HORN's CONJECTURE REVISITED* Jacques Moeschler
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A Review of Relevance STEPHEN C
J. Linguistics 25 (1989), 455-472. Printed in Great Britain REVIEW ARTICLE A review of Relevance STEPHEN C. LEVINSON Department of Linguistics, University of Cambridge (Received 31 March 1989) Dan Sperber & Deirdre Wilson, Relevance: communication and cognition. Oxford: Blackwell, 1986. Pp. viii + 279. In this bold and highly controversial book, Sperber and Wilson attempt to shift the whole centre of gravity of pragmatic theory by locating it firmly in a general theory of cognition. Outlining that general theory takes the bulk of the book, so those who have followed technical developments in pragmatics will not find those issues much advanced here. For the purpose of the book is otherwise, to outline a single cognitive principle which (it is held) will give us, along with a theory of attention, almost all we need in the way of a theory of communication, such a theory in turn having linguistic applications merely sketched here.1 The book is written in a fluid argumentative style; easy to read, it is not easy to understand, presuming much that the central thesis depends on. Perhaps because of the global and speculative aims, there is little or no reference to recent developments in the theory of meaning.2 This book has already aroused much passion for and much passion against. Cited by its authors as long ago as 1979, the ideas have been trailered in a series of articles, with both critics and protagonists taking up provocative positions (see for example the still useful exchange in Smith, 1982). Thus when the book finally appeared, extensive airings of these passions were inevitable (see the peer review in Behavioral and Brain Sciences (BBS) 10 (1987), or the exchange in Journal of Semantics 5 (1988)).3 The views have [1] A second and third volume on pragmatics and rhetoric were projected (vii-viii) and this reviewer had hoped for some glimpse of these applications before passing judgment on a disembodied principle, as it were. -
POLITENESS: ALWAYS IMPLICATED? Manuel Padilla Cruz
POLITENESS: ALWAYS IMPLICATED? Manuel Padilla Cruz Manuel Padilla Cruz holds a PhD in English Linguistics and is currently an Associate Professor at the Department of English Language (University of Seville). His research interests include cognitive, social, historical, interlanguage and cross-cultural pragmatics. He is a member of the Research Group “Intercultural Pragmatic Studies (English-Spanish): Pragmatic and Discourse Aspects” (P.A.I. HUM 640) and has co- edited the volumes Current Trends in Intercultural, Cognitive and Social Pragmatics (2004) and Studies in Intercultural, Cognitive and Social Pragmatics (in press). Contact information: Manuel Padilla Cruz Departamento de Filología Inglesa (Lengua Inglesa) FACULTAD DE FILOLOGÍA c/ Palos de la Frontera, s/n. 41004 Sevilla Tlfno. : 954 55 15 50 Fax: 954 55 15 16 e-mail: [email protected] POLITENESS: ALWAYS IMPLICATED? Manuel Padilla Cruz Abstract Based on the relevance-theoretic distinction between explicit and implicit communication, and the notion of explicature of an utterance and its different types (Sperber and Wilson, 1986, 1995; Wilson and Sperber, 1993, 2002), this paper argues that (im)politeness may also be communicated explicitly, and not only implicitly as has been normally claimed in the extant literature. The fact that certain linguistic expressions and paralinguistic features have a procedural meaning that does not affect the truth-conditional content of the utterance where they occur but leads the hearer to obtain a propositional-attitude description can be exploited by the speaker in order to communicate her (im)polite attitude explicitly, as part of the explicit content of that utterance. The hearer will in turn rely on such expressions and features so as to recover a description of the speaker’s attitude and, hence, information about (im)politeness. -
Making Inferences: the Case of Scalar Implicature Processing Judith Degen ([email protected]) Michael K
Making Inferences: The Case of Scalar Implicature Processing Judith Degen ([email protected]) Michael K. Tanenhaus ([email protected]) Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, University of Rochester Rochester, NY 14627-0268, USA Abstract ten). Under the assumption that a speaker is being as informa- tive as possible, a weak implicature, that the speaker doesn’t Scalar implicature has served as a test case for investigating the nature of inference processes in language comprehension. know whether all of the sections are written, is licensed. If Specifically, the question of whether or not scalar implicatures the hearer further assumes that the speaker is competent with are computed by default has been extensively investigated in respect to the truth of the stronger statement, the implicature recent years. We argue that the question of default is overly simplistic and propose instead to think of scalar implicature that the speaker believes that some, but not all of the sections computation as a problem of optimal cue combination within a are written, is licensed. constraint-based framework. We provide evidence from three In recent years the representation and processing of scalar experiments supporting the view that multiple constraints of differing strength operate in parallel to provide probabilistic implicatures has emerged as perhaps the defining problem in support for or against an implicature. experimental pragmatics – a subfield of cognitive science that Keywords: experimental pragmatics; scalar implicature; eye- seeks to combine theoretical proposals from linguistics, com- tracking; subitizing puter science and philosophy with state-of-the-art experimen- tal methods. Introduction Importantly for the experimental investigation of the phe- Successful communication requires comprehenders to infer a nomenon, scalar implicatures are cancelable, that is, they are speaker’s intended meaning from an underspecified utterance. -
