Germany and the World of Yesterday Leon Mangasarian
STRATEGIC UPDATE JANUARY 2021 LSE IDEAS is LSE’s foreign policy ‘‘ think tank. Ranked #1 university affiliated think tank in the world in the 2019 Global Go To Think Tank Index.
We connect academic knowledge of diplomacy and strategy with the people who use it. Germany and the World of Yesterday | Leon Mangasarian 1
tefan Zweig lays bare what Europe lost in two world wars, revolutions and Nazism at the start of his Selegiac The World of Yesterday. “When I attempt to find a simple formula for the period in which I grew up, prior to the First World War, I hope ‘‘ that I convey its fullness by calling it the Golden Age of Security,” Zweig wrote. His pre-1914 Europe’s set-in-stone permanence was swept away in just 28 years. The book, completed in 1942, Without security was an extended suicide note he mailed to his publisher there is not only before he and his wife took their lives.1 Security is the be all and end all—no matter how much no prosperity, cynical, post-everythings take a jackhammer to reason, there is almost understanding and power. A glance at the metrics of states
nothing. suffering chronic insecurity shows the horrendous cost.
Without security there is not only no prosperity;2 there is almost nothing. ‘‘ Germans may look back on their Golden Age of Security as starting with the 1949 founding of the Federal Republic and ending in the ugly conglomeration of the 2008 Russian invasion of Georgia, Russia’s 2014 seizure of Crimea/war on Ukraine and Donald Trump’s 2016 election. During these roughly six decades, the four pillars of Germany’s post-World War II security model were built and expanded: NATO, the European Union, trans-Atlanticism and free trade. This gave Germans their longest period of peace, making them fantastically rich as the world’s fourth biggest economy. 2 LSE IDEAS Strategic Update | January 2021
Today, all four pillars are wobbling and things like “decoupling” the EU from the US, weakened. A Golden Age of Security is in no rise in German military spending and danger of slipping away yet most Germans blocking armed drones for the Bundeswehr.4 remain in a state of denial, convinced Biden may be more diplomatic than Trump the riches of the post-war era are the yet he’ll expect Germany do far more. He’s natural world order and that their holiday likely to stand tough on China and expand from history will go on forever. Too many Barack Obama’s pivot of US armed forces Germans cling to the model of “Germany as and diplomatic focus to the Indo-Pacific. a big Switzerland.” Despite their victories in 2020, Simplified to the point, (and I write Democrats cannot count on an opponent this with sorrow as someone who lives as unpopular as President Trump, or on in and loves Germany) this Germany-as- a devastating pandemic to support their Switzerland-on-steroids ideal says: Let us electoral chances in 2024. Though Trump is have our peace and quiet, let us earn lots of out of office, Trumpism is alive and well.5 In money, let us use the world as our oyster for four years, it might be the same old policies, vacations but spare us tough decisions on minus the late-night Tweeting and a national security, geopolitics and war so we candidate who doesn’t brag about grabbing can stay on our moral high horse. “The great women by their genitals.6 President Nikki model of strategic dwarfism,” is the acerbic Haley, anyone? conclusion of Josef Joffe.3 So, it would be fatal for Germans just to Sure, this German attitude is benign focus on Biden. Berlin must do its utmost to compared to the past four years of Trump, make German-American ties “Republican- who’s done more damage to NATO and proof”7 so that any nativist-nationalist GOP US-European ties than any alliance friend return to the White House doesn’t become or foe. Former US National Security a Trump redux. Adviser John Bolton’s memoirs show how This is where Germany has a big terrifyingly close Trump came to quitting challenge with the US NATO. A Trump re-election would have Trump’s vulgarity shouldn’t deflect from meant, if not a formal NATO exit, a slow- the German failure to meet NATO’s 2 percent motion alliance train wreck. of GDP defence spending target, backed by But let’s not kid ourselves. Joe Biden’s Berlin in 2014 (or, more important, boosting victory gives Europe some breathing space actual military capabilities). Trump is by but not much. The biggest danger under far not the only inhabitant of the White President Biden is that Germans will say, House to grumble about Europe shirking ‘Wunderbar! We don’t have to spend more its military duties. Barack Obama dubbed on guns!’ Indeed, just days after Biden European NATO allies “free riders” and was declared the winner, some Social we can go back to 1961 to find Dwight Democrats, the junior partner in Chancellor Eisenhower warning the incoming John F. Angela Merkel’s government, demanded Kennedy that the US balance of payments Germany and the World of Yesterday | Leon Mangasarian 3
problem should be addressed by making NATO allies pay more for their defence.8 Kennedy went on to complain about Europeans not doing their share and “living off the fat of the land.”9 Even in the best of worlds, there’s going to be less America in Europe. Maybe a lot less. In a worst case, no US security guarantee for Europe means the end of NATO as we know it because 75 percent of all NATO capabilities come from Washington.10 Aside from US military hardware, let’s be clear about how crucial trans-Atlanticism is for Germany and Europe. American soldiers fought their way into Europe in two Germany’s world wars. The US has been a European power since ‘‘ ‘strategic 1941. America supported European unification after the war, in part politically but also because the US military frivolity’... a presence drained old rivalries and enmity among European country that nations. It’s easily forgotten that US support for the 1990 has lost the German reunification helped overcome British and French opposition. Now, as the US departs, some of this old, intra- ability and even European mistrust is seeping back. the language Yet the idea of truly producing, rather than just to address and consuming security, remains alien to most Germans, even as it was underlined in two remarkable speeches by think about German Defence Minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer.11 power, national Why is this? In a book, written with Jan Techau,12 we argue interest and ‘‘ this stems from Germany’s “strategic frivolity.” It’s rooted in the trauma of Germany’s moral bankruptcy under the geostrategy. Nazis, with the Holocaust as its nadir, followed by 45 years of occupation and division under which Germans had limited say in their own, let alone European security. The result is a country that has lost the ability and even the language to address and think about power, national interest and geostrategy in a sober, analytical manner. When such things are discussed by Germans the tone is too often agitated, shrill and hyper-moralistic. Strategic frivolity is undermining Germany’s pillars of security and prosperity: NATO, the EU, trans-Atlantic ties and trade. 4 LSE IDEAS Strategic Update | January 2021
What are these frivolities and their consequences? Here are just a few:
■ A failure to understand that the past 75 years of peace in Europe is an anomaly that contrasts with the past millennium in which Europe was dominated by war. Germans gloss over that Europe’s fringes are being made safe again for territorial conquest as with Azerbaijan, A failure to ‘‘ aided by Turkey, routing Armenian forces (Where was understand that Europe when Turkey and Russia redrew the borders?13) the past 75 or Russia with its land grabs in Georgia and Ukraine. Stuck in a shibboleth of being a “civilian power” where years of peace “nationalism and heroism are verboten and ‘leave me in Europe is an out’ is the best part of valour,”14 Germans express horror anomaly at the idea that to keep the peace you must be ready to that contrasts fight and die for it.
with the past ■ Germany’s military isn’t treated as a linchpin of the nation.
