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The Phrasal Implicature Theory of Metaphors and Slurs THE PHRASAL IMPLICATURE THEORY OF METAPHORS AND SLURS Alper Yavuz A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD at the University of St Andrews 2018 Full metadata for this thesis is available in St Andrews Research Repository at: http://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/ Please use this identifier to cite or link to this thesis: http://hdl.handle.net/10023/13189 This item is protected by original copyright This item is licensed under a Creative Commons Licence The Phrasal Implicature Theory of Metaphors and Slurs Alper Yavuz This thesis is submitted in partial fulfilment for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) at the University of St Andrews March 2018 Abstract This thesis develops a pragmatic theory of metaphors and slurs. In the pragmatic literature, theorists mostly hold the view that the framework developed by Grice is only applicable to the sentence-level pragmatic phenomena, whereas the subsenten- tial pragmatic phenomena require a different approach. In this thesis, I argue against this view and claim that the Gricean framework, after some plausible revisions, can explain subsentential pragmatic phenomena, such as metaphors and slurs. In the first chapter, I introduce three basic theses I will defend and give an outline of the argument I will develop. The second chapter discusses three claims on metaphor that are widely discussed in the literature. There I state my aim to present a theory of metaphor which can accommodate these three claims. Chapter3 introduces the notion of \phrasal implicature", which will be used to explain phrase- level pragmatic phenomena with a Gricean approach. In Chapter4, I present my theory of metaphor, which I call \phrasal implicature theory of metaphor" and discuss certain aspects of the theory. The notion of phrasal implicature enables a new conception of what-is-said and a different approach to the semantics-pragmatics distinction. Chapter5 looks into these issues. In Chapter6, I compare my theory of metaphor with three other theories. Finally, in Chapter7, I develop a phrasal implicature theory of slurs, which I argue outperforms its rivals in explaining various uses of slurs. 1 Acknowledgements First of all, I would like to thank Cengiz G¨undo˘gdu. My interest in philosophy started in his seminars at \Insancıl_ At¨olyesi" in Istanbul._ I realised the significance of philosophy for the first time in these open-to-public seminars on history of philosophy and the place of philosophy in life. Next, I would like to thank Omer¨ Naci Soykan, who encouraged me to become a philosopher while I was a Computer Science student. I have felt his support since then. His dedication to philosophy will be a guiding light for the rest of my career. Many thanks to Ilhan_ Inan,_ who was my Master's thesis supervisor at Bo˘gazici University in Istanbul._ I am indebted to him for his profound impact in my initiation to philosophy of language. He has been a mentor, friend and role model for me. I would like to thank Mimar Sinan Fine Arts University, where I began working as a research assistant in 2008, for sponsoring my doctoral education. I am grateful to the chairs of the Philosophy Department Hakan Poyraz and Hasan B¨ulent G¨ozk^an for permitting me to apply to the doctoral funding program of Turkish Council of Higher Education and the subsequent extensions. My research assistant friends Eylem Hacımurato˘glu,Egemen Ku¸scu,Barı¸sAydo˘ganand Ekin Dedeo˘gluhad to undertake extra responsibilities when I was away. My special thanks go to them. I spent three and a half wonderful years in St Andrews. I cannot imagine a better place to do a philosophy PhD, and I am not exaggerrating. The staff in the Philosophy Department were always helpful and friendly. Thanks to them and to all philosophy postgraduate community for creating such an inclusive work environ- ment. I was lucky enough to be a member of Arch´e. In its inspiring atmosphere doing philosophy was great fun. I would like to thank all my Arch´efriends, but particularly to my office mates Ryo Ito, Fenner Tanswell, Caroline Touborg, Dan Healey and Alex Yates (almost an office mate). My deepest thanks go to my supervisor Derek Ball, who was always extremely helpful and understanding all through the PhD period. He carefully read everything I wrote over and over again and gave me invaluable feedback. I am also indebted to my second supervisor Josh Dever. Every meeting with him was full of intellectual 2 3 pleasure, and his contributions to