Governing Fragmented Societies: State-Building and Political Integration in Chechnya and Ingushetia (1991-2009) Ekaterina Sokirianskaia Political Science Department, Central European University In partial fulfillment of the requirements For the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Budapest, Hungary 2009 I confirm that the thesis contains no materials accepted for any other degrees in any other institutions This thesis contains no materials previously written and/or published by another person, unless otherwise noted ii Abstract My dissertation analyzes state-building and political integration in the two North Caucasian Republics of Ingushetia and Chechnya. The study is to a large extent designed as a reaction to the mainstream claim that the degree of national consolidation and stability of these North Caucasian regimes are primarily a result of clan politics, i.e. political process where the main actors are pre-existing kin-based identity organizations. The task of this research was thus to assess the relative role of informal social structures in projects aimed at establishing and consolidating indigenous political units in the North Caucasus and to identify the principal internal reasons for the outcomes of these projects. On the basis of long-term participant observation, interviews with experts, analysis of historical data and modern political processes this thesis argues that clans (teips) have seized to be patterns of political integration of any prominence in Ingushetia and Chechnya. As a result of demographic growth and social change brought about by colonization, Soviet modernization and frequent forced and voluntary resettlements, they lost their organizational structure and are incapable to mobilize members for action. Five case studies show that although certain traditional institutions and practices still play an important role in the society, state-building is determined by struggle for power between socially heterogeneous groups that are driven by ideologies, programs, economic or military interests, and can be based on strong or weak ties. Five structural factors influence elite formation and state-building in the region: descent, kinship, territory, religion and ideology. The prominence of each of them is dependent on elite choices and the particular demands of the state-building project. Governments differ in how homogeneous they are, and how strong are the ties binding their members together. I conclude that the lack of checks and balances and a risk-prone environment increase the relevance of strong ties. I also show that the role of kinship in iii structuring the elite and the determining the strength of ties within governments do not covary, despite the expectations to the contrary. Acknowledgements I would like to thank my supervisor Zsolt Enyedi without whom my return to academia would not have happened and this thesis would have never seen light. It is only due to his pedagogical wisdom, flexibility and strong faith in me that this project became possible. I am grateful to him for becoming an expert on Chechen and Ingush clans together with me and for illuminating discussions, which helped me shape out the argument. Special thanks for teaching me how to sketch graphs, for understanding and friendship. I am very grateful to Matteo Fumagalli who joined my project at a later stage and was its most thorough, thoughtful and stimulating reader and critic. His guidance helped me develop the theoretical framework, elaborate argument, focus on methodology and structure. His encouragement and support helped me get till the end. I am truly indebted to my friends and colleagues in Ingushetia and Chechnya, who helped me in my fieldwork, spent hours trying to explain me the logic of Vajnakh informal social institutions, drove me all around Ingushetia and Chechnya for interviews. I thank them for being frank and open about many sensitive issues that we have discussed and for making me warm and safe all the five years in the region. I am grateful to my interviewees for their stories and hospitality. 90% of the credit for this work goes to my mom. Her love and care kept me going. iv The Table of Contents: INTRODUCTION 11 1. GOVERNING FRAGMENTED SOCIETIES: LATE STATE-BUILDING AND SOCIAL INTEGRATION 10 1.1. Late State-building and Social Integration: Analytical Problems and Concepts 11 1.2. State-Building: State-Centered Perspectives 16 1.3. Finding Balance: “State-in-Society Approach” 23 1.3.1. Neo-Primordialism: “Clan Politics” Approach and the Factor of Kinship 26 1.4. Kinship in Anthropological Theory 34 1.5. Trust Networks and the „Economy of Favors“ 44 2. POLITICAL ORDER, INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS AND SOCIAL INTEGRATION BEFORE COLONIZATION AND IN THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE 50 2. 