millennium in With its legendary planes and helicopters that can’t fly
which Europe and submarines that can’t go to sea, the Bundeswehr, wrecked by decades of underspending, probably couldn’t was dominated ‘‘ even defend Germany, let alone other NATO members.15 by war. In the US, this would be political suicide. But in Germany there are no votes to be won for more military spending. Telling German Friday for Future climate activists that their nation also needs a Friday for the Bundeswehr’s future elicits bafflement followed by disbelief. The breaking of the Bundeswehr happened under 15 years of rule by Merkel and her Christian Democrats. Nothing will change until after the September 2021 election and if, as will likely be the case, any mix of the SPD, the Greens or the former East German communist Left party play a role in the next government, things will get worse. The curious suggestion of Greens co-leader Annalena Baerbock is that Germany should not meet NATO’s defence spending goal but at the same time must “strengthen European sovereignty.”16 She’s a member of what Charles Grant identifies as the club of German politicians “who talk about Europe taking more responsibility for its own Germany and the World of Yesterday | Leon Mangasarian 5
security and then refuse to vote for ■ Anti-Americanism has long been a more defence spending.17 The harsh potent force in Germany and entire conclusion is that there’s little chance books have been written about it. German military spending will rise to “Ami Go Home,” is a slogan passed on needed levels. This, more than anything since the 1950s. That a prize-winning else, should alarm the German people reporter for the magazine Der Spiegel and spark deep misgivings among could get away with making up cliché- Germany’s friends and allies. ridden, hateful stories about the US for years22 raises questions about the ■ There is widespread ignorance of how nation’s media culture. The US is too dependent Germany remains on US often treated by Germans like the man armed forces and intelligence services sitting over a dunk tank at a Wisconsin for its safety and security. Almost 50 county fair. You can hit the target with percent of Germans want the number of a ball so he looks a fool and falls into US troops in Germany reduced18 and 51 the water -- and then wander off to enjoy percent say Germany and Europe should the rest of the fair. Germans endlessly become more independent from the criticize the US but still want to earn US.19 Germans almost universally fail to money on Wall Street and visit Florida or ask the most basic question: ‘Why are the Grand Canyon. US troops here?’ If they did, they’d get the answer, ‘Because there’s a threat to ■ Germans, even at the highest levels, NATO member states from Russia and remain under illusion and error when from Chinese authoritarianism’s use of they look at Russia. Exhibit No. 1 is economic power as a weapon’20 -- as Chancellor Merkel who for years has Merkel herself has indirectly admitted21. claimed that the Nord Stream 2 natural So, if US troops leave there’s a vacuum. gas pipeline, running from Russia to The logical follow-up question would be Germany under the Baltic Sea, is just a ‘Who fills the vacuum? But since nobody business deal. Sorry, Chancellor: with in Germany asks these questions, Russia (or China or Iran) there can be no nobody admits there’d be a vacuum and separation of business from geopolitics. then explains how it will be filled. The Exhibit No. 2 is former Chancellor problem with Germany is that there’s Gerhard Schröder who is chairman of no military-security-political ethos. In the board of directors of Nord Stream London or in Paris the question would 2 and pals around with Vladimir Putin, be: How do we defend Europe? In Berlin, whom he calls a “flawless democrat.” there’s aimless wandering around with That Poland and the Baltic states lots of process and hand-wringing but fiercely oppose Nord Stream 2 is of no geostrategic compass. fleeting interest to German leaders. 6 LSE IDEAS Strategic Update | January 2021
Berlin’s stance on the pipeline has a China hot war but rather merely in a “new whiff of then French President Jacques US-Chinese cold war.”27 Most Germans Chirac who derided Central and East no longer read the Prussian philosopher European countries for missing a of war, Carl von Clausewitz. If they chance “to shut up.”23 Even the poisoning did, they’d realize that war is different of Russian opposition leader Alexey from everything else and war changes Navalny seemingly isn’t changing the everything.28 If there’s a conflict between business-is-just-business doctrine. To China and the US in which American be sure, there are striking exceptions to soldiers die and Germans think that this stance. German military leadership Siemens and Audi can go on exporting of NATO troops in Lithuania shows that to China it will be the end of the US Berlin doesn’t always view its smaller, security guarantee for Europe. The idea eastern neighbours as flyover country on that Germans or Europeans don’t have the way to Moscow. to take sides in a US-China standoff is a dangerous fallacy.29 ■ China is where Germans most fear the idea of looking at trade from a ■ Germans