LINKAGES BETWEEN DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICIES UNDER GORBACHEV: THE CASE OF KOREA TAI KANG CHOI Submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the Institute of Soviet and East European Studies University of Glasgow (C) October 1993 ProQuest Number: 13833807 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a com plete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. uest ProQuest 13833807 Published by ProQuest LLC(2019). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States C ode Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. ProQuest LLC. 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346 ° \ 8 GLASGOW I UNIVERSITY LIBRARY j ABSTRACT A shrinking world is a knot of intertwined political, economic, ethnic, national, military, and environmental problems. Foreign and domestic matters have become inextricably linked in contemporary international relations. Nations are becoming increasingly interdependent in a highly developed industrialized society. In this process we may find a key to unlocking the riddle about how domestic and foreign policy stimuli interact in an environment characterized as 'cascading interdependence'. In this thesis, I have attempted to highlight the internal and external factors which were very interactive under Gorbachev. Domestic policy within the Soviet Union had a profound impact on the nature of its foreign policy and, similarly, the impact of the latter determined significant aspects of domestic policy-making. The thesis concludes with an overall assessment of the linkage between perestroika and new political thinking. Are there any particular features of the link between Domestic and foreign policies under Gorbachev toward the Korean peninsula? There are some elements: international environment, the changes of Soviet domestic politics, the economic factor, political leadership, timing, and Seoul's northern policy. In the case of Korea, therefore, we can not say domestic factors had an important role or external factors an unimportant role. Rather, a dynamic of internal-external interaction went on under the situation of a reduction in cold-war hostilities and increasing accommodation between the superpowers in the late 1980s. Hence one has to construct a model of linkages between domestic and foreign policies under Gorbachev, if one is to understand why particular policies were chosen at a particular time. In sum, although domestic factors played an important role, it is my position that neither domestic nor external factors alone best explain Gorbachev's policy but, rather, the complex interplay of international politics on domestic politics and vice versa, within the context of increasing global interdependence. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS In the first place, I would like to acknowledge my indebtedness to my supervisors, Professors Stephen White and William Wallace, who gave their invaluable advice, encouragement and guidance throughout the writing of this thesis. I am grateful to Dr. James D. White and Tanya Frisby for their assistance in my research. I would like to extend grateful thanks to my colleague, Ian D. Thatcher, in the Institute of Soviet and East European Studies of University of Glasgow for his assistance rendered to me. I am also indebted to my father, Choi Ju-ho, for his encouragement and continued interest in the progress of the research. Last, but not the least, to my wife, Kim Bok- hee, and my dauther* So-young for their patience, encouragement, and inspiration, I owe more than words can express. i i i CONTENTS Abstract ii Acknowledgements iii Contents iv Chapter 1 Introduction 1 1.1 Political Science / International Literature on Domestic and Foreign Linkages 3 1.2 Linkages in the Soviet Area Literature 7 Chapter 2 Domestic and Foreign Linkages in the Soviet Union 16 2.1 The Pre-Gorbachev Period 16 2.2 The Gorbachev Period 22 2.3 Linkages of Perestroika: Domestic and Foreign Policies 27 Chapter 3 New Thinking and Soviet Foreign Relations 46 3.1 Background of New Political Thinking 46 3.2 Principles of New Political Thinking 49 3.3 Practices of New Political Thinking 59 Chapter 4 The Soviet Union and Asia-Pacific Area 78 4.1 Soviet Asia-Pacific Policy Since Stalin 79 4.2 Gorbachev's New Political Thinking in the Asia-Pacific Region 87 4.3 The Soviet Union and the Pacific Economy 94 4.4 The Issues of Military Security 114 Chapter 5 The Soviet Union and The Korean Peninsula 134 5.1 Russia-Korean Relations (1860-1917) 134 5.2 Soviet-Two Korean Ties (1945-1985) 143 5.3 Gorbachev and Korea 154 Chapter 6 Gorbachev and North Korea 161 6.1 Soviet-North Korean Relations 161 6.2 North Korea's Responses to a New International Environment Created by Gorbachev's New Political Thinking 168 6.3 North Korea's A-bomb Potential 179 6.4 Economic Relations 185 Chapter 7 Gorbachev and South Korea 196 7.1 