76 No. Eryngium bourgatii 'Picos Amethyst' 2L 9/m² they conform to relevant British Standards and design life 76 No. Geranium phaeum 2L 9/m² requirements. 151 No. Helleborus × hybridus (Mix) 2L 9/m² 20. Ensure tree root airpot is not larger than rootball shown on dwg. 114 No. Veronicastrum virginicum 'Album' 2L 9/m² 1000005680-4-N-DW-3410. 21. As per Earthworks Material Acceptability Assessment document 39 No. Anemone hybrida 'Honorine Jobert' 2L 5/m² number A119070-TGEE-S0-XX-TN-C-0002, all site won 24 No. Centaurea nigra 2L 5/m² earthwork material can be used as landscape fill (Class 4) to 24 No. Digitalis purpurea 2L 5/m² 122 No. Aster frikartii 'Monch' 2L form approximately 1.0 m high landscape bunds. The earth 9/m² bunds will be topsoiled. 63 No. Geranium sylvaticum 'Mayflower' 2L 9/m² 22. Specialist soft landscape contractor to set out planting for 63 No. Helleborus foetidus 2L 9/m² approval by Supervisor/Landscape Architect. 63 No. Lobelia cardinalis 2L 9/m² 23. Runway Park decorative lighting: It is the contractors' 182 No. Rudbeckia 'Goldsturm' 2L 9/m² responsibility to provide a detailed design for the footpath 64 No. Digitalis ferrunginea 2L 5/m² lighting and architectural / feature lighting within Runway Park. 124 No. Echinacea purpurea 'Magnus' 2L 5/m² The contractor must ensure that the lighting design is fit for 64 No. Lobelia cardinalis 2L 5/m² purpose, compliant with relevant standard / guidelines, and is fully coordinated with all associated disciplines. The contractor shall obtain written approval for the detailed lighting design from Wildflowers Medway BC prior to ordering any materials. For the indicative Number Species Pot Size Density location of lighting features / equipment within Runway Park, please refer to drawing series 1000005680-3-N-01310 and 419 No. Primula veris 2L 9/m² Appendix 1/10a of the Specification. 24. Wayfinding: It is the contractors' responsibility to provide a Grasses detailed design for the wayfinding. The contractor must ensure that the wayfinding design is fit for purpose, compliant with Number Species Pot Size Density relevant standard / guidelines, and is fully coordinated with all 2816 No. Sesleria autumnalis 2L 9/m² associated disciplines. The contractor shall obtain written 340 No. Calamagrostis × acutiflora 'Karl Foerster' 2L 5/m² approval for the detailed wayfinding design from Medway BC 1967 No. Miscanthus sinensis 'Kleine Silberspinne' 2L 5/m² prior to ordering any materials. For information on Wayfinding 1822 No. Carex 'Ice Dance' 2L 5/m² Strategy and its indicative location, please refer to Appendix 1716 No. Calamagrostis brachytricha 2L 9/m² 1/10b of the Specification. 1067 No. Calamagrostis epigejos 2L 5/m² 1408 No. Carex elata 'Aurea' 2L 5/m² 706 No. Carex pendula 2L 5/m² 1222 No. Luzula nivea 2L 9/m² 355 No. Stipa tenuissima 2L 9/m² 182 No. Molinia caerulea 'Dauerstrahl' 2L 9/m² 656 No. Miscanthus sinensis ‘Graziella’ 2L 5/m²
Ferns Number Species Pot Size Density
232 No. Asplenium scolopendrium 2L 5/m² 232 No. Dryopteris wallichiana 2L 5/m²
Bulbs Number Species Density Specification
