DOCSLIB.ORG

Energy for People

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Energy for People ’09 JSC GAZPROM NEFT SUSTAINABILITY REPORT 2009 ENERGY FOR LIFE ENERGY FOR PEOPLE JSC GAZPROM NEFT SUSTAINABILITY REPORT 2009 Presented below is Sustainable Development Report of JSC Gazprom Neft for 2009. Since the year 2007, the Company has been annually summing up the results of this activity, informing the stakeholders of its priorities and achievements. This fourth release of the Report describes the Company’s efforts in achieving the sustainable development goals set in the corporate strategy. In this Report, such terms as JSC Gazprom Neft, Gazprom Neft, the Company, and the Group in various versions mean JSC Gazprom Neft and its affiliates and subsidiaries. The Report describes the financial standing and performance based on the consolidated data of JSC Gazprom Neft. The data describing the activities in the social sphere and labor relations, and environmental protection results, cover JSC Gazprom Neft and its affiliates and subsidiaries in Russia and the CIS, if not otherwise specified in the text. 2 JSC GAZPROM NEFT SUSTAINABILITY REPORT 2009 CONtENts 5 1. LEttER FROm thE ChaIRmaN 71 8. SaFE dEvELOPmENt: INdustRIaL OF thE maNaGEmENt BOaRd aNd ENvIRONmENtaL saFEtY, OCCuPatIONaL hEaLth 7 2. GazPROm NEFt IN 2009 72 Strategy AND management 8 ABOUT ThE Company 73 Occupational health AND SAFETY 12 KEY AChIEvEMENTS OF 2009 76 INDUSTRIAL SAFETY 77 REDUCTION OF ADvERSE ENvironmental 15 3. ImPLEmENtatION OF thE sustaINaBLE impacts AND EFFICIENT USE OF RESOURCES dEvELOPmENt stRatEGY: CONsIstENCY aNd EFFICIENCY 84 9. AppendIx 1. sELECtEd tERms aNd aBBREvIatIONs 23 4. SustaINaBLE dEvELOPmENt maNaGEmENt 24 Integration OF ThE sustainable 86 10. CONtaCts aNd FEEdBaCk DEvELOPMENT PRINCIPLE INTO ThE Company’S practice 25 Corporate GOvERNANCE AND Operations Management 26 Implementation OF ThE SYSTEMIC approach TO management 26 Interaction wITh StakehOLDERS 27 Corporate Communications 31 Sustainability REPORTING 33 5. REsOuRCEs FOR thE FutuRE: ECONOmIC dEvELOPmENt 34 Strategy Implementation: GROwTh AND Efficiency 42 Vector OF INNOvativE DEvELOPMENT 47 6. HumaN REsOuRCEs dEvELOPmENt aNd sOCIaL PROGRams 48 Strategy AND management 50 PERSONNEL Characteristics 51 PERSONNEL RECRUITMENT AND TRAINING 52 MOTIvation AND wages 54 Cooperation wITh TRADE UNIONS 54 SOCIAL PROGRAMS 59 7. CONtRIButION tO REGIONaL dEvELOPmENt 60 Strategy AND management 60 REGIONAL cooperation AND SOCIAL INvESTMENTS 69 ChARITIY 3 JSC GAZPROM NEFT SUSTAINABILITY REPORT 2009 Dear colleagues, In the year 2009, Gazprom Neft confirmed its reputation of a stable and efficient company once again. In a difficult financial and economic environment, the Company increased its oil production and refining outputs, and extended its assets in and outside Russia. Along with this, we strive to ensure the optimal balance of the economic, environmental, and social components of the Company’s activity, to generate an environment friendly for business and for development of our employees’ innovative potential, thus providing a stockpile for stable growth in the future. The sustainable development strategy is an integral part of the Company’s long-term strategy. Creating a firm basis for large-scale growth, for establishment of Gazprom Neft as a world class company, we consistently set and achieve targets both of financial and technological nature and those aimed at increasing the social capital and natural resources conservation. These targets are closely interrelated, for successful modernization is impossible without proper care of the Company’s human resources, and you cannot successfully compete on the world market today without improving your environmental safety. In 2009, our sustainable development activity was aimed at improving the quality and efficiency of the key social and environmental programs. Under the challenging economic conditions, we have learned to manage these programs better, to focus our resources on strategic sectors, and to set our priorities with regard to material issues of the day. Improvement of corporate governance, development and implementation of policies and standards relying on the best international and Russian practice in industrial safety, occupational health and environmental protection, as well as in human resources development and community investments – have raised this work to a higher level, enabling us to retain and develop programs important for our employees and social partners. Among the priorities of the year for the Company were improvement of the employee motivation and professional development system, social support to employees, involvement in the social and economic development of the regions where Gazprom Neft operates, and implementation of large-scale programs aimed at higher industrial and environmental safety. The innovative technological, social, and environmental initiatives of Gazprom Neft presented in this Report have become a