Lecture 7: Semantics and Pragmatics. Entailments, Presuppositions, Conversational and Conventional Implicatures. Grice's

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Lecture 7: Semantics and Pragmatics. Entailments, Presuppositions, Conversational and Conventional Implicatures. Grice's Formal Semantics, Lecture 7 Formal Semantics, Lecture 7 B. H. Partee, RGGU April 1, 2004 p. 1 B. H. Partee, RGGU April 1, 2004 p. 2 Lecture 7: Semantics and Pragmatics. Entailments, presuppositions, (intentionally or unintentionally) much more than what is literally said by the words of her conversational and conventional implicatures. Grice’s conversational sentence. maxims. An example: (1) A: How is C getting along in his new job at the bank? 1. Grice’s Conversational Implicatures. .................................................................................................................1 B: Oh, quite well, I think; he likes his colleagues, and he hasn’t been to prison yet. 1.1. Motivation. Questions about the meanings of logical words.......................................................................1 1.2. Truth-conditional content (semantics) vs. Conversational Implicatures (pragmatics).................................2 What B implied, suggested, or meant is distinct from what B said. All B said was that C had 1.3. Conversational maxims. (“Gricean maxims”.) ............................................................................................3 not been to prison yet. 1.4. Generating implicatures. General principles. Examples............................................................................4 1.4.1. Characterization of conversational implicature. .............................................................................4 1.4.2. More Examples...............................................................................................................................4 2. How a better understanding of conversational implicatures helps semantics.....................................................5 1.2. Truth-conditional content (semantics) vs. Conversational Implicatures 2.1. And. ........................................................................................................................................................5 (pragmatics). 2.2 Or. Inclusive – exclusive ambiguity?......................................................................................................5 3. At the borderline of semantics and pragmatics: presuppositions........................................................................6 Grice’s new terms: implicate, implicature. “Implicate” is meant to cover the family of uses 3.1 Presuppositions of definite descriptions. .....................................................................................................7 of “imply”, “suggest”, “mean” illustrated above. Things that follow from what a sentence 3.2. Presuppositions of Factive Verbs.................................................................................................................8 literally “says” or asserts are called entailments; so the major distinction Grice is drawing is 3.2. Presuppositions in lexical meanings. ...........................................................................................................9 4. Conventional implicatures. Summary of distinctions and tests for them...........................................................9 between (semantic) entailments and (pragmatic) implicatures. B’s sentence in (1) entails that 4.1. Conventional vs. conversational implicatures. ............................................................................................9 C is not in prison; it conversationally implicates that C may have a tendency toward criminal 4.2. General features of entailments, presuppositions, conventional and conversational implicatures............. 10 behavior. Thought questions. (not a written assignment.).................................................................................................... 11 References ............................................................................................................................................................ 11 Example: How many and’s? Suggested reading: (2) (a) Mary got married and had a baby. (1) Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet (1999), Meaning and Grammar: An Introduction to Semantics. (b) Mary had a baby and got married. Chapter 4: Speaking, Meaning, and Doing. Section 5: Conversational Implicature. (pp 187 – 203) (c) Mary got married. She had a baby. (2) Paducheva, Elena (1985), Vyskazyvanie i ego sootnesennost’ s dejstvitel’nost’ju. (d) Mary got married and had a baby, although not in that order. (Referencial’nye aspekty semantiki mestoimenij.) Chapter III: Ponjatie presumcii. (pp 48-78) (3) Tests proved that Jones was the author of the pamphlet(.)/ and (a) he was sent to jail. Other major references: (not handed out): (Grice 1975, Kadmon 2001, Levinson 1983) (b) he was awarded the prize. 