this thesis were always crucial. I had the chance to discuss several aspects of my thesis with Emma Borg, Elisabeth Camp, Herman Cappelen, Robyn Carston, Aaron Cotnoir, Andy Egan, Berys Gaut, Simon Hope, Colin Johnston, Paula Rubio-Fern´andez,Josef Stern, and Michael Wheeler. I am grateful for their input. I am sincerely thankful to Elisabeth Camp and Patrick Greenough, who kindly accepted to act as my PhD examiners. Their detailed comments on my thesis are of great importance for my future work. I would like to express my immense gratitude to my friends Caroline Touborg, Wolfgang Sattler, Matt Cameron, Ravi Thakral, Poppy Mankowitz and Matt McK- eever, who read parts of my thesis in its final phase and gave me extremely helpful feedback on its content and form. Finally, I wish to thank my partner Ipek_ Mine Sonakın, my parents Veysel and T¨ulinYavuz, and my sister Ozg¨ulYavuz¨ for their love and support. I dedicate this thesis to my beloved partner Ipek_ Mine Sonakın and to my dear teacher Omer¨ Naci Soykan, who passed away on December 3rd, 2017. Contents 1 Introduction 10 1.1 There are Phrasal Implicatures . 11 1.2 Metaphorical Meaning is a Form of Phrasal Implicature . 18 1.3 Slurring Generates Phrasal Implicatures . 19 2 Common Claims about Metaphor 21 2.1 Grice on Metaphor . 21 2.1.1 The Features of Conversational Implicatures . 25 2.1.2 Flouting the Maxims: Metaphor and Irony . 27 2.2 Metaphor-Implicature Contrast Claim . 31 2.3 One-step Process Claim . 37 2.4 The Claim that Metaphorical Meaning is Implicated . 46 3 Phrasal Implicature 53 3.1 Examples of Phrasal Implicatures . 54 3.2 Theoretical Discussion . 58 3.2.1 Previous Discussions concerning Subsentential Implicatures . 59 3.2.1.1 Chierchia on Embedded Implicatures . 61 3.2.1.2 Simons on Embedded Implications . 63 3.2.2 My Proposal . 67 3.2.2.1 Bart Geurts and Karen S. Lewis on the Gricean Rea- soning at the Subsentential Level . 68 3.2.2.2 A Gricean Approach to Subsententials . 71 3.2.2.3 Maxims at the Subsentential Level . 73 4 The Phrasal Implicature Theory of Metaphor 81 4.1 The Theory of Metaphor in General . 81 4.1.1 Triggering of Phrasal Implicatures . 82 4.1.2 The Basic Picture . 87 4.1.3 Salience . 88 4 5 Contents 4.1.4 Question Under Discussion (QUD) . 89 4.1.5 Emergent Property Problem . 91 4.1.6 Systematic Interpretation? . 94 4.1.7 Why not Semanticism? . 95 4.2 Association Sequences . 98 4.2.1 Common Ground . 98 4.2.2 The Epistemological Character of Association Sequences . 100 4.2.3 Wider Contexts . 102 4.2.4 Associating with Phrases or Contents? . 103 4.3 Claims about Metaphor Again . 106 4.3.1 Metaphor-Implicature Contrast Claim . 107 4.3.2 One-step Process Claim . 109 4.3.3 The Claim that Metaphorical Meaning is Implicated . 110 4.4 Implicature Tests . 111 4.4.1 Cancellability . 111 4.4.2 Non-detachability . 113 4.4.3 Non-conventionality . 115 4.5 Special Cases . 116 4.5.1 Metaphorical Use of Definite Descriptions . 116 4.5.2 Adjectival Metaphors . 117 4.5.3 The Metaphorical Use of Proper Names . 117 4.5.4 Tautologous Metaphors . 119 4.5.5 Metaphorical Metonymies . 120 4.5.6 F is a Metaphor for G ...................... 124 4.5.7 Poetic Metaphors . 124 5 What-is-said 129 5.1 What-is-said as Exact Wording . 129 5.1.1 What-is-said and Direct Quotation . 134 5.1.2 What-is-said and Demonstratives . 137 5.1.3 Kent Bach on What-is-said . 138 5.1.4 What-is-said and Metaphor . 139 5.1.5 What-is-said and the Literal Proposition . 142 5.2 A New Conception of Semantics-Pragmatics Distinction . 143 5.2.1 Modularity Question . 146 Contents 6 6 Pragmatic Rivals 149 6.1 Relevance Theory . 149 6.1.1 Loose Talk and Metaphor . 150 6.1.2 A Worry Concerning Metaphorical Ad Hoc Concepts . 151 6.1.3 Two Problems with Relevance Theory . 152 6.2 Borg's Defence of the Autonomy of Metaphors . 155 6.3 Camp's Interactionist Theory of Metaphor . 157 6.3.1 Characterizations . 158 6.3.2 An Interactionist Theory of Metaphor . 159 6.3.3 A Problem with Negated Metaphors . 161 6.3.4 Unnecessary Complications . 163 6.3.5 Cognitive Effects of Metaphor . 168 7 On Slurring 173 7.1 What are Slurs? . 174 7.2 The Features of Slurs . 175 7.2.1 Group Expressions . 175 7.2.2 Different Uses . 176 7.2.2.1 Literal Negative Use . 176 7.2.2.2 Literal Neutral Use . 176 7.2.2.3 Literal Positive Use . 177 7.2.2.4 Figurative (Non-literal) Negative Use . 177 7.2.3 Projection and Embeddability . 178 7.2.4 Descriptivity . 179 7.3 Competing Views . 180 7.3.1 Prohibitionism . 180 7.3.2 Expressivism . 183 7.3.3 Combinatorial Externalism . 186 7.3.4 Conventional Implicature Accounts .
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