AI MRCNPROGRAM LATIN AMERICAN WOODROW WILSONCENTERUPDATE ONTHEAMERICAS Creating Community NO. 27 Nations and the Organizationof soup of18missions sponsor tor pr Beg violence come chr transitional go Apr Stabilization MissioninHaiti(MINUST m lizing ar r and stab author Council TheUNSecurity under UNauspices. peacekeepingestablishment mission ofaformal landed inHaititohelprestore order pendingthe andChile France, Canada, the UnitedStates, er gangs. militiasand andarmed civil societygroups, oppositionparties, supporters, between Aristide product ofthedeeppolarization unabated, Butviolencecontinued presidential elections. try’s politicaldivisions andprepare sharp fornew with thegoalofworking toovercome thecoun- sitional government was quicklyestablished, tran- Aninterim gency throughout thecountry. andamidstspiralingviolenceinsur- ernment AUGUST 2007 I Arnson José RaúlPerales andCynthiaJ. I Johanna MendelsonForman By ElizabethBryanwithCynthiaJ.Arnson,JoséRaúlPerales,and Difference? the InternationalCommunityMakea Governance andSecurityinHaiti:Can of apr lo de efor NTRODUCTION gue andr unity toassisttheHaitiango mn n h ntdNtos troops from nment andtheUnitedNations, v MINUST elopment aswell asaprocess ofnationaldia- il 2004, inning with a UN effort in1990tomoni- inning withaUNeffort lowing widespread protests againsthisgov- was forced Aristide fromBertrand officefol- n igteHiinNtoa oie demobi- ming theHaitianNationalPolice, sdnileetos averitable alphabet esidential elections, eray20,HaitianPresident Jean- 2004, February At the request of the interim Haitiangov-At therequest oftheinterim olonged effor ized thecr med g andweak democraticgovernance. , le en ncpolm fisaiiy political onic problems ofinstability, econciliation. with abr AH isb v roups, and fostering institutional andfostering roups, vir er eation oftheUnitedNations onment,” restructuring and restructuring onment,” nment in ensuring “asecure nment inensuring t ut thelatestmanifestation by the international com- by theinternational oad mandatetoassistthe 1 ed by theUnited vernment over- American AH) in tr tutions. establishment offunctioninggovernment insti- the andsupport provide security, cial reform, andjudi- military, oversee police, human rights, States hasattemptedtoprotect andmonitor indicator po en thr hemispher isthepoorest inthe Thecountry Western . many have statein orfailing labeledafailed Haitian society—againstthebackdrop ofwhat consultation withabroad in rangeofactors sa eighty per De Dev J (1957-71) andhisson, ing politicalstability li 1986 ofthedictator militar br Ber tor vided billions of dollars inforeignvided billionsofdollars assistance. have pro- with individual government donors, along Developmentand Inter-American Bank, al financialinstitutionssuchasthe World Bank andinternation- Haiti’s deeppoliticaldivisions, involved to overcome indiplomaticefforts Community (CARICOM) havedeeply been ean-Claude Duv v ,withalackofcoordination andinsufficient y, ies assessedfortheUNDP’ a oua upr,onlytobeoustedina oad popularsupport, ed governments were incapable ofestablish- voys to work diplomaticallyforthe v eyas theUNand OAS appointedspecial ee years, Such effor dpeieta lcin n19,Jean- ed presidential electionsin1990, v er trand Aristide was electedpresidenttrand Aristide with elopment Repor elopment Pr y andacombinationoflife quality ty, y 2 s opoeya ae.Over the next coup oneyear later. places Haiti177thoutof192coun e: The nationsoftheCaribbean cent ofHaiti’ accor shv nodda ie,critics ts have unfolded—attimes, ga UD) morethan (UNDP), ogram le,asuccessionofshort- alier, ding totheUnitedNations t . . F ship ofFrançoisDuv In internationally-moni- ollowing thecollapsein s “Pr population li esident forLife” s Human ves in alier - WOODROW WILSON CENTER UPDATE ON THE AMERICAS

restoration of democratic rule, as did a U.S. delega- organizations (NGOs) sought to fill outside the tion led by former President Jimmy Carter. institutional framework; progress in the profes- Ultimately, in September 1994, on the eve of an sionalization of the Haitian National Police intervention by a U.S.-led multilateral military (HNP) was slow and uneven; drug trafficking force acting under a Security Council resolution, a increased; human rights abuses and corruption U.S. delegation led by Carter successfully negotiat- continued; and real economic growth did not ed an exit for the coup leaders. The UN peace materialize. Lack of progress over time and lack operation mandated that Aristide be restored to of accountability resulted in renewed threats of power. Since Aristide’s return, successive UN and sanctions and the suspension of much of the OAS missions have had only limited success in international assistance.3 helping Haiti establish the security and stability necessary for tackling the country’s grave econom- On January 9, 2007, the Wilson Center’s Latin ic and political problems. After Aristide was forced American Program convened a group of regional 2 from power for the second time, the United leaders, diplomats, and practitioners from multilat- Nations observed in 2004 that: eral organizations to discuss the role of the interna- tional community in addressing Haiti’s governance, …there were a number of positive developments, security, and development challenges. Participants in including the restoration of some measure of the conference painted a markedly more positive democracy, with the first peaceful handover of and optimistic portrait of Haitian achievements power between two democratically elected presi- under the government of President René Préval, dents; the growth of a multifaceted civil society; who took office in 2006, noting progress in over- and its increasing involvement in the develop- coming the intense factionalism of Haitian politics. ment of a political culture based on democratic This progress has continued as successful local and values. There were, however, also setbacks. municipal elections took place in December 2006, Owing to the continuing political crisis and con- the first in a decade. Virtually all panelists called for comitant lack of stability, serious reforms never greater coordination among international donors, took hold. The consolidation of a genuine dem- and for greater collaboration with Haitian institu- ocratic system did not occur; self-sustaining and tions. For tenuous gains to be consolidated, panelists effective institutions at all levels, particularly in argued, the international community needs to the area of public security and the rule of law, did remain engaged over the long-term, while at the not take firm root and were unable to deliver same time developing an exit strategy that leaves public services, a gap which non-governmental principal responsibility for the country’s welfare in

The Latin American Program serves as a bridge between the and Latin America, encouraging a free flow of information and dialogue between the two regions. The Program also provides a nonpartisan forum for dis- cussing Latin American and Caribbean issues in Washington, D.C., and for bringing these issues to the attention of opinion leaders and policy makers throughout the Western hemisphere. The Program sponsors major initiatives on Democratic Governance, Citizen Security, Comparative Peace Processes, Creating Community in the Americas, U.S.-Brazilian relations and U.S.-Mexican relations.