Cohesion, Coherence and Temporal Reference from an Experimental Corpus Pragmatics Perspective Yearbook of Corpus Linguistics and Pragmatics
Yearbook of Corpus Linguistics and Pragmatics Cristina Grisot Cohesion, Coherence and Temporal Reference from an Experimental Corpus Pragmatics Perspective Yearbook of Corpus Linguistics and Pragmatics Editor-in-Chief Jesús Romero-Trillo, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Spain Reviews Editor Dawn Knight, Cardiff University, Cardiff, UK Advisory Editorial Board Karin Aijmer, University of Gothenburg, Sweden Belén Díez-Bedmar, Universidad de Jaén, Spain Ronald Geluykens, University of Oldenburg, Germany Anna Gladkova, University of Sussex and University of Brighton, UK Stefan Gries: University of California, Santa Barbara, USA Leo Francis Hoye, University of Hong Kong, China Jingyang Jiang, Zhejiang University, China Anne O’Keefe, Mary Immaculate College, Limerick, Ireland Silvia Riesco-Bernier, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Spain Anne-Marie Simon-Vandenbergen, University of Ghent, Belgium Esther Vázquez y del Árbol, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Spain Anne Wichmann, University of Central Lancashire, UK More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/11559 Cristina Grisot Cohesion, Coherence and Temporal Reference from an Experimental Corpus Pragmatics Perspective Cristina Grisot Department of Linguistics University of Geneva Geneva 4, Switzerland Published with the support of the Swiss National Science Foundation ISSN 2213-6819 ISSN 2213-6827 (electronic) Yearbook of Corpus Linguistics and Pragmatics ISBN 978-3-319-96751-6 ISBN 978-3-319-96752-3 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-96752-3 Library of Congress -
7 Relevance Theory and Shared Content Herman Cappelen and Ernie Lepore
7 relevance theory and shared content herman cappelen and ernie lepore Speakers share content when they make the same assertion (claim, conjecture, proposal, etc). They also share content when they propose (entertain, discuss, etc.) the same hypothesis, theory, and thought. And again when they evaluate whether what each says (thinks, claims, suggests, etc.) is true, false, interesting, obscene, original or offensive. Content sharing, so understood, is the very foundation of communication. Relevance theory (RT), however, implies that content sharing is impossible; or at least, we will argue as much in what follows. This chapte is divided into three sections. In section 1, we amplify on what we mean by ‘shared content’ and its roles in how we think about language and communication; we discuss various strategies RT might invoke to account for shared content and why all these strategies fail. Section 2 is exegetical; there we show why RT must deny the possibility of shared content. The denial is a direct consequence of some of the most central tenets of RT. It is, however, a consequence downplayed by RT proponents. Our goal in section 2 is to show how central the denial of shared content is to RT. In section 3 we outline how we think a pragmatic theory should account for shared content. question: good enough? According to RT, interpreters follow ‘the least effort strategy’ (LES): (LES) Check interpretive hypotheses in order of their accessibility, that is, follow a path of least effort, until an interpretation which satisfi es the expectation of relevance is found; then stop. (Carston 2001, 6) In section 2 we elaborate on how exactly to interpret (LES) and its RT defence. -
Grice's Theory of Implicature and the Meaning of the Sentential
Gergely Bottyán The operationality of Grice’s tests for implicature 1. Introduction In less than a decade after its first publication in 1975, Herbert Paul Grice’s paper Logic and conversation becomes one of the classic treatises of the linguistic subdiscipline now standardly referred to as pragmatics. There are at least two reasons for the paper’s success: (i) it can be regarded as the first truly serious attempt to clarify the intuitive difference between what is expressed literally in a sentence and what is merely suggested by an utterance of the same string of words, (ii) the components of the notional and inferential framework that Grice set up to characterize various kinds of utterance content are intuitively appealing (cf. Haberland & Mey 2002). The present paper has two related aims: (i) to give a comprehensive overview of Grice’s theory of implicature, and (ii) to investigate whether it is possible to test the presence of a conversational implicature on the basis of some or all of the properties that Grice attributes to this construct. It will be argued that of the six characteristics listed by Grice, only cancellability is a practical criterion. However, cancellability is not a sufficient condition of the presence of a conversational implicature. Therefore, additional criteria are needed to arrive at an adequate test. 2. Overview of Grice’s theory of implicature Most of the body of Grice 1975=1989a consists in an attempt to clarify the intuitive difference between what is expressed literally in a sentence and what is merely suggested or hinted at by an utterance of the same string of words. -