4415 No. Camassia leichtlinii 9/m² 4415 No. Camassia quamash 9/m² 3380 No. Nectaroscordum siculum 2/m² Planted in drifts within Mix 4550 No. Hyacinthoides non-scripta 3/m² Planted in drifts within Mix 356 No. Eremurus bungei 1/m² A 08.01.21 FOR TENDER CM DK JT 707 No. Allium 'Purple Rain' 2/m² 1169 No. Narcissus ‘February Gold’ 5/m² Planted in small groups along the edge of beds approx 0.8m width - 22.09.20 ORIGINAL ISSUE CM DK JT 429 No. Galanthus 'S. Arnott' 6/m² To be planted under trees - approx. 1.5m diameter Rev Date Description Drn Chk App 132 No. Narcissus 'Cheerfulness' 5/m² 208 No. Narcissus 'Thalia' This drawing has been specifically prepared to meet the requirements of the named client and may 5/m² contain design and innovative features which differ from conventional design standards. 492 No. Narcissus 'February Gold' 5/m² 344 No. Allium stipitatum 'Mount Everest' 2/m²
Grass Areas Weight Seed Mix Name Seed Mix Supplier Coverage Density
24060 g EG6 – MEADOW GRASS MIXTURE Emorsgate Seeds 100% Coverage 5g/m²
part of Marston Holdings
Unit 2 Holford Yard London 11500g Southern band grass area of 2300sq.m WC1X 9HD EG6 - Meadow Grass mixture - Emorsgate Seeds - 5g/m2 Tel. 0330 1358 950 Mail. [email protected] Web. www.projectcentre.co.uk Contractor to check all quantities, dimensions and units show on drawings prior to placing orders. Client
Project
INNOVATION PARK MEDWAY
Drawing Title NORTHERN SITE PROPOSED PLANTING PLAN PLANTING SCHEDULE
Drawing Status FOR TENDER PLANTING SCHEDULE
NTS @ A1 Drawn Designed Date Scale Size CM DK SEP 2020 NTS A1
Drawing No. Rev 1000005680-4-N-DW-3200 PLANTING PLAN-19 A Office Registered in England No. 02625312 | Unit 2 Holford Yard, London, WC1X 9HD
PLOT DATE: 08/01/2021 14:37:01 | CAD REFERENCE: \\itservices.local\shared$\Project Centre\CAD\00-PROJECT\1000005680\Drawings\Northern_Site\Series_3000\1000005680-4-N-DW-3200 PLANTING PLAN.dwg | CMa | This map is reproduced from Ordnance Survey material with the permission of Ordnance Survey on behalf of the Controller of Her Majesty's Stationery Office © Crown copyright. Unauthorised reproduction infringes Crown copyright and may lead to prosecution or civil proceedings. (100032379) (2019) | Contains Ordnance Survey data © Crown copyright and database right (2019) Notes:
1. Speed limit of the Gateway streets and The Boulevard are yet to be confirmed. Design code states 20-30mph. Visibility splays have therefore been based on assumed 85th percentile speeds of 25mph. 2. Medway have confirmed that buses will enter the site via the Boulevard only (travelling eastbound), and exit via the Gateway Streets (shown as junctions 1 and 3). For all THE GATEWAY other manoeuvres at junctions, the swept path of a refuse vehicle has been shown.
N1.1 THE BOULEVARD
N1.4 N3.1
43m x 2.4m VISIBILITY SIGHT LINE 43m x 2.4m VISIBILITY SIGHT LINE
LAKER ROAD LAKER ROAD
VISIBILITY SPLAY - JUNCTION 1: BETWEEN LAKER ROAD AND THE GATEWAY VISIBILITY SPLAY - JUNCTION 2: BETWEEN LAKER ROAD AND THE BOULEVARD
JUNCTION 4 KEY PLAN
N5.1
N2.5
PROPOSED MSCP N2.2 N4.5 N5.2 PROPOSED N4.2 MSCP
N2.7
N4.7
N2.4
N4.4 N5.3 N5.4
N2.1 N4.1
N4.6
N2.3 N2.6
N4.3
N5.5
N1.2
N5.6
N3.6 N3.2 N3.5
N1.1
N1.3 N3.4 PROPOSED N3.7 MSCP PROPOSED N1.4 MSCP N3.1 N3.3 N5.7
JUNCTION 1 JUNCTION 2 JUNCTION 3
THE GATEWAY
A 10-02-2020 FORMAL ISSUE WB DN LL - 03-02-2020 ORIGINAL ISSUE SM DN LL THE GATEWAY Rev Date Description Drn Chk App N3.7 This drawing has been specifically prepared to meet the requirements of the named client and may 43m x 2.4m VISIBILITY SIGHT LINE contain design and innovative features which differ from conventional design standards.
