NSIAD-97-134 Operation Desert Storm: Evaluation of the Air Campaign
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United States General Accounting Office Report to the Ranking Minority Member, GAO Committee on Commerce, House of Representatives June 1997 OPERATION DESERT STORM Evaluation of the Air Campaign GAO/NSIAD-97-134 United States General Accounting Office GAO Washington, D.C. 20548 National Security and International Affairs Division B-276599 June 12, 1997 The Honorable John D. Dingell Ranking Minority Member Committee on Commerce House of Representatives Dear Mr. Dingell: This report is the unclassified version of a classified report that we issued in July 1996 on the Operation Desert Storm air campaign.1 At your request, the Department of Defense (DOD) reevaluated the security classification of the original report, and as a result, about 85 percent of the material originally determined to be classified has subsequently been determined to be unclassified and is presented in this report. The data and findings in this report address (1) the use and performance of aircraft, munitions, and missiles employed during the air campaign; (2) the validity of DOD and manufacturer claims about weapon systems’ performance, particularly those systems utilizing advanced technology; (3) the relationship between cost and performance of weapon systems; and (4) the extent that Desert Storm air campaign objectives were met. The long-standing DOD and manufacturer claims about weapon performance can now be contrasted with some of our findings. For example, (1) the F-117 bomb hit rate ranged between 41 and 60 percent—which is considered to be highly effective, but is still less than the 80-percent hit rate reported after the war by DOD, the Air Force, and the primary contractor (see pp. 125-132); (2) DOD’s initially reported 98-percent success rate for Tomahawk land attack missile launches did not accurately reflect the system’s effectiveness (see pp. 139-143); (3) the claim by DOD and contractors of a one-target, one-bomb capability for laser-guided munitions was not demonstrated in the air campaign where, on average, 11 tons of guided and 44 tons of unguided munitions were delivered on each successfully destroyed target (with averages ranging from 0.8 to 43.9 tons of guided and 6.7 to 152.6 tons of unguided munitions delivered across the 12 target categories—see p. 117); and, (4) the all-weather and adverse-weather sensors designed to identify targets and guide weapons were either less capable than DOD reported or incapable when employed at increasing altitudes or in the presence of clouds, smoke, dust, or high humidity (see pp. 78-82). 1In July 1996, we also issued a report entitled Operation Desert Storm: Evaluation of the Air War (GAO/PEMD-96-10), that set forth our unclassified summary, conclusions, and recommendations. Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-97-134 Operation Desert Storm Air Campaign B-276599 The report also now includes analyses of associations between weapon systems and target outcomes (see pp. 112-118); selected manufacturers’ claims about product performance in Desert Storm (see pp. 143-146); the air campaign’s effectiveness in achieving strategic objectives (see pp. 148-159); and the costs and performance of aircraft and munitions used during the campaign (see pp. 162-193). Although some initial claims of accuracy and effectiveness of these weapon systems were exaggerated, their performance led, in part, to perhaps the most successful war fought by the United States in the 20th century. And though some claims for some advanced systems could not be verified, their performance in combat may well have been unprecedented. While this report reveals findings that were not previously publicly available, our analyses of the air campaign’s success against nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) targets predates recent revelations regarding suspected locations and confirmed releases of chemical warfare material during and immediately after the campaign. In our report, we indicate that available bomb damage assessments during the war concluded that 16 of 21 sites categorized by Gulf War planners as NBC facilities had been successfully destroyed. However, information compiled by the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) since the end of Desert Storm reveals that the number of suspected NBC targets identified by U.S. planners, both prior to and during the campaign, did not fully encompass all the possible NBC targets in Iraq.2 Thus, the number of NBC targets discussed in the report is less than the actual suspected because (1) target categorizations were based on the predominate activity at the facility that may not have been NBC-related (i.e., a major air base or conventional weapons storage depot may have contained a single chemical or biological weapons storage bunker); (2) target categorizations were inconsistent across agencies; and (3) the intelligence community did not identify all NBC-related facilities. UNSCOM has conducted investigations at a large number of facilities in Iraq, including a majority of the facilities suspected by U.S. authorities as being 2In the CIA Report on Intelligence Related to Gulf War Illnesses, dated 2 August 1996, the number of sites suspected to have been connected to Iraq’s chemical warfare program alone, totaled 34 (p. 6). UNSCOM has conducted chemical weapons-related inspections at over 60 locations and investigations continue. Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-97-134 Operation Desert Storm Air Campaign B-276599 NBC-related.3 With three exceptions, Khamisiyah, Muhammadiyat, and Al Muthanna, UNSCOM found no evidence that chemical or biological weapons were present during the campaign; and only at Muhammadiyat and Al Muthana did UNSCOM find evidence that would lead them to conclude that chemical or biological weapons were released as a result of coalition bombing. Post-war intelligence compiled by the Central Intelligence Agency indicates some releases of chemicals at Muhammadiyat and Al Muthanna; however, both are in remote areas west of Baghdad, and each is over 400 kilometers north of the Saudi Arabian border and the nearest coalition base. Regarding the few suspected chemical weapon sites that have not yet been inspected by UNSCOM, we have been able to determine that each was attacked by coalition aircraft during Desert Storm and that one site is located within the Kuwait Theater of Operations in closer proximity to the border, where coalition ground forces were located.4 However, we have yet to learn why these facilities have not been investigated. We are seeking additional information on these sites. As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 15 days from its issue date. At that time, we will send copies to the Chairmen and Ranking Minority Members of the Senate and House Committees on Appropriations and their respective Subcommittees on National Security and Defense; Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs; House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight; and Senate and House Committees on the Budget. We will also make copies available to others upon request. 3UNSCOM and the International Atomic Energy Agency have had responsibility to investigate Iraq’s NBC weapons programs since the cease-fire and the number of suspected chemical weapons-related facilities investigated by UNSCOM far exceeds the number of sites originally suspected (or attacked) by the United States. For example, Khamisiyah, which was first inspected by UNSCOM in October 1991, was not identified as an NBC air campaign target during the war and, thus, is not among the 21 NBC sites evaluated in our report. 4The Kuwait Theater of Operations is generally defined as Kuwait and Iraq below 31 degrees north latitude. Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-97-134 Operation Desert Storm Air Campaign B-276599 This report was prepared under the direction of Kwai-Cheung Chan, Director, Special Studies and Evaluation, who may be reached on (202) 512-3092 if you or your staff have any questions. Other major contributors are listed in appendix XIII. Sincerely yours, Henry L. Hinton, Jr. Assistant Comptroller General Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-97-134 Operation Desert Storm Air Campaign Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-97-134 Operation Desert Storm Air Campaign Contents Letter 1 Original Letter 14 Appendix I 44 Scope 44 Scope and Methodology 45 Methodology Strengths and Limitations 58 Appendix II 60 Operating Conditions: Time, Environment, and Enemy Capability 60 The Use of Aircraft Air-to-Ground Weapon Systems: Planned Versus Actual Use 64 and Munitions in the Combat Operations Support 82 Air Campaign Aircraft Survivability 92 Summary 107 Appendix III 110 Effectiveness Data Availability 111 Aircraft and Munition Associations Between Weapon Systems and Outcomes 112 Effectiveness in Target Accuracy and Effectiveness as a Function of Aircraft and 118 Desert Storm Munition Type LGB Accuracy 122 F-117 Effectiveness Claims 125 TLAM Effectiveness Claims 139 Weapon System Manufacturers’ Claims 143 Air Campaign Effectiveness Against Mobile Targets 146 Air Campaign Effectiveness in Achieving Strategic Objectives 148 Summary 159 Appendix IV 162 Cost and Performance of Aircraft 162 Cost and Performance Cost and Effectiveness of Munitions 177 of the Aircraft and Summary 192 Munitions in Desert Storm Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-97-134 Operation Desert Storm Air Campaign Contents Appendix V 194 Desert Storm Campaign Objectives 194 Operation Desert Discussion 200 Storm Objectives Summary 203 Appendix VI 205 Basic Structure of the Evidence on IADS Capabilities 205 Iraqi Integrated Air Defense System Appendix VII 207 Pre-Desert Storm Missions and Actual