may not be pacifists but the geopolitical perspective. China, in almost automatic response to any popular imagination, is the country international crisis is: “A military option where Germany sells BMWs, Mercedes is not the solution.” This may be true and its world-beating machines. most of the time, however, Germans Merkel’s forbearance regarding Chinese fail to understand how military strength technology for German 5G mobile can make diplomacy more effective. networks24 is the same side of this coin. The prospect of hard power triggers a It’s also a wedge in the transatlantic collective nervous breakdown rather alliance.25 Merkel’s ramming through than being viewed as a tool of statecraft. of an EU-China investment agreement In private, German officials marvel at the at the end of last year is “a geopolitical clout provided by Bundeswehr foreign gift to Beijing and a slap in the face to deployments. “You wouldn’t believe how an incoming Biden administration,” says carefully Baltic governments listen to us Noah Barkin, a Berlin-based analyst when our Luftwaffe is stationed there,” at the Rhodium Group.26 There’s scant one official told me. realization of the historic and fateful choice Berlin might have to make between ■ Strategic frivolity is in abundance the US and China amid worsening Sino- with regard to Germany’s intelligence American ties or even the most limited services. Their work is widely seen as military standoff. Some 82 percent of dishonourable and immoral. There’s little Germans say their country should stay realization that a country of Germany’s “neutral” not regarding a possible US- size and importance needs its own Germany and the World of Yesterday | Leon Mangasarian 7
spies and will be spied on, including by its allies. Allegations that Merkel’s mobile phone was listened to by the US caused nationwide moral outrage. A more useful response would have been a few billion euros more for the BND intelligence service to prevent this ever happening again. In contrast, there is little public outrage over a Russian cyberattack on the German Bundestag.30
■ Germany may be one of the most successful trading nations in the world yet the economic importance of ‘‘ “Made in Germany,” free trade and globalization for the nation’s prosperity is hideously unrecognized and Exports apparently not taught in school. Even a new Tesla are totally plant being built outside Berlin triggered protests and dependent on legal action that repeatedly delayed its construction. There were bigger protests against the now defunct the US given that EU-US free trade agreement (TTIP). Regarding trade, a 90 percent of spoiled and sated society is unable to comprehend the world trade goes foundation of its success.
by ship and the
■ Related to this, Germans are oblivious to the fact that US guards the their business model: exports, is totally dependent on global seaways. ‘‘ the US given that 90 percent of world trade goes by ship and the US guards the global seaways.
■ What follows is a failure to understand that keeping Germany fit as an economic powerhouse is intensely important for the success of the EU. Chancellor Schröder committed political suicide with his hugely successful Agenda 2010 economic reforms. Merkel not only lacks the courage to continue Schröder’s reforms, she’s chipped away at them, raising taxes, social benefits and energy costs. Germany now has almost the most expensive electricity in Europe, mind-numbing corporate regulation and some of the highest taxes in the world. Holding the EU together is going to take a lot of money. Only a rich Germany with dynamic economic growth can shoulder the cost. 8 LSE IDEAS Strategic Update | January 2021
■ Germans massively underestimate the cost to the EU of losing the UK. The quaint habit Germans have of referring to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as merely “die Englander” may be part of the reason. Germans are truly saddened by Brexit but they overlook the impact of a big, like-minded nation exiting the European project: a military nuclear power with battle-hardened combat troops; a member of the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing club (with the US, Australia, Canada and New Zealand); a permanent member of the ‘‘ UN Security Council; a democracy and bureaucracy with centuries of experience; a big free-trading nation (that helped Berlin counter Paris); and the country with some of Europe’s best diplomatic and intelligence services. Minus the UK, Minus the UK, the European Union will be poorer and the European diminished. Germany urgently needs to start thinking Union will be more like France does about filling the capabilities and leadership gap. poorer and
diminished. ■ Germans do not understand the continued need of
nuclear deterrence. They do not grasp that NATO is a nuclear alliance; that their own national security policy ‘‘ is built on deterrence and that the US nuclear umbrella is the ultimate security guarantee for NATO member states. Germans, including many Social Democrats, want the US to remove nuclear weapons stationed in Germany. Little consideration is given to how a Germany, decoupled from American nuclear weapons, could respond to Russian nuclear blackmail.
