Russia’s Military Reform: Political Trajectories

By Assoc. Prof., dr. Raimundas Lopata and Assoc. Prof., dr. Ceslovas Laurinavicius*

ussia’s state and identity crisis that was cut but not reformed. Igor strategic deterrence under one command commenced with the end of the cold Rodionov’s tenure (defence minister in and to reduce the number of military war has inevitably touched the military 1996-1997) was marked mainly by his in- districts1 . of the state. creasingly strident complaints of the mea- However, several factors played a ma- Military reform has been discussed over gre finances available to the army and ad- jor role in the trajectory of the military the last decade in Russia, with decidedly vocated preparations for a theatre-wide development: the Kosovo crisis, the sec- mixed results. In practice, reform has pri- conventional war with NATO. The most ond Chechnya War and the ‘Kursk’ sub- marily meant further cuts in the size of significant steps toward not just a smaller marine catastrophe. the armed forces (from 5,1 million to 1,2 but also restructured military have taken Russia, as response to the NATO op- million) with some moderate organiza- place under Igor Sergeyev (defence min- eration in Kosovo, laid a new emphasis tional changes. Reform under Pavel ister in 1997-2001). Further cuts were en- on a nuclear deterrence, which should Grachev (defence minister in 1992-1996) acted in a more logical fashion - assem- compensate for the weakness of the con- basically amounted to a gradual hollow- bling of a small number of “permanent ventional forces. At the meeting of Rus- ing out of the military structure inher- readiness” divisions has been started, it sia’s Security Council on the 29th of April ited from the Soviet Union. The army was tried to integrate all components of 1999 there were prepared three secret de-

* Associate Professor, dr. Raimundas Lopata is the Director of the Institute of International Relations and Political Science, University of Vilnius, Lithuania. Associate Professor, dr. ¹eslovas Laurinavi²ius is also with the Institute of International Relations and Political Science, University of Vilnius, Lithuania.

99 crees. One of them allegedly prescribed military authoritarianism. The urgent who oversaw the inter-ministerial work- the development of new tactical weapons. need to restructure and reorganise the ing group that drew up a military reform Neither the content of those decrees nor whole military system was confirmed dur- program. Now he will have to implement their implementation has become ing the series of the meetings of the Secu- this programme6 . The fact that Putin has known2 . Nevertheless, the military ma- rity Council during autumn 20005 . appointed a close ally to the Defence Min- noeuvres in Kaliningrad that imitated the Thereby Putin faced the dilemma: How ister’s job suggests he really does consider scenarios of “de-escalation” mission spoke to reform (modernise) the military by military reform a top priority and re- for themselves (Russia’s military doctrine keeping up political leverage that assisted signed the principal that the military re- signed in April 2000 confirmed this)3 . in the forming the authority of Putin? form was given to the military “to preoc- In 1999 the reactivated use of the Therefore Kremlin’s trajectory with regard cupy themselves with”. armed forces in Chechnya determined to the military reform reflects certain con- The new Deputy Defence Minister re- preconditions for the authoritarianism of tradiction. The military issue implicates sponsible for the financial and economic Putin and for the emergence of a hyper- two scopes reflecting the above-mentioned issues is a well-known specialist Lyubov trophied status of the military. In every ambivalence. Kudelina, who will also head the Defence public speech in early 2000, Acting Presi- Ministry’s Chief Military Budget and Fi- dent Vladimir Putin reiterated the key Reshuffle of the top of the military nances Department. When one considers message: “The Army has regained trust in and security establishment that the defence budget represents one- itself and society believes in and trusts its fifth of the total state budget, the impor- Army”4 . At this juncture the situation At the end of March 2001, in appoint- tance of this job is obvious. Over the past could end up with the formation of the ing a retired KGB Lieutenant General decade the structure has been much criti- military authoritarianism. Sergey Ivanov to head the Defence Min- cized for its poor performance and two However, in 2000 the Kursk submarine istry and making a senior woman official of Kudelina’s predecessors have been dis- catastrophe brought the public attention Lyubov Kudelina from the Finance Min- missed. There seems to be a new aware- to the disastrous deterioration of the istry one of his deputies, Putin claimed ness that the department needs qualified military. Without any doubts the accident to have begun de-militarising Russia and civilian specialists. The Defence Ministry’s had a huge impact on Putin’s authority justified his decision by saying that as Financial Inspectorate and Labour Depart- as well as on a presumable model of the Security Council Secretary, it was Ivanov ment, where new directors are to be ap-