N5.7
Unit 2 Holford Yard London WC1X 9HD Tel. 0330 1358 950 Mail. [email protected] Web. www.projectcentre.co.uk
Client THE BOULEVARD
Project 43m x 2.4m VISIBILITY SIGHT LINE INNOVATION PARK MEDWAY LAKER ROAD N4.2
Drawing Title N2.7 VISIBILITY SPLAYS
Drawing Status FOR INFORMATION
VISIBILITY SPLAY - JUNCTION 3: BETWEEN LAKER ROAD AND THE GATEWAY VISIBILITY SPLAY - JUNCTION 4: BETWEEN THE BOULEVARD AND THE GATEWAY Drawn Designed Date Scale Size SM DN FEB 2020 1:250 A1
Drawing No. Rev 1000005680-3-N-612-01 A Office Registered in England No. 02625312 | Unit 2 Holford Yard, London, WC1X 9HD
PLOT DATE: 10/02/2020 18:03:20 | CAD REFERENCE: G:\Project Centre\CAD\00-PROJECT\1000005680\1000005680-3-N-612.dwg | WBridgland | This map is reproduced from Ordnance Survey material with the permission of Ordnance Survey on behalf of the Controller of Her Majesty's Stationery Office © Crown copyright. Unauthorised reproduction infringes Crown copyright and may lead to prosecution or civil proceedings. (100032379) (2019) | Contains Ordnance Survey data © Crown copyright and database right (2019) Notes:
1. Speed limit of the Gateway streets and The Boulevard are yet to be confirmed. Design code states 20-30mph. Visibility splays have therefore been based on assumed 85th percentile speeds of 25mph. 2. Medway have confirmed that buses will enter the site via the Boulevard only (travelling eastbound), and exit via the Gateway Streets (shown as junctions 1 and 3). For all other manoeuvres at junctions, the swept path of a refuse vehicle has been shown.
THE GATEWAY THE GATEWAY
KEY PLAN
N5.1
N2.5
PROPOSED MSCP N2.2 N4.5 N5.2 PROPOSED N4.2 MSCP
N2.7
N4.7
N2.4
N4.4 N5.3 N5.4
N2.1 N4.1
N4.6
N2.3 N2.6
N4.3
N5.5
N1.2
N5.6
N3.6 N3.2 N3.5
N1.1
N1.3 N3.4 PROPOSED N3.7 MSCP PROPOSED N1.4 MSCP N3.1 N3.3 N5.7
A 10-02-2020 FORMAL ISSUE WB DN LL - 03-02-2020 ORIGINAL ISSUE WB DD LL Rev Date Description Drn Chk App
This drawing has been specifically prepared to meet the requirements of the named client and may contain design and innovative features which differ from conventional design standards.
Unit 2 Holford Yard London WC1X 9HD Tel. 0330 1358 950 Mail. [email protected] Web. www.projectcentre.co.uk
Client N2.1 N2.1
Project
INNOVATION PARK MEDWAY
Drawing Title VISIBILITY AT PEDESTRIAN CROSSINGS
Drawing Status FOR INFORMATION PEDESTRIAN VISIBILITY ALONG THE GATEWAY PEDESTRIAN VISIBILITY ALONG THE GATEWAY
Assumed 85 percentile speed on approach 25mph Assumed 85 percentile speed on approach 25mph Drawn Designed Date Scale Size Desirable minimum visibility 50 metres Absolute minimum visibility 40 metres SM DN FEB 2020 1:200 A1
Drawing No. Rev 1000005680-3-N-612-02 A Office Registered in England No. 02625312 | Unit 2 Holford Yard, London, WC1X 9HD
PLOT DATE: 10/02/2020 18:03:26 | CAD REFERENCE: G:\Project Centre\CAD\00-PROJECT\1000005680\1000005680-3-N-612.dwg | WBridgland | This map is reproduced from Ordnance Survey material with the permission of Ordnance Survey on behalf of the Controller of Her Majesty's Stationery Office © Crown copyright. Unauthorised reproduction infringes Crown copyright and may lead to prosecution or civil proceedings. (100032379) (2019) | Contains Ordnance Survey data © Crown copyright and database right (2019) Notes:
1. Speed limit of the Gateway streets and The Boulevard are yet to be confirmed. Design code states 20-30mph. Visibility splays have therefore been based on assumed N5.1 85th percentile speeds of 25mph. 2. Medway have confirmed that buses will enter the site via the Boulevard only (travelling eastbound), and exit via the Gateway Streets (shown as junctions 1 and 3). For all other manoeuvres at junctions, the swept path of a refuse vehicle has been shown.