All this strategic frivolity has been fine as long as Germans are being watched over by the US and sleep safely in their beds because rough American men and women stand ready in the night to visit violence on those who would harm them. Yet many in Germany ridicule the very idea that the US has kept the peace. Germany’s default solution to anti-US and anti-NATO sentiment is that European security will be done by Europeans. The latest scheme from the SPD calls for troops to be put under command of the European Commission.31 Germany and the World of Yesterday | Leon Mangasarian 9
This is absurd. Security won’t come from between north and south, east and west and the EU. With the departure of the United is stumbling and hesitant over confronting Kingdom, the EU has lost one of its few Poland and Hungary on rule of law and serious armed forces. A bigger defence Romania and Bulgaria on corruption.33 role for Europe is, as the Americans would This said, the EU indisputably does have say, the dog that’s refused to hunt since unity and clout on trade, regulatory and the 1950s. No matter how many fancy- competition policy— all of which matter on sounding acronyms EU leaders coin about the global stage. defence cooperation, they can’t paper Germany is the one country that could over the undersized militaries, the lack of hold the post-Brexit EU together and inter-operability and the dire condition of powerfully lead it using its vast financial most national armed forces. France, the means as a nation prepared to pay more only remaining EU nuclear power, is the and compromise earlier for the good of lone member state with a serious military Europe. There is the oft-stated German self- that can be deployed far afield in real interest in the success of the EU because combat situations.32 it’s a huge market for German exports. Yet Yet Europe exists in a tough there’s a darker side: If the EU falls apart neighbourhood where Russia is taking then Germany walks alone. But Germany is territory by force; China is playing divide too big to walk alone in Europe. and rule and buying its way into creating To make the EU succeed, Germany European client states; Turkey and Hungary needs to jettison its strategic frivolity. agitate over lands they lost after World Germany has to finally accept that it can War I; Russia and others destabilize via be a big force in world politics and face disinformation and cyber-attacks; parts of up to using its power in pursuit of national North Africa and the Middle East become and European interests. It needs to stop failed states; Africa’s Sahel becomes a “deploring,” “condemning”, “expressing centre for Islamist extremists; and Iran, concern” or just endlessly talking about with missiles that can strike Europe, problems. Berlin needs hard-nosed, seemingly continues moves to develop concrete goals and above all an approach nuclear weapons. of “how do we fix it” to dealing with the The EU, rather than unifying its member world as it is. In a word: action. states to face these dangers, has driven Berlin needs a compelling vision them apart with divisions on almost for Europe to win over German voters. everything including the euro, migration, Chancellor Merkel failed to seize upon borders, how to deal with Russia and China French President Emmanuel Macron’s 2017 and the scope of relations with the US. Even Sorbonne speech on building a more robust agreement on what to do about Europe’s EU. Merkel could have backed Macron’s last dictator in Belarus was almost beyond broad thrust while making it clear his vision the EU. The European Union is splitting of “European sovereignty” and strategic 10 LSE IDEAS Strategic Update | January 2021
