Ideas, Ideology & Intellectuals in Search of Russia’s Political Future

Elena Chebankova

Abstract: The intellectual discourse of any state can function within two broad paradigms: consensual and pluralistic. In the first case, political elites, intellectuals, and the public agree on the base parameters of what constitutes “the good life” and argue about the methods of application. In the second case, par- ticipants hold radically different, incommensurable views, which coexist in society. This essay argues that the Western political system broadly rests on the politics of liberal consensus, formed throughout the period of capitalist modernization. But Russia’s history took a different turn, following a path of alternative mod- ernization. This engendered the politics of paradigmatic pluralism, in which a number of radically different politico-intellectual frameworks struggle for the dominant discourse. This essay examines these paradigms and argues that, due to the nature and substance of these models, fundamental change of Russia’s dom- inant discourse, along with its main politico-institutional parameters, is unlikely.

Russia’s extant political system is stabilized through the politics of paradigmatic pluralism. More specific, two broad and radically different paradigms of “the good life” are present in Russia: pro-Western liberal and state-centered traditional- ist.1 Their mutual questioning and criticism allow society to function within a relatively stable frame- work. While the two alternatives have struggled for discursive supremacy, the nativist and state-centered paradigm has emerged as a hegemonic discourse, with the support of the majority of the population. It is focused on avoiding shocks to the extant system and on sustaining sociopolitical stability. This essay ELENA CHEBANKOVA is Reader demonstrates that the paradigmatic split in Russia in Politics at the School of Social has been historically determined. It continues with and Political Sciences at the Uni- an examination of the main dimensions of Russia’s versity of Lincoln. She is the au- thor of Civil Society in Putin’s Russia hegemonic discourse, pointing to its general incli- (2013) and Russia’s Federal Relations: nation toward national reconciliation and political Putin’s Reforms and Management of stability. It then ponders the potential breakdown of the Regions (2009). the dichotomous nature of the existing ideological

© 2017 by the American Academy of Arts & Sciences doi:10.1162/DAED_

1 Ideas, landscape and assesses the chances of a have a number of epistemes that struggle Ideology & third, more radical alternative capturing to agree on the “base” positions, that pro- Intellectuals in Search the field. The essay concludes that, with- pose meaningfully different ideas of socio- of Russia’s in the period under review, a fundamen- political development, and that compete Political Future tal change of the hegemonic paradigm in for hegemony in the discursive realm. Russia is unlikely due to the dynamics of A paradox of contemporary Russian Russia’s political system. politics is that, since the fall of the Soviet Union, it has rested on the pluralistic, rath- Until very recent years, the Western po- er than the consensus, model, with conse- litical system has mainly rested on the quences for the country’s intellectual land- politics of liberal consensus. This implies scape and potential for change to its extant that society reaches a basic agreement on regime. We shall address the participants the idea of the good life within a liberal in these debates as critical intelligentsia. To framework and hopes that there will be a clarify positions at the outset, we will not gradual “step-by-step convergence of all limit our understanding of critical intelli- values with liberal values.”2 John Rawls gentsia to those who are hopeful of altering called to establish a “base consensus” that Russia’s extant political system. Rather, would rest on liberal democratic, cultur- the discussion considers all those who al, and political notions and act as a basic ponder Russia’s fate–her past, present, framework capable of encompassing di- and future in its full complexity–as intel- verging but “reasonable” ideas of the good lectuals. Hence, the account examines the life, thus buttressing pluralism of a liber- full spectrum of existing opinion, regard- al nature.3 This thinking has its origins in less of its support or criticism of the exist- the monistic tradition of Plato and Aristo- ing political structure. tle that subsequently merged with mono- The two main paradigms of the good theistic Christian conceptions to determine life–pro-Western liberal and state-cen- much of ensuing Western philosophy.4 tered traditionalist–struggle for position Critics of consensus politics represent as Russia’s hegemonic discourse. The first a less practiced alternative that calls for intellectual group, which includes some the coexistence of incommensurable par- members of the government and finan- adigms of the good life, their incessant di- cial elite, advocates the path of westerni- alogue, and mutual enrichment. This is the zation for Russia. The second group adopts intellectual posterity of Thomas Hobbes, a conservative approach insisting on the David Hume, and John Stuart Mill, ad- creation of a strong state that relies on pre- vanced in the twentieth century by Isaiah vious periods of Russia’s history and her Berlin, John Gray, Jean-François Lyotard, idiosyncratic political traditions. This par- Shmuel Eisenstadt, Bernard Williams, and adigm has a pro-Western dimension, but others. These critics point to the “absolu- it is a particular kind of westernization. It tization” of liberalism by the proponents welcomes almost all aspects of Western of liberal consensus politics and advo- modernity related to the capitalist econo- cate the need to introduce meaningfully my, nation-state, religion, and family, but different alternatives that could enrich is skeptical about the West’s postmod- the cultural landscape of society. In short, ernist path. It also insists on Russia being consensus politics seek to operate within Western and European but not subordi- one broad politically liberal episteme that nate to the West geopolitically. Although houses divergent ideas of an invariably lib- the pro-Western liberal paradigm is readily eral coloring. Pluralistic politics, in turn, available in the current political climate in

