DOCSLIB.ORG

191559 Circuit Court No

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
191559 Circuit Court No VIRGINIA: In the Supreme Court of Virginia held at the Supreme Court Building in the City of Richmond on Thursday the 10th day of December, 2020. Present: All the Justices. Dwayne Ramon Smith, Appellant, against Record No. 191559 Circuit Court No. CL18-3893 Bank of America, N.A., et al., Appellees. Upon an appeal from a judgment rendered by the Circuit Court of Chesterfield County. Upon consideration of the record, briefs, and argument of counsel, the Court is of the opinion that there is error in the judgment of the circuit court, but that error is harmless. In April 2012, Dwayne Ramon Smith (“Smith”) and Bank of America (“BANA”) entered into a Federal Housing Administration (“FHA”) mortgage loan involving real property in Chester, Virginia. The promissory note securing the loan (the “Note”) incorporated by reference FHA regulations administered by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”). Section 6(B) of the Note states that, in the event the borrower defaults on payment, the lender “may, except as limited by regulations of the Secretary in the case of payment defaults, require immediate payment in full of the principal balance remaining due and all accrued interest.” This section further states that acceleration of the Note is not authorized “when not permitted by HUD regulations.” Additionally, the Note was secured by a deed of trust on the property which contained similar language regarding limitation on the acceleration of the Note. In May 2014, Smith defaulted on the loan by failing to make the necessary payments under the terms of the Note and the deed of trust. On July 2, 2014, BANA sent Smith a letter informing him that it would be sending a representative to his house to meet with him and evaluate whether he could receive any loan assistance. The meeting with the representative did not occur. BANA continued to send additional correspondence to Smith, informing him that his property had been referred for foreclosure as well as offering him the possibility of avoiding foreclosure. BANA subsequently appointed Equity Trustees, LLC (“Equity”) as substitute trustee on the deed of trust. On December 3, 2018, Equity conducted a public foreclosure sale of the property. BANA made the high bid and title was conveyed to it. On December 21, 2018, Smith filed a complaint alleging breach of contract against BANA and breach of fiduciary duties against Equity. Specifically, Smith alleged that BANA failed to comply with 24 CFR § 203.604(d), which requires a lender to have a face-to-face meeting with the borrower or make a reasonable effort to arrange such a meeting, before the borrower falls more than three months into arrears. With regard to Equity, Smith claimed that it breached its fiduciary duties by conducting the foreclosure even though BANA had failed to conduct a face-to-face meeting as required by FHA regulations. BANA and Equity demurred and filed pleas in bar. Additionally, BANA filed a motion craving oyer. In support of its plea in bar, BANA submitted an affidavit of a custodian of its business records indicating that National Creditors Connection, Inc. (“NCCI”) sent an agent to Smith’s home on July 5, 2014. In his brief in response to the pleas in bar, Smith stated that “[a]s regards the claim in the plea in bar that the home visit requirement was met, Smith is prepared to testify to the contrary.” On June 13, 2019, the trial court heard oral argument on the demurrers and the motion craving oyer. When the trial court offered BANA the opportunity to make an argument with regard to the pleas in bar, BANA noted that Smith wanted to put on a witness and the time allotted for the hearing was running out. BANA subsequently stated: We’re fine continuing the plea [in] bar if it works for Your Honor’s schedule, or we can let a ruling be had on the oyer and demurrer. And, then if it’s sustained, we can move on from there; if not, we can move on to plea [in] bar. It’s up to Your Honor. When the trial court indicated that it would hear the argument and rely on the parties’ briefs on the matter, Smith argued that a plea in bar is an evidentiary matter and he had a witness that was “going to take some time.” BANA then clarified that it was offering to limit the hearing to just the motion craving oyer and the demurrers, and, depending on how the trial court ruled, a hearing on the pleas in bar could be rescheduled for a later date. When the trial court specifically asked if the parties wanted to wait to argue the pleas in bar, BANA confirmed that that was its request. In response, the trial court stated: 2 All right. Then we’ll just take the plea [in] bar completely under advisement. I’ll take the motion to crave oyer and the demurrer, with respect to the demurrer, today, under advisement. And I will respond to you within a week on the motion to crave oyer and the two demurrers. And then we’ll set the plea [in] bar or not depending on how the Court rules. On July 3, 2019, the trial court issued a letter opinion sustaining the pleas in bar and dismissed Smith’s complaint with prejudice. Specifically, the trial court found that BANA, through NCCI, paid a personal visit to [Smith’s] residence to avoid foreclosure and have a face-to-face meeting. Smith was not available. The [c]ourt finds these efforts constitute reasonable effort on the part of BANA to arrange a face-to-face meeting before three