DOCSLIB.ORG

Russia's Military Reform: Political Trajectories

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Russia's Military Reform: Political Trajectories Russias Military Reform: Political Trajectories By Assoc. Prof., dr. Raimundas Lopata and Assoc. Prof., dr. Ceslovas Laurinavicius* ussias state and identity crisis that was cut but not reformed. Igor strategic deterrence under one command commenced with the end of the cold Rodionovs tenure (defence minister in and to reduce the number of military war has inevitably touched the military 1996-1997) was marked mainly by his in- districts1 . of the state. creasingly strident complaints of the mea- However, several factors played a ma- Military reform has been discussed over gre finances available to the army and ad- jor role in the trajectory of the military the last decade in Russia, with decidedly vocated preparations for a theatre-wide development: the Kosovo crisis, the sec- mixed results. In practice, reform has pri- conventional war with NATO. The most ond Chechnya War and the Kursk sub- marily meant further cuts in the size of significant steps toward not just a smaller marine catastrophe. the armed forces (from 5,1 million to 1,2 but also restructured military have taken Russia, as response to the NATO op- million) with some moderate organiza- place under Igor Sergeyev (defence min- eration in Kosovo, laid a new emphasis tional changes. Reform under Pavel ister in 1997-2001). Further cuts were en- on a nuclear deterrence, which should Grachev (defence minister in 1992-1996) acted in a more logical fashion - assem- compensate for the weakness of the con- basically amounted to a gradual hollow- bling of a small number of permanent ventional forces. At the meeting of Rus- ing out of the military structure inher- readiness divisions has been started, it sias Security Council on the 29th of April ited from the Soviet Union. The army was tried to integrate all components of 1999 there were prepared three secret de- * Associate Professor, dr. Raimundas Lopata is the Director of the Institute of International Relations and Political Science, University of Vilnius, Lithuania. Associate Professor, dr. ¹eslovas Laurinavi²ius is also with the Institute of International Relations and Political Science, University of Vilnius, Lithuania. 99 crees. One of them allegedly prescribed military authoritarianism. The urgent who oversaw the inter-ministerial work- the development of new tactical weapons. need to restructure and reorganise the ing group that drew up a military reform Neither the content of those decrees nor whole military system was confirmed dur- program. Now he will have to implement their implementation has become ing the series of the meetings of the Secu- this programme6 . The fact that Putin has known2 . Nevertheless, the military ma- rity Council during autumn 20005 . appointed a close ally to the Defence Min- noeuvres in Kaliningrad that imitated the Thereby Putin faced the dilemma: How isters job suggests he really does consider scenarios of de-escalation mission spoke to reform (modernise) the military by military reform a top priority and re- for themselves (Russias military doctrine keeping up political leverage that assisted signed the principal that the military re- signed in April 2000 confirmed this)3 . in the forming the authority of Putin? form was given to the military to preoc- In 1999 the reactivated use of the Therefore Kremlins trajectory with regard cupy themselves with. armed forces in Chechnya determined to the military reform reflects certain con- The new Deputy Defence Minister re- preconditions for the authoritarianism of tradiction. The military issue implicates sponsible for the financial and economic Putin and for the emergence of a hyper- two scopes reflecting the above-mentioned issues is a well-known specialist Lyubov trophied status of the military. In every ambivalence. Kudelina, who will also head the Defence public speech in early 2000, Acting Presi- Ministrys Chief Military Budget and Fi- dent Vladimir Putin reiterated the key Reshuffle of the top of the military nances Department. When one considers message: The Army has regained trust in and security establishment that the defence budget represents one- itself and society believes in and trusts its fifth of the total state budget, the impor- Army4 . At this juncture the situation At the end of March 2001, in appoint- tance of this job is obvious. Over the past could end up with the formation of the ing a retired KGB Lieutenant General decade the structure has been much criti- military authoritarianism. Sergey Ivanov to head the Defence Min- cized for its poor performance and two However, in 2000 the Kursk submarine istry and making a senior woman official of Kudelinas predecessors have been dis- catastrophe brought the public attention Lyubov Kudelina from the Finance Min- missed. There seems to be a new aware- to the disastrous deterioration of the istry one of his deputies, Putin claimed