autonomy doesn’t correspond with German seeking or which Europe needs. In fact, Atlanticism and Westbindung—the post- fire-hosing vast amounts of money into EU 1945 political and military binding of states, without a convincing and strategic Germany to the Western powers forged by vision, may ultimately drive Europe apart. Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. The German media is raising doubts on how It took three years before German Italy will spend the billions it’s getting36 and Defence Minister Kramp-Karrenbauer Merkel’s support for aid to deeply corrupt argued that Europe still needs the US for Bulgaria might lead to a backlash against its defence. (And she did so only after more EU integration.37 announcing her resignation as Christian Germany’s equivocating shows how Democratic Union party leader and giving up Germans still have trouble with what her bid to become chancellor.) This drew a President George H.W. Bush called “the withering put-down from President Macron vision thing.” German leaders too often who dismissed her remarks as “a historical prefer to react to proposals from others misinterpretation” with which “I profoundly rather than taking the lead. Berlin is stuck in disagree.” In a bid to drive a French wedge the rut of former Chancellor Helmut Schmidt into the German cabinet, he added that he who said: “People with visions should go to believed Chancellor Merkel backed him.34 the doctor.” (Though Schmidt, it should be AKK, as the German defence minister is noted, did have some visions, as in being a known, doubled down in a keynote address father of NATO’s Double-Track Decision.) at the Bundeswehr University in Hamburg.35 It doesn’t have to be this way. She refuted Macron by saying that without Germans are often at their best when US conventional and nuclear weapons facing a crisis. The pandemic has shown Europe couldn’t defend itself. She criticized this yet again. It’s shown that most Germans Macron’s idea of “strategic autonomy” as want a steady hand for political leadership feeding illusions that Europe can safely and they are ready to face tough realities exist without a US-led NATO while stressing and restrictions for the good of their that Europeans must do more for their neighbours, their nation and for Europe. defence to remain a serious partner for The German people are willing to look Washington and so ensure American at the world as it is rather than stick their soldiers stay in Europe. heads in the sand. But they need leaders AKK may be right but where’s the rest with the political courage to bluntly explain of the German government? Years after what the big picture problems are; how they Macron’s speech and his latest remarks, impact on German and European interests; where is Merkel’s answer? and what Germany must do to deal with Spurred by the COVID-19 crisis, them. They need leaders that don’t merely Germany’s backing of EU-backed bonds describe or deplore a problem or promise is a start but not the reply that Macron is a painless, easy way out—but rather those Germany and the World of Yesterday | Leon Mangasarian 11
who say what has to be done. Germany desperately needs a grand strategy debate about where Berlin wants to be in Europe in the coming two decades. If that debate isn’t led by the chancellery then it needs to come from the Bundestag, from the country’s expanding think tank community, the universities and citizen fora. It must also come from the media which needs to focus on news with context and policy rather than getting lost in the weeds of identity politics, process or the latest social media outrage.38 “The direction the continent will choose depends on Germany,” says former Lithuanian Foreign Minister Linas Linkevicius.39 The 30 years after German reunification have been among the best in Germany’s history – a Golden Age of Security. Pace to Yeats, the German center of Europe must hold. Unless Berlin provides enlightened, visionary and powerful leadership, things will fall apart and the coming 30 years will be far less happy for Germany and for Europe. 12 LSE IDEAS Strategic Update | January 2021