full monthly installments due on the mortgage were unpaid. As such, BANA complied with 24 CFR § 203.604(b) and was authorized to proceed with the foreclosure. In light of its ruling on the pleas in bar, the trial court determined that it “need not rule on BANA’s demurrer, Equity’s demurrer, or BANA’s motion craving oyer.” On July 18, 2019, Smith moved for reconsideration, noting that he had not been given the opportunity to present evidence on the pleas in bar. On August 23, 2019, the trial court entered an order granting the pleas in bar “[f]or the reasons stated in the Letter Opinion issued on the matter on July 3, 2019, which is incorporated herein by reference.” Smith objected on the grounds that he was denied the opportunity to present evidence in response to the pleas in bar. On appeal, Smith argues that the trial court erred in granting the plea in bar without giving him the opportunity to present evidence to counter the evidence presented by BANA and Equity Trustees. Thus, the issue before the Court is whether the trial court erred in not affording Smith the opportunity to present his evidence. As this Court has repeatedly stated, a “trial court’s exercise of its discretion in determining whether to admit or exclude evidence will not be overturned on appeal absent evidence that the trial court abused that discretion.” May v. Caruso, 264 Va. 358, 362, 568 S.E.2d 690 (2002). “An abuse of discretion . can occur in three principal ways: when a relevant factor that should have been given significant weight is not considered; when an irrelevant or improper factor is considered and given significant weight; and when all proper factors, and no improper ones, are considered, but the court, in weighing those factors, commits a clear error of judgment.” 3 Landrum v. Chippenham & Johnston-Willis Hosps., Inc., 282 Va. 346, 352 (2011) (quoting Kern v. TXO Production Corp., 738 F.2d 968, 970 (8th Cir.1984)). Here, the record clearly establishes that Smith explicitly requested the opportunity to present evidence and the trial court indicated that it would give him that opportunity if it overruled the demurrers and the motion craving oyer. By subsequently ruling on the pleas in bar without affording him the opportunity to present evidence, the trial court implicitly denied him the opportunity that he was entitled to under this Court’s jurisprudence. See Hawthorne v. VanMarter, 279 Va. 566, 577 (2010) (“The issue raised by a plea in bar may be submitted to the circuit court for decision based on a discrete body of facts identified by the parties through their pleadings, or developed through the presentation of evidence supporting or opposing the plea”) (emphasis added). Under the facts of this case, such a denial represents a clear error of judgment by the trial court. Accordingly, the trial court’s decision to grant the pleas in bar without giving Smith an opportunity to present any evidence was an abuse of discretion. That said, the trial court’s error is ultimately harmless. This Court has recognized that, “where a trial court's decision is correct, but its reasoning is incorrect, and the record supports the correct reason,” the judgment will be upheld under the “right result for the wrong reason doctrine.” Haynes v. Haggerty, 291 Va. 301, 305 (2016); see also Spinner v. Commonwealth, 297 Va. 384, 391 (2019) (referring to the doctrine as “the right result for a different reason”). Here, the record establishes that, in April 2016, BANA offered Smith a Trial Period Plan Agreement (the “TPPA”). Under the TPPA, Smith was required to make three monthly payments on time. If he did so, BANA agreed to offer him a permanent loan modification that would bring his loan current and avoid foreclosure. Smith complied with the TPPA and made all the required payments.* He was then offered a permanent loan modification, but he failed to sign and return the required loan modification documents to BANA within the specified deadline.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • The Supreme Court and the New Equity
    Vanderbilt Law Review Volume 68 | Issue 4 Article 1 5-2015 The uprS eme Court and the New Equity Samuel L. Bray Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr Part of the Supreme Court of the United States Commons Recommended Citation Samuel L. Bray, The uS preme Court and the New Equity, 68 Vanderbilt Law Review 997 (2019) Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol68/iss4/1 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, please contact [email protected]. VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW VOLUME 68 MAY 2015 NUMBER 4 ARTICLES The Supreme Court and the New Equity Samuel L. Bray* The line between law and equity has largely faded away. Even in remedies, where the line persists, the conventional scholarly wisdom favors erasing it. Yet something surprisinghas happened. In a series of cases over the last decade and a half, the U.S. Supreme Court has acted directly contrary to this conventional wisdom. These cases range across many areas of substantive law-from commercial contracts and employee benefits to habeas and immigration, from patents and copyright to environmental law and national security. Throughout these disparate areas, the Court has consistently reinforced the line between legal and equitable remedies, and it has treated equitable remedies as having distinctive powers and limitations. This Article describes and begins to evaluate the Court's new equity cases.