The Latin American Program's Project on Creating Community in the Americas seeks to establish an effective security community for the countries of the region and to foment strategic debate over matters of human, national, regional, and hemispheric security. The project helps to facilitate a coherent response to the radical changes in the region’s security situation that have occurred since the end of the Cold War and the accelerating advance of globalization. We are grateful to The Ford Foundation for its generous support of this initiative.

Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars One Woodrow Wilson Plaza, 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20004-3027 tel. (202) 691-4000, fax (202) 691-4001 www.wilsoncenter.org/lap GOVERNANCE AND SECURITY IN HAITI

Haitian hands. The consensus was that Haiti would international response to illegitimate rule was need- need some international presence over the long haul ed, Mendelson Forman asserted. if stability and capable governance were to be con- In 1994, a U.S.-led multi-national force, agreed solidated. Moreover, it was also evident that an to by the UN Security Council, entered Haiti to island-wide approach to environmental and other protect its citizens and to restore legitimate govern- issues would help improve relations with Haiti’s ment. The arrival of more than 25,000 troops, most- neighbor, the . As with all ly U.S., but also those of other participating UN efforts to rebuild fragile states, members of the states, marked a shift in the way the international international community increasingly recognize that community would manage situations in countries goals must be achieved and reinforced not only with now deemed “failed states.”The extent to which the resources, but also with engagement of the citizens international community has the legitimacy under of Haiti to ensure that gains are enduring. international law to engage in Haiti is often ques- tioned, she noted, given that Haiti is not a post-con- flict state, but a “failed state in recovery mode.” 3 Johanna Mendelson Forman However, she stressed that the international commu- discussed the potential for international assistance to nity does have a role to play in promoting stability, make a significant contribution to Haiti’s develop- sound governance, and economic prosperity. ment. She pointed to three factors that make Haiti’s A third problem is that Haiti has been locked in a situation especially unique. One factor is Haiti’s his- long and confrontational relationship with the torical context. Haiti did not benefit from U.S. and Dominican Republic, with which it shares the Soviet competition during the Cold War, she noted. island of . The tensions have produced Rather, grinding poverty, repressive military cross-border skirmishes and, in 1937, violence that regimes, and a centuries-old neglect of governance ended in a massacre of some 20,000 Haitians by the and justice gave way to a tidal wave of immigrants Dominican army. This violence against Haitians and who sought a better life on U.S. shores. Thus, in the the policy of President (1930-1961) absence of international competition, Haiti became of “Dominicanization” of the border only added to a U.S. security concern and a problem for interna- the tensions between the two countries. In 1994, tional action, Mendelson Forman said. Although the relations between Haiti and the Dominican country became deluged by foreign assistance, the Republic were still tense during the first UN inter- results of such aid were limited. Corruption in gov- vention. Conditions for an island-wide solution to ernment, poor development decisions, unchecked the ongoing Haitian disorder were not ripe. population growth, and disease thwarted the best Mendelson Forman argued that finding real and intentions of donors, both bilateral and multilateral, enduring solutions to Haiti’s problems will require a to right the wrongs of Haitian leaders, she argued. new set of ideas, diplomacy that engages an island- A second problem, she said, was that Haiti was wide approach to solving the economic problems not an example of a post-conflict state, like so many that Haiti faces, and a strong long-term economic other cases that confronted the world community in involvement of the multinational finance institu- the wake of the Cold War. While there was conflict, tions that hold the key to resources that are needed violence, and the disruption of democratic rule— to help build a local and decentralized economic demonstrated by the coup that overthrew the freely- system. However, she noted, in the vacuum created elected government of Jean Bertrand Aristide in by the war in Iraq, the United States has been more 1991—Haiti appeared more appropriate as a case for disengaged than ever in working out solutions to the Organization of American States to consider; in this long-standing problem of development. She 1991 the OAS declared disruptions of the demo- noted the important role that nations of this hemi- cratic process as cause for regional intervention. The sphere were playing to support the restoration of continued deterioration of human rights conditions security and development to Haiti. Brazil’s lead in in Haiti, the ongoing actions of death squads, and an the peace operations, coupled with the strong sup- OAS-imposed embargo became sources of great port of many of the region’s larger governments, has human suffering and sent out an alarm that a strong marked a very different and positive engagement by WOODROW WILSON CENTER UPDATE ON THE AMERICAS

regional actors in Haiti’s future. will they have to sustain what is clearly a long- Fortunately, she said, the growth of democratic term mission in the region? governance and improved civil-military relations in Latin America have enabled many governments to She concluded that Haiti’s future and the way take strong stands in support of peace operations. that it is viewed by Latin American countries may Nine Latin American countries have troops partici- signal a new era of regional relations that could sub- pating in the security of Haiti through UN peace- ordinate U.S. interests to those of other regional keeping operations while hemispheric defense min- actors. It is important that Haiti and its future isters continue to work together in helping to estab- development become a central part of a wider effort lish a safe and secure environment. Concerned with of all countries interested in peace and security at the ongoing role of Haiti as a narcotics transfer the third U.S. border, the Caribbean. point in the Caribbean, and recognizing the poten- tial for failed states to provide an opening for terror- 4 ists, U.S. policymakers are now becoming more Assistant Secretary-General engaged in the country. Albert Ramdin of the Organization of Mendelson Forman highlighted several broad American States (OAS) noted that the political questions that need to be considered in evaluating landscape in the Western hemisphere has changed the role of the international community in Haiti: tremendously over the past 12 to 15 months. Many countries held elections in 2006; almost two-thirds • Are international organizations the new vil- of the population of the Americas now has a new lains of dependency or are they playing an government or has renewed the mandate for the sit- important role in jump-starting failed ting government. Ensuring free and fair elections regimes? and democracy have been key focal points of OAS • Are the types of threats that poor countries like involvement in the region during this time. While Haiti face best managed through multilateral the OAS has been pleased with the quality of the organizations? For example, are the transna- elections and the strength of democracy in the tional threats that now plague so many weak region, Ramdin added that new or sitting govern- states possible to solve only through a partner- ments, including Haiti’s, face many economic, ship between the emerging governments and social, and political challenges, as well as issues con- multilateral institutions? cerning indigenous peoples. • What role can diplomacy play in fostering the One positive development, Ramdin said, is there awareness that Haiti and the Dominican is greater political support in the Western hemisphere Republic have a shared fate, and that the for cooperation and engagement in Haiti. The for- island as a whole is not sustainable without mation of the UN Stabilization Mission (MINUS- some alternative form of energy develop- TAH), which involves a number of South American ment? Is it possible to build peace through countries, is an example of this political momentum. shared collaboration on energy security? Ramdin urged countries to sustain the political • What can be done now to further build secu- momentum aimed at addressing Haiti’s needs. rity in Haiti? Insecurity is a symptom of a In discussing Haiti, Ramdin argued that it is larger problem, and the only way to rebuild it important to avoid using labels like failed state, non- is to provide young men and women with failed state, or fledgling democracy. Such labels are hope for a future. Now, with the economic difficult to define, he said, particularly since so- opportunities limited, insecurity will remain a called developed states also face many challenges. constant threat to governance. Can the inter- Furthermore, Ramdin argued both the Haitian national community assist in building a rural government and the international community Haiti that is decentralized and self-sufficient should focus on Haiti’s particular needs with through alternative forms of technology? to resources, assistance, and technical support. • Will the democracies of Latin America contin- Ramdin noted that Haitian President René Préval is ue to provide support for Haiti? What capacity committed to this approach—during a visit to the GOVERNANCE AND SECURITY IN HAITI