11 https://www.bmvg.de/en/news/speech- NOTES akk-presentation-steuben-schurz-media- award-3856630 and https://www.bmvg. 1 Nicholas Lezard, „The World of Yesterday de/de/aktuelles/zweite-grundsatzrede- by Stefan Zweig,” The Guardian, Dec. 5, verteidigungsministerin-akk-4482110 2009. 12 Leon Mangasarian, Jan Techau, 2 Eric Gujer, “Ohne Sicherheit kein Führungsmacht Deutschland, Strategie Wohlstand – wie Europa seine ohne Angst und Anmaßung (Munich: Verteidigungsfähigkeit verspielt.“ Neue DTV, 2017). Zürcher Zeitung, Aug. 7, 2020; and David Landes, The Wealth and Poverty 13 Ben Judah, “Europe Stands by as of Nations (London: Little, Brown and Borders Are Redrawn by Nagorno- Company, 1998), p. 31. Karabakh Ceasefire,” Politico, Nov. 11, 2020. 3 Josef Joffe, “Germany’s Shift from Wolf to Lamb,” The Wall Street Journal, Oct. 14 Joffe, ibid. 30, 2020. 15 For a sober look at the grim state of 4 Hans Monath, “Sonst fliegt die NATO Germany’s armed forces, see the former auseinander,“ Der Tagesspiegel, Nov. SPD Chairman of the Bundestag’s 11, 2020; and Mike Szymanski, “SPD Defense Committee and former will doch keine Kampfdrohnen für die Parliamentary Commissioner for the Bundeswehr”, Süddeutsche Zeitung, Armed Forces, Hans-Peter Bartels’ Dec. 8, 2020. commentary, “Deutschland kann seine Zusagen an die NATO nicht einhalten,” 5 Andrew Sullivan, “Trump is Gone. Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Nov. 18, 2020. Trumpism Just Arrived,” The Weekly Dish, Nov. 6, 2020. 16 Cited in: Zia Weise, „Europe Must Step Up on Defense, German Greens Leader 6 See: Hal Brands, “American Needs to Says,” Politico, Nov. 30, 2020. Keep Some Trumpism in Foreign Policy,” Bloomberg News, Nov. 11, 2020. 17 Charles Grant, „Deadly Coronavirus, Domineering China and Divided 7 Thomas Kleine-Brockhoff, “Wie America, What the New Geopolitics Berlin Biden helfen kann,“ Frankfurter Means for Europe,” Centre for European Allgemeine Zeitung, Nov. 10, 2020. Reform, London, Dec. 2020, p. 11. 8 William I. Hitchcock, The Age of 18 YouGov.de, Ein Drittel der Deutschen Eisenhower (New York: Simon and ist gegen den US-Truppenabzug aus Schuster, 2018), p. 499. Deutschland, Aug. 4, 2020. 9 Cited in: Jordan Becker and Edmund 19 Körber Stiftung, “The Berlin Pulse, J. Malesky, “Yes, NATO is Sharing German Foreign Policy in Perspective, the Defense Burden. Here’s What We 2020/21,“ Nov. 2020. https://www. Found,” The Washington Post, Dec. 9, koerber-stiftung.de/fileadmin/user_ 2016. upload/koerber-stiftung/redaktion/ 10 Royal United Services Institute, London, the-berlin-pulse/pdf/2020/The-Berlin- cited by German Defense Minister Pulse_2020-21.pdf Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer in https:// 20 Gideon Rachman, “Europe has Handed www.bmvg.de/de/aktuelles/zweite- China a Strategic Victory, Financial grundsatzrede-verteidigungsministerin- Times, January 4, 2021. akk-4482110 Germany and the World of Yesterday | Leon Mangasarian 13
21 See Merkel’s January 21, 2020, 31 Thorsten Jungholt, „‘Revolutionärer speech at the American Academy Schub‘ für eine eigenständige Europa- in Berlin. Merkel says: “If you look Armee,“ Die Welt, Nov. 15, 2020. at what we Europeans have on our See also: https:// doorstep the whole thing looks quite augengeradeaus.net/wp-content/ challenging. We have Russia and right uploads/2020/11/20201006_SPD- after that China. China and Russia AGSV_Diskussionspapier_28Armee.pdf are moving closer together.” https:// 32 “France in the Sahel, Mission Impossible www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/ but Necessary,” The Economist, Nov. 14, suche/rede-von-bundeskanzlerin- 2020. merkel-bei-der-verleihung-des-henry-a- kissinger-preises-am-21-januar-2020-in- 33 Gideon Rachman, “Corruption Is Rotting berlin-1714694 the Periphery of Europe,” Financial Times, Nov. 23, 2020. 22 https://www.spiegel.de/kultur/ gesellschaft/der-fall-claas-relotius- 34 Groupe d’etudes Geopolitiques, “The hier-finden-sie-alle-artikel-im- Macron Doctrine, A Conversation with ueberblick-a-1245066.html the French President,” Nov. 16, 2020. 