THE GATEWAY
N4.5 PROPOSED PEDESTRIAN VISIBILITY ALONG THE GATEWAY MSCP Assumed 85 percentile speed on approach 25mph Desirable minimum visibility 50 metres KEY PLAN
N5.1
N2.5
PROPOSED MSCP N2.2 N4.5 N5.2 PROPOSED N4.2 MSCP
N2.7
N4.7
N2.4
N4.4 N5.3 N5.4
N2.1 N4.1
N4.6
N2.3 N2.6
N4.3
N5.5
N1.2
N5.6
N3.6 N3.2 N3.5
N1.1
N1.3 N3.4 PROPOSED N3.7 MSCP PROPOSED N1.4 MSCP N3.1 N3.3 N5.1 N5.7
A 10-02-2020 FORMAL ISSUE WB DN LL - 03-02-2020 ORIGINAL ISSUE WB DN LL Rev Date Description Drn Chk App
This drawing has been specifically prepared to meet the requirements of the named client and may contain design and innovative features which differ from conventional design standards.
THE GATEWAY
Unit 2 Holford Yard London WC1X 9HD Tel. 0330 1358 950 Mail. [email protected] Web. www.projectcentre.co.uk
Client
Project
INNOVATION PARK MEDWAY
Drawing Title VISIBILITY AT PEDESTRIAN CROSSINGS
Drawing Status N4.5 FOR INFORMATION PROPOSED PEDESTRIAN VISIBILITY ALONG THE GATEWAY
MSCP Assumed 85 percentile speed on approach 25mph Drawn Designed Date Scale Size Absolute minimum visibility 40 metres SM DN FEB 2020 1:200 A1
Drawing No. Rev 1000005680-3-N-612-03 A Office Registered in England No. 02625312 | Unit 2 Holford Yard, London, WC1X 9HD
PLOT DATE: 10/02/2020 18:03:31 | CAD REFERENCE: G:\Project Centre\CAD\00-PROJECT\1000005680\1000005680-3-N-612.dwg | WBridgland | This map is reproduced from Ordnance Survey material with the permission of Ordnance Survey on behalf of the Controller of Her Majesty's Stationery Office © Crown copyright. Unauthorised reproduction infringes Crown copyright and may lead to prosecution or civil proceedings. (100032379) (2019) | Contains Ordnance Survey data © Crown copyright and database right (2019)
30 MPH ROAD SPEED = SSD: 43M THE GATEWAY SLOW
0 11/05/21 ORIGINAL ISSUE RF BM BM Rev Date Description Drn Chk App
This drawing has been specifically prepared to meet the requirements of the named client and may contain design and innovative features which differ from conventional design standards.
part of Marston Holdings N4.2 N2.5 B2 PROPOSED Unit 2 Holford Yard N2.7 London MSCP WC1X 9HD N2.2 B1 Tel. 0330 1358 950 B2 Mail. [email protected] Web. www.projectcentre.co.uk
Client
Project
INNOVATION PARK MEDWAY
Drawing Title
THE BOULEVARD NORTHERN SITE SSD VISIBILITY SPLAYS SHEET 1 0F 2
Drawing Status PLANNING
Drawn Designed Date Scale Size RF RF MAY 2021 1:250 A1
Drawing No. Rev 1000007033-1-02-SSD VISIBILITY SPLAYS - Office Registered in England No. 02625312 | Unit 2 Holford Yard, London, WC1X 9HD
PLOT DATE: 11/05/2021 17:30:53 | CAD REFERENCE: G:\Project Centre\Project-BST\1000007033 - IPM PLANNING\2 Project Delivery\4 Drawings And Graphics\Drawings\1000007033-1-02-SSD VISIBILITY SPLAYS.dwg | ####### | This map is reproduced from Ordnance Survey material with the permission of Ordnance Survey on behalf of the Controller of Her Majesty's Stationery Office © Crown copyright. Unauthorised reproduction infringes Crown copyright and may lead to prosecution or civil proceedings. (100032379) (2019) | Contains Ordnance Survey data © Crown copyright and database right (2019)
THE GATEWAY 30 MPH ROAD SPEED = SSD: 43M SLOW
0 11/05/21 ORIGINAL ISSUE RF BM BM Rev Date Description Drn Chk App
This drawing has been specifically prepared to meet the requirements of the named client and may contain design and innovative features which differ from conventional design standards.
