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Russian Relations: More Than Meets the Eye

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MIDDLE EAST 3 Where Goes the IRGC’s Economic Wing under Rouhani? 4 Updating Iran’s Naval Doctrine Foreign Military Studies Office 5 The Huthis Prepare for Post-Transition Yemen 7 Syria: Who Frames Whom? 9 Egyptian Russian Relations: More Than Meets the Eye RUSSIA 10 Russian Air Force Academy Welcomes First OE WATCH UAV Class FOREIGN NEWS & PERSPECTIVES OF THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 12 Armenia’s Surprising Decision to Join Russian-led Customs Union 14 Ukraine Moves Closer to Europe—for Now 16 Russia’s Sovereign Foreign Policy Vol. 3 Issue #10 October 2013 18 Bio-Weapon Accusations 20 Popularity of Military Cadet Education IN THIS ISSUE 22 Russia “Restoring” Military Presence in Arctic Click on the Table of Contents to the Left. 24 Recent Developments in Russia’s Foreign Agent Law 26 3D Will Help Troops to Conduct Warfare Special Essay: TURKEY 27 Turkey’s Position on Syria Leaves it Isolated 29 Why Did Turkey Down the Syrian Helicopter? Anti-Americanism in the 31 Is the PKK Peace Process Stalling? AFRICA Kremlin 33 Somalisation of the Central African Republic Narrative 35 Tall Problems for a Short People: Conflict in the DRC Displaces the Bambuti 37 Kenya’s Turkana County Oil Rush: Niger Delta Déjà Vu? 39 Post Independence, Blood Continues to Be Shed: Human Rights Abuses by South Sudan’s Army LATIN AMERICA 41 Something that Doesn’t Smell Right in the Caribbean MEXICO 43 El Chapo: Eventual Ally of the Peña Nieto Administration? INDO-PACIFIC ASIA 45 India’s First Dedicated Military Satellite Launched 46 Taiwan Donates Maritime Patrol Boats to The Gambia 48 Asian Carrier Programs Suggest Naval Rivalries but Reflect National Priorities 50 Thailand as Foil to China CHINA 53 China’s Dilemma: Paranoia Hampers Technological Progress 55 Retired Indian Flag Officer Voices Concern Over Possible Joint China-Pakistan Attack 56 Economic Growth and Energy Demand Go Hand-in-Hand KOREA 58 Syrian Fallout in North Korea? CENTRAL ASIA 59 The Perception of Threats from Radical and Extremist Groups 61 The Continuing Development of Kazakhstan’s Defense Industry 63 Uzbekistan’s Bilateral Security Relationships SPECIAL ESSAY 64 ANTI-AMERICANISM IN THE KREMLIN NARRATIVE WL KNO EDGE NCE ISM SA ER IS E A TE N K N O K C E N N T N I S E S J E N A 3 V H A A N H Z И O E P W O I T E D N E Z I OE Watch A M I C O N O C C I O T Foreign News & Perspectives N S H O E L C A I N M Z E N O T of the Operational Environment Volume 3 | Issue 10 October | 2013 For over 25 years, the Foreign Regional Analysts and Military Studies Office (FMSO) at Fort Expert Contributors Leavenworth, Kansas, has conducted Africa Robert Feldman open source research on foreign Middle East Michael Rubin perspectives of defense and security William Tombaugh issues, emphasizing those topics that Lucas Winter are understudied or unconsidered. FMSO’s Operational Environment Turkey Karen Kaya Watch provides translated selections China, Korea Cindy Hurst Youngjun Kim and analysis from a diverse range of Lianna Faruolo Tim Thomas foreign articles and other media that Blaise Zandoli our analysts and expert contributors India, Southeast Asia Kevin Freese believe will give military and security Ivan Welch professionals an added dimension Mexico, South America Geoff Demarest to their critical thinking about the Brenda Fiegel Cynthia Gonzalez Operational Environment. Materials, outside of the original foreign press article, Central Asia Matthew Stein under copyright have not been used. All articles published in the Operational Environment Watch are not provided Russia, Eastern Europe Chuck Bartles in full, and were originally published in foreign (non-US) Anna Borshchevskaya media. For questions or original articles, contact FMSO at Ray Finch Les Grau [email protected]. The Dezeree Hodish Operational Environment Watch is archived, and available Emily Kangas at http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil. Scott McIntosh Alisa Moldavanova FMSO has provided some editing, format, and graphics to these articles to conform to organizational standards. Editor-in-Chief Tom Wilhelm Academic conventions, source referencing, and citation Editors Ray Finch style are those of the author. Harry Orenstein The views expressed are those of the author and Design Editor Hommy Rosado do not represent the official policy or position of the FMSO Contact Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the [email protected] U.S. Government. MIDDLE EAST Where Goes the IRGC’s Economic Wing under Rouhani? 