1. Political Order and Social Institutions Prior to the Caucasian War ( - 1817) 52 2.1.2. Debates on the Nakh Feudalism 55 2.1.3. Proto-national political institutions and law: Mekhk-Khel, Tukhum and Adat 61 2.2. Political Order, Social Change and Social Institutions during and after the Caucasian War 63 2.2.1. The Beginning of the Caucasian War 63 2.2.2. Shamil’s Imamate 67 2.2.3. Political Structures and Informal Patterns of social integration during the Caucasian War and Shamil’s Imamate 69 2.3. The Russian State and Vajnakh Social institutions after the Caucasian War 72 2.3.1 Land reform. Institutionalization of “dym” as a fiscal and economic unit. The Russian administration 72 2.3.2. Enforcement of Russian institutions and law. Involvement in new sectors of economy 73 2.3.3. New Pattern of Social Integration: Tariqas and Virds 74 3. STATE-BUILDING, INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS AND SOCIAL INTEGRATION IN THE SOVIET STATE (1921-1991) 77 3.1. Early Bolshevik State and the Social Change (1922-1940) 78 3.2. Vajnakh society and social institutions during the deportation (1944-1957) 83 3.3. Vajnakh society and social institutions upon return (1957-1991) 89 3.4. Collective Memory as a Political Resource 95 4. SOCIAL INTEGRATION IN INGUSHETIA AND CHECHNYA 103 (A FIELDWORK REPORT) 103 4.1. Fieldwork methodology and challenges 104 4.2. Descent Groups in Ingushetia and Chechnya 106 4.2.1. Is Teip a Social Organization? Looking at Mechanisms for Maintaining Teip’s Unity 114 v 4.3. Kinship 129 4.3.1. Categories of Kinship and Relations between them 129 4.3.2. Kinship Relations and Kin Solidarity 131 4.3.3 Co-habitation: Kinship enclaves 133 4.3.4. Kinship and Blood Feud 135 4.4. Territory 136 4.5. Religion 138 4.5.1. Tariqas and virds 139 4.5.2. Murid Groups and Local Religious Authorities 141 4.5.3. Fundamentalists 143 4.6. Mechanisms of recruitment to office and getting access to social goods 144 4.6.1. Kinship and descent 144 4.6.2. Neighbors/ Zemlyaks 146 4.6.3. Religion 146 4.6.4. Professional networks, ideological networks and others 146 5. NATIONALIST STATE-BUILDING PROJECT IN CHECHNYA 1991-1994 149 5.1. Socio-Political Processes Preceding State-Building: Nationalist Movement and National Revolution 150 5.2. State-Building Policies (1991-1994) 154 5.2.1 Budget and Tax collection 156 5.2.2. Industry and Unemployment 157 5.2.3. Law Enforcement and Security Services 158 5.2.4. The Judicial System 161 5.2.6. The Military 162 5.2.7. Education and Healthcare 162 5.2.8. Infrastructure and welfare 162 5.3. Political Crisis: Parliament vs. President 164 5.4. State Building and Informal Social Institutions in Chechnya 1991-1994 174 5.4.1. Teips and Descent groups 174 5.4.2. Neo-traditionalism: Mekhk-Khel and Seniors in Politics 179 5.4.3. Kinship 182 5.4.4. Territory 184 5.4.5. Religion 186 5.4.6. Political elite formation: ideology, personal networks 188 5.4.7. Personal networks and “joint responsibility” 189 5.5. Challengers to the Regime: Regions in Opposition 192 6. ISLAMIST STATE-BUILDING PROJECT IN CHECHNYA (1997-1999) 201 6.1. Socio-political processes shaping state-building in Chechnya (1997-1999) 202 6.2. Elections and attempts at initial elite consolidation 205 6.3. Regime challengers: formal opposition, informal groups 208 6.4. State-building policies 1997-1999 216 6.4.1. Economy 216 6.4.2. Budget and tax collection 216 6.4.3. Industry 218 6.4.4. Agriculture 220 vi 6.4.5. Education and healthcare 221 6.4.6. Armed forces 225 6.4.7. Law-enforcement and capacity to maintain order 226 6.4.8. Judicial system 230 6.5. Political Crisis and Government’s response 230 6.6. State-building and informal institutions and practices in 1997-1999 238 6.6.1. Paramilitary groups 238 6.6.2. Religion and ideology 239 6.6.3. Regional opposition 240 6.6.4. Teip, seniors, kinship 241 6.6.5. Political elite formation: kinship and personal networks 243 7. DEMOCRATIC STATE –BUILDING PROJECT IN INGUSHETIA: 1992-2001 247 7.1. Socio-political processes shaping state-building in Ingushetia: National Movement and Foundation of the Ingush Republic 248 7.2. Creating Institutions, initial consolidation 252 7.3. State-Building Policies 1992-2001 254 7.3.1. Economy 254 7.3.2. Budget and Tax Collection 257 7.3.3. Agriculture 258 7.3.4. Law-enforcement 260 7.3.5. Education and healthcare 264 7.4. Issues of Political Disagreement: Ingush-Ossetian conflict, Wars in Chechnya 266 7.5. State-building and Informal Social Institutions and Practices in Ingushetia (1992-2001) 270 7.5.1. Teips and Familias 270 7.5.2. Religion 277 7.5.3. Elite formation: Kinship, Personal Networks, Ideology (Program) 279 8. PERSONALISTIC REGIMES: INGUSHETIA UNDER MURAT ZYAZIKOV (2002-2008) AND CHECHNYA UNDER KADYROVS (2003- CURRENT) 288 8.1. Ingushetia under Murat Zyazikov: 2002-2008 289 8.2.