N4.2 N4.5 B2 PROPOSED N4.7 part of Marston Holdings N2.7 MSCP B2 B1 Unit 2 Holford Yard London WC1X 9HD Tel. 0330 1358 950 Mail. [email protected] Web. www.projectcentre.co.uk
Client
Project
INNOVATION PARK MEDWAY THE BOULEVARD Drawing Title SOUTHERN SITE SSD VISIBILITY SPLAYS SHEET 1 0F 2
Drawing Status PLANNING
Drawn Designed Date Scale Size RF RF MAY 2021 1:250 A1
Drawing No. Rev 1000007033-1-02-SSD VISIBILITY SPLAYS - Office Registered in England No. 02625312 | Unit 2 Holford Yard, London, WC1X 9HD
PLOT DATE: 11/05/2021 17:31:23 | CAD REFERENCE: G:\Project Centre\Project-BST\1000007033 - IPM PLANNING\2 Project Delivery\4 Drawings And Graphics\Drawings\1000007033-1-02-SSD VISIBILITY SPLAYS.dwg | ####### |
Samer Muhandes Your ref
Project Centre Limited 2 Holford Yard Our ref Islington DS_CC_PDE-119855 London Date WC1X 9HD 30 November 2020
Contact Tel 0330 303 0119
Dear Mr Muhandes,
Southern Water – Your build rates and occupation information Site Name: Rochester Airport (Medway Innovation Park), Maidstone Road, Chatham, Kent, ME5 9SD.
We are contacting you to request information which is required by Southern Water in order to prepare for the connection of your development site (as listed above), to our public sewer network.
In April 2018, water companies in England published their new connection charges (part of the charges are also known as the infrastructure charge). A copy of the Southern Water New Connection Charging Document is available on our website: southernwater.co.uk/media/3305/new- connections-services-charging-arrangements-20_21.pdf
Under the new charging rules, our customers can connect to the closest point of connection, to a pipe of equivalent size or greater. If any reinforcement to the public sewer network is required to enable your connection, this will be provided through the new infrastructure charge. It will take time for us to provide any such network reinforcement. To enable us to plan for this, we require some information.
Action request:
Please provide the details of your anticipated occupation dates and build out rate for the site listed above. This information will support us in planning the required works across our region in readiness for your site to be occupied. If we do not receive this information about the site, we may not be able to progress with the work required to prepare for the connection of your site and your development program. Please note this does not constitute a discharge of any pre- commencement condition that may be attached to your planning consent.
Please provide the information in the form below and email this back to us as soon as possible, to the following address: [email protected].
Southern Water, Southern House, Yeoman Road, Worthing, West Sussex, BN13 3NX southernwater.co.uk Southern Water Services Ltd, Registered Office: Southern House, Yeoman Road, Worthing West Sussex BN13 3NX Registered in England No. 2366670
Build Rate & Occupation details
Please fill out the tables below in block capital letters and email this back to us as soon as possible. Please email the form to [email protected]
If the site is not proceeding please email the address above with the site references listed above and a brief description of why it is not going ahead. If you have queries about the information required, please call Developer Services on 0330 303 0119.
Your earliest reply would be much appreciated,
Joff Edevane Growth Planning Lead Business Channels
Southern Water, Southern House, Yeoman Road, Worthing, West Sussex, BN13 3NX southernwater.co.uk Southern Water Services Ltd, Registered Office: Southern House, Yeoman Road, Worthing West Sussex BN13 3NX Registered in England No. 2366670
A. Contact Information in case of further queries: Name of person completing
form Company Phone number Email address Date form completed
B. Site references: Proposal
Site Name (on letter) Site Postcode/location
Planning Reference (on letter)
Planning Authority (on letter)
Our reference (on letter)
C. Site information: Proposed start date / / Proposed connection date / / First occupation date / / Forecast completion date / / Proposed date of full occupancy / / Proposed connecting manhole reference number
Build out period (Per month for each year of development) Year Month 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 20 20 20 20 20
If the site had previous use, please describe the type of previous use: e.g. greenfield/brownfield, block of flats, warehouse etc.