OAS in March of 2006, Préval made clear that his officers take place outside Haiti; an exchange pro- policies would be based on Haiti’s interests. gram with CARICOM nations could train Haitian Emphasizing positive developments, Ramdin police officers in a calmer environment before noted that Haiti has succeeded in establishing a truly returning them to work in Haiti. representative government, with all parties repre- While security is a key concern, Ramdin said that sented in parliament and the cabinet. Establishing an more attention should be paid to the problem of inclusive, unified government that has a positive poverty, as it is closely linked to the security chal- outlook and is committed to improving the country lenge. Noting that it will take many years to is a great achievement and is the starting point for strengthen the Haitian National Police, he argued any engagement with the international community, that focusing on poverty alleviation and other devel- Ramdin said. opment challenges will lessen security concerns Ramdin stressed, however, that expectations indirectly in the short term. Given the length of time regarding what can be achieved should be lowered needed to strengthen the police force and the need in order to avoid disappointment and ensure steady for immediate development assistance, he argued 5 progress, particularly given the vast number of chal- that MINUSTAH should remain in the country for lenges Haiti faces. These include weak institutional an extended period of time while slowly changing capacity, a history of political instability, a disen- its mandate to focus more on development issues and gaged civil society, and massive unemployment and institutional support other than security. poverty. Such challenges require an incremental Given the many challenges Haiti faces, in 2006 the approach through which each problem is addressed OAS expanded its mandate to include the promotion step by step, he said. of economic and social development alongside its Noting that the Haitian people have suffered far original focus on strengthening democratic gover- too long, Ramdin said that the Haitian government nance. In connection with this broadened mandate, should focus on demonstrating short-term results in the manner in which the OAS operates is also evolv- order to establish and maintain confidence in the ing. OAS Secretary-General José Miguel Insulza political process. He warned that without short-term established a Haiti Task Force aimed at coordinating results, social unrest is likely to mount, which could all OAS activities in Haiti. As chair of the Haiti Task lead to further political instability and damage the Force, Ramdin said that he is responsible for stream- governmental unity that has been achieved. Some of lining OAS operations in Haiti in order to strengthen the main challenges in the short-term, he said, are their effectiveness and better serve Haitian authori- maintaining a peaceful environment and providing ties. Thus, the activities of the three basic OAS enti- opportunities for income generation. One example ties in Haiti—the OAS country office, the Electoral of a short-term project is the Pan-American Technical Assistance Program (ETAP), and the OAS Development Foundation’s initiative to create 1,500 Special Mission—will all be managed under the jobs for street cleaners. Ramdin cautioned that while heading of the OAS country office. focusing on creating short-term opportunities should Ramdin added that better coordination within be a priority, the government and the international the international community, particularly at the community should not lose sight of long-term strate- technical and political levels, is needed, as is greater gic plans and goals, including the structural improve- cooperation between donor aid organizations work- ment of the economy and government institutions ing within Haiti. This involves 1) making sure that and the strengthening of the social system. donor aid for technical support takes account of the A major challenge is security, Ramdin stated. political environment; 2) expanding membership in Confronting this challenge involves protecting the extended framework for cooperation on Haiti; human rights, ensuring fair judicial processes, and and 3) holding regular meetings on political devel- strengthening the Haitian National Police. It also opments. Such coordination among international involves international cooperation and assistance. entities is likely to increase program effectiveness and One instance where international cooperation reduce the risk that if one element of the strategy would be useful is in the training of Haitian police collapses, everything falls apart. Moreover, he said, officers. He suggested that the training of police the Haitian government needs to professionalize WOODROW WILSON CENTER UPDATE ON THE AMERICAS