    [Show full text]
  • The Restitution Revival and the Ghosts of Equity
    The Restitution Revival and the Ghosts of Equity Caprice L. Roberts∗ Abstract A restitution revival is underway. Restitution and unjust enrichment theory, born in the United States, fell out of favor here while surging in Commonwealth countries and beyond. The American Law Institute’s (ALI) Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment streamlines the law of unjust enrichment in a language the modern American lawyer can understand, but it may encounter unintended problems from the law-equity distinction. Restitution is often misinterpreted as always equitable given its focus on fairness. This blurs decision making on the constitutional right to a jury trial, which "preserves" the right to a jury in federal and state cases for "suits at common law" satisfying specified dollar amounts. Restitution originated in law, equity, and sometimes both. The Restatement notably attempts to untangle restitution from the law-equity labels, as well as natural justice roots. It explicitly eschews equity’s irreparable injury prerequisite, which historically commanded that no equitable remedy would lie if an adequate legal remedy existed. Can restitution law resist hearing equity’s call from the grave? Will it avoid the pitfalls of the Supreme Court’s recent injunction cases that return to historical, equitable principles and reanimate equity’s irreparable injury rule? Losing anachronistic, procedural remedy barriers is welcome, but ∗ Professor of Law, West Virginia University College of Law; Visiting Professor of Law, The Catholic University of America Columbus School of Law. Washington & Lee University School of Law, J.D.; Rhodes College, B.A. Sincere thanks to Catholic University for supporting this research and to the following conferences for opportunities to present this work: the American Association of Law Schools, the Sixth Annual International Conference on Contracts at Stetson University College of Law, and the Restitution Rollout Symposium at Washington and Lee University School of Law.
    [Show full text]
  • Equity in the American Courts and in the World Court: Does the End Justify the Means?
    EQUITY IN THE AMERICAN COURTS AND IN THE WORLD COURT: DOES THE END JUSTIFY THE MEANS? I. INTRODUCTION Equity, as a legal concept, has enjoyed sustained acceptance by lawyers throughout history. It has been present in the law of ancient civilizations' and continues to exist in modem legal systems.2 But equity is no longer a concept confined exclusively to local or national adjudication. Today, equity shows itself to be a vital part of international law.' The International Court of Justice--"the most visible, and perhaps hegemonic, tribunal in the sphere of public international law" 4-has made a significant contribution to the delimitation,5 development of equity. Particularly in cases involving maritime 6 equity has frequently been applied by the Court to adjudicate disputes. Equity is prominent in national legal systems and has become increas- ingly important in international law. It is useful, perhaps essential, for the international lawyer to have a proper understanding of it. Yet the meaning of equity remains elusive. "A lawyer asked to define 'equity' will not have an easy time of it; the defimition of equity, let alone the term's application in the field of international law, is notoriously uncertain, though its use is rife."7 Through a comparative analysis, this note seeks to provide a more precise understanding of the legal concept of equity as it relates to two distinct systems oflaw: the American and the international. To compare the equity administered by the American courts with that administered by the World Court, this note 1. See sources cited infra notes 10, 22.