Southern Water, Southern House, Yeoman Road, Worthing, West Sussex, BN13 3NX southernwater.co.uk Southern Water Services Ltd, Registered Office: Southern House, Yeoman Road, Worthing West Sussex BN13 3NX Registered in England No. 2366670
SOUTHERN WATER
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The positions of pipes shown on this plan are believed to be correct, but \ Southern Water Services Ltd accept no responsibility in the event of
inaccuracy. The actual positions should be determined on site. \ \
Based upon Ordnance Survey Digital Data with the permission of the controller of H.M.S.O. Crown Copyright Reserved Licence No. WU 298530 \
O.S. REF: TQ7164NW Scale: 1:1250 Printed By: Mercy Date:\ 30-11-2020
Sewer Plot WTW \ \
WARNING: BAC pipes are constructed of Bonded Asbestos Cement Requested By: \
WARNING: Unknown (UNK) materials may include Bonded Asbestos Cement
\ \
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Samer Muhandes Your ref ------Project Centre Limited 2 Holford Yard Our ref Islington DS_CC_PDE-119855
London Date WC1X 9HD 30 November 2020
Contact Tel 0330 303 0119
Dear Mr Muhandes,
Level 1 Capacity Check Enquiry: Rochester Airport (Medway Innovation Park), Maidstone Road, Chatham, Kent, ME5 9SD. We have completed the capacity check for the above development site and the results are as follows:
Foul Water There is currently inadequate capacity within the foul sewerage network to accommodate a foul flow of 24.38 l/s for the above development at manhole reference TQ74641701 or TQ74640901. The proposed development would increase flows to the public sewerage system which may increase the risk of flooding to existing properties and land. Additional off-site sewers or improvements to existing sewers will be required to provide sufficient capacity to service the development. Southern Water has a duty to provide Network capacity from the point of practical connection (point of equivalent or larger diameter pipe) funded by the New Infrastructure Charge.
Southern Water aim to provide this within 24 months following the date that planning has been granted for developments not identified as strategic sites in our current business plan. Strategic sites are larger developments and will often take longer than 24 months for a full solution to be provided.
The nearest point where capacity is currently available is at Wouldham WTW which is located approximately 2.8 km West of the proposed development site. Rights are not issued for a direct connection to Wastewater Treatment Works (WTW). Please note that connection to the WTW will have to be agreed by Southern Water Services before being carried out.
New Infrastructure Charging Please note as of 1st April 2018 we have moved to the “New Connections Services Charging Arrangements”. We understand that this may cause uncertainty for customers, particularly where they may have already committed to a development based on previous charging arrangements. We have worked with our stakeholders and Water UK to agree a set of principles by which we will base
Southern Water, Southern House, Yeoman Road, Worthing, West Sussex, BN13 3NX southernwater.co.uk Southern Water Services Ltd, Registered Office: Southern House, Yeoman Road, Worthing West Sussex BN13 3NX Registered in England No. 2366670
our charges. Please read through our new charging arrangement documents available at the following link: southernwater.co.uk/developing-building/connection-charging-arrangements
Alternatively, New Appointees and Variations (NAVs), also known as ‘inset’ companies, can provide new connection services or take ownership of the new water and wastewater connection infrastructure provided for a new development. NAVs are appointed by Ofwat and replace the regional water company. It is for the developer to choose whether to use a NAV or the regional water company to supply services for new sites, according to certain legal criteria.
Connecting to our network It should be noted that this information is only a hydraulic assessment of the existing sewerage network and does not grant approval for a connection to the public sewerage system. A formal Sewer Connection (S106) application is required to be completed and approved by Southern Water Services. To make an application visit: developerservices.southernwater.co.uk/
Please note the information provided above does not grant approval for any designs/drawings submitted for the capacity analysis. The results quoted above are only valid for 12 months from the date of issue of this letter.
Should it be necessary to contact us please quote our above reference number relating to this application by email at [email protected]
Yours sincerely,
Joff Edevane Growth Planning Lead Business Channels
Southern Water, Southern House, Yeoman Road, Worthing, West Sussex, BN13 3NX southernwater.co.uk Southern Water Services Ltd, Registered Office: Southern House, Yeoman Road, Worthing West Sussex BN13 3NX Registered in England No. 2366670
Samer Muhandes Your ref ------Project Centre Limited 2 Holford Yard Our ref Islington DS_CC_PDE-120845
London Date WC1X 9HD 30 November 2020
Contact Tel 0330 303 0119
Dear Mr Muhandes,
Level 1 Capacity Check Enquiry: Rochester Airport (Medway Innovation Park), Maidstone Road, Chatham, Kent, ME5 9SD. We have completed the capacity check for the above development site and the results are as follows:
Foul Water There is currently inadequate capacity within the foul sewerage network to accommodate a foul flow of 3.16 l/s for the above development at manhole reference TQ74637804. The proposed development would increase flows to the public sewerage system which may increase the risk of flooding to existing properties and land. Additional off-site sewers or improvements to existing sewers will be required to provide sufficient capacity to service the development. Southern Water has a duty to provide Network capacity from the point of practical connection (point of equivalent or larger diameter pipe) funded by the New Infrastructure Charge.