100 pointed, will be subordinate to Kudelina7 . “aparatchik” and implementer of Putin?9 nothing of the state of the civil society in The dismissals followed given appoint- It could be expected that the appointment Russia, it is worth noticing that Kremlin ments. A top Russian Defence Ministry of Ivanov, the person closely related to does not feel any need to inform the pub- official known for hawkish statements Putin, will put an end to the conflict be- lic on what is going on in the military. toward the West Colonel General Leonid tween former Defence Minister Sergeyev In the meantime, changes in the person- Ivashov, the Head of the Department for and the Chief of the General Staff Anatoly nel at the top of Defence Ministry follow International Military Co-operation, is to Kvashnin over differing approaches to the the old tradition – Kremlin changes po- lose his job. Ivashov has become known army reforms. However, it is hardly cred- tentially disloyal persons. for strong statements against NATO’s east- ible that this factor points to the reform- Except the interest to consolidate the ward expansion, blaming it for being a ist potential of Ivanov. It is more likely power of Putin, these appointments, “criminal organization” and for the US that Putin has started a disassembling of maybe, do not change anything. The De- plans to deploy a missile defence system. the military establishment (mostly based fence Ministry is still a military rather than Presumably the situation can be inter- on the Soviet clan-corporate principal) re- a political institution. Russia does not yet preted as Russia’s interest in military co- placing it by the bureaucracy structures have the hundreds of civilian officials with operation not only on bilateral but as well consolidating a so-called vertical line of solid military knowledge it will need. Nor on international-institutional basis. By the power. A statement of Ivanov made dur- does it have top generals open minded way, Mikhail Dmitriev, the person from ing his visit in Minsk, Belarus, in April enough to take orders from a Minister Putin’s entourage, former professional 2001 confirms the version: “Today, the close to the President, let alone from not- intelligence agent, and incumbent Deputy discussions are over. The armed-forces re- so-high-ranking civilian officials. Real de- Defence Minister was appointed to head form plans have been approved by the militarisation of the political institutions the Military Technological Co-operation President, and it is time to implement would have to start by removing the mili- Committee of the Defence Ministry. The the approved decisions”10 . tary status from the dozens of ministries outspoken, hawkish General Valery In reality, however, the appointment and government agencies run on military Manilov was ousted as the First Deputy of one or even several civilians to the top lines. Instead, it looks as though the mili- Chief of Russia’s General Staff8 . defence posts could end up doing more tary contingents in these government Nevertheless, is it realistic to expect se- to discredit the idea of de-militarisation bodies will in some way or another be rious reforms from the obedient rather than furthering its cause. To say made subordinate to the Defence Minis-