donor aid coordination within Haiti. The OAS is supporting institutional strengthening within the Ramdin said that the Haitian government Ministry of Planning, the institution officially desig- should focus on demonstrating short-term nated to deal with donor aid. results in order to establish and maintain Within each of the three main areas of focus confidence in the political process. He warned under the extended mandate—democratic gover- that without short-term results, social unrest nance, development, and security—the OAS has is likely to mount, which could lead to further designed a specific set of activities. In the area of democracy and governance, Ramdin explained, the political instability and damage the govern- OAS intends to continue the civil registry and mental unity that has been achieved. National ID Card project, which has successfully registered 3.5 million Haitians. Support for the Haitian Electoral Council will also be continued as through tourism, many short-term job opportuni- ties could be established, particularly with the 6 this body is transformed into a permanent electoral council. One challenge, he highlighted, is the fre- involvement of the private sector and international quency of elections in the country. In the coming institutions like the Caribbean Hotel Association five years, 15 elections will be held in Haiti, costing and the Caribbean Tourism Organization. The OAS between 15 and 20 million dollars each. Given the is already providing technical assistance in develop- great cost of holding such frequent elections—150 ing the tourism potential of several areas including million dollars over the next five years—and the La Gonave^ and Cap Haïtien, he said. limited amount of funding available, Ramdin sug- Promoting greater trade with and investment in gested that Haitian authorities revisit the electoral Haiti will also contribute to the country’s develop- process and consider making constitutional changes ment. What is needed, Ramdin said, is a positive to address this problem. attitude that demonstrates the potential for specific Other issues in the area of democracy and gover- economic and investment opportunities in areas nance which require attention are judicial reform, such as in water resource management, reforesta- capacity building, and supporting the Parliament, he tion, natural disaster mitigation, port security, and stated. Recognizing that the OAS cannot take on trade facilitation. To accomplish this, the OAS is the entirety of judicial reform, he noted that the organizing a trade mission and a business forum in OAS can be of assistance in certain areas such as the Haiti in October 2007. He ended by pointing out training of judges. In order to promote institutional other OAS programs that can assist in Haiti, includ- strengthening and capacity building in the past, the ing those designed to combat illegal arms, narcotics, OAS has provided technical assistance. However, he and human trafficking. argued that capacity building should be more per- manent. Rather than simply sending experts to Haiti, these experts should be tied to a Haitian Ambassador Raymond Joseph, counterpart in order to train individuals for an Haitian ambassador to the United States, argued that extended period of time. For example, he said, Haiti’s current situation should be considered in light Caribbean countries can be especially useful in pro- of the historical legacy of colonialism and occupa- viding support for the . tion. Many of Haiti’s problems, he said, stem from the With its expanded mandate, the OAS is also fact that it was the second country in the Western assisting the Haitian government in the area of hemisphere after the United States to achieve inde- development. As part of a program which will con- pendence. Given the reluctance of the international tinue throughout 2007, the OAS has sent two tech- community—and the United States in particular—to nical missions to assess conditions for expanded recognize a state established by former slaves who had work. The mission has also provided strategic plan- defeated a “civilized” country, France, Haiti was not ning and training in tourism, including agri- welcomed into the international community. This tourism, in collaboration with the Inter-American was despite the fact that Haiti’s independence bene- Institute for Agriculture. Ramdin argued that fited the United States tremendously: France’s fear of GOVERNANCE AND SECURITY IN HAITI losing its richest colony, he asserted, sparked its deci- ing, he said, international assistance should be well sion to sell the Louisiana Territory for $15 million, coordinated and aim to achieve sustainable solu- perhaps the greatest real estate bargain in history. tions. Rather than claiming credit for their individ- Thus, the United States doubled its landmass, gaining ual contributions, international organizations the vast domain west of the Mississippi to the Rocky should work in cooperation with Haitians on devel- Mountains, from the Gulf of Mexico all the way to opment initiatives to strengthen the country’s the border of Canada. human capital and capacity. He highlighted the Despite the United States’ gain from Haiti’s Inter-American Development Bank’s fund to bring struggle for independence, the United States joined Haitian professionals living abroad back to the France in imposing an embargo on Haiti that country as a successful example of this approach. remained in place for 60 years, with devastating Joseph added that development initiatives should consequences for the country. Moreover, in return not try to reinvent the wheel, but rather build on for recognition, France demanded payment from previous efforts. The dissolution of the Haitian Haiti as compensation for its losses. Haiti was thus armed forces after the reestablishment of democracy 7 further saddled by the debt of paying for its inde- had devastating consequences, he said. Destroying pendence, Joseph said. the armed forces without a substitute in place creat- When the United States did become involved in ed a huge vacuum and made gaining control over Haiti—it occupied the country between 1915 and the security situation much more challenging. This 1934—it reinforced the old social structure imposed lesson should be learned with reference to other by the French, perpetuating social divisions countries, he concluded. between mulattos on top and black masses on the bottom. Thus, despite some investment in infra- structure including roads, schools and buildings dur- Ambassador Roberto Álvarez, ing the U.S. occupation, the U.S. Marines allied Mission of the Dominican Republic to the OAS, themselves with the bourgeoisie, leaving the social discussed three principal areas of concern about structure unchanged. Haiti from the Dominican perspective: drug and Haiti did not benefit from the rivalry between arms trafficking, HIV/AIDS, and migration. the United States and the Soviet Union during the Quoting the 2006 State Department International Cold War, when those countries were fighting for Narcotics Control Strategy Report on the allies and offering assistance to newly independent Dominican Republic, Álvarez noted that the countries. The Cold War did, however, keep brutal Dominican Republic has been identified as “a dictator François Duvalier (1957-71) in power, major drug transit country for illegal substances because he was viewed as a bulwark against commu- flowing from South America,” and that during nism.4 While Haiti was the second major tourist 2005, the State Department credited the Dominican destination in the Caribbean behind Cuba from the Republic with increasing the seizures of large quan- 1940s to the 1960s, after coming to power in 1957, tities of drugs, raising the number of extraditions of Duvalier drove all the professionals from the coun- suspects to the United States, and improving try, greatly damaging Haiti’s economic standing. domestic law enforcement capacity. Referring to Turning to the role of the international commu- Haiti, the same report notes, “Haiti is a key conduit nity in recent years, Joseph stated that assistance for drug traffickers.” Álvarez maintained that the from the international community is important and international community made a terrible decision effective when properly directed. International by dismantling Haitian armed forces before a new, observers sent by the OAS made the first democrat- non-politicized, effective security force was in place, ic elections possible in 1990, he said. Although the saying that this decision has had a significant impact Haitian people are very accepting of foreign assis- on drug and arms interdiction between the tance, he warned that the presence of foreign troops Dominican Republic and Haiti: the Dominican for an extended period of time could spark Haitian armed forces now bear the burden of patrolling the nationalism and a rejection of international involve- Haitian border. The Dominican armed forces now ment in the country. To prevent this from happen- lack an interlocutor on the Haitian side, he added. WOODROW WILSON CENTER UPDATE ON THE AMERICAS