Conditional Strengthening [A Case Study in Implicature]
Draft • Version from 9/13/01 1:08 PM Conditional Strengthening [A Case Study in Implicature] Kai von Fintel MIT Introduction Hearers can extract from an asserted sentence a good amount of information that goes beyond the grammatically encoded truth-conditions of the sentence. There are inferences of at least two kinds: (i) Inferences from the (assumed) truth of the asserted sentence. Hearers may have conditional beliefs (if p, q) and upon hearing p asserted they can infer q by Modus Ponens (with suitable caveats about the reliability of their initial conditional belief and the new information that p). (ii) Inferences from the fact that the sentence was asserted. Hearers may have conditional beliefs of the following nature: if q were the case, p would not have been asserted. This together with the information that p was in fact asserted leads via Modus Tollens to the conclusion that q cannot have been the case. For both of these kinds of inferences, we can ask whether the speaker bears (some) responsibility for them. If the speaker is (or should be) well aware of the relevant conditional beliefs on the part of the hearer, he or she may be partly responsible for the inference. Many authors argue that such inferences are part of the utterance meaning if the underlying assumptions are mutual beliefs of speaker and hearer. It may often be much easier to decide whether speaker bears some responsibility for an inference than to decide whether the inference is part of the meaning of the utterance. I will not worry about these issues of responsibility. -
1. Introduction
MICHELA IPPOLITO PRESUPPOSITIONS AND IMPLICATURES IN COUNTERFACTUALS In this article, I propose a pragmatic account of temporally mismatched subjunctive past counterfactuals. The proposal consists of the following parts. First, I show that in cases of temporal mismatch, Past cannot be interpreted inside the proposition where it occurs at surface structure. Instead, it must be interpreted as constraining the time variable of the accessibility relation. This has the effect of shifting the time of the evaluation of the conditional to some contextually salient past time. Second, I will propose specific Felicity Conditions (presuppositions) for subjunctive conditionals and I will argue that there is a strict correspondence between the time of evaluation in the truth-conditions of a conditional and the time relevant for the felicity conditions. In other words, if the time relevant for the accessibility relation has been shifted to the past, then the conditional’s presupposition will make reference to the speaker’s past epistemic states. On the other hand, if no past is constraining the time argument of the accessibility relation, the conditional’s felicity will make reference to the speaker’s epistemic state at the time of the utterance. Third, I will argue that the intuition that the antecedent of mismatched counterfactuals is not true is a scalar implicature arising not from a competition between assertions but between presuppositions. Finally, I will investigate the general repercussions of my proposal on the problem of presupposition projection. 1. Introduction Past subjunctive conditionals do not always talk about the past. Sometimes they may talk about the future, despite the overt past verbal morphology. -
A Hybrid Theory of Metaphor
A Hybrid Theory of Metaphor Relevance Theory and Cognitive Linguistics Markus Tendahl A Hybrid Theory of Metaphor Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Taiwan eBook Consortium - PalgraveConnect - 2011-03-02 eBook Consortium - PalgraveConnect Taiwan - licensed to www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright 10.1057/9780230244313 - A Hybrid Theory of Metaphor, Markus Tendahl This page intentionally left blank Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Taiwan eBook Consortium - PalgraveConnect - 2011-03-02 eBook Consortium - PalgraveConnect Taiwan - licensed to www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright 10.1057/9780230244313 - A Hybrid Theory of Metaphor, Markus Tendahl A Hybrid Theory of Metaphor Relevance Theory and Cognitive Linguistics Markus Tendahl University of Dortmund, Germany Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Taiwan eBook Consortium - PalgraveConnect - 2011-03-02 eBook Consortium - PalgraveConnect Taiwan - licensed to www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright 10.1057/9780230244313 - A Hybrid Theory of Metaphor, Markus Tendahl © Markus Tendahl 2009 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No portion of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, Saffron House, 6-10 Kirby Street, London EC1N 8TS. Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The author has asserted his right to be identified as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. -