ness that the department needs qualified military. Without any doubts the accident to have begun de-militarising Russia and civilian specialists. The Defence Ministrys had a huge impact on Putins authority justified his decision by saying that as Financial Inspectorate and Labour Depart- as well as on a presumable model of the Security Council Secretary, it was Ivanov ment, where new directors are to be ap- 100 pointed, will be subordinate to Kudelina7 . aparatchik and implementer of Putin?9 nothing of the state of the civil society in The dismissals followed given appoint- It could be expected that the appointment Russia, it is worth noticing that Kremlin ments. A top Russian Defence Ministry of Ivanov, the person closely related to does not feel any need to inform the pub- official known for hawkish statements Putin, will put an end to the conflict be- lic on what is going on in the military. toward the West Colonel General Leonid tween former Defence Minister Sergeyev In the meantime, changes in the person- Ivashov, the Head of the Department for and the Chief of the General Staff Anatoly nel at the top of Defence Ministry follow International Military Co-operation, is to Kvashnin over differing approaches to the the old tradition Kremlin changes po- lose his job. Ivashov has become known army reforms. However, it is hardly cred- tentially disloyal persons. for strong statements against NATOs east- ible that this factor points to the reform- Except the interest to consolidate the ward expansion, blaming it for being a ist potential of Ivanov. It is more likely power of Putin, these appointments, criminal organization and for the US that Putin has started a disassembling of maybe, do not change anything. The De- plans to deploy a missile defence system. the military establishment (mostly based fence Ministry is still a military rather than Presumably the situation can be inter- on the Soviet clan-corporate principal) re- a political institution. Russia does not yet preted as Russias interest in military co- placing it by the bureaucracy structures have the hundreds of civilian officials with operation not only on bilateral but as well consolidating a so-called vertical line of solid military knowledge it will need. Nor on international-institutional basis. By the power. A statement of Ivanov made dur- does it have top generals open minded way, Mikhail Dmitriev, the person from ing his visit in Minsk, Belarus, in April enough to take orders from a Minister Putins entourage, former professional 2001 confirms the version: Today, the close to the President, let alone from not- intelligence agent, and incumbent Deputy discussions are over. The armed-forces re- so-high-ranking civilian officials. Real de- Defence Minister was appointed to head form plans have been approved by the militarisation of the political institutions the Military Technological Co-operation President, and it is time to implement would have to start by removing the mili- Committee of the Defence Ministry. The the approved decisions10 . tary status from the dozens of ministries outspoken, hawkish General Valery In reality, however, the appointment and government agencies run on military Manilov was ousted as the First Deputy of one or even several civilians to the top lines. Instead, it looks as though the mili- Chief of Russias General Staff8 . defence posts could end up doing more tary contingents in these government Nevertheless, is it realistic to expect se- to discredit the idea of de-militarisation bodies will in some way or another be rious reforms from the obedient rather than furthering its cause. To say made subordinate to the Defence Minis- 101 try. This could lead to the emergence of a 50.000, the Air Forces 40.000; in total efits for the military. This could be inter- militarised behemoth, encompassing over 90.000 during 2001) and 130.000 so called preted as a tendency of shifting to a pro- two million people, even with the planned civilian specialists. Given that the state can- fessional army16 . Ivanov does not mask military cutbacks. The problem is that not even properly feed and arm all its such intention. Asked when Russia would Kremlin does not seem to understand that soldiers12 , this looks like a perfectly ra- move from conscription to a professional de-militarisation of the military related tional decision. army, Ivanov said at the moment it was ministries is an important element in es- The biggest cuts can be expected in Si- impossible to say, because it depended tablishing civilian control. And this is not beria, the Far East and in the Kaliningrad on the economic situation. The Defence the only step - it is equally important to Oblast. Cuts will also affect Russian troops Minister pointed out that the changeover encourage greater openness and transpar- in Trans-Dnestr and in the South Cauca- cannot occur overnight, and that in the ency. But as Security Council Secretary, sus13 . Though some army corps will be US - for example - it took 10 years17 .