material input to implementation of the Company’s long-term development strategy. Many of these initiatives have also won public recognition, receiving awards and prizes of governmental agencies and of public and professional organizations. In these efforts, Gazprom Neft actively cooperates with a broad range of stakeholders: the Government, shareholders, employees, users, and suppliers, as well as with local communities in the regions where the Company operates. we strive to build this interaction upon a basis of mutual trust and responsibility. The Company emphasizes the transparency of its activity. In 2009, the information disclosure quality of Gazprom Neft was recognized both in and outside Russia. The annual report of the Company was named the best in the non-financial sector by the results of the 11th annual competition of annual reports of the Expert RA rating agency. Gazprom Neft was also ranked first among global oil and gas industry companies for best financial disclosure procedures by the IR Global Rankings. The Company’s sustainability reports supplement its financial reporting, reflecting the balance of the financial, industrial, social, and environmental components of the Company’s activity. Oriented at the best international and Russian practice, Gazprom Neft has started implementation of the internationally recognized sustainability reporting guidelines. The dynamic growth of the Company, as well as the developments concerning its structure and business processes, requires careful adaptation of our sustainability reporting to the new conditions. we consider the 2009 Sustainable development report as a step in this direction. Presenting you this Report, I hope for constructive and concerned discussion of both our today’s performance and problems that have yet to be solved. I would also like to express my gratitude to all employees of the Company who took part in the preparation of this Report. Alexander Dyukov, Chairman of the Management Board, Gazprom Neft 5 ENERGY FOR LIFE ENERGY FOR PEOPLE 2 GAZPROm NEFt IN 2009 GAZPROM NEFT IN 2009 Energy for life 2 ENERGY FOR PEOPLE GazPROm NEFt IN 2009 aBOut thE COmPaNY Gazprom Neft, a subsidiary of JSC Gazprom, The Company’s core lines of business COmPaNY’s is one of Russia’s largest and fastest-growing A Oil and natural gas prospecting, BusINEss oil and gas companies. Gazprom Neft is development, production, and sales Russia’s fifth company by oil production A Oil refining and marketing of GEOGRaPhY level, and third, by the oil refining output. petroleum products The Company’s proved hydrocarbon The Company carries out its activities reserves by the SPE (PRMS) classification in Russia’s largest oil- and gas-bearing exceed 1 billion TOE, which positions the stRatEGY regions such as Khanty-Mansiysk Company among the twenty world’s largest Autonomous District, Yamalo-Nenets oil companies. The Company employs over The strategy of JSC Gazprom Neft Autonomous District, Tomsk, Omsk and 50 thousand people. is oriented to increase the scale and Tyumen Regions. expand the geography of the business, and to maintain and improve its The Company’s major oil refining efficiency. The goal of the Company’s facilities are located in Moscow, the long-term Development Strategy until Omsk and Yaroslavl Regions. The 2020 is to establish Gazprom Neft as Gazprom Neft’ distribution network a global company of Russian origin operates countrywide. efficiently competing on the worldwide oil and petroleum products markets. Gazprom Neft is strengthening its positions on international markets. The Company operates in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and the Republic of Belarus. The Gazprom Neft assets outside Russia include companies in Serbia and Italy. The Company stRatEGIC GOaLs implements projects in the Middle East, OF JsC GazPROm NEFt Africa, and Latin America. uNtIL 2020 GROwTh OF PROvED OIL RESERvES: UP TO 2,200 MILLION TONS kEY FINaNCIaL aNd OPERatIONaL REsuLts IN 2009* GROwTh OF OIL PRODUCTION: Proceeds, US$ millions 24 166 UP TO 90–100 MILLION TOE A YEAR EBITDA, US$ millions 5 977 Oil and gas production, millions of barrels, oil equivalent GROwTh OF OIL REFINING (including the interest in subsidiaries assessed by the share 369,8 OUTPUT: UP TO 70-80 MILLION interest method) TONS A YEAR Refining, millions of tons (by corporate refineries, and subsidiary refineries included 33,4 GROwTh OF SALES OF hIGh ADDED by the share interest method) vALUE OIL PRODUCTS: UP TO 40 MILLION TONS A YEAR * For more details of the financial and industrial results of the Company’s activity, see «JSC Gazprom Neft Annual Report for 2009» 8 JSC GAZPROM NEFT SUSTAINABILITY REPORT 2009
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Defining and Identifying Russia's Elite Groups