1. Grice’s Conversational Implicatures. There have been proposals that and is ambiguous among “logical and”, and then, and 1.1. Motivation. Questions about the meanings of logical words. therefore, and nevertheless, …. But Gricean principles like “Be orderly” and “Be relevant” It was widely held (before Grice) that there are considerable mismatches between the can help to defend the semantic non-ambiguity of and. standard interpretations of the standard connectives and operators of logic ( ‘~’, ‘&’, ‘∨’, Consider first the hypothesis that and in (2a) and (2b) means “and then”, and the ‘→’, ‘∀x’, ‘∃x’, ‘ιx’) and the meanings of their closest counterparts in ordinary English competing hypothesis that what we have in (2a) and (2b) is the ordinary logical conjunction (‘not’, ‘and’, ‘or’, ‘if – then’, ‘every’, ‘some’ (or ‘at least one)’, ‘the’). Some consider and plus a conversational implicature that the events happened in the order in which the two natural language rather vague and imprecise and take the logical language as a clauses are given, an implicature that can be derived from the Gricean principle “Be orderly”. “regimentation” and an improvement. Others consider natural language richer than and The first argument for a single and involves Occam’s razor (“Do not multiply entities different from the language of formal logic, but not ‘inferior’, and urge the independent unnecessarily.”) If we posit multiple “and”s, how many will we need? And will we predict investigation of ‘natural logic’ as something distinct from formal logic. many sentences containing and to be ambiguous when in fact they generally are not? Will we have “and then” in (2a-b), a distinct “and therefore” and “and nevertheless” for the Grice does not want to take sides in this debate; he wants instead to challenge its common sentences in (3), and other kinds of and in other sentences? And doesn’t sentence (3a) presupposition. He believes that the gap between the meanings of the connectives and strongly suggest both temporal order and cause? So would that require a still different and? operators of standard logic are much closer to the meanings of their natural language For the second argument, we can see in example (2c) that the principle, “Be orderly”, counterparts than had been assumed. The reason for the widespread belief to the contrary, he gives rise to the same implicature even without the word and; that gives another reason not to argued, was a failure to distinguish between semantics and pragmatics, a failure to distinguish posit a separate “and then” meaning for and. between the literal semantic content of a sentence (“what is literally said by a sentence”) and And a third argument is illustrated with example (2d). One of the properties of a variety of further kinds of inferences that may reasonably be drawn from the speaker’s use conversational implicatures is that they can be “cancelled” without contradiction: we can see of that sentence in a particular context. A speaker may succeed in communicating that happening in (2d), which would be contradictory if and in the first clause of (2d) meant “and then”. RGGU047.doc 1 RGGU047.doc 2 Formal Semantics, Lecture 7 Formal Semantics, Lecture 7 B. H. Partee, RGGU April 1, 2004 p. 3 B. H. Partee, RGGU April 1, 2004 p. 4 Thus it seems most reasonable to conclude that the sentential conjunction and is 1.4. Generating implicatures. General principles. Examples. unambiguous: lexical semantics should specify that its truth-conditional meaning is just the (i) A participant may quietly and unostentatiously violate a maxim. If he does so “quietly”, meaning of the logical conjunction and. The fact that sentences containing and often convey rather than “cooperatively”, he may mislead. Example: saying (4) when in fact Bill has much more than that can be explained within pragmatics, using the concept of conversational two wives. This violates one of the maxims of quantity, and would normally be implicatures. We will describe the principles that generate them, Grice’s “Conversational misleading, although it is not false. maxims”. (4) Bill has a wife 1.3. Conversational maxims. (“Gricean maxims”.) (ii) A participant may be faced by a clash. It may be impossible to fulfill one maxim without Conversational partners normally recognize a common purpose or common direction in their violating another. For instance, one may be unable to fulfill the first maxim of Quantity conversation, and at any point in a conversation, certain “conversational moves” are judged (say enough) without violating Quality (only say what you have evidence for.) Example: suitable or unsuitable for accomplishing their common objectives. A most general principle: in conversation (5),B’s answer is less informative than required. Assuming he is not opting out, we can explain the violation if we assume that
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