2 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences Russia, it functions merely as a discursive third wave have faced the painful politi- Elena alternative, not as a meaningful option se- cal consequences of ideological borrow- Chebankova riously considered by the majority of the ing. A borrowed idea can be “an asset to population. Permanent dialogue between the development of a country and a re- the two paradigms, as well as the fact that minder of its comparative backwardness, the traditionalist discourse already con- that is both a model to be emulated and a tains some elements of the Western sys- threat to national identity. What appears tem, stabilizes the traditionalist discourse desirable from the standpoint of progress and makes unexpected shifts in the coun- often appears dangerous to national in- try’s political trajectory unlikely. dependence.”5 Hence, this cruel dilemma The paradigmatic split and the difficulties forces a split within the intellectual scene experienced by the pro-Western liberal par- of second-wave industrialization states, of adigm are rooted in history; things become which Russia is part. clearer if we sketch Russia’s past three hun- Intellectuals of those countries inevita- dred years. First, Russia has a complex rela- bly face an uneasy choice between losing tionship with modernity, a social paradigm intellectual and cultural independence by that largely lends a liberal consensus matrix admitting their backwardness and adopting to the politics of most Western European the externally borrowed progressive para- states. Russia is a second-wave moderniza- digm, or reaffirming nativism and tradi- tion country, a circumstance that predeter- tion by holding on to the previously cho- mines the paradigmatic split. Second, Rus- sen path. The drama for Russian intellectu- sia’s idiosyncratic relationship with moder- als is in the quandary of either adopting the nity barred her from forming a clear civic ideology of individual freedom and bour- identity supportive of liberal consensus pol- geois liberties, combined with embracing itics. Finally, Russia’s tumultuous twentieth Western ontology, or clinging to the idio- century further contributed to the consol- syncratic centralized modes of governance idation of the existing intellectual rift. Let that could conduct modernization and de- me elaborate on these factors. velopment, albeit in a risky alternative fash- Russia’s embrace of Western modernity ion. The latter option remains less explored, was rather tardy. The Petrine period (1682– a problem that political scientist Alexander 1721) was a watershed, during which Russia Dugin described as the need for the devel- had only just launched a painful transfor- opment merger between distinctively Rus- mation toward modernity, met with resis- sian epistemology and ontology.6 tance from a reluctant population. In con- Further, Russia’s complex experience trast, most European countries had already with modernity impedes the process of experienced the Reformation and Enlight- forging a civic national identity, which enment. Russia also lagged behind in in- also requires a bourgeois ideological con- dustrialization. Western European coun- sensus. Bourgeois elites that took the lead tries underwent the peak of industrializa- in creating the “imagined communities” tion during the late eighteenth and most of civic nation-states promoted the ideas of the nineteenth centuries. Russia, in con- of citizenship and society (Gesellschaft) at trast, industrialized during the late Tsarist the expense of the traditional commune period and in the first half of the twentieth (Gemeinschaft); civil (economic), political, century, part of the Soviet “alternative mo- and social rights; individual liberty; civ- dernity” paradigm. ic responsibility; and representative de- In general terms, countries that expe- mocracy. These notions gradually formed rienced modernization in the second or the cornerstone of the liberal bourgeois