101 try. This could lead to the emergence of a 50.000, the Air Forces – 40.000; in total efits for the military. This could be inter- militarised behemoth, encompassing over 90.000 during 2001) and 130.000 so called preted as a tendency of shifting to a pro- two million people, even with the planned civilian specialists. Given that the state can- fessional army16 . Ivanov does not mask military cutbacks. The problem is that not even properly feed and arm all its such intention. Asked when Russia would Kremlin does not seem to understand that soldiers12 , this looks like a perfectly ra- move from conscription to a professional de-militarisation of the military related tional decision. army, Ivanov said at the moment it was ministries is an important element in es- The biggest cuts can be expected in Si- “impossible to say”, because it depended tablishing civilian control. And this is not beria, the Far East and in the Kaliningrad on the economic situation. The Defence the only step - it is equally important to Oblast. Cuts will also affect Russian troops Minister pointed out that the changeover encourage greater openness and transpar- in Trans-Dnestr and in the South Cauca- cannot occur overnight, and that in the ency. But as Security Council Secretary, sus13 . Though some army corps will be US - for example - it took 10 years17 . Ivanov preferred to keep all plans as se- disbanded it is emphasized that cutbacks On the other hand, it should be men- cret as possible - the military-reform plans would not involve units on permanent tioned that the decrease of the armed are still secret to this day. And as for combat readiness and the number of sol- forces that started during the period of Kudelina, when she was in charge of the diers in some of them (the South-Western Gorbachev was fitful partly because of the military budget at the Finance Ministry, and Central-Asian Strategic Zones) will even financial deficit. Let us not forget that she insisted on maximum secrecy11 . be increased14 . While having reservations this is the third major cutback since So- some analysts envisage certain changes in viet times. The armed forces have shrunk, Cutbacks in numbers in the the priorities of Russia’s security policy but this has not led to any proportional Armed Forces (Islamic extremism as the main threat)15 . increase in effectiveness. The resources The significance of the cutbacks under saved were allocated to maintaining the Ivanov particularly emphasises that way requires new approaches in the armed structure, but not to reorganising it. Mili- cutbacks are to take place in the number forces. The battle over Russia’s defence tary authorities are following a simple of servicemen. Over the coming three budget for 2002 shows that the Defence logic in their planned cutbacks - if they years, the armed forces are to be cut by Ministry is prepared to bring military can spend more money on each soldier, 365.000 servicemen (respectively the wages in line with those of public serv- servicemen will serve better and have more Ground Forces by 180.000, The Navy – ants and in parallel to abolish the ben- resources. The catch is that this logic does

102 not work. The problem is that the reform that a professional army would mean dras- no employment alternatives21 . Essentially, program’s authors have not veered an iota tically increasing the defence budget19 . what this all boils down to is that cut- from the principles on which the Soviet So long as the conscript system remains backs in the armed forces will not result Army ran18 . in place, there will not be any real quality in any serious change. The reality of the matter is that com- improvement among soldiers. Meanwhile pulsory military service in Russia is not the traditionalism of Russian office gen- Changes in the command system compulsory for everyone. According to erals, the concepts of mutually assured de- of the armed forces General Vyacheslav Putilin, Head of the struction and “all-azimuth defence”, “ide- General Staff’s Chief Recruitment Depart- ology of total siege” still substantially The contretemps regarding the struc- ment, 88% of young men who are called point to the existence of the conscript ture of the armed forces were personified up get their service deferred. It is no se- system20 . Eventually the references that for a long time, when the former Minis- cret that many educational establishments establishment of professional army re- ter of Defence Sergeyev and the Chief of exist for the sole purpose of granting these quires a long time confirm the resistance the General Staff Kvashnin came out deferrals. Putin also finds himself forced against the plans of the establishment of openly as antagonists. The discussion on to admit that the best of those able to professional army. what armament should prevail demon- military service are dodging it. More than The correlation between the cutbacks strated serious organisational tensions half of the draftees have never studied or and the officers’ corps should be taken between two institutions as well as the race had a job. It’s pure fantasy to imagine into consideration as well. Effective re- for influence. In the framework of the that these young men will become the form means that there will be winners and discussion, the earlier created Russian soldiers of the 21st century. But despite losers within the military. The point is Forces of the Strategic Purpose (RVNS) all this, the “office” generals are doing all that the Russian officers corps is not im- as a separate branch of the Army, has un- they can to prevent the changeover to a mune to what is going on within the state doubtedly been expected to carry and professional army. The state’s military and as a whole. In Russia, with its bureaucratic enhance the weight of Sergeyev. However, political leadership still does not see the and organizational politics, the majority Kvashnin managed to take over the ini- need for a corps of professional Non- of officers who have remained in the tiative by both appealing to the war in Commissioned Officers. One official ar- military through the 10 years period of Chechnya and calling to prioritise con- gument the Russia’s top generals give is institutional decline believe, that they have ventional armament.