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Kazakhstan Missile Chronology
    Kazakhstan Missile Chronology Last update: May 2010 As of May 2010, this chronology is no longer being updated. For current developments, please see the Kazakhstan Missile Overview. This annotated chronology is based on the data sources that follow each entry. Public sources often provide conflicting information on classified military programs. In some cases we are unable to resolve these discrepancies, in others we have deliberately refrained from doing so to highlight the potential influence of false or misleading information as it appeared over time. In many cases, we are unable to independently verify claims. Hence in reviewing this chronology, readers should take into account the credibility of the sources employed here. Inclusion in this chronology does not necessarily indicate that a particular development is of direct or indirect proliferation significance. Some entries provide international or domestic context for technological development and national policymaking. Moreover, some entries may refer to developments with positive consequences for nonproliferation. 2009-1947 March 2009 On 4 March 2009, Kazakhstan signed a contract to purchase S-300 air defense missile systems from Russia. According to Ministry of Defense officials, Kazakhstan plans to purchase 10 batteries of S-300PS by 2011. Kazakhstan's Air Defense Commander Aleksandr Sorokin mentioned, however, that the 10 batteries would still not be enough to shield all the most vital" facilities designated earlier by a presidential decree. The export version of S- 300PS (NATO designation SA-10C Grumble) has a maximum range of 75 km and can hit targets moving at up to 1200 m/s at a minimum altitude of 25 meters.
    [Show full text]
  • Russia Yello Rdy 4 Py
    The Kremlin wants to tackle long-festering problems, and painful reform can’t be avoided much longer. Russia’s Military Retrenchment AP photo/Murad Sezer Agent of change. Russian President Vladimir Putin launched the cut-and- reshape campaign to revitalize Russia’s forces. In this June photo, the By Stewart M. Powell Kremlin leader reviews Russian peacekeeping troops at Pristina airport in Kosovo. USSIA’S military, tapped by the scope and magnitude of which of valuable equipment for sale to President Vladimir Putin for can be glimpsed in a random sam- criminal gangs. a thorough revitalization, is pling of problems: Now, the Kremlin, for the first under pressure to clean up Fighter pilots get 14 hours of time since collapse of the Soviet R its own act. flying time per year. Union a decade ago, seems serious Even staunch advocates of in- Murder claims 500 troops per about tackling problems besetting creased support for Russia’s soldiers, year—18 times the number in US the force. Fueled by humiliating set- sailors, and airmen are turning their armed forces. backs in Chechnya and the disas- guns on the waste and mismanage- Ground station fires knock out trous loss last summer of the subma- ment that have weakened the force ground military communications rine Kursk with all hands, Putin’s in recent years. They say that spend- systems and communications with planned revitalization aims to in- ing more on the military as presently satellites. crease the resources and prestige of constituted will only feed its pen- Commanders sometimes seize the armed forces.
    [Show full text]
  • The Russian Military Faces “Creeping Disintegration”
    The Russian Military Faces “Creeping Disintegration” DALE R. HERSPRING There were virtually no units which were combat ready in 1997. —Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev lthough often ignored by observers and pundits, the Russian military plays A one of the most important roles of any institution in that society. The reason is that the armed forces are always the last bastion against anarchy and chaos in any political system. And Russia now is on the verge of collapse and anarchy. In taking a closer look at the Russian military and the role it plays in the Rus- sian political system, I divide my observations into three categories. First is the question of the armed forces themselves. It is impossible to discuss the role of the military without understanding how serious the situation is in Moscow’s armed forces. As those who have spent time working in the military or analyzing military issues know, reversing conditions like those that now characterize the Russian armed forces is not easy. It will take considerable time. The lead time on many weapons systems exceeds five years from planning to production. A second issue is the question of whether there is a serious danger that the Rus- sian military will become involved in politics. Finally, there is the question of what the West can do and should be doing at this point vis-à-vis the Russian military. The Situation Facing the Russian Military Despite Defense Minister Marshal Igor Sergeyev’s comment on 19 July 1999, to the effect that Russia’s armed forces are “combat ready, controllable and capable of ensuring the military security of the country,” the fact is that their situation is nothing short of disastrous.1 Equipment is outdated, officers and men are dispir- ited, thousands of the “best and brightest” are leaving, the budget is in shambles, generals have been politicized in a way unknown in the past, and talk of reform is a farce.