The flow of drugs through the Dominican Republic has had serious consequences for Le Chevallier identified three simultaneous Dominican society, as not all drugs that pass transitions taking place in Haiti—from through the country leave, he said. armed conflict to reconciliation and peace, Turning to health issues and focusing in particu- from a non-democratic culture to a lar on the problem of HIV/AIDS, Álvarez noted democratic society, and from a failed state to that the Caribbean region is the second most affect- a nation- state.Trying to address one of ed area in the world after sub-Saharan Africa, with AIDS a leading cause of death in people aged 15 to these transitions while ignoring the other 44. According to a report by the United Nations two is what explains the past failures of program on HIV/AIDS, of the Caribbean’s 1.6 per- international assistance. cent prevalence rate, Haiti is the biggest cause of concern, with an adult prevalence rate of 3.8 per- for migration from Haiti, Álvarez noted that the 8 cent, compared to 1.7 percent in the Dominican Republic. The report also points out that Hispaniola embargo imposed on Haiti in the 1990s had delete- is the most affected island in the Caribbean, with rious effects on the Haitian economy and exacerbat- 77.5 percent of the cases of 330,000 adults in ed poverty. However, according to a recent needs region. Haiti alone has 57.5 percent of regional assessment and cost analysis, the Dominican cases, or 190,000 cases, while the Dominican Republic itself needs between $29 and $30 billion Republic has 20 percent, or 66,000 cases. to meet the Millennium Development Goals. (The With regard to immigration, Álvarez argued country’s GDP is $21 billion.) Thus, Álvarez stressed that the strict U.S. immigration policy and that in trying to meet the Dominican Republic’s increased vigilance by the U.S. Coast Guard have own development goals, including reducing the resulted in more migration across the Haitian- prevalence of HIV/AIDS, the Dominican govern- Dominican border since the early 1990s, placing a ment should not be expected to be able to meet the great strain on the Dominican Republic. While needs of Haitians living within Dominican borders. President Bush recently signed a law authorizing Álvarez agreed with Johanna Mendelson Forman the construction of a wall between the United that the international community should consider States and Mexico, what Álvarez called a “virtual island-wide solutions or approaches. Taking issue wall” has existed between the island of Hispaniola with the comments of OAS Assistant Secretary- and the United States since the mid 1990s. The General Ramdin, Álvarez argued that such solutions number of interdictions of Haitians by the U.S. should not be slow and incremental but dramatic. Coast Guard greatly increased in the early 1990s. Unfortunately, he said, initiatives for dramatic, As a point of reference, in 1987, the U.S. Coast island-wide solutions are not being proposed by the Guard interdicted 3,541 Haitians on the high seas. international community; it has not viewed the After the 1991 coup in Haiti, the number of inter- immigration burden placed on the Dominican dictions jumped to 10,087, spiking to 25,069 in Republic as a shared responsibility and thus has 1994. Using a term coined by Bernardo Vega, for- failed to address the problem. mer Dominican ambassador to the United States, Álvarez concluded by indicating that polls show Álvarez commented that increased vigilance by public opinion in the Dominican Republic shifting the U.S. Coast Guard in the Windward Passage towards less acceptance of Haitian immigrants. In and the Mona Channel between the Dominican 1990, when asked whether Haitians who illegally Republic and Puerto Rico placed the island of immigrated to the Dominican Republic should be Hispaniola “in brackets.” returned to Haiti, 44 percent of Dominican respon- Given the difficulty of migrating to the United dents said they should be allowed to stay. Ten years States, the absence of a Haitian security force, and later, only 17 percent responded that way. He the lack of identity cards, Haitians migrated to the warned that unless the situation is viewed in an Dominican Republic in dramatically increased island-wide context and dramatic measures—such numbers in the 1990s. Acknowledging the impetus as widespread job creation in Haiti—are adopted, GOVERNANCE AND SECURITY IN HAITI the international community can expect very seri- that there are no obvious choices for a successor. The ous conflicts in the future. continuity of the transition process will become an issue as his term approaches its end. The political transformation underway faces Gerardo Le Chevallier, UN three more challenges: the inefficiency of govern- Stabilization Mission (MINUSTAH), agreed with ment itself, the burden and cost of holding frequent Assistant Secretary-General Ramdin regarding the elections, and the lack of strong political parties. need to maintain a positive outlook, noting State institutions are weak, slow, often corrupt, and progress on a number of fronts. On January 7, complex, yet a strong state is needed in order to 2006, he said, MINUSTAH lost Brazilian General address extreme poverty and maintain stability, he Urano Bacellar, Force Commander of MINUS- said. There are many levels of authority in the TAH.5 On January 9, a general strike organized by Haitian government, he noted, and Haiti has more the private sector shut down the whole of Port- elected officials than Peru, a much richer country au-Prince, in a protest over the security situation with more than double the population. Although 9 and a demand to postpone the presidential elec- the electoral cycle just ended, it will restart again in tions. Despite these setbacks, on February 7, 2006, November 2007 with senatorial elections to renew Haiti held the best elections in its history. one-third of the . This involves investing $30- The transition to democracy has yet to succeed, $32 million in order to elect ten senators during two however. The results of the February 2007 elections electoral rounds in November. Approximately $105 were not accepted by all of the participants. The million will be needed to finance seven elections in international community has been going in and out the next four years. The structure of the govern- of Haiti for several years. MINUSTAH is on its sev- ment and political processes are written into the enth mission and many other international actors, Constitution, he said, and the existing mechanism including the United States, France, Canada, and for constitutional reform takes five years. Political the OAS, have left without much success. The party building is also needed to anchor the whole image of the international community and of political system and reduce corruption, he argued. MINUSTAH has not improved in the eyes of Le Chevallier underscored the fact that Haiti has Haitians due to the small number of lasting results. not recovered from the economic embargo of the Le Chevallier identified three simultaneous tran- 1990s and the government lacks revenues to advance sitions taking place in Haiti—from armed conflict the development agenda. Local taxes only partly to reconciliation and peace, from a non-democratic cover government salaries, leaving the international culture to a democratic society, and from a failed community to finance all investments. Moreover, the state to a nation- state. Trying to address one of cooperation framework agreed to by international these transitions while ignoring the other two is donors has not delivered all the results expected by what explains the past failures of international assis- the government. Donors are criticized for a lack of tance, he argued. coordination and for being slow to disburse pledges, With regard to the political transformations in but the Haitian government’s absorptive capacity is Haiti, Le Chevallier argued the key player in this low. Agreeing with Haitian Ambassador Joseph, Le process is President Préval. For the first time, a pop- Chevallier stated that the international community ular president was re-elected. The six major political should help build the capacity of the Haitian govern- parties participated and agreed to a one-year political ment to spend the resources that have been pledged. truce. However, he said, President Préval’s health is a He noted that the UN country system has launched matter of concern. Even though President Préval has a transitional appeal for $98 million in order to con- informed the nation that his cancer has not returned, solidate and facilitate the transfer of investment funds the psychological implications of the fact that he over the short term. may be ill are extremely important. Private investors, Turning to the transition to peace with which as well as Haitian politicians who are thinking of MINUSTAH is intimately involved, Le Chevallier replacing the President, might not necessarily wait described threats to security as emanating from a for the end of this term, he said. He added, however, range of “partisans of chaos”: drug traffickers, WOODROW WILSON CENTER UPDATE ON THE AMERICAS