146 (2) Spring 2017 3 Ideas, base consensus, upon which most modern Finally, Russia’s two major national ca- Ideology & Western European societies rest. Hence, tastrophes of the twentieth century exac- Intellectuals in Search the idea of civic identity, as well as the civ- erbate paradigmatic differences. The first of Russia’s ic nation-state, is closely related to the cap- state collapse followed Russia’s entry to Political Future italist mode of production and its support- World War I, which resulted in the fall of ing political institutions. It also represents the monarchy, disintegration of the empire, the cardinal feature of modernity. and subsequent (Bolshevik) October Rev- Russia’s path of “alternative modernity,” olution. The second major social catastro- engendered by Soviet Communism, fea- phe followed the fall of the Soviet Union. tured a different set of values. Bourgeois The demise of the erstwhile Soviet Empire individual liberties were replaced by the completed the unfinished disintegration of supremacy of community over the individ- the Russian Empire, the remains of which ual, the idea of liberating masses of work- the Communists managed to reassemble ers in order to dispense with exploitation in the course of the 1921–1923 Civil War. and enable fairer participation in the life of These two major events contributed to the the community. Equality was understood significant dealignment of Russian and So- as social equality, which differed from the viet societies, involving transformations of Western understanding of equality of op- all societal cleavages, as well as the recon- portunity. From this point of view, Russia’s sideration of all preexisting cultural codes alternative modernity has not created a so- and behavioral patterns. Twice in the twen- cial fabric with an immanent understand- tieth century Russia experienced the break- ing of civic identity and civic nation that down of historic myths, demoralization of rests on the notions of bourgeois individu- society, decline in interpersonal and insti- ality, liberal rights, and personal freedoms. tutional trust, and a significant drop in civ- This hinders a liberal base consensus and ic responsibility. The liberal paradigm pre- lends credence to the nativist state-cen- sided over the March 1917 Romanov abdi- tered discourse. cation, the February Revolution of 1917, and Therefore, while we can successfully the 1991 disintegration of the ussr. identify the Russian state and Russian peo- It has now become clear that Russia’s idio- ple, we struggle to pinpoint the dimen- syncratic relationship with modernity and sions of Russia’s civic identity.7 It comes as the particularities of its twentieth-century no surprise that 43 percent of respondents history make the politics of paradigmatic to a 2011 vtsiom (Russian Public Opin- pluralism almost inevitable. This predic- ion Research Center) poll did not feel like ament determines the nature of Russia’s part of the Russian nation and 20 percent political discourse, both the hegemonic could not understand the very idea of na- and the alternative. It is strategically im- tion. Only 37 percent of respondents felt portant that Russia’s elite allow a dialogue like part of the nation.8 Hence, in order to among the alternative discourses, while embrace a Western consensus matrix, Rus- subtly marginalizing those that lie outside sia would first need to adopt a civic identi- the state-endorsed dominant discourse. ty based on the ideas of individual liberty Moreover, the state does not try to reach a and a bourgeois nation-state. Russia would consensus between liberals and traditional- next need to embrace modernity’s frame- ists, and thus fully embraces the existing di- work of capitalism and liberal base con- vide within society. Various ideological al- sensus, and then enter the era of postmo- ternatives appear on television, radio, and dernity, with its global civil society and the in print. Radical liberals, foreign journal- gradual fading of national identity. ists, and advocates of 1990s-style policy are

4 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences daily participants in Russia’s main political Interestingly, intolerance of beliefs and Elena talk shows. Yet pro-state conservatives usu- political radicalism is often a feature of Chebankova ally outnumber and dominate them. pro-Western radical liberal circles whose Pro-Western liberal ideas therefore ap- views unfortunately do not fit well with pear peripheral. They act as a reminder the inclinations of the majority. This of- that radical alternatives are available and ten results in representatives of the liberal that such alternatives could pose a threat wing blaming ordinary people for self-im- to the extant stability. Hence, high pub- posed servility, a lack of civic conscious- lic awareness of the neoliberal paradigm ness, an absence of respect for liberal prin- precludes it from being novel to the Rus- ciples, and disdain for the countries that sian public. Moreover, despite the paradig- promote such values.9 It is also clear that matic pluralism, the 2000s saw the consol- the tactics of radicalizing the discourse im- idation of a hegemonic discourse through pede the chances of a liberal project in Rus- a significant shift toward a political cen- sia. Critics and sympathizers of the liberal ter. Having experienced the state collapse cause often appeal to liberal public figures and the obliteration of preexisting values by asking them to reconsider their discur- during the 1990s, contemporary Russians sive practices. They implore them to aban- are reluctant to embark on radical vicis- don their Russophobia (or anthrophobia) situdes. They lean toward socioeconom- that manifests in shocking journalistic ex- ic stability at the expense of radical and, pressions, as well as political profanations, in particular, pro-Western liberal alterna- aiming to strike at the heart of Russia’s he- tives. This brings us to the nature of Rus- gemonic discourse. sia’s hegemonic discourse. These voices–in particular Sergey Kur- ginyan, Alexander Prokhanov, and Zakhar One cardinal feature of this discourse, Prilepin–advise liberals to center them- and a consequence of the immediate selves on Russia, turn to defending the post-Soviet experience, is that it remains country’s interests internationally, and open to debate with its counterhegemon- abandon the unconditional support of glob- ic competitors. With the fall of the ussr, a al oligarchy. These critics argue that the fail- peculiar kaleidoscope of radically different ure of the liberal project and de-Sovietiza- ideas ranging from overtly pro-Western, tion of Russia occurred not because of the Euro-Atlantic, socialist, liberal, neoliberal, nature of the Soviet Union, but because it liberal nationalist, civic nationalist, Stalin- became clear that alternative policies in- ist, nostalgically Soviet, and even fascist volved the full-scale deconstruction of Rus- emerged in Russia to fill the void of erst- sian society in the interests of Western pow- while Soviet uniformity. Economic de- ers.10 Simultaneously, critics invoke liberals pression, along with a wealth of opportu- to develop a Russia-centered liberal epis- nities for rapid enrichment, has become a temology that could challenge the extant milieu in which such styles, ideologies, and political system from all directions with- movements develop. The need to survive out engaging in the destructive practice of this radically pluralistic environment from national self-denial. both economic and sociopolitical perspec- Many moderate liberals accept the need tives taught Russians to be tolerant of par- to play down their discourse and narrow adigmatic differences. Hence, post-Soviet disagreements with traditionalists. Rus- Russians emerged from the collapse of the sia’s great Western philosopher, Alexander ussr as pluralistic liberals who welcomed Herzen, once emphasized his affinity with radically different alternatives. traditionalist Slavophiles: “Like Janus,

