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Restitution of Unjust Enrichment Case List for the Examination Room in 2019 RESTITUTION OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT CASE LIST FOR THE EXAMINATION ROOM IN 2019 Enrichment Moses v Macferlan (1760) 2 Burr 1005 Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v HMRC [2018] UKSC 39 Planche v Colburn (1831) 8 Bing 14 Benedetti v Sawiris [2013] UKSC 50, Greenwood v Bennett [1973] QB 195 Weatherby v Banham (1832) 3 C&P 228 Leigh v Dickeson (1884) 15 QBD 60 Falcke v Scottish Imperial Insurance Co (1886) 34 ChD 234 Cressman v Coys of Kensington (Sales) Ltd [2004] EWCA Civ 47, [2004] 1 WLR 2775 Gibb v Maidstone &Tunbridge Wells NHS Trust [2010] EWCA Civ 678; [2010] IRLR 786 At the expense of the Claimant Edwards v Lee’s Adminstrators 96 SW 2d 1028 (1936) Investment Trust Companies v HMRC [2017] UKSC 29 Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v HMRC [2018] UKSC 39 Aiken v Short (1856) 1 H & N 210 Lloyds Bank v Independent Insurance [2000] 1 QB 110 Khan v Permayer [2001] BIPIR 95 Macdonald Dickens & Macklin v Costello [2011] EWCA Civ 930, [2012] QB 244 Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Birmingham City Council [1997] QB 380 Relfo Ltd v Varsani [2014] EWCA Civ 360 Butler v Rice [1939] Ch 286 Banque Financiere de la Cité v Parc (Battersea) Ltd [1999] AC 221 Bank of Cyprus UK Ltd v Menelaou [2015] UKSC 66, [2016] AC 176 Clarke v Shee & Johnson (1774) 1 Cowp 197 Gebhardt v Saunders [1892] 2 QB 452 Failure of Basis (Consideration) Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour Ltd [1943] AC 32 Roxborough v Rothmans of Pall Mall Australia Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 516 Crown Prosecution Services v Eastenders Group [2014] UKSC 26, [2015] AC 1 Goss v Chilcott [1996] AC 788 (PC) Cobbe v Yeoman’s Row Management Ltd [2008] UKHL 55, [2008] 1 WLR 1752, [39]-[45]. Hunt v Silk (1804) 5 East 449; 102 ER 1142 Bush v Canfield, 2 Conn 485 (1818) Rowland v Divall [1923] 2 KB 500 Baltic Shipping Co v Dillon [1993] HCA 4, 176 CLR 344 Planché v Colburn (1831) 8 Bing 14; 131 ER 305 (B & M 83) De Barnardy v Harding (1853) 8 Ex 822; 155 ER 1586 (B & M 219) Boomer v Muir 24 P 2d 570 (1933) (B & M 219) Dies v British and International Mining Corp [1939] 1 KB 724 Rover International Ltd v Cannon Film Sales Ltd [1989] 1 WLR 912 Stocznia Gdanska SA v Latvia Shipping Co [1998] 1 WLR 574 Sumpter v Hedges [1898] 1 QB 673 Fibrosa v Fairbairn Lawson [1943] AC 32 BP Exploration Co (Libya) Ltd v Hunt (No2) [1982] 1 All ER 925-978, Gamerco SA v ICM Fair Warning (Agency) Ltd [1995] 1 WLR 1226 Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943 Rover International v Cannon [1989] 1 WLR 912 Goss v Chilcott [1996] AC 788 (PC) Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington LBC [1996] AC 669, [1994] 4 All ER 890 Guinness Mahon & Co Ltd v Kensington and Chelsea Royal LBC [1999] QB 215 (CA) Sharma v Simposh Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 1383 William Lacey (Hounslow) Ltd v Davis [1957] 1 WLR 932, [1957] 2 All ER 712 British Steel v Cleveland Bridge and Engineering Ltd (1981) [1984] 1 All ER 504 Cobbe v Yeoman’s Row Management Ltd [2008] UKHL 55, [2008] 1 WLR 1752 Mistake Kelly v Solari (1841) 9 M & W 54 Aiken v Short (1856) 1 H & N 210 Lady Hood of Avalon v Mackinnon [1909] 1 Ch 476 Kerrison v Glyn, Mills, Currie & Co (1911) 81 LJKB 465, [1911-13] All ER Rep 417 RE Jones Ltd v Waring & Gillow Ltd [1926] AC 670 (HL) Morgan v Ashcroft [1938] 1 KB 49 (CA) Barclays Bank Ltd v WJ Simms & Son Ltd [1980] QB 677 Kleinwort Benson v Lincoln CC [1999] 2 AC 349 (HL) Nurdin & Peacock v DB Ramsden & Co Ltd [1999] 1 All ER 941 Lloyds Bank v Independent Insurance [2000] 1 QB 110 Dextra Bank v Bank of Jamaica [2002] 1 All ER Com 193 (PC) Deutsche Morgan Grenfell Group plc v Inland Revenue Commrs [2007] 1 AC 558 Re Griffiths [2008] EWHC 118 (Ch), [2008] 2 All ER 654 Pitt v Holt [2013] UKSC 26, [2013] 2 AC 108 Kennedy v Kennedy [2014] EWHC 4129 (Ch) Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Commissions for HMRC [2018] UKSC 39 Greenwood v Bennett [1973] QB 195 (CA) Cressman v Coys of Kensington (Sales) Ltd [2004] EWCA Civ 47, [2004] 1 WLR 2775 Erlanger v New Sombrero Phosphate Co (1878) 3 App Cas 1218 Whittington v Seale-Hayne (1900) 82 LT 49 Hayward v Zurich Insurance Co plc [2016] UKSC 48 Duress Astley v Reynolds (1731) 2 Str 915 Williams v Bayley (1866) LR 1 HL 200 Inche Noriah v Shaik Allie Bin Omar [1929] AC 127 Mutual Finance Co Ltd v Wetton and Sons Ltd [1937] 2 KB 389 Norreys v Zeffert [1939] 2 All ER187 *Barton v Armstrong [1976] AC 104 (PC) North Ocean Shipping Co Ltd v Hyundai Construction Co Ltd [1979] QB 705 Pao On v Lau Yiu Long [1980] AC 614 (PC) *Universe Tankships v ITWF, The Universe Sentinel [1983] AC 366 (HL) B & S Contracts and Design Ltd v Victor Green Publications Ltd [1984] ICR 419 Williams v Roffey Bros & Nicholls (Contractors) Ltd [1991] 1 QB 1 (CA) Dimskal Shipping Co SA v ITWF [1992] 2 AC 152 (HL) CTN Cash and Carry Ltd v Gallaher [1994] 4 All ER 714 (CA) Huyton SA v Peter Cremer GmbH [1999] 1 Lloyds Rep 620 DSND Subsea Ltd v Petroleum Geo-Services ASA [2000] BLR 530 (T&CC) R v Att-Gen for England and Wales [2003] UKPC 22 Adam Opel GmbH v Mitras Automotive (UK) Ltd [2007] EWHC 3205 (QB) Progress Bulk Carriers Ltd v Tube City IMS LLC [2012] EWHC 273 (Comm), [2012] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 501 Times Travel (UK) Ltd v Pakistan International Airlines Corp [2017] EWHC 1367 (Ch) Undue Influence Bridgeman v Green (1757) Wilm 58 Allcard v Skinner (1887) 36 Ch D 145 (CA) Barclays Bank plc v O’Brien [1994] 1 AC 180 Cheese v Thomas [1994] 1 WLR 129 Barclays Bank plc v Boulter [1999] 1 WLR 1919 Royal Bank of Scotland v Etridge (No 2) [2001] UKHL 44, [2002] 2 AC 773 R v Att-Gen for England and Wales [2003] UKPC 22 Pesticcio v Huet [2004] EWCA Civ 372 Smith v Cooper [2010] EWCA Civ 722 Thorne v Kennedy [2017] HCA 49 State Unlawfulness Auckland Harbour Board v R [1924] AC 318 Woolwich Equitable BS v IRC [1993] 1 AC 70 (HL) Kingstreet Investments Ltd v New Brunswick [2007] SCC 1, [2007] 1 SCR 3 Charles Terence Estates Ltd v The Cornwall Council [2011] EWHC 2542 (QB) [2012] 1 P & CR2 Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation v Revenue and Customs Comrs [2012] UKSC 19, [2012] 2 AC 337 Hemming v Lord Mayor and Citizens of Westminster [2013] EWCA Civ 591 Taxes Management Act 1970 s 33 Social Security Administration Act 1992 ss 71 Necessity Nicholson v Chapman (1793) 2 Hy Bl 254, 259 126 ER 536 Falcke v Scottish Imperial Insurance Co (1886) 34 Ch D 234 Jenkins v Tucker (1788) 1 Hy Bl 90 126 ER 55 Rogers v Price (1829) 3 Y & J 28 148 ER 1080 Great Northern Rly co v Swaffield (1873-74) LR 9 Ex 132 ENE Kos 1 Ltd v Petroleo