South Korea's Northern Policy 196 7.2 Moscow-Seoul Relations 212 7.3 China's Policy Changes after Seoul-Moscow Relations 222 7.4 Soviet Economic Links with South Korea 229 Chapter 8 Conclusion 238 Appendix: Soviet Trade with Asia-Pacific Countries (1919-1991) 244 Selected Bibliography 281 i v Chapter 1. Introduction True, we need normal international conditions for our internal progress. But we want a world free of war, without arms races, nuclear- weapons and violence; not only because this is an optimal condition for our internal development. It is an objective global requirement that stems from the realities of the present day.1 During the Gorbachev period, the Soviet Union underwent revolutionary changes in its political, economic, moral and cultural life. The Soviet people also had to acquire new ways of thinking. Gorbachev inherited a system in terminal decay, characterised by rampant corruption, coercion, and technological and economic obsolescence. His main problem was that this society had been frozen solid under the pressure of the totalitarian state ruled arbitrarily by a post-revolutionary bureaucratic class, organised in a minority party, enjoying a monopoly of power. So, he had to mobilise the constructive forces of Soviet society, provoke the adversaries of change into open opposition in order to be able to crush them with the popular power he tried to activate and to win the support of the people.2 In this respect, time was very important for the Soviet Union, because such a great power could not allow itself to fall behind second- class power status. The starting point in the concept of perestroika was the profound conviction that we couldn't go on living as we were.3 Gorbachev's response to the decline in power wasperestroika. Perestroika began as a plan for radical economic reform, to lift the Soviet Union out of economic decay 1. M. Gorbachev, Perestroika i Novoe Myshlenie dlya Nashei Strany i dlya vshego Mira (Moscow: Politizdat, 1988), pp.5-6. 2. Lothar Ruhr, Gorbachev - New Era, New Perspective?, in Armand Clesse and Thomas C. Schelling, eds., The Western Community and The Gorbachev Challenge (Baden-Baden: Nomos Publishing Company, 1989), p.265. 3. M. Gorbachev, The August Coup: The Truth and the Lessons (London: Harper Collins Publishers, 1991), p. 102. 1 by introducing the use of market relations and advanced technology.Perestroika referred to the decentralization of authority to make major economic decisions, and to the creation of markets to coordinate those decisions.Perestroika meant an end to the cold war, stopping the waste of massive resources on defence, and bringing the country out of isolation from the West.4 Above all, Gorbachev held that true economic reform would bring a free flow of information and access to the West. The force of a mobilized population was needed to break the entrenched power of the bureaucracy, embodied in the Communist Party and the vast central ministries, which would naturally resist economic reform. In making this decision, Gorbachev deliberately opted for a different approach than that of the Chinese Communist leadership, which opened up the economy while keeping a lid on political freedom. In order to prompt economic and political reform within the Soviet Union, it was also necessary for Gorbachev to endeavour to materialize his 'new political thinking' in external policies (see chapter 3). Gorbachev's policy of improving the international situation corresponded to the need to create favourable external conditions for reform in the Soviet Union. Moreover, domestic policy made it necessary to develop broad and multi-faceted cooperation with foreign countries (see chapter 2). Soviet policy thus sought to call on external aid to help the internal environment, on condition that the political costs at home were held to a manageable minimum. Therefore, opening up the Soviet Union to global economic influences inevitably expanded the role of'low politics' in the foreign policy process. Now, in world politics, it is accepted that the 'low politics' of economic and social affairs dominates the 'high 4. For a detailed definition of perestoika, see Gorbachev, Perestroika i Novoe Myshlenie dlya Nashei Strany i dlya vshego Mira, p. 30. 2 politics' of military security.5 Gorbachev argued for domestic and foreign policies based onPerestroika " " and "New Thinking", i.e., interdependence among nations was increasing, and that big powers could not dominate small powers as they both became more interdependent. Shevamadze also said that the protection of the national interest increasingly depended on economic, technological, and financial factors, whereas enormous arsenals of weapons could not provide rational answers to the challenges of the day.6 1.1 Political Science / International Literature on Domestic and Foreign Linkages The term 'linkage politics' was first used by James N.