    [Show full text]
  • The Federal Equity Power
    Florida State University College of Law Scholarship Repository Scholarly Publications 1-2018 The Federal Equity Power Michael T. Morley Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.law.fsu.edu/articles Part of the Courts Commons, and the Jurisdiction Commons THE FEDERAL EQUITY POWER MICHAEL T. MORLEY INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................ 219 I. THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF EQUITY............................................................................. 224 II. AMERICAN EQUITY PRIOR TO ERIE .......................................................................................... 230 A. Equity Jurisdiction .............................................................................................................. 232 B. Equity Procedure ................................................................................................................ 236 C. Equitable Remedies............................................................................................................. 238 D. Equity and Substantive Rights ............................................................................................. 241 III. EQUITY IN THE POST-ERIE WORLD ......................................................................................... 244 A. Erie and General Law ......................................................................................................... 244 B. Guaranty Trust and Equity .................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Equity Investment Agreement
    Equity Investment Agreement THIS EQUITY INVESTMENT AGREEMENT (the "Agreement") is dated as of DATE (the "Effective Date") by and between ________________________________________________, a Delaware business corporation, having an address at _________________________________________________________________ ("Company") and Cornell University, a non-profit New York corporation, having an address at Day Hall, Ithaca NY, 14850 ("Cornell"). WHEREAS, Company is developing technologies that it represents are consistent with the educational, research and economic development objectives of Cornell; and WHEREAS, Company would benefit from a relationship with Cornell and its Kevin M. McGovern Family Center for Venture Development in the Life Sciences, (the "McGovern Center"), whereby the McGovern Center would provide Company with assistance in accessing elements of the McGovern Center's network of public and private commercialization resources (the "McGovern Center Network"); and WHEREAS, the McGovern Center is willing to provide such assistance, subject to the terms and conditions of this Agreement; NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants and agreements set forth below, the parties covenant and agree as follows: Article 1. Equity Partner Program 1.1 As a part of its equity partnership with Company, the McGovern Center agrees, from time to time upon the request of Company, to: (i) Provide Company with timely information that the McGovern Center reasonably believes to be of benefit to Company including information related to capital
    [Show full text]
  • Mere Equities’
    WHAT IS A MERE EQUITY?: AN INVESTIGATION OF THE NATURE AND FUNCTION OF SO-CALLED ‘MERE EQUITIES’ Jack Wells PhD University of York Law January 2019 Abstract This thesis will examine the type of equitable claim known as a ‘mere equity’. The basic characteristics of a mere equity are well established. A mere equity is ‘proprietary’ in that it can be enforced against certain third parties and is capable of alienation in favour of certain third parties. Despite its proprietary flavour, however, a mere equity does not amount to an interest in any property to which it relates. The main consequence of this is that a mere equity is postponed to any interest, legal or equitable, subsequently purchased for value and without notice of the mere equity. While the core features of mere equities are settled, there is much confusion over the underlying legal nature and practical function of these claims. This confusion has produced the criticism that mere equities are an anomalous category, and brought into question whether mere equities should even exist as a juridical concept. This state of affairs is clearly unsatisfactory, especially given that mere equities are the admitted basis of a sizable body of equitable doctrines, including rescission, rectification and proprietary estoppel. This thesis aims to demystify mere equities. It will show that the existing scholarly literature has not adequately engaged with the concept of a mere equity. It will then look afresh at the primary legal materials in order to fill in the conceptual gaps. In short, the thesis will argue that a mere equity is an equitable right of action: a simple claim to pursue a particular equitable remedy against a particular defendant.
    [Show full text]
  • In Law Or in Equity?