organized criminal rings (many of which include Achilles Zaluar, Embassy of Brazil, current police officers), criminal and politically- shared ten lessons from his experience as a diplomat motivated gangs, some members of the oligarchy, based at the Brazilian Embassy in Port-au-Prince. some former members of the military and police, The first lesson, he said, is that national leadership and radical supporters of former President Aristide. must be taken seriously.The often-quoted principle Stressing that MINUSTAH is strictly a peace- of national ownership, to which many donors pay keeping operation that is not involved in develop- lip service, is not sufficient. National ownership ment, Le Chevallier stated the goal of MINUSTAH suggests that recipient countries receive complete is to help stabilize the country by providing a secure packages of projects in the form of a gift, of which and safe environment, supporting reforms to con- the recipient countries become owners and for the solidate the rule of law, strengthening democratic outcome of which they are to be held responsible. 10 governance and state institutions, and promoting He added that no development plan, no matter human rights. He argued that MINUSTAH’s man- how well designed from the technical standpoint, date should be renewed and extended to at least one will be relevant unless it is initiated and guided by year beyond the February 15, 2007, expiration date, the national state, national government and nation- given the fact that many aspects of MINUSTAH’s al society.The role of foreign actors, such as bilater- mandate require a longer commitment.6 Longer al cooperation agencies and international develop- international involvement in a country is often ment agencies, should be purely an advisory and needed to maintain peace and ensure that national consulting one. forces are prepared to take over, he argued, pointing Noting that the primary cause of Haiti’s prob- to the presence of the UN in El Salvador for almost lems is the weakening of the Haitian state since the ten years after the signing of the peace agreements. 1970s, Zaluar argued that the top priority for He stressed that the international community donors should be to strengthen the state of the should make good on its promises of troops, special- recipient country. Without a strong and effective ists, and equipment. For example, of the 7,200 state, which provides the favorable climate for sav- troops promised, only 6,662 are in Haiti, and police ings and investment, there can be no development, officers are short by about 200. he stated. MINUSTAH also needs to begin formulating The second lesson he offered is that cooperation an exit strategy, he stated. This involves establish- for development should be demand-driven, not ing benchmarks for success and deadlines to supply-driven. While this is formally recognized by achieve them. He added that donors should many donors, he said, it is not always applied in improve cooperation with the government as well practice. Often donors that have some capacity to as MINUSTAH in order to avoid duplication and offer, such as technical assistance services, agricul- increase effectiveness. tural inputs, medical supplies, and office supplies, Commenting on many of MINUSTAH’s long- will push this capacity on the recipient. Rather, term concerns, Le Chevallier stated that while the recipients should define their real needs before the government does have the political will to effect coordination mechanisms of the UN system seek to change, it lacks the resources required to do so. mobilize what is needed, he said. Donors and the UN system do have the political Third, Zaluar argued that development coopera- will and resources to engage in Haiti in the short tion must bring concrete benefits to the recipient term, Le Chevallier said. However, he questioned country, such as infrastructure improvements (roads, how long this commitment would last. He warned ports, airports, electric power, and sanitation); social that leaving the country prematurely, as other mis- services such as universal education and free health sions have done in the past, could lead to later crises care; direct income support for the poor to help and the need for further international intervention. jumpstart the economy; and agricultural improve- ments (fertilizer, seeds, pesticides, local roads, stor- age structures, and conservation protection). These GOVERNANCE AND SECURITY IN HAITI

are all things that countries themselves choose to do tion agencies, embassies, international development once they have the resources and control over the agencies, and, as it often happens, for NGOs that development process, he said. receive international monies for projects. The However, instead of doing concrete things, may Haitian state was practically dismantled in the 1980s donors spend fortunes sending consultants and and 1990s in favor of NGOs, which executed the organizing seminars on things like “good gover- major share of international aid. Furthermore, the nance,” “capacity building,” “anti-corruption,” medical sector was destroyed with the massive emi- “judicial reform,” and human rights; whatever issue gration of doctors and nurses to developed coun- is fashionable at the time in the international tries. Today, most of the free medical assistance that “development community.” While these abstract is available to 8.5 million Haitians is provided by goals are important, he said, their achievement about 700 Cuban doctors who partially replaced the depends almost exclusively on local dynamics, not exported Haitians, he pointed out. 11 on donor agencies. Often, the only people that ben- Sixth, Zaluar argued, the goal of the internation- efit from these efforts are the consultants and per- al community, the UN system, etc., should be to haps the hotel, restaurant, and convention center become more effective, not more efficient. If inter- industries of the recipient countries, he argued. national cooperation is ineffective or counterpro- Moreover, he said, in agriculture, what donors ductive, efforts to render it more efficient are irrele- sometimes do is dump subsidized excess food on the vant and even harmful. Regardless of whether the local market either bilaterally or through the World donor spends less or better, he said, practical results Food Program, destroying local agriculture in the on the ground will be nil. However, too much process and turning recipient countries into “inter- debate about international cooperation focuses on national beggars.” efficiency instead of effectiveness. Lesson number four is that projects must be Lesson number seven is that “lack of absorptive drawn on a national scale, not on a pilot scale, Zaluar capacity” is a false problem. Donors often use this asserted. The developing world is a vast cemetery of claim to shift the blame to Haitians and evade pilot projects, which worked as long as the extent of responsibility for poor performance, he argued. A funding continued with no durable, positive effects, donor blaming a recipient country for lack of he stated. Such pilot projects divert scarce human absortive capacity is like a doctor blaming a patient resources away from the ministries in the recipient for “lack of healing capacity.” If he could heal him- country for the purpose of “project implementa- self, he would not need a doctor. In contrast, Zaluar tion.” For small developing countries such as Haiti, suggested that donors have a low capacity to plan and one of the most important constraints for develop- execute cooperation effectively, in a way that attends ment is the availability of competent officials and to the needs of the recipient country, while coun- technicians who are willing to work for the govern- tries such as Haiti suffer from an excess of absorptive ment at the low salaries that are offered in the local market. To divert those technicians to work on pilot projects is counterproductive, he argued. Thus, if it is impossible to achieve results on a national scale in all In the area of development, dozens of independent areas, it is better to define priorities and concentrate agencies, the UNDP,international financial institu- resources in a smaller number of areas. tions, the European Union, bilateral cooperation The fifth lesson is: do no harm. International agencies, humanitarian bodies, and major NGOs, all cooperation for development, if not well planned, working on their own, make coordination impossible… may actually hurt development, Zaluar noted. For If the international community tried to run peace- instance, he said, international cooperation has been keeping operations in the same way that development is known to stimulate the brain drain if the few com- carried out… the result would be chaos. petent technicians of the public sector are siphoned off to work for the local offices of bilateral coopera- WOODROW WILSON CENTER UPDATE ON THE AMERICAS

