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Takings and Causation William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal Volume 5 (1996-1997) Issue 2 Article 2 May 1997 Takings and Causation Jan G. Laitos Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj Part of the Property Law and Real Estate Commons Repository Citation Jan G. Laitos, Takings and Causation, 5 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 359 (1997), https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj/vol5/iss2/2 Copyright c 1997 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository. https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj WILLIAM AND MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL VOLUME 5 SUMMER 1997 ISSUE 2 TAKINGS AND CAUSATION Jan G. Laitos" Constitutionalprotection of privateproperty is grounded in a conflict- between two legal principles--the government's power to regulate pri- vate property for the common good and the Constitution's limit on this power in the Takings Clause. The Takings Clause's check on government power conforms to John Rawls's philosophy, which rejects the utilitarian beliefs that government may act to achieve*the "good" of maximizing human happiness and that government can force people to trade certain political liberties for an improved distribution of wealth. Under Rawls's theory, the principle of "justice as fairness" limits a government's ability to require some people to bear burdens in order to advance public goals, and the principle of "equal liberty" eventually leads to Pareto- optimality. In this Article, Professor Laitos notes that for many years, the United States Supreme Court adopted a utilitarianperspective when it deferred to legislative judgments furthering generalpublic goals. Recently, howev- er, the Court's Takings Clause jurisprudence has shifted markedly to- ward Rawlsian theory. Under the Court's current jurisprudence, a gov- ernment allocates burdens improperly if it singles out an impacted prop- erty owner to bear the cost of a regulation, despite the fact that the owner's property use did not cause the problem that the regulation ad- dresses. Professor Laitos concludes that this causation test is not a per- fect predictor of when laws work unconstitutional takings, but routine application of the test to regulations affecting property should help courts void unfair and unjust government rules that select from the pri- vate sector convenient targets to pay for benefits for which the public . John A. Carver, Jr. Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law. 360 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 5:2 should be responsible. I. JOHN RAWLS AND THE TAKINGS CLAUSE Constitutional protection of private property is grounded in a conflict between two legal principles-the government's power to regulate pri- vate property for the common good' and the Constitution's limit on this power in the Takings Clause, which provides that "private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation. ' The first prin- ciple, government's power to restrict private property rights for the pub- lic good, is consistent with utilitarianism, which condones redistribution of private wealth in order to maximize societal happiness.3 The second principle, reflected in the Takings Clause, prohibits certain regulations. The Takings Clause's check on government power conforms to John Rawls' philosophy.4 A Rawlsian approach to an organized society rejects the utilitarian beliefs that government may act to achieve the "good" of maximizing human happiness and that government can force people to trade certain political liberties for an improved distribution of wealth.' Under Rawls's theory, the principle of "justice as fairness" limits a government's ability to require some people to bear burdens in order to advance public goals, and the principle of "equal liberty" eventually leads to Pareto-optimality.' For many years, the United States Supreme Court adopted a utilitari- an perspective when it deferred to legislative judgments furthering gener- al public goals. To the extent that utilitarianism urges decisionmakers to ' See Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594-95 (1962) (noting that the state may interpose its authority on "'behalf of the public [if] the interests of the public require such interference"') (quoting Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894)). 2 U.S. CONST. amend. V; see Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) (stating that although "some values are enjoyed under an implied limitation and must yield to the police power ... the implied limitation must have its limits"). ' See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32-33 (1954) ("[T]he legislature ... is the main guardian of the public needs to be served by social legislation."); JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 3 (1988) ("An action then may be said to be comfortable to the principle of utility . when the tendency it has to augment the happiness of the community is greater than any it has to diminish it."). See generally JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM (1957). 4 See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). 5 Id. at 60-63. 6 Id. at 31, 150-52; see infra note 396 (citing a source that discusses Pareto- optimality). 19971 TAKINGS AND CAUSATION maximize society's happiness,7 the Court embraced the theory when' it rejected takings claims that arose from three types of governmental ac- tion: (1) "a public program that adjusts the benefits and burdens of eco- nomic life to promote the common good"8; (2) a restriction on private property that furthers "a legitimate state goal ' 9 or a "substantial public purpose""°; or (3) a government decision "to protect the public interest in health, the environment, [safety], and ... fiscal integrity."'" Judicial deference to property-restrictive legislation designed to advance the greater public interest followed another utilitarian principle that "the most effective way to increase total happiness [within an organized soci- ety] is to increase the average happiness. ' 2 Consistent with this princi- ple, courts often do not consider takings to be regulations that limit prop- erty uses because the property owners subject to the restrictions may enjoy "an average reciprocity of advantage,1 3 which allows them to "share with other owners the benefits ... of the [government's] exercise of its police power."' 4 Some leading commentators on the Takings Clause endorsed judicial adoption of utilitarian principles. 5 Recently, however, the Supreme 7 See, e.g., BENTHAM, supra note 3, at 3; HENRY SIDGWICK, THE METHODS OF ETHics 411, 415 (7th ed. 1907); J.J.C. SMART & BERNARD WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST 7 (1973). ' Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 643 (1993) (quoting Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 225 (1986)); Connolly, 475 U.S. at 225. 9 Texaco v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 529 (1982). 10 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 127 (1978) (citing Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962)). " Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 488 (1987); Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 136-37 (1894). 12 SMART & WILLIAMS, supra note 7, at 28. 3 Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 415 (1922); Keystone, 480 U.S. at 491 (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 144-50); see HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 542 P.2d 237, 246-47 (Cal. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904 (1976). 14 Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 262 (1980); see Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 134-35. 1" See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. REV. 1165, 1214-15 (1967) (decisionmakers must decide if a proposed measure's "efficiency gains" (the net gain of benefits over costs of government action) are greater than either "demoralization costs" (damage to affected property owners' expectations due to a diminished sense of security) or "settlement costs" (transaction costs incurred in reaching compensation settlements with affected parties)); Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 67 (1964) ("[W]hen the challenged act is an improvement of the public condition through resolution of conflict within the private sector of the society, compen- sation is not constitutionally required."). 362 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 5:2 Court's takings jurisprudence has shifted markedly toward Rawlsian theory.16 The change began in 1960, when the Court held in United States v. Armstrong7 that the federal government had violated the Fifth Amendment by taking private property without compensating its owners. In Armstrong, the Court did not assume, consistent with utilitarian theo- ry, that the federal government could take property from private parties to improve the public condition without paying just compensation. 8 Rather, the Court adopted a rationale for the Takings Clause that is con- sistent with Rawls's idea of "justice as fairness": "The Fifth Amendment's guarantee that private property shall not be taken for a public use without just compensation was designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all 19 fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.' Since 1960, the Court frequently has cited this statement as an articu- lation of "[t]he purpose"2 or "one of the principal purposes"2' of the Takings Clause. Indeed, the Court has quoted Armstrong so often in takings cases that some commentators believe that the statement "has taken on the quality of a canonical recitation."22 The Court's rationale in Armstrong, however, is not just an oft-repeated summary of why the 16 See generally Leigh Raymond, The Ethics of Compensation: Takings, Utility, and Justice, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q.
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