Southern Water aim to provide this within 24 months following the date that planning has been granted for developments not identified as strategic sites in our current business plan. Strategic sites are larger developments and will often take longer than 24 months for a full solution to be provided.
The nearest point where capacity is currently available is at TQ74643203 which is located approximately 450 metres North West of the proposed development site. Rights are not issued for a direct connection to Wastewater Treatment Works (WTW). Please note that connection to the WTW will have to be agreed by Southern Water Services before being carried out.
New Infrastructure Charging Please note as of 1st April 2018 we have moved to the “New Connections Services Charging Arrangements”. We understand that this may cause uncertainty for customers, particularly where they may have already committed to a development based on previous charging arrangements. We have worked with our stakeholders and Water UK to agree a set of principles by which we will base
Southern Water, Southern House, Yeoman Road, Worthing, West Sussex, BN13 3NX southernwater.co.uk Southern Water Services Ltd, Registered Office: Southern House, Yeoman Road, Worthing West Sussex BN13 3NX Registered in England No. 2366670
our charges. Please read through our new charging arrangement documents available at the following link: southernwater.co.uk/developing-building/connection-charging-arrangements
Alternatively, New Appointees and Variations (NAVs), also known as ‘inset’ companies, can provide new connection services or take ownership of the new water and wastewater connection infrastructure provided for a new development. NAVs are appointed by Ofwat and replace the regional water company. It is for the developer to choose whether to use a NAV or the regional water company to supply services for new sites, according to certain legal criteria.
Connecting to our network It should be noted that this information is only a hydraulic assessment of the existing sewerage network and does not grant approval for a connection to the public sewerage system. A formal Sewer Connection (S106) application is required to be completed and approved by Southern Water Services. To make an application visit: developerservices.southernwater.co.uk/
Please note the information provided above does not grant approval for any designs/drawings submitted for the capacity analysis. The results quoted above are only valid for 12 months from the date of issue of this letter.
Should it be necessary to contact us please quote our above reference number relating to this application by email at [email protected]
Yours sincerely,
Joff Edevane Growth Planning Lead Business Channels
Southern Water, Southern House, Yeoman Road, Worthing, West Sussex, BN13 3NX southernwater.co.uk Southern Water Services Ltd, Registered Office: Southern House, Yeoman Road, Worthing West Sussex BN13 3NX Registered in England No. 2366670
From: Atkinson, Jonathan To: Michael Green; KSLPlanning Cc: Samer Muhandes Subject: RE: Medway Innovation Park - proposed surface water ground infiltration Date: 05 November 2019 09:29:56
Michael We are aware of this application and have commented on scope and had contact about drainage previously. Our responses related to this application should be on the planning portal, but my Sustainable Places colleagues can send you copies I am sure. In principal, in the right locations and using appropriate depths and designs and relevant pollution control measures, we are not against clean surface water entering the ground within the development footprint. There would be constraints for road/parking drainage entering SAs in SPZ1 any areas. regards Jonathan Jonathan Atkinson Groundwater & Contaminated Land Environment Agency Orchard House, Endeavour Park, London Road, Addington, West Malling, Kent ME19 5SH Direct Dial +44208 4746727 From: Michael Green [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: 04 November 2019 15:48 To: Atkinson, Jonathan
Information in this message may be confidential and may be legally privileged. If you have received this message by mistake, please notify the sender immediately, delete it and do not copy it to anyone else. We have checked this email and its attachments for viruses. But you should still check any attachment before opening it. We may have to make this message and any reply to it public if asked to under the Freedom of Information Act, Data Protection Act or for litigation. Email messages and attachments sent to or from any Environment Agency address may also be accessed by someone other than the sender or recipient, for business purposes.