    Defining and identifying Russia’s elite groups Siloviki representation during Putin’s third term Master’s Thesis Russian and Eurasian Studies Leiden University, The Netherlands 23 January 2017 Sam Broekman Student Number: 1605062 Word Count: 18,005 Supervisor: Dr. M. Frear Table of contents Introduction ............................................................................................................................................. 2 Introducing the siloviki ......................................................................................................................... 2 General research gaps ......................................................................................................................... 2 Research question ............................................................................................................................... 3 Methodology ....................................................................................................................................... 4 Chapter overview ................................................................................................................................. 4 Section 1: Rise of the siloviki..................................................................................................................... 6 1.1 The Politburo 2.0 ........................................................................................................................... 6 1.2 Putin’s return to the presidency .................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Russia: Background and U.S. Policy
    Russia: Background and U.S. Policy Cory Welt Analyst in European Affairs August 21, 2017 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov R44775 Russia: Background and U.S. Policy Summary Over the last five years, Congress and the executive branch have closely monitored and responded to new developments in Russian policy. These developments include the following: increasingly authoritarian governance since Vladimir Putin’s return to the presidential post in 2012; Russia’s 2014 annexation of Ukraine’s Crimea region and support of separatists in eastern Ukraine; violations of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty; Moscow’s intervention in Syria in support of Bashar al Asad’s government; increased military activity in Europe; and cyber-related influence operations that, according to the U.S. intelligence community, have targeted the 2016 U.S. presidential election and countries in Europe. In response, the United States has imposed economic and diplomatic sanctions related to Russia’s actions in Ukraine and Syria, malicious cyber activity, and human rights violations. The United States also has led NATO in developing a new military posture in Central and Eastern Europe designed to reassure allies and deter aggression. U.S. policymakers over the years have identified areas in which U.S. and Russian interests are or could be compatible. The United States and Russia have cooperated successfully on issues such as nuclear arms control and nonproliferation, support for military operations in Afghanistan, the Iranian and North Korean nuclear programs, the International Space Station, and the removal of chemical weapons from Syria. In addition, the United States and Russia have identified other areas of cooperation, such as countering terrorism, illicit narcotics, and piracy.
    [Show full text]
  • Romanov News Новости Романовых
    Romanov News Новости Романовых By Ludmila & Paul Kulikovsky №117 December 2017 Detail on a door in the Russian Orthodox Church of Saint Elizabeth in Wiesbaden, Germany The conference and exhibition "Hessian Princesses in Russian History" in Frankfurt On December 19, in Frankfurt-am-Main, Germany, the scientific and educational conference "Hessian Princesses in Russian History" arranged by the Russian Ministry of culture and the Elizabeth-Sergei Enlightenment Society, was opened. The conference was held in the "Knights hall" of the "German order" - commonly known as the "Teutonic Knights" - the full name being "The Order of Brothers of the German House of Saint Mary in Jerusalem". It is a Catholic religious order founded as a military order c. 1190 in Acre, Kingdom of Jerusalem. More than 50 Russian and German historians, archivists, and cultural figures attended the conference. Among them were: Alla Manilova, Deputy Minister of Culture of the Russian Federation; Anna Gromova, Chairman of the Elizabeth-Sergei Enlightenment Society"; Karl Weber, Director of the Office of State Palaces and Parks of the Land of Hesse; Sergey Mironenko, Scientific director of the State Archives of the Russian Federation; Elena Kalnitskaya, General director of Museum "Peterhof", and Ludmila and Paul Kulikovsky. The relations between the Hessen and Russian Imperial houses started in the reign of Empress Catherine the Great. In 1773 she invited the Hessian Princess, Wilhelmina Louisa of Hesse-Darmstadt, to St. Petersburg. On 29 September the same year Princess Wilhelmina married Empress Catherine the Great's son, the Tsarevich Paul Petrovich - the later Emperor Paul I. In Russia she was named Grand Duchess Natalia Alexeevna.
