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RUSSIA and the POWER of the MEDIA Mokhmad Akhiyadov

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RUSSIA and the POWER of the MEDIA Mokhmad Akhiyadov THE ARMENIAN LOBBY IN RUSSIA AND THE POWER OF THE MEDIA Mokhmad Akhiyadov To cite this article: Akhiyadov, M. (2020). “The Armenian Lobby in Russia and the Power of the Media”, Analysis INSAMER, 19.02.2020. Swift adaptation to new circumstances or the country (Krasnodar, Stavropol and Rostov). environments has long been one of the mainstays In Moscow alone, there are more than 100,000 of the Armenian national character. Perhaps it is Armenians. Moreover, agencies and cultural precisely this peculiarity that accounts for the centers of the Union of Russian Armenians are strength of the Armenian diaspora extending active in 65 of the 85 federal subjects of Russia its global reach with an increasing number of and 642 cities. The Armenian community in supporters. There are about 10 million Armenians Russia is almost seamlessly integrated into in the world and only one third of them live in the Russian society. Indeed, Armenians, who the Republic of Armenia. USA, France, Georgia, today hold important positions in the Russian Syria and Lebanon are the leading countries public domain, enjoy a very privileged position. with the largest concentrations of Armenian Therefore, the Armenians undoubtedly have a population, but Russia is the country that has palpable impact on the Russian policy-making the largest number of Armenian population, though it often goes unnoticed. Today, around machinery. 2.5 million Armenians live in Russia. Armenians in Russia, who identify themselves Historically, one of the largest Armenian as Russian patriots at every opportunity, also diaspora was based in Russia. As a consequence, make a point of maintaining their ties with their Armenians today find ample representation in homeland. Therefore, the permanent positioning almost all aspects of the Russian society. With a of Armenia as an ally of Russia and the influence presence in almost every Russian city, about half of the Armenian lobby on Russian politics are of the Armenians live in the southern regions of inseparable. 1 For example, Sergey Lavrov, who has been seen very clearly in November 2015 during the Russia’s foreign minister since 2004, is of fighter jet crisis between Russia and Turkey. Armenian stock. However, Lavrov has so While there were serious discussions on certain far only made one statement about his ethnic Russian TV programs after the crisis, there were origin. Lavrov, who met with the students of the also “hysterical cries” calling out for a full- Russian-Armenian University on February 17, scale war against Turkey. It is no secret that the 2005, said “Clean Armenian blood flows in my propaganda machine of the Armenian lobby veins” in response to a question on his ethnic played a part, either secretly or overtly, in the origin. creation of this hostile climate portraying Turkey as Russia’s historical enemy where it makes sure Armenians also have an important place in that it never misses an opportunity to remind the Russian economy. Eight businessmen of public of past Turkish-Russian wars. Armenian origin have been included in the list of the 200 richest people in Russia, published While there were voices in the Russian media by Forbes magazine in April 2019. These advocating a more astute and prudent attitude businessmen also maintain close ties with towards the crisis between the two countries, their homeland Armenia. For example, Samvel the Armenian lobby feeding off anti-Turkish Karapetyan, the 29th richest person in Russia, sentiment was bending backwards to “remind” became a member of the Investors Club of the Russian public that Turkey is a “historical Armenia, which made headlines in 2017 with enemy”. The seething anti-Turkish sentiment its intention to invest more than $3.2 billion was not just limited to TV screens; it also in Armenia. Likewise, Ruben Vardanyan, who spread to print and digital media platforms. It is has a personal fortune worth $950 million and also no coincidence that “experts” like Sergey makes important donations in education, has Kurginyan, Gevorg Mirzayan and Armen major investments in Armenia. Gasparyan of Armenian origin or pro-Armenian figures like Semen Bagdarasov and Yevgeniy In 2015, on the 100th anniversary of the Satanovskiy were invited to prime time talk deportation of Armenians, Vardanyan led a large- shows. It is understandable that these names budget project called 100 Lives in collaboration have in one way or another connections with the with famous Hollywood stars and human rights Armenian lobby. activists. The project was held to explain to the world about the deportation of Armenians, Some important media channels in Russia have with the aim to portray it as “genocide”. The turned into a kind of Russian propaganda network, project also included the awarding of an annual due to their domination by the Armenians. The international humanitarian aid prize called best examples are undoubtedly the Russia Today Aurora. The winner was selected from persons TV channel, whose executive editor is Margarita who risk their lives to save others. The