18 September 2013 “We do not know to what [future] projects President Rouhani was referring.” OE Watch Commentary: While Western policymakers focus on the potential for renewed diplomacy with the Islamic Republic of Iran now that President Hassan Rouhani has changed the tone of Tehran’s rhetoric, the new administration is focused on a different agenda inside Iran. Under both President Mohammad Khatami’s second term (2001- 2005) and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s presidency (2005-2013), the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) gained significant power, as the Supreme Leader blessed their entry into the political sphere in order to contain reformist sentiment. Ahmadinejad himself personified this trend, as he was the first post-revolutionary Iranian president to base his legitimacy on his service to the IRGC during the Iran-Iraq War rather than as a cleric. The power of the IRGC reached its peak during Ahmadinejad’s second term: more than half of Ahmadinejad’s cabinet (From left to right) Current Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, former Iranian Presidents Mahmoud were IRGC veterans, but his cabinet included Ahmadinejad, and Mohammad Khatami. only one cleric. Source: “Amadeh Komak be Dawlat Hastim” (“We Are Ready to Help the Rouhani’s cabinet is far different: he has State”) Fars News Agency, 18 September 2013. http://farsnews.com/newstext. reduced dramatically the number of IRGC php?nn=13920626000175 veterans, balancing them instead with former employees of the Ministry of Intelligence. It is against this backdrop that Rouhani’s speech We Are Ready to Help the State to the IRGC is interesting. The true base of According to a dispatch from the Fars News Agency, Hassan Rouhani, president of the republic, on Monday [September 16], at the 20th annual meeting of Corps commanders, the IRGC’s power and political influence rests emphasized the ability of this revolutionary institution in the great reconstruction and in Khatam al-Anbia, the IRGC’s economic development activities in the country, and asked the IRGC to accept many large projects wing. As president, Ahmadinejad awarded in the economic sphere. upwards of $40 billion in no-bid contracts IRGC Commander Mohammad Ali Jaafari said in response to the request of the to Khatam al-Anbia-affiliated companies, a president, that the IRGC is ready to assist the state in economic affairs and especially in figure that represents a several-fold increase the manufacturing sector. over the official IRGC budget. While Rouhani In the same token, Ebadollah Abdullahi, the commander of Khatam al-Anbia, which was willing to pay lip service to the IRGC’s plays a major role in this issue, in a conversation with the defense correspondent of economic role, Khatam al-Anbia chief the Fars News Agency, referring to the history of Khatam al-Anbia’s activities in the construction sector, stated for two decades the Khatam al-Anbia base has been trusted Ebadollah Abdullahi appears frustrated at the with the responsibility to implement many of the country’s large projects. In discussions lack of firm commitment Rouhani has made with on construction and the execution of large projects in the country, for example one can regard to new projects which his government see the projects of Asaluyeh, railroad and road infrastructure like the highway from the might award Khatam al-Anbia. shrine in Qom to the shrine in Mashhad, and other projects in a factories and mines… Abdullahi continued, “For example, the shrine to shrine project is a highway whose Should Rouhani try to starve Khatam al- construction will have many effects in the areas of road safety and security, and will Anbia of new projects, it will signal a renewed also shorten the path. Likewise, the shortening of the road will lead to a decrease in fuel effort by Iranian political leaders to bring the consumption… Completion of the first phase of this highway will be executed quickly, IRGC under control. Whether the IRGC—with and the road between Qom and Semnan and Garmsar will be operational in the coming tens of billions of dollars in reserve—will two to three months… Today, the Khatam al-Anbia is also present in large national subordinate itself without a fight is another projects, but we do not know to what [future] projects Mr. President was referring… question entirely. End OE Watch Commentary These meetings have taken place in the past as well. For example we have gotten good (Rubin) results from negotiations with the Oil, Road and other ministries.” OE Watch October 2013 3 MIDDLE EAST Updating Iran’s Naval Doctrine 17 September 2013 “The ability of the IRGC Navy is defined on five grounds: swift boats, missiles, naval air force, UAVs, and jihadi commandos.” OE Watch Commentary: If Iranian Source: “Gosht-e Zani Shanavar-e Sepah dar Khalij-e Fars / Amrikaye-ha Hameh-e Ja Ma President Hassan Rouhani has sought ra Mibinand” (“100 Guard Vessels in the Persian Gulf; Wherever the Americans Look, to change the tone of Iranian rhetoric, They See Us”) Fars News Agency, 17 September 2013. http://farsnews.com/newstext. his memo has not reached the Islamic php?nn=13920625001479 Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
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