    [Show full text]
  • Impact of New US Sanctions Against Russia 1
    Impact of new US sanctions against Russia 1 Client memorandum March 2014 Impact of new US sanctions against Russia In response to the escalating tensions involving the Crimean peninsula, Russia and Ukraine, the United States has now imposed sanctions against (i) the former President of Ukraine and certain Ukrainian persons associated with the crisis in Crimea, (ii) certain senior Russian government officials, (iii) certain politically- influential Russian businessmen, and (iv) a Russian bank associated with the inner circle of Russia's President Putin. As discussed further below, the US Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control ("OFAC") imposed these sanctions under three successive US Executive Orders that give OFAC a broad authorization to designate not only persons but also companies and sectors of the Russian economy in order to obtain negotiating leverage and signal US resolve to deter any Russian military and other pressure directed at neighboring countries. The obligation to comply with the sanctions applies to US persons globally and to non-US persons in regard to their USD dealings and other economic activity involving the United States. OFAC expects that persons with compliance obligations will conduct sufficient diligence of their Russia and Ukraine-related business to establish that such business does not involve the new sanctions targets, directly or indirectly. Executive Order 13660 On 6 March 2014, the United States issued Executive Order 13660 ("EO 13660") authorizing an asset freeze and visa ban on individuals or entities determined to be responsible for, or complicit in, actions or policies that undermine democratic processes or institutions in Ukraine or that threaten the peace, security, stability, sovereignty, or territorial integrity of Ukraine.
    [Show full text]
  • Muslim World League to Rus- Sia—A First-Ever Trip—And the Gathering of the MARCH 28, MOSCOW International Islamic Conference “Islam: a Mes- H.E
    MAY 2019 | VOLUME 45 | ISSUE 5 Contents I. Editorial Leaders Letter from the Editor . 7 New Zealand: The Intolerability of Intolerance . 9 Russia & Islam: The Power of Tradition . .13 Editorial Department: II. MWL and the World: The Month in Review Secretary General H.E. Dr. Muhammad bin Abdulkarim Al-Issa III. Feature Articles Supervisor General Geopolitics Media Affairs Dept. Moscow, Grozny, St. Petersburg, Kazan: Abdulwahab Alshehri MWL Reaches Hearts & Minds . .17 Editor Responsible The Chechnya Report: Marcia A. Christoff MWL Makes Inroads, Marks Influence . .29 P.O. Box 537 Russia Conference Keynote Speech of H.E. Sheikh Makkah, Saudi Arabia Dr. Al-Issa “Islam: A Message of Mercy and Peace” . 36 Tel: 0096 66 (012)560 0919 Email: [email protected] Cultural Affairs: Dazzling Gems and Hidden Treasures: Two Mosques of Russia . .42 Follow Us on Social Media: Islam & Orthodoxy: Cooperation Not Conflict . .48 @mwlorg_en | @mwlorg | Russia’s Powerful Muslim Spiritual Board . .52 @mwlorg_fr | @mwlorg_ur Economics/Business /mwlorg.en | /mwlorg Start-ups and Oligarchs: Russian-Muslim Entrepreneurship . .54 @mwlorg Technology and Medicine /themwlorg Russia’s Silicon Valley and Islamic World Investment ....................57 mwlorg IV. Historical Essays Kazan’s Most Famous Woman . .58 Count Leo Tolstoy: The Friend of Islam . .60 1 MWL in March/April Highlights of the Month in Review MARCH 28 and the Islamic world. The visit of the Muslim World League to Rus- sia—a first-ever trip—and the gathering of the MARCH 28, MOSCOW international Islamic conference “Islam: A Mes- H.E. Sheikh Dr. Al-Issa signed a cooperation sage of Mercy & Peace” began on this day at the agreement with the State Fund for the Promotion President Hotel in Moscow, closing in Grozny on of Culture, Science and Education in Russia.
    [Show full text]
  • Federación De Rusia
    OFICINA DE INFORMACIÓN DIPLOMÁTICA FICHA PAÍS Rusia Federación de Rusia La Oficina de Información Diplomática del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y de Cooperación pone a disposición de los profesionales de los medios de comunicación y del público en general la presente ficha país. La información contenida en esta ficha país es pública y se ha extraído de diversos medios no oficiales. La presente ficha país no defiende posición política alguna ni de este Ministerio ni del Gobierno de España respecto del país sobre el que versa. MAYO 2018 Organización Territorial: La Constitución define a Rusia como un estado federal Rusia e integrado por una serie de Sujetos o entidades constitutivas de la Federación, que reciben distintos nombres (república, región, distrito…), sin que ello su- ponga diferencias significativas en cuanto a las competencias que cada entidad puede ejercer. Actualmente la Federación de Rusia está formada por 83 Sujetos de la Fede- ración (de los cuales 2 son ciudades, Moscú y S. Petersburgo), agrupados en 8 Mar de Barents Distritos Federales. Crimea y Sebastopol se han convertido, tras la anexión no reconocida internacionalmente en 2014, los Sujetos Federales 84 y 85, respec- San Petersburgo tivamente. Moscú Kazan 1.2. Geografía Mar de Ojotsk Rostov Samara del Don Ifa Ekaterimburgo La Rusia europea tiene una orografía poco accidentada. Limitada por la gran Kronsnodor Omsk cadena montañosa del Cáucaso y los montes -más bien colinas- Urales, no hay Novosibirsk quiebras en el relieve de la llanura rusa. Siberia occidental, constituida por las KAZAJISTÁN CHINA cuencas del Obi y el Yeniséi es también casi totalmente llana.
    [Show full text]
  • United States and EU Impose Expanded Sanctions in Response to the Situation in Ukraine
    CLIENT ALERTS UNited States aNd EU Impose ExpaNded SaNctioNs iN RespoNse to the SituatioN iN UkraiNe March 18, 2014 Authors Edward J. KraulaNd, Meredith RathboNe, Richard J. Battaglia, Guy SoussaN, Maury SheNk, AlexaNdra Baj, Jack R. Hayes Overview IN the past two weeks, the UNited States aNd the EuropeaN UNioN have imposed ecoNomic saNctioNs agaiNst UkraiNiaN aNd RussiaN persoNs iN respoNse to the oNgoiNg crisis iN UkraiNe. CaNada has also iNtroduced saNctioNs similar to those imposed by the UNited States aNd the EuropeaN UNioN, aNd, aloNg with the UNited States, is suspeNdiNg trade talks with Russia iN respoNse to the crisis. US aNd EuropeaN officials have iNdicated that the ecoNomic saNctioNs, discussed below, curreNtly directed at a limited Number of iNdividuals, could be expaNded to target additioNal persoNs, as well as specific iNdustry sectors, iNcludiNg the RussiaN arms, eNergy, aNd baNkiNg iNdustries. US SaNctioNs Executive Order 13660 ON March 6, 2014, PresideNt Obama issued Executive Order 13660, blockiNg the property aNd iNterests iN property, aNd suspeNdiNg eNtry iNto the UNited States, of aNy persoN determiNed by the Secretary of the Treasury (iN coNsultatioN with the Secretary of State) to be: directly or iNdirectly: uNdermiNiNg democratic processes or iNstitutioNs iN UkraiNe; threateNiNg the peace, security, stability, sovereigNty, or territorial iNtegrity of UkraiNe, or misappropriatiNg the state assets of UkraiNe or of aN ecoNomically sigNificaNt eNtity iN UkraiNe; assertiNg goverNmeNtal authority over aNy part or regioN of UkraiNe without the authorizatioN of the GoverNmeNt of UkraiNe; the leader of aN eNtity that has, or whose members have, eNgaged iN such activities, or whose property is blocked; materially assistiNg, spoNsoriNg, or providiNg finaNcial, material, or techNological support for, or goods or services iN support of such activities, or of aNy persoN whose property is blocked; or owNed or coNtrolled by, or have acted or purported to act for or oN behalf of, directly or iNdirectly, aNy persoN whose property is blocked.
    [Show full text]
  • Russia Presidential Pre-Election Assessment Report March 20, 2000
    I R I Advancing Democracy Worldwide RUSSIA PRESIDENTIAL PRE-ELECTION ASSESSMENT REPORT MARCH 20, 2000 INTRODUCTION For the second time in just over three months, the Russian electorate will go to the polls in a national election. On March 26, 2000, Russia will hold its third democratic election for president and complete an election cycle that began with the State Duma election of December 19, 1999. This election is being held earlier than was initially scheduled (June 2000) due to the surprise resignation of then-President Boris Yeltsin on December 31, 1999. In preparation for the post-Yeltsin era, the Kremlin has undertaken a well-orchestrated campaign to ensure the transfer of power to its own hand-picked candidate. The State Duma election was used by the Kremlin as a means to remove all serious opponents for the presidential election. Prior to the start of the campaign for the State Duma in August 1999, presidential aspirants former Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov and Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov were polling 22 percent and 9 percent respectively (polls by Public Opinion Foundation.) Considering both potential candidates were leaders of the broad-based Fatherland-All Russia alliance and had no intention of running against each other, either of their candidacies was considered extremely formidable. Now eight months later, neither Primakov nor Luzhkov is running and the Kremlin’s candidate of choice – acting President Vladimir Putin – sits atop the polls with an approval rating around 59 percent (VCIOM -- All Russia Center for Public Opinion.) If nothing else has been proven in this campaign cycle, it is that the Kremlin is still the most formidable campaign organization in Russia.
    [Show full text]
  • Who's Who in Primakov's New Russian Government
    No. 1232 November 6, 1998 WHOS WHO IN PRIMAKOVS NEW RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT EVGUENI VOLK, PH.D. On September 11, 1998, the Russian State THE PRIMAKOV GOVERNMENT Duma approved President Boris Yeltsin’s choice of Evgeny Primakov as Prime Minister by a vote of Primakov and most of his Cabinet officials built 317 out of 450. The Duma’s action came in the their political careers in the former Communist regime. wake of the August 17 devaluation of the ruble, Produced by the dismissal of former Prime Minister Sergei A former senior Commu- The Kathryn and Shelby Kiriyenko and his government, and the Duma’s nist Party of the Soviet Cullom Davis International failure to approve Yeltsin’s choice of Viktor Cher- Union (CPSU) nomenkla- Studies Center nomyrdin. tura member and former member of the CPSU’s rul- Published by Primakov used his first month in office to shape ing body, the Politburo, he The Heritage Foundation his new government and draft the semblance of a managed to survive when 214 Massachusetts Ave., N.E. crisis management program to address the coun- President Boris Yeltsin took Washington, D.C. 200024999 try’s serious financial problems. His choices prove over. He was appointed head of the Russian foreign (202) 546-4400 him to be a master of compromise: His Cabinet intelligence service in 1991. http://www.heritage.org members represent every major political faction in and became Foreign Minis- the Duma, and his economic proposals are ter in January 1996. designed to please both the left and the right. Primakov has challenged Primakov is wary of the United States and has America’s global leadership been a consistent opponent of U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • The Dual Structure and Mentality of Vladimir Putin´S Power Coalition: A
    This report analyses the Russian authoritarian regime that emerged under Vladimir Putin and attempts to give a wider context to the so-called FSB-ization of the Russian government. The Dual Structure and Mentality of Joris van Bladel The first part of the report deals with Putin’s main achievements in domestic and foreign policy and examines the extent to which state policy has fulfilled the aspirations of the Russian public. The much-needed stability and Vladimir Putin’s Power Coalition security that Putin has brought to the country seem to outweigh the fact that the government has veered towards authoritarianism. The degree to which Russian society has truly been taken over by the FSB is critically examined, A legacy for Medvedev and this process of FSB-ization is explained in a wider social and historical context. DR. JORIS VAN BLADEL The second part aims to bring some insight into the current political dynamic by examining the power relations in the coalition and the mentalities typical of the major factions: the ‘siloviki’ and the liberal. In particular, the ‘siloviki’ are critically examined with regard to their history, their typical modes of thinking, and their rise to influence. The very notion of ‘siloviki’ is given a more precise explanation by showing why they have come to power, whom the term ‘siloviki’ should actually be applied to, what their mode of thinking is like, and how PowerCoalition Putin’s Vladimir of Mentality and Dual Structure The influential they are likely to be in the future. The study then focuses on the actual siloviki faction: its members, its role, and its influence.
    [Show full text]
  • The Politburo 2.0 and the Anti-Establishment Wave
    THE POLITBURO 2.0 AND THE ANTI-ESTABLISHMENT WAVE Summer 2019 THE POLITBURO 2.0 AND THE ANTI-ESTABLISHMENT WAVE This report is based on the results of non-formalised expert interviews with representatives of the Russian political class. The expert panel was formed in 2012 and has been regularly updated since then, currently totalling more than 100 experts. CONTEXT In our anniversary report on Politburo 2.0, published in August 20171, we made several forecasts, which were verified in the following two years. The Politburo 2.0, an informal decision-making structure that has developed around Vladimir Putin, has been preserved after the 2018 presidential election. The composition of the Politburo 2.0 has been undergoing a gradual rotation. The key changes to date include the entry of Nikolay Patrushev, the secretary of the markedly strengthened Security Council, into full Politburo 2.0 membership, the return of businessman Gennadiy Timchenko, the preservation and strengthening of positions of Igor Sechin and Arkadiy Rotenberg, the transition of the State Duma Speaker Vyacheslav Volodin to the rank of candidate member, as well as a decrease in the number of candidate members, mostly due to the weakening influence of the representatives of large private companies. Only players serving as supervisors of significant industries and projects remain in the major league of the Russian political elite. Further deterioration of Russia’s relations with the West, as we had forecast, pushes the Politburo 2.0 to opt for the mobilisation scenario. This entails an increase in the role of the Security Council’s apparatus, which is becoming the fourth element of the “Big Government”2 – alongside the Presidential Administration, the government per se and the key state corporations.
    [Show full text]
  • Through the Russian Looking Glass: the Development of a Russian Rule of Law and Democracy Witney Cale United States District Court
    Loyola University Chicago International Law Review Volume 7 Article 2 Issue 2 Spring/Summer 2010 2010 Through the Russian Looking Glass: The Development of a Russian Rule of Law and Democracy Witney Cale United States District Court Follow this and additional works at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/lucilr Part of the International Law Commons Recommended Citation Witney Cale Through the Russian Looking Glass: The Development of a Russian Rule of Law and Democracy, 7 Loy. U. Chi. Int'l L. Rev. 93 (2010). Available at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/lucilr/vol7/iss2/2 This Feature Article is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola University Chicago International Law Review by an authorized administrator of LAW eCommons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. THROUGH THE RUSSIAN LOOKING GLASS: Tr DEVELOPMENT OF A RUSSIAN RULE OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY Whitney Calet I. Introduction ................................................... 94 II. Russia's unique vision of the rule of law: the product of a unique legal experience and history ................................... 99 A. Russia's Historical and Cultural Antipathy Toward the Law . 101 B. The Law As Inadequate ................................... 103 C. Justice, Not the Law, as the Truth ......................... 104 D. Western Imperialism Through the Law ..................... 104 E. The Twentieth Century: A Harsh Russian Legal Experience. 105 F. Post-Soviet Transition: Failure to Implement Western-Style L aw ...................................................... 10 8 G. The Current Development of Russia's Legal Vision: A Hybrid Legal Culture ...................................... 109 1. Putin Steps Down from the Presidency ................. 110 2. Medvedev's Call to Amend the Constitution ...........
    [Show full text]