capacity. Somehow, he said, these countries are able that all actors have been accomplices in developing to manage hundreds of micro projects, with dozens the current system for development assistance. of different bilateral, multilateral NGO donors, each Unfortunately, he noted, there is little correlation with their own burdensome reporting requirements; between receiving development aid and making even as their “development partners” steal their best progress towards development. Nobody has figured technicians with salaries several times higher than out how to promote development in any particular those paid locally. case, he said, because development is a complex cul- Lesson number eight, he said, is that any coordina- tural and social process. He concluded that the first tion effort must fully engage the Bretton Woods insti- step is to create some political and institutional space tutions and regional development banks, such as the where all actors can talk, work, and learn together. Inter-American Development Bank, that have the In short, the ten lessons on peacebuilding and resources to make a positive impact. However, he development cooperation are: added, coordination between the UN system, Bretton 12 Woods institutions, regional mechanisms, and bilater- 1) Be guided by national leadership, not “national al donors is impossible unless the national government ownership;” of the recipient country takes a leadership role. 2) Cooperation must be demand-driven, not sup- Lesson number nine is that the United Nations, ply-driven; which already knows how to conduct peacekeeping 3) Bring concrete benefits; operations, must learn to execute development 4) Think on a national scale, not pilot scale; operations, he argued. In the area of development, 5) Do no harm (don’t plunder the human dozens of independent agencies, the UNDP, inter- resources of the country nor destroy the food- national financial institutions, the European Union, production capacity of the country you are bilateral cooperation agencies, humanitarian bodies, trying to help); and major NGOs, all working on their own, make 6) Strive to become more effective, not more effi- coordination impossible, he said. If the international cient; community tried to run peacekeeping operations in 7) Lack of absorptive capacity” is a false problem; the same way that development is carried out, with 8) Engage the Bretton Woods institutions and dozens of autonomous armed forces, each with its regional development banks; own doctrine, capability, and priorities, the result 9) Learn to execute development operations like would be chaos, he said. we learned to execute peacekeeping opera- Rather than simply improving coordination, tions; and what is needed is a more radical rethinking of inter- 10) Stop the blame-shifting game and create some national cooperation for development, he said. He political and institutional space where all actors suggested a model similar to the relationship can talk, work, and learn together. between the Security Council, the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, and con- tributing countries, with unity of command. In Caroline Anstey, The World Bank, high- development operations, a new United Nations lighted Haiti’s significant progress on the democrat- Peacebuilding Commission is needed, he argued, ic and economic governance fronts over the last which would play a role similar to that of the three years. In addition to having held successful Security Council in peacekeeping operations. In elections at the national and local levels, economic countries like Haiti, such a development operation management has also greatly improved. Haiti has should start functioning years before the end of the qualified for the Heavily-Indebted Poor Country peacekeeping operation, he added. (HIPC) debt relief program and is on track to qual- The last lesson, he said, is that all major actors, ify for multilateral debt relief through a G7 initiative including donor countries, new donors, recipient that will bring half a billion dollars of debt relief to countries, the United Nations, international finan- the country. Haiti has also produced its first Interim cial institutions, humanitarian agencies, etc., should Cooperation Framework—a coordinated, national- stop the blame-shifting game. The truth, he said, is ly-owned framework—and has prepared an Interim GOVERNANCE AND SECURITY IN HAITI

committed to better coordinate projects and make There are grave misperceptions in the inter- sure such projects were carried out under Haitian national community that Haiti as a nation is leadership. Donors also committed to engage in insecure.The vast majority of Haiti, roughly Haiti over the long run, and to channel funds three-quarters of the country,is peaceful. In directly through the Haitian budget rather than fact, a number of development projects are through NGOs. On the Haitian side, authorities committed to put in place coordination mecha- underway in rural areas of the country, nisms, maintain sound economic governance, including infrastructure programs to build address issues of fraud and corruption, and work roads, water and sanitation projects, school with donors as a united group, she said. construction, and community- driven While a coordinated development strategy—the development programs. Interim Cooperation Framework—has been put into place and donors have committed to support a Haitian-led strategy, donors still do not channel 13 Poverty Reduction Strategy. Haiti has submitted its enough money through the Haitian budget, Anstey budget on time over the past two years, has asserted. Haiti’s budget for a population of eight increased the transparency of and participation in million people is roughly the same size as the oper- the budget process, and has reduced the amount of ating budget of a medium-sized U.S. university, and discretionary accounts from about 60 percent of the smaller than the operating budget of the humanitar- budget to less than 10 percent. Furthermore, a civil ian organization, CARE. To further promote eco- society monitoring mechanism has been set up to nomic growth in the country, the budget has to track economic governance reforms, something expand, she argued. Donors often cite Haiti’s low beyond what many other governments in the ranking on the Transparency International Caribbean have achieved. Haiti has also introduced Corruption Perception Index as a reason for not procurement reform, has conducted publicly- channeling resources through the Haitian budget. released audits of the five main public enterprises, But without bolstering Haitian institutions, Anstey and has agreed to implement annual asset declara- emphasized, the viability of the state will not tions by public officials. improve. Indeed, she said, donors are themselves In addition to these management improvements, culpable of contributing to the weakness of the she said that economic performance has also shown Haitian state by refusing to work through the state, signs of progress. In 2004, growth was approximately by setting up parallel organizations, and, all too negative 3.5 percent. In 2005 it was a positive 1.5 per- often, by pulling out their resources. cent. In 2006, she predicted, growth will probably be In the future, she argued, it is important to raise around 2.5 percent. Inflation is down and the macro- the confidence of donors about how their money economic indicators are stable. In addition, Haiti now will be used so they are more willing to send funds has a poverty reduction and growth facility from the directly through the Haitian budget. This can be IMF.These improvements send an important signal to achieved by obtaining a strong commitment from the international community and are considerable the Haitian government to deepen its program of feats for a government with such overwhelming economic governance reform. To reduce the capacity constraints, Anstey argued. administrative burden on the state, donors should Despite this progress, there is still room for consider pooling resources into a multi-donor trust improvement, Anstey argued. At an April 2004 fund, which would disburse funds according to one workshop in Port-au-Prince following the depar- set of requirements, one set of conditionalities, and ture of Aristide, a number of donor organizations one reporting mechanism. This has been done and and Haitian representatives pledged to learn from has been successful in places such as Iraq, the West the past experience of donor involvement in Haiti Bank and Gaza Strip, Kosovo, East Timor, Burundi, and improve the aid process, she said. At this meet- and Afghanistan. Even if some donors are not will- ing, donors agreed that there had been far too many ing to put their money into a multi-donor trust “feel-good projects draped in national flags” and fund, they can still better coordinate missions and WOODROW WILSON CENTER UPDATE ON THE AMERICAS