Brasileiro SA (No 2) [2012] UKSC 17 China Pacific SA v Food Corp of India, The Winson [1982] AC 939 Sale of Goods Act 1979, s 3(2) Mental Incapacity Act 2005, s 7 Absence of Basis Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington LBC [1994] 4 All ER 890. Guinness Mahon & Co Ltd v Kensington and Chelsea Royal London BC [1999] QB 215 (CA) Deutsche Morgan Grenfell Group plc v IRC [2007] 1 AC 558 Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation v Revenue & Customs Commissioners [2012] UKSC 19, [2012] 2 AC 337 Moses v Macferlan (1760) 2 Burr 1005 KB 97 ER 676 Roxborough v Rothmans of Pall Mall Australia Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 516 Pitt v Holt [2013] UKSC 26, [2013] 2 AC 108 Garland v Consumer Gas Ltd [2004] 1 SCR 629 BMP Global Distribution Inc v Bank of Nova Scotia [2009] 1 SCR 504 Discharge of Another’s Obligation Deering v Earl of Winchelsea (1787) 2 Bos & Pul 270 Jenkins v Tucker (1788) 1 Hy Bl 90 Exall v Partridge (1799) 8 TR 308 Moule v Garrett (1872) LR 7 Ex 101 British & Mercantile Ins Co v London, Liverpool & Globe Insurance Co (1877) 5 Ch D 569 Gebhardt v Saunders [1892] 2 QB 452 Bonner v Tottenham Building Soc [1899] 1 QB 161 Brook’s Wharf and Bull Wharf Ltd v Goodman Bros [1937] 1 KB 534 Receiver for Metropolitan Police v Croydon Corp [1957] 2 QB 154 Owen v Tate [1976] QB 402 Banque Financiere de la Cité v Parc (Battersea) Ltd [1999] AC 221 Crantrave Ltd v Lloyds Bank plc [2000] QB 917 Niru Battery Manufacturing Ltd v Milestone Trading Ltd (No 2) [2004] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 319 Ibrahim v Barclays Bank plc [2011] EWHC 1897, [2012] EWCA Civ 640, [2012] 4 All ER 160 Bank of Cyprus UK Ltd v Menelaou [2015] UKSC 66, [2016] AC 176 Lowick Rose LLP v Swynson Ltd [2017] UKSC 32 Mercantile Law Amendment Act, 1856, s 5 Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 Interference with C’s Rights Clarke v Shee & Johnson (1774) 1 Cowp 197, 98 ER 1041 Holiday v Sigil (1826) 2 C & P 176, 172 ER 81 Neate v Harding (1851) 6 Ex 349, 155 ER 577 Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd [1991] 2 AC 548 Re Hallett's Estate (1880) 13 Ch D 696 Re Oatway[1903] 2 Ch 356 Roscoe (James) (Bolton) v Winder [1915] 1 Ch 62 Re Montagu's Settlement Trusts [1987] Ch 264 BCCI v Akindele [2001] Ch 437 Criterion Properties plc (Appellants) v Stratford UK Properties LLC [2004] UKHL 28 Williams v Central Bank of Nigeria [2014] UKSC 10, [2014] AC 1189 Crédit Agricole Corp & Investment Bank v Papadimitriou (Gibraltar) [2015] UKPC 13 (Federal Republic of Brazil v Durant International Corp (Jersey) [2015] UKPC 35, [2016] 1 All ER (Comm) 722 Re Diplock [1948] Ch 465, aff'd [1951] AC 251 Change of Position; Estoppel Thomas v Houston Corbett and Co [1969] NZLR 151 (NZCA) Avon CC v Howlett [1983] 1 WLR 605 Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd [1991] 2 AC 548 Goss v Chilcott [1996] AC 788 (PC) Scottish Equitable plc v Derby [2001] 3 All ER 818 Philip Collins Ltd v Davis [2000] 3 All ER 808 Dextra Bank and Trust Company v Bank of Jamaica [2002] 1 All ER Comm 193 (PC) National Westminster Bank v Somer [2002] QB 1286 Niru Battery Manufacturing Co v Milestone Trading Ltd [2004] 1 All ER (Comm) 193 Commerzbank AG v Gareth Price-Jones [2003] EWCA Civ 1663 Barros Mattos Jnr v MacDaniels Ltd [2004] 3 All ER 299 Abou-Rahmah v Abacha
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