146 (2) Spring 2017 5 Ideas, or a two-headed eagle, we looked in op- the Romanov Dynasty in 1613–and at the Ideology & posite directions, but one heart beats in end of the Russian Civil War.14 Intellectuals 11 in Search our breasts.” But today, political scien- Further, the international atmosphere of Russia’s tist Sergey Stankevich regrets, “we have created by the fall of the ussr also raised Political Future different hearts. It is our task to find ways debates about state sovereignty. With the in which we can rekindle our dialogue in collapse, the United States took steps that a similar fashion to the dialogue between had the potential to shift the internation- Westerners and Slavophiles in the 19th al relations structure toward unipolarity. century.”12 These have included various “humanitari- Contemporary hegemonic discourse fo- an interventions,” “regime changes,” and cuses on three notions: 1) the idea of state other initiatives used to consolidate Amer- sovereignty; 2) the ideology of the multi- ica’s global leadership. And while glob- polar world; and 3) the idea of national rec- al institutional structures remained un- onciliation. The multipolar world ideology changed, these processes worried Russia’s bears the concept of state sovereignty at its intellectuals and policy-makers. They pon- heart. Hence, I will focus on the notion of dered metaphysical issues invoking ques- state sovereignty and combine these points. tions over international ethics and the di- rection in which the contemporary world Over the past decade, the concept of order should evolve. state sovereignty, seen by the capacity for Russia’s hegemonic discourse advocates political development free from external a multiplicity of the world’s political forms influence, has become the principal unify- and states’ entitlement to independent de- ing factor in Russia. There this idea, much velopment. These ideas oppose the Euro- in the classical republican and neo-Roman Atlantic universalist logic of globalist de- fashion, invokes civic solidarity, patriotic mocratization. Russia’s minister of foreign awareness, and a sense of belonging. affairs, Sergey Lavrov, argues that the abil- Hence, the notions of external freedom and ity of states to pursue political cultural dis- territorial integrity are unconditional “red tinctness remains the cornerstone of the lines” that Russia’s hegemonic discourse world’s lasting peace. In his September is unwilling to relinquish. Russian polit- 2015 speech to the Russian State Duma, ical scientist Viacheslav Nikonov argues he advocated creating a more just, poly- that only two countries in Europe–Rus- centric, and stable world order. He claimed sia and England–enjoy over five hundred that imposing a particular developmental years of sovereign independent history.13 recipe on weaker countries would increase The red lines have been drawn largely by chaos and be met with resistance by many Russia’s successful maintenance of its ter- states.15 Sergey Kurginyan concurs, argu- ritory and ability to shape its future for- ing that many developing countries under- eign and domestic policy over such a long go the phase of incipient modernity (dogon- period. Painful memories of occasion- yayushchii modern), which the postmodern al state collapses further consolidate the West, through its foreign-policy actions, desire for sovereignty. Proponents of sov- dismantles. With this in mind, desover- ereignty use these examples to argue that eignization of formerly secular sover- grassroots movements would invariably eign states in the Middle East triggers the emerge to restore national control over the desovereignization dynamic worldwide. state just as it happened during the Times This has the potential to result in a new of Trouble–the period between the end of “global disorder” that suits contemporary the Rurik Dynasty in 1598 and the start of global capital.16

6 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences A search for national reconciliation is an- Hence, intellectuals and the general pub- Elena other cornerstone of the hegemonic dis- lic have formed a clear plan for reconcilia- Chebankova course. It may become tempting to claim tion organized around the following points: that the search for reconciliation would First, they concur with an idea that contem- immediately imply a search for a “base porary Russia is a direct inheritor of the So- consensus” and the desire to dispense viet Union and that most achievements in with the politics of paradigmatic plural- the post-Soviet period stem from Soviet ism. While the construction of a base con- times. While the imperial and medieval sensus could significantly overlap with the eras made indispensable contributions to search for reconciliation, they still repre- the development of the Russian state, it was sent two qualitatively distinct categories. the Soviet period that had a decisive impact Reconciliation occurs when the two war- on how contemporary Russia looks today. ring parties accept the existing divide and Achievements in science, technology, in- move forward on that assumption, mean- dustry, medicine, and health care, the idea while forgiving each other for transgres- of victory in the Great Patriotic War–all sions that took place in the fight for preva- derive from the ussr. As does Russia’s cur- lence. This does not involve forming con- rent social divide between the wealthy and sensus in ideological terms, which would poor, a result of the privatization of Soviet invariably involve the prevalence of one industrial assets. The Soviet period also ideological paradigm at the expense of shapes contemporary Russian anthropol- another. Reconciliation is merely admit- ogy and Russia’s collective unconscious. ting that both sides have different opin- With the quest for consumption and a si- ions and that there are some issues that multaneous idealistic vision of reality, Rus- nevertheless unite them and help them sians inherited most of their behavioral pat- move forward. Hence, they remain dif- terns from Soviet times.18 ferent albeit united on some consolidat- Second, the public must learn of the trag- ing grounds. edies of the formative period of the Soviet Those grounds need not be ideological. state. This would require the publication of Proponents of reconciliation consciously the real number of victims from the purges avoid the push toward forming an ideolog- of 1921 to 1954. Speculation over the number ical base consensus; neither side should of victims is unacceptable for both ethical dominate. In his November 4, 2015, speech and political reasons. This part of Russia’s to the Congress of Russia’s Compatriots, history must be accepted as a great trage- Vladimir Putin insisted that the proposed dy and every person who suffered injustice reconciliation should not equate to uni- must be vindicated. Nevertheless, society formity in views, but rest on spiritual uni- must not focus solely on tragic episodes ty and a sense of belonging to one country but also admit positive aspects of the So- united by common history and language. viet experience. Russian journalist Maxim Indeed, history and attachment to a com- Shevchenko has claimed: mon homeland make people equal partic- The idiosyncrasy of the Russian Revolution ipants of the past glories of the nation and lies in the fact that it socially elevated masses members of the same territorial communi- of Russian people who were previously con- ty. There is always an appeal to civic loyalty sidered mere building material for the good and national unity in lieu of more divisive life of the few. This process encompassed al- ideas such as language, ethnicity, religion, most everything: purges of innocent victims or the ideological treatment of particular 17 as well as great victories and genuine sacrific- elements of political structures. es of the Soviet people. One historical peri-

146 (2) Spring 2017 7 Ideas, od contained polar phenomena: monstrous purges in almost every political analysis Ideology & bureaucracy resting on the dominance of program. On the other hand, it recognizes Intellectuals in Search the Communist party and the possibility Soviet achievements in the spheres of sci- of Russia’s of creating a truly socialist people’s gover- ence, medicine, education, and ideological Political Future nance. The Russian revolution gave people influence on the outside world. More im- the chance to construct a qualitatively dif- portant, the increase in the Soviet compo- ferent idea of equality, and our contempo- nent of the discourse does not undermine rary principles and ethics are direct inheri- its westernization. Alexander Zinovyev, the tors of those ideals.19 late Russian philosopher and émigré of the Soviet era, observed this phenomenon as Third, the Russian experience of revo- early as 2000. He argued that a country like lution and industrialization must be com- Russia would require a strong state with an pared with similar experiences of revolu- almost Soviet-like bureaucracy to deal suc- tion, civil war, and industrialization in oth- cessfully with its challenges. At the same er states. The French Revolution and Reign time, the construction of this new state bu- of Terror usually figure as benchmarks. Rus- reaucracy would go hand in hand with in- sian scholars and commentators, including creased westernization.20 Sergey Kurginyan, Vitaly Tretyakov, Nata- Yet this westernization is of a particular lya Narochnitskaya, and Peter Tolstoy, have kind. The postmodern ideological pack- argued that, despite tragic episodes, French age promoted by Western powers most- people reconciled with the history of their ly generates skepticism among ordinary revolution, ensuing terror, and the Napo- Russians. Looking at the West, Russians leonic wars. These intellectuals also call lament the growing domination of global for an examination of the history of rev- oligarchy, “humanitarian” interventions olution and civil war in China, Spain, and leading to socioeconomic catastrophes, the United States. They conclude that civil the growing lack of tolerance toward al- wars, conservative reactions, and even ter- ternative opinions dressed in political cor- rors follow most revolutions and radical rectness, and the substitution of real de- transformations worldwide. bate with media simulacra. In this light, This three-point reconciliation strategy Maria Zakharova, the spokeswoman for reflects a deeply held suspicion that inval- the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, idating the Soviet experience could inval- claims that Russia does not reject but up- idate Russia’s contemporary order and holds Western values. Thus, in a contem- lead to the new redistribution of pow- porary world, Russians perceive that their er and property or the territorial disinte- nation has become the true defender of the gration of the state. Many dominant-dis- ideals that erstwhile defined the period of course thinkers argue that de-Sovietization Western liberal modernity.21 would undo nearly a hundred years of the country’s history and lead to the assump- The final question concerns the stability tion that Russians are not capable of draft- of the extant balance between the moderate ing the main structural, cultural, and ideo- statist and liberal paradigms. How durable is logical dimensions of their future. Hence, their symbiotic coexistence and what could finding the right balance between admit- a legitimacy crisis, induced by either seri- ting to the wrongs of the Soviet period and ous economic decline or a political succes- acknowledging its rights becomes para- sion, lead to? Here we should consider an mount. Russian media carefully treads that outcome in which a revanchist and radical- line. On the one hand, it denounces Soviet chauvinist force dominates the scene.

8 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences Though unlikely now, such a scenario and Donbas events.25 In the aftermath of Elena was not a distant possibility throughout the 2005 Ukrainian Orange Revolution, it Chebankova the past decade. Indeed, a more nuanced does not come as a surprise that the Krem- approach to Russia’s ideological landscape lin viewed the nationalists as a tactical ally would allow the exploration of a third, al- that could stabilize the extant political sys- beit minor, option. This discursive para- tem and defend it from external interfer- digm is often referred to as “political na- ence. Therefore, this third cohort is sub- tionalism” or the “third force.”22 It is fo- stantial, uniting members of patriotic, cused on a radical agenda of repudiating liberal, monarchical, and even fascist op- external and internal enemies and ad- position. As a political force, nationalists vancing a project of “greater Russia.” This divided into two separate categories. The force comprises diverging trends with first group expected the restoration of the wide-ranging ideological positions. Yet its Russian Empire and advocated territori- representatives usually acknowledge Rus- al expansion. The second wished for the sia’s discursive division of liberals and stat- creation of an ethnic Russian state and en- ist patriots and blame the Kremlin for be- visaged sacrificing some of Russia’s ethnic ing indecisive in repudiating the liberals. territories in order to see this goal through. They invoke the fate of Viktor Yanu- However, this once-promising third kovich, ex-president of Ukraine, who si- force, buttressed by the silent support of multaneously pursued European-integra- financial elites and special services, grad- tion and politicoeconomic ties with Rus- ually began losing its discursive niche. sia. This inconsistency, advocates of the Some analysts claim that by 2016, nation- third paradigm argue, ultimately led to alists had become so marginalized and Yanukovich’s demise, and the Kremlin’s fragmented that they could not meaning- inconsistency toward domestic liberals fully discuss participation in the forth- and the West could result in Russia’s own coming parliamentary or regional elec- liberal maidan revolution.23 These ideol- tions.26 The emerging rift with the Krem- ogists claim that the Kremlin must steer lin, disagreements with the liberals, and toward a “patriotic” trajectory and aban- the Crimean crisis all helped alter the dis- don futile attempts to reach a dialogic bal- cursive scene in Russia. As for the Krem- ance with the liberals.24 It is unacceptable, lin, it subsequently sensed the danger asso- they claim, both that the statists’ discourse ciated with flirting with nationalists. The contains substantial chunks of liberalism apparent failure of nationalists to protest and that Russia’s main media channels against the West and their preoccupation and state socioeconomic policies advance with internal immigration indicated that, these positions. Russia, in their view, must instead of protecting Russia’s political re- adopt a steady line toward the national re- gime from Western interference, this rad- vival and cease “appeasing” the West by ical force had the potential to turn its guns openly declaring it as an existential enemy against the Kremlin itself. The first signs of rather than a dialogical partner. rupture between the Kremlin and nation- Initially, such a radical approach may alists took place in 2007–2008, when the seem marginal. However, many observ- state adopted a range of punitive measures ers claim that large segments of Russia’s against ethnic hatred and extremism. The financial, political, and special services immigration process was systematized, elite–who come across as liberal or con- the judicial review for racial crimes was servative in public–had shared in this ide- revised, and the dissemination of xeno- ology in private, at least until the Crimean phobic literature was restricted. Political

146 (2) Spring 2017 9 Ideas, nationalists then fully emerged as a radi- number of volunteers who would agree Ideology & cal stronghold of the nonsystemic oppo- to take up arms for this cause.28 This was Intellectuals in Search sition to the Kremlin. mainly linked to the fact that Russia’s gen- of Russia’s Nationalists still had a chance to unite eral public was not in favor of the country’s Political Future with radical liberals and form a single direct military involvement in the con- front against the statists. This would have flict and wished only to support the Rus- granted them an opportunity to survive as sian population in Eastern Ukraine rhetor- a meaningful discursive paradigm. It does ically. This led to a significant narrowing of not come as a surprise that during the De- the discursive niche in which nationalists cember 2011 protests, liberals worked with could engage. nationalists and formed a single anti-Krem- Further, the political field previously oc- lin front. The nationalist cohort hoped to cupied by the revanchist ideologists has capitalize on the shortcomings of the Krem- been gradually taken over by moderate lib- lin’s policies in the international arena as erals and statists. Following the failure of well as on the state’s inability to tackle cor- the December 2011 protests, moderate lib- ruption and the economic crisis. National- erals began appealing to values with social ists promoted two broad agendas that the currency, praising patriotism, proclaiming liberal cohort has generally approved. The their “love of the motherland,” and sup- first agenda focused on the relationship be- porting development of the welfare state. tween Central Russia and the North Cau- This trend deepened in the wake of events casus and advanced the Stop Feeding the in Crimea. The overwhelming majority of Caucasus campaign, which sought to end Russians backed the Kremlin and by doing Russian federal government spending on so squeezed the liberal support base. This the region. The second agenda item was the partly made the liberals accept the advice of general anti-immigration campaign geared their statist opponents to soften their stance toward the introduction of the visa regime toward the “people.” The statists also in- with the Central Asian republics. tensified their patriotic rhetoric, seeing it as However, the events in Crimea and Don- a useful tactical instrument in the struggle bas turned the tables radically, virtual- for the dominant discourse. Russian polit- ly obliterating this third discourse. Many ical scientist Sergey Karaganov has argued nationalists initially supported the 2014 that contemporary Russia remained a non- Maidan Revolution, attracted by the fact ideological state, thus adhering to our ini- that their Ukrainian equals played a deci- tial proposition of paradigmatic pluralism. sive role in the change of the Ukrainian po- Yet Russia obtained, Karaganov continued, litical regime. Yet they quickly faced disap- the two consolidating ideas of sovereignty pointment, given that the Ukrainian Revo- and defense, which united under the over- lution took on an anti-Russian ideological arching notion of “patriotism.”29 This de- coloring.27 The subsequent outbreak of prived nationalists of their habitual play- the bloody conflict in Donbas led these ground. nationalists to adopt a radically pro-Rus- The fragmentation and weakness of the sian agenda, arguing in favor of Russia’s di- potential third force was demonstrated rect military involvement in rescuing the by its proponents’ most recent attempt to “Russian world” in Eastern Ukraine. This set aside internal ideological differences policy, however, resulted in further disap- and unite into a single group. The 25 Jan- pointment, for the mobilization potential uary Committee, established in 2016, rep- of Russian nationalists was minimal and resents a union of extremely diverse and they were not able to attract a substantial largely incompatible forces. It includes

10 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences monarchists led by Igor Strelkov, radical intellectuals support it. The main stabiliz- Elena national democrats represented by Kon- ing feature of this discourse is that it does Chebankova stantin Krylov, National Bolsheviks led by not seek ideological uniformity and wel- Eduard Limonov, ultra-nationalist fascists comes various alternatives within the de- such as Egor Prosvirnin, and opposition- bate on domestic politics. It has little ap- ist former security service officers such as peal to values and seeks national reconcili- Anatoly Nesmiyan. This ideologically di- ation. This discourse is also foreign-policy verse group supports irredentist claims of centered and, for that reason, has an overall ethnic Russians in the post-Soviet space consolidating effect. In addition, it is more and the idea of establishing an ethnic Rus- open to debate than its liberal counterpart, sian state based on the principles of justice, which is often intolerant of nonliberal (but legality, and equality. not illiberal) alternatives. Indeed, pro-West- Members of the Committee are driven ern liberals subconsciously feel that their by their mutual detest of liberalism and paradigm may prevail only through the full the West and the search for internal ene- and radical recasting of public conscious- mies within the Russian state apparatus. ness that cannot take place overnight or The slide of Russia’s third discourse, from a even within a short period. formerly promising political force to a mar- To realign the system fundamentally, ginalized group of intellectuals with dubi- one would need to dispense with the pol- ous goals, is perhaps unfortunate for those itics of paradigmatic pluralism and in- who wished to create a sustainable politi- still a new consensus, which could only cal paradigm within this field and move it be achieved via authoritarian means and in a moderate direction. Yet their current would go against the grain of popular political weakness suggests that the arrival wishes. Considering the decisive liberal of representatives of this paradigm in the turn, those who anticipate that a chang- highest echelons of Russia’s power is un- ing regime in Russia would bear fruit and likely, even within the conditions of eco- move the country in the direction of full nomic and political crisis. integration into the Euro-Atlantic commu- nity overlook the fact that such a change A radical change that could fundamen- could only be temporary. For this develop- tally alter the political situation in Russia ment to take full effect and result in a fun- seems an unlikely prospect. Extraordinary damental change, Russia would need the as it may seem, at this point, Russia has necessary conditions to form the liberal run out of revolutionaries. First, contem- base consensus and move away from the porary Russia functions within the con- politics of paradigmatic pluralism. This ditions of a paradigmatic pluralism that can only take place gradually through pro- makes a vast number of options readily gressive accumulation of liberal capital- available. The presence of different par- ist behavioral patterns, a few generations adigms in the mass media and public de- of steady development in the modernist bate precludes the situation, in which a sys- fashion, and the construction of the main tem-deposing paradigm could arrive unex- dimensions of Russia’s civic nation. The pectedly, appearing more just and novel, fifteen years phase pondered in this vol- and radically changing the hegemonic dis- ume thus does not allow sufficient time for course. Despite the wealth of different para- a fundamental change of this magnitude. digms, the state-centered conservative epis- teme won the hegemonic discourse; the majority of Russia’s population and her