    In law or in equity? By Eric Lindquist, Of Counsel to Fox Horan & Camerini LLP © Eric Lindquist 2020 St. Thomas More, English Chancellor 1529-1532 Lawyers and businesspersons around the world read contracts every day that provide for indemnity against, or the release of, claims “in law or in equity.” Based on my conversations with civil lawyers and with business executives in the US and abroad, it seems that many of them haven’t really thought about what “equity” means in this context. Here are the basics. Equity jurisdiction arose in England during the Middle Ages to balance the excessive rigidity of the common law courts by allowing a royal official, the Lord Chancellor, to decide disputes based on broad concepts of fairness and good conscience. The distinction between law and equity is important because: (a) equitable claims are decided by a judge, not by a jury, (b) claims in equity are subject to different defenses from legal claims (the defenses of “unclean hands,” “laches,” or “undue hardship,” e.g.), (c) equitable relief being viewed as an “extraordinary remedy,” the standards of pleading and proof are generally stricter than for legal claims, requiring greater specificity and clearer evidence, (d) courts can retain jurisdiction over equitable matters long after judgment is entered, allowing them to modify or dissolve injunctions, or to appoint receivers to manage property or special masters to monitor compliance, (e) equitable judgments are enforceable by sanctions for contempt of court, and (f) equitable judgments are discretionary and therefore especially difficult to overturn on appeal. Most claims arising “in equity” ask the court for an injunction, that is, an order that the respondent do something or refrain from doing something.
    [Show full text]
  • Magna Carta and the Law of Nature
    University of Chicago Law School Chicago Unbound Journal Articles Faculty Scholarship 2016 Magna Carta and the Law of Nature Richard H. Helmholz Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/journal_articles Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Richard. H. Helmholz, "Magna Carta and the Law of Nature," 62 Loyola Law Review 869 (2016). This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact [email protected]. +(,121/,1( Citation: 62 Loy. L. Rev. 869 2016 Provided by: The University of Chicago D'Angelo Law Library Content downloaded/printed from HeinOnline Sat Apr 8 00:43:53 2017 -- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance of HeinOnline's Terms and Conditions of the license agreement available at http://heinonline.org/HOL/License -- The search text of this PDF is generated from uncorrected OCR text. -- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope of your HeinOnline license, please use: Copyright Information BRENDAN BROWN LECTURE MAGNA CARTA AND THE LAW OF NATURE R. H. Helmholz* INTRODUCTION' My subject is an appropriate one for a lecture series established by Brendan F. Brown. From first to last, he was "an advocate and defender of the natural law and its school of jurisprudence." 2 He sparked an interest in the subject among his students, he wrote books and articles to demonstrate its value, 3 and he compiled an historical survey of the subject that remains useful today.4 Coming to his scholarly maturity in the years immediately following the Second World War, Professor Brown was optimistic about the future of this subject.
    [Show full text]
  • 20191223115738971 18-1501 Liu V SEC Restitution Scholars Brief.Pdf
    No. 18-1501 In the Supreme Court of the United States CHARLES C. LIU et al., Petitioners, v. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, Respondent. __________ ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT __________ BRIEF OF REMEDIES AND RESTITUTION SCHOLARS AS AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF NEITHER SIDE __________ Douglas Laycock Counsel of Record 2406 McBee St. Austin, TX 78723 512-656-1789 [email protected] QUESTIONS PRESENTED This brief addresses two questionss: 1. Whether “equitable relief” in the securities laws includes the longstanding equitable remedy of disgorgement, also known as accounting of profits, and 2. Whether disgorgement in the securities laws should be measured by the longstanding rules of equity, a measure that both petitioners and respondent appear to reject. i TABLE OF CONTENTS Table of Authorities .................................................. iv Interest of Amici ..........................................................1 Summary of Argument ...............................................2 Argument .....................................................................5 I. Each Party’s Position Seriously Overreaches ......................................................5 II. Disgorgement, or Accounting for Profits, Is a Long-Established Equitable Remedy That Imposes Liability for the Wrongdoer’s Net Profits—Not Gross Profits or Gross Receipts .............................................................9 A. Disgorgement of a Wrongdoer’s Profits Is a Longstanding Equitable Remedy.