103 A substantial moment was November expression of the tension, Chief Com- whether the “office generals” representing 2000 when Kvashnin proposed strict di- mand of the Ground Forces, whose Com- hierarchy of the army will take over the vision of functions between the Defence mander (Colonel General Nikolai influence or whether the power of the army Ministry and the General Staff22 . Under Kormilcev) is designated to be a Deputy hierarchy will be broken trough introduc- this plan, the Defence Ministry would take Defence Minister, has been revived. He tion of civil institute in the military sphere? on political and administrative functions, will take the supervision of military de- In other words, we observe a silent discus- while the General Staff would be respon- tachments and will be responsible for the sion on the form of potential authoritari- sible for the operational command of the military training of all armed forces. In anism in Russia: Military authoritarianism troops. The concrete project was supposed parallel it is tried to overcome the frag- or modernised authoritarianism based on to be presented to Putin in January 2000. mentation of the military establishment. an extensive social-political basis. However, the project has still not been The military reform is treated as a struc- worked out23 . tural issue and is to be conducted in asso- Priorities for armament Such a situation speaks of portentous ciation with the reforms proceeding in tension between the Kremlin and the other “power institutions”, including the It was decided that the Russian Armed General Staff. The next link down in the Ministry of Interior, headed by Boris Forces would be given a structure based command chain is the Military Districts, Gryzlov who is closely related to Putin24 . on three main branches (the Ground which have both administrative and op- However, the status quo is that the Forces, the Navy and the Air Force)26 . erational functions. Kvashnin’s propos- Chief of the General Staff Kvashnin ex- This could be interpreted as the return als would simply fragment command of tends his influence with the help of po- to the priority equalising conventional the military. If they were implemented, litical capital made in Chechnya. So the and nuclear armament. It is planned that Putin, as Commander-in-Chief of the talks about the possibility that Kvashnin the Strategic Missile Forces will form a Armed Forces, would lose his direct link can be removed are doubtful25 . branch of their own (till 2002) that will with the troops. At the same time the It means that while Sergeyev will be a exclude the Space Forces, which will be General Staff - the agency responsible for loser in the bureaucratic infighting, it will made into a separate wing. Such thoughts planning military operations for every oc- not be clear whether the General Staff will both presume that nuclear armament is a casion - would get the chance to meddle emerge as a winner. Nevertheless, the most prerequisite to retaining the superpower directly in political life. Currently, as an important is that two tendencies develop - image and can be one of the answers for

104 the US missile defence plans. However, in ment needed to fight this kind of fire29 . With or without treaties, Moscow will be one of his first interviews as a Defence All this leads to the conclusion that mak- forced to dramatically reduce its nuclear Minister, Ivanov said that the decision to ing sure the early warning system func- arsenal over the coming years. make the Space Forces a separate wing is tions reliably at all times, is not a major It is unlikely that Russia will be able to not a response to the US plans to deploy Russian defence priority. Moscow does build new missiles of this class. During a National Missile Defence. Ivanov spoke not seriously believe for a second that the the Soviet time, these missiles were built perfectly seriously about how the Space USA could launch a sudden nuclear at- in Ukraine. For understandable reasons, Forces could back armed-forces subdivi- tack. Moscow is hardly likely to risk develop- sions on a tactical level27 . Generally, according to the last reports ing its missile-building potential on a But even in this framework it is very Russia’s strategic nuclear arsenal is aging foreign state’s territory. This leaves the well known that the Russian Space Forces and shrinking and strategic delivery ve- most modern of the Russian missiles, the have half the satellites of the US Space hicles have limited operational lives30 . Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) Command, which really does provide tac- Russia’s heavy missiles will be withdrawn SS-28 (Topol-M). These missiles are de- tical support for the army troops. Fur- from service in 2008 and they have long signed to carry three warheads. It had been thermore, 70% of the Russian satellites since passed their guaranteed service life hoped at one point that Moscow would have already expended their service life28 . (SS-19s (Stileto) would rapidly reach the be able to produce 30 new SS-28s each It is not at all certain that they can fulfil end of their operational live after 2007, year, but the reality is no more than 10 a their original tasks - strategic intelligence, the SS-24 (Scalpel) will be phased out by year; and last year, only four new missiles early warning of missile attacks and com- 2007 regardless of the Strategic Arms Re- were produced32 . munication. duction Treaty II (START II), few if any Having the capabilities of Russia’s stra- Finally in May the fire at the Russian SS-18s (Satan) and SS-25s (Sickle) would tegic nuclear arsenal in mind it is possi- satellite control centre showed how far the remain by the end of 2010, the number ble that Moscow is following a more ra- plans to create an independent space force of operational Sea Launched Ballistic Mis- tional logic. An indication of this is a are from reality. It took almost a day to siles (SLBMs) may drop precipitously over recent statement by Sergeyev, who said put out the fire at this strategic military the next decade as Russian Ballistic-Mis- that what matters today, is not so much site, suppressing the fact that Russia does sile Submarines, Nuclear-fueled, (SSBNs) the number of warheads or the discus- not have the specialized fire fighting equip- reached the end of their service lives31 ). sion how to balance a strong nuclear ca-