prize was Simonyan of Armenian origin, and the Rossiya awarded in memory of Arshaluys Mardiganian, Segodnya International News Agency (MIA who moved first to Russia and then to the Rossiya Segodnya). The largest Russian media US during the Armenian deportation in 1915 group, MIA Rossiya Segodnya, broadcasts in where she took the name Aurora Mardiganian. more than 30 languages, including English, Ruben Vardanyan put Svetlana Mironyuk, a Spanish, French, German, Arabic, Chinese and prominent figure in the media industry and also Turkish. There are various news agencies like former executive editor of the news agency RIA Sputnik, RIA Novosti, InoSMI, and Prime under Novosti, in charge of the 100 Lives project to the umbrella of the most cited Russian news manage and supervise all the work done under agency, MIA Rossiya Segodnya. the project. The influence of the Armenian lobby is clearly Russian media is the sector where the Armenian visible in the news that appears on RIA Novosti. diaspora is at its strongest. Its effects were For example, Azerbaijan’s occupied territory 2 is defined as disputed territory in news reports Armenian lobby and the current government in about a topic as sensitive as Nagorno-Karabakh is Russia. Yuliya Krijanskaya, who was appointed made with reference to comments and arguments director general of the agency, was the former borrowed directly from the Armenian media. deputy chairwoman of the executive council And the region is referred to as the “Republic of the United Russia Party, which rules Russia. of Astrakhan” instead of Nagorno-Karabakh. More importantly, she is currently involved in News sources of RIA Rossiya Segodnya cover a social movement called the Essence of Time, the Karabakh issue from a completely pro- led by Sergey Kurginyan, at a management Armenian perspective by distorting the facts level. Sergey Kurginyan, whose nickname is instead of breaking down prejudices in a manner “aggressive patriot”, is the greatest Armenian that goes against professional journalism. propagandist, constantly spewing bile and Turkophobia on Russian television. Another example is Aram Gabrelyanov, head of the LifeNews TV channel, which is part of Similarly, it is known that REGNUM is part of the News Media group. In a written statement in Gazprom-Media Holding, although this has not January 2016, the Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry been officially announced. This is so because criticized the channel saying that LifeNews in 2014 almost all shares of the agency were journalists were broadcasting provocative bought by Gazprom. In addition, Alexander programs based on lies and slander against Bespalov, the new chairman of the news agency, Azerbaijan. However, as the station continued sat on the management board of Gazprom until with its unchanged broadcasting policy, the July 2019. All these data suggest that Gazprom- concerned journalists were deported from Media is led by the Armenian lobby. The most Azerbaijan in April of the same year. By hacking concrete proof of this situation is the meeting into the email account of Aram Gabrelyanov in that took place in December 2017 between 2017, the Russian hacker group known as Shaltai then-Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan and Boltai made public a series of correspondences Rafael Minasbekyan, who was general director revealing the activities of some Armenian of Gazprom-Media back then. The meeting was journalists in Russia against Azerbaijan. In these held following reports by NTV, the primary correspondences, the executive editor of MIA media instrument of the holding and one of the Rossiya Segodnya, Margarita Simonyan was three most watched television channels in Russia, also mentioned. In one of the correspondences in criticizing the relations between Armenia and the question, Simonyan apologized to Gabrelyanov Western world that had been gaining momentum on behalf of her news agency for its report about over recent years. Sargsyan wanted to meet with Azerbaijan’s criticism of the broadcasting policy the Armenian manager at the helm of Gazprom- of LifeNews. Media regarding these news reports. In the wake of the meeting, a cooperation agreement REGNUM is another news agency that seems to was signed between Gazprom-Media and the be in the grip of the Armenian lobby; it produces Armenian State Corporation of Radio and a constant stream of defamatory news that target Television. This makes it clear that Gazprom- Turkey. Established in 2002, the agency is Media and REGNUM news agency (controlled manipulated by the Armenian lobby, sometimes by Gazprom-Media) are manipulated by the directly and sometimes indirectly. In June 2014 Armenian lobby. most of the agency shares were sold, and so the management changed hands. Although Vigen Another remarkable fact in this context is the Akopyan, who was appointed executive editor interview of Modest Kolerov, who became in 2009, resigned in October 2014, nothing has executive editor of REGNUM as the successor changed about the Turcophobic broadcasting of Vigen Akopyan, with the leader of the Gulen policy of the agency, as the new management movement Fethullah Gülen in February 2019.
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