    [Show full text]
  • National Missile Defense: Russia's Reaction
    Order Code RL30967 Report for Congress Received through the CRS Web National Missile Defense: Russia’s Reaction Updated June 14, 2002 name redacted Specialist in National Defense Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress National Missile Defense: Russia’s Reaction Summary In the late 1990s, the United States began to focus on the possible deployment of defenses against long-range ballistic missiles. The planned National Missile Defense (NMD) system would have exceeded the terms of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Recognizing this, the Clinton Administration sought to convince Russia to modify the terms of the Treaty. But Russia was unwilling to accept any changes to the Treaty. It also decried the U.S plan to deploy NMD, insisting that it would upset strategic stability and start a new arms race. Russia claimed that the ABM Treaty is the “cornerstone of strategic stability” and that, without its limits on missile defense, the entire framework of offensive arms control agreements could collapse. Furthermore, Russia argued that a U.S. NMD system would undermine Russia’s nuclear deterrent and upset stability by allowing the United States to initiate an attack and protect itself from retaliatory strike. The Clinton Administration claimed that the U.S. NMD system would be directed against rogue nations and would be too limited to intercept a Russian attack. But Russian officials questioned this argument. They doubted that rogue nations would have the capability to attack U.S. territory for some time, and they believed that the United States could expand its NMD system easily.
    [Show full text]
  • State Militarism and Its Legacies State Militarism and Its Alexander M
    State Militarism and Its Legacies State Militarism and Its Alexander M. Golts Legacies and Tonya L. Putnam Why Military Reform Has Failed in Russia Russia’s economy and political system have undergone enormous changes since the end of the Soviet era. A burgeoning market system has replaced the Soviet command economy, and open multiparty competition for representation in Russia’s political insti- tutions operates in place of the Communist Party that ruled the country exclu- sively for more than 60 years. In the areas of defense and security, however, radical changes to the organizational and operational system inherited from the Soviet Union have yet to occur. After more than a decade of reform efforts, Russia’s armed forces have shrunk to less than two-thirds of their 1992 size of 3.7 million.1 Russia’s military leaders, nevertheless, have been adamant about preserving Soviet-era force structures and strategic plans. Why have Russia’s armed forces—nearly alone among the core institutions of the Russian state— resisted efforts to change their structure and character in accordance with insti- tutional arrangements operative in Western liberal democracies? This question is all the more bafºing because Russia’s military has been mired in an institutional crisis that predates the 1991 Soviet collapse. Currently, the Russian military is laboring under conditions of acute infrastructure decay and extreme shortages of equipment, a recruitment crisis exacerbated by a dysfunctional conscription system and the exodus of junior ofªcers, a lack of combat-ready forces for deployment to the ongoing conºict in Chechnya, and force structures and strategies that are woefully inadequate to address the country’s security threats.
    [Show full text]
  • Vladimir Putin and Russia's Armed Forces: a Faustian Bargain?
    Vladimir Putin and Russia's Armed Forces: A Faustian Bargain? Stephen Blank Professor Strategie Studies Institute U.S. Army War College forces, especially the General Staff. They forged this deal during wars, Vladimir international Putin crisis, came and intense to political power struggle withinlargely the armed forces.through a deal with Russia's armed NATO's 1999 Kosovo operation offered the General Staff the opportunity to win its campaign to redefine official Russian threat assessments and reverse defense policy by postulating the NATO threat. The General Staff avidly seized this op portunity and with the Duma began publicly attacking Russian defense policy in March 1999.1 Russia's 1997 security concept had proclaimed there was no threat of ag gression against Russia, that no state was Russia's enemy and that the armed forces' excessive size was a burden to Russia. It advocated specific military reforms, downsizing the armed forces, reducing costs, and relying mainly on nuclear weap ons—specifically the new Topol-M (SS-27) ICBM until the year 2007. It was expected then that Russia would recover from its domestic crisis and could then begin devoting resources to its conventional forces.2 This posture, associated with Defense Minister General Igor Sergeyev, immediately encountered the General Staff's unyielding opposition. General Anatoly Kvashnin, Chief of the General Staff, wanted to expand the General Staff's control over all Russian armed forces, argued for conventional as well as nuclear forces' modernization, and expressed a much more consistent hostility to NATO's enlargement.3 Kosovo gave Kvashnin and Putin their first opportunity.
    [Show full text]
  • A View from Chechnya : an Assessment of Russian
    Copyright is owned by the Author of the thesis. Permission is given for a copy to be downloaded by an individual for the purpose of research and private study only. The thesis may not be reproduced elsewhere without the permission of the Author. A View from Chechnya: An Assessment of Russian Counterinsurgency During the two Chechen Wars and Future Implications A thesis presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Masters of Arts in Defence and Strategic Studies at Massey University, Palmerston North, New Zealand. Sean Renaud 2010 Abstract Following the 11 September 2001 attacks, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the myriad of smaller engagements taking place around the world in conjunction with the global war on terrorism, military academia has increasingly focused study on historical counter-insurgencies. The study of historical counter-insurgency has been very beneficial to the conduct of contemporary counter-insurgency operations. Although lessons can be learned from historical study, any conclusions tend to be subjective and are time, space and country specific. Notwithstanding this, historical case studies of counter-insurgency operations reveal a number of consistent themes. These themes include: the recommended approaches towards the conduct of information, security, hearts and minds, and reconstruction operations, the use of allied indigenous forces, the importance of unity of effort between the various counter-insurgent forces, the correct use of air power, the manipulation of the media, the proper training of counter-insurgent forces, logistics operations, and the importance of morale during counter-insurgencies. In the last two decades Russia has fought two counter-insurgency conflicts in Chechnya.
    [Show full text]
  • The Chechen War and Its Consequences
    Russia 's Ulster: The Chechen War and Its Consequences STEPHEN BLANK A fter capturing Groznyi in February 2000, Moscow claimed victory in the war against Chechnya. Generals and officials anticipated the war's end by the presidential election of 26 March 2000, and Moscow announced its "final offen- sive" to destroy the Chechen forces by 26 February.' Nevertheless, Russian armed forces in Groznyi remain vulnerable to the approximately five hundred Chechens there. Because estimates of Chechen strength vary on a daily basis, Russian intel- ligence evidently knows neither the number nor location of the enemy forces it faces. By June 2000, Chechen terror attacks against Russians in and around Chechnya had already begun to seriously demoralize Russian troops, forcing the General Staff to admit that it had underestimated the size of Chechen forces. Thus, Russian and foreign observers increasingly admit that no end to the war is in sight, although Russian troops will remain as long as it takes to destroy the Chechen forces.2 It is equally difficult to define what would constitute a Russian victory other than Chechnya's utter devastation. In this sense Chechnya, like Northern Ireland, appears to be an internal war that will last for years. And as with "the troubles," the honre government is (or was until the Blair government took power in Great Britain) pledged to win to preserve the state's unity. Chechnya's Strategic Implications The Chechen war's strategic implications are now appearing at home and abroad. Even local commanders have begun to grasp that only a political settlement with a recognized Chechen authority can extricate Moscow from Chechnya sooner rather than later.
    [Show full text]
  • Who's Who in Primakov's New Russian Government
    No. 1232 November 6, 1998 WHOS WHO IN PRIMAKOVS NEW RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT EVGUENI VOLK, PH.D. On September 11, 1998, the Russian State THE PRIMAKOV GOVERNMENT Duma approved President Boris Yeltsin’s choice of Evgeny Primakov as Prime Minister by a vote of Primakov and most of his Cabinet officials built 317 out of 450. The Duma’s action came in the their political careers in the former Communist regime. wake of the August 17 devaluation of the ruble, Produced by the dismissal of former Prime Minister Sergei A former senior Commu- The Kathryn and Shelby Kiriyenko and his government, and the Duma’s nist Party of the Soviet Cullom Davis International failure to approve Yeltsin’s choice of Viktor Cher- Union (CPSU) nomenkla- Studies Center nomyrdin. tura member and former member of the CPSU’s rul- Published by Primakov used his first month in office to shape ing body, the Politburo, he The Heritage Foundation his new government and draft the semblance of a managed to survive when 214 Massachusetts Ave., N.E. crisis management program to address the coun- President Boris Yeltsin took Washington, D.C. 200024999 try’s serious financial problems. His choices prove over. He was appointed head of the Russian foreign (202) 546-4400 him to be a master of compromise: His Cabinet intelligence service in 1991. http://www.heritage.org members represent every major political faction in and became Foreign Minis- the Duma, and his economic proposals are ter in January 1996. designed to please both the left and the right. Primakov has challenged Primakov is wary of the United States and has America’s global leadership been a consistent opponent of U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • The Dual Structure and Mentality of Vladimir Putin´S Power Coalition: A
    This report analyses the Russian authoritarian regime that emerged under Vladimir Putin and attempts to give a wider context to the so-called FSB-ization of the Russian government. The Dual Structure and Mentality of Joris van Bladel The first part of the report deals with Putin’s main achievements in domestic and foreign policy and examines the extent to which state policy has fulfilled the aspirations of the Russian public. The much-needed stability and Vladimir Putin’s Power Coalition security that Putin has brought to the country seem to outweigh the fact that the government has veered towards authoritarianism. The degree to which Russian society has truly been taken over by the FSB is critically examined, A legacy for Medvedev and this process of FSB-ization is explained in a wider social and historical context. DR. JORIS VAN BLADEL The second part aims to bring some insight into the current political dynamic by examining the power relations in the coalition and the mentalities typical of the major factions: the ‘siloviki’ and the liberal. In particular, the ‘siloviki’ are critically examined with regard to their history, their typical modes of thinking, and their rise to influence. The very notion of ‘siloviki’ is given a more precise explanation by showing why they have come to power, whom the term ‘siloviki’ should actually be applied to, what their mode of thinking is like, and how PowerCoalition Putin’s Vladimir of Mentality and Dual Structure The influential they are likely to be in the future. The study then focuses on the actual siloviki faction: its members, its role, and its influence.
    [Show full text]
  • The Evolution of Military Reform in Russia, 2001
    CIM D0004857.A / / Final October 200 7 The Evolution of Military Reform in Russia, 2001 Sergey Rogov Director, Institute for USA and Canada Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences Center for* Strategic f Edited by H. H. Gaffney and Studies \ Dmitry Gorenburg, CNAC The CNA Corporation Alexandria, Virginia • 4325 Mark center Drive 22311-1350 • (703)324-2000 The Center for Strategic Studies is a division of The CNA Corporation (CNAC). The Center combines in one organizational entity regional analyses, studies of political-military issues, and strategic and force assessment work. Such a center allows CNAC to join the global community of centers for strategic studies, and share perspectives on major security issues that affect nations. There is a continuing need for analytic and assessment work that goes beyond conventional wisdom. The Center for Strategic Studies is dedicated to providing a deeper level of expertise, and work that considers a full range of plausible possibilities, anticipates a range of outcomes, and does not simply depend on straight-line predictions. Another important goal of the Center is to attempt to stay ahead of today's headlines by looking at "the problems after next," and not fall into the trap of simply focusing on analyses of current events. The objective is to provide analyses that are actionable, and not merely commentary. While the Center's charter does not exclude any area of the world, Center analysts have clusters of proven expertise in the following areas: The full range of East Asian security issues, especially those that relate to the rise of China Russian security issues, based on ten years of strategic dialogue with Russian institutes Maritime strategy Future national security environment and forces Strategic issues related to the Eastern Mediterranean region Missile defense Latin America, including guerrilla operations Operations in the Persian (Arabian) Gulf The Center is under the direction of Rear Admiral Michael McDevitt, USN (Ret.), who is available at 703-824-2614 and on e-mail at [email protected].
    [Show full text]
  • US Military Engagement with Transcaucasia and Central Asia
    U.S. MILITARY ENGAGEMENT WITH TRANSCAUCASIA AND CENTRAL ASIA Stephen J. Blank June 2000 ***** The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This report is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited. ***** Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 122 Forbes Ave., Carlisle, PA 17013-5244. Copies of this report may be obtained from the Publications and Production Office by calling commercial (717) 245-4133, FAX (717) 245-3820, or via the Internet at [email protected] ***** Selected 1993, 1994, and all later Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) monographs are available on the SSI Homepage for electronic dissemination. SSI’s Homepage address is: http://carlisle-www.army. mil/usassi/welcome.htm ***** The Strategic Studies Institute publishes a monthly e-mail newsletter to update the national security community on the research of our analysts, recent and forthcoming publications, and upcoming conferences sponsored by the Institute. Each newsletter also provides a strategic commentary by one of our research analysts. If you are interested in receiving this newsletter, please let us know by e-mail at [email protected] or by calling (717) 245-3133. ISBN 1-58487-023-0 ii FOREWORD The United States has adapted a strategy of engaging and enlarging the democratic community of states. Trans- caucasia and Central Asia have become important testing grounds of this strategy, by virtue of their strategic location adjacent to Russia, the Middle East, and Europe’s periph- ery, and their large-scale oil and natural gas deposits.
    [Show full text]