105 pability with a robust conventional force Minister Ilya Klebanov, who oversees the only because they export arms to China, structure, but the military command sys- military-industrial complex, said that the India and “rogue states”. tem33 . The analysis above demonstrates reform programme of the sector would On the other hand the decision on that Sergeyev can appeal to the main is- be presented before May. The programme Russia’s long-term defence strategy relates sue - forthcoming political system in Rus- has not been approved yet. It is known with the real funds for the military re- sia. The same could be said about the in- that the draft programme supposes creat- form, as well as with the situation in the fluence of economy on the military do- ing 30 – 40 vertically organized holdings, defence budget. Over the past eight years, main. consisting of the most effective defence en- the armed forces have made only one-off terprises, for the different arms produc- arms purchases. Arms procurement ac- Economy and the military reform tions sectors. All companies in the hold- counts for 6% of total defence expendi- ing would have to hand over controlling ture as opposed to a minimum of 20% in Russians openly declare that the pace stakes to the state. The programme’s au- NATO member-states. The greater share and success of military reform in Russia thors say this would allow the state to con- of Russia’s defence budget, according to and its security policy will depend on the centrate its limited resources on the most Ivanov - 70% goes to wages, food, uni- economic situation. Even without discuss- important military programmes. It would forms and so on as opposed to 25 – 27% ing the Strategy of Russia’s Development also free the military-industrial complex of the defence budget in NATO states. till 2010, by German Gref and planned from needless competition35 . Modern military technology accounts for annual growth of economy by 5 – 5,5%, The paradox is that these plans are not 15 – 20% of Russia’s arsenals, while the the decision on Russia’s long-term defence new at all. The first plan to create hold- figure for NATO is 60 – 70%. Since the strategy is still an open question. ings along arms-sector lines appeared a collapse of the Soviet Union, the armed First of all, it relates with a possible decade ago. Then, as now, the main idea forces have not purchased a single new correlation between Putin’s course to- was not so much to rationalize produc- military transport plane. Most money the wards more functional, market-oriented tion, as to maintain cosy jobs for mili- military receives goes to maintaining and economy and Russia’s huge and tary-industrial complex bureaucrats. This modifying old arms and technology36 . unreformed defence-industrial complex, same aim lurks in the current programme. In financing terms, the defence budget which employs two million people34 . At Russia has only a handful of effective de- expenditure for 2001 has risen more than the beginning of April Deputy Prime fence enterprises, and they are effective 150% compared with the previous year

106 (from 140 billion roubles to around 230 nally, the fourth scenario – “deterrent from maintenance and investment portions of billion roubles, and it is planned to in- conventional, wide-raging attack” suggests defence budget to 50 – 50% in the long crease defence spending to 262 billion rou- 6.000 SNW, i.e. 50 billion rouble or 25% run40 . In that case it should be said that bles for 200237 ). But this is a low figure. of the defence budget39 . the Russian leadership has come to the Former Defence Minister Sergeyev said, Having in mind the still lasting inert- conclusion that nuclear deterrent does not that given the financial limitations for ness of the military-industrial complex, automatically mean having a nuclear par- buying new arms and technology, money such considerations demonstrate the ten- ity with the USA. Nevertheless this model would be spent primarily on extending the dency to maintain Russia as a militarised will allow modernising of conventional service life of existing technology38 . authoritarian state. However, the state- force structure able to operate not only Nevertheless, there are vital claims to ments that Russia is able to implement at the frontiers of the former Soviet Un- sustain nuclear parity with the USA in the scenarios by “tightening its belt” are ion, but eventually realising the claims of Russia. Considered projects of the answers questionable. Verification of the economic a great power (e.g. qualified for military regarding, the US plans for the missile validity of the described scenarios is com- actions in the Balkans). defence confirm such intention. One of plicated particularly as there is no trans- All the discussions demonstrate that such projects supposes four scenarios. So- parency in Russia’s defence budget. For the crucial factor in defining Russia’s long called minimal deterrent scenarios envis- example, who could describe the state of term strategy is not the number of SNW age 1.500 Strategic Nuclear Warheads Russia’s conventional armament in the case and the quantity of conventional forces, (SNW), i.e. 17 billion roubles per year or of the fourth scenarios, without saying but the principle response to the ques- 8% of the defence budget. The second sce- nothing about the living conditions of tion, what will be the evolution of Rus- nario - “to keep the USA in the 1972 Anti- Russia’s citizens or the perspectives of the sia’s political system and how Russia sees Ballistic Missile Treaty” - foresees 2.500 civil society? its position in the international system? SNW, i.e. 20 billion roubles or 10% of the Meanwhile, according to Alexei Undoubtedly, The Second Chechnya defence budget. For the implementation Arbatov and Aleksandr Golts, Moscow War plays a major role in the future of of the third scenario – “to hold back the should give preference to the model that Russia’s political system. As for the war U.S.A. from the arms race”- Russia would projects to reduce the SNW to 1.500, to in Chechnya, its continuation enables need up to 3.500 SNW, i.e. 40 billion rou- decrease the military personnel to 0,8 Putin to keep public opinion in mobili- bles or 17% of the defence budget and fi- million and to change the ratio between zation mode and to accuse the opposi-

107 tion of any sins he pleases, from insuffi- sia’s existing military capabilities, it an- tions related to Russian security, its di- cient patriotism to treason. For the sec- nually costs of about 25% of the defence rection and perspectives of its military ond time, Russia is burying its potential budget and Russia’s losses rise to 2.500 components, could hardly be given with for economic development in Chechnya. with 8.000 wounded in action42 the much certainty. There is now little room for manoeuvre Kremlin is not going to fall back. Taking Nevertheless, all analysed aspects of in the economy - the positive effect of into account the support of Russia’s pub- Russia’s military reform confirm the di- devaluation has worn off, world oil prices lic opinion for the military campaign, it lemma: Will Russia choose the way of are falling, the debt crisis continues and is hard so far to forecast eventualities, the modern, though authoritarian, state the temptation to soften the blows by which can be seen in connection with the with a wide-range social-political base, printing money as elections roll around, current information on the new political modernised (civilian control, profession- will only worsen the financial situation41 . initiatives, helping to solve the problem alism, modern armament) as well as car- Putin is not going to be drawn into and able to symbolize the shift from the rying the functions of minimal deter- another Afghanistan, nor is he going to course towards the military authoritari- rent army; or will Russia take the direc- withdraw from Chechnya. It should not anism. tion towards the military authoritarian- be forgotten that Putin’s appealing for ism, i.e. will it still desperately lay claims assurance of national security in internal Conclusions to the status of superpower, will it allow politics means, that he behaves as written the military-industrial complex to mani- in the textbooks of realism – he empha- It is always hard to forecast Russia and fest by inertia and to dominate the So- sised that the main political function of particularly in the meantime, when Rus- viet-type office generals standing for the national security is the validation and le- sia propagates the idea of specific devel- ideas of the Soviet-type conscription? gitimating of the use of force and weak- opment and stands for the idea of a multi- Fundamentally it means a conditional ening of internal opponents. Such polar global order. In addition, the in- decline of the living conditions in Rus- thoughts re-emphasise the inertness of the fluence of multiple specific economic, sia and stagnation in the development direction towards the military authori- social and cultural factors is unpredict- of civil society. tarianism. able for the still on going post-commu- The context analysed reveals the neces- Regardless of the fact that the war in nist transformation in this part of the sity of Western political and diplomatic Chechnya revealed the limitations of Rus- world. That is why the answers to all ques- pressure on Russia’s military sector. At

108 the same time it is essential to promote 7 Mukhin V., “Reshuffle Brings Putin People to 15 Golts A., “Signals of Reform, but under Soviet the segments of market economy and civil the Top”, The Russia Journal, http://www.russia- Principles” in The Russia Journal, http:// society, to encourage the Kremlin to find journal.com/index.cgi, May 4, 2001. www.russiajournal.com/index.cgi, May 4, 2001. 8 “Radical Military Reform Finally Takes off in Orlov A., Vladimir Putin Odobril Plany Voenych the political solution in the Second Post-Soviet Russia”, April 6, 2001 in http:// in http://www.strana.ru/ Chechnya War, to evolve from the model www.wps.ru/chitalka/military/en/; “Russia’s 16 Golts A., “Battle begins Over Russia’s Defense of Soviet (Prussian) military sector. Vari- Ivashov Expected to Lose His Job”, Associated Budget Cash” in The Russia Journal, July 7, 2001. ous military servicemen training and re- Press, 3 July 2001. 17 “Sergej Ivanov: Plody Voenoj Reformy ” ; Golts 9 Bennett G. Ivanov, The New Russian Defence A., “Battle Begins Over Russia’s Budget Cash”; training programmes, opening of the Minister, CSRS Occasional Brief, London, 2001, Mukhin V., “Reshuffle Brings Putin People to the Top”. world armament market for the reformed No. 81, p. 3 – 5. 18 Golts A., “Signals of Reforms, but under Soviet Russian military-industrial complex 10 Mukhin V, Op. Cit. Principles”. would be helpful. 11 Antonenko O., “Putin’s “New” National Secu- 19 Golts A., “Why the Generals don’s want a Profes- rity Team”, IISS Reports, March 29, 2001. Golts A., sional Army” in The Russia Journal, April 24, 2001. “Civilian Goes to Top, but Same Old Approach” in V Blizhaischije 5 let v Rosiji ne budet Profesionalnoj 1 Baev P., “Putin’s military reform. Two Trajec- The Russia Journal, http://www.russiajournal. Armiji in http://www.strana.ru, June 5, 2001. tories for the First Presidency” – The Norwegian com/index.cgi, March 30, 2001. 20 Egorov I., Genshatb: Rosija ne Gotova k Atlantic Committee, Security Policy Library, 2001, From the perspective of “secrecy-openness” an Profesionalnoj Armiji in http://www.strana.ru, No- No. 6, p. 4 – 6, “Prospects for Military Reform in interview with Kudelina is eloquent: “Lyubov vember 11, 2000. Russia” in http://www.ceip.org/files/events/ 21 asp?pr=2 Kudelina: vopros ob otmene lgot voenosluzhaschim ne Zisk K., “Putin and the Russian Military”, http:/ 2 Sokut S., “Russia’s Priority State Interests” in stojit”, April 2, 2001 in http://www.strana.ru/ /www.fas.harvard.edu/ponars/; Wallander C. A., Nezavysimoe Voennoje Obozrenie, 17 - 13 May 12 For instance, daily bread allowance is 750 “Conference Report. December 2000”, http:// 1999, No. 17. gram per head. In reality 150 - 200 gram. For www.fas.harvard.edu/ponars/; “Soldiers Worry 3 Sokov N., “The “Tactical Weapons Scare” of more details, see Bogachov D. Osobenosti polevoj About Road to Civilian Life” in The Russia Jour- 2001”, CNS Reports in http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/ kuchni in Argumenty i Fakty, July 2001, No. 27, p. nal, May 15, 2001. raports 6; Sivkova V. Kto kormit armiju? in Argumenty i 22 Smith M. A., “A Russian Chronology. October- 4 Shukshin A., “Russia’s Putin Praises Army, Fakty, July 2001, No. 27, p. 6. December 2000”, London, 2000, p. 58. Promotes Generals” in Reuters, 21 February 2000, 13 Golts A., “The Russian Military’s Exercises in 23 Golts, “Signals of Reform, but under Soviet Princi- Johnson’s Russia List, No. 4125. Futility” in The Russia Journal, http:// ples; Minoborony i Genshtab Chiotko Razgranichat 5 Trenin D., “Russia’s Military in Crisis” in www.russiajournal.com/index.cgi, February 24, Funkciji”, http://www.strana.ru, March 29, 2001. http://www.carnegie.ru 2001. Orlov A, Kadrovyje perestanovki v Minoborony budut 6 Smith A., “Russian Chronology. January – 14 “Sergej Ivanov: Plody Voennoj Reformy Pojavitsia poetapnymi, http://www.strana.ru, April 26, 2001. March 2001”, CSRS, London, 2001, p. 51. nie Ranshe 2004 g“ in Izvestia, June 25, 2001. 24 Arzumanova M. Silovyje, Organy Nuzhno