146 (2) Spring 2017 11 Ideas, endnotes Ideology & 1 Intellectuals In philosophical terms, such paradigms of the “good life” can be seen through the Aristote- in Search lian lenses of spiritual, virtuous, and prudent politics that can ensure welfare and flourishing of Russia’s for humans. Political 2 Future Stuart Hampshire, “Justice is Strife,” Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Asso- ciation 65 (3) (1991): 24–25. 3 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). 4 John Gray, Berlin (London: Fontana Press, 1995); and Bernard Williams, In the Beginning was the Deed: Realism and Moralism in the Political Argument (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2005). 5 Reinhard Bendix, Embattled Reason: Essays on Social Knowledge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 352. 6 Alexander Dugin, “Rossiiskaia Identichnist v Sovremennom Mire,” lecture at the Ural Poly- technic University, 2012. 7 Ibid. 8 Otkrytaya Studia with Nika Strizhak, “Kto my: Russkie ili Rossiyane?” March 21, 2012, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CmlspuJ5AU8 (accessed January 17, 2017). 9 Vadim Slutsky, “Proryv Gnoinika,” Ekho Moskvy, March 6, 2014, http://echo.msk.ru/blog/ vadimslutsky/1273246-echo/. 10 Paul Rodkin, “Pochemu Desovetizatsiya Dala Obratnyi Effekt,” RIA Novosti, May 21, 2015, http://ria.ru/zinoviev_club/20150521/1065729530.html. 11 Bendix, Embattled Reason, 352. 12 Duel with Vladimir Solovyev, “Kurginyan vs Nadezhdin,” available at https://www.youtube .com/watch?v=QE1Na64gQ8U (accessed November 17, 2015). 13 Pravo Znat! “Vyacheslav Nikonov,” November 7, 2015, available at https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=4j64b91T4ss (accessed November 12, 2015). 14 Duel with Vladimir Solovyev, “Kurginyan vs Nadezhdin.” 15 “Vystuplenie Lavrova v Gosdume,” https://russian.rt.com/article/123511, October 14, 2015. 16 Spetsialnyi Korrespondent, September 29, 2015, available at https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=l6I5cZD4Eyw (accessed January 3, 2017); and “Kurginyan: ssha–Novyi Karfagen, Ustraivayushchii Khaos po Vsemu Miru,” Regnum, September 30, 2015, http://regnum.ru/ news/polit/1982223.html. 17 Bendix, Embattled Reason, 353. 18 Tochka Zrenia, “Velikiy Oktyabr i Sovremennost,” November 7, 2015, available at https://www .youtube.com/watch?v=lXLLBYqMvRM (accessed January 3, 2017). 19 Ibid. 20 Rodkin, “Pochemu Desovetizatsiya Dala Obratnyi Effekt.” A number of Russian intellectu- als note that Vladimir Putin and his elite are pro-Western, with Sergey Kurginyan branding Putin as a liberal statesman. 21 Spetsialnyi Korrespondent, September 29, 2015. 22 Valery Solovey, “Bol’, Gnev i Nenavist. Tri Uroka Russikim Natsionalistam iz Ukrainskogo Krizisa,” Slon, March 21, 2016, https://slon.ru/posts/65611. 23 Igor Strelkov, “Dlia Spaseniya Rossii My Sozdaem Tretyu Silu,” Dvizhenie Novorossiya, January 31, 2016, http://novorossia.pro/strelkov/1552-igor-strelkov-dlya-spaseniya-rossii-my-sozdaem -tretyu-silu.html; and Igor Strelkov, “My Protivostoim Liberalnomu Revanshu,” Kolokol Rossii,

12 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences January 29, 2016, http://kolokolrussia.ru/russkiy-mir/igor-strelkov-m-protivostoim-liberalnomu Elena -revanshu?_utl_t=fb#. Chebankova 24 Eduard Limonov, “Prizrak, Brodivshii po Rossii Materializovalsia,” Svobodnaya Pressa, February 4, 2016, available at http://svpressa.ru/politic/article/141645/ (accessed January 16, 2017). 25 Solovey, “Bol’, Gnev i Nenavist”; and Sut Igry, “Khvatit Kormit Kavkaz: Sergey Kurginyan ob Etoi Idee,” 2011, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tUfBSi86Xa4 (accessed April 1, 2016). 26 Solovey, “Bol’, Gnev i Nenavist.” 27 Limonov, “Prizrak, Brodivshii po Rossii Materializovalsia.” 28 Solovey, “Bol’, Gnev i Nenavist.” 29 Sergei Karaganov, “Mir Nakhoditisya v Predvoennom Sostoyanii,” Rossiya v Globalnoi Politike, February 17, 2016, http://www.globalaffairs.ru/pubcol/Mir-nakhoditsya-v-predvoennom -sostoyanii-17999.

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