    [Show full text]
  • The Case Against Equity in American Contract Law
    Columbia Law School Scholarship Archive Faculty Scholarship Faculty Publications 2020 The Case Against Equity in American Contract Law Jody S. Kraus Columbia Law School, [email protected] Robert E. Scott Columbia Law School, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship Part of the Contracts Commons, Criminal Law Commons, Criminal Procedure Commons, and the Legal Remedies Commons Recommended Citation Jody S. Kraus & Robert E. Scott, The Case Against Equity in American Contract Law, 93 S. CAL. L. REV. 1323 (2020). Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/2537 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For more information, please contact [email protected]. THE CASE AGAINST EQUITY IN AMERICAN CONTRACT LAW JODY P. KRAUS* & ROBERT E. SCOTT† The American common law of contracts appears to direct courts to decide contract disputes by considering two opposing points of view: the ex ante perspective of the parties’ intent at the time of formation, and the ex post perspective of justice and fairness to the parties at the time of adjudication. Despite the black letter authority for both perspectives, the ex post perspective cannot withstand scrutiny. Contract doctrines taking the ex post perspective—such as the penalty, just compensation, and forfeiture doctrines—were created by equity in the early common law to police against abuses of the then prevalent penal bond. However, when the industrial revolution pushed courts to accommodate fully executory agreements, and parties abandoned the use of penal bonds, the exclusively ex ante focus of the new contract law that emerged rendered the ex post doctrines obsolete.
    [Show full text]
  • Equity: System Or Process?
    The Catholic Lawyer Volume 3 Number 1 Volume 3, January 1957, Number 1 Article 10 Equity: System or Process? Philip A. Ryan Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/tcl Part of the Catholic Studies Commons This Reprint is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in The Catholic Lawyer by an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. The place of Equity in modern procedure and in the curriculum in present day law schools will be discussed in a series of three articles, of which this is the first. EQUITY: SYSTEM OR PROCESS?* PHILIP A. RYANt T HE NATURE OF EQUITY has troubled legal scholars for many years. It has been viewed as a closed but flexible department of our juris- prudence, and it has been equated with procedure. No matter what the framework of discussion, however, everyone recognizes a value, intangible and compelling, which surpasses strict legal rules. This consensus on the value but disagreement on the nature of Equity invites the effort to obtain a satisfactory personal insight. As pointed out by Professor Chafee, "Equity is a way of looking at the administration of justice."' It is also true that there are different ways - at least three - of looking at Equity. Each may be necessary and useful, depending on the problem to be solved. But distinction and differentiation are important if we are to use the right tools for the right problems.
    [Show full text]
  • 674KB***Accessory Liability in Tort and Equity
    (2015) 27 SAcLJ Accessory Liability in Tort and Equity 853 ACCESSORY LIABILITY IN TORT AND EQUITY Unlike the position in criminal law, there does not currently exist a general doctrine of accessory liability in civil law. Thus, a person may be liable as an accessory in equity for dishonestly assisting with a breach of trust, but there is no tort for dishonest assistance. Rather, one who participates in another’s tort will only be liable if he is a joint tortfeasor acting pursuant to a common design with the primary tortfeasor. This article examines the reasons for this divergence and evaluates the case for their assimilation. It observes that, contrary to common perception, the scope of participatory liability in both spheres does not materially differ. It also concludes that the case for assimilation is not made out if the overarching principle for civil accessory liability is defined principally by reference to criminal concepts of complicity. Such an approach overlooks the fundamental distinctions between civil and criminal processes and threatens to extend civil liability beyond acceptable bounds. LEE Pey Woan* LLB (Hons) (London), BCL (Oxford); Barrister (Middle Temple), Advocate and Solicitor (Singapore); Associate Professor, School of Law, Singapore Management University. 1 In civil as well as criminal law, a person may be liable when he participates in the wrong of another. Such liability is variously described as “accessory”, “secondary” or “derivative” because it is contingent upon a wrong being committed by the primary wrongdoer. In criminal law, a general doctrine of accessory or secondary liability exists which applies uniformly to all crimes.
    [Show full text]