109 Reformirovat v Komplekse, in http://www.strana.ru, 39 Solovjov V., Rosija Drognula Pered Amerikanskoj April 2, 2001; Baev P, Op. Cit, p. 9. NPRO in Nezavisimoje Voenoje Obozrenije, June 25 Korotchenko I., Generalnyj Shtab Zhdut Peremeny 22, 2001. in Nezavosymoje Voennoje Obozrenije, June 15, 40 Arbatov A., “The Transformation of Russian 2001. Military Doctrine: Lessons Learned from Kosovo and 26 Orlov A., Op. Cit. Chechnya”, The Marshall Centre Papers, 2000, No. 27 Mukhin V., “Reshuffle Brings Putin People to the 2, p. 15 – 26; Golts A., “Kremlin Moves to Rekindle Top”. Cold War Missile Plan”. 28 Golts A., “Signals of Reform, but under Soviet 41 Stephen Ch., “Changes in Power Structure” in Principles”. The Scotsman, May 10, 2001. 29 Golts A., “Russia’s Superpower Illusions go up in 42 Trenin D., “Russia’s Military in Crisis” in http:/ Smoke” in The Russia Journal, http:// /www.carnegie.ru russiajournal.com/index.cgi, May 18, 2001. 30 “Status Report: Nuclear Weapons, Fissile Material and Export Controls in the Former Soviet Union”, CNS Print Publication, 2001, http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/ print/nsr2.htm 31 Ibidem, p. 14 – 17, 19. 32 Golts A., “Kremlin Moves to Rekindle Cold War Missile Plan” in The Russia Journal, June 28, 2001. 33 Op. Cit. 34 “Prospects for Military Reform in Russia” in http:/ /www.ceip.org/files/events/trenin.asp 35 Golts A., “Greedy Bureaucrats Hinder Defense Re- form” in The Russia Journal, April 4, 2001. 36 The details were presented by Yuri Baluyevski, Head of the General Staff’s Chief Operations Department in Mukhin V., “Reshuffle Brings Putin People to the Top”. 37 Golts A., “Battle Begins over Russia’s Budget Cash”. 38 Mukhin V., “Reshuffle Brings Putin People to the Top”.

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