23 Craig S. Smith, “Chirac Upsets East 35 https://www.bmvg.de/de/ Europe by Telling It to `Shut Up’ on Iraq, aktuelles/zweite-grundsatzrede- The New York Times, Feb. 18, 2003. verteidigungsministerin-akk-4482110 See also: Interview with Annegret 24 Noah Barkin, “What Merkel Really Thinks Kramp-Karrenbauer, Neue Zürcher about China – and the World,” Foreign Zeitung, Dec. 11, 2020. Policy, Dec. 31, 2020. 36 Tobias Piller, “Italien braucht eine viel 25 Edward Lucas, “A China Strategy,” The bessere Infrastruktur,“ Frankfurter Center for European Policy Analysis, Allgemeine, Sept. 17, 2020. 2020. See also: Judy Dempsey, “The Closing Window for Angela Merkel 37 Tony Barber, “Double Standards on and Joe Biden,” Carnegie Europe, Corruption Bode Ill for the EU”, Financial Dec. 8, 2020, and Thorsten Benner, @ Times, Oct. 22, 2020. thorstenbenner, Tweet, Dec. 6, 2020. 38 See: Michael Hanfeld, “92 Prozent für 26 Barkin, Ibid. Rot-Rot-Grün,“ Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Nov. 6, 2020, and Jan 27 Körber Stiftung, Ibid. Fleischhauer, „Wenn der Journalisten- 28 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and Nachwuchs geschlossen links wählt: translated by Michael Howard and Peter Nur noch sehen, was ins Weltbild passt,“ Paret, (Princeton: Princeton University Focus, Nov. 14, 2020. Press, 1976), p. 55. 39 Interview published in Körber Stiftung, 29 See: Philip Stephens, “Europe Must Take “The Berlin Pulse, German Foreign Sides with the US over China,” Financial Policy in Perspective, 2020/2021,“ Nov. Times, Dec. 3, 2020. 2020. https://www.koerber-stiftung.de/ fileadmin/user_upload/koerber-stiftung/ 30 Hans von der Burchard and Laurens redaktion/the-berlin-pulse/pdf/2020/ Cerulus, “Berlin Seeks Sanctions The-Berlin-Pulse_2020-21.pdf Against Russian Hackers Over Bundestag Cyberattack,” Politico, Nov. 25, 2020. 14 LSE IDEAS Strategic Update | January 2021
THE AUTHOR
Leon Mangasarian was an editor and reporter for Bloomberg News (2007-2015), Deutsche Presse-Agentur (1994-2007) and United Press International (1989-1994) in East Berlin, Berlin, Bonn and Brussels. He received a PhD in International Relations from the London School of Economics in 1993. He is now a freelance writer living in Potsdam, Germany, and on a farm in southeast Brandenburg state. A Unique International Relations Programme for Decision Makers
LSE IDEAS, a centre for the study of international “Right from the first week affairs, brings together academics and policy-makers I was able to apply the to think strategically about world events. lessons I had learnt to our operational and policy work
and to coach my teams to The Executive MSc International Strategy and look at issues differently.” Diplomacy programme is a one-year degree designed to enhance the strategic vision and negotiation skills –Dame Karen Pierce of professionals from the public, private or NGO UK Ambassador sectors working in an international environment. to the United States
The programme has been especially tailored so that you can accelerate your career while holding a CONTACT US demanding position in the public or private sector. [email protected] bit.ly/execideas ] Germany and the World of Yesterday
Leon Mangasarian
For general enquiries: In the past six decades, the four pillars of Germany’s post-World War II security model were built and expanded: NATO, the European Union, trans-Atlanticism LSE IDEAS and free trade. This gave Germans their longest period Floor 9, Pankhurst House of peace, making them fantastically rich as the world’s 1 Clement’s Inn, London fourth biggest economy. Can Germany’s view of itself WC2A 2AZ as a ‘big Switzerland’ be sustained? Leon Mangasarian argues not. The Biden presidency is providing Germans with a false sense of security, one which means that Germany will fail to build the appropriate policies and NATO alliances Germany desperately needs in order to build a grand strategy of its place in Europe. If that debate is not led by the chancellery then it needs to come from the Bundestag, from the country’s expanding think tank community, the universities and citizen fora.
+44 (0)20 7955 6101
lse.ac.uk/ideas
@lseideas
lseideas