work through the government to bolster govern- unsafe often or most of the time, only 15 percent in ment capacity, she said. rural areas feel unsafe. Turning to the relationship between security and In order to improve the situation in urban areas, development, Anstey argued that security and devel- Anstey reiterated that security and development ini- opment must go hand in hand. Insecurity has often tiatives should go hand in hand; development agen- prevented development workers from reaching certain cies should work within political cycles, enabling areas of the country, including areas of Port-au-Prince political leaders to capitalize on development progress such as Cité Soleil and Bel Air. She agreed with Le and push forward more substantial reforms. It was also Chevallier that security problems stem in part from imperative to be able to produce quick, visible results. the fact that the number of UN peacekeeping forces, She suggested establishing a better division of labor international police forces, SWAT team experts, anti- between those agencies that can deliver quick-impact 14 gang experts, etc., has not been sufficient. programs of job creation and those that work on At the same time, she insisted, there are grave medium- to longer-term reform. misperceptions in the international community that Anstey concluded by challenging the notion that Haiti as a nation is insecure. The vast majority of the security situation in areas like Cité Soleil had to Haiti, roughly three-quarters of the country, is be addressed and settled before development could peaceful, she said. In fact, a number of development take place. Many countries in Latin America have projects are underway in rural areas of the country, insecure urban areas, including São Paulo, Brazil, including infrastructure programs to build roads, and Kingston, Jamaica, yet the amount of money water and sanitation projects, school construction, pouring into those countries from foreign investors and community-driven development programs. is substantial. While it is important to work towards Recent public opinion polls indicate that while 58 achieving security in problem areas, she said, it was percent of residents in the metropolitan area feel wrong to make the rest of Haiti dependent on

Conference Participants:

Johanna Mendelson Forman is a Senior Associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Albert Ramdin is Assistant Secretary-General of the Organization of American States.

Raymond Joseph is Haiti’s Ambassador to the United States.

Roberto Álvarez is the Dominican Republic’s Ambassador to the Organization of American States.

Gerardo LeChevallier is Director of Political Affairs and Planning at the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH).

Achilles Zaluar is Political Advisor at the Brazilian Embassy in Washington, DC, and a previous Assistant to the Brazilian Ambassador to Haiti.

Caroline Anstey is Country Director for the Caribbean in the Latin America and the Caribbean Region program at the World Bank.

Cynthia J. Arnson is Director of the Latin American Program at the Woodrow Wilson Center; José Raúl Perales is Senior Program Associate; and Elizabeth Bryan is former Program Assistant. GOVERNANCE AND SECURITY IN HAITI

improvements in the urban areas. She argued that NOTES donors should be more creative in mobilizing investment from the Haitian Diaspora and channel- 1. Text, United Nations Security Council Resolution ing it for development. 1542 of 30 April 2004, establishing the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti. 2. UN and OAS missions to and operations in Haiti Conclusion: Since taking office in May since 1990 include the United Nations Observer Group for 2006, President Préval has managed to keep his the Verification of the Elections in Haiti (ONUVEH); the coalition government together. Port au Prince is far International Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH); the more secure, in part because of aggressive efforts by United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH); the United MINUSTAH, in collaboration with the national Nations Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH); the United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti (UNTMIH); and the government, to go after gangs that were terrorizing United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti civilians. Improvements in security have attracted (MINOPUH). 15 the attention of potential investors, especially in 3. United Nations Security Council, “Report of the light of trade legislation passed by the U.S. Congress Secretary-General on Haiti,”S/2004/300, 16 April 2004, p. 2. in late 2006 to expand the export of manufactured 4. François Duvalier was succeeded in power by his goods into the United States. nineteen-year-old son Jean-Claude, who was ultimately forced into exile in 1986. [Ed.] Like any fragile government, Haiti will need 5. The Brazilian government and the UN deemed continued assistance to build capacity in its min- Urano Bacellar’s death a suicide. [Ed.] istries, and to find a way to demonstrate to ordinary 6. On February 15, 2007, the UN extended the mission Haitians that progress is being made in their com- until October 2007, less than the one year requested. munities. This is the challenge that President Préval faces on a daily basis. It is a challenge that may well keep his coalition together. No one wants another international peace operation for Haiti. And yet it is clear that the current mission will be in Haiti for the long haul, something that will ensure that, with appropriate leadership and adequate resources, Haiti will be able to join the community of Caribbean states and contribute to the peace and well-being of the region. WOODROW WILSON CENTER UPDATE ON THE AMERICAS

THE WOODROW WILSON INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SCHOLARS Lee H. Hamilton, President and Director

BOARD OF TRUSTEES ABOUT THE WOODROW WILSON CENTER Joseph B. Gildenhorn, Chair The Woodrow Wilson Center is one of Washington’s David A. Metzner, Vice Chair most respected institutions of policy research and public dialogue. Created by an act of Congress in Public Members: James H. Billington, Librarian of 1966, the Center is a living memorial to President Congress; Bruce Cole, Chair, National Endowment for Woodrow Wilson and his ideals of a more informed the Humanities; Michael O. Leavitt, Secretary, U.S. public policy community in Washington. It supports Department of Health and Human Services; Tamala L. research on international policy issues; organizes con- Longaberger, designated appointee within the Federal ferences, seminars, and working groups; and offers Government; Condoleezza Rice, Secretary, U.S. residential fellowships for scholars, journalists and 16 Department of State; Cristián Samper, Acting policymakers. Center director Lee H. Hamilton is a Secretary, Smithsonian Institution; Margaret widely respected former member of Congress who Spellings, Secretary, U.S. Department of Education; chaired the House International Relations Committee. Allen Weinstein, Archivist of the United States The Latin American Program focuses attention on U.S.-Latin American relations and important issues in Private Citizen Members: Robert B. Cook, Donald E. the region, including democratic governance, citizen Garcia, Bruce S. Gelb, Sander Gerber, Charles L. security, peace processes, drug policy, decentraliza- Glazer, Susan Hutchison, Ignacio E. Sanchez tion, and economic development and equality.

ONE WOODROW WILSON PLAZA, 1300 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, NW, WASHINGTON, DC 20004-3027

SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION OFFICIAL BUSINESS PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE $300