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Testimony of Laurence H. Tribe Before the Senate Judiciary Committee on the Nomination of Anthony M

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Testimony of Laurence H. Tribe Before the Senate Judiciary Committee on the Nomination of Anthony M 304 TESTIMONY OF LAURENCE H. TRIBE BEFORE THE SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE ON THE NOMINATION OF ANTHONY M. KENNEDY TO BE AN ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT December 16, 1987 My name is Laurence Tribe. I am the Tyler Professor of Constitutional Law at Harvard Law School. I have taught there since completing a clerkship with Justice Potter Stewart in 1968. I have served as an expert witness on numerous constitutional matters in Congress and have frequently argued in the United States Supreme Court. Among the books and articles I have written is a 1978 treatise entitled American Constitutional Law, the second edition of which has just been published. In 1980, I was elected a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences,, and my treatise received the Order of the Coif Award for distinguished legal scholarship. On September 22, 1987, I testified before this Committee on another Supreme Court nomination. It was with regret that I found myself unable, on that occasion, to support the nominee. It is a great honor — and, on this occasion, a distinct pleasure — to appear at the Committee's invitation to testify on the nomination of Anthony M. Kennedy as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. This time, I am glad to say, I am here to testify in favor of President Reagan's nominee. 305 Testimony of Laurence Tribe page 2 December 16, 1987 I. INTRODUCTION: THE SENATE'S ROLE In a speech delivered at Columbia Law School in New York City last month, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist called attention to the role of "the Senate as well as ... the President" in conducting "inquiry . into what may be called the 'judicial philosophy' of a nominee to [the] Court." The Chief Justice expressed the view that such inquiry by the Senate is "entirely consistent with our constitution and serves as a way of reconciling judicial independence with majority rule." I share the Chief Justice's view. Nonetheless I am convinced, for reasons I developed at some length in a 1985 book (God Save This Honorable Court), that the Senate's proper function under the Advice and Consent Clause of Article II, Section 2, does not include enforcing the Senate's own political preferences as between liberalism and conservatism, or as among any other set of "isms". It is one thing for the Senate to reject a nominee whom it perceives, rightly or wrongly, as a threat to the Supreme Court's basic role in our constitutional scheme. It would be another thing entirely if the Senate were to reject a nominee simply because a majority of the Senators would have preferred someone with different views, either more liberal or more conservative, either in general or on some set of specific issues. Assuming a nominee is otherwise superbly qualified, therefore, the issue for the Senate, as I see it, is not whether 306 Testimony of Laurence Tribe page 3 December 16, 1987 it agrees or disagrees with where the President's Supreme Court nominee stands, or is likely to stand in the future, on such matters as the exclusionary rule, comparable worth, or affirmative action. Today's burning agenda may not be tomorrow's. The issue, rather, is how Senators assess the nominee's commitment to fundamental constitutional principles at the most general level, and how Senators evaluate the nominee's capacity to contribute to the ongoing development and refinement of those principles as a member of our nation's highest court. My purpose today is to be of whatever help I can to the Senate as it makes that assessment and undertakes that evaluation. II. EVALUATION OF JUDGE KENNEDY With this purpose in mind, I have studied all of the speeches Judge Kennedy has made available to this Committee and have read a large number of his judicial opinions. Although I obviously do not agree with everything Judge Kennedy has said or written, and although I fully expect to disagree with some of the opinions he would be likely to write and votes he would be likely to cast as a Supreme Court Justice, it seems to me indisputable that Judge Kennedy's very considerable intellectual strengths are coupled with a deep and abiding commitment to basic constitutional values and principles. There is every reason to expect that, if confirmed as a Justice, Judge Kennedy would make 307 Testimony of Laurence Tribe page 4 December 16, 1987 a significant and enduring contribution to the Supreme Court's crucial work of elaborating, explaining and enforcing the Constitution of the United States. It is true that Judge Kennedy does not espouse any single, simple theory of constitutional interpretation. This makes his writings harder to characterize than is sometimes the case. But the nominee should not be faulted for having views of a more complex character — views not susceptible to simplistic labeling. Indeed, in the second edition of my treatise, American Constitutional Law, I address this very matter. On page one of that book, I suggest that little "can be gained by seeking any single, unitary theory for construing the Constitution .... For the Constitution is an historically discontinuous composition; it is the product, over time, of a series of not altogether coherent compromises; it mirrors no single vision or philosophy but reflects instead a set of sometimes reinforcing and sometimes conflicting ideals and notions." A. The Speeches Judge Kennedy's speeches consistently reflect the highest level of sensitivity to precisely this complexity. In speech after speech — and in his many years as a professor of constitutional law — Judge Kennedy has resisted the temptation to offer dogmatic, definitive answers to the most perplexing puzzles of our constitutional order. Speaking of presidential 90-878 0 - 89 - 11 308 Testimony of Laurence Tribe page 5 December 16, 1987 authority and the separation of powers in Salzburg, Austria, in November 1980, for example, Judge Kennedy explained why answers to some of the most pressing constitutional questions "must await an evolutionary process" and observed that, "as to some fundamental constitutional questions it is best not to insist on definitive answers." In his view — a view I share — "[t]he constitutional system works best if there remain twilight zones of uncertainty and tension between the component parts of the government. The surest protection of constitutional rule lies not in definitive announcements of power boundaries but in a mutual respect and deference among all the- component parts." (Pg. 11.) 1. On Structural Principles. In dealing with the structural principles underlying the Constitution, Judge Kennedy's discussions of federalism and /"> states' rights reflect an unusually subtle appreciation for constitutional history and for the perennial tensions and paradoxes of our constitutional system. In a speech on October 15, 1987, in Sacramento, Judge Kennedy called federalism's division of power into two distinct levels of government "[w]ithout question . [the] most daring contribution made by the framers to the science of government" — the "conception that this dual allocation of authority would be protective of freedom." (Pg. 7.) In an address emphasizing the historical background of the concept, delivered on October 26, 1987, before 309 Testimony of Laurence Tribe page 6 December 16, 1987 the Historical Society for the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, he emphasized the "moral and ethical content inherent in federalism" — the framers' conclusion that it is wrong "for an individual to surrender essential power over his or her own personality to a ramote government that he or she cannot control in a direct and practical way." He concluded that "[t]he states, and their subdivisions, with more visible and approachable legislators, and often with an initiative and referendum process, are likely to be more responsiv *o the citizen than the federal government." (Pg. 13.) Yet r_dge Kennedy does not let his strong belief in federalism blind him to the difficulties of direct judicial protection of states' rights under our Constitution. In the Historical Society speech, he recognized that "[o]ne of the most intriguing aspects of the Constitution is that it says very little about the power of the states or their place in the federal system," and that "it is difficult to find effective structural mechanisms designed to protect the states." (Pgs. 7-8.) He noted that, when selection of United States Senators by state legislatures was replaced by direct election by the people, the states lost their sole institutional check on the national government, leaving them little ability to fight the national government for turf in the way the three branches of the national government can fight among themselves. (Pg. 8.) As to other guarantees in the Constitution shielding the states from the 310 Testimony of Laurence Tribe page 7 December 16, 1987 national government, Judge Kennedy noted that "[t]he guarantee of a republican form of government and the prohibition against depriving states of equal suffrage in the Senate are there, but nothing more." (Pg. 9.) Indeed, Judge Kennedy recognized in this speech that "[t]he principal protection for the states is that the national government is one of limited powers." (Pg. 9.) But even this protection has in recent decades exhibited little promise, given developments in how broad those powers are viewed as being. In his 1987 Sacramento speech, Judge Kennedy recognized that, "of all of the structural elements of the Constitution, federalism remains today the most in doubt," given the nationalization of the economy and the growth of national governmental power in both domestic and foreign realms. (Pg- 7.) As a result, Judge Kennedy explained in a February, 1982, speech in Los Angeles, protection of the states is "remitted primarily to the exercise of self-restraint by the political branches." (Pg.
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