Sino-Indian Relations Prior to 1954

chapter 2 Sino-Indian Relations Prior to 1954

The speed with which the Indian Government accustomed itself to the con- duct of foreign policy can be explained by the interest taken in external affairs by the nationalist movement, the Indian National Congress, which was founded as early as 1885. Originally its attention was directed towards issues closely related to India’s neighbours. The use of the Indian army and the consequent drain on Indian resources by various British expeditions caused early protests. The first session of the Congress passed a resolution condemning the annexa- tion of Upper Burma, largely because of fears of increased taxation, and advo- cated separate status for Burma as a Crown Colony. In 1891 reference was made to the subject again as a possible source of a clash with China. The Younghusband expedition to Tibet in 1904 was severely criticised by the Congress President, Sir Henry Cotton, as an “act of wanton violence and aggression.” Another mem- ber condemned the action, because there were no indications of fresh provo- cation by Russia in Tibet or Central Asia, which in any case would not necessarily concern India.1

Tibet

Early British explorers were drawn to Tibet by the wool of the famous Kashmir shawls. In the East T.T. Cooper was looking for a shorter way to China by way of Bhutan and Tibet, but was not allowed to cross. In the West much earlier William Moorcroft crossed the Niti pass in 1812 and reached Gartok. Britain obtained a direct border with Tibet with the acquisition of Kumaon and Garhwal following the Anglo-Nepalese war of 1814–16. Its double purpose was to have access to the wool trade, but also to prevent an alliance between Nepal with its large army and the Sikh state. Gulab Singh, the Dogra Raja of Jammu and feudatory of the great Sikh ruler Ranjit Singh, conquered Ladakh, which at present forms the north-eastern part of Kashmir. In 1834 he turned his army towards the Tibetan provinces of Rudok and Ngari. Forces sent from Lhasa almost annihilated the Sikhs, marched on Leh, the capital of Ladakh, but were driven out again. A treaty of ‘amity and peace’ signed on 17 September 1842 by a general of Gulab Singh, the governor of Kashmir and officials from Lhasa

1 H.A. Waidya. See Bimla Prasad, The origins of Indian foreign policy, pp. 35–45.

Sino-indian Relations Prior To 1954 9 contained the Tibetan guarantee, that Ladakh will “absolutely and essentially not be the subject of our designs and intention” and that the trade in wool and other commodities would be carried on via Ladakh in accordance with the old customs.2 Article I said ‘that the boundaries of Ludak and Lhassa shall be con- stituted as formerly’, engaging the parties to confine themselves within their respective boundaries and to refrain from any act of aggression. What was the ‘formerly’ ? Presumably the treaty of Tingmosgang between Ladakh and Tibet of 1684, which in turn was based on a partition effected in the 10th century. With the treaty of Amritsar of 1846 ending the Anglo-Sikh War both the Sikh and the British governments recognised Gulab Singh as an independent ruler. As the East India Company still feared his ambitions in West Tibet, which could damage the profitable wool trade or cause difficulties with China, it pre- ferred a formal definition of the eastern border. With great difficulty the British plenipotentiary in Hongkong obtained Chinese agreement to send a delega- tion to cooperate in the demarcation of Tibet’s western frontier. When the two British commissioners arrived at the border in August, 1847, however, nobody was awaiting them and the Tibetans showed active hostility. They proceeded on their own and prepared a map which conformed essentially to the align- ment currently claimed by India. With the collapse of Chinese rule in eastern Turkestan British policy in the frontier area was generally determined by the danger of Russian expansion, which posed an immediate threat to Hunza. As this area in northwest Kashmir bordered on Sinkiang the British were alarmed when in 1898 the negotiations between representatives of the Mir of Hunza and the Chinese Amban at Kashgar produced no success. They intervened with an attempt to settle the whole northern frontier of Kashmir. In 1896 Chinese officials, reportedly prompted by Russia, had challenged British maps of the Aksai Chin plateau (an uninhabited area in the northeast corner of Kashmir whose high lying salt deposits were regularly exploited by traders), which incorporated a larger area than appears in present day maps. British interest in Aksai Chin was out- weighed by concern over the threat of Russian interference further West and in 1899 London made an offer to delimit the boundary on the basis of ceding the plateau and the Karakash basin in exchange for Chinese recognition of Hunza’s claims. Peking did not even reply formally to this offer, which contained sub- stantial territorial concessions, including a departure from the position that

2 Sapru, A.N., The building of the Kashmir State. Punjab Record Office, Lahore, 1931, Appendix ii. Text also in A.G. Noorani, op. cit., pp. 235–238. In 1959 Chou En-lai dismissed the treaty as a non-aggression pact. Claiming non-participation would have clashed with his argument of Tibet not possessing treaty-making powers.