The Acquisition of Scalar Implicatures
Wer bei „scalar implicatures“ an eine exotische Zierfischart denkt und vor seinem geistigen Auge bunte Segelflosser majestätisch zwischen Steinen und Grünpflanzen dahinschweben sieht, der irrt sich sehr: Stefanie Röhrig Scalar implicatures bezeichnen keine Buntbarschart, sondern gehören in den Bereich der Pragmatik. Diese Disziplin der Linguistik untersucht sprachliches Handeln, also sprachliche Äußerungen und die Entstehung von Bedeutung. Insbesondere logische Schlussfolgerungen sind von wissenschaftlichem The Acquisition of Interesse. Wer auf die Frage „Have you read Shakespeare‘s works?“ mit „I have read some of them“ antwortet, der bejaht einerseits die Frage, schränkt aber - ohne dies ausdrücklich zu sagen - zugleich die Zustimmung ein: some of them heißt nicht all of them. Implikaturen müssen ‚zwischen den Zeilen‘ Scalar Implicatures verstanden werden. Gewöhnlich wird davon ausgegangen, dass Kinder erst mit etwa 6 Jahren Implikaturen wirklich verstehen und für sich nutzen können. Stefanie Röhrig zeigt in ihrer als Feldstudie angelegten Göttinger Schriften zur Englischen Philologie Staatsarbeit, dass diese Lehrmeinung dringend der Überarbeitung bedarf. Denn Kinder, so decken ihre Untersuchungen auf, verfügen sogar über eine ihnen eigene Art der Implikatur. Band 3 2010 Stefanie Röhrig The Acquisition of Scalar Implicatures Scalar of Acquisition The Röhrig Stefanie ISBN: 978-3-941875-49-4 ISSN: 1868-3878 Universitätsdrucke Göttingen Universitätsdrucke Göttingen Stefanie Röhrig The Acquisition of Scalar Implicatures This work is licensed under the Creative Commons License 3.0 “by-nd”, allowing you to download, distribute and print the document in a few copies for private or educational use, given that the document stays unchanged and the creator is mentioned. You are not allowed to sell copies of the free version. -
Linguistic Returns: the Currency of Sceptical-Rhetorical Theory and Its Stylistic Inscription in the Platonic and Derridian Text
Linguistic Returns: the currency of sceptical-rhetorical theory and its stylistic inscription in the Platonic and Derridian text by Monina Wittfoth B.A., The University of Toronto, 2000 M.A., The University of British Columbia, 2003 A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in The Faculty of Graduate Studies (English) THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA (Vancouver) October 2010 © Monina Wittfoth, 2010 ii Abstract Based on the premise that modernity’s understanding of the linguistic sign has a long history dating back to ancient Greece when the linguistic mediation of knowledge preoccupied thinkers like Parmenides and Plato, this dissertation synthesizes contemporary post-structuralist and rhetorical understandings of language with like-minded findings of other fields of language study. It sees post-structuralist and deconstructive understandings of language as being congruent with the long tradition of rhetorical theory and the infamous linguistic turn in philosophy, that was initiated by the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, as a turn away from the actual phenomena of language towards an idealization of it. Nevertheless the thesis discovers recent findings by some of the beneficiaries of the “philosophy of language” that corroborate rhetorical theory’s insights. Inspired by both Derrida and Plato, this dissertation presents a rhetorical-deconstructive image of language that, recalling the root of the term skopevw (‘I look,’ ‘behold,’ ‘contemplate’), I characterize as sceptical. -
Conversational Implicatures (And How to Spot Them)
Conversational Implicatures (and How to Spot Them) Michael Blome-Tillmann McGill University Abstract In everyday conversations we often convey information that goes above and beyond what we strictly speaking say: exaggeration and irony are obvious examples. H.P. Grice intro- duced the technical notion of a conversational implicature in systematizing the phenom- enon of meaning one thing by saying something else. In introducing the notion, Grice drew a line between what is said, which he understood as being closely related to the conventional meaning of the words uttered, and what is conversationally implicated, which can be inferred from the fact that an utterance has been made in context. Since Grice’s seminal work, conversational implicatures have become one of the major re- search areas in pragmatics. This article introduces the notion of a conversational implica- ture, discusses some of the key issues that lie at the heart of the recent debate, and expli- cates tests that allow us to reliably distinguish between semantic entailments and conven- tional implicatures on the one hand and conversational implicatures on the other.1 Conversational Implicatures and their Cancellability In everyday conversations our utterances often convey information that goes above and beyond the contents that we explicitly assert or—as Grice puts it—beyond what is said by our utterances. Consider the following examples:2 (1) A: Can I get petrol somewhere around here? B: There’s a garage around the corner. [A can get petrol at the garage around the corner.] (2) A: Is Karl a good philosopher? B: He’s got a beautiful handwriting.