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Who's Who in Primakov's New Russian Government

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No. 1232 November 6, 1998 WHOS WHO IN PRIMAKOVS NEW RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT EVGUENI VOLK, PH.D. On September 11, 1998, the Russian State THE PRIMAKOV GOVERNMENT Duma approved President Boris Yeltsin’s choice of Evgeny Primakov as Prime Minister by a vote of Primakov and most of his Cabinet officials built 317 out of 450. The Duma’s action came in the their political careers in the former Communist regime. wake of the August 17 devaluation of the ruble, Produced by the dismissal of former Prime Minister Sergei A former senior Commu- The Kathryn and Shelby Kiriyenko and his government, and the Duma’s nist Party of the Soviet Cullom Davis International failure to approve Yeltsin’s choice of Viktor Cher- Union (CPSU) nomenkla- Studies Center nomyrdin. tura member and former member of the CPSU’s rul- Published by Primakov used his first month in office to shape ing body, the Politburo, he The Heritage Foundation his new government and draft the semblance of a managed to survive when 214 Massachusetts Ave., N.E. crisis management program to address the coun- President Boris Yeltsin took Washington, D.C. 200024999 try’s serious financial problems. His choices prove over. He was appointed head of the Russian foreign (202) 546-4400 him to be a master of compromise: His Cabinet intelligence service in 1991. http://www.heritage.org members represent every major political faction in and became Foreign Minis- the Duma, and his economic proposals are ter in January 1996. designed to please both the left and the right. Primakov has challenged Primakov is wary of the United States and has America’s global leadership been a consistent opponent of U.S. international role by promoting “multipo- leadership. During the recent missile crisis with larity” and opposing NATO Iraq, for example, he resisted U.S. military retalia- enlargement. Yet he is too pragmatic to allow Rus- tion against Saddam Hussein. Exactly how Prima- sian–U.S. relations to deteriorate dramatically. He kov’s government will affect U.S.–Russian relations might even pressure the State Duma into ratifying may be uncertain, but its policies clearly could the START II Treaty, believing it to be in Russia’s have a major impact on U.S. national interests. national interest. But this would not signal an end No. 1232 November 6, 1998 to Russia’s flirtation with anti-American regimes. mander of Russia’s Strategic Rocket Forces, has retained his ministerial portfolio. A professional Most of Primakov’s deputies were high-ranking military man, he has launched serious military CPSU officials in the 1970s and 1980s when the reforms which have encountered strong resistance U.S.S.R. was suffering economic decline. They from the generals. represent a generation of Russian history plagued by stagnation and economic morass, and are CONCLUSION unlikely to adjust their economic philosophies to the reality of a developing market. Primakov’s Cabinet selected may have been spe- First Deputy Premier Yuri Maslyukov, the top cifically to avoid alienating influential political and Deputy Prime Minister and the government’s chief economic groups, such as international financial economic executive, built his career largely within institutions and the powerful oligarchs. It may also the huge Soviet military–industrial complex. be the political base to launch a Primakov for Maslyukov will supervise macroeconomics, the resident campaign in the near future. Overall, military–industrial complex, and the arms trade. Primakov’s government is more likely to restrict He is Russia’s chief representative for talks with the economic freedom and strengthen its involvement International Monetary Fund (IMF), despite his in the economic system than to concentrate on Communist background and lack of experience in opening markets and increasing their competitive- negotiating financial issues. His counterparts are ness. unlikely to give him much credence. But failure to pursue free-market reforms could Deputy Premier Gennady Kulik is in charge of aggravate the social and economic situation within agriculture. A Communist-allied Agrarian Party the Russian Federation. Separatist tendencies member, he was a CPSU apparatchik. He opposes could increase, hastening Russia’s dissolution into private ownership of land and will pursue protec- poorly governed regions and jeopardizing the tionist policies to shield the agricultural sector centralized command and control of nuclear from foreign competition, which could mean an weapons, making them easy prey for unpredict- end to chicken imports from the United States. able local leaders, criminals, or terrorist groups. Finance Minister Mikhail Zadornov seems as The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction foreign to Primakov’s government as do his politi- could expand even more rapidly than feared. Any cal record and views on economic policy. He never such developments would seriously affect U.S. held a significant position in the Soviet nomenkla- national interests. tura. In 1990, he coauthored a free-market reform Washington should make it clear that it will program rejected by CPSU conservatives. Zador- help Russia through its current difficulties only if nov is likely to proceed with financial reform, but Primakov’s government demonstrates its commit- his freedom to maneuver will be restricted, and he ment to free-market and democratic reforms. It will be subject to pressures from First Deputy Pre- also should insist that Russia’s government con- mier Maslyukov. centrate on fighting crime and corruption, con- Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov is a career diplo- tinue legal and court reforms, respect the property mat with no political ambitions. He served at the and rights of American investors, and institute Russian Embassy in Spain and was the Ambassa- tougher measures to ensure nuclear safety and the dor there in later years. He is expected to follow non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Primakov’s concept of foreign policy, rarely making Without such assurances, U.S. relations with independent moves—which will allow Primakov Russia inevitably will be fragile. to mastermind Russia’s foreign policy. —Evgueni Volk, Ph.D., is Coordinator of The Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev, ex-com- Heritage Foundation’s Moscow Office. No. 1232 November 6, 1998 WHOS WHO IN PRIMAKOVS NEW RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT EVGUENI VOLK, PH.D. On September 11, 1998, the Russian State resisted U.S. military retaliation against Saddam Duma (the lower house of parliament) approved Hussein’s regime during the recent missile crisis President Boris Yeltsin’s choice of Evgeny Prima- with Iraq. He also confronted Washington during kov as Prime Minister. The Duma’s action came in the recent crisis over Kos- the turbulent wake of the August 17 devaluation ovo. Because Washington is of the ruble and the dismissal of former Prime uncertain how Primakov’s Produced by The Kathryn and Shelby Minister Sergei Kiriyenko and his government. confirmation as Prime Min- Cullom Davis International After the Duma twice rejected the nomination of ister will affect U.S.–Russian Studies Center Viktor Chernomyrdin, Chernomyrdin’s former relations and how his poli- leftist opposition in the Duma endorsed Prima- cies could affect U.S. Published by kov by a vote of 317 out of a possible 450. national interests, a closer The Heritage Foundation look at the experience and 214 Massachusetts Ave., N.E. Primakov used his first month in office to shape political bent exhibited by Washington, D.C. his new government and draft a crisis management Primakov and by those he 200024999 program to address the country’s serious financial has selected to serve with (202) 546-4400 problems. His selections have proven that he is a him in the new government http://www.heritage.org master of compromise: His Cabinet members rep- becomes highly relevant. resent every major political faction in the Duma, and his economic proposals are designed to please PRIMAKOV AS PRIME both the left and the right. Such a coalition may MINISTER: A SHIFT turn out to be the future political base for a presi- TO THE LEFT dential bid by Primakov, should President Yeltsin exit the political scene. But a major question On October 6, on the eve remains: What will the government under Prime of a nationwide anti-government protest organized Minister Primakov do? by trade unions and the Communist Party, Prime Minister Evgeny Primakov addressed the Russian Primakov is not considered a friend of the people on television to outline his new govern- United States. He has been a consistent opponent ment’s top priorities. Among the most critical of U.S. international leadership, for example, and No. 1232 November 6, 1998 objectives he identified were (1) the urgent need to control the production and distribution of hard pay off wage arrears, already in the billions of liquor. In the past, this group was strong enough dollars, to the military, retirees, and government to thwart Primakov’s predecessors from curtailing employees (education and health care are funded its profits and re-imposing strict government regu- from the federal budget), and (2) the need to sup- lation. Primakov’s success in fighting these Russian port the debt-ridden and stagnating regions of bootleggers will be a litmus test of his govern- Russia. To do this, Primakov promised to safe- ment’s viability. guard private bank deposits currently frozen in banks that are on the verge of bankruptcy. At the Primakov’s program portends greater govern- same time, he made it clear that there would be no ment interference in the current economy, slower re-nationalization of property privatized during rates of privatization, and increased protectionism. the reform years, although he did intimate that It indicates that Russia’s economic policy may there might be a need to reconsider the pace of indeed be shifting to the left. privatization. But his promise to pay off wage and pension The new Prime Minister referred to his strategic arrears raises an immediate concern